The Ottoman Turks in Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy Author(s): De Lamar Jensen Reviewed work(s): Source: The Sixteenth

Century Journal, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Winter, 1985), pp. 451-470 Published by: The Sixteenth Century Journal Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2541220 . Accessed: 19/12/2011 07:57
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The SixteenthCenturyJournal VolumeXVI, No. 4, 1985

The Ottoman Turks In Sixteenth Century French Diplomacy

De LamarJensen Brigham Young University I The formative period in the development of close diplomatic relations between Europe and the Ottoman empire was the first half of the sixteenth century. The leading role in that complex drama was taken by the French king, who was the first to abandonthe traditionalattitude of Christendom toward the Turks and make them an active partner in his foreign policy. For several centuries Islam had been the principal rival and threat to Latin Christendom, a peril that was military as well as religious. When Mehmet II, "The Conqueror," broke through the Western defenses in 1453 and overranConstantinople, making it the new Ottoman capital, Istanbul,the imminence of that threat was obvious. Pope Pius II, the colorful humanistdiplomat turned defender of the church, tried desperatelyto arouse the squabbling princes of Renaissance Europe to the danger and lead them in a new crusade.But despite the chorus of cries for a crusade,few of the princes could be moved into action, even when the Turks raidedthe coasts of Italy itself. In 1517, the year Sultan Selim I completed his conquest of Egypt, Pope Leo X turned hopefuly to the dashing young French king, Francis I, for the leadershipof an anti-Turkish league among the Europeanpowers. Francisresponded with a great show of enthusiasm for the enterprise;after all, had he not recently demonstrated his military prowess at Marignano and cleared the way for a campaign against the infidel? A short time later, when the ambitious young king himself became a candidatefor Holy Roman Emperor,he declared his determination to defend Christendom against the Turks if he were elected' In light of this background, the question of the nature, extent, and motives of Francis I's "scandalous"alliance with the Ottoman sultan, Suleiman "The Magnificent," deserves some attention. What was the purpose of the agreement between them? Why would Francis initiate a policy that was so much at variancewith Christian tradition and with his own previous attitude? When we have answered these questions, we must inquire as to whether or not the purpose was accomplished, and why the alliance was maintained for so long.
lErnest Charriere, ed., Nigociations de la Francedans le Levantet correspondences, mimoires et actesdiplomatiques ambassadeurs Francea Constantinople,etc. (Paris: Imprimerie Imperides de ale, 1848), I: 16-18, 78-82; and Pierre de Vaissiere, ed.,Journal dejean Barrillon, secritairedu ChancelliereDuprat, 1515-1521, (Paris: Renouard, 1897), I:250 et passim. Also see J. Ursu's perceptive and detailed La politiqueorientate FrancoisIer (Paris: Champion, 1908), 9-10. de

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The usual explanation of the Franco-Turkish alliance is that the king turned to the sultan to solicit military aid following the disastrousbattle of Pavia (1525), when Francis found himself a prisoner of the emperor Charles if V. There is much to be said for this interpretation. A traitede circumstance, that is what it was, would naturallyshock Christian consciences for a moment, but if there were no longer-range inferences in it, the affairwould soon be forgotten, and Franciscould still maintain his integrity as a Christian monarch. The issues might be simplified if we could examine the precise language of the instructions given by the French king to the first envoy sent to the sultan. But that agent was murderedin Bosnia, and all of his paperswere stolen.2 We can only surmisetheir contents, or those of the second envoy, Jean Frangipani, whom the king sent to the sublime Porte in December 1525. His secret dispatch, supposedly begging the sultan to come to the king's rescueby attacking the Habsburgsfrom the rear, was concealed in the sole of his shoe.3 The letter has never turned up, but we do have Suleiman's interesting reply, from which a fairly accuratepicture of the French request can be reconstructed.According to the sultan'sresponse, the king must have askedfor "aidand succor," although the nature of that aid is not specified, and was probablynot stated in Frangipani's letter either. We know that the envoy was authorized to treat verbally with the sultan and that a verbal reply was returned: "For the rest," Suleiman advised, "question your ambassadoron these affairs and items and you will be informed."4 Upon his return to the West in July 1526, Frangipaniwas immediately sent back to the sultan, again with verbal and written instructions, the consequences of which suggest that Francis intended to establish a long-range alliance with the Turks, the only power he considered to be capableof preventing the Habsburgs from dominating Europe. This would of course explain the pseudosecrecy of the missions and the reluctance of both sides to put much into writing. Interpolating from the activities of Antonio Rincon, thleFrench agent in Poland,5and from the letters exchanged by FrancisI with Sigismund of Poland and John Zapolya of Transylvania that culminated in the FrancoHungarian alliance of 1528,6 it appears that Francis hoped to build up a
2Marino Saunto, I Diarii de Marino Saunto (Venice: Visentini, 1879-1903), 39:268. Joseph von Hammer, "Memoire sur les premieres relations diplomatiques entre la France et la Porte," Journal Asiatique 10 (1827): 23-24, and Ursu, La politique orientale, 29. 3Ursu, La politiqueorientale,30. For the report of Ferdinand's ambassadors see "Bericht des Hieronymus von Zara und des Cornelius Duplicus Schepper an Ferdinand I," in Anton von Gevay, ed., Urkunden und Actenstuckezur Geschichteder Verhaltnissezwischen Osterreich, Ungarn und der Pforte im XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderte (Vienna: Schaumburg, 1842), II, 1:1-50. 4Charriere, Negociations/Levant, I:116-18. Sanuto, Diarii, XL:824. 5V.-L. Bourrilly, "Antonio Rincon et la politique orientale de Francois Ier, 15221541," Revue historique 113 (1913):64-83, 268-308. 6Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris [hereafter cited BNP], Collection Dupuy, 468, fol. 191. Charriere, Negociations/Levant, I:162-69.

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broadly based anti-Habsburg eastern front, the southeastern sector of which would be secured by the Ottoman Turks. With such an alliance to keep pressure on the Habsburg empire in the east, Francis might stand a chance of regaining control of Milan and increasing his influence in the Mediterranean, where the Turks had now become a formidable naval power.7 So the groundwork was laid for a long-term cooperation between two countries, one Christian and the other Moslem, that seemed to have nothing in common except their hatred and fear of the Habsburgs. Yet perhaps they had more mutual interests than have usually been seen, interests which were a part of the Franco-Turkish negotiations from the very beginning and came to be an increasingly important feature of Franco-Turkish diplomacy during the course of the sixteenth century. I refer specifically to the commercial advantages of cooperation. The French were certainly aware of the concessions long enjoyed by Venice and Ragusa through their favored nation treaties with the Turks. In fact, France too (along with the Catalans)had acquiredcommercial privileges in partsof the Mediterraneanas a result of its previous agreements with Egypt. These agreements were recognized by Sultan Selim I following his conquest of the Mameluk kingdom and were confirmed by Suleiman in 1528.8 If France could now obtain broader trading privileges-comparable to the Venetiansthat would be a boon to its erraticeconomy, shoring up its maritime weakness after the desertion to Spanish service of Andrea Doria and his great Genoese fleet, and providing additional markets for French wines, textiles, and metalware, thus compensating for the failure to capture a share of the profits from the FarEasternand New World trades.The Turks too might gain from a commercial agreement through its stimulating effect upon the Levant trade, which was suffering now from the establishment of the Portuguese African spice route, and by providing the facility for increasedmerchandising of European wares. Francis proceeded cautiously in his negotiations with Suleiman, unsure of the reliability of an Ottoman alliance and still apprehensiveabout the possible Europeanreaction to it. Secretly he approachedthe sultan on the religious issue, namely, the protection of Christians in the Holy Land and the restitution of a Christian church in Jerusalem that had been converted into a mosque. Suleiman's reply to the latter requestwas negative, but it left the door open for further discussion of French protection of Christian rights in the Levant.9In 1528 or 1529 Francissent his principal EastEuropeanagent, Antonio Rincon,
7Charriere, Negociations/Levant,I: 149-51, 155-60; Ursu, La politique orientate,40-50; also Dorothy Vaughan, Europe and the Turk: A Pattern of Alliances, 1350-1700 (Liverpool: University Press, 1954), 111-12. 8BNP, Fonds franqais, 16141, fol. 1-8; Dupuy, 429, fol. 22-27; Bibliotheque de l'Arsenal, 4767, fol. 1-3; Charrifre, Negociations/Levant, I:121-29; Ignace de Testa, ed., Re(Paris: Amyot, 1864), I:23-28. 6trangeres cueildestraitesde la Porteottomanaveclespuissances 9Chariere, Negociations/Levant, I:129-31.

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to negotiate with Suleiman and his powerful grand vizier, Ibrahim Pasha. Rincon was well received by both and returned to France in 1530 laden with gifts from the Orient.10The general European reaction to Rincon's mission was strong since it was followed almost immediately by the Turkish siege of Vienna. But there is no reason to attributeSuleiman's action to French initiative. In fact, Francishad more to lose than gain from the continued Ottoman expeditions into Hungary and Austria because these actions tended to unite the For German princes-even the Protestants-behind the Habsburgs.11 this reason, Rincon was quickly sent again to the sultan early in 1532 to try to dissuade him from further attacksin easternEurope12 although Rincon arrivedtoo late to prevent the invasion of Hungary that year and the Ottoman capture of Buda. A peace was finally concluded with Ferdinandof Habsburgin 1533, allowing the sultan to turn his attention toward his perennial enemy, Shah Tahmasp of Persia, or to give heed to Francis'srenewed appeal for action in the Mediterranean.13 The shifting focus of Franco-Turkish diplomacy to the Mediterranean areain 1533-1535 suggests Turkish awarenessof the economic opportunities, and a growing emphasis upon maritime matters as their newly enlarged fleet began its devastationsof the Europeancoasts. For Francethe worsening of the religious situation following the Affair of the Placards in 1534, and the mounting strength of the emperor, Charles V, supported now by the new Farnese pope, Paul III, called for the decisive action of French diplomacy. In April 1535, just as Charles V was initiating his audaciousattackon La Goletta and Tunis, the French king rushedJean de La Foret to Constantinople to propose an agreement with the GrandTurk.14La Foret was accompaniedby
'0Bourilly, "Antonio Rincon," 271-72. Cf. British Library, London [hereafter cited BLL], Add. MSS., 28580, fol. 165; Calendarof State Papers, Spanish [hereafter, CSPS], (London, HMSO, 1879), IV, 1:602; Ursu, La politique orientate,58-60; and C. D. Rouillard, The Turk in French History, Thought and Literature, 1520-1660 (Paris: Boivin, 1938), 108. Suleiman responded by sending an envoy to France, Zorzi Gritti, an illegitimate son of the Venetian doge, Andrea Gritti, born in Turkey, Calendarof State Papers, Venetian [hereafter, CSPV], V:619-22. "Stephen A. Fischer-Galati, Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism, 15211555 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 117. 12Charriere, Nigociations/Levant, I:176-82; Ursu, La Politique orientate,68-72; Bourrilly, "Antonio Rincon," 276-78. 13That appeal resulted in early 1534 in a three-year treaty with the Barbary corsair, Barbarossa, see BNP, Dupuy, 44, fol. 30; and CSPS, V:2:327. Meanwhile, Clement VII's famous meeting with Francis I at Marseille in November 1533-resulting in a marriage alliance between the pope's niece, Catherine de' Medici, and the dauphin-was intended to draw France into closer ties with papal policy. See the report of Antonio Soriano in Franco vinetiens (Paris: Klinsksieck, 1969), 51-58. Gaeta, ed., Relations des ambassadeurs 14V.-L. Bourrilly, "L'Ambassade de La Forest et de Marillac a Constantinople, 15351538," Revue historique76 (1901):297-328.

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another noted diplomat, his cousin, Charles de Marillac,who served as his secretary, and by the humanist scholar, Guillaume Postel, author of the influential De la Re'publique Turcs(1560), along with a suite of a dozen or so other des men. La Foret'sjob was to formalize the military alliance with the Turks and at the same time negotiate a peaceful and long-term commercial treaty. La Foret was a good choice for the assignment because not only was he a respected humanist (with a good knowledge of Italian and Greek as well as Latin), a knight of the Order of St. John, secretaryof chancellor Duprat, and then of the king, he was also apostolic protonotary and abbot of Saint-Pierrele-Vif-lis-Sens. He understood equally well the political, military, religious, and economic aspects of his mission. He was instructed first to visit Kheir-eddin Barbarossa,the illustrious governor of Algiers whom Suleiman had recently made Kapudan-pasha,that is, grand admiral of the Turkish fleet, to solicit his aid in the proposed French conquest of Genoa.15Then La Foret was to proceed to the Sublime Porte itself and there arrange a rapprochement with the Turks.16 The ambassadorfulfilled his instructions well, after spending several months following the sultan on his summer and fall campaign against the Persians in Azerbaijan.By February1536 formal understandinghad been reached between La Foret and the sultan.17 The authenticity of the text of that treaty has been challenged by Gaston Zeller, on the grounds that its wording and flavor are anachronistic.18 The preamble does read much like a bilateral Western treaty between two Christian powers. It is unlikely that Suleiman the Magnificent would have agreed to a

15Ursu, La politique orientate,85-91. The emissaries were accompanied on this leg of their journey by the ambassador from Barbarossa, who had been in France since July 1533 negotiating the truce mentioned above (note 13). V.-L. Bourrilly, ed., LaJournal d'un Bourgeois de Paris sous le regnede Franfois Ier, 1515-1536 (Paris: Picard, 1910), 357. 16LaForet's instructions in the Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres in Paris [hereafter AMAE], Correspondence politique, Fonds Turquie, 2, fol. 47-50.

17Altihough the date of the Capitulations given in Charriere, Nigociations/Levant, I:283-84, and Testa, Recueildestraitis, I:15, is February 1535, this means 1536 since in France at that time the new year did not begin until Easter. La Forft did not leave Marseille en route to the East until April 1535. Cf. Journal manuscriptd'Honor6de Valbelle, 397-98, cited in Bourrilly, "Antonio Rincon," 281-82. 18Gaston Zeller, "Une k6gende qui a la vie dure: les Capitulations de 1535," Revue 2 et d'histoiremoderne contemporaine (1955): 127-32. Zeller in turn refers to similar views of the de Romanian historian, Nicolae Iorga, Points de vuesur l'histoiredue commerce l'Orient a l'Npoque (Paris: Gamber, 1925), esp. 41-48. Zeller also uses the absence of a manuscript documoderne ment either in Paris or Istanbul to discredit the authenticity of the treaty. He further argues (incorrectly) that for 250 years no mention was made of the treaty, which was cited for the first time by Count Franqois de Saint-Priest, French ambassador to Turkey, in 1777, and des de published 100 years later in Mimoiressur l'ambassade Franceen Turquie,et sur le commerce franfais dans le Levant (Paris: Leroux, 1877) from documents found by Saint-Priest in the Bibliotheque du Roi.

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treaty that made him appearto deal with Francisas an equal. The sultan'spronouncements issued from him alone and were understood to be acts of grace bestowed by his own sovereign and supremewill. Therefore, any grantof concessions would have been prefacedby a long preamble enumerating the powers and dominions of the sultan rather than a simple citing of the names and abbreviatedtitles of the contracting parties. Such a preamble is missing from the published version of the treaty.19 But Zeller is too quick to judge the document by its preamblealone. The text of the agreement itself readsvery much as we would expect it to, as a unilateral grant of privilege from the sultan alone. It is strikingly similar in both form and tone to the 1569 capitulations which Zeller accepts unconditionally.20 Besides, evidence from the Marseille archives and from documents now located in the Bibliotheque Inguimbertine at Carpentras prove conclusively that the 1536 capitulations are authentic.21 Whatever the fate of the original documents, events following the meeting of La Foret with Suleiman point decisively to the conclusion of a commercial agreement between the sultan and the French king, an agreement which was particularlyadvantageousto the commercial interests of the Mediterraneanports like Marseille, Narbonne, and Montpellier. These concessions guaranteedthe complete freedom of commerce between the two peoples; authorized the establishment of French consuls at Constantinople and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire; assured Francis that no new taxes would be levied against French merchants, that French subjects would be protected against prejudiciallawsuits, and that they would be allowed to practicetheir Christian faith within thejurisdiction of the sultan. Furthermore,the French were given exemption from forced labor;assuranceof the right to reclaim captives, fugitives, and victims of shipwrecks; and recognition of the favored status of French ships in the Mediterranean.22 These concessions were to remain in effect during the lifetimes of Suleiman and Francis. II Formal diplomatic relations between the two countries were established with the appointment of La Foret as first resident ambassadorat the Porte and
19Charriere, Negociations/Levant I:285-94. 20BNP, Fonds francais, 16141, fol. 23v-34; Arsenal, 4767, fol. 10-13. Cf. Fonds francais, 20977, fol. 50; Dupuy, 745, fol. 215; AMAE, Corr. pol., Turquie, 2; and Archives Nationales, Paris [herafter, ANP], K. 1347. 21Archives departementales des Bouches-du-Rh6ne [hereafter, ADBR], IX B, 14, 198ter; B 2547; B 2548, B 2549. Archives de la Ville de Marseille, [hereafter, AVM], AA 176-77, BB 45-46, HH 243, HH 256, HH 259, et al. Archives de la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie de Marseille, H.1, J.1860. Bibliotheque Inguimbertine, Carpentras, 1777 (P. VIII) fol. 9r-13v is a manuscript copy of the 1536 treaty. 22Saint-Priest, Me'moiresur l'ambassadede Turquie, 354-62; Charriere, N60qociations/ Levant I:285-94; Testa, Recuedides traite's I:15-21.

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the perpetuation of the office by subsequent appointments. After La Foret's death in 1537, Charles de Marillac remained as charge d'affairesuntil the arrival of Antonio Rincon as ambassador the next year. Rincon was an unpolished but competent envoy and definitely personagrata at the Porte, achieving a considerabledegree of success there until his assassinationin 1541 by Habsburgagents.23Rincon was succeeded by a prominent military veteran, Antoine Escalin de la Garde, known also as Capitaine Poulin, who later became admiralof the French Mediterraneangalleys. He, too, was well thought of at the Ottoman court and proved to be an effective promoter of French interests there.24 In 1547 he was replaced by the much-traveled Gabriel d'Aramon, best-known of all the early French ambassadorsto Turkey due to the publication of his adventures by his companion and secretary, Jean Chesneau.25 D'Aramon accompanied the sultan on many of his campaignsand took part more as a participantthan as a spectator in the Mediterraneanwars of 1551-1553. He was replaced in 1554 byJean de Codignac, who was instrumental in negotiating the first signed treaty between the Ottomans and Persia (1555), thus freeing the Turks to give stronger support to their French allies in the Mediterranean.26 The least effective French ambassadorduring the reigns of Francis I and Henri II was Jean de la Vigne, who served from 1556 until the death of Henri II in 1559. La Vigne did not have the right disposition to be a successful diplomat, and he disliked the Turks with a passion. They responded accordingly. He also suffered by comparisonswith his famous and illustrious archrival, Ogier Ghislin de Busbecq, Emperor Ferdinand'stalented envoy to the Turks.27 It is noteworthy that the establishment of resident ambassadorswas a one-way affair with the Ottoman Empire. No permanent representativewas sent by the sultan to reside in France.This should not be misunderstood. In no way does it imply that Suleiman was half-hearted about the alliance; rather it
23Bourrilly, "Antonio Rincon," 285-308; Alexandre Tausserat-Radd, ed., Correspondance politique de Guillaume Pellicier, 1540-1542 (Paris, 1899), 440-41, 573; and Jean Zeller, La Diplomatiefranfaise vers le milieu du XVIe siecle (Paris, 1881; rep. Geneva: Slatkine, 1969), 177-266. 24BNP, Fonds franqais, 20977; Ursu, La politique orientate,135-56, 177. On the special embassy of Jean de Montluc in 1543-45, see BNP, Dupuy, 745, fol. 255, 231; and Charri&re,Negociations/Levant I:596-620. 25La voyagede Monsieur d'Aramon, ambassadeur pour le Roy en Levant (Paris, 1887; repr. Geneva: Slatkine, 1970). Cf. the Venetian, Bernardo Navagero's "Relatione fatta da M. Bernardo Navagero de la cosa del Turco" (1533) in the Biblioteca Marciana, Venice [hereafter, BMV], MS. 8506. 26Ursu, La politique orientate 178-79, and letters in Charrikre, Negociations/Levant II:329-61. Interestingly, Codignac deserted the French service in 1558, remaining in Constantinople as a special agent for the new Spanish monarch, Philip II, ibid, II:533-38. 27Charri&re, Negociations/Levant II:362-608; Vaughan, Europe and the Turk, 131-33; Rouillard, The Turk in FrenchHistory, 127-28. See also The Lettersof Ogier Ghiselin deBusbecq, ImperialAmbassador Constantinople,1554-1562, trans. from the Latin of the Elzevir edition at of 1633 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927).

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was a reflection of Ottoman custom regarding residence at a Christian court. To have assigned a resident Turkish ambassadorat Paris would have implied an equality between the sultan and the French king that was totally unacceptable. Suleiman welcomed the French ambassadorat Constantinople since that implied an unequal relationship by which he spoke to the king, through the French ambassador,as to an inferior. Besides, it was considered a great honor to the sultan to have a foreign emissary present at the Ottoman court. The more impressive and opulent the embassy the more honor it imparted. The sultan was particularlypleased by the gifts brought by the French ambassadors because they usually included one or more elaborate and intricate clocks of European make, which were highly prized by the Turks.28Nevertheless, ad hoc embassies were occasionally sent by the sultan, and Barbarossafrequently dispatched his own representatives to France.29 In order to appreciatethe meaning of the new Franco-Turkishrelationship, and recognize the extent of the French diplomatic accomplishment, we must look at it over a longer period of time. There were immediate consequences of the Franco-Turkish accord, particularlyin the military-naval field as French and Barbaryfleets began to cooperate against the Spanish enemy. Their first joint venture in the Mediterraneanwas a fiasco, primarily due to Francis's mismanagement, but the resounding Turkish victory at Prevesa in 1538, over a combined fleet of papal, Genoese, Spanish, and Venetian galleys, was achieved with some French support, and initiated a thirty-year period of Ottoman naval domination in the Mediterranean,with its yearly raidsagainst the Spanish and Italian coasts. Nevertheless, the periods of effective military cooperation between French and Ottoman units during the next seventy-five years were rare. The Franco-Turkishnaval concert of 1543-1544, with the Turkish fleet wintering at Toulon, promised to bring richer rewards to both allies than were actually realized. The Toulon encampment was fraught with many problems and disagreements, and the Franco-Turkish siege of neighboring Nice (the Savoyard rival to Marseille and Toulon, garrisonedat the time by Spain) can hardly be

28BNP, Fonds franqais, 7092, fol. 57-58v, passim. Petremol, and others, made frequent comments about the sultan's passion for clocks. See Charriere, Nigociations/Levant II:766-67, where Suleiman desires to have the French clockmaker, Jean le Coustanqois, return to Constantinople and practice his trade there; also Public Record Office [hereafter, PRO], Turkey, S.P. 97/1, fol. 4. Otto Kurz's European Clocks and Watchesin the Near East (London; The Warburg Institute; Leiden: Brill, 1975) examines many facets of this Eastern fascination with European clocks. 29BNP, Fonds franqais, 3053, fol. 18v; BLL, Add. MSS., 8715, fol. 336, 342v; Letters and Papers,Foreignand Domestic,of the reignofHenry VIII, etc. [hereafter, L. &P.], ed. byJames Gairdner (London: HMSO, 1890), XII, 1:333-34. Cataloguedes Actes de Franfois Ier [hereafter, Acts] (Paris: Imp. Nationale, 1905), VIII, nos. 30672, 30674, p. 153, no. 30694, p. 155.

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called a cooperative effort.30There was some cooperation in the Turkish siege of Tripoli in 1551, but pressures on the Persian front prevented the Turks from being much help to the French in their attempt to seize Corsica and Genoa. In retrospect it appearsthat the greatest military value of the FrancoTurkish alliance was its potential threat rather than its actual operation. As long as it lasted, the Habsburgs could never be sure when the French and Turks might combine and when they might not.31For this reason the thunder of the alliance diminished with time as its ineffectiveness was manifested. After the 1559 Treaty of Cateau-Cambresisbrought an end to the Habsburg-Valois wars, the likelihood of overt Franco-Turkish action was further reduced and the military alliance proportionally weakened.32In the second half of the century the alliance was strained by the Turkish siege of Malta in 1565 (valiantly defended by the French grand master of the Knights of St. John, Jean Parisot de La Valette) and by the subsequent capture of Cyprus by the Turks. It was even further taxed by the creation in 1571 of the Holy League, a last great Christian crusadeagainst Islam and an attempt to interdict the annual harassmentsby the Turkish fleet. Pope Pius V tried to get France to join the Papal-Spanish-Venetian league, but Catherine de'Medici cautiously declined the invitation on the grounds that such an alliance would likely arouse the fear of the German Protestants,who might then combine in a counter league that could have dangerous results. So the great battle of Lepanto was fought with the French as spectators, giving only token help to the Turks, while cheering for the league.33

30Charriere, Nigociations/Levant I:555-58; 565-74. Charles B. de La Ronci&re,Histoire de la marinefranfaise (Paris: Plon, 1932), III:384-85; Pierre Heinrich, L'Alliancefrancoalgerienne au XVIe sihcle(Paris and Lyon: Mougin Rusand, 1898), 55; and Rouillard, The Turk in French History, 120. 31P&tremol,the first ambassador of Catherine de' Medici to the Turks, noted that this had its negative effects too. He argued that Naples, Corsica, and Genoa would all have surrendered to the French if it had not been for their fear of becoming prey to France's Turkish allies. Petremol to the king, 15 November 1564, "Extrait des registres des lettres escripts par M. de P&tremol,"in Cimber et Danjou, ed., Archivescurieuses l'histoiredeFrancedepuisLouis de XIjusqu'a Louis XVIII (Paris: Beauvais, 1835), VI:241-52. Also BNP, Dupuy, 131; Fonds franqais, 7092, 16168; and Arsenal, 4768. Some of Petremol's interesting letters are printed in Charri&reNigociations/Levant II:663-806. 32Charrikre, Nigociations/Levant II:578-90. However,the decisive victory of the Turkish fleet at Djerba in 1560 shocked Philip II into launching a rapid build-up of his Mediterranean seapower, thus contributing to the Spanish revival and the eventual Turkish defeat at Lepanto in 1571.

33The victory over the Turks was celebrated in many of the churches of France, just as it was throughout Christendom. In Lyon the celebration at the church of Ste.-Croix sang a Te Deum "to give thanks to God for the magnanimous victory which he pleased to give us against the Turk," followed some days later by a city-wide religious procession. I am indebted to Professor Natalie Z. Davis for this information from the ecclesiastical archives of Lyon.

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Why, then, was it so important to maintain the alliance after it had apparently outlived its usefulness?I believe it was the growing economic importance of the treaty that made it so attractive. No sooner had the original agreements been arranged in 1536 than a French fleet under the baron de Saint-Blancard sailed east from Marseille to test the privileged position the French were now in.34 Wintering at Chios, Saint-Blancard entered the Golden Horn the following February.It was a momentous event, for this was the first time since the fall of Constantinople in 1453 that Christian warships had passed the Dardanelles. Other French fleets and single merchantmen followed suit, though not always without mishap. As early as 1542, according to data from Marseille,35the proceeds from theferme desgabellesof that port almost tripled. A year later a royal edict gave Marseille the exclusive right to import and market Eastern drugs. By midcentury the annual value of imports from the Levant were in the neighborhood of 8.5 million 'cus.36 In 1551 concessions were granted to Thomas and Antoine Lenche, of Corsica and Marseille, to gather coral between Cape Bon and Cape Negre, leading directly to the formation of the Compagnie du Corail de Bone (1553) and subsequenttrading companies.37 After 1552 a veritable boom in Marseille commerce highlights the reality of the FrancoTurkish capitulations and their value to France, including the bankers and merchants of Lyon and other cities.38 The establishment of the Portuguese sea-road to India at the beginning of the century had cut deeply into the Mediterraneanspice trade, and the constant wars up to mid-century had hampered commerce in other goods as well. But now the tide was turning again. The Red Sea was a Turkish thoroughfare,
repr. New York: Burt Franklin, 1967), xiii; La Ronciere, Histoirede la marinefranfaise, III:360-68;and especiallythe detailed study by PierreGrillon, "LaCroisikredu Baron de
Saint-Blancard (1537-1538)," Revue d'histoire moderneet contemporaine (1968):624-62. 15 34Paul Masson, Histoire du commercefranfais dans le Levant au XVIIe siecle (Paris 1911;

35ADBR,Amiraut& Marseille,IX b 198ter,passim; de AVM, HH 243 et al. Joseph Billioud, "Capitulations histoiredu commerce:a proposde l'&tude M. GastonZeller," et de
Revue d'histoire moderneet contemporaine (1955):312-13. 2

de 36Statistiquedes Bouches-du-Rhone, in Jules Julliany, Essai sur le commerce 2d Marseille, ed. (Marseille:Barile, 1842), I:45.
37See Paul Masson, Les compagnies Corail:EtudeHistoriquesurle commerce du deMarseille au XVIe siecle et les origines de la colonisation francaise en Algerie-Tunisie (Paris & Marseille: Fontemoing, 1908); Paul Giraud, Les origines de l'empirefrancais nord-africain:les Lenche a

Marseille en Barbarie et (Marseille:Inst. historiquede Provence, 1937). 38Billioud,"Capitulations histoiredu commerce,"313-14, and RaymondCollier et andJoseph Billioud, Histoire commerce Marseille du de (Paris;Plon, 1951) III:195-96, a valuable study sponsoredby the Chamberof Commerceof Marseille.On the Lyonnaiseshare in this traffic,see the painstakingbook of RichardGascon,Grandcommerce vie urbaine et au XVIesiecle: Lyonetsesmarchands (Paris& The Hague:Mouton, 1971), I:91-94, 119, 201-3, 337; II:638-43, passim.

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and goods were moving overland across the Fertile Crescent in increasing volume.39Alexandria and Aleppo were bustling as they had not done for decades;the ports of the Peloponese were expanding their activity. Coral from the North African coasts, silks from Persia, wool and leather goods from Asia Minor, tapestriesfrom Smyrna,perfumes from Arabia,and spices form the Far East were all for sale in the Levant and along the Barbarycoast, where merchants traded eagerly for European cloth, hardware, copper, and silver. The ships of Marseille and Narbonne carried not only the products of their own hinterland,40 broadcloths of Dauphine, the wines and fruits of Languedoc the and Provence, but also the valued fabricsmade in Normandy and known in the Levant as "cloth of Paris,"returning from the East with cargoes of spices and
drugs.41

In October 1569 Claude de Bourg, a strange combination of royal functionary and adventurousdiplomatic condottiere, sent as a special ambassador was to Sultan Selim II to renew the Franco-Turkishtrade concessions (which had ended with the death of Suleiman in 1566) and demand redressfor the confiscations of certain French property by the Jewish entrepreneurand confidant to the sultan, Joseph Nasi, known as the Duke of Naxos.42 Although du Bourg succeeded only partially in the latter affair, quarrelling sharply with the resident French ambassadorand making a number of new enemies among the Spanishand Genoese, he did achieve his primarypurpose of negotiating a new set of capitulations, even more advantageous to France than those of 1536.43 The preamble of this new treaty assuredthe precedence of the French ambassadorover those of all other Christian princes, and stipulated, explicitly for the first time, the French right to grant "pavilion" to other nations, that
and the MediterraneanWorld in the Age of Philip 39Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean II (New York: Harper & Row, 1972-73) I:545-54, 562-68. 40French exports in the sixteenth century were predominantly rural products reflecting the close proximity of domestic industries and land. See Jean Meurret, "Circulation monetaire et utilisation &conomique de la monnaie dans la France du XVIe et du XVIIe 1 siecles," Etudes d'histoire moderneet contemporaine (1947):14-28, esp. 17-19. entre le Levant et l'Europedepuis les Croisades du commerce 41Bernard Depping, Histoire jusqu'a la fondation des colonies d'Amerique (Paris: Imp. Royale, 1830), I:295-308; and A. de Germain, Histoiredu commerce Montpellier(Montpellier: Jean Martel, 1861) II:1-24. On the du products of this East-West trade, see Wilhelm Heyd, Histoirede commerce Levantau Moyenage (Leipzig: Harrassowitz, 1886) II:555-711; Eliyahu Ashtor, Levant Tradein the LaterMiddle Ages (Princeton: University Press, 1983), 433-512; and Collier and Billioud, Hist. du de commerce Marseille III:371-539. 42Grandchamp to Charles IX, in Charriere, Negociations/LevantIII:82-90. On this interesting individual, see Cecil Roth, The House of Nasi: The Duke of Naxos (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1948), esp. 39-74. 43BNP, Fonds franqais, 16141, fol. 47v-58, 226-72v, and 22726; Arsenal, 4767, fol. 22-35; Grandchamp to Catherine de'Medici, Charriere, Negociations/Levant III:90-94. Saint-Priest, Memoires, 363-75; Andr&Bruneau, Traditionset politique de la France au Levant (Paris: Alcan, 1932), 29.

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is, to allow them to tradein the Levant only under the protection and authorization of the French flag. Furthermore, it dropped the ten-year residence clause of the earlieragreement and exempted French merchantsfrom the head tax which Moslem law requiredall foreigners to pay. It also extended beyond the life of its principals and no longer mentioned the accession of other nations. Obviously, the Franco-Turkishalliance had become a valuable and permanent part of French foreign policy, and primarily for commercial reasons. But by this time Francehad fallen upon very hardtimes. The Wars of Religion and related domestic difficulties were draining her of vitality and wealth. Threatened by Huguenots and Catholics alike, with both sides receiving help from enemies or potential enemies abroad, the crown was hard pressed to maintain peace with its neighbors without leaving the door ajarto hostile intervention. Only a strong and active diplomatic network could insure French survivalif the civil wars were not soon ended. The Turkish alliance became an important part of this diplomacy of survival. As Pius V succeeded in drawing the Holy League together and into action against the Turks,44 Catherine de'Medici ordered one of her most capable diplomats to take up the ambassadorialpost at Constantinople. Franqoisde to Noailles, recently made bishop of Dax, had previously served as ambassador Rome, England, and Venice. He was a devoted servant of the crown and a shrewd and level-headed negotiator.45The outbreak of the Lepanto war detained the envoy in Venice, but he reached Constantinople early in 1572, where he immediately went to work, along with Arnauddu Ferrier,his counterpart in Venice,46 to negotiate a Turco-Venetian peace that would draw Venice out of the league, thus weakening Spain, and restorepeace to the Mediterranean, thereby creating conditions for accelerating commerce in the Levant. By March 1573, under Noaille's persistent efforts, Venice agreed to the
44BNP, Fonds italien, 251, fol. 124-29, 158-61, 344-46; BMV, 8025, cc. 142-272; Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Milan, MS. G.122 inf. (2, 9, 11); and Biblioteca Nacional Madrid, 11265, fol. 7; 18190, fol. 97-115. See also the valuable study by Luciano Serrano, La Liga de LepantoentreEspaha y la Santa Sede, 1570-1573, 2 vols. (Madrid: n.p., 1918-19); and Jos& Aparici, Coleccionde documentos ineditosrelativosa la batalladeLepanto(Madrid: Imp. Nacional, 1847), as well as Luis Carrero Blanco, "La batalla naval de Lepanto," in El Escorial, 15631963 (Madrid: Patrimonial Nacional, 1963) 1:235-55. 45BNP, Fonds francais, esp. 3164-65, 16142, and 16170; Dupuy; 429, fol. 7-11; 521; Cinq cents de Colbert, 482; Arsenal, 4769; AMAE, Corr. pol., Turquie, I, and M&m. et Doc., Turquie, 4; BLL, Add. MSS., 30624; Harleian, 4570. See some of his published letters in Revue de Gascogne 6 (1865):9-25, 86-102, 138-44, 217-31, 275-89, and in Charriere, Negociations/Levant III:240-494. 46The importance of Venice and the French embassy there cannot be overemphasized in Franco-Turkish relations. See in particular, J. Zeller, La diplomatiefran~aise, 149-72, based on the correspondence of the French ambassador in Venice, Guillaume Pellicier; Edouard Fr&my, Un ambassadeur liberalsous Charles IX et Henri III: Ambassadesa Venise d'Arnaud du Ferrier(Paris: Leoux, 1880); and his letters in BNP, Fonds francais, 3967. Also see Vladimir Lamansky, ed., Secretsd'etat de Venice:documentsextraits, noticeset etudes,etc., 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1884) II:792-97. Reports of Venetian agents at Constantinople are located in Archivio di Stato, Venezia; Constantinopoli, filze 5 and 6.

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harsh terms of peace, which included the payment of a heavy indemnity to the Turks.47 the same time Noailles prevented a flareupof fighting between the At Ottomans and Emperor Maximilian II, thereby freeing the former to concentrate on Spain. He also persuadedthe sultan to send an embassy to Warsaw to induce the Polish diet to elect the duke of Anjou, brother of the French king, to the vacant throne of Poland.48 Franco-Turkish relations were never better than in 1572-1575 during Noaille's embassy, and their renewed commercial traffic after Lepanto succeeded in making Marseille, rather than Venice, the principal Christian port of the Levant trade49-for a time at least. The French position was further enhanced by the activation of new consulates around the perimeter of the Mediterranean.The consulates were created to give continuous protection and aid to French merchants. They had roots in the medieval trade between Mediterranean cities, but now became quasi-royal agencies.50The duties and authority of these consuls were extensive. They were the sovereign judges of all kinds of adjudication among Frenchmen, or patrons of the French, in the Levant. They were authorized to make pronouncements in criminal cases falling into their area ofjurisdiction. They presided over the distribution of goods and property left by a decedent. They saw to it that all the rights accordedto the French by the Franco-Turkish treatieswere respected, including the consul's own extensive immunities. And in Syria they could pronounce injunctions, known as batelationes, against anyone, including Turkish or other merchants, convicted of doing harm to a French merchant. Such an injunction carried with it a heavy fine.51 The rights and functions of a long-established consul at Alexandria had been recognized by the Ottomans after their conquest of Egypt. Soon after the Capitulations of 1536 a French consul was confirmed in Syria, and as tradeincreased another was established at Constantinople, functioning there under the supervision of the French ambassador,and a short-lived one created at Tripoli in 1548. Partly in response to the harassments of Barbarypirates, a
perilleuse del 47Biblioteca Escorial,MS. X.III.8, fol. 1-85. A. Degret, "Un ambassade
de Francois de Noailles en Turquie," Revue Historique 159 (1928): 250-52. Gaetan de Raxis (Paris: Chez Treuttel et Wurtz, de Flassan, Histoiregeneraleet raisonnede la diplomatiefran~aise 1811), II:83-84. 252-60; TestaRecueildestraitesI:113-14, Lettre Perilleuse," 48Degret, "Un ambassade

de de CharlesIX a l'ambassadeur Noailles, 30 November 1572. de 49Collier & Billioud, Hist. du commerce Marseille III:197-98; Masson,Hist. du commercefran~aise,xv-xvi; Braudel, The MediterraneanI:547, 555, and notes. (Paris: 50Georges Salles, Les originesdespremiersconsulatsde la nationfran~aisea l'etranger

sur Leroux,1896), 1-4; ErnestWatbled, "Aprecu les premiersconsulatsfrancaisdansle Levant et les &tatsbarbaresques," Revue Africaine 16 (1872):20-34. 51BNP, Fonds francais, 18111, fol. 69; 18593, passim; Dupuy, 273, fol. 128-29; Salles, Les originesdespremiersconsulats,13-14; and the analysis by H. Michaud in "La nomi-

et moderne nation d'un consul francais a Alexandrie au XVIe si&cle,"Revue d'histoire

7 contemporaine (1960):233-42.

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consulate was set up at Algiers in 1565.52It underwent many vicissitudes from the hostility of the corsairsbut was re-establishedon a firmer basisin 1577, the same year that a consulate was created at Tunis to regularize trade along the Barbarycoast from La Goletta to Tripoli.53Also in 1577 Henri III issued letters of provision for the establishment of a Moroccan consul with headquarters at Fez.54All of these posts, with their combined political and economic functions, were manned primarily by personnel from Marseille who were usually nominated by the Marseille council. In the last quarterof the sixteenth cenwere active all aroundthe Medtury French consuls as well as the ambassadors iterranean, protecting the rights and promoting the activities of French merchants and seamen.55 The upswing of French traffic in the Levant following the Capitulations of 1569, and most strikingly during the ensuing Lepantowar, when the Venetian trade was brought almost to a standstill, was noticeable on every side. It was particularlymarkedin the case of Marseille. The customs tax on merchandise (dernier port) suddenly rose from 7,000 to 8,000 livresin 1570 (where du it had held for the previous twenty-five years)to 13,200 a year later, to 15,000 in 1572, and by 1573 reached 19,000. This commercial boom was mostly atin tributableto the Easternspice trade which grew from 20,000 livrestournois 1560 to 64,000 in 1571.56 The impact on the Mediterraneanmerchant fleet was even more striking. In 1535 no more than twenty vessels could be found for the transportof spices; fifty years later the king was assuredthat he could count on one hundred to two hundred ships for that purpose.57 Commerce also precipitatedindustry in Marseille as the Compagnie de l'Ecarlate was created in 1570 to manufacture cloth destined for the countries of the Levant, followed by a sugarrefinery in 1574, a new cloth company two yearslater, and a soap factory in 1578.58The Capitulations of 1569 indeed had immediate and wide ranging
52Pierre Grillon, "Origins et fondation du consulat de France a Alger (1564-1582)," Revue d'histoirediplomatique78 (1964):97-117. 52AMAE, M&m. et doc., Afrique, 5, fol. 4. Cf. Eugene Plantet, Correspondance Beys des de Tunis et desconsulsdeFranceavecla courdeFrance(Paris:Alcan, 1893), I:1-2, and related documents, 2-9; Pierre Grandchamp, ed., La Franceen Tunisie a lafin du XVIe siecle, 1582-1600 (Tunis: Imprimerie Rapid, 1920), ix-xxi. 54Salles, Les originesdespremiersconsultats,39-51. See also Eugene Plantet, ed., Correspondencedes Deys d'Alger avec la cour de France (Paris: Alcan, 1889) I:xi-xxxvi. 55Paul Masson, Histoire des etablissements et du commercefran~ais dans l'Afrique barbaresque, 1560-1793 (Paris: Hachette, 1903), 1-26; Heinrich, L'Alliancefranco-algerienne, 135-71; Ernest Watbled, "La France et les barbaresque aux XVIe si&cle,"La nouvellerevue84 (1893):64-66, 368-71; and the documents in Grandchamp, La France en Tunisie. de 56Gascon, Grand commerce II:639; Collier & Billioud, Hist. du commerce Marseille III:198, 439-49. 57AVM, HH 256, Remonstrance of 29 November 1583. Collier & Billioud, Hist. du commerce Marseille III:333. de 58Collier & Billioud, Hist. du commerce Marseille III:199. de

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effects in France,although most of its benefits were squanderedduring the violent era of religious wars.

IV
The success of French diplomacy in acquiring favored treatment in the Ottoman empire, including the regencies of North Africa, was nowhere more apparent than in the vigorous attempts of other nations to break into the French near-monopoly. Even the Spanish, despite their long and bitter rivalry with the Turks, desired to increase their Mediterraneantrade through commercial agreement with the Porte. In 1573-1574 Venice was the primary target of this competition; by 1577 it was France.Near the end of that year Philip II sent out Giovanni Margliani, Milanese veteran of the Turkish wars, to negotiate a truce with the Turks.59 After some reluctance, due to the unimpressiveness of the Spanish embassy, the sultan agreed to talk with Margliani, this in the face of strong protests from the French ambassadors.60 The Ottoman need for peace in the west because of their costly new war in Persiaprompted them to accept a provisional truce with Spain in 1578, which was finalized three years later, renewed in 1584 and again in 1587. However, the vigorous intervention of a new French ambassador, the experienced Jacques de Germigny, baron de Germoles, who was dispatched to Constantinople in 1579 to impede the Spanish negotiations,61may have prevented the conclusion of an Hispano-Turkish commercial agreement. But troubles sometimes come in pairs. Germigny had no sooner parried the Spanish threat when he was presented with its English mate. In 1578 William Harbornewas sent out by some of the forward-looking merchants of London to try for a trade agreement between themselves and the Ottoman empire.62
III: 59Braudel, The Mediterranean 1152-61. de Gilles de Noailles, abb& 1'Isle,younger brotherof Franqoisde Noailles; 60First, tried residentsecretary, Juy&, then, aftera costly two-year interim duringwhich Sebastien his best to hold things together, Jacuqes de Germigny took up the fight. BNP, Fonds IFP],Collection Godefroy, 16143, fol. 2-241; Institutede France,Paris[hereafter, franqais, 516, fol. 171-75. III:814-936,IV:40-85, Negociations/Levant 16143; Charriere, 61BNP,Fondsfranqais, orbandale, l'histoire ov Bertraudand Pierre Cusset, eds., L'Ilvstre 113-24, 223-98; L&onard sur de ancienne moderne la villeet citede Chalons sa6ne... (Chalon & Lyon: Cusset, 1662), et I:1-12, 67-76; Philippe Tamizey de Larroque,"Le cardinaled'Armagnacet Jacques de
Germigny," Revue des questionshistoriques33 (1883):181-204. 62Arthur L. Horniker, "William Harborne and the Beginnings of Anglo-Turkish Diplomatic and Commercial Relations,"Journal of ModernHistory 14 (1942):289-316; H. G. Rawlinson, "The Embassy of William Harborne to Constantinople," Transactionsof the Royal HistoricalSociety,4th ser., vol. 5 (1922):1-27; "William Harborne: Our First Ambassador to the Sultan,"Journal of the Universityof BombayI, 1 (1932):1-4; and Albert L. Rowland, Relations (Philadelphia, 1924; repr. England and Turkey:The Rise ofDiplomatic and Commercial New York: Burt Franklin, 1968), 3-10. Colleccion de documentosineditospara la historia de Espana [hereafter CDI] (Madrid: Genestra, 1888), 90:438-40.

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The English had something to offer that they knew would appeal to the Turks: tin, and other war supplies. Drained by their campaigns in the east, where they had again been drawn in a counterpoint of religious wars by what Fernand Braudel calls the rhythmic phases of Ottoman military history, the Turks were anxious to buy munitions from the West. The French, paralyzed by their own civil wars, had none to spare;but the English did, and they also had tin, a necessary ingredient in the casting of bronze cannon. So, while Germigny struggled to impede the Spanish, Harborne succeeded, with help from the sympathetic GrandVizier Sokilli, in obtaining commercial privileges for English traders similar to those enjoyed by the French.63 Caught momentarily by surprise, thinking the English were going to tradeunder the French flag, the French ambassador now went to work. When Harborne returnedto England to report his success (and participatein the formation of the Levant company for trading with the Turks),64Germigny used lavish gifts and his considerable influence with the Turkish grand admiral, Uluj Ali (Ochiali), and others who were favorably disposed toward the French, to have the English treaty revoked.65And in order to reaffirm and strengthen the Franco-Turkish alliance, he negotiated and obtained in July 1581, a new commercial treaty from Sultan MuradIII.66 Its twenty-seven articles were even more favorablethan the previous pacts, stating outright that the English, Portuguese, Catalans, Sicilians, Anconians, Ragusans, Genoese, and even Venetians were allowed to trade only under the French banner. Venetians alone were permitted to fly their own flag, yet they too were considered to operate under the protection of the French ambassadorand consuls. Article three of the new capitulations guaranteedthe French diplomatic precedence over the ambassadors all other Christian kings and princes. The fourteenth of article exempted the French from all personal taxes, even the married tax required by Moslem law. This victory was soon wasted by the diplomatic bungling of Henri III. Immediately upon issuing the capitulations, the sultan sent an embassy to
63PRO, Turkey, S.P. 97/1 ,fol. 1. Richard Hakluyt, The PrincipalNevigations, Voyages, Traffiquesand Discoveriesof the English Nation (Glasgow: MacLehose & Sons, 1904), V:16971, prints the first letter of privilege from the sultan to Queen Elizabeth. Her reply is on 171-78, and the formal charter datedJune 1580, on 178-89. In November 1580 Bernardino de Mendoza reported the arrival in London of an envoy from Constantinople (who Mendoza thought to be a renegade Italian) with a letter from the Grand Turk encouraging close relations with the English. Archivo General de Simancas, Estado Inglaterra, 833, fol. 32, published in CDI 91:523, Mendoza to Philip II, 13 November 1580. 64Levant Company charter in Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations V:192-202. See Alfred C. Wood, A History of the Levant Company (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), 1-14.
65CSpV VIII:1. French influence was still strong in the Levant at this time. See "Autorit&des agents de la France dans le Levant en 1570," Revuefranoaise d'histoired'outre-mer 4 (1923):152-57.

66BNP, Fonds franqais, 16141, fol. 58v-74. Saint-Priest, Memoires, 381-92. Flassan, Hist. gen. de la diplomaticII:97-98.

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France,including one of the most venerable officers at the Turkish court, with a copy of the agreement and an invitation to the French king to be represented at the circumcision ceremony of the sultan's youngest son, Mehmet-the supreme compliment the sultan could pay.67But Henri, fearing the reactions of the pope (and perhaps of Philip II, with whom relations were now very tense after the Portuguese succession crisis) to a reception of high ranking "infidel ordered that the envoys be detained in Venice, instructing his ambassadors," own ambassadorthere to try persuading them to return to Constantinople.68 The affront to the Turks was obvious, but still the envoys refused to turn back. To do so would undoubtedly have cost them their lives. Finally, after an embarrassingthree-months delay, and the concerted apin peals of both the French ambassadors Venice and Constantinople, the Turkish representatives were invited to proceed to Paris, where they arrived in December 1581. Their reception and entertainment were lavish. Gifts were exchanged, including "a silver cup gilded inside with a thousand gold ecus,a dozen ells [1 ell = 45 inches] of linen cloth with gold fringe, and thirty ells of scarletcloth" given by the king to the emissaries,and an "exquisitely beautiful and rich clock" for the sultan's son.69But the thing most desired by the GrandTurk Henri would not give-the promise to send a personal representative to the circumcision. Henri declined on religious grounds, or so he said. Whatever the reason, this rebuff was deeply felt and resented by the sultan. The insult was compounded when Germigny failed to show up at the ceremony because of "certain discourtesies" he had received from some of the Turkish ministers. Germigny's embassyended in frustrationand deteriorating relations.70 In this cooling atmosphere the English agent returned to Constantinople and had no difficulty obtaining a ratification of his previous to treatyand being accepted asEngland's first resident ambassador the Turks.71
67IFP, Godefroy, 516, fol. 179-189v, July 1581; Charriere, Negociations/Levant IV:51-56, Germigny to Henry III, 10 June 1581. 68BNP, Fonds, franqais 4824, fol. 24-27. Charriere, Negociations/Levant IV:72. 69"Relations des ambassadeurs envoyez par le Grand-Seigneur, empereur des Turcs, vers le roy Henry III," in Cimber et Danjou, Archivescurieusesler ser., X:173-74. Charriere, Negociations/Levant IV:1 14. 70"Relations de sieur de Germigny, de sa charge et legation du Levant, pres&ntee au roy le 30 de mars 1585," Cimberet Danjou, Archives curiueses,X:175-85. 71Hakluyt, Principal Navigations V:243-58; CSPV VIII:52-55, 67-68, 88-90, 93-94; Horniker, "William Harborne," 303; Wood, The Levant Company, 12-13. Harborne's gifts to the sultan included "a very fair clock made with sundry devices garnished stones pearls, and much work of silver and gilt," PRO, Turkey, S.P. 97/1, fol. 24, 26. The French ambassador in Venice wrote that Harborne had been treated with great honors by the sultan: AMAE, M&m. et doc., Venice, 31, fol. 15. Soon even the Hanseatic League and especially the Dutch were swarming into the Mediterranean to grab a share of the Levant trade. Braudel, The MediterraneanI:629-36; and Pierre Jeannin, "Enterprises hans&ates et commerce mediterraneen a la fin du XVIe si&cle," Histoire economique du monde mediterraneen, 1450-1650: Melanges en l'honneur de Fernand Braudel (Toulouse: Privat, 1973), 263-76.

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To make matters worse, from the French point of view, Jacques de Savary,sieur de Lancosme, who replaced Germigny in 1585, was an incompetent and presumptuousperson, refusing even to speakto the English representative, and trying unsuccessfully to cajole the sultan into cancelling the English capitulations.72Only the mutual threat of the Spanish Armada forced the French and English into reluctant partnership,a partnershipin which the English agent took the lead in trying to entice the Turks into a naval attack against Spain.73 When the Armada episode was over, Lancosme found himself in deep hot water. France hadjust entered its most disastrousphase of civil wars. The Catholic League now controlled half of France. Henri III fled to the camp of his former enemy, Henri of Navarre, leader of the Protestant Huguenots. Shortly thereafter the king was murdered, and the new monarch, Henri IV (the same Henri of Navarre), ordered Lancosme's recall, designating the English ambassador,Edward Barton, as joint representative for England and France until a new and acceptable French resident could be sent. But Lancosme, a staunch Catholic and supporter of the French Catholic League, refused to leave or relinquish his post to the English agent. Eventually he was arrestedby the sultan and held prisoner until 1592.74 In the meantime Lancosme's young and eminently qualified nephew, Franqoisde Savary,sieur de Breves, who had accompanied his uncle to the Levant and had served as embassysecretary,was appointed to the post of resident It ambassador.75 was a difficult time to fill such an assignment, but de Breves proved to be one of the most skillful and effective diplomats in the French service. He was also an outstanding scholar and man of letters, with a special taste and aptitude for Eastern literature and languages. He soon mastered the Turkish tongue and became highly respected at court and wherever he traveled. When he returned to France in 1605 at the end of his long tour of duty, he brought back a whole library of Turkish and Persian books and

72BNP, Fonds francais, 7094, fol. 11-61v; 15870, fol. 248-55; 23405, fol. 303-64; Cinq cents de colbert, 102, fol. 449-57; Dupuy, 587, fol. 239; Arsenal, 4769; Bibliotheque Municipale de Besancon, Collection Granvelle, MS. 33, fol. 263-72v; CSPVVIII:210, 497, 501, 545, 547; and Charriere, N&gociations/Levant IV:484-542, 634-64, 714-20. One of the more curious of these letters is Lanconme's 25 July 1586 report of Uluj Ali's intention of building a canal across Suez to connect the Red Sea with the Mediterranean, Charriere, Negociations/Levant IV:535-39. 73CSPF XXI:504, 508-9, passim; Horniker, "William Harborne," 307-11; Conyers Read, Mr. SecretaryWalsinghamand the Policy of Queen Elizabeth (London: Oxford University Press, 1925), III:226-28, 329-32. 74CSPVIV:27-29, 36-38, 50-52, 61. 75BNP, Fonds francais, 7161, 15869, fol. 41-58; 16144, fol. 208-380; Dupuy, 121, fol. 103-32; Cinq cents de Colbert, 100, fol. 170-226; 107, fol. 1-30; Clairambault, 1221, fol. 199-220; IFP, Godefroy, 270, passim.

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manuscripts.76 was perhaps second only to Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq in He opening the eyes and minds of (a few) Europeans to the life, literature, and thought of Turkey. The first of de Breves' many diplomatic achievements was his success in obtaining Turkish help to persuade Marseille-which, as a Leaguer city, had rebelled against the crown during the League uprising of 1589-1594-to submit to the authority of Henri IV. Largelybecause of his personal regardfor de Breves, Sultan Murad III agreed to exert his pressureon the Marseillaisto end their rebellion and return their allegiance to the French king. "We enjoin you," the sultan wrote in a curious letter to the city, "to yield to your leaders and render obedience to that most magnanimous among the great and powerful lords, Henri king of Navarre, present emperor of France. If you persist in your sinister obstinacy, we declare that your vessels and their cargoes will be confiscated and sour men made slaves."77 De Breves final accomplishment was the conclusion of a new commercial treatywith the Turks, once Francewas delivered from its internal troubles and Henri IV was finally established on the throne. In 1595 Murad died and was succeeded by his son, Mehmet III. The Capitulations of 1597 contained thirty-two unnumbered paragraphs,among them the license, hitherto forbidden, to export to Turkey Cordoban leather and cotton thread;exemption from the payment of duties on the importation of foreign specie; and the promise to force the Barbarycorsairsto returnthe loot they had plundered from French ships, and demand punishment of those responsible.78 Five years later de Breves negotiated a final treaty with Ahmed I, following the sudden death of Mehmet in 1603. The Capitulations of 1604, fifty in number, were the climax of a successful first century of Franco-Turkish diplomacy.79They granted French merchants the most complete tax and customs break possible; guaranteed French immunity from the harassment of
76BNP, Fonds francais, 15528, 18600; Dupuy, 673, fol. 131-32; 812, fol. 282-83. See Michaud, Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne (Graz: Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt, 1966), V:502. 77PRO, Turkey, S.P. 97/2, fol. 26; Michaud, Biographie universelle V:502, and generale VII:355. Nouvelle biographie 78BNP, Fonds, francais, 3653, fol. 1. Piracy was a growing menace to Mediterannean shipping. See Stanley Lane-Poole, The Barbary Corsairs (London: Unwin, 1890); G. N. Clark, "The Barbary Corsairs in the Seventeenth Century," CambridgeHistoricalJournal 8 II:865-91, (1944): 21-35; and especially Braudel's insightful discussion in The Mediterranean along with Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and theDecline of Venice, 1580-1615 (London: Longmans, 1967). 79BNP, Cinq cents de Colbert, 483, fol. 19-42; Fonds, frs., 4824, fol. 37-45; 7094, fol. 65-80v; 20982, fol. 259-309; Dupuy, 429, fol. 89-92. Relations desvoyagesde monsieurde des Breves,. . . Ensembleun Traictefaictl'an 1604 entrele Roy Henry le Grand, & I'Empereur Turcs, etc.(Paris: Chez Nicolas Gasse, 1628); Saint-Priest, Memoires, 415-30; Testa, Recueil des traites, 1:141-51; and Gabriel Effendi Noradounghian, Recueil d'actesinternationauxde l'Empire Ottoman, etc. (Paris: Cotillon, 1897), I:93-102.

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Moslem pirates (easier said than done); and reaffirmed the precedence of French diplomats and merchants in the Levant. Another feature of the treaty, implied in the religious guarantees included in the previous renewals but stated openly for the first time in 1604, was the granting to the French the right of protectorship over the Holy Places in Jerusalem. The only thing de Breves could not achieve was the cancellation of the English right to trade now under their own flag. In 1612 a similar concession was granted to the Dutch, but that is another story. All of this demonstratesthat there was a growing desire by many European nations to participate in the commerce of the Levant, and that trading rights and privileges were at the center of French Easterndiplomacy, not just a cover for a military alliance. In a later memoir to King Louis XIII, summarizing the great utility of the Turkish treaty, de Breves pointed out that "Now more than a thousand vessels from the coasts of Provence and Languedoc traffic in the Turkish empire, and notjust for their own enrichment but also to the benefit of the regions of France that are helped by it."80 With the ending of the civil wars in France,the reestablishmentof the French crown, and the restoration of some economic order out of the chaos of the previous decade, France was again able to take advantage of the commercial opportunities offered through the success of its Turkish diplomacy.

80Testa, Recueil des traitesI:176; Bruneau, Traditionset politique de la Franceau Levant, 36.