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ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS

LAO v. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC. FACTS: Petitioner Lao is the owner of a Fuso truck insured with respondent Standard Insurance Co., Inc. for the maximum amount of P200,000 and an additional sum of P50,000 to cover any damages that might be caused to his goods. While the policy was in effect, an accident occurred. o The insured truck bumped another truck also owned by petitioner Lao. o The insured truck sustained damages estimated to be around P110,692, while the damage to the other truck and to properties in the vicinity of the accident were placed at P35,000 more or less. Petitioner filed a claim with respondent for the proceeds from his policy. o The claim was denied by the insurance company on the ground that when its adjuster went to investigate the matter, it was found that the driver of the insured truck, Leonardo Anit, did not possess a proper drivers license at the time of the accident. o The restriction in Leonardo Anits drivers license provided that he can only drive four-wheeled vehicles weighing not more than 4,500 kgs. Since the insured truck he was driving weighed more than 4,500 kgs., he therefore violated the authorized driver clause of the insurance policy. o In addition, respondent cited the following excerpts from the police blotter of the Iloilo INP, to wit:
C-UN-85 DAMAGE TO PROPERTY W/ PHY INJURIES R/ IMPRUDENCE 11:30 PM Sgt. A. Bernas informed this office that a collision took place at Brgy. Buhang, Jaro, IC. Investigation conducted by Pat. Villahermosa, assisted by Lt. P. Baclaron (OD), disclosed that at about 8:00 PM this date at the aforementioned place, a collision took place between a truck (Hino) with Plate Nr FB[S] 917 owned by Rudy Lao and driven by BOY GIDDIE Y COYEL, 38 yrs, a res. of Balasan, Iloilo, with License Nr DLR 1108142 and another truck with Plate Nr. FCG538 owned by Rudy Lao and driver (sic) by LEONARDO ANIT Y PANES, 33 yrs, a res. of Brgy Laya, Balasan, Iloilo with License Nr 1836482. Petitioner claims that at the time of the accident, it was in fact another driver named Giddie Boy Y Coyel who was driving the insured truck. Giddie Boy possessed a drivers license authorizing him to drive vehicles such as the truck which weighed more than 4,500 kgs. As evidence, petitioner presented the Motor Vehicle Accident Report wherein the Investigating Officer, Pat. Felipe D. Villahermosa, stated that it was Giddie Boy driving the insured truck and not Leonardo Anit. The said report was made three days after the accident or on April 27, 1985. However, respondent insurance company was firm in its denial of the claim.

following are the requisites for its admissibility: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person, specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. The police blotter was properly admitted as they form part of official records. o Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence. o Although police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. o In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected the information subject of the controversy. Stated therein was the fact that Leonardo Anit was driving the insured truck with plate number FCG-538. o Furthermore, the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence. The person who made the entries was likewise presented in court; he identified and certified as correct the entries he made on the blotter. The information was supplied to the entrant by the investigating officer who did not protest about any inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to him. No explanation was likewise given by the investigating officer for the alleged interchange of names. (2) The assessment of the credibility of witnesses Great weight, and even finality, is given to the factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of the trial courts. There is no reason to overturn such conclusions. (3) The propriety and basis of awards for exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds that plaintiff lacks sufficient cause of action against the defendant and hence ordered his case dismissed and further orders him to pay the defendant the following: 1) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P500.00 for appearance fee; and 2) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed the civil case before the RTC, which disposed of the case:

On appeal, the RTC decision was affirmed. The petition was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration was denied. ISSUES/RATIO: (1) The admissibility and probative value of the police blotter as evidence The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court. Under the rule, the

We agree with petitioner that the award of exemplary damages was improper. o Tiongco v. Atty. Deguma: the entitlement to the recovery of exemplary damages must be shown. Although exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they also need not be proved. But a complainant must still show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. o In the case at bar, respondent has not shown sufficient evidence that petitioner indeed schemed to procure the dubious documents and lied to establish his version of the facts. What was found was that the document he presented was inadmissible, and its contents were dubious. However, no proof was adduced to sufficiently establish that it came to his hands through his employment of underhanded means. It was error for the courts below to award exemplary damages in the absence of any award for moral, temperate or compensatory damages. The award of attorneys fees must also be deleted. Such award was given in its extraordinary concept as

indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. But it was not sufficiently shown that petitioner acted maliciously in instituting the claim for damages. Perforce, the award of attorneys fees was improper. DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees is hereby DELETED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. WALLEM v. NLRC FACTS: Respondent Macatuno was hired by Wallem Shipmanagement Limited thru its local manning agent petitioner. Said respondent bacame a seaman on board the M/T Fortuna a vessel of Liberian registry. Said respondent was employed for the span of ten months. While the said vessel was berthed in the port of Kawasaki Japan, an altercation ensued between the respondent and his fellow Filipino crew member Gurimbao. The said altercation involved the two Filipinos beating hitting a cadet/apprentice officer of the boat. It seemed that a misunderstanding arose due to the cadet/apprentice insistence that respondent use a shovel to drai water mixed with oil that had accumulated at the rear portion of the upper deck of the vessel. The captain of the ship, who was coincidentally a fellow national of the said cadet/apprentice was able to witness the said incident. As a result, the incident was reported and entered in the tanker's logbook. Also, respondent and Gurimbao were repatriated to the Philippines and later filed complaints for illegal dismissal against the petitioner herein. POEA: petitioners were illegally dismissed and were not even afforded the right to due process. In ruling in favor of the respondent, the POEA held that: (1) Petitioner's reliance on Annex 1 of the Answer: certified true copy of the official logbook, is misplaced. (2) The alleged entries therein were only handpicked and copied from the official logbook of the vessel. (3) Moreover, the pages in the official logbook should have been the ones reproduced in order to be considered as credulous. (4) Also, no documentary evidence was submitted to support the alleged official logbook like the Master's report and the police report or any report by the japanese authorities by reason of their arrest. NLRC: Affirmed the decision of the POEA. ISSUES/RATIO: 1. WON the ship captain's logbook may be accepted unqualified as evidence in this case. NO. We agree with petitioners that the ship's captain logbook is a vital evidence as Article 612 of the Code of Commerce requires the captain to keep a record of his decisions as head of the vessel. Haverton Shipping vs. NLRC: a copy of an official entry in the logbook is legally binding and serves as an exception to the hearsay rule. However, unlike in the this case, there was an investigation conducted by the ship captain, the facts stated in the said logbook were supported by facts gathered in the investigation. In this case, since there was no investigation, the contents of the logbook have to be duly identified

2.

and authenticated. this is so in order to prevent injustice resulting from a blind adoption of such contents which merely serve as prima facie evidence of the incident. Moreoever, unlike in the Haverton case where what was presented was a copy of an official entry from the logbook itself, the petitioner in this case merely offered a typewritten collation of excerpts from what could be the logbook because by their format, they could be lifted from other records kept in the vessel. Also, petitioners did not submit as evidence to the POEA the logbook itself. they could have easily reproduced or photocopied the said entries in the logbook or the authenticated copies of pertinent pages thereof. WON the respondent was illegally dismissed. YES. the offense committed did not fall under the category of insubordination or assaulting a superior officer with the use of a deadly weapon. the cadet/apprentice is not an officer hence the violation is not qualified. Strict interpretation of the employment contract in these cases must be favored since a man's livelihood is at stake. Furthermore, the entry in the logbook is so sketchy that unsupported by other evidence, it leaves so many questions unanswered.

HELD: Petition Denied. MANALO v. ROBLES FACTS: Robles Transportation Co., Inc. operates taxicabs. An accident occurred between one of Robles taxicabs and a passenger truck. In the course of the accident, the Manalos son, Armando was ran over by the taxicab and died. The driver, Edgardo Hernandez was eventually found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. He served out his sentence but failed to pay the indemnity. Two writs of execution were issued against him to satisfy the amount of the indemnity. However, both writs were returned unsatisfied by the sheriff who certified that no property, real or personal, in Hernandez's name could be found. Hence, the spouses Manalo sued Robles to enforce its subsidiary liability under A102-103, RPC. Pieces of Evidence Presented by Spouses Manalo: 1. copy of the decision in the criminal case 2. the writs of execution 3. the returns of the sheriff It must be noted that Robles objected to the admissibility of these pieces of evidence, to no avail. CFI: The Manalo spouses are entitled to recover damages. SC: affirmed the CFI Decision ISSUES: 1. Are these admissibile?

a. b. 2. 3.

judgment of conviction? YES. ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS: sheriffs return? YES.

Were A102-103, RPC repealed by A2177, CC? NO. Has the action prescribed? NO.

RATIO: First Issue Evidence: Judgment of Conviction The judgment of conviction, in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and offended party, is binding upon

the party subsidiarily liable. Evidence: Writ of Execution and Sheriffs Return Robles Argument: In admitting these pieces of evidence to prove Hernandezs insolvency, without requiring the sheriff's appearance in court, it was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine. SC: Relying on Rule 130.44, the sheriff making the return need not testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry. If this exception is not in place, hosts of officials would be found devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering their depositions before an officer. Further, the law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity. Thus, whatever acts they do in discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and circumstances of each case may appear to require. ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS: With reference to the method of proving private documents, an exception is made with reference to the method of proving public documents executed before and certified to, under the hand and seal of certain public officials. (this case is also cited for Entries in the Course of Business, this is the lone statement that I could attribute to that topic) Second Issue A2177, CC expressly recognizes civil liabilities arising from negligence under the RPC, only that it provides that plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act of omission of the defendant. Third Issue Robles Argument: This is an action either upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff or upon a quasi-delict. A1146, CC provides that such an action must be instituted within four years. The accident occurred on Aug. 9, 1947 and the present action was brought on February 17, 1953. Hence, more than four years have elapsed. Thus, the present action has prescribed. SC: The present action is based upon a judgment in a criminal case. Thus, it may be instituted within ten years (A1144, CC). CANQUE v. CA FACTS: Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business under the name and style RDC Construction. She had contracts with the government for: (a) the restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf road; (b) the asphalting of Lutopan access road; and (c) the asphalting of Babag road in Lapulapu City. In connection with these projects, petitioner entered into 2 contracts with private respondent Socor Construction Corporation. 1st contract (Exh. A), dated April 26, 1985, provided:
The Sub-Contractor (SOCOR Corporation) and the Contractor (RDC Construction) for the consideration hereinafter named, hereby agree as follows: 1. SCOPE OF WORK: a. The Sub-Contractor agrees to perform and execute the Supply, Lay and Compact Item 310 and Item 302; b. That Contractor shall provide the labor and materials needed to complete the project; c. That the Contractor agrees to pay the Sub-Contractor the price of (P1,000.00) per Metric Ton of Item 310 and (P8,000.00) per Metric Ton of Item 302. d. That the Contractor shall pay the Sub-Contractor the e.

volume of the supplied Item based on the actual weight in Metric Tons delivered, laid and compacted and accepted by the MPWH; The construction will commence upon the acceptance of the offer.

2nd contract (Exh. B), dated July 23, 1985, stated:

The Supplier (SOCOR Construction) and the Contractor (RDC Construction) for the consideration hereinafter named, hereby agree as follows: 1. SCOPE OF WORK: a. The Supplier agrees to perform and execute the delivery of Item 310 and Item 302 to the jobsite for the Asphalting of DAS Access Road and the Front Gate of ACMDC, Toledo City; b. That the Contractor should inform or give notice to the Supplier (2) days before the delivery of such items; c. That the Contractor shall pay the Supplier the volume of the supplied items on the actual weight in metric tons delivered and accepted by the MPWH (15) days after the submission of the bill; d. The delivery will commence upon the acceptance of the offer.

May 28, 1986, private respondent sent petitioner a bill (Exh. C) o Containing a revised computation, for P299,717.75, plus interest at rate of 3% a month, representing the balance of petitioner's total account of P2,098,400.25 for materials delivered and services rendered by private respondent under the 2 contracts. o However, petitioner refused to pay the amount Claiming that private respondent failed to submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of the items delivered and the acceptance thereof by the government. September 22, 1986, private respondent brought suit in RTC of Cebu to recover from petitioner the sum of P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% o Petitioners answer: Admitted the existence of the contracts with private respondent as well as receipt of the billing (Exh. C), dated May 28, 1986. Disputed the correctness of the bill considering that the deliveries of [private respondent] were not signed and acknowledged by the checkers of [petitioner], the bituminous tack coat it delivered to [petitioner] consisted of 60% water, and [petitioner] has already paid [private respondent] about P1.4M but [private respondent] has not issued any receipt to [petitioner] for said payments and there is no agreement that [private respondent] will charge 3% per month interest. o Petitioners amended answer: Denying she had entered into sub-contracts with private respondent. o During the trial: Private respondent, as plaintiff, presented its vice-president, Sofia O. Sanchez, and Dolores Aday, its bookkeeper. Petitioner's evidence consisted of her lone testimony. TC: ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P299,717.75 plus interest at 12% per annum, and costs. Held: [B]y analyzing the plaintiff's Book of Collectible Accounts particularly page 17 thereof (Exh. "K") this Court is convinced that the entries (both payments and billings) recorded thereat are credible. Undeniably, the book contains a detailed account of SOCOR's commercial transactions

with RDC which were entered therein in the course of business. We cannot therefore disregard the entries recorded under Exhibit "K" because the fact of their having been made in the course of business carries with it some degree of trustworthiness. Besides, no proof was ever offered to demonstrate the irregularity of the said entries thus, there is then no cogent reason for us to doubt their authenticity. In spite of the fact that the contracts did not have any stipulation on interest, interest may be awarded in the form of damages under Article 2209 CC. CA: affirmed; upheld TCs reliance on private respondent's Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) on the basis of Rule 130, Sec 37 ROC

ISSUES/RATIO: 1. WON the CA erred in admitting in evidence as entries in the course of business the entries in SOCORs book of collectible accounts, considering that the person who made said entries actually testified in this case but unfortunately had no personal knowledge of said entries? YES (TOPIC) Petitioner: o Entries in private respondent's Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) cannot take the place of the delivery receipts and that such entries are mere hearsay and, thus, inadmissible in evidence. Respondent: o Cites Rule 130, Sec 37 ROC and argues that the entries in question constitute "entries in the course of business" sufficient to prove deliveries made for the government projects. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, outside of the Philippines or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. SC: o The stipulation in the two contracts requiring the submission of delivery receipts does not preclude proof of delivery of materials by private respondent in some other way. o The question is whether the entries in the Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) constitute competent evidence to show such delivery. The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following conditions: (1) The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify; (2) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer; (3) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (4) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and (5) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. The business entries in question (Exh. K) do not meet the 1st and 3rd requisites. Dolores Aday, who made the entries, was presented

by private respondent to testify on the account of RDC Construction. It was in the course of her testimony that the entries were presented and marked in evidence. There was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the presentation of the entries as the person who made them was available to testify in court. o Necessity is given as a ground for admitting entries, in that they are the best available evidence. o What a man has actually done and committed to writing when under obligation to do the act, it being in the course of the business he has undertaken, and he being dead, there seems to be no danger in submitting to the consideration of the court. o The person who maybe called to court to testify on these entries being dead, there arises the necessity of their admission without the one who made them being called to court be sworn and subjected to cross-examination. And this is permissible in order to prevent a failure of justice. Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. She said she made the entries based on the bills given to her. But she has no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the facts stated in the bills. The deliveries of the materials stated in the bills were supervised by "an engineer for (such) functions." o The person, therefore, who has personal knowledge of the facts stated in the entries, i.e., that such deliveries were made in the amounts and on the dates stated, was the company's project engineer. o The entries made by Aday show only that the billings had been submitted to her by the engineer and that she faithfully recorded the amounts stared therein in the books of account. o Whether or not the bills given to Aday correctly reflected the deliveries made in the amounts and on the dates indicated was a fact that could be established by the project engineer alone who, however, was not presented during trial. o Rule: [W]hen the witness had no personal knowledge of the facts entered by him, and the person who gave him the information is individually known and may testify as to the facts stated in the entry which is not part of a system of entries where scores of employees have intervened, such entry is not admissible without the testimony of the informer.

2.

WON the entries may be admitted under Rule 132 Sec 10? NO.

Sec. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly stated in the writing; but in such case the writing must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution.

Petitioner contends that evidence which is inadmissible for the purpose for which it was offered cannot be admitted for another purpose. Cites from Chief Justice Moran's commentaries: o The purpose for which the evidence is offered

must be specified. Where the offer is general, and the evidence is admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another, the evidence should be rejected. o Likewise, where the offer is made for two or more purposes and the evidence is incompetent for one of them, the evidence should be excluded. o The reason for the rule is that "it is the duty of a party to select the competent from the incompetent in offering testimony, and he cannot impose this duty upon the trial court." o Where the evidence is inadmissible for the purpose stated in the offer, it must be rejected, though the same may be admissible for another purpose. o Rule: If a party . . . opens the particular view with which he offers any part of his evidence, or states the object to be attained by it, he precludes himself from insisting on its operation in any other direction, or for any other object; and the reason is, that the opposite party is prevented from objecting to its competency in any view different from the one proposed. It should be noted, however, that Exh. K is not really being presented for another purpose. Private respondent's counsel offered it for the purpose of showing the amount of petitioner's indebtedness. He said: o Exhibit "K," your Honor faithful reproduction of page (17) of the book on Collectible Accounts of the plaintiff, reflecting the principal indebtedness of defendant in the amount of (P299,717.75) and reflecting as well the accumulated interest of (3%) monthly compounded such that as of December 11, 1987, the amount collectible from the defendant by the plaintiff is (P616,435.72); o This is also the purpose for which its admission is sought as a memorandum to refresh the memory of Dolores Aday as a witness. In other words, it is the nature of the evidence that is changed, not the purpose for which it is offered. Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself constitute evidence. As explained in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals: o Under the above provision (Rule 132, Sec 10), the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. o In other words, where the witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence. o It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because he supports his open-court declaration with written statements of the same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down. o What is more, even where this requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of the rule itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if only because it is not very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such evidence.

As the entries in question (Exh. K) were not made based on personal knowledge, they could only corroborate Dolores Aday's testimony that she made the entries as she received the bills.

3.

Does this, therefore, mean there is no competent evidence of private respondent's claim as petitioner argues? NO. Aside from Exh. K, private respondent presented the following documents: (1) Exhibits A: Contract Agreement dated 26
April 1985 which contract covers both the Toledo wharf project and the Babag Road project in Lapulapu City. (2) Exhibit B: Contract Agreement dated 23 July 1985 which covers the DAS Asphalting Project. (3) Exhibit C: Revised Computation of Billings submitted on May 28, 1986. (4) Exhibit D: an affidavit executed by [petitioner] to the effect that she has no more pending or unsettled obligations as far as Toledo Wharf Road is concerned. (5) Exhibit D-1: Statement of Work Accomplished on the Road Restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf project. (6) Exhibit E: another affidavit executed by [petitioner] attesting that she has completely paid her laborers at the project located at Babag, Lapulapu City (7) Exhibits F, G, G-1, G-2, G-3: Premiums paid by [private respondent] together with the receipts for filing fees. (8) Exhibits H, I, J: certifications issued by OIC, MPWH, Regional Office; Lapulapu City, City Engineer; Toledo City Treasurer's Office respectively, proving that RDC construction has no more collectibles with all the said government offices in connection with its projects. (9) Exhibit L: Bill No. 057 under the account of RDC Construction in the amount of P153,382.75 dated August 24, 1985. (10) Exhibit M: Bill No. 069 (RDC's account), in the amount of P1,701,795.00 dated November 20, 1985. (11) Exhibit N: Bill No. 071 (RDC's account) in the amount of P47,250.00 dated November 22, 1985. (12) Exhibit O: Bill No. 079 (RDC's account) in the amount of P7,290.00 dated December 6, 1985.

The entries recorded under Exhibit "K" were supported by Exhibits "L", "M", "N", and "O" which are all Socor Billings under the account of RDC Construction. These billings were presented and duly received by the authorized representatives of defendant. The circumstances obtaining in the case at bar clearly show that for a long period of time after receipt thereof, RDC never manifested its dissatisfaction or objection to the aforestated billings submitted by plaintiff. Neither did defendant immediately protest to plaintiff's alleged incomplete or irregular performance. In view of these facts, we believe Art. 1235 of the New Civil Code is applicable. o Art. 1235. When the obligee accepts the performance, knowing its incompleteness and irregularity and without expressing any protest or objection, the obligation is deemed complied with. o FINALLY, after a conscientious scrutiny of the records, we find Exhibit "D-1" (p. 85 record) to be a material proof of plaintiff's complete fulfillment of its obligation. o There is no question that plaintiff supplied RDC Construction with Item 302 (Bitunimous Prime Coat), Item 303 (Bituminous Tack Coat) and Item 310 (Bitunimous Concrete Surface Course) in all the three projects o On the other hand, no proof was ever offered by defendant to show the presence of other contractors in those projects. We can therefore conclude that it was Socor Construction Corp.

ALONE who supplied RDC with Bituminous Prime Coat, Bituminous Tack Coat and Bituminous Concrete Surface Course for all the three projects. Indeed, while petitioner had previously paid private respondent about P1.4M for deliveries made in the past, she did not show that she made such payments only after the delivery receipts had been presented by private respondent. o On the other hand, it appears that petitioner was able to collect the full amount of project costs from the government, so that petitioner would be unjustly enriched at the expense of private respondent if she is not made to pay what is her just obligation the contracts.