SCIR Issue II

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
USCS UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
VOL. 1 ISSUE 2 FALL 2011
Southern California International Review

Volume 1, Number 2 Fall 2011
Southern California International Review

scinternationalreview.org
Staff
Editor-in-Chief: Angad Singh Editors:
Philip Meyer Samir Kumar Rashmi Rikhy Chandni Raja Landry Doyle Taline Gettas Jake Kennedy
Cover Design: Samir Kumar Layout: Philip Meyer
The Southern California International Review (SCIR) is a bi-annual interdisciplinary print and online journal of scholarship in the field of international studies generously funded by the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California (USC). In particular, SCIR would like to thank the Robert L. Friedheim Fund and the USC SIR Alumni Fund. Founded in 2011, the journal seeks to foster and enhance discussion between theoretical and policy-oriented research regarding significant global issues. SCIR also serves as an opportunity for undergraduate students at USC to publish their work. SCIR is managed completely by students and also provides undergraduates valuable experience in the fields of editing and graphic design.
Copyright 2011 Southern California International Review. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form without the express written consent of the Southern California International Review. Views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors themselves and do not necessarily represent those of the editorial board, faculty advisors, or the University of Southern California.
Dedicated to the memory of a beloved teacher and respected leader: Robert L. Friedheim Professor of International Relations, 1976-2001 Director of the School of International Relations, 1992-1995
A letter from the editor:

It is with great pleasure that I introduce the second issue of the new Southern California International Review (SCIR). This bi-annual undergraduate journal seeks to create a unique opportunity for students here at the University of Southern California to publish their research and other academic work in order to spread their ideas to a wider audience. By fostering such dialogue between students of international relations and other related fields both on campus and throughout the region, SCIR looks to promote a better understanding of the global issues facing our world today. As our world becomes increasingly interconnected through technology, trade, and diplomacy, its evident that events occurring anywhere on the globe have worldwide effects. The need to study international relations has never been more important and thus this journal desires to contribute unique and innovative ideas to this fascinating and essential field of study. The pieces contained in the journal are written by undergraduate students and were chosen by our eight-member editorial board. The graphics, templates, and formatting was also designed by our editorial board. In an effort to not restrict students in their submissions, SCIR welcomed submissions on a wide variety of topics in the realm of international studies thereby emphasizing our commitment to interdisciplinary learning. SCIR is also available on-line at scinternationalreview.org. The journal would also not be here without the generous funding of the School of International Relations. Lastly, SCIR would really appreciate to hear your feedback on our issue. Please send us your comments, questions, and suggestions at scinternationalreview@gmail.com. Sincerely, Angad Singh Editor-in-Chief
Contents
1.
Assessing Levels of Difficulty in the EU Enlargement Process An Examination of Irish, Spanish, and Bulgarian Accession Maya Swisa Holy Rus The Orthodox Church and Society in Post-Soviet Russia Philip Meyer The Internet as a Fundamental Human Right Examining the Boundaries of Free Speech Online Rebecca Wertman Northern Mexicos Maquiladoras Enhancing the US-Mexico Bilateral Relationship Rafael Cano
2.
31
3.
53
4.
65
Assessing Levels of Difficulty in EU Enlargement

An Examination of Irish, Spanish, and Bulgarian Accession
Maya Swisa
This study examines the levels of difficulty in the accession process during the first, second, and fourth round of enlargement from the perspective of the applicant countries. It seeks to understand the role that public diplomacy has played in the enlargement process and whether it facilitates accession when examined alongside adherence to economic, political-domestic, and acquis communautaire selection criteria. In each respective round, the state selected represents the country that would have had the hardest time acceding to the Union for economic, political, or historical reasons. This analysis gives attention to how much reform was needed in Ireland, Spain, and Bulgaria in order to join the Union and how prepared each state was based on its preparation in the areas of economic, political-domestic, acquis communautaire, and public diplomacy reforms for acquiring membership. After drawing comparisons from the accession of these three countries, this paper conclude that accession was more difficult for Spain than it was for Ireland. However, it was far easier for Bulgaria than for both Ireland and Spain because the standards for Bulgarias accession were much lower. Thus, states in the last round faced less difficulty in joining the EU. While the levels of difficulty over time were not consistent across the board, it appears that public diplomacy did facilitate Bulgaria, who, out of the three countries, utilized public diplomacy the most in its accession process.
Introduction
The Six began the process of European enlargement in 1957 with the signing of the Treaty of Rome.1 The treaty aimed to achieve integration through the economic expansion of the European Economic Community (EEC). As a result, the Union has grown from six to twenty-seven member states. The unprecedented enlargement came about in four rounds. In the first round, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (UK) joined the Community in 1973. In the second round, Greece became a member state in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. In the third round, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the European Union (EU)2 in 1995. In the fourth and largest round of enlargement to date, the EU granted
1 The Six refers to France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 2 The Treaty of Nice combined the Treaty of the European Community (EC) and the Treaty of the European Union (EU) in a more consolidated version. Since then, the organization is generally referred to as the EU. (See Treaties and Law)
Maya Swisa graduated from USC with a Bachelors Degree in International Relations in May 2011.
10
Maya Swisa
membership to ten Central and Eastern European countries in 2004,3 followed by the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.4 In the first few of the four rounds of enlargement, the requirements for membership remained rather vague. Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome states any member state may apply to become a member of the Community.5 In later rounds, however, the criteria became more clear-cut. In 1993, the Union created the Copenhagen Criteria as the official accession criteria for applicant states. With the establishment of more specific guidelines over time, the question arises as to whether the standards for accession into the EU have risen with each successive round of enlargement, thus making it more difficult to join. This is important for determining how extensively and rapidly the EU will pursue future enlargement. This study seeks to analyze the level of difficulty in accession with each round of EU enlargement, focusing solely on the perspective of the member states and applicant states in the enlargement process. In the cases presented, a representative sample country is selected from each round of enlargement. The states that would appear to have the most difficulty of all the applicants in their respective rounds of enlargement are chosen as representative countries. The third round of enlargement is excluded from this analysis because it represents a round where the inclusion of the three applicant countries, due to their domestic stability and economic success, was an obvious benefit to the Union. In this analysis, this paper examines three cases from the first, second, and fourth roundIreland, Spain, and Bulgaria respectively. These states faced the most difficulty, in their respective rounds, joining the Community due to historical, economic, or political circumstances. In this analysis, the level of difficulty is scrutinized based on three variableseconomic, political-domestic, and acquis communautaire6derived from the Copenhagen Criteria. Because the Copenhagen Criteria were not in effect during the first and second round, this study simply draws upon the three variables as a guide for measuring difficulty. The fourth variable, public diplomacy, adds a new and important dimension that is rarely addressed, if at all, in the literature about enlargement. It remains an important component because, by altering their perceived image, applicant states are able to influence the accession process.
3 Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 4 European Union. Communication Department of the European Commission. From 6 to 27 Members and Beyond. Europa. eu. <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/from-6-to-27-members/index_en.htm> 5 Article 237: Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after obtaining the opinion of the Commission. The conditions of admission and the adjustments to this Treaty necessitated thereby shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant state. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the Contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. (See Treaty of Rome) 6 Acquis communautaire refers to the ability of states to literally acquire community, in other words adopt the EUs treaties and laws, declarations and resolutions, international agreements on EU affairs, and judgments given by the Court of Justice. This also includes joint action taken by the EU member states in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. (See EU At A Glance)
Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2
Assessing Levels of Difficulty in the EU Enlargement Process
11
In this analysis, the accession process begins with the acceptance of a candidates application and ends with the formal accession. The paper proceeds as follows. First, the abovementioned framework is laid out for analysis in a review of previous enlargement literature. Following this description, the three case studies are presented. In each case, this paper analyzes the measures taken to reach political and economic stability, fulfill the acquis communautaire, and incorporate a public diplomacy campaign in the accession process and its resulting outcomes. Ultimately, this paper finds that Bulgaria met the overall lowest standards of the three cases and, because it made the least amount of progress in its reforms, had the least amount of difficulty in joining the EU. Despite not fully meeting the necessary domestic, economic, and acquis criteria prior to its accession, the EU still granted Bulgaria full membership. Furthermore, Bulgarias engagement in public diplomacy ultimately acted as a facilitator in the accession process.
Frameworks for Understanding Enlargement

With no shortage of literature on the enlargement process, authors have approached the issue rather differently. This section presents the various frameworks that have been used to examine enlargement, putting the choice of frameworks into perspective. Christopher Preston focuses his analysis on how the EUs objectives and procedures in the enlargement process act either as impetuses or inhibitors to accession.7 First, Preston looks at the EUs present goals, particularly with regards to internal economic and political growth. The EU bases its decisions on the effect that enlargement has on those particular goals. Second, he discusses the difficulty faced by the Union in striking a balance between widening and deepening.8 The EU tends to focus either on enlargement or integration, prioritizing one over the other at any given point in time.9 The third variable of his model focuses on the potential risk posed by increasing EU membership. For example, in the case of Spain, the risks of accession were higher for the EU because the countrys large fisheries and agricultural sector could lead to internal competition by threatening to make the current member states fisheries and agricultural contributions relatively inadequate. Fourth, Preston discusses the role of the Community Method and the Classical Method in determining a states accession. In the former, member states ability to reach a unanimous consensus within the framework of the European Council influences whether or not the EU will pursue enlargement. In the latter, the Unions principles and procedures underlying the
7 Preston, Christopher. Enlargement & Integration in the European Union. London: Routledge, 1997. 6. 8 Preston, 6. 9 Allen, David. Wider but weaker or the more the merrier: enlargement and foreign policy cooperation in the EC/EU, Charleston, South Carolina. 1995.
12
Maya Swisa
enlargement process play an important role in determining accession.10 While Prestons approach can prove useful, it tends to be more EU-centric and institutional in nature. Even though the EU derives authority from its ability to open and close chapters in the enlargement process, this analysis conveys that the individual member states make the final decision to pursue enlargement. Thus, concentrating solely on the EU and its institutions remains insufficient in examining the enlargement process. Martin Banses analysis of the macroeconomic implications associated with enlargement focuses more on specific aspects of the economic criteria. He looks at the macroeconomic compatibility of the candidates with the EU for determining the likelihood of accession. His frameworks for analysis include agriculture and trade policy, wages, gross domestic product (GDP), gross investment, exchange rates, income of private households, agricultural/non-agricultural production and consumption, and net EU transfers.11 When economic convergence results in high levels of compatibility and mutual benefit, candidate countries are more likely to join the Union. While the focus on the economic implications of accession is important in enlargement research, Banse falls short in addressing the political aspects of accession. The approach laid out in this paper considers both political and economic components. Nomi Lendvais assessment examines five key frameworks for determining accession. First, she points to the institutionalization of EU social policy and the adoption of the social aspects of the acquis, particularly adherence to the aims of political union. Second, she points to the extent of de-centralization of the governmental structures in the applicant states. Third, she assesses the role of a window of opportunity regarding the timing of accession. Fourth, she argues that states commitment to the acquis in domestic reform influences their ability to join the Union. This relates to the fifth element, which analyzes the extent to which a state undergoes the process of Europeanization norms in its policy processes.12 This analysis does not address the roles of window of opportunity or Europeanization because they are not as much determinants as they are inherent elements of the enlargement process. After a states application for accession has been granted, it can be assumed that a window of opportunity has already opened and will not necessarily close as the candidate continues to prepare itself for accession. Furthermore, by participating in acquis reforms and accession negotiations, the candidate inherently partakes in a process of Europeanization.
10 The Community Method refers on an intergovernmental approach of unanimous consensus in the EU used for agreeing on enlargement. The Classical Method refers to the formal accession procedures as well as certain implicit principles and assumptions that have been integral in shaping the process. (See Macroeconomic Implications for EU Accession) 11 Banse, Martin. Macroeconomic Implications for EU Accession. Central and Eastern European Agriculture in an Expanding European Union. By Banse, Martin, and Stefan Tangermann. New York: CABI, 2000. 133-55. 12 Lendvai, Nomi. The Weakest Link? EU Accession and Enlargement: Dialoguing EU and Post-Communist Social Policy. Journal of European Social Policy 14.3 (2004): 319-33.
13
The most important elements included in Lendvais approach revolve around the acquis, domestic reforms, and de-centralization as driving forces behind accession. Her attention to de-centralization is important because it leads to economic and political stability, which ultimately influences preparedness for accession. However, her emphasis on the acquis and its domestic reforms falls short in that it only addresses its social aspects. Preparation for membership includes economic and political aspects as well. Therefore, this research paper focuses on all aspectssocial, political, and economicof the candidates preparation for enlargement. Two works reference the role of domestic political structure. Geoffrey Pridham relies on the degree to which democracy has been consolidated in an applicant country for determining accession. In particular, a state must address issues of rule of law, state apparatus, and civil, political, and economic society in order to be considered democratic.13 The further along a states government is in the democratization process, the less preparation is needed for accession. Similarly, Martin Brusis focuses on the role of self-government, particularly the role of regional self-government with substantial fiscal and legal autonomy.14 Certain applicants must embark on institutional reforms both at the regional and national level before they can join the EU. While this paper agrees with the two approaches, they are insufficient in explaining enlargement in its entirety. Thus, in addition to focusing on the level of democratization, this analysis focuses on economic development as an indicator for stability and preparation. This examination closely resembles the work of Susan Senior Nello and Karen E. Smith. They look specifically to the role of the economic and political criteria that a state must meet in order to join the Union as well as its ability to commit to the full spectrum of the EUs acquis communautaire.15 These guidelines closely follow the Copenhagen Criteria, which, although established in 1993, have played a role in determining the underlying factors of accession since the first round of enlargement. Like Nello and Smith, this analysis also utilizes the Copenhagen Criteria as a guide for the accession criteria in this analysis. When looking into the three cases, the paper makes a general assessment based on determinants such as democratic institutions, the amount of liberalized trade with other states, and any other changes made to prepare the country for accession. It splits the criteria into three categories: economic, political-domestic, and acquis communautaire. In addition, public diplomacy is included as a fourth variable.
13 Pridham, Geoffrey. EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post-Communist States - Formality and Reality. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 40.5 (2002): 955. 14 Brusis, Martin. Between EU Requirements, Competitive Politics, and National Traditions: Recreating Regions in the Accession Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Governance 15.1 (2002):531559. 15 Senior Nello, Susan, and Karen E. Smith. The Consequences of Eastern Enlargement of the European Union in Stages. European University Institute: Robert Schuman Centre (1997).
14
Maya Swisa
In this paper, the three accession criteria represent values upheld by the EU as an economic, political, and supra-national organization. First, the potential member states must show stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.16 The Union cannot offer membership to a state that does not uphold these democratic values in its political-domestic setting. Second, the candidate must show the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.17 Because the EU has built its existence based on liberalized trade and free markets, a member must be able to contribute to the economic success of all member states. Third, the state seeking accession is required to show the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union.18 States must be prepared to take on all EU laws under the premise of acquis communautaire. This ensures that membership allows EU legal supremacy over national law. Much of literature on enlargement falls short by not including public diplomacy as a relevant aspect of the accession process. Unlike previous frameworks, this analysis includes public diplomacy as the fourth variable to the three abovementioned variables. Because the concept of public diplomacy is a rather new phenomenon, definitions continue to develop over time. Earlier definitions described public diplomacy as direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments.19 This definition tends to focus on governments as the central actors controlling the process. However, later definitions define actors and content more specifically.20 More recently, public diplomacy has been defined as the way in which both governments and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes or opinions which bear directly on another governments foreign policy decisions.21 This paper will utilize a simplified definition that includes the efforts of government actors rather than incorporating non-state actors. Because public diplomacy was not as relevant in the earlier rounds of enlargement, governmental officials and elites were the only actors required to utilize and implement any action resembling public diplomacy. Non-state actors were not as relevant to the accession process in these rounds. Regarding the recipients of public
16 European Union. Communication Department of the European Commission. Accession Criteria. Europa.eu. <http:// ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm> 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Malone, Gifford. Managing public diplomacy. Washington Quarterly 8.3 (1985): 199. 20 Gilboa, Eytan. Searching for A theory of Public Diplomacy. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616.1 (2008): 57. 21 Signitzer, Benno, and Timothy Coombs. Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Conceptual Divergence. Public Relations Review 18:2 (1992): 138.
15
diplomacy, this paper includes foreign publics and foreign governments as part of its public diplomacy definition. Some of the case studies utilize pubic diplomacy to portray a positive image to foreign publics in order to improve the candidates chances for accession. Although it is not applicable to all the case studies, public diplomacy has to be included as part of the criteria because, as this paper shows in the case of Bulgaria, it does have an affect on the accession process. This paper assesses the extent and outcome of public diplomacy efforts in the accession process. This examination seeks to understand whether public diplomacy has an impact on the accession process. It concludes that public diplomacy remains an important undertaking for candidates in accession, along with meeting the economic, political, and acquis criteria.
Case Studies: Ireland, Spain, and Bulgaria

These next three sections are devoted to the three case studiesIreland, Spain, and Bulgaria. As mentioned earlier, these states historical, economic, or political circumstances made joining the Community more difficult. In the first round of enlargement, Ireland lagged behind Denmark and the UK economically, with the lowest GDP per capita of the three applicants.22 In the second round, the three countries were all relatively new democracies. However, Greece joined the Community immediately in 1981 before Spain and Portugal joined in 1986. While Spain and Portugal had been in relatively similar positions politically, Spain met more difficulty than Portugal in negotiating its conditions for accession with the EU.23 Bulgaria and Romania were not deemed ready for accession in 2004, when ten other applicants joined the EU in the fourth round. Due to their domestic instability, both countries faced tough probation conditions for future development upon their entry in 2007. In choosing between the two, Bulgaria had to work harder than Romania in dealing with high inflation and cracking down on its governmental corruption and domestic instability. 24 This analysis seeks to assess the level of difficulty each state faced relative to one another. After comparing each states level of difficulty in becoming a member state, it can be concluded that accession was more difficult for Spain than it was for Ireland. However, it was far easier for Bulgaria than for both Ireland and Spain. Of the three countries, Bulgaria was the least prepared for membership and made the least amount of progress in its reforms. However, the standards for Bulgarias accession were much lower than for Spain or Ireland. Thus, states in the final round of enlargement faced less difficulty in joining the EU than those in the first or second rounds.
22 In 1973, the three countries GDP per capita was $2,361.28Ireland; $5,966.11Denmark; 3,255.66United Kingdom. (See Country Facts) 23 Preston, 8. 24 Noutcheva, Gergana and Dimitar Bechev. The Successful Laggards: Bulgaria and Romanias Accession to the EU, East European Politics & Societies 22.1 (2008): 121; Jordan, Michael J. New Europe, New Problems, Foreign Policy 9 Mar. 2011.
16
Maya Swisa
Ireland
During the first round of enlargement, Ireland was accepted into the European Community (EC) along with the United Kingdom and Denmark in 1973. It took about twelve years to join after the Irish Prime Minister, Sen Lemass, first applied for membership in 1961. Membership into the EC offered an opportunity for Ireland to grow economically and politically while simultaneously allowing it to become more self-reliant. When compared with Spain, Ireland faced less difficulty in joining the Union. In terms of its economic stability, when Ireland joined in 1973, it was considered one of the poorest countries in the EC. Its GDP per capita was approximately 53 percent lower than the average of all the existing member states. After WWII, Irelands economic growth had stumbled at around 2 percent throughout the early 1950s compared to 6 percent in most of Western Europe, leaving Ireland significantly behind.25 However, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the government moved its strategic orientation from protectionism and isolationism to increased liberalization and externalization. This strategic switch was prompted by balance of payments difficulties, recession, and emigration during the war. The Republic sought to achieve an exporting economy by modernizing and reorienting the domestic economy to attract more investment.26 During the 1950s, the Irish standard of living amongst the poor population gradually improved as the Labor government implemented a welfare state system. In 1959, when Lemass came to office, he embarked on his plan to fully rebuild the Irish economy. This plan included reconstructing the agricultural industry and subsidizing almost two-thirds of costs to set up factories in Ireland. As a result of Lemasss policies, the Irish economy grew faster than any predictions and exports had risen by 50 percent in the period from 1960-1966.27 Although it was one of the poorest countries at its time of entry, the Irish economy faced remarkable economic growth while preparing for accession into the EC. By 1973, Irelands GDP was $7.26 billion, up from $2.26 billion in 1962.28 With regards to its political-domestic organization, Ireland was considered a stable liberal democracy in the years leading up to joining the EC.29 As a result of deep-seated nationalism and religious conflict, Northern Ireland began experiencing violence and political
25 Berry, Frank. Irish Economic Development over Three Decades of EU Membership. Czech Journal of Economics and Finance 53.9-10 (2003): 396. 26 ODonnell, Rory. The New Ireland in the New Europe. Europe: The Irish Experience. Dublin: Institute of European Affairs, 2000. 27 Abbot, Patrick. History of Ireland 1945-1963: The Birth of the Irish Republic and Economic Development. <http://www. wesleyjohnston.com/users/ireland/past/history/19451963.html> 28 Barrientos, Miguel, and Claudia Soria. Ireland-GDP. IndexMundi. <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/ireland/gdp>. 29 Gilland, Karin, and Raj Chari. European Integration: Enlargement Now and Then: Implications for Ireland. Irish Studies in International Affairs 12 (2001): 217.
17
unrest since the Republic of Ireland gained independence from the British Empire in 1922.30 However, because much of this instability occurred in Northern Ireland, a region outside the Republic, in the British Commonwealth, the political misgivings of Northern Ireland were not significant enough to hinder the Republics bid for accession. Much of the debate regarding Irelands accession refers to economic capability and political support of the acquis as dominant issues of contention.31 Irelands ability to fulfill the democratic values in the Community was not an issue. Committing to the acquis communautaire in Ireland required constitutional reform that could only be approved by popular referendum. Ireland began to set up these reforms in 1962 with the establishment of a legal committee comprised of the Attorney General and officials from the Department of Justice and External Affairs. Initially, the committee found only five articles in the Constitution that were in direct conflict with the Treaty of Rome. Instead of amending the entire Constitution, the committee proposed that Ireland add a single amendment binding Irish law to the Treaty of Rome.32 After coming up with an acceptable amendment in 1962, the Irish application was withdrawn in 1963 as a result of a veto by Charles de Gaulle.33 The committee did not reconvene until 1967 and a significant amount of EC integration occurred in that six-year interim beginning with Irelands application.34 Thus, when the committee reconvened, they dealt with integrating the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), as well as a number of other EU policies and judgments, into Irish domestic law.35 When Ireland sat at the negotiating table with the EEC in 1970, the areas needing reconciliation included: Anglo-Irish Trading Agreements, fisheries, animal and plant health, sensitive industries, dumping, tariff quotas, the EECs Common Commercial Policy (CCP), economic and monetary union, industrial incentives, and structural reform for the CAP.36 However, in Ireland, there were few problems (in accession negotiations), since both the political will of the government and the wish of the people were unreservedly in favor of accession to the Community.37 By 1972, after holding a successful popular referendum
30 Hutchinson, Matthew. Ireland: Countries IN Profile. InContext 11.5 (2010). <http://www.incontext.indiana.edu/2010/septoct/article3.asp> 31 Keogh, Dermot. The Diplomacy of `Dignified Calm: An Analysis of Irelands Application for Membership of the EEC, 1961-1963. Chronicon 1.4 (1997): 1-68. Web. <http://www.ucc.ie/chronicon/keoghfra.htm> 32 Geary, Michael J. A Historical Analysis of the Constitutional Implications of Irelands Membership of the European Economic Community, 1961-73. The Irish Legal History Conference, Dublin (2007): 4. 33 Ibid., 6. 34 The six-year interim refers to 1961-1967. Although candidates requested a slowing down of EU integration during their application period, member states continued to further integration at a rather rapid pace. 35 Geary, 8. 36 Ibid., 13. 37 Centre Virtuel De La Connaissance Sur LEurope. Negotiations with Ireland, Denmark and Norway. European Navigator. <http://www.ena.lu>
18
Maya Swisa
to amend the constitution, the committee was able to implement a single constitutional amendment to guarantee acquis.38 Despite the numerous reforms and challenges posed by the acquis, Ireland only needed to introduce one amendment to adhere to it. In the end, Ireland only faced difficulty in the interim period when its application was withdrawn. However, this did not directly affect its ability to take on the acquis as much as it simply prolonged the process. Thus, Ireland faced little difficulty in reforming its domestic law to adapt to EU law. The use of public diplomacy in the case of Ireland was rather weak, especially when compared to the later cases of Bulgaria and Spain. While Ireland had embarked on several domestic information campaigns regarding enlargement, there was a lack of external campaigns aimed at the foreign publics of existing member states. Because the heads of state had the final say in granting membership, popular opinion was not as relevant in the first round.39 Of the six member states, France was the only country to hold a popular referendum to approve the first round of enlargement.40 This decreased the importance of foreign publics opinions regarding accession. However, in spite of importance, Ireland did not direct any public diplomacy campaigns in France with the intent to influence its referendum. Because of the value placed on the political elites in existing member states, Lemass and other Irish officials, especially in the Department of Foreign Affairs, developed a sophisticated understanding of the EEC, created a network of contacts with the institutions and member states.41 While the establishment of these political contacts allowed for mutual communication and trust, helping Ireland overcome certain political obstacles, it still does not qualify as public diplomacy because the government did not directly target any foreign publics with some sort of communication campaign.42 Instead, Irelands campaign represents a more government-to-government form of traditional diplomacy. In the case of Ireland, the Republic underwent certain major economic changes in the years leading up to accession. In terms of its political-domestic reform, Ireland needed to do rather little to prove itself as a democratic government that upheld the political values embodied in the Community. In terms of the acquis, Ireland faced some minor challenges, but was able to prove lawful commitment to the acquis via a single constitutional amendment. Regarding public diplomacy, although Lemass made an effort to communicate Irelands commitment to political elites and heads of state, there was little effort at communicating to
38 Geary, 14. 39 Centre Virtuel De La Connaissance Sur LEurope. Treaty concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom to the EEC and the EAEC. 1972. European Navigator. <http://www.ena.lu/>. 40 Leleu, Claude. The French Referendum of April 23, 1972. European Journal of Political Research 4.4 (1976): 25-46. 41 ODonnell (2000). 42 A major issue of contention among existing member states was Irelands non-membership in NATO. However, Irish leaders were eventually able to convince political elites of their cooperative and non-isolationist intentions within the Community.
19
the foreign publics. However, it is important to note lack of public diplomacy did not inevitably prevent Ireland from joining the EU because foreign publics played a less significant role in the enlargement process.
Spain
Although Francisco Franco first applied to the European Community in 1961, it would not be until after his death in 1977 that the EC would consider Spanish accession.43 Successive Spanish governments led by Prime Ministers Adolfo Surez, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, and Felipe Gonzlez worked hard for Spains integration into the European Community.44 Spain officially became a member in 1986seven years after negotiations began. In terms of its economic stability, until the 1960s, Spain remained a rather closed economy inside Western Europe. There was minimal foreign trade and external economic activity. Because the state controlled the countrys command economy, the government was a central actor in renovating and liberalizing its economy. In the 1960s and 1970s, Spain was transformed into a modern industrial economy with a thriving tourism sector.45 The country had established a capitalist free-market economy that was highly ranked in the world economy well before its accession process. Spain was a country with a strong, modern, and advanced capitalist economy by the mid 1970s. For six years until 1976, Spain enjoyed a GDP growth of approximately six percent. By 1976, measured at current prices and exchange rates, Spains economy was ranked eighth by OECD, behind only members of the G7.46 In Spain, the economic transition from a command economy to a market economy had taken place well before Francos death and the countrys transition from authoritarian to democratic rule.47 The economic expansion in Spain led to an improved income distribution and the development of a large middle class.48 To put it in perspective, at the time of accession, Spains GDP per capita was approximately 48 percent below the EC average in 1986 compared to Irelands, which was 53 percent below the EC average in 1973. Because Spains economy had developed so much before the accession process began, Spain had to embark on fewer economic reforms than Ireland, making Spains economic accession easier. With regards to its political-domestic situation, Spain was a democratic state at the time of accession in 1986. However, one of the main reasons Spain was marginalized from
43 Generalissimo Francisco Franco was a Spanish dictator who acted as head of state for 36 years, from 1936 until his death in 1975. (See Manuel, 5.); Gilland, Chari, 217; Centre Virtuel De La Connaissance Sur LEurope. Spains application for accession to the European Economic Community. 1977. European Navigator. <http://www.ena.lu/>. 44 Spain. Spain The Fulfillment of a European Destiny. Representacin Permanente De Espaa Ante La Unin Europea. <http://www.es-ue.org/Default.asp?section=157&lg=1> 45 Spain. U.S. Department of State. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2878.htm> 46 Gilland, Chari, 219. 47 Ibid., 219. 48 U.S. Department of State.
20
Maya Swisa
European integration in the late 1950s and 1960s was related to its domestic politics. Because the country experienced a political dictatorship during the early years of integration, the Community had rejected multiple applications for Spains accession in the 1960s.49 Spain had isolated itself politically and failed to represent the democratic values embodied in the Community. However, the death of Franco in 1975 paved the way for accession and the emergence of a democratic government. Francos heir, Prince Carlos de Borbon y Borbon, became the king and chief of state after Francos death. He replaced Francos prime minister with his own, Adolfo Surez, whose administration sought to liberalize Spains new government. Upon Surezs entry into office in 1976, Suarez promised to hold elections in one year and by 1977, Spain held its first parliamentary elections since 1936.50 Spain had consolidated its parliamentary democracy by the late 1970s. By then, political parties had become legal entities competing in elections, a constitution with a Charter of Rights had been put in place, and the government had drafted basic legislation and re-established basic representative institutions including the House, Senate, and Supreme Court. In addition, communities like Catalonia and Basque country were legally deemed autonomous entities and a strong social safety net had been restructured, guaranteeing a strong social safety net.51 By setting up basic democratic legislation and institutions, Spain established the foundation and structure for a functioning democratic government. By the 1982 elections, Spain had eight registered political parties on the ballot.52 Voter turnout in the election was nearly eighty percent with 21 million votes.53 Even though Spain was a relatively young democratic regime, it became a full-fledged democracy both on paper and in reality. Spain made a significant number of domestic changes to its political structure in order to join the EC. Ireland, on the other hand, changed relatively little of its domestic political structure. The EC required that Spain make certain reforms to comply with the acquis communautaire. In negotiation rounds, the main obstacles for Spain revolved around the adaptation of its agricultural sector to comply with the CAP, particularly in the areas of fishing quotas and agricultural production.54 The addition of Spains economy to the EEC was estimated
49 Gilland, Chari, 217. 50 U.S. Department of State. 51 Gilland, Chari, 218. 52 The participating political parties: Partido Socialista Obrero Espaol (PSOE), Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), A. Popular-P. Demcrata Popular-P. Demcrata Liberal-U. de Centro Democrtico (AP-PDP-PDL-UCD), Herri Batasuna (HB), Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE), Centro Democrtico y Social (CDS), Partido Comunista de Espaa (PCE), and Fuerza Nueva (FN). (See October 28, 1982 General Election Results) 53 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Voter Turnout Data for Spain. 2010. <http://www.idea.int/ vt/country_view.cfm?CountryCode=ES> 54 Representacin Permanente De Espaa Ante La Unin Europea.
21
to increase its entire agricultural area by 30 percent.55 While Spain widened the economic base of the EEC, the inclusion of its agricultural area meant the emergence of direct competition with French agricultural products like fruits, olive oil, and vegetables. Similarly, Spains fishing fleet alone was larger than the entire EEC fleet. This led to member states interest in limiting Spains economic impact in these sectors.56 After a difficult round of negotiations, Spain was eventually able to put forth certain proposals addressing agriculture, fisheries, and internal competition that were acceptable to all EC member states, including France.57 Spain had to integrate in tariffs and prices and approve tax changes that the EC had already put in place, which included the establishment of a VAT. The process also included a second phase, which entailed the removal of technical barriers to trade, which brought significant adjustment costs to Spain.58 Although an agreement was reached, it was at a price. The terms of the Treaty of Accession were less than favorable to Spain, making the country a net contributor to the EC budget for several years after.59 Compared to Ireland, Spain faced more difficulty in order to accommodate the acquis process. Post-dictatorship Spain needed to utilize public diplomacy to help convey its democratic transformation to foreign publics. In 1962 when Spain first called for EC membership, many member states opposed it on the basis of Spains lack of democracy and isolationist policies. Therefore after Francos death, Spain needed to communicate that it had changed from an isolationist dictatorship to a cooperative democracy. Spain joined a number of international organizations and signed international human rights declarations as well as social charters, shifting its foreign policy to be more cooperative. In addition to these policy changes, which were important in legitimizing its public diplomacy efforts, the Spanish government created a cabinet level position of Foreign Minister to Europe, in charge of all relations between Spain and Europe. The position would establish someone directly responsible for maintaining contacts in Europe. 60 After the victory of the Socialist Party in 1982,
55 Gilland, Chari, 219. 56 Manuel, Paul C. Re-conceptualizing Economic Relations and Political Citizenship in the New Iberia of the New Europe: Some Lessons from the 15th Anniversary of the Accession of Portugal and Spain to the European Union. New England Political Association Annual Meeting, Portsmouth. 2001: 19. 57 Ibid., 21. 58 Ibid., 8. 59 United States. U.S. Library of Congress. Spain and the European Community. <http://countrystudies.us/spain/87.htm> 60 In 1958, Spain became an associate member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and a full member of the organizations successor, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in 1959. Spain had achieved membership in the World Bank as well. (See Manual, 6); 60 Between 1977 and 1980, Spain ratified the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The country also became a member of the Council of Europe and signed the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Additionally, Spain subscribed to the European Social Charter and made the declaration recognizing the competence of the European Commission of Human Rights to receive petitions from private individuals. (See Representacin Permanente De Espaa Ante La Unin Europea); 60 Public diplomacy can be seen as empty if a states foreign policy fails to coincide with its campaign. Thus, Spains policies with other international organizations helped back up its public diplomacy actions.
22
Maya Swisa
new leaders embarked on a series of visits to the EC capitals, speaking to political elites and citizens, to make the case for Spains accession.61 These leaders were able to directly communicate their cause and Spains new image to those who had opposed Spains accession. After years of communicating a more legitimate image grounded in its foreign policy, Spain joined the EC in 1986. Although rather minimal, Spain utilized public diplomacy in its accession process while Ireland did not. At the time of its accession in 1986, Spains economy was better off than Irelands was in 1973. However, in terms of its domestic-political situation, Spain had to completely democratize its government whereas Irelands government was already democratic. With regard to the acquis, whereas Ireland had to establish lawful commitment to the Community with a single constitutional amendment, Spain had to forfeit and sacrifice more in the reform process, making it more difficult for Spain. Spains use of public diplomacy somewhat facilitated the accession process by altering its international image. However, when comparing Spain and Ireland, it seems as though lack of public diplomacy does not inhibit a states entry into the Community, but the use public diplomacy does not necessarily hurt the applicant in the process. In the end, Spain faced slightly more difficulty in attaining membership to the Community.
Bulgaria
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Grand National Assembly of Bulgaria passed a resolution expressing their desire to join the European Community in 1990 and Bulgaria submitted its formal application in 1995.62 While others in the fourth round were quick to carry out their own political and economic reforms, Bulgaria moved at a slower pace.63 When ten states joined the EU in the big bang of 2004, only Bulgaria and Romania were deemed unfit to join. Even when it officially joined the EU in 2007, Bulgaria had only broadly brought its economic and political institutions in line with EU requirements.64 Regarding Bulgarias economic stability, its GDP per capita was approximately eightyfour percent below the EU average in 2007. This was significantly lower than Ireland and Spain at the time of accession. Bulgarias transition to a market economy had been and continues to be a slow and difficult process. Hubbard and Hubbard write, begun in the early 1990s, the transition process was characterized by a slow pace, resistance to structural
61 Manuel, 20. 62 Noutcheva, Bechev, 118; Centre Virtuel De La Connaissance Sur LEurope. Demande dadhsion de la Bulgarie lUnion Europenne. 1995. European Navigator. <http://www.ena.lu/>. 63 Q&A: EU Enlargement. BBC News. 1 Jan. 2007. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2266385.stm> 64 Noutcheva, Bechev, 116.
23
change, inconsistent reforms, and ad-hoc political decisions.65 When Bulgaria began to transition from the Soviet run economy to a free market system, it held a heavy foreign debt, relatively high levels of market distortion, limited exposure to market institutions, and sixty percent of its GDP came from trade dependent on Soviet markets.66 In contrast, during the accession process, Ireland was rather quick to reform and liberalize its market. Spains economy had been equipped for integration well before accession. During the first few years of transition, Bulgarias GDP decreased drastically while inflation and unemployment continued to increase. As a result of its inability to follow through on privatization and reform, much of the economy remained in the hands of the state, with subsidies fueling inefficiency that led to several economic crises throughout the 1990s.67 It was not until 1998 that Bulgaria began to manage its high inflation and economic instability with the introduction of a currency board.68 Since then, there has been a distinct improvement in Bulgarias economy. The countrys GDP has shown signs of significant growth. In 2005, the World Bank classified Bulgaria as an upper-middle income economy. Bulgaria has averaged a surplus in its government budgets in recent years and, more impressively, the government debt has fallen from over seventy percent of its GDP to thirty percent.69 Around sixty percent of Bulgarias exports go to EU member states, with about fifty percent of its imports coming from EU member states. Although Bulgaria did not approach the economic levels of Spain or Ireland at the time of accession, it did meet the economic requirements of the Copenhagen Criteria. Thus, while Bulgariamet lower standards than Ireland and Spain, it was still able to attain membership. This implies that accession has actually gotten easier since the first two rounds. While the criteria have become more clearcut over time, the applicants ability to barely meet the minimal standards of these criteria has resulted in lower standards for acceptance. Bulgaria faced difficulty regarding democratization and stabilization in the politicaldomestic context due to rampant government corruption at the onset of its democratic transition.70 The government provided well-paid secure and prestigious employment to those political affiliates and others affiliated through nepotism.71 The Constitution that was established in 1991 did little to ensure the set up of independent checks between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.
65 Hubbard, Carmen, and Lionel Hubbard. Bulgaria and Romania: Paths to EU Accession and the Agricultural Sector. Centre For Rural Economy Discussion Paper Series 17th ser. (2008): 2. 66 Ibid., 3. 67 Ibid., 4. 68 Noutcheva, Bechev, 121. 69 Hubbard and Hubbard, 5. 70 Jordan, (2011). 71 Noutcheva, Bechev, 128.
24
Maya Swisa
In order to fulfill the political component of the EUs Copenhagen criteria, the Bulgarian government had to make the necessary reforms to reduce corruption throughout the 1990s. However, many governmental reforms tended to be partial and counterproductive72 and as the 20th century came to an end, corruption scandals became more prevalent. According to Noutcheva and Bechev, Corruption became a widespread phenomenon (in Bulgaria) and grew exponentially compared to the earlier periods when it played a social function as a compensatory mechanism for the inefficiency of the socialist economies. This was accompanied by a rise of organized crime, particularly in Bulgaria, which was fuelled by the international embargo against the former Yugoslavia. Public administration and the political class proved susceptible to corruption. Low-paid, politically dependent, and unaccountable judiciaries followed suit. The advent of reformist governments in 1996-1997 did not make matters better because speeding privatization offered new incentives and opportunities for state capture. By the end of the decade, corruption scandals became common.73 Superficial reforms only resulted in the emergence of high-level officials wanting to maintain the status quo, which led to further stagnation in governmental reforms.74 As a result, the reformation process showed little improvement throughout the 1990s. Because of pressure coming from EU conditionality, Bulgaria was required to take certain measures to continue receiving financial assistance. The Union required Bulgaria to transfer all criminal investigations to the EUs Ministry of the Interior as a way to combat organized crime.75 While this may have helped deal with the EUs desire to bring Bulgaria closer to accession, it did little to further any profound and lasting domestic reforms needed to build a democratic state. Instead of finding ways to deal with it internally, all the legal issues were pushed into the hands of the EU. Bulgarias accession poses a striking contrast to Spain, which fulfilled its transition from a dictatorship to a democracy rather quickly and with little help from the Community. Despite Bulgarias inability to make significant strides in achieving democratization, a civil society, which remains an important element of democracy, began to develop in the process. In 1997, an association of Bulgarian NGOs and media established the Coalition 2000 as a pioneering and comprehensive effort to harness the capacity of civil society to establish a public-private coalition against corruption. 76 After developing an Anti-Corruption Action
72 Ibid., 130. 73 Ibid. 74 Hubbard and Hubbard, 5. 75 Noutcheva, Bechev, 133. 76 Ibid., 138; The Bulgarian Anticorruption Portal: About C2000. Anticorruption.bg. <http://www.anticorruption.bg/index. php?id=785>
25
Plan for Bulgaria, the coalition tried to serve as a watchdog during the reform process.77 Although the emergent civil society is still rather weak, it remains an important element to developing a more solid and accountable democratic system. Ultimately, although Bulgaria formally met the EUs political criteria for accession, it continued to face widespread corruption, criminality, and administrative ineffectiveness preventing full democratization, remaining inadequate to support rule of law domestically.78 In contrast, Spain experienced a rather smooth transition and problems of corruption were not as widespread. Furthermore, while Spain and Ireland possessed fully functioning democratic governments at the time of accession, Bulgaria failed to fully consolidate its own democracy. Even after accession had already taken place, Bulgaria did not develop the core elements of a liberal democracy, including free and fair elections, high voter turnout, and competing political parties.79 In the end, Bulgaria faced the least amount of difficulty, as its political-domestic reform was much lower than those of Spain or Ireland. In the acquis communautaire process, the Bulgarian accession was accompanied by heavy EU conditionality. The EU sought to use tools of accession in an attempt to establish more Europeanness in Bulgaria and to ensure Bulgarias commitment to EU law.80 As a result, the country made tangible progress chiefly in terms of coordinating and upgrading the capacity of parts of the core executive in charge of harmonization with the EU law, benefiting from financial assistance and policy advice from the European Commission and the member states.81 Before Bulgaria joined the Union, the EUs conditionality mechanism acted as a powerful tool in helping to reform the country. However, once Bulgaria was granted accession, the Union no longer held the same leverage.82 While, studies show that Bulgaria has not decreased its formal compliance with EU law since 2007, they suggest that Bulgaria has failed to convince the Commission of its good will and determination to meet the benchmarks set by the EU. While the EU continues to extend its conditionality and place sanctions on Bulgaria for failing to comply, Bulgaria, now a member state, has little motivation to make any hasty developments.83 Unlike Ireland and Spain, Bulgaria failed to entirely fulfill the acquis process.
77 Anticorruption.bg. 78 Hubbard and Hubbard, 5. 79 Ibid., 7. 80 Morgan, Rebecca. Enlargement 2007: Romania, Bulgaria, and the Path to the European Union. Thesis. University of Canterbury, 2009. 81 Noutcheva, Bechev, 132. 82 Hubbard and Hubbard, 5. 83 Trauner, Florian. Post-accession Compliance with EU Law in Bulgaria and Romania: a Comparative Perspective. European Integration Online Papers (EIoP) 13.2 (2009).
26
Maya Swisa
The Bulgarian government sought to use nation branding as a mechanism for its public diplomacy efforts in the years leading up to its 2007 accession.84 The Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up its Communication Strategy for Bulgarias Accession to the EU in 2002 aimed at promoting activities targeting Bulgarian and EU citizens and building awareness about the benefits and challenges of Bulgarias potential membership in the EU.85 It was also meant to provide information on topical issues related to the process of integration.86 Two commercials were produced under the funding of the Communication Strategy, Nice to Meet You and You Are Here.87 The former sought to demonstrate that Bulgaria was no different than other EU member states. By portraying typical city life, the strategy intended to establish parity between Bulgaria and other EU countries, suggesting its status as an equal partner in the European family.88 Similarly, the latter attempted to emphasize the fact that Bulgaria is actually part of Europe. The internal effect of Bulgarias public diplomacy efforts was rather positive.89 A Eurobarometer poll taken in 2007 showed that Bulgarian citizens trusted the EU and understood the benefits of membership.90 On the other end of the spectrum, the effect that these efforts had on EU citizens is unclear. Regarding the commercials, many viewers felt sadness and an inability to identify with the subjects of the commercials.91 However, regarding Bulgarian accession, polls covering the opinions of the EU-25 population are difficult to find. In an online forum discussing Bulgarian accession, Europeans talked about the benefit of becoming a more diverse EU and helping out Bulgaria.92 Thus, although the commercials sought to emphasize the similarities between Bulgarians and other EU citizens, they ultimately had the opposite effect, yet still yielded a positive outcome. Even though Europeans felt sad and unable to identify with Bulgaria, it strengthened their desire to help Bulgaria and reinforce the Unions diversity. Similarly, party leaders of the European Parliament,
84 Gyorgy Szondi defines nation branding as the strategic self-presentation of a country with the aim of creating reputational capital through economic, political and social interest promotion at home and abroad. (See Szondi, 5.) 85 Kaneva, Nadia. Meet the New Europeans: EU Accession and the Branding of Bulgaria. Advertising & Society Review 8.4 (2007). 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid. 89 Although public diplomacy is geared toward external audiences, it often reverberates internally and has the effect of changing the perception of internal audiences. 90 European Union. European Commission. Eurobarometer. Eurobarometer 67: National Report Executive Summary Bulgaria. Spring 2007. 91 Kaneva, (2007). 92 Due to the lack of official opinion polls documenting the opinion of EU citizens regarding Bulgarias accession, I use an online discussion forum as representing the general public opinion; Bulgaria - Future EU-member. What Do You Think? 6 Oct. 2006. <http://www.englishtest.net/forum/ftopic13212.html>.
27
representing the voice of the EU citizenry, were generally supportive of Bulgarias accession.93 In this case, trying to communicate its message to foreign publics had incongruously positive effects, helping Bulgaria to establish some sort of dialogue with other EU citizens, increasing visibility and support for its accession. In the case of Bulgaria, its economic performance lagged behind that of Spain and Ireland at the time of their respective accessions. Similarly, Bulgaria lacked strength in its political-domestic situation due to its inability to fully democratize. Conversely, Spain and Ireland had fully consolidated democracies at the time of accession. Bulgaria continues to face difficulty in committing to the acquis and deals with prolonged EU conditionality as a result. Neither Ireland nor Spain faced such heavy conditionality upon their entry into the EC. The effect of Bulgarias public diplomacy efforts on internal audiences was rather successful. Similarly, while it is difficult to assess the extent to which it affected external audiences, it appears that Bulgarias communication campaigns helped establish more visibility and support in the accession process. Ultimately, in the fourth round of enlargement, Bulgaria faced the least amount of difficulty in joining the EU.
Conclusion
As mentioned earlier, further research is required to determine the role of the EU bureaucracy in affecting the standards of accession. When looking at the difficulty of accession, this paper focuses on which applicants met the highest standards and levels of reform. In this analysis, it seems as though there is not an overarching, straightforward trend regarding the difficulty of enlargement over time, except with the public diplomacy variable.
References
Abbot, Patrick. History of Ireland 1945-1963: The Birth of the Irish Republic and Economic Development. <http://www.wesleyjohnston.com/users/ireland/past/history/19451963.html> Allen, David. Wider but weaker or the more the merrier: enlargement and foreign policy cooperation in the EC/EU. Charleston, South Carolina. 1995. lvarez-Rivera, Manuel. October 28, 1982 General Election Results. Election Resources on the Internet: Elections to the Spanish Congress of Deputies. 2010. <http://electionresources.org/es/congress.php?election=1982&province=01>
93 Because of low voter turnout in elections for the European Parliament, it cannot be fully representative of EU public opinion. However, it provides some insight into how those intended to represent the EU populace feel about Bulgarian accession; 93 EU Stakeholders Applaud Bulgaria-Romania Accession. EurActiv | European Union Information Website. European Union and Europe, 27 Sept. 2006. <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-stakeholders-applaud-bulgaria-romania-accession/ article-158234>
28
Maya Swisa
Banse, Martin. Macroeconomic Implications for EU Accession. Central and Eastern European Agriculture in an Expanding European Union. By Banse, Martin, and Stefan Tangermann. New York: CABI, 2000. 133-55. Berry, Frank. Irish Economic Development over Three Decades of EU Membership. Czech Journal of Economics and Finance 53.9-10 (2003): 394-412. Brusis, Martin. Between EU Requirements, Competitive Politics, and National Traditions: Recreating Regions in the Accession Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Governance 15 (2002):531559. Delhey, Jan. The Prospects of Catching up for New EU Members: Lessons for the Accession Countries to the European Union from Previous Enlargements. Social Indicators Research 56.2 (2001): 205-31. Geary, Michael J. A Historical Analysis of the Constitutional Implications of Irelands Membership of the European Economic Community, 1961-73. The Irish Legal History Conference, Dublin (2007). Gilboa, Eytan. Searching for A theory of Public Diplomacy. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616.1 (2008): 55-77. Gilland, Karin, and Raj Chari. European Integration: Enlargement Now and Then: Implications for Ireland. Irish Studies in International Affairs 12 (2001): 215-30. Hubbard, Carmen, and Lionel Hubbard. Bulgaria and Romania: Paths to EU Accession and the Agricultural Sector. Centre For Rural Economy Discussion Paper Series 17th ser. (2008). Hutchinson, Matthew. Ireland: Countries IN Profile. InContext 11.5 (2010). <http://www. incontext.indiana.edu/2010/sept-oct/article3.asp> Jordan, Michael J. New Europe, New Problems. Foreign Policy 9 Mar. 2011. Kaneva, Nadia. Meet the New Europeans: EU Accession and the Branding of Bulgaria. Advertising & Society Review 8.4 (2007) Keogh, Dermot. The Diplomacy of `Dignified Calm: An Analysis of Irelands Application for Membership of the EEC, 1961-1963. Chronicon 1.4 (1997): 1-68. <http://www.ucc. ie/chronicon/keoghfra.htm>. Leleu, Claude. The French Referendum of April 23, 1972. European Journal of Political Research 4.4 (1976): 25-46.
29
Lendvai, Nomi. The Weakest Link? EU Accession and Enlargement: Dialoguing EU and Post-Communist Social Policy. Journal of European Social Policy 14.3 (2004): 319-33. Malone, Gifford. Managing public diplomacy. Washington Quarterly 8.3 (1985): 199-213. Manuel, Paul C. Re-conceptualizing Economic Relations and Political Citizenship in the New Iberia of the New Europe: Some Lessons from the 15th Anniversary of the Acsion of Portugal and Spain to the European Union. New England Political Association Annual Meeting, Portsmouth. 2001. Morgan, Rebecca. Enlargement 2007: Romania, Bulgaria, and the Path to the European Union. Thesis. University of Canterbury, 2009. Noutcheva, Gergana and Dimitar Bechev. The Successful Laggards: Bulgaria and Romanias Accession to the EU. East European Politics & Societies 22.1 (2008): 114-144. ODonnell, Rory. The New Ireland in the New Europe. Europe: The Irish Experience. By Rory ODonnell. Dublin: Institute of European Affairs, 2000. 161-214. Preston, Christopher. Enlargement & Integration in the European Union. London: Routledge, 1997. Pridham, Geoffrey. EU Enlargement and Consolidating Democracy in Post-Communist States -Formality and Reality. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 40.5 (2002): 953-73. Senior Nello, Susan, and Karen E. Smith. The Consequences of Eastern Enlargement of the European Union in Stages. European University Institute: Robert Schuman Centre (1997). Signitzer, Benno, and Timothy Coombs. Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Conceptual Divergence. Public Relations Review 18:2 (1992): 137-47. Szondi, Gyorgy. Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael (2008).
The Orthodox Church and Society in Post-Soviet Russia

Philip Meyer
Holy Rus
In 1933, the Soviet authorities introduced an anti-religious pamphlet entitled Prayers or Tractor to its devout, Orthodox Christian peasantry. The technological marvel of the tractor, the Soviets reasoned, would turn the peasants away from Orthodox mysticism and toward progress-minded Leninism. Yet, to the Communists surprise, many peasant villages celebrated the arrival of their new tractors by attaching crosses to them and holding services in thanks to God. Certainly, to the peasants, there should be both prayers and tractors.1 While the Bolsheviks early hopes of eradicating religion were never realized, they were instrumental in constructing a religious landscape that had a profound effect on the former Soviet states. All religionsOrthodoxy in particularwere subject to strict scrutiny. Suspicious as they were of the multitudes of small, anti-establishment religious sects, the Soviets favored larger, hierarchical religious establishments that could act as instruments of the state.2 Religious organizations and the buildings they used for worship had to be properly registered, and the states Council for Religious Affairs approved appointments for ecclesiastical office and regulated the content of sermons, church publications, and seminary curricula.3 While religion was generally discouraged throughout the Soviet era, the regimes direct policy toward religious groups shifted over the years according to the states needs. An early assault on the Russian Orthodox Church that reduced the number of church buildings from 50,000 in 1917 to between two and three hundred in 1939 soon morphed,4 with the Nazi invasion in 1941, into a policy that allowed the reconstruction of seminaries and parishes and the dissemination of some church literature on the provision that clergy supported the war effort.5 In 1946, the Ukrainian Uniate Church was delegalized and subsumed into the ROC. Nikita Khrushchev reapplied pressure on religious organizations, and used the KGB to infiltrate their ranks or coopt their leaders to serve state interests and root out anti-Soviet
1 Walter Kolarz, Religion in the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martins Press, 1961), 19-20. 2 Sabrina P. Ramet, Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe and Russia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 5. 3 Ibid., 6. 4 Ibid., 231. 5 Ibid., 232.
Philip Meyer graduated from USC in December 2011 with Bachelors Degrees in International Relations and Russian.
32
Philip Meyer
elements.6 Eventually, the openness of Mikhail Gorbachevs glasnost policy reached religious associations. In 1988, the Russian Orthodox Church celebrated the thousand-year anniversary of the Christianization of the Kievan Rus, and in 1990, the Soviet Union passed the law On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Association, which established broad, Western-style freedoms for religious groups and individual believers. Yet, even though religion began to revive in the Soviet Union, the legacies of the past had forced it into an awkward position from which to confront the disintegration of the Soviet empire. In 1991-92, the USSR fell apart as the Soviet satellite republics broke away to form their own states, but the fracturing of Soviet political hegemony was not harmonious. In some cases, the Soviet system had corrupted the dynamics of national self-determination, and it was much the same for religions. Religious groups that had existed officially or unofficially under the Soviet Union began to emerge and looked to reclaim their places in their respective nations. Problems arose, such as in Poland, where the population was shocked to discover that its national religious leaders had been agents of the state.7 Meanwhile, the loosening of government restrictions on religious freedom meant a deluge of well-financed foreign religions and small homegrown sects could compete for souls of post-Soviet believers. Finally, a wave of Western pluralism washed over societies that were accustomed to much more uniform complexes of identity. Political and religious leaders alike were left bewildered and scrambled to find ways to connect with their respective peoples. In this chaos, Russia found itself in a particularly peculiar condition. During the Soviet era, the divisions in society drifted away from class differences and toward distinctions of ethnicity or nationality. Similar to how the traditional European empires felt duty-bound to civilize their colonial subjects, the Russians saw themselves bringing the gospel of Marxism-Leninism to the former Russian empire. In the words of Daniel Brandenberger, the Russian people were assuming the mantle of vanguard nation where before, the workers had been referred to as Soviet societys vanguard class.8 As a result, the fall of the USSR and its ideology left a void in the Russian soul. It might have seemed at first that they had little choice but to return to their Orthodox roots, and the fracturing of the Soviet empire along national lines and the transformation of these nations from SSRs to states seemed to reinforce that choice. But suddenly it became clear that the crumbling of the Soviet empire had permitted the birth of a new Western-driven identity, a modern personality,9 complete with pluralisms of all kinds, an independent media and a vibrant consumer culture.
6 Ramet, 234-5. 7 Jonathan Luxmoore, Spies in From the Cold: Polands Church Confronts Its Other Past, National Catholic Reporter, December 22, 2006 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1141/is_9_43/ai_n26713176/. 8 David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 44. 9 Alexander Agadjanian, Revising Pandoras Gifts, Europe-Asia Studies 53, no.3 (May 2001): 473-488.
Russian Orthodox Church and Post-Soviet Russia
33
For the Church, these new trends were alarming. Russians of the younger and middle generations, who had grown up replacing the Lenin in the ubiquitous Soviet slogan Lenin lived, Lenin lives, Lenin will live with Levis under their breath, would now celebrate their freedom by listening to rock music, not praying before the iconostasis. Historian Dmitry Pospielovsky, explains that during the Soviet years, the ROC was the only surviving overt institution linking the present generations with the Russian non-Marxist cultural and historical heritage.10 He could just as easily have written non-Western. There has been an explosion of new cultures and identities in Russia, as consumer culture and Western media has rushed to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the eyes of the church, this new secular culture is as alien to Russia as the overtly atheist Marxist ideology. They fear the moral degradation of Russian society as it abandons its traditional identity in favor of a new globalized, Western one. The influx of well-heeled religious groups from abroad and the breaking away of national Orthodox churches to autocephaly is another source of concern for the Russian church leaders, who have energetically struggled to maintain the Churchs spiritual and moral hegemony in the in the Russian imperial space. Broadly, the Churchs position has been a combination of triumphalism and defensiveness,11 attempting to force itself into society and emphasizing a Russian national identity to which it and its conservative values are inextricably bound. Its campaign has been waged in four main ways: first, opposing the independence of Orthodox Churches of the former Soviet republics; second, by campaigning against the Western missionaries that rushed into Russia after the fall of the USSR; third, by developing close relations with state officials; and fourth, by asserting itself on domestic social issues like education. The public, which has adapted to a more European, secular way of life, respects the Church as a symbol of national identity and a moral and spiritual institution, but prefers to keep the church out of politics and non-religious daily life. The Churchs continued relevance in Russia will require that it accept its new role as society evolves and responds to its believers demands for an accessible spiritual institution.
Empire Saving12 and the Near Abroad

As much as the Church resents the hostile atheism of the Soviet era, it also lament the crumbling of Russias empire. In 1993, the Patriarchate hosted the right-wing All-World Russian Assembly at its headquarters at Danilov Monastery in Moscow, and then-Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad gave the keynote address. The conference agreed
10 Dmitry V. Pospielovsky, The Russian Orthodox Church in the Postcommunist CIS, in The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Michael Bourdeaux (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 45. 11 Jane Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church: Triumphalism and Defensiveness (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996). 12 John B. Dunlop, The Russian Orthodox Church as an Empire-Saving Institution, in The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia.
34
Philip Meyer
that Russian (russkii) is a generic, collective concept that includes Great Russians, Little Russians, and Belarusians and any aliens (inorodtsy) that convert to Orthodoxy.13 This compound definition of Russianness is remarkable in several ways. It claims that Ukrainians and Belarusians are ethnically congruent to the Russians and suggests that they should be subject to the same political authority. Indeed, most Ukrainians would reject the notion of Russian-Ukrainian brotherhood and bitterly remember decades of tutelage under the Russian empires. The basis for this broad definition of Russianness is founded in the common ethnic origins of the Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian people, who descended from the early Slavs who occupied the Kievan Rus starting in the late 9th century and who were baptized by the Grand Prince Vladimir of Kiev. Yet, even if we accept that Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarusians share a common ethnic heritage, we must also recognize that the development of separate languages and cultures has also differentiated them. The Assembly members and the Orthodox hierarchs cannot ignore this socially constructed differentiation because the foundation for calling them all Russian and for unifying them under a Russian state has also been constructed through centuries of Russian imperial domination. This definition also suggests that even those who are not ethnically Russian (Russian, Ukrainian, or Belarusian) can become so through the adaptation of Russian cultural traditions like religion. More recently, the Patriarchate has made the point that nations that use Russian as a lingua franca, such as the former Soviet states of Central Asia, are members of the Russkii Mir or Russian World.14 The Patriarchate ignores the nations unique religious, social, and ethnic foundations of identity as it posits its own born from the history of Russian imperial domination. Take, for example, a Tatar family who are Russian citizens and whose ancestors converted (or were forced to convert) to Orthodoxy. The word russkii means ethnically Russian, in contrast to rossiiskii, which denotes a Russian citizen, regardless of ethnicity. According the Assemblys definition, the family is russkii despite their Turkic, non-Slav heritage. Having been subject to Russian cultural hegemony, the family is indivisible from Russia, regardless of how it defines itself today. The Basis of the Social Concept, the Orthodox Churchs 21st century expression of its views on state and society, demonstrates the same Russo-centric conception of the postSoviet space. The document states that sovereignty and territorial integrity are basic for the defense of a people of their legitimate interests, but in todays world there is a certain contradiction between the universally accepted principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity on the one hand, and the search by a people or part of them for state independence,
13 Ibid., 15-16. 14 Andrei Zolotov, The Old New Player, Russia Profile, March 31, 2010 http://russiaprofile.org/international/a1270043113. html.
35
on the other.15 But sovereignty and territorial integrity are less important to the Church than the Basis makes them out to be. For the Church, national self-determination impinges on the indivisibility of the Russian world. The document goes on to endorse the tendencies for unification of countries and nations, especially those with common history and culture, provided this unification is not directed against a third party The Basis does not explain how nations develop a common history and culture without a history of union, and it ignores Russias forceful instillation of its own culture on the peoples that surround Russia. .16 In the churchs view, national self-determination prevents the natural tendency to unify, and the wishes of the third party are subordinate to the demands of unification. Another passage confirms this interpretation: The division of a multinational state can be justified only if one of the peoples is clearly oppressed or the majority of a country do not show a definite will to preserve unity.17 Again, the sway of a majority demanding unity supersedes the rights and wishes of any particular ethnic group. It is worth noting that in 1991, Russians were the majority, comprising just fewer than 51 percent of the population, and they more than doubled the population of Ukrainians and Belarusians.18 In this case, the majoritys union is the minoritys empire. The Churchs policy toward other religions presents a clear picture of its new defensive posture in post-Soviet Russia. Here, there are two areas of interest: one is the Churchs relationship with the newly-formed national Orthodox churches of new states like Ukraine and Estonia, among others and the other is its hostile attitude toward the missionary groups that represent well-financed Christian denominations from the West. In both areas, the Church has acted aggressively to preserve its powerful and privileged position in the Russian imperial space. Although most religious leaders in the Soviet satellite republics had long wanted to break away from the Moscow Patriarchate, church autocephaly would not necessarily follow national independence. Even before the fall of the Soviet Union, when Mikhail Gorbachev first opened the door for religious pluralism in Soviet territory, the Church aligned itself with Soviet hardliners and aggressively staked its territory in throughout the CIS. Here, I recount the experiences of Ukraine and Estonia.
Ukraine
Both of Ukraines major religions roots in the historic Kievan Rus. The first is a Ukrainian Orthodoxy similar to the Russian variety, and the second is an Eastern Catholic denomination
15 Russian Orthodox Church Department for External Church Affairs, Basis of the Social Concept, Part XVI http://www. mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Russia, CIA World Factbook 1991 accessed May 12, 2011 at http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/25/pg25.html.
36
Philip Meyer
known as the Uniate Church, which occupies the Galicia region in Western Ukraine and retained Orthodox religious practices as it converted from Orthodoxy to Catholicism in the sixteenth century.19 During the Soviet years, Ukrainian Orthodoxy was split into two groups. One was the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, led by the Metropolitan Filaret, who answered to Patriarch Aleksii II in Moscow. The other was the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), which claimed independence from the Russian Church and practiced in secret. When Gorbachevs glasnost granted official recognition and more freedom to religious groups throughout the Soviet Union, the Moscow Patriarchate moved to neutralize the Uniate Church and the UAOC and bolster its jurisdiction through the Ukrainian Exarchate, renamed the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC). It labeled the Uniate Church unchurchly, extremist, nationalist, and accused it of plotting to conquer Galicia violently.20 The Patriarchate, while keeping the UOC an integral part of the Russian Orthodox, gave the UOC greater freedoms and a status of autonomy.21 Yet, as the Ukrainian national independence movement began to mount, UOC Patriarch Filaret revoked his allegiance to Moscow and began to campaign for autocephaly while welcoming the UAOC into the bosom of the canonical holy church.22 Predictably, Moscow refused the metropolitan. In May, he was removed from his post at the head of the Ukrainian Church. With the support of the Ukrainian government, he became the patriarch of a new faction, the Ukrainian Orthodox ChurchKiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP).23 Most of the UAOC followers disliked Filaret for pandering to the Russians for as long as he did, and they rejected his proposal to unite the UOC-KP and the UAOC.24 In the end, Ukraine was left with three major Orthodox Churches that still exist today. The Russian Church is not entirely to blame for the fracturing of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, but it is clear its relentless effort to preserve its ecclesiastical domain contributed significantly. Today, through its rhetoric on the Russkii Mir or Russian World and emphasis on the common ethnic, cultural and religious heritage of Ukraine and Russia, the Russian Patriarchate continues to resist the notion of Ukrainian autocephaly. The new Patriarch Kirill made three trips to Ukraine in 2010, stressing good-neighborly relations25 and the role of Orthodox values in combating the Western secular values that threaten the Russian world. His methods have been decidedly more restrained than those of his predecessor,
19 Bohdan Bociurkiw, Politics and Religion in Ukraine: The Orthodox and the Greek Catholics, in The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia,135. 20 Ibid., 137. 21 Ibid., 141. 22 Ibid., 142. 23 Ramet, 256. 24 Bociurkiw, 147. 25 Andrei Zolotov, Jr., Nonaggressive Integration, Russia Profile, March 31, 2010 http://russiaprofile.org/culture_living/ a1270041656.html.
37
probably in part because the chaos of the early post-communist transition has passed. For example, Kirill often makes a point of speaking Ukrainian on his visits and, in 2009, recognized Ukrainian suffering at the hand of Stalin during the early 1930s.26 Andrei Zolotov, Jr., founding editor of the Moscow-based English language publication Russia Profile, has commented that the Patriarchate has been more tactful toward Ukraine than the Kremlin, citing that Kirill sent former Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko a pointedly polite note after Russian President Dmitri Medvedev criticized Yushchenko for taking an antiRussian position.27 While the Russian Church has recently sought to downplay the notion of imperialism in its stance towards Ukraine and tried to stress each countrys state as an equal part of an integrated whole,28 it is still fiercely opposed to Ukrainian autocephaly. Last July, the Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk, the head of the Churchs Department for External Church Relations, said, The very slogan that an independent state should have an independent Church is absolutely non-canonical.29 Further, it is clear that, to the Russian church leaders, returning to church communion30 and reuniting Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox believers means the taking over of theschismatic Ukrainian autocephalous church by the Russian church or its Ukrainian subsidiary. Four days after the Metropolitan Hilarions comments, the Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin said, [Patriarch Kirill] is equally the Patriarch for the faithful in Russia, the faithful in Ukraine, the faithful in Belarus, the faithful in Kazakhstan.31 On another visit in April, Kirill made a direct offer to the UOC-KP to join ROC as an autonomous church.32 But the Ukrainian leaders are loath to accept such an arrangement. Patriarch Filaret has publicly requested that Patriarch Kirill respect Ukrainian
26 Andrei Zolotov, Jr., Kirill on a Mission: Will the New Patriarch of Moscow Succeed in His New Role in Ukraine? Russia Profile, July 27, 2009 http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2009-141-37.cfm. 27 Zolotov, The Old New Player; Michael Schwirtz, Moscow Signals Widening Rift With Ukraine, The New York Times, August 11, 2009 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/12/world/europe/12moscow.html. 28 Andrei Zolotov, Jr., The Patriarchs Russian Civilization Project, Russia Profile, January 6, 2011 http://russiaprofile.org/ interviews/a1294333190.html. 29 Russian Orthodox Church Department for External Church Affairs, Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk: Many signals are coming from the schism that people feel the need to re-unite with the Church, news release, July 27, 2010 http://www. mospat.ru/en/2010/07/27/news23074/. 30 Russian Orthodox Church Department for External Church Affairs, Appeal of the Russian Orthodox Churchs Holy Synod to Orthodox Christians in Ukraine who are out of unity with the Holy Church, news release, July 26, 2010, http://www.mospat. ru/en/2010/07/26/news23023/. 31 Russian Orthodox Church Department for External Church Affairs, Press-conference summing up Patriarch Kirills visitation of Ukrainian Orthodox Church, news release, July 30, 2010 http://www.mospat.ru/en/2010/07/30/news23391/ 32 Moscow patriarch urged UOC(KP) to join ROC as autonomous church ZIK, April 27, 2011, http://zik.com.ua/en/ news/2011/04/27/284898.
38
Philip Meyer
independence, making the point that Russian aggressiveness has granted more credibility to the autocephalous Ukrainian church.33
Estonia
Estonias tiny Orthodox church has undergone a similar experience. The Estonian Orthodox Church had been under the canonical jurisdiction of Moscow from 1721 until 1923, when in the midst of the Russian Civil War it moved under the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople. But when Estonia was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1944, its Church was again subsumed into the ROC. In February 1996, the Ecumenical Patriarchate announced that the hitherto-dormant 1923 decision was again in effect.34 In response, the Russian Patriarchate lambasted the attempt of the schismatic group of priests and believers for attempting to force the Russian-speaking faithful out of the country and to weaken and divide Orthodoxy35 and severed formal relations with Constantinople. Although communion was reestablished between the two sides in May, it is meaningful that the Russian church would be willing to take such drastic measures over a country with an Orthodox population of less than 100,000 people.36 Today, there exists an Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate which consists of thirty-one parishes.37
The Russkii Mir

The church maintains its effort to reunite the Churches in certain countries, particularly those that comprise the heart of its Russkii Mir (Russian World) in the Slavic heartland of Eastern Europe. This concept, to which I have alluded already, is similar to the definition of Russian that the All-World Russian Assembly arrived upon in 1993. Although it does not go so far as to say that the descendants of the early Slavs who occupied the Kievan Rus are ethnic Russians, this ideology for post-Soviet integration38 is in the words of The Patriarchs deputy, Hegumen Father Filipp Ryabykh a historic, civilizational community that has been formed that shares certain values and, even more importantly, a certain experience of embodying these values, as well as symbols and symbolic acts associated with this specific experience of these values.`39 The Church contends that Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,
33 Patriarch Filaret Tells Russia Patriarch Kiril to Relinquish Claims to Ukrainian Orthodox, ZIK, November 10, 2010 http:// zik.com.ua/en/news/2010/11/10/255743. 34 Alexander F.C. Webster, Split Decision: The Orthodox Clash Over Estonia The Christian Century, June 5-12, 1996, 614623. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Current Situation in the Estonian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate, Estonian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate, accessed May 14, 2011, http://www.orthodox.ee/indexeng.php?d=history/today. 38 Zolotov, The Patriarchs Russian Civilization Project. 39 Ibid.
39
Moldova, and Kazakhstan constitute a single civilization that, with the fall of the Soviet Union, shifted from being centralized to having many distinct but equal centers. Church leaders have focused primarily on the elements of culture and historical experience that Russia holds in common with her former colonies. In a 2009 speech to the Russkiy Mir Assembly, Father Filipp said, A country would consider itself to be part of the Russian World if it uses Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication, if Russian culture is developing there and if the common historical memory and values of social structure are being maintained. 40 It appears that having recognized the efforts of Ukrainians and other peoples to establish their national distinctiveness on the basis of a unique culture, the Orthodox Church has gone on the counteroffensive and announced the inherent similarities between Russia and its former subjects. This emphasis on common culture and a shared historical experience stakes the claims that the countries have evolved collectively over time and that their common evolution will continue, bolstered by institutions like the Russian church. Overall, despite the talk of equals in an integrated whole, the Russkii Mir concept is yet another assertion of the Russian Orthodox Church in the post-Soviet social landscape.
The ROC and Non-Traditional Religions

The Churchs stance toward religions Russias non-traditional religions is also indicative of its sensitivity about its position in society. In 1989, Gorbachev had already begun to grant traditional religious groups like the Ukrainian Uniates formal state recognition In 1990, the Soviet law On Religious Freedom granted freedom of religious choice and established the equality of all religions before the law. Subsequent legislation, which was first passed in the RSFSR and carried over to the Russian Federation, preserved the freedoms of the Soviet law and added a formal separation of church and state that prohibited state infringement on religious affairs.41 In a few short years, Russia had gone from a society of state-imposed atheism to complete religious freedom. It is worth mentioning, moreover, that the June 1990 Local Church Council, which appoints the Patriarch, submitted the RSFSR draft law.42 Yet, today, Church leaders are remembered more for their opposition to religious freedom than their support for it, because it put all religions on equal footing. In May 1993, months before the new Russian constitution would declare the separation of church and state and the equality of religions before the law, Patriarch Aleksii expressed his views in an address in Kostroma:
40 Zolotov, The Old New Player. 41 Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations and Law of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic on Freedom of Worship, in Religion in the Soviet Republics, ed. Igor Troyanovsky (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991). 42 Pospielovsky, 43.
40
Philip Meyer The work of the Russian Church for the rebirth of society is threatened by the expansion of foreign missions in Russia. Hundreds and thousands of very different preachers have invaded Russia. There is great tension in our country owing to divisions between people on political and nationalistic issues. There is a danger of a similar division on religious grounds. The patriarchate wants to prevent this and to help our society to be stable. So the Patriarchate has suggested to parliament that it pass a law proclaiming a moratorium on religious propaganda from outside.43
Russian Orthodox leaders see their Church as the Russian national church, and they see the collapse as the USSR as the Churchs chance to reclaim its rightful place in society and spiritually and morally rejuvenate Russia. This is an even more important task, they believe, because the influx of Western liberal ideas threatens Russian identity, unity, and morality. To the church, foreign religions complicate this reestablishment of national spiritual and moral footing when they proselytize in Russia. Church leaders have tried to depict a state of affairs in which the foreign religions aim to destroy Russian national identity, divide its people, and distract them from religion. In 1996, Kirill, then Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, made a speech at the World Conference of Churches on World Mission and Evangelism in Brazil, in which he expressed these views. He said, Hordes of missionaries dashed in, believing the former Soviet Union to be a vast missionary territory. They behaved as though no local churches existed, no Gospel was being proclaimed. They began preaching without even making an effort to familiarize themselves with the Russian cultural heritage or to learn the Russian language. In most cases the intention was not to preach Christ and the Gospel, but to tear our faithful away from their traditional churches and recruit them into their own communities.44 The extent of the Metropolitans paranoia is clear. Earlier in the speech, Kirill said that the ROC hoped the rest of the Christian community would support its campaign to recover its lost souls and that he is disappointed when instead there began a crusade began against the Russian church.45 Like Aleksii, Kirill views the missionary practices of other religions as a pointed attack against the Church and the Russian people, to destroy the spiritual unity of the people and the Orthodox faith.46
43 Ellis, 174. 44 Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Gospel and Culture, in Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia: The New War For Souls, ed. John Witte Jr. and Michael Bourdeaux (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999), 73. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 73-74.
41
To the church leaders, the ROCs weakness makes the attacks from abroad even more insidious. Upon the opening of Russian society in the early nineties, the Church found itself in dire financial straits. Resources were much too thin to respond to all the demands to establish religious education for young Russians and future clergy alike, perform charitable work, and to renovate and rebuild the dilapidated churches, monasteries, and seminaries that had been returned the Church. It wasnt long, either, before this scarcity of resources was compounded as inflation soared and the economy contracted.47 Further, after decades of suppression, the Church did not have the manpower it needed to fill even the pulpits, let alone positions in seminaries and Sunday schools.48 The foreign churches, by contrast, are based in free, capitalist societies and had a steady stream of parish donations supporting efficient and well-organized missions. In his 1996 speech as Metropolitan at the World Conference of Churches, Patriarch Kirill described the state of affairs in rather colorful terms. According to Kirill, the Russian church was recovering from a prolonged disease, standing on its feet with weakened muscles, while the foreign churches were boxers in a ring with their pumped-up muscles, delivering blows.49 Metropolitan Kirills solution to inappropriate proselytism is adhering to the principle of the local church.50 He claims that the Gospel is best communicated through the appropriate cultural framework,51 so the Christian community should support local churches that have constructed and best understand the local culture. Proposing, it seems, that the Christian world cease practice of sending missionaries abroad, Kirill notes that there are indigenous churches virtually everywhere.52 Lest this line of thinking undermine the ROCs active role in the former Soviet republics, the Metropolitan adds, Indeed, even where a Christian church was founded by foreign missionaries, it has long since become part of that place and culture.53 Here, Kirill has echoed the persistent theme that the majority or the central, recognized authorityin this case, the ROC Patriarchateis meant to determine what is right for others based on its own appraisal of their cultural and spiritual character. The choice is the individuals or their nations, and the Churchs conservative reading of historical traditions always supersedes the individuals choice. On this basis, the Church stakes its claim to all of the Russian imperial space.
47 48 49 50 51 52 53
Ellis 55. Ibid. Patriarch Kirill, in Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia, 73. Ibid. 75. Ibid. 69. Ibid. 75. Ibid.
42
Philip Meyer
By 1997, the Church and its allies in Russian nationalist groups had found success in their crusade against so-called pseudo-religious movements.54 The State Duma passed the law On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, which gave Orthodoxy special privileges while sharply curtailing the freedoms of non-traditional religions. In its preamble, the law recognizes the special contribution of Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and to the establishment and development of Russias spirituality and culture and then recognizes Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, and other religions for constituting an inseparable part of the historical heritage of the Russias peoples.55 The law establishes an official hierarchy of religions with its distinction between religious organizations, which are subject to the rights previously afforded all religions, and religious groups, which have only the right to have religious services and rituals and educated their believers.56 Religious groups cannot own property, receive economic tax privileges from the state, or conduct entrepreneurial activity.57 In 2002, the Duma passed another law, On Counteracting Extremist Activity, which set stringent penalties for conducting extremist activities, publishing extremist literature, and harboring extremists in a voluntary association. It codifies a definition of extremism that includes advocating either supremacy or inferiority of citizens on the basis of religion, social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation,.58 This would appear to give authorities the leeway to discriminate against any religion that claims a position of doctrinal superiority, which most groups do.59 The Federal List of Extremist Materials, a list of banned books, pamphlets, and other texts, has recently become the principle instrument of abuse against foreign religious groups.60 In one ordinary case, police outside of Moscow stopped a truck carrying 440 pounds religious literature of the Jehovahs Witnesses and ceased all of it with little explanation.61
54 Christopher Marsh and Wallace L. Daniel, Editorial: Russias 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience, Journal of Church and State 49, no. 1: 5-17; Religious Affairs Highlights (26), 1-31 December 2009, World News Connection, January 8, 2010. 55 Russian Federation Federal Law: On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations, Journal of Church and State 39, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 873-889. [hereafter, 1997 Law] 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 J. Brian Gross, Russias War on Political and Religous Extremism: An Appraisal of the Law On Counteracting Religious Extremism, Brigham Young University Law Review, 2003, no. 2 (2003): 717-760. 59 Ibid. 60 Galina Kozhevnikova, Inappropriate Enforcement of Anti-Extremist Legislation in the First Half of 2010, SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, October 1, 2010 http://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-analyses/2010/10/d19880/. 61 United States State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report 2010 Russia, report, Washington, D.C., 2010.
43
Church and State

The ROC has encouraged favorable federal legislation by cultivating a close relationship with state authorities. In 2009, for example, the Patriarchate and the ruling party United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya) announced a plan that would allow the Church to review and make suggestions on the legislation that passes through the state Duma.62 Eager to maintain its own autonomy, the ROC stresses state non-interference of religious affairs while also encouraging a cooperative Church-state relationship to achieve common goals. Overall, a relationship with the state has been one of the most effective ways for the ROC to keep a high level of influence on society. The Basis of the Social Concept states that the Church is absolutely free from the state, and emphasizes the ways and areas in which the ROC and Russian government can cooperate. In the list of areas of Church state cooperation, some items, such as promoting mutual understanding among people and the preservation of morality in society, hint at the Churchs self-conception as an everlasting collective moral and spiritual institution in Russian society. Others more pointedly state elements of the states current social agenda, and some outline the parameters of the relationship between the Church and state. Notably, the Social Concept encourages Church dialogue with government bodies of all branches and levels on issues important for the Church and society, including the development of appropriate laws, by-laws, instructions and decisions, and for Church-state cooperation in opposition to the work of pseudo-religious structures presenting a threat to the individual and society.63 The Church sees itself and the state as institutions that guide and represent the collective Russian nation and that achieve the nations collective goals. Shrewdly, the ROC has kept its distance from electoral politics, which would undermine its claim to represent the collective Russian nationl. By interacting only with those in power, the Church puts itself above the party politics where it has more legitimacy and where it can more easily maintain a consistent amount influence. It has positioned itself in some instances as being on equal footing with the state in offering Russians spiritual salvation while the state protects their well-being on earth.64 It has also interpreted its role as protecting certain moral norms that undergird rule of law and, by extension, the state sphere of the protection of earthly well-being. John Basil notes that the Churchs conception of relationship church-state relations is influenced more by Church leaders feelings about the states domination of the state under Peter the Great and the Soviets than by any desire to reestablish any harmonious historical
62 US State Department, International Religious Freedom Report 2010 Russia. 63 Russian Orthodox Church Department for External Church Affairs, Basis of the Social Concept, Part III http://www. mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/. 64 John D. Basil, Problems of Church and State in the Russian Federation: Three Points of View, Journal of Church and State 51, no. 2 (2009): 211-235.
44
Philip Meyer
relationship between the Russian church and state.65 While looking to increase its influence and position and society through ties with the state, the Church is also aware of the states power and very protective of its independence. It has been suspicious, for example, of any talk of creating a Russian religious affairs ministry.66 This is part of the reason that the Church has never pushed to establish itself as the official state religion. In October 1992, Patriarch Aleksii said, I am not a supporter of the idea of state religionBut [the Church and state] are called to mutual assistancewithout pressure on one another, without replacing one anotherwithout red tape, without attempts to limit the freedom of the church, the state, society, or the individual.67 The churchs ability to reclaim the position it wants in society is closely linked with its independence. State control would limit its ability to achieve its goals and undermine its legitimacy as the bearer of Russian collective identity. By and large, the Church has been careful not to ruffle any feathers in the Kremlin and portray a symbiotic, agreeable relationship with the state. In 2008, Michael Bourdeaux noted that in recent times no bishop has criticized an aspect of Kremlin policy,68 and Robert Blitt has found that the Putin Administration and the Church shared virtually uniform policy views and objectives on a host of issues.69 Church leaders have also expressed views critical of democratic politics and suggested that, in the future, Russia will be led by a single party. In March 2010, Patriarch Kirill called political pluralism a toy and a passing fad.70
The ROCs Social Campaign

Keeping with its self-conception as the moral compass of Russian society, the ROC has attempted to insert itself and its teachings into Russian everyday life. The Basis of the Social Concept touches upon issues of alcoholism, abortion, the environment, the death penalty, sex and marriage, and others, and takes a conservative view. Kirill has lamented what he feels is the moral degradation of Russian society because of the importation of Western liberal thought. In 1996 speech in Brazil, he said, In Russia, just as in many countries in the West, the mass media have been involved in the broadest possible propaganda of lust, debauchery, and violence.71 In January, Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin was heavily criticized for railing
65 Basil, Problems of Church and State in the Russian Federation, 215. 66 Ibid., 216. 67 Vsevolod Chaplin, Church and Politics in Russia, in The Politics of Religion in Russian and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Michael Bourdeaux (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 108. 68 Michael Bourdeaux, President Putin and the Patriarchs, The Times January 11, 2008 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ comment/faith/article3172785.ece. 69 Robert C Blitt, How to Entrench a De Facto Church in Russia: A Guide In Progress, Brigham Young University Law Review 2008, no. 3: 707-778. 70 Ibid. 71 Kirill, in Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia, 68.
45
in a sermon against promiscuously dressed women and suggesting that Russia should have a nation-wide dress code. He remarked, If a woman is wearing a mini-skirt, then she is provoking not only people from the Caucasus but also Russians. If on top of that she is drunk, it is even more provocative. If on top of that she herself actively provokes contact, and is then surprised that it ends in rape, then moreover she is not in the right.72 Chaplin, who is the Head of the Synodal Department for Church and Society Relations, is the most inflammatory of the church leaders when it comes to social issues. In May 2011, in his promotion of decent night clubs that he claims have risen in popularity, he expressed relief that it would be unfair to refer to all night clubs as brothels, or drug joints, or cesspools of alcoholics.73 But remarks on the order of Chaplins are the exception more than the rule. Although the ROC opinions about Russian society have hardly changed since the fall of the USSR, its strategy has become much less aggressive over the past two decades But Fr. Chaplins comments do shed light on the depth of ROCs fears that the moral foundation of Russian society will crumble as Western ideas persuade citizens to reject Orthodoxy. The most prominent arena of the Churchs push into modern Russian society is the public education system. Its position on religion was first expressed in the Basis of the Social Concept, in which Orthodox faith takes a position opposite the materialism of Soviet ideology and contemporary Western thought.74 Public education is one of the main fronts for Churchs campaign to imbue society with Orthodox morality and a sense of Russian identity rooted in faith, but the Church also finds itself having to appease those who demand that education be secular. The Basis concedes the Churchs respect for secular education and suggests that religious education classes be optional, while at the same time using colorful language to emphasize the dangers that a non-Orthodox education poses to Russian society. It warns of the danger of occult and neo-heathen influences and destructive sects penetrating into the secular school and of a secular culture that threatens to impose upon students anti-religious and anti-Christian ideas and to assert the monopoly of the materialistic worldview.75 In this sense, the Social Concepts position on schools is representative of its conception of society at large. It finds itself on the defensive, competing with the attractive ideas of the liberal West and responds assertively.
72 http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/russia-russian-orthodox-dress-code-modesty-jan-267.cfm 73 Russian Church Proposes to Encourage Decent Night Clubs, Interfax, May 11 2011, http://www.interfax-religion. com/?act=news&div=8435. 74 Basil, Orthodoxy and Public Education in the Russian Federation: The First Fifteen Years, Journal of Church and State 49, no. 1 (Winter 2007), 27-52. 75 Russian Orthodox Church Department for External Church Affairs, Basis of the Social Concept, Part XVI, http://www. mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/.
46
Philip Meyer
Church leaders stance on education has changed little since the Social Concept was written in 2000. In 2006, the theme of the Moscow Patriarchates Christmas Lectures was School and ChurchTradition and Reform in Education. Patriarch Aleksii II and Metropolitan Filaret, Exarch of Belarus, gave the opening speeches at the conference, reiterating much of what is established in the Social Concept. It has also taken its campaign outside of Moscow to school districts around the country and tried to persuade teachers and school administrators to offer courses in Orthodox faith. Some classes now instruct their students in Orthodox doctrine and receive visits from local clergy. 76 Though the church has not been able to convince the state to establish a nationwide program of religious education in Russian schools, it is telling of the Churchs power that the central Russian authorities have not stepped in on the local schools, even as secular advocates criticize the secularization of Russian society. 77 This Western secular liberalism has been the Churchs most formidable enemy since the fall of the USSR. Church leaders conflate the secular emphasis of contemporary thought with the scientific atheism of Soviet ideology, treating it as a hostile ideology that aims to take over Russia and the world. In 2007, Patriarch Aleksii rejected secular criticisms of the Churchs policy toward public schools as an echo of the atheistic propaganda of the past.78 In the nineties, Church leaders saw the Western liberalism of the United States and Western Europe and the self-determinist nationalism of the former Soviet republics as two distinct but equally destructive forces. In the 1996 speech in Brazil, Patriarch Kirill announced, The world is faced, on the one hand, with an aggressive globalizing monoculture which tries to impose itself everywhere, dominating and assimilating other cultural and national identities and, on the other, with nationalistic upheavals, trivialization, and disintegration of the human family.79 According to Kirill, this monoculture, which uses the mass media to propagate moral permissiveness under the auspices of personal freedom and instill a super-consumer culture, has led to global devastation80 and will bring about the coming collapse of civilizations.81 In April, Father Chaplin compared the Western social model with Soviet communism and Nazi fascism, stating, The Christian social model has no relation to the modern Western world. The West is now that same Godless system which has collapsed as communism, it has collapsed as Nazism and it will collapse as capitalism.82
76 Clifford J. Levy, Welcome or Not, Orthodoxy is Back in Russias Public Schools, The New York Times, September 23, 2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/world/europe/23russia.html. 77 Basil, Orthodoxy in Public Education in the Russian Federation. 78 Levy. 79 Kirill, in Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia, 66. 80 Ibid., 68 81 Patriarch Kirill: Unity of Russia and Ukraine based on Christian values Voice of Russia, July 19, 2010 http://english.ruvr. ru/2010/07/19/12789630.html 82 Archbishop Vsevolod Chaplin: Russia is the Best Part of Todays Europe, Interfax, April 8, 2011 http://www.interfaxreligion.com/?act=news&div=8354.
47
The Church has resolved not to adapt itself to contemporary society because its leaders see Orthodoxy and Western secularism as opposite, incompatible ideologies. In 2001, Kirill wrote an article for the journal Ecumenical Review, in which he stated that the irreconcilable difference between secular liberalism and the traditional Christian world-view is that in Christianity, man finds true freedom as he frees himself from sin, whereas in liberalism, quite alien as it is to the notion of sin, includes the idea of the emancipation of human beings as they are, which actually means the release of the potential of sin in the human person.83 Liberalism, he asserts, subordinates morality to the individual instead of to God. Kirill claims that there are two popular models for challenging Western liberalism: the first is for the Church to isolate itself, and the other is to accept the liberal civil model and put it in the soil of the Church.84 Even the second model, Kirill argues, would lead to the Churchs isolation because it would prompt an emphasis of liberal values that would allow and legitimize things which we are convinced are incompatible with the tradition of the church, such as female priesthood, homosexuality, abortion, and others.85 Orthodoxy cannot be practiced a la carte. Anything but to accept it wholesale is to reject it. By taking such an uncompromising, conservative position, the Church weakens its chance of gaining the amount influence it desires.
Religion and the New Russia

The Russian public has a generally European opinion of religion and contemporary society. Surveys of Russian citizens have shown a steady increase since the fall of the USSR in the number of those identifying as Russian Orthodox believers.86 Today, about two-thirds consider themselves Orthodox, but only about 5 percent of the believers attend religious services once per week or more often. Just fewer than 12 percent even attend once each month, and 13.5 percent never attend.87 Only 46.3 percent of Orthodox believers claim that God is important in their lives.88 This information seems to suggest, as Christopher Marsh and other have noted, that Orthodoxy is often treated as a cultural association and a marker of national identity for many Russians who are not religious in the conventional sense.89
83 Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Leningrad, The Orthodox Church in the Face of World Integration: The Relation between Traditional and Liberal Values, Ecumenical Review 53, 4 (October 2001): 479-484. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Levada Center, 2008 http://www.levada.ru/religion.html. 87 World Values Survey, 2009, accessible at http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalize.jsp. 88 Ibid. 89 Christopher Marsh, Russian Orthodox Christians and Their Orientation Toward Church and State, Journal of Church and State, 47, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 545-561; Juliet Johnson, Modern Identities in Russia: A New Struggle for the Soul? in Religion and Identity in Modern Russia: The Revival of Orthodoxy and Islam, ed. Juliet Johnson, Marietta Stepaniants and Benjamin Forest (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2005).
48
Philip Meyer
Either way, we see that while Russians generally identify with their Orthodoxy, they do not see the Church having a prominent role in everyday life. Over 70 percent of Russians found it appropriate in 1999 to look to the church for answers on moral and spiritual issues, but they reject the notion of church weighing on social issues. Even as the number of reported believers has increased over the past 20 years, the number of Russians who would turn to the church for moral or spiritual issues reduced between 1990 and 1999. In 1990, more than half of citizens, including the non-Orthodox, thought it appropriate for the Church to express its opinion on social issues, but in 1999, 75 percent responded that the church and social issues should be separate. Even among professed Orthodox believers, more than half thought that the Church is best off abstaining from social commentary.90 In 2008, the Moscow-based Levada Center asked Russians what the role of the Church should be in public life. The most popular answers, representing 46, 37, 31, 30 and 29 percent of the population, respectively, were preserve social morality, meet the spiritual needs of believers, support charity, help the poor, and preserve cultural traditions.91 Sixty-one percent of respondents said in 2007 the church should not influence state decision-making, and 58 percent disagreed with the proposition that Russian political leaders should lead according to religious beliefs.92 Few believe that the Orthodox Church or Orthodox believers should be given special legal benefits, and they support religious equality. On the controversial issue of religion and schools, 20 percent thought that religion had no place in public education, while another 60 percent supported having optional classes that teach the history of religion and the foundations of religious morality.93 While most Russians recognize religions role development of Russian culture and its collective national identity, they generally do not expect religion to have an impact on their daily lives. They are more convinced, moreover, that there are particular areas of society in which religion is appropriate. They mostly disagree with church involvement in politics of any kind, and they believe that religion is an individual choice. While Church leaders can be relieved that Russians still accept and trust the Church, they would balk at anything short of a pervasive role in society; they would see the choice of some citizens to life a life without religion as a crowning example of the pernicious effect of Western secularism. Confronted as it is with a dynamic, evolving society, there is not much the church can do but adapt to the demands of its believers. If it wants to make more devout believers out of its legions of cultural believers, then it must update itself, says Orthodox priest Father Georgii Chistiakov. He argues that current Church practice is so incompatible with
90 91 92 93 World Values Survey. Levada Center. Ibid. Ibid.
49
contemporary society that it creates an obstacle to religious enlightenment.94 Chistiakov claims that church services, which are still conducted in Old Church Slavonic, not modern Russian, are inaccessible and restrict the believers relationship with God. He says that religion is ritualistic, fetishized, and materialistic for most believers today.95 He argues that the ROCs desire to preserve and extend its dominion in the former Soviet space has distracted it from its proper role connecting believers with God, and he criticizes its exaggerating the threat of foreign religions. He says that a communist paradigm is still in effect even more than a decade after the fall of the USSR, which causes Orthodox consciousness to become xenophobic, closed, and highly intolerant of other faiths and the West in general.96 He stresses that there is an important place for the Church in Russian society if it allows the establishment of a free, open society to occur.
Conclusion
Fr. Chistiakov presents the ROC with an attainable strategy for maintaining its status in the dynamic society of post-Soviet Russia, but how much will the Patriarchate entertain the recommendation? Judging from the leaders public statements, it appears that the Church hierarchy has adapted somewhat to Russias new social realities. The shift in Church policy toward Ukraine appears to show some more respect than it did previously for Ukrainian national self-identification. Church leaders also often voice their support for secular politics and society. However, it has done little to modify its rituals or traditions to make them more accessible to contemporary Russians, and it should. It will have the most success in pursuing its social agenda and establishing itself as a spiritual and moral guide if ordinary believers are able to engage with their faith through the church. In the end, the Church is still a persistent influence in Russian civilization, and it will always be a respected institution and a social force. Yet the dynamics of modern society are mostly out of the Churchs hands, as they have also been liberated from the control of the state. The policy of the Church should therefore not be to counter the prevailing social movements. Rather, it should adhere to the values it represents while making itself attractive and accessible to those who seek its guidance.
References
Agadjanian, Alexander. Revising Pandoras Gifts. Europe-Asia Studies 53, no. 3 (May 2001): 473-488. Basil, John D. Orthodoxy and Public Education in the Russian Federation: The First Fifteen Years. Journal of Church and State 49, no. 1 (Winter 2007), 27-52.
94 Georgii Chistiakov, In Search of the Russian Idea: A View from Inside the Russian Orthodox Church, in Religion and Identity in Modern Russia, 54. 95 Chistiakov, 54. 96 Ibid., 57.
50
Philip Meyer
____. Problems of Church and State in the Russian Federation: Three Points of View. Journal of Church and State 51 no. 2 (2009): 211-235. Bociurkiw, Bohdan. Politics and Religion Ukraine: The Orthodox and the Greek Catholics. In The Politics of Religion in Russia and the News States of Eurasia, edited by Michael Bourdeaux. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. Brandenberger, David. National Bolshevism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. Chaplin, Vsevold. Church and Politics in Russia. In The Politics of Religion in Russia and the News States of Eurasia, edited by Michael Bourdeaux. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. Chistiakov, Georgii. In Search of the Russian Idea: A View From Inside the Russian Orthodox Church. In The Politics of Religion in Russia and the News States of Eurasia, edited by Michael Bourdeaux. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. Daniel, Wallace L. and Christopher Marsh. Editorial: Russias 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience. Journal of Church and State 49, no. 1: 5-17. Dunlop, John B. The Russian Orthodox Church as an Empire-Saving Institution. In The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, edited by Michael Bourdeaux. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. Ellis, Jane. The Russia Orthodox Church: Triumphalism and Defensiveness. New York: St. Martins Press, 1996. Gross, J. Brian. Russias War on Political and Religious Extremism: An Appraisal of the Law On Countering Religions Extremism. Brigham Young University Law Review 2003, no. 2: 717-760. Johnson, Juliet. Modern Identities of Russia: A New Struggle for the Soul? In Religion and Identity in Russia: The Revival of Orthodoxy and Islam, ed. Juliet Johnson, Marietta Stepaniants and Benjamin Forest. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2005. Kolarz, Walter. Religion in the Soviet Union. New York: St. Martins Press, 1961. Luxmoore, Jonathan. Spies in From the Cold: Poland Church Confronts Its Other Past. National Catholic Reporter. December 22, 2008. Marsh, Christopher. Russian Orthodox Christians and Their Orientation Toward Church and State. Journal of Church and State, 47, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 545-561. Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad. Gospel and Culture. In Proselytism and Orthodox in Russia: The New War for Souls. Edited by John Witte Jr. and Michael Bourdeaux. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999. Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2
51
Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Leningrad. The Orthodox Church in the Face of World Integration: The Relation Between Traditional and Liberal Values. Ecumenical Review 53, no. 4 (October 2001): 479-484. Pospielovsky, Dmitry V. The Russian Orthodox Church in the Postcommunist CIS. In The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, edited by Michael Bourdeaux. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995. Ramet, Sabrina P., Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe and Russia. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1141/is_9_43/ai_n26713176/. Webster, Alexander F.C. Split Decision: The Orthodox Clash Over Estonia. The Christian Century. Jun 5-12, 1996: 614-623. Zolotov, Andrei. Nonaggressive Integration. Russia Profile. March 31, 2010. http://russiaprofile.org/culture_living/a1270041656.html. ____. Kirill on a Mission: Will the New Patriarch of Moscow Succeed in His New Role in Ukraine? Russia Profile. July 27, 2009. http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2009-141-37.cfm ____. The Old New Player. Russia Profile. March 31, 2010. http://russiaprofile.org/international/a1270043113.html.
The Internet as a Fundamental Human Right

Examining the Boundaries of Free Speech Online
Rebecca Wertman
The Internet creates a new tool for the citizens of the world to communicate; however, along with this great invention comes a number of problems. The invention of the internet has increased freedom for some, for others, the Internet further limits freedom of expression experienced in their home countries. This paper explores this new phenomenon of freedom of expression on the Internetwhat it means, where limits lie, and who supports or abuses this type of freedom of expression. The international community, sovereign states, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector all play an important role in addressing this 21st Century issue of freedom of expression on the Internet.
The Internet is a new tool for the citizens of the world to communicate. Words like globalization, interconnectedness, and economic growth often surround the positive side of this new tool. The Internet is an unprecedented medium for the exchange of ideas, but the technological advance also introduces new problems. Freedom of expression, while recognized multilaterally as a fundamental freedom in international law, becomes increasingly restricted on the Internet. Governments fear that the Internet limits their ability to govern or have unilateral control over their own citizens. Consequently, these oppressive states feel a need to regain some control of their people by limiting the use of this new technology. Simultaneously, the Internet itself has developed into a necessity for modern living, thus the right to access should be guaranteed to citizens universally. Unacceptable restrictions surrounding Internet availability and access permeate states around the world with debate and action occurring at multiple levels. This paper will discuss the agenda of different actors from the United Nations (UN), to states, civil society, and the business sectorand explain how these actors, along with international human rights law and the principle of human security, are addressing this 21st Century issue of freedom of expression on the Internet.
Freedom of Expression in International Law

According to Frank La Rue, UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of expression on the Internet is already guaranteed by international human rights law. The medium for the exchange of
Rebecca Wertman is a Junior majoring in International Relations and minoring in French and Economics.
54
Rebecca Wertman
ideas changes with new technology, yet, the laws governing expression do not. La Rue explained in his presentation during the interactive dialogue of the 17th Session of the UN Human Rights Council that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) both allow for technological change in definition of freedom of expression.1 In the UDHR, Article 19 guarantees freedom of expression. In its three sections, the article establishes the universal right of people to hold opinions without interference and the right to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds. The third subcategory of Article 19 explains that the only restrictions to these rights are provided by law for the respect or reputations of others and for the protection of national security, public order, health, or morals. In addition, Article 19 expresses that the right to freedom of expression can take place regardless of frontiers, including oral, written, artistic forms, or most importantly for this 21st Century debate, through any other media of choice.2 Article 19 of the ICCPR explains, Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.3 La Rue emphasized the terms any media and regardless of frontiers when arguing that universal human rights law regarding freedom of expression already includes room for changes in technology. Other notable regional human rights documents that propose the freedom of expression include the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), and the European Convention for Human Rights (ECHR). These three significant documents coincide with their international counterparts, binding states to include freedom of expression in their own domestic charters. Unfortunately, each of these documents is vague in its explanation of what the limits are to this fundamental freedom.
The Debate at the United Nations

The current debate at the UN Human Rights Council rests member states are condemned for their use of legal measures to limit freedom of expression on the Internet. Andrea Bianchi, Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute Geneva, explains in his discussion of the use of UN Charter Article 51 that countries use their own national laws enshrined in the Westphalian sovereign state system to justify their use of Internet
1 Frank La Rue, The Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (statement, 17th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, June 3, 2011). 2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19, December 10, 1948, http://www.un.org/ en/documents/udhr/. 3 Ibid.
Freedom of Expression on the Internet
55
restrictions.4 At the 17th Session of the Council, most of June 3rds debate surrounded this controversial reasoning behind restrictions as well as the condemnation of states whose restrictions were not truly justified. Frank La Rue began by presenting his report, entitled The Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, which focused on the two issues of access to online content and Internet connection as a necessary infrastructure. La Rue said, Internet is a communication tool that allows individuals to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, echoing the language of the UDHR and the ICCPR. La Rue went on to explain that, The extent to which people can exercise their right to freedom of expression is an indicator of the current state of human rights in any country. Many countries agreed, and commented on his report stating that there should be as little restriction on the net as possible. According to La Rues report, existing restriction occurs in four areas: 1. Arbitrary blocking or filtering of content 2. Criminalization of legitimate expression 3. Intermediary liability 4. The right to privacy and data protection5 Continuing his report, La Rue then gave examples of what each of these four areas entails. Arbitrary blocking or filtering of content included blocking of YouTube or blocking Internet access during key political moments, including elections. Blocking certain Internet content or access often occurs without any judicial review and without complying with international law. Criminalization of legitimate expression relates to the use of criminal law to sanction legitimate expression.6 The third issue area, the imposition of intermediary liability, is the use of state laws that require intermediaries to filter, remove, or block content. La Rue noted here that companies should not comply with such government requests that could implicate themselves with human rights violations. Finally, inadequate protection of the right to privacy and data protection condemns governments who collect the usernames, passwords, and other personal information from their users for the sole purpose of monitoring their behavior.7 These four issue areas, while often justified in the vagueness of national legal measures, explain how states are abusing their own citizens rights to freedom of expression through limiting Internet, and severely punishing those who try to speak out against restrictions.
4 Andrea Bianchi, The International Regulation of the Use of Force (Lecture, Graduate Institute, Geneva, June 22, 2011). 5 Frank La Rue, The Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (Statement, 17th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, June 3, 2011), 2. 6 Ibid, 3. 7 Ibid, 4.
56
Rebecca Wertman
The Global Response

With the issues at hand, states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had the opportunity to respond to La Rues report, presenting personal narratives of successful or best practices in the field. The representative of the United States of America took the floor with a stance supporting the rights to freedom of expression on the Internet. The American representative recognized how the, Dramatic events in North Africa, the Middle East, and beyond highlight the importance of new communications tools for providing new avenues to exercise freedom of expression and allowing people everywhere to articulate their democratic aspirations. The American representative continued, urging member states to remove domestic legal provisions that improperly criminalize or limit freedom of expression, and that states should ensure that Internet access is always available, even at times of political unrest.8 Other western countries echoed the United States sentiments and added, reiterating La Rues points, that states should ensure the protection of freedom of expression online in accordance with international human rights law and that the move towards democracy today relies on open communication on the Internet. Oppressive states responsible for blocking websites, unlawful imprisonment, and censorship took the opportunity to justify their actions. Nigeria spoke on behalf of the African Group and said, The Internet should be restricted to protect security and public order.9 Belarus simply stated that the Special Rapporteurs report was not objective.10 Pakistan, on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), spoke of an Internet hierarchy, which the Cuban representative seemingly agreed with in its anti-American remarks regarding the United States hegemonic control over the Internet.11 Although the false accusations of some states against other actors are both frustrating and hypocritical, even more absurd is the unique case of China. According to La Rue, 72 of the 109 imprisonments of bloggers in 2010 occurred in China.12 In their report entitled, Freedom on the Net 2011, Freedom House explained how China unjustly shuts down blogs on political and social issues, scans user searches for banned key words, and even sends out emails containing harmful software capable of spying on the recipients computer. China is also home to what is known as the Great Firewall, responsible for blocking
8 United States (Statement, 17th Session of United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, June 3, 2011), www.ohchr.org. 9 Nigeria (Statement, 17th Session of United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, June 3, 2011), www.ohchr.org. 10 Belarus (Statement, 17th Session of United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, June 3, 2011), www.ohchr.org. 11 Pakistan (Statement, 17th Session of United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, June 3, 2011), www.ohchr.org; Cuba (Statement, 17th Session of United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, June 3, 2011), www.ohchr.org. 12 Frank La Rue, The Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (Statement, 17th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, June 3, 2011), 3.
57
Internet content. Furthermore, while the country boasts housing the largest population of Internet users in the world, the state remains classified as not free in the NGOs report.13 Yet, at the UN Human Rights Council, the Chinese representative stated that its government is, unfairly accused on its management of the Internet. The Chinese representative explained that under law, Chinese citizens have the right to free speech and can even criticize, complain, and sue. The representative went on to explain that freedom of expression is protected according to law and that the countrys Internet is open.14 Nonetheless, sufficient evidence from the UN, other governments, and NGOs exists to prove China violates international law in its limitations to freedom of expression on the Internet.
Non-Governmental Organization Action

In light of the obvious contradictions between evidence and opinions towards freedom of speech on the Internet, what course of action can the international community take? The United Nations sends Special Rapporteurs to investigate the situations in countries and uses the public forum of the UN Human Rights Council to condemn abusers. The rest of the international community has its own tools that coincide with international efforts to ensure that the right to digital freedom of expression is enforced. Freedom House created a report classifying countries as free, somewhat free, and not free by using their own set of indicators. The report introduced the topic of Internet freedom by stating, Over the past decade, and particularly in the last few years, the influence of the Internet as a means to spread information and challenge government-imposed media controls has steadily expanded. The number of Internet users doubled in the past five years, but website blocking and filtering, content manipulation, attacks on and imprisonment of bloggers, and cyber-attacks have all increased as well.15 There are new Internet restrictions responding to the emergence of new social networking tools such as Facebook and Twitter; states even post their own information on these sites to manipulate public opinion.16 Freedom House has three categories that aim to measure each countrys level of Internet and new media freedom, so that states that abuse freedom of expression can be identified and condemned. The first, Obstacles to Access, includes infrastructural and economic barriers, government efforts to block specific applications of technologies, and legal, regulatory, and ownership control over the Internet. The second, Limits on Content, considers filtering and blocking of websites, and other forms of censorship, manipulation of content, and the
13 Sanja Kelly and Sarah Cook, Freedom on the Net 2011: A Global Assessment of the Internet and Digital Media, Freedom House Report, April 18, 2011. 14 China (Statement, 17th Session of United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, June 3, 2011), www.ohchr.org. 15 Sanja Kelly and Sarah Cook, Freedom on the Net 2011: A Global Assessment of the Internet and Digital Media, Freedom House Report, April 18, 2011, 1. 16 Ibid, 3.
58
Rebecca Wertman
overall diversity of online content. The third and final category, Violations of User Rights, measures legal protections and restrictions of online activity, surveillance, and privacy and repercussions for online activity.17 By categorizing countries in this way, Freedom House seeks to make violations of the freedom of expression on the Internet apparent to the international community, so that not free countries will feel international pressure to liberalize Internet use. Reporters Without Borders is another NGO taking action in the name of freedom of expression on the Internet. While the NGO primarily defends journalists and media assistants who are imprisoned or persecuted they also fight against censorship and laws that undermine press freedom, including online content. The NGO operates internationally, researching and compiling reports on press freedom violations, sending protest letters to governments, and sometimes sending fact-finding missions to countries that lack transparency. Reporters Without Borders also organized an annual World Day Against Cyber Censorship to support freedom on the Internet.18 Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders are not the only civil society actors working to protect freedom of expression. Other NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also have a voice in global debates. In addition, twenty-two NGOs, including Freedom House and United Nations Watch, met in Geneva for the third consecutive year to host the Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy. This summit occurred at the same time as the March session of the UN Human Rights Council, but instead of having state representatives debating, arguing, and attempting to pass resolutions, the Summit assembled real human rights dissidents to tell their stories of abuse. One of the Summits sessions, Protecting Press Freedom and Internet Freedom, allowed victims from Vietnam, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe to share their experiences.19 The Vietnamese victim, Nguyen Thanh Van, discussed the arbitrary arrests of bloggers in Vietnam for writing texts critical of the regime and the regimes blocking of access to foreign media, which it sees as propaganda.20 Through the proliferation of information, the issue of freedom of expression on the Internet takes on a human face as victims tell their own stories in attempt to gain support for a freer Internet from the international community. The Internet itself also aids NGOs in their advocacy efforts, although some countries like Vietnam block access to human rights NGO websites.21 A free Internet thus creates a
17 Ibid, 12. 18 Reporters Without Borders: Press Freedom, Reporters Without Borders, last modified 2011, http://en.rsf.org/. 19 Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy, http://www.genevasummit.org. 20 Geneva Summit, Protecting Press Freedom and Internet Freedom: Nguyen Thanh Van, March 15, 2011, http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=fLAJDXSCohA. 21 Geneva Summit, Protecting Press Freedom and Internet Freedom: Nguyen Thanh Van, March 15, 2011, http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=fLAJDXSCohA.
59
platform for NGOs to distribute their ideas internationally and instantly. In his Foreign Policy article The Internet, Andrew L. Shapiro notes how within the field of International Relations, the Internet plays a role in redefining international diplomacy by creating a more equal playing field between states, multinational corporations, and NGOs.22 Yet, just as NGOs aim to ensure freedom of expression on the net through their own naming and shaming efforts, multinational Internet corporations also have an imperative role in this debate.
Are Multinational Corporations Helping or Hindering?

Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are all large international digital actors who play a role in either providing or limiting freedom of expression on the Internet. According to the American Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Terrence P. McCulley, the Internet has become a global town square for the citizens of the world, and Internet gatherings parallel rallies in the streets.23 Through Internet services, people around the world are empowered to share information and express their opinions, ideally, even in environments normally hostile to freedom of expression. These corporations, however, have a choice to make when governments attempt to limit their services within state borders. During the Arab Springs democratic revolts, Middle Eastern and North African citizens and media sources were able to use social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, to mobilize groups of likeminded individuals. For example, in protest to the death of 28 year-old Khaled Saeed, demonstrators used Facebook to organize a protest on January 25, 2011. Saeeds unwarranted death mobilized more than 80,000 people through a Facebook page called We are all Khaled Saeed, which now has more than one million supporters. This is just one example of how the availability of internet access allowed for the creation of a mass political protest.24 During the Arab Spring these social networking sites also provided a forum to report current news and human rights violations. The Egyptian example and others from the Arab Spring show how the Internet became a powerful tool for achieving freedom of expression nationally. American Ambassador to Uganda, Jerry P. Lanier, noted, People around the world come together every day on the Internet to connect to one another, sample a universe of news and information, and make their voices heard.25 William Saletans article, Springtime for Twitter, explains the broad role that the Internet and social networking served during the Arab Spring. The author explains that
22 Andrew L Shapiro, The Internet, Foreign Policy 115 (Summer 1999): p24, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149490. 23 Terrence P McCulley, Free Speech on the Internet, Daily Independent (Lagos), March 2, 2011. 24 NATO Review, Arab spring = Facebook revolution #1? http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/Social_Medias/Arab_ Spring/EN/index.htm. 25 Jerry P Lanier, Internet Advances Basic Principles of Freedom, Monitor (Kampala), April 8, 2011.
60
Rebecca Wertman
the availability of technology does not guarantee revolution, but it allows for people who are frightened to express their beliefs publicly and rally with like-minded individuals. In Tunisia, while the government blocked YouTube and Flickr, it did not block Facebook for fear of public protest. Tunisians seized this opportunity and congregated on Facebook to mobilize the rebellion of their repressive government. According to activists within such repressive countries, technologies such as Twitter allow people to circumvent the grip of totalitarian governments. This can occur regardless of whether the government takes extreme censorship measures because activists are able to establish their own routes of communication without the infiltration of the government.26 The Arab Spring exemplifies how access to the Internet can allow citizens in one country to learn about human rights, mobilize online, and take direct action against their government to demand for freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms. With the true services of such sites being available to everybody, freedom of expression on the Internet can exist. Google, another multinational Internet corporation, believes in providing only its full services to its users. Googles mission is to organize the worlds information and make it universally accessible and useful, thus its core values are strongly founded on freedom of expression. In 2010, the company had to decide whether to remain in China, where its services were becoming increasingly restricted.27 The Chinese government required the search engine to adjust search results to match government-imposed criteria, and ultimately Google chose to end compliance with the regimes regulations and withdrew its services.28 Its once-censored search engine limited freedom of expression and did not project the true image of Google. Instead of remaining in China providing a limited service, Google decided that it would be best to provide no service at all.29 Microsoft is another important player in the freedom of expression on the Internet debate. Their views, however, differ from those of Google. Microsoft does business in many countries around the world and in order for a business to operate in a country the business must comply with local laws. Microsofts beliefs on freedom of expression on the Internet are thus as follows: Microsoft believes in freedom for users to connect to the people and information that is important to them, but Microsoft will continue to comply with local laws of the markets in which we do business. While this is a complex and difficult issue, we remain convinced
26 William Saletan, Springtime for Twitter, Slate, last modified July 18, 2011, http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/future_tense/2011/07/springtime_for_twitter.html. 27 Global Network Initiative Inaugural Report 2010 (n.p., 2010), 15. 28 Sanja Kelly and Sarah Cook, Freedom on the Net 2011: A Global Assessment of the Internet and Digital Media, Freedom House Report, April 18, 2011, 8. 29 Verne G Kopytoff, Free-speech iniative gains no Net traction; Original participants unable to persuade other companies to sign up, International Herald Tribune (San Francisco), March 8, 2011.
61
it is better for Microsoft and other multinational companies to be in these markets with our services and communication tools, as opposed to not be there.30
Global Efforts
While Microsofts and Googles views differ in complying with governments to provide some information, versus taking a stance and refusing to provide anything but their full services, both companies are part of a global initiative aimed at providing freedom of expression on the Internet. The Global Network Initiative is a multi-stakeholder group of companies, civil society organizations (such as human rights groups and press freedom groups), investors, and academics.31 The Initiative believes that the Internet and other related communication technologies have the potential to further public good. The Global Network Initiative formed over two primary issues. First, governments forcing online service companies to disclose personal data about their users in order to enforce laws against political activity, and second, governments limiting access to information by removing it from search results, blogs, and other online services.32 The Initiatives members are diverse, including representatives of Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo, civil society groups such as Human Rights Watch, and academic groups like USCs Annenberg School for Communications. These different actors work together to develop approaches for the private sector to promote respect for human rights despite government policies or practices that have negative implications on free expression and privacy on the Internet.33 They also established a framework for responsible corporate decisionmaking and action. One way the Global Network Initiative achieves these goals is through the United Nations Protect, Respect, and Remedy, framework.34 John Ruggie, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Secretary General on human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, created the framework and explains that the goal of the principles is to protect human rights, respect human rights, and remedy (have access to judicial procedures and aid) in situations of human rights abuses.35 Each group member also has its own individual responsibilities. Companies are responsible for upholding the Initiatives principles and implementing them within their own organizational framework. Civil society participants help expose limits to freedom and right
30 Jill Giacomoni, Freedom of Expression on the Internet Research by a USC Student, e-mail message to Becca Wertman, July 14, 2011. 31 Global Network Initiative, Global Network Initiative, last modified 2011, http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/. 32 Global Network Initiative Inaugural Report 2010 (n.p., 2010), 1-3. 33 Ibid, 3. 34 Ibid, 7. 35 John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, March 21, 2011, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, www.ohchr. org/Documents/Issues/Business/ A-HRC-17-31_AEV.pdf.
62
Rebecca Wertman
the wrongs of governments and provide knowledge and expertise on human rights issues. Investors have interest in encouraging the information and communication technologies sector to respect the rights of their users and protect their brands while continuing to operate in diverse and challenging countries and markets around the world. 36 Finally, academics contribute research findings and analysis. The diverse set of actors, while using its own tools, also relies on human rights law and the principle of human security to strengthen its cause. Human rights law recognizes the right to freedom of expression, regardless of what medium, as a fundamental freedom. Thus, when the limitation of citizens voices occurs, it becomes what Keith Krause, Professor of International Politics at the Graduate Institute Geneva, describes as a human security issue. Human security becomes important and relates to the idea that security is no longer only about a state securing its borders, but about a state securing the rights and protection of the people within its borders.37 When freedom of expression becomes limited, it transforms into a human security issue because the right of individuals to freely express their ideas, beliefs, and gain the information they desire can no longer occur. Even those who argue that human security should only include violent threats can agree that freedom of expression on the Internet fits here as violent responses to those who challenge the restrictions of their governments occurs.
Is Freedom Safe?
Having the Internet free for users to express their beliefs is essential, but there are certain instances where restrictions upon Internet use provide a beneficial service to the overall public good. Child pornography, pedophilia, copyright infringement, hacking, identity fraud, and espionage all take place over the Internet. The users and creators of such sites use the protection of freedom of expression to commit what would be obvious crimes if committed on a field other than the Internet. According to Dwayne Winseck, reporter to the Globe and Mail newspaper, Internet service providers (ISPs), telephones and search engines have become the electronic crossroads of the world, facilitating commerce and communication in some incredible ways. However, they also enable some extremely nasty things too. Winseck explains in his article Bill C-51 will turn ISPs into Internet gatekeepers how a new bill, the Investigative Powers for the 21st Century Act (Bill C-51) seeks to limit telecom and ISPs to function as arms of law enforcement and national security in Canada. Under the bill, telecom providers, ISPs and search engines must monitor, store, retain and disclose email, Internet and telephone communications at the request of law and security officials.
36 37 Global Network Initiative Inaugural Report 2010 (n.p., 2010), 13. Keith Krause, Human Security in World Politics (Lecture, Graduate Institute, Geneva, June 20, 2011).
63
Bill C-51 shows that even Canada, a fully democratic middle power state, limits pure freedom of expression on the Internet by enacting a bill requiring Internet providers to comply with a law that could interfere with their users privacy.38 Yet, the bill aims to protect against crime and functions only under the legal jurisdiction of the country. According to the UDHR, this sort of action should be allowed, as it aims to protect national security, public order, health, and morals, but to others it may still look like a government trying to exercise power over its people.
Conclusion
Whether the Internet is ultimately a tool that can be used to create freedom, or simply a tool that governments may use to limit the rights of their people is the question that remains. This debate occurs at the United Nations between states and NGOs, within NGOs addressing their own advocacy efforts, and within the major Internet companies of the world. Each of these actors is responsible for protecting Internet freedom in its own way, by condemning the oppressors or choosing to provide or limit Internet services. Luckily, there are forums, such as the UN Human Rights Council, the Geneva Summit, and the Global Network Initiative, where this diverse set of actors can convene to discuss the issue of Internet freedom and create positive change towards a freer Internet. While there are differences in opinion, such as Frank La Rues belief that companies should not comply with restrictive government laws and Microsofts belief that it is better to provide some service rather than none, the actors do share a common belief that freedom of expression on the Internet is a fundamental right. Human rights law and the notion of human security help further international pressure and maintain consistency in their advocacy efforts. There should be freedom of expression on the Internet so people can condemn abusive governments and gain aid from the international community. If the Internet is to become a true human right, the international community must continue to play its role in debating this issue and pressuring abusive states on the global stage.
References
Bianchi, Andrea. The International Regulation of the Use of Force. Lecture, Graduate Institute, Geneva, June 22, 2011. Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy. http://www.genevasummit.org/. Giacomoni, Jill. Freedom of Expression on the Internet Research by a USC Student. Email message to Becca Wertman, July 14, 2011.
38 Dwayne Winseck, Bill C-51 will turn ISPs into Internet gatekeepers, Globe and Mail (Toronto), June 14, 2011, http:// www.theglobeandmail.com/news/technology/digital-culture/dwayne-winseck/bill-c-51-will-turn-isps-into-internet-gatekeepers/ article2059908.
64
Rebecca Wertman
Kelly, Sanja, and Sarah Cook. Freedom on the Net 2011: A Global Assessment of the Internet and Digital Media. Freedom House Report. April 18, 2011. Kopytoff, Verne G. Free-speech iniative gains no Net traction; Original participants unable to persuade other companies to sign up. International Herald Tribune (San Francisco), March 8, 2011. Krause, Keith. Human Security in World Politics. Lecture, Graduate Institute, Geneva, June 20, 2011. Lanier, Jerry P. Internet Advances Basic Principles of Freedom. Monitor (Kampala), April 8, 2011. La Rue, Frank. The Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression. Statement, 17th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, June 3, 2011. McCulley, Terrence P. Free Speech on the Internet. Daily Independent (Lagos), March 2, 2011. Ruggie, John. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. March 21, 2011. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A-HRC-17-31_AEV.pdf. Saletan, William. Springtime for Twitter. Slate. Last modified July 18, 2011. http://www. slate.com/ Shapiro, Andrew L. The Internet. Foreign Policy 115 (Summer 1999): 14-27. http://www. jstor.org/stable/1149490. Winseck, Dwayne. Bill C-51 will turn ISPs into Internet gatekeepers. Globe and Mail (Toronto), June 14, 2011. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/technology/digital-culture/dwayne-winseck/bill-c-51-will-turn-isps-into-internet-gatekeepers/article2059908/.
Enhancing the US-Mexico Bilateral Relationship

Rafael Cano
This study examines the levels of difficulty in the accession process during the first, second, and fourth round of enlargement from the perspective of the applicant countries. It seeks to understand the role that public diplomacy has played in the enlargement process and whether it facilitates accession when examined alongside adherence to economic, political-domestic, and acquis communautaire selection criteria. In each respective round, the state selected represents the country that would have had the hardest time acceding to the Union for economic, political, or historical reasons. This analysis gives attention to how much reform was needed in Ireland, Spain, and Bulgaria in order to join the Union and how prepared each state was based on its preparation in the areas of economic, political-domestic, acquis communautaire, and public diplomacy reforms for acquiring membership. After drawing comparisons from the accession of these three countries, this paper conclude that accession was more difficult for Spain than it was for Ireland. However, it was far easier for Bulgaria than for both Ireland and Spain because the standards for Bulgarias accession were much lower. Thus, states in the last round faced less difficulty in joining the EU. While the levels of difficulty over time were not consistent across the board, it appears that public diplomacy did facilitate Bulgaria, who, out of the three countries, utilized public diplomacy the most in its accession process. In the past few decades, the bilateral relationship between the United States and Mexico has become increasingly significant to both nations. The two have experienced deeper integration through their expanding economic dependencies, migration patterns, and social experiences. This process of integration is best exemplified by Mexicos creation of maquiladoras, manufacturing or export assembly plants, in the 1960s in Mexican cities such as Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and Matamoros, which lie directly across the US border cities of San Diego, California, El Paso, Texas, and Brownsville, Texas. Today, maquiladoras are the most dynamic exporters in Mexico, shipping ninety percent of their goods to the United States. The industrialization of the US-Mexico border has led the two states to a turning point in their relationship where cooperationrather than bargained negligenceis in each nations national interest. Continued economic and social cooperation on the US-Mexico border will maintain and develop US and Mexicos complex relationship. The strengthening of this
Northern Mexicos Maquiladoras
Rafael Cano is a Senior majoring in International Relations and minoring in Entrepreneurship.
66
Rafael Cano
bilateral relationship will be important as foreign economic competition to the United States continues to intensify. By examining the economic sector, the issue of border migration, and the broader notion of social change, it is evident that despite its varied impact, the establishment of maquiladoras has been beneficial and will continue to be for the US-Mexico border region.
Maquiladora Development
The maquiladora industry in Mexicos northern border has become a significant component of the Mexican economy. It was originally a part of the Mexican governments temporary strategy, the Border Industrialization Program (BIP), to solve rising unemployment in the border zone with the US in 1965 when Mexico began to soften its economic import substitution strategy.1 The BIP offered fiscal advantages to both Mexico and the United States. Mexican law allowed foreign companies to operate temporarily in Mexico, while a US law allowed US companies to export manufacturing materials abroad and then re-import the assembled products into the US without taxes upon re-entry.2 As a result, maquiladoras became an attractive alternative to US companies due to the availability of inexpensive labor, the devaluation of the Mexican peso, and favorable changes in US customs laws.3 Low labor costs in Mexico allowed the US to maintain its global economic leadership and international corporate competitiveness. The industrialization process was the first step of true economic integration between the US and Mexico. Maquiladoras became Mexicos first case of free trade when they effectively became accessible to its northern neighbors free market. This was strengthened through the creation of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 between Mexico, the US, and Canada. This trilateral bloc enhanced and established new rules for investment and trade, creating new business opportunities between Mexico and the US and unparalleled growth of maquiladoras on the border. Barring competition from other low-wage countries, NAFTA strengthened Mexicos maquiladora industry.4 By 2000, the share of international trade in Mexicos GDP was thirty-two percent, up from eleven percent in 1980. Additionally, foreign direct investment has helped increase Mexicos export growth, quadrupling from less than of GDP in the early 1980s to over 3 percent of GDP in the late 1990s.5 As a result, Mexico converted itself from an inward-oriented economy to one where
1 Laura Randall, Changing Structure of Mexico: Political, Social, and Economic Prospects (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 268. 2 Quintero Cirila, Border Industrialization Program, JRANK, accessed November 16, 2010. http://www.jrank.org/cultures/ pages/3657/Border-Industrialization-Program.html. 3 Gordon H Hanson, The Role of Maquiladoras in Mexicos Export Boom, Migration Dialogue - Research & Seminars (JuneJuly 2002), accessed November 18, 2010. http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rs/more.php?id=8_0_2_0. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid.
67
export production is the main source of economic growth. Between 1990 and 2002, real added value produced by the maquiladora industry grew at an astonishing annual average rate of 10 percent. For comparison, Mexicos real GDP at the time only expanded by an annual average rate of 3 percent.6 As a result of the strong, positive economic integration between the US and Mexico, there are now over one million Mexicans working in over 3,000 maquiladoras along the northern border.7
Economic Sector Mexico

The implementation of the maquiladora program provided many Mexicans with better income opportunities and an overall higher standard of living. Before the northern industrialization, Mexicos northern border was the region with the highest unemployment. Maquiladoras brought the region a consistent record of employment growth, and now northern Mexico is the region with the lowest unemployment rate. Employment in Mexicos maquiladoras, mainly in the border states, skyrocketed from 180,000 workers in 1984 to 1.3 million workers in 2000.8 In Ciudad Juarez, the maquila industry has become so important to the regions economy that 60 percent of the citys jobs in 2000 came from maquiladoras.9 These positive employment numbers helped solidify the maquila industrys ability to improve the Mexican economy, while doing the same for the US. Moreover, Mexicos northern industrialization created above-average levels of income in its border states. In 2000, the manufacturing sector saw a wage increase 20 percent higher than the wages in the next tier of northern states, 27 percent higher than wages in the central states, and 58 percent higher than wages in southern states.10 Consequently, the Mexican standard of living improved significantly in the border states while still providing the US with low-cost production. The relationship between the US dollar and Mexican peso is crucial for border economic expansion. Maquiladoras have dollar-dominated budgets, but their costs are in pesos.11 Therefore, any overnight peso devaluation reduces their peso-based costs. This dollar to peso relationship enhances opportunities for more American foreign direct investment, as profits can increase in the millions just overnight. It lowers the cost of Mexican maquila production, which ultimately creates higher profits and employment growth. For example,
6 Ibid. 7 Lucinda Vargas, Maquiladoras: Impact on Texas Border Cities, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (June 2001), accessed November 2010. http://www.dallasfed.org/research/border/tbe_vargas.html. 8 Hanson. 9 Vargas. 10 Hanson. 11 Vargas.
68
Rafael Cano
during the late 1990s, when the maquila industry experienced economic growth due to the peso devaluation, border employment averaged double-digit growth on a yearly base of 11.1 percent.12 Although peso devaluation is a concern to some of Mexicos general population, any temporary devaluation allows for greater economic opportunities in Mexicos maquiladoras. Thus, it is evident that the relationship between the two countries currencies strengthens both economies. In addition, the maquila industry has already been exceptional at attracting American foreign direct investment. For example, in 2000, Mexican maquiladoras attracted $2.98 billion in US foreign direct investment, which made up 21.4 percent of all Mexican foreign direct investment that year.13 As a result, American foreign direct investment in Mexico benefits both economies and creates an incentive for the two to jointly work together to increase the number of successful mutually beneficial economic ventures. The bilateral relationship is poised to garner greater economic strength, which is especially important with the rise of growing global economies and the possible economic costs they could create in both the US and Mexico. Mexicos northern industrialization created a new border economy that relies heavily on its manufacturing export sector. As a result, there are certain disadvantages to the Mexican economy and the border cities. First, most profits generated from maquiladoras are typically sent back to the United States. Therefore, some argue that the maquiladoras themselves do not promote direct economic development within Mexico and are unable to create distinct economic linkages to their Mexican counterpart cities. However, greater US economic growth allows for more involvement in Mexico through foreign direct investment through the installation of more advanced machinery infrastructure. Therefore, it is clear that the long-term economic benefits of Mexicos maquila industry outweigh these concerns by creating more opportunities for economic linkage throughout Mexico and greater job growth. The border region would be in even worse condition in terms of development without its northern industrialization. Second, since the Mexican economy has seen rapid growth through its export sector, it then becomes increasingly sensitive to US business cycles and global economic shocks. This was evident in 2001, when an economic recession in Mexico quickly followed the economic recession in the US. Mexican employment in maquila firms fell by 22 percent, and the number of maquiladora plants fell by 20 percent.14 However, when the US economy bounced back, the export sector immediately began to increase border employment. Regardless of short-term Mexican economic sufferings, the benefits of the overall higher
12 Ibid. 13 Per Stromberg, The Mexican Maquila Industry and the Environment: An Overview of the Issues (Mexico, DF: UN, ECLAC, Industrial Development Unit, 2002). 14 Randall, 268.
69
standard of living and a low unemployment rate outweigh the costs. In addition, many now argue that emerging markets like Mexico are now able quickly recover from a global financial crisis. For example, after the global recession in 2009, Mexicos economy grew 5.5 percent in 2010. 15 Mexicos government had a balanced budget with almost no foreign debt, and was able to intervene to stabilize any destabilizing factors external to its country, sustaining the countrys overall economic growth.16 The maquila industry has also allowed for regional development through Mexican border city funding. Successful maquiladoras have collaboratively helped improve the infrastructure of their border cities. For example, around 54 percent of maquiladoras in Ciudad Juarez make annual contributions equal to $1.6 million to the citys budget aside from the taxes already paid.17 These contributions fund the construction of roads and other infrastructure. They also provide substantial financial assistance to border commercial bridges, such as the Bridge of Americas between El Paso and Juarez, which are essential to transporting daily shipments across the border.18 Maquiladoras have also been criticized at times for polluting the border regions. There are claims that their impact on the environment, such as added population, traffic, and industrial activity, has exposed both nature and human populations to hazardous risks.19 The maquila industry has contributed to atmospheric emissions and the generation of hazardous water, putting long-term regional sustainability in question.20 However, maquiladoras overall perform much higher than the non-maquiladora industry with respect to controlling and reducing environmental wastes.21 Additionally, many maquiladora companies have begun to make internal green investments that have allowed for better water management, product recycling programs, and lower electrical costs through greener infrastructure remodeling. As a result, while there are environmental concerns, the maquila industry has managed to maintain the environment while continuing to make improvements. The border region has yet to see any environmental catastrophe, which supports the belief that the benefits of the maquila industry outweigh any potential environmental economic cost. However, universal concern for the environment boasts a continued need for a more cooperative and collaborative bilateral relationship to prevent any future border mishaps.
15 Dave Graham, Analysis: Mexico: Another BRIC in the Wall?Business & Financial News, Breaking US & International News. Reuters.com, March 28, 2011, accessed November 6, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/28/us-latam-summit-mexico-economy-idUSTRE72R6W220110328. 16 Ibid. 17 Vargas. 18 Ibid. 19 Stromberg. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid.
70
Rafael Cano
United States
The geographic proximity between the American border cities and their Mexican counterparts allows efficient bilateral production within the maquila industry. Some American industry suppliers have either expanded or relocated their operations to the US border cities in order to be closer to their customers in Mexico. For example, in El Paso, plastics manufacturing has grown by 101 percent from 1990-1999, creating 40 new plastic injectionmolding companies and employing more than 4,100 workers.22 The creation and success of plastic injection molding equaled $806 million in American revenue in 1999, up more than 700 percent from the 1993 level.23 These astonishing numbers are a result of an increase in the number of manufacturing plants in Ciudad Juarez. The geographic proximity between border cities also allows managers to monitor production operations in Mexico while still living in the US. The US border cities have also reaped important benefits from their maquiladora neighbors. Companies, such as logistics and customs services, have thrived on the US side due to the large trade flows coming into the US from Mexico. Furthermore, maquiladoras also stimulate American industrial real estate because most companies tend to create distribution facilities and administrative offices on the US side of the border.24 Moreover, the maquila industry also attracts various economic activities, such as the corporate personnel and industry visitors that lodge and dine in US border cities. This ultimately helps further stimulate the US regional economies. US border cities see a 1.1 to 2 percent rise in their overall employment when there is a 10 percent increase in export manufacturing in their Mexican border counterparts.25 Maquiladoras not only positively impact the US border regions, but also provide benefits to the US interior economy. The maquila industry imports 97 percent of the raw materials they use, and 80 to 85 percent come from US non-border states. Maquiladora companies in Ciudad Juarez import materials from every US state except Hawaii.26 If these trends continue steadily, they will ultimately help maintain the US as the worlds leading economic competitor.
Border Migration
The northern industrialization brought about internal migration waves that border states were not accustomed to. First, the initial spark increasing migration was the evolution of regional wages, which increase or decrease in response to American demand of manufacturing in maquiladoras. For example, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the border states
22 23 24 25 26 Vargas. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.
71
received more net migrants than the rest of Mexico. However, when salaries began to decline after 2000, migration to the border states diminished. Additionally, those from southern Mexico who had originally migrated to the region either continued their migration into the US or chose to return to Mexicos capital or its southern states. As a result, maquiladoras are often seen as migration flow facilitators. Employment in the maquila industry is a pressure indicator and an indirect estimator of maquila-related population pressure in the border region.27 Second, the larger the number of maquiladoras in a Mexican border city, the greater the number of workers who come to the city searching for work.28 Consequently, all border states, except for Coahuila, experience higher population growth than the Mexican national average.29 For example, the population of Baja California is expected to increase by 32.9 percent between 2000 and 2010.30 Therefore, it is important that the US-Mexico border regions work together to control migration patterns since the maquila industry has essentially facilitated the flow. A highly-populated border region can present complications in the bilateral relationship. The northern border population is expected to double by 2020 from the 10.6 million in 2000. Consequently, many migrants may find themselves unemployed or without adequate housing and basic services. They are placed into vulnerable housing environments that can lead some migrants to participate in the drug trade for fast and easy money. However, many maquiladoras have begun to work alongside the Mexican government, who originally did not properly plan for large migrant populations, in efforts to build affordable and sufficient housing for workers and to provide financial assistance. This Mexican initiative to address the highly congested border cities has improved many migrants and workers formerly poor living standards. Moreover, since maquiladoras are a large part of the American economy, it is in the US interest to assist the Mexican government and maquiladoras a they continue efforts to improve the border regions living environments.
Social Change
The maquila industry has created a more efficient Mexican workforce, which helps enforce the countrys regional comparative advantage. The northern industrialization process originally consisted of labor-intensive work with only a low technological content. Companies now have modern technologies, are efficiently organized, and have a welltrained and skilled labor force.31 With the acquisition of new technology, the maquila labor
27 Stromberg. 28 Marie T. Mora and Alberto E. Davila, Labor Market Issues along the U.S.-Mexico Border. (Tucson: University of Arizona, 2009),146. 29 Stromberg. 30 Ibid. 31 Randall, 268.
72
Rafael Cano
force had to modernize and become more educated and competitive. In 1980, technicians made up 9 percent of the maquiladora workforce, whereas in mid-2004 they accounted for at least 12.5 percent. In response to the demand of higher skilled workers, maquiladoras, through a collaborative effort with the state and federal governments, now sponsor vocational programs at local technical centers and trade schools. Moreover, companies are awarding scholarships to attend these higher skilled learning schools, such as the Center for High Technology Training in Ciudad Juarez. This has created an education trend that transcends beyond maquiladora working hours. Employees share their experiences within maquiladoras and in local society, which ultimately creates a more capable and valuable social capital that benefits the border regions.32 As a result, the northern border states have higher levels of schooling compared to other regions throughout Mexico. For example, 14 percent of labor force in the Mexican border states has completed college, compared to less than 11 percent of Mexican workers overall.33 Additionally, any company expansion requires new management positions. In Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez, there are approximately 500 of these positions created annually, 70 percent of which are filled by Mexican engineers and administrators.34 Improvements in the industrys learning process have produced a regional comparative advantage that should not be ignored by US companies but rather recognized as an incentive to invest in Mexico. The northern industrialization of Mexicos border region has also brought about socio-cultural change. Through NAFTA, maquiladoras are exposed to the global competitive market. As a result, they now have added social, cultural, environmental, and political responsibilities aside from their initial basic economic goals. Mexican maquiladoras are then required to adhere to guidelines set by large companies like Hewlett Packard and Dell Computers that take pride in creating globally responsible products. Maquiladora managers understand that in order to compete in the global free market they must adhere to American values such as discipline and order, which have spilled over to the Mexican industries. These ideas of modern social order within business are transforming the maquila workforce, exposing them to a new, revolutionary way of working, which ultimately helps transform Mexicos reputation of having lackluster work environments. Workers now arrive on time, wear uniforms, properly follow industry guidelines without cheating the system, as was custom, and now earn healthcare benefits. These improvements within the maquila workforce have profound effects on Mexican culture by creating a new border image, which dispels negative stereotypes of Mexicans and helps promote more foreign investment in the
32 33 34
Ibid., 273. Mora and Davila, 96. Randall, 273.
73
border regions. These positive social changes will allow more trust in a bilateral relationship that has often been characterized by ignorance and distrust. However, establishing a new social order in the border also has some disadvantages. The maquila industrys low wages has forced both parents in some families to work, leaving their children unattended for most hours of the day. As a result, children are exposed to their surrounding environments dangers. Lacking the core Mexican family values, these children often find comfort and relative stability with those involved in drugs, gangs, and violence. This creates a potential threat to any social stability that can penetrate the maquila industry. While the childrens parents are benefitting from the opportunities presented by maquiladora employment, their children may be getting involved with the organized crime sector of Mexican society that can create instability in the border region. As a result, the Mexican border regions may seem to be of moderate risk to many American companies who opt to relocate or expand their offices in other lower wage countries. It is important that the US and Mexico continue monitoring the current Mexican drug war and Americas drug demand in order to prevent their economic sectors from falling victim to drug violence.
US-Mexico Today
Northern Mexican industrialization is an ongoing process that requires cooperation from the Mexican and American governments and the maquiladoras. The bilateral relationship continues to evolve into one where both nations must come together to address and resolve the problems maquiladoras currently or could potentially face. First, the Mexican government must work jointly with maquiladoras to adequately capture the technological spillover from US companies. If the government plays an active role in assessing the state-ofthe-art production technology and applying it to other Mexican companies, then the foreign money invested in Mexico will essentially be able to create economic linkages to its regional and national economies. It is key that the US government play part in this integration in order to help develop the Mexican economy. This would allow for the creation of more joint economic ventures, create a more competitive North American market in the global sphere, and aid migration patterns between the two nations. In Mexico, there is a public outcry from all sectors, including the maquiladoras, to solve the nations problems with security, unemployment, and infrastructure. The root issue between the two nations is Mexicos inability to introduce long-term economic reform that overcomes any political hindrances and growth limitations (via Mexican elite). Maquiladoras have fostered a new positive US-Mexico border culture that otherwise would never have been created. They have produced better paying Mexican jobs, established order, discipline, and education within the maquiladora field, and established an overall regional competitive advantage. Consequently, the US and Mexico must understand that collaborative efforts Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2
74
Rafael Cano
and shared vision are necessary for continued maquiladora growth and developing Mexicos long-term economic reform, which will benefit joint overall economic advancement. It is imperative that both countries work together to prevent the US from relocating its investments elsewhere, such as Asia. Many American companies were initially lured to relocate to China for its cheap labor once it entered the World Trade Organization in 2001. Mexicos wages were 240 percent higher than China in 2002, canceling out its natural advantage of US geographic proximity. However, Mexican maquila wages are now only about 14 percent higher than Chinas rising wages, allowing Mexico to regain its regional cost and proximity comparative advantage. Furthermore, the rise in shipping costs across the Pacific Ocean makes Mexico even more attractive to American companies. Additionally, US investments in Mexico are also beneficial for US business because Mexican maquiladoras buy more US-made components than Chinese-made components. Overall, Mexico buys nearly twice as many US exports as does China, and anything that creates more demand for US goods eases global imbalances.1 Therefore, the US and Mexico share a complimentary bilateral relationship that ultimately creates mutual economic growth. Lastly, Mexico is now closing the gap on the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) nations as a driver of global growth, powered by its rising competitiveness.2 Mexico exports more than Brazil and India, and enjoys a greater population growth than Russia. Mexican manufacturers have a bright future, having taken on only a fraction of the debt of their BRIC rivals, particularly China.3 American companies must realize that Mexico is poised to help the US to continue as a leading global player and that it would be irrational for both nations to not collaboratively work towards a mutually beneficial and sustainable economic future.
References
Ayres, Jeffrey, and Laura Macdonald. Contentious Politics in North America National Protest and Transnational Collaboration under Continental Integration. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Print. Cirila, Quintero. Border Industrialization Program. JRANK. Web. 16 Nov. 2010. <http:// www.jrank.org/cultures/pages/3657/Border-Industrialization-Program.html>. Cypher, James M., and Ral Delgado Wise. Mexicos Economic Dilemma The Developmental Failure of Neoliberalism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010. Print. Graham, Dave. Analysis: Mexico: Another BRIC in the Wall? Business & Financial News,
1 Jason Lange, Analysis: Mexico Gets Helping Hand from Costlier China Labor.Business & Financial News, Breaking US & International News. Reuters.com, January 26, 2011, accessed November 6, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/26/us-mexico-economy-china-idUSTRE70P6BG20110126. 2 Graham. 3 Ibid.
75
Breaking US & International News. Reuters.com, 28 Mar. 2011. Web. 06 Nov. 2011. <http:// www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/28/us-latam-summit-mexico-economy-idUSTRE72R6W220110328>. Hanson, Gordon H. The Role of Maquiladoras in Mexicos Export Boom. Migration Dialogue - Research & Seminars. June-July 2002. Web. 18 Nov. 2010. <http://migration. ucdavis.edu/rs/more.php?id=8_0_2_0>. Lange, Jason. Analysis: Mexico Gets Helping Hand from Costlier China Labor.Business & Financial News, Breaking US & International News. Reuters, 26 Jan. 2011. Web. 06 Nov. 2011. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/26/us-mexico-economy-china-idUSTRE70P6BG20110126>. Miller, Van V. NAFTA and the Maquiladora Program: Rules, Routines, and Institutional Legitimacy. El Paso: Texas Western, 2007. Print. Mora, Marie T., and Alberto E. Davila. Labor Market Issues along the U.S.-Mexico Border. Tucson: University of Arizona, 2009. Print. Randall, Laura. Changing Structure of Mexico: Political, Social, and Economic Prospects. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006. Print. Rockenbach, Leslie J. The Mexican-American Border: NAFTA and Global Linkages. New York: Routledge, 2001. Print. Rosenberg, Matt. Maquiladoras in Mexico. Geography Home Page - About.com. Web. 17 Nov. 2010. <http://geography.about.com/od/urbaneconomicgeography/a/maquiladoras.htm>. Stromberg, Per. The Mexican Maquila Industry and the Environment: An Overview of the Issues. Mexico, D. F.: UN, ECLAC, Industrial Development Unit, 2002. Print. Vargas, Lucinda. Maquiladoras: Impact on Texas Border Cities. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. June 2001. Web. 18 Nov. 2010. <http://www.dallasfed.org/research/border/ tbe_vargas.html>.

SCIR Issue II

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

SCIR Issue II

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA INTERNATIONAL REVIEW

USCS UNDERGRADUATE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

VOL. 1 ISSUE 2 FALL 2011

Southern California International Review

Southern California International Review

Cover Design: Samir Kumar Layout: Philip Meyer

A letter from the editor:

Assessing Levels of Difficulty in EU Enlargement

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Assessing Levels of Difficulty in the EU Enlargement Process

Frameworks for Understanding Enlargement

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Assessing Levels of Difficulty in the EU Enlargement Process

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Assessing Levels of Difficulty in the EU Enlargement Process

Case Studies: Ireland, Spain, and Bulgaria

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Assessing Levels of Difficulty in the EU Enlargement Process

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Assessing Levels of Difficulty in the EU Enlargement Process

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Assessing Levels of Difficulty in the EU Enlargement Process

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Assessing Levels of Difficulty in the EU Enlargement Process

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Assessing Levels of Difficulty in the EU Enlargement Process

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Assessing Levels of Difficulty in the EU Enlargement Process

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Assessing Levels of Difficulty in the EU Enlargement Process

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

The Orthodox Church and Society in Post-Soviet Russia

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Russian Orthodox Church and Post-Soviet Russia

Empire Saving12 and the Near Abroad

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Russian Orthodox Church and Post-Soviet Russia

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Russian Orthodox Church and Post-Soviet Russia

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

The Russkii Mir

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Russian Orthodox Church and Post-Soviet Russia

The ROC and Non-Traditional Religions

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Russian Orthodox Church and Post-Soviet Russia

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

Russian Orthodox Church and Post-Soviet Russia

Church and State

Southern California International Review - Vol. 1 No. 2

The ROCs Social Campaign