PART ONE Container ships are cargo vessels that carry their payload in truck-sized boxes which makes

them easy to ship as well as unload and transport once in port. These ships are designed so that no amount of space is wasted. Container revolution is a term which is often and increasingly heard of today. Simplified, it just stands for a box of freight delivered from one place to the other. A container has created a dramatic change in earlier systems for the movement of cargo by ocean. The prospects for further changes are manifold. At the same time containers have raised a myriad of problems that also need to be tackled. As a result of this many new regulations and codes have been now incorporated to ensure the safe carriage of cargo. Lets us first have a look at the various advantages and disadvantages of containerization. Advantages y Flexibility of usage: The type of cargo carried in containers is unlimited. Raw materials (coal, wheat), manufactured goods, cars, frozen products ,Liquids (oil and chemical products) and reefers(50% of all refrigerated cargo) are just a few examples of the versatile nature of container ships. Costs Low transport costs: The transport costs of containers are also very less as compared to other cargo types. They cost 20 times less than bulk transport. Speed: Transshipment operations are minimal and rapid. Port turnaround times reduced from 3 weeks to about 24 hours. Containerships are faster than regular freighter ships. Stopping pilferage: Contents of the container are unknown to shippers; they can only be opened at the origin, at customs and at the destination. Reduces spoilage and losses due to pilferage.

y y

Disadvantages: y Management logistics: requires management and tracking of every container. Recording, (re)positioning and ordering of containers. y Empty movements: Many containers are moved empty (20% of all flows) either full or empty, a container takes the same amount of space. y Illicit trade: Common instrument used in the illicit trade of drug and weapons, as well as for illegal immigration. Worries about the usage of containers for terrorism.

Now in view of the above let us examine a few accidents and see as to how they impacted changes in various regulations 1) Cosco Busan : On November 08, 2007 Cosco Busan crashed into the base of a tower of the Bay Bridge's western span in heavy fog spilling 58,000 gallons of fuel into San Francisco Bay. In the ensuing USCG investigations it was proved that the accident was a combined result of incompetence and human error. The vessel whilst navigating in heavy fog did not adhere to safe speed & misinterpreting the information given by the ECDIS. The operator was fined 10 million USD. This accident resulted in USCG making the following new regulation. Members trading ships to and from the US will be interested in a new Coast Guard requirement for non tank ships to submit a response plan. Operators of tankers trading to US waters will already be familiar with the requirement to lodge an oil spill response plan with the US Coast Guard. (ref. //www.ukpandi.com/)

2) M/V Hyundai Fortune/Hanjin Pennslyvannia :These two vessels had explosions onboard from containers carrying dangerous goods. The UK P&I club took initiative in focusing on the mis-stowed and mis-declared dangerous goods in freight containers and also varying standards of competence of shore personnel involved in consigning and packing containers. Following these accidents the UK P& I club made the following recommendations . It was in response to this dangerous trend that the Club launched four related guidebooks with supporting training material on the workings of the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code under the thematic title Book it Right and Pack it Tight. (ref www.ukpandi.com, IMDG code) 3) MSC Napoli : the vessel suffered a major hull failure through engine room in rough seas when she was transiting the English channel. The ensuing MAIB investigation stated a number of key factors in the hull failure one of which was the incorrect declaration of weights in the containers with upto 20% of them declared wrong. Also 7% of the containers were mis-stowed. Also the design of the vessel

was found to be suspect. A number of recommendations were made by the MAIB to the following. The International Association of Classification Societies The International Chamber of Shipping Zodiac Maritime Agencies Ltd ( operators of the vessel) In the annex a copy of the regulations is attached.
(ref. www.maib.gov.uk\msc napoli).

In view of the above accident, IMO and other major organization stressed upon IMDG code, International convention for Safe Containers, 1972(CSC) and Code of Safe Practice for Cargo Stowage and Securing to be followed strictly. Now we will have a look into the above codes ; INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR SAFE CONTAINERS (CSC), 1972 The 1972 Convention for Safe Containers has two goals. One is to maintain a high level of safety of human life in the transport and handling of containers by providing generally acceptable test procedures and related strength requirements. The other is to facilitate the international transport of containers by providing uniform international safety regulations, equally applicable to all modes of surface transport. In this way, proliferation of divergent national safety regulations can be avoided. (ref http://www.imo.org/conventions)

To summarize: The main aim of the CSC 1972 was to formalize structural requirement to ensure safety in handling, stacking and transportation in course of normal day to day operations. The CSC 1972 has 2 annexes

Annex I includes Regulations for the testing, inspection, approval and maintenance of containers. Annex II covers structural safety requirements and tests, including details of test procedures. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DANGEROUS GOODS CODE IMDG code was adopted in the fourth assembly of IMO in 1965. This code has special relevance for dangerous cargoes carried in containers. The IMDG Code is the official legal document of the maritime transport of dangerous goods and marine pollutants, which sets out the rules and requirements. Amendments to SOLAS chapter VII (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) adopted in May 2002 make the IMDG Code mandatory from 1 January 2004. The Code lays down basic principles; detailed recommendations for individual substances, materials and articles, and a number of recommendations for good operational practice including advice on terminology, packing, labelling, stowage, segregation and handling, and emergency response action. (ref www.imo.org)

CARGO SECURING MANUAL (SOLAS REQUIREMENT) The cargo securing manual is a booklet containing all the securing equipment onboard and the detailed use of all of them. It gives the dimensions and weight as well as the procedure of using the equipment as well as their limitations. A cargo securing manual has to be ship specific covering the entire equipment of the ship. For a vessel carrying freight containers the following are suggested: CSM should not be too complex. Lashing arrangements should not be given without the necessary portable and fixed equipment being available on board.

Restrict the number of stowage and securing arrangements to the practical operation of the vessel

In view of the above a lot of regulations have been formed resulting from accidents. However due to the fast pace of the trade, accidents still take place. Sometimes commercial restraints take over the consideration for safety. However it is the endeavor of every person to make the trade as safe as possible. As the trade expanded the vessels could not be expected to make the cargo plan as a lot of management and logistical issues came into it. As a result the cargo planning is now done on the shore side and the ship has to rely on the shore to give it accurate cargo quantity. Here in lies the problem as sometimes inaccurate data with regards to the cargo, as already mentioned above in accidents, can spell immense trouble for the ship & her crew.

PART TWO

In the course of maritime history a number of oil pollution disasters have taken place. These have impacted the regulations for carriage of petroleum products by sea is a big way. The potential for oil to pollute the marine environment was recognized by the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954 (OILPOL 1954) . Oil pollution is the biggest concern as it damages the marine environment to a great extent. There were many incidents which acted as a wake up call for the shipping fraternity due to oil pollution. The most profound of which are : 1) 2) 3) 4) Torrey Canyon disaster Exxon Valdez disaster Erika disaster Prestige disaster

Let us briefly see as to how each of these disasters brought about a change in the regulations regarding Oil tanker vessels.

TORREY CANYON DISASTER In 1967 the Torrey Canyon ran aground while entering the English Channel and spilled her entire cargo of 120,000 tons of crude oil into the sea. This resulted in the biggest oil pollution incident ever recorded up to that time. Upon this disaster the erstwhile OILPOL 1954 was in need of an immediate change incorporating new regulations for the control of oil pollution. In view of the same, in 1971 IMO adopted amendments to OILPOL 1954, which limited the size of cargo tanks ordered after 1972 to limit the amount of oil entering the sea in case of a hull breach. In 1973 the first convention regarding oil pollution was held. This was the convention which today is known as the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships or simply MARPOL 73. Annex I incorporated the entire OILPOL 54 and also put forward new regulations, while other annexes covered chemicals, harmful substances carried in packaged form, sewage and garbage. Annex I expanded and improved on OILPOL in several ways. It specified requirements for continuous monitoring of oily water discharges and included the requirement for Governments to provide shore reception and treatment facilities at oil terminals and ports. It also established a number of Special Areas in which more stringent discharge standards were applicable, including the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Gulf, and Baltic Seas. These special areas would be implemented when the littoral States concerned had provided adequate reception facilities for dirty ballast and other oily residues. An important regulation of Annex I was Regulation 13 which required segregated ballast tanks on new tankers over 70,000 deadweight tonnes. The aim was to ensure that ballast water (taken on board to maintain stability, such as when a tanker is sailing empty to pick up cargo) is never going to be contaminated by oil carried as cargo or fuel. (ref. www.imo.org) In 1978 Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention was held. This further made some amendments to MARPOL 73 making a protocol to the existing MARPOL. This Protocol: y Expanded the requirements for segregated ballast tanks for all new crude oil tankers greater than 20,000 DWT and all product tankers to 30,000 DWT. Also the location of the tanks was mentioned.

y New crude oil tankers greater than 20,000 dwt should be fitted with a crude oil washing systems. y The Protocol also called for existing tankers over 40,000 dwt to be fitted with either segregated ballast tanks or crude oil washing systems. The above came to be know by the MAPOL 73/78 and was ratified by October 1982.

THE EXXON VALDEZ DISASTER In 1989 , Exxon Valdez, loaded with 1,264,155 barrels of crude oil, ran aground in the northeastern portion of Prince William Sound, spilling about one-fifth of its cargo. This accident gained massive media coverage and changed the entire way the world looked at oil tankers making some of the most important changes in Annex I of MARPOL to date. The United States introduced its Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), making it mandatory for all tankers calling at U.S. ports to have double hulls. The IMO followed suit introducing the double hull amendment in Annex I. In 1992, the double hull amendment was adopted and came into force in 1993. The following are the extraxts : Regulation 13F applies to new tankers - defined as delivered on or after 6 July 1996 while existing tankers must comply with the requirements of 13F not later than 30 years after their date of delivery. Tankers of 5,000 dwt and above must be fitted with double bottoms and wing tanks extending the full depth of the ship's side. The regulation allows mid-deck height tankers with double-sided hulls as an alternative to double hull construction. The MEPC also adopted Regulation 13G, concerned with existing tankers, which makes provision for an enhanced programme of inspections to be implemented, particularly for tankers more than five years old. (ref. www.imo.org) European Union member states all together stood up and adopted regulation EU Reg 2978/94 to deal with the double hull and the segregated ballast tank which came into force on 1st Jan 1999.

ERIKA DISASTER On 12 December 1999 the 37,238-dwt tanker Erika broke in two in heavy seas off the coast of Brittany, France, while carrying approximately 30,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil. Although the crew was saved, some 14,000 tonnes of oil were spilled and more than 100 miles of Atlantic coastline were polluted. As a result of the Erika disaster, proposals were submitted to the MEPC to accelerate the phase-out of single-hull tankers contained in the 1992 MARPOL amendments. The amendments to Regulation 13G in Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 were adopted by the MEPCs 46th session in April 2001. (ref. www.imo.org) European union members adopted the new EU regulation 417/2002 which was enforced on 18th Feb 2002 which reflected the amendments to the Regulation 13G MARPOL 73/78. The objective of EU 417/2002 was the fast elimination of single hull tankers within the European ports.

THE PRESTIGE DISASTER The Prestige tanker incident of 2002 led to calls for further changes to MARPOL 73/78. The MPEC in its 49th session in July 2003 considered adoption for faster phase out of single hulled tankers and also an extended Condition assessment scheme according to MARPOL 13G. In light of above, EU Reg 417/2002 was amended to EU Reg 1726/2003 on 22nd July 2003.IMO came up with a new Regulation 13H - Prevention of oil pollution when carrying Heavy Grade Oil. It is similar to the EU Regulation 1726/2003 (ref. www.imo.org , www. eur-lex.europa.eu )