PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REP. DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, respondents. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

: In this petition for certiorari, Pablo C. Villaber, petitioner, seeks the nullification of two Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA-01-058. The first one was issued by its Second Division on April 30, 2001, disqualifying him as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the First District of the Province of Davao del Sur in the last May 14, 2001 elections, and cancelling his certificate of candidacy; and the second is the en banc Resolution dated May 10, 2001 denying his motion for reconsideration. Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman on February 19, 2001,[1] while Cagas filed his on February 28, 2001.[2] On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Commission On Elections (COMELEC), Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition[3] to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter s certificate of candidacy. Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 86-46197 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of P100,000.00.[4] Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (Tenth Division), in its Decision dated April 23, 1992 in CAG.R. CR No. 09017,[5] affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision, docketed as G.R. No. 106709. However, in its Resolution[6] of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third Division) dismissed the petition. On February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and executory.[7] Cagas also asserted that Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy that he is Eligible for the office I seek to be elected which false statement is a ground to deny due course or cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. In his answer[8] to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his conviction has not become final and executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his presence.[9] Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude. After the opposing parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was forwarded to the COMELEC, Manila, for resolution.

On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division), finding merit in Cagas petition, issued the challenged Resolution[10] in SPA 01-058 declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate for and from holding any elective public office and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude following the ruling of this Court en banc in the administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda.[11] Villaber filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en banc in a Resolution[12] dated May 10, 2001. Hence, this petition. The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude. The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a candidate for Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides: Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis ours) As to the meaning of moral turpitude, we have consistently adopted the definition in Black s Law Dictionary as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [13] In In re Vinzon,[14] the term moral turpitude is considered as encompassing everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections[15] that not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, and that as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine. [16] We further pronounced therein that: in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC (221 SCRA 760 [1993]), the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude, and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of

fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. (Emphasis ours) We reiterate here our ruling in Dela Torre[17] that the determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its elements alone, as we did in Dela Torre which involves the crime of fencing punishable by a special law.[18] Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following Information: That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Efren D. Sawal to apply on account or for value Bank of Philippine Islands (Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check No. 958214 dated February 13, 1986 payable to Efren D. Sawal in the amount of P100,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check, when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Efren D. Sawal the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice. (Emphasis ours) He was convicted for violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 which provides: SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. (Emphasis ours). The elements of the offense under the above provision are: 1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value; 2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and

3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.[19] The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda[20] we held that a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person . [21] The effects of the issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano vs. Martinez,[22] through Justice Pedro L. Yap, transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. [23] Thus, paraphrasing Black s definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals. Petitioner contends that this Court s pronouncement in People v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,[24] insofar as it states that conviction under B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, does not apply to him since he is not a lawyer. This argument is erroneous. In that case, the Court of Appeals affirmed Atty. Fe Tuanda s conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and, in addition, suspended her from the practice of law pursuant to Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Her motion seeking the lifting of her suspension was denied by this Court on the ground that the said offense involves moral turpitude. There we said in part: We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, under both of which she was bound to obey the laws of the land. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. x x x. [25] (Emphasis ours) Clearly, in Tuanda, this Court did not make a distinction whether the offender is a lawyer or a nonlawyer. Nor did it declare that such offense constitutes moral turpitude when committed by a member of the Bar but is not so when committed by a non-member. We cannot go along with petitioner s contention that this Court s ruling in Tuanda has been abandoned or modified in the recent case of Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines,[26] which reiterated the ruling in Vaca vs. Court of Appeals.[27] In these two latter cases, the penalty of imprisonment imposed on the accused for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was deleted by this Court. Only a fine was imposed. Petitioner insists that with the deletion of the prison sentence, the offense no longer involves moral turpitude. We made no such pronouncement. This is what we said in Rosa Lim:

In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, we held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material, and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. There we deleted the prison sentence imposed on petitioners. We imposed on them only a fine double the amount of the check issued. We considered the fact that petitioners brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was committed, otherwise, they would have simply accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade prison term. We do the same here. We believe such would best serve the ends of criminal justice. In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC A.C. No. 289 November 29, 1962 MERCEDES AGDOMA, EUGENIA AGDOMA and PEDRO AGDOMA, petitioners, vs. ATTY. ISAIAS A. CELESTINO, respondent.

PADILLA, J.: This is a disbarment proceeding against Isaias A. Celestino for malpractice and misconduct as a lawyer and notary public. The complainants Mercedes Agdoma, Eugenia Agdoma and Pedro Agdoma are aunts and uncle of respondent Isaias A. Celestino, his deceased mother Eulogia Agdoma being the sister of the former. Both the complainant and the respondent, in representation of his late mother Eulogia, are the heirs of the late Julian Agdoma, the complainants' father and the respondent's grandfather. Julian Agdoma left a parcel of land situated in barrio San Juan, Alcala, Pangasinan, registered in his name under original certificate of title No. 62507. On 23 July 19 Julian Agdoma died in Lambayong, Cotabato (Exhibits B-1 and B-2). On 9 March 1956 Anastasia Cabatic, Julian's wife, died in Alcala, Pangasinan (Exhibit C). On or after 16 August 1955 Isaias A. Celestino filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an exparte petition in behalf of the late Julian Agdoma. In said petition he represented that his late grandfather was alive and that the latter's copy of original certificate of title No. 62507 had been burned by fire that razed to the ground his (Julian's) house in San Vicente, Alcala, Pangasinan and prayed that the Register of Deeds in and for the province of Pangasinan be directed to issue another duplicate copy

thereof. (Exhibit E-1). The respondent supported the petition by an affidavit purportedly subscribed and sworn to by the deceased Julian Agdoma on 16 August 1955 before him (the respondent) as notary public (Exhibit E-2). On 17 August 1955 Judge Jesus P. Morfe of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan entered an order granting the petition and directing the Register of Deeds in and for the province of Pangasinan to issue another owner's duplicate of certificate of title No. 62507 (Exhibit F). Two days before the respondent filed the ex parte petition asking for a new copy of original certificate of title No. 62507, it was made to appear that for and in consideration of P1,000 Julian Agdoma had sold the lot described in the original certificate of title No. 62507 to the respondent in a deed of absolute sale (Exhibit C) purportedly acknowledged before notary public Julio B. Pequet who, however, turned out to be a fictitious or nonexistent notary public in and for the province of Pangasinan (Exhibits I and J). By virtue of said sale, on 17 August 1955 the Register of Deeds in and for the province of Pangasinan cancelled original certificate of title No. 62507 in the name of Julian Agdoma and in lieu thereof issued transfer certificate of title No. 18925 in the name of respondent Isaias A. Celestino (Exhibit H). Afterwards, the respondent mortgaged the parcel of land for P425 to the Dagupan City branch of the Philippine National Bank. Until now the loan still is unpaid. On 14 February 1957 the complainants filed in this Court a complaint praying for the disbarment of Isaias A. Celestino. On 19 February 1957 this Court ordered the respondent to answer the complaint within ten days from notice. On 15 March the respondent in his behalf filed an answer denying all the material averments of the complaint. On 18 March this Court passed a resolution referring the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 30 April, the Solicitor General forwarded the case to the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan for investigation, report and recommendation. The Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan set the hearing of the case for 26 April 1957, which was postponed to 9 May 1957. At the hearing held on 9 May, the respondent did not appear. The officer serving summons and notices certified that the respondent refused to sign the notice. The fiscal considered such refusal as a waiver by the respondent of his right to be present at the investigation. When the fiscal was preparing a report on case based on the evidence presented by the complainants, Attorney Cipriano V. Abenojar of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, on 10 June 1957 formally entered his appearance for the respondent and requested that the case be immediately set for hearing. The respondent expressed in writing his consent to the appearance of and motion by Attorney Abenojar to set the case for hearing. The fiscal granted request and set the hearing for 26 July 1957 with a warning that no further postponement would be granted. At the hearing held on 26 July, neither the respondent nor his counsel appeared. Instead, the latter filed a motion for postponement, alleging that the respondent and the complainants, being blood relatives, might settle amicably. This last motion was granted and the fiscal set the investigation for 20 August 1957 with a warning of no further postponement. Again, the respondent or lawyer did not appear at the hearing on 20 August. Forthwith, the fiscal rendered a report finding the respondent Isaias A. Celestino guilty of malpractice an commending to the Solicitor General that the corresponding charges for disbarment be filed against him (respondent Celestino). On 22 June 1959, the Solicitor General filed in Court a formal complaint against Isaias A. Celestino malpractice and breach of professional ethics. Letters and communications sent by this Court to the

respondent directing him to answer the complaint filed by the Solicitor General were all returned undelivered or unserved, because the respondent could not be located at his given address at San Vicente, Alcala, Pangasinan. His attorney of record in the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan also required to answer, but instead of answering, he requested that he be relieved as counsel for the respondent. At the oral argument of the case before this Court on 14 December, Attorney Cipriano V. Abenojar appeared the respondent. The Court ordered the respondent self to submit a memorandum in lieu of oral argumentation. The oral and documentary evidence points unerringly to the guilt of respondent Isaias A. Celestino as charged. The ex-parte petition wherein he sought another owner's duplicate of original certificate of title No. 62507 and presented himself as counsel for Julian Agdoma, his grandfather, whom he knew had been dead since 23 July 1945, and the affidavit which he (the respondent) represented to have been subscribed and sworn to by Julian Agdoma before him (the respondent) as notary public, thus making it appear that his late grandfather was alive, and which he used to support the ex-parte petition, are clear evidence that the respondent Isaias A. Celestino had committed a wanton falsehood in court. And this wanton disregard for truth and honesty is aggravated by his forging or simulating a deed of sale of the parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 62507 executed in his favor by his deceased grandfather Julian Agdoma when he (the respondent) knew that his grandfather had been dead ten years before and therefore could not have executed the deed of sale. To lend to this concoction a semblance of legality, the respondent made it appear that Julian Agdoma, appeared and acknowledged the sale before one Julio B. Pequet supposedly a notary public. But it clearly has been shown that said Julio B. Pequet was a non-existent or fictitious notary public. The residence certificate No. A-3609899 issued at Alcala, Pangasinan, on 14 February 1955, which the respondent attributed to pertain to and to have been exhibited by the late Julian Agdoma in swearing before him (the respondent) supporting affidavit to the ex-parte petition seeking an owner's duplicate of the original certificate of title No. 62507 and in acknowledging the deed of sale before the fictitious notary public Julio B. Pequet is another evidence showing the respondent's propensity to commit falsehood, because the said residence certificate does not belong to Julian Agdoma but to one Mrs. Angela Eslava of Alcala, Pangasinan (Exhibit A). The clinching evidence of the respondent's guilt is the fact that after the ownership to the parcel of land had been transferred to him, he mortgaged it for P425 to the Philippine National Bank, Dagupan City branch. The respondent avoided attending the hearings conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan. Even in this Court, his whereabouts are totally unknown. His knowledge that a disbarment proceeding had been file pending against him imposes upon him the duty to make himself or his presence available to this Court for a trial. That he could not be located at his known address without making his whereabouts known implies that he had chosen to waive every right and opportunity to put up his defense. THEREFORE, the respondent Isaias A. Celestino is barred from the practice of the legal profession.

A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963 JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.

BARRERA, J. In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation that the respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows: The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959). She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959). The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).

The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960). xxx xxx xxx

FINDINGS AND COMMENT There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her honor .... But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him. The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.." But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive,

knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer. xxx xxx xxx

RECOMMENDATION Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys. In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys." In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaint does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed. On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t

At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows: ... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she and respondent 'had already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]." Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request was also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the following:. ... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this Court the fact of

his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962). After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel of record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed. It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the complainant several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present. The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment. It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules

merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose. Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar. The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:. The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).

Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be as the Solicitor General puts it recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar. The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means he could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735). The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different from those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state: SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently. SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days.

The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation.. The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.

A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981 MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant, vs. SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.

AQUINO, J.: Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang. Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos College. They became

sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her. Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. They renewed their relationship. After they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since the other boarders had gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said that she was in love with another man and that she had a child with still another man. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he did not mind because he loved her very much. Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married. In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his law studies in Davao City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z). When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married although they were not really so. Segundino convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations. He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license. Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his child. Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25, 1975. Several days after his oath-taking, which Magdalena also attended, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan. In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao. Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured medical treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J). Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of the child Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that

promise because of Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an illegitimate child before Michael was born. The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion, respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment. An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court. If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959). Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896). There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend on the surrounding circumstances. This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still prevailed, observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt a saint" has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).

Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following cases: (1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of marriage, which he refused to fulfill, although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an abortion to which she did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102). (2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256). (3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another women who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313). (4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450). (5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse because, anyway, they were going to get married. She used to give Puno money upon his request. After she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439). (6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was single and making a promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. I will bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony." "Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in death, my Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586). (7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman separated from her husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with

Mercedes H. Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels. On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that, because of the close intimacy between the complainant and the respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity. According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva. This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montana vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91). Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed. SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 3405 June 29, 1998 JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, respondent.

PER CURIAM: Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law. On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment against her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers. 2 The complainant narrated: The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of Atty. Dominador M. Narag in the early seventies as a full-time college instructor in the College of Arts and Sciences and as a professor in the Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina Espita, 17 years old and a first year college student, enrolled in subjects handled by Atty. Narag. Exerting his influence as her teacher, and as a prominent member of

the legal profession and then member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuguegarao, Atty. Narag courted Ms. Espita, gradually lessening her resistance until the student acceded to his wishes. They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in the community, but which they managed to from me. It therefore came as a terrible embar[r]assment to me, with unspeakable grief and pain when my husband abandoned us, his family, to live with Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous circumstances. It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan to cause the employment of Ms. Espita at the Department of Trade and Industry Central Office at Makati, Metro Manila. Out of gratitude perhaps, for this gesture, Ms. Espita agreed to live with Atty. Narag, her sense of right[e]ousness and morals completely corrupted by a member of the Bar. It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Dominador M. Narag has abandoned us, his family, to live with a 22-year-old woman, who was his former student in the tertiary level[.] 3 This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 4 On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan received from complainant another letter seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint. She alleged therein that (1) she fabricated the allegations in her complaint to humiliate and spite her husband; (2) all the love letters between the respondent and Gina Espita were forgeries; and (3) she was suffering from "emotional confusion arising from extreme jealousy." The truth, she stated, was that her husband had remained a faithful and responsible family man. She further asserted that he had neither entered into an amorous relationship with one Gina Espita nor abandoned his family. 5 Supporting her letter were an Affidavit of Desistance 6 and a Motion to Dismiss, 7 attached as Annexes A and B, which she filed before the IBP commission on bar discipline. 8 In a Decision dared October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of Governors 9 dismissed the complaint of Mrs. Narag for failure to prosecute. 10 The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this Court 11 received another letter 12 from the complainant, with her seven children 13 as co-signatories, again appealing for the disbarment of her husband. She explained that she had earlier dropped the case against him because of his continuous threats against her. 14 In his Comment on the complainant's letter of November 11, 1991, filed in compliance with this Court's Resolution issued on July 6, 1992, 15 respondent prayed that the decision of the Board of Governors be affirmed. Denying that he had threatened, harassed or intimidated his wife, he alleged that she had voluntarily executed her Affidavit of Desistance 16 and Motion to Dismiss, 17 even appearing before the investigating officer, Commissioner Racela, to testify under oath "that she prepared the Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit of Desistance on her own free will and affirmed the contents thereof."

In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied abandoning his family to live with his paramour. However, he described his wife as a person emotionally disturbed, viz: What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an incurably jealous and possessive woman, and every time the streak of jealousy rears its head, she fires off letters or complaints against her husband in every conceivable forum, all without basis, and purely on impulse, just to satisfy the consuming demands of her "loving" jealousy. Then, as is her nature, a few hours afterwards, when her jealousy cools off, she repents and feels sorry for her acts against the Respondent. Thus, when she wrote the Letter of November 11, 1991, she was then in the grips of one of her bouts of jealousy. 18 On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring the Comment of respondent to the IBP. 19 In the hearing before IBP Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose, respondent alleged the following: 20 2. Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have left him not even a square meter of land, but gave him the best legacy in life: a purposeful and meaningful education. Complainant comes from what she claims to be very rich parents who value material possession more than education and the higher and nobler aspirations in life. Complainant abhors the poor. 3. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the gentle ways of love, forgiveness, humility, and concern for the poor. Complainant was reared and raised in an entirely different environment. Her value system is the very opposite. 4. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has done all he could in thirty-eight (38) years of marriage to protect and preserve his family. He gave his family sustenance, a comfortable home, love, education, companionship, and most of all, a good and respected name. He was always gentle and compassionate to his wife and children. Even in the most trying times, he remained calm and never inflicted violence on them. His children are all now full-fledged professionals, mature, and gainfully employed. . . . xxx xxx xxx Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a social institution. On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable jealousy, Complainant has been systematically and unceasingly destroying the very foundations of their marriage and their family. Their marriage has become a torture chamber in which Your Respondent has been incessantly BEATEN, BATTERED, BRUTALIZED, TORTURED, ABUSED, and HUMILIATED, physically, mentally, and emotionally, by the Complainant, in public and at home. Their marriage has become a nightmare. For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence and bore the pain of his misfortune with dignity and with almost infinite patience, if only to preserve their family and their marriage. But this is not to be. The Complainant never mellowed and never became gentl[e], loving, and understanding. In fact, she became more fierce and predatory.

Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your Respondent does not seem in sight. The darkness continues to shroud the marital and familial landscape. Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a liberation from enslavement. Paraphrasing Dorfman in "Death and the Maiden", can the torturer and the tortured co-exist and live together? Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and uncompromising mind whose only obsession now is to destroy, destroy, and destroy, Your Respondent, with perpetual regret and with great sorrow, filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage, Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC, Branch III, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. . . . 5. Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending. But your Respondent never revealed these destructive qualities to other people. He preserved the good name and dignity of his wife. This is in compliance with the marital vow to love, honor or obey your spouse, for better or for worse, in sickness and in health . . . Even in this case, Your Respondent never revealed anything derogatory to his wife. It is only now that he is constrained to reveal all these things to defend himself. On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage, Complainant tells everyone, everywhere, that her husband is worthless, good-for-nothing, evil and immoral. She goes to colleges and universities, professional organizations, religious societies, and all other sectors of the community to tell them how evil, bad and immoral her husband is. She tells them not to hire him as professor, as Counsel, or any other capacity because her husband is evil, bad, and immoral. Is this love? Since when did love become an instrument to destroy a man's dearest possession in life his good name, reputation and dignity? Because of Complainant's virulent disinformation campaign against her husband, employing every unethical and immoral means to attain his ends, Your Respondent has been irreparably and irreversibly disgraced, shamed, and humiliated. Your Respondent is not a scandalous man. It is he who has been mercilessly scandalized and crucified by the Complainant. 21 To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges, respondent presented as evidence the following list of the complaints she had filed against him and Gina Espita: 3.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty . . . 3.2 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG, Adm. Case No. P-5-90. . . . 3.3 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. I.S No. 89-114. . . . 3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and concubinage. OMBUDSMAN Case No. 1-92-0083. ... 3.5 Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No. 4061. DISMISSED. 3.6 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. I.S. No. 92-109. DISMISSED. (. . .). Complainant filed Motion for Reconsideration. DENIED. (. . .).

3.7 Complaint for Disbarment (. . .) with S[upreme] C[ourt]. Withdrawn (. . .). DISMISSED by IBP Board of Governors (. . .). Re-instituted (. . .). 3.8 Complaint for Disbarment, again (. . .). Adm. Case No. 3405. Pending. 3.9 Complaint for Concubinage, again (. . .). Third MCTC, Tumauini, Isabela. Pending. . . . 22 In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred: I. That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (. . .), picture (. . .) are inadmissible in evidence as enunciated by the Supreme Court in "Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, et.al.", G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996. (. . .). xxx xxx xxx II. That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He never courted Gina Espita in the Saint Louis College of Tuguegarao. He never caused the employment of said woman in the DTI. He never had or is having any illicit relationship with her anywhere, at any time. He never lived with her as husband and wife anywhere at any time, be it in Centro Tumauini or any of its barangays, or in any other place. He never begot a child or children with her. Finally, respondent submits that all the other allegations of Mrs. Narag are false and fabricated, . . . xxx xxx xxx III. Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her two sons forcibly drove respondent Narag out of the conjugal home. After that, Atty. Narag tried to return to the conjugal home many times with the help of mutual friends to save the marriage and the family from collapse. He tried several times to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. In fact, in one of the hearings of the disbarment case, he offered to return home and to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. But Mrs. Narag refused all these efforts of respondent Narag. . . IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous, violent, vindictive, scandalous, virulent and merciless wife since the beginning of the marriage, who incessantly beat, battered, brutalized, tortured, abuse[d], scandalized, and humiliated respondent Atty. Narag, physically, mentally, emotionally, and psychologically, . . . V. Complainant Julieta Narag's claim in her counter-manifestation dated March 28, 1996, to the effect that the affidavit of Dominador B. Narag, Jr., dated February 27, 1996 was obtained through force and intimidation, is not true. Dominador, Jr., executed his affidavit freely, voluntarily, and absolutely without force or intimidation, as shown by the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of Respondent Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge Dominador Garcia during the trial of Criminal Case No. 12439, People vs. Dominador M. Narag, et. al., before the Tuguegarao MTC on May 3, 1996. . . . xxx xxx xxx VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man a senior citizen of 63 years sickly, abandoned, disgraced, weakened and debilitated by progressively degenerative gout and arthritis, and hardly able to

earn his own keep. His very physical, medical, psychological, and economic conditions render him unfit and unable to do the things attributed to him by the complainant. Please see the attached medical certificates, . . ., among many other similar certificates touching on the same ailments. Respondent is also suffering from hypertension. 23 On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his report, 24 recommending the indefinite suspension of Atty. Narag from the practice of law. The material portions of said report read as follows: Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the contending parties, two (2) issues are relevant for the disposition of the case, namely: a) Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged abandonment of respondent's own family and [whether he was] living with his paramour, Gina Espita; b) Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate children with Gina Espita (Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador) as appearing on paragraph 1(g) of respondent's Comment vis-a-vis his handwritten love letters, the due execution and contents of which, although he objected to their admissibility for being allegedly forgeries, were never denied by him on the witness stand much less presented and offered proof to support otherwise. Except for the testimonies of respondent's witnesses whose testimonies tend to depict the complaining wife, Mrs. Narag, as an incurably jealous wife and possessive woman suffering everytime with streaks of jealousy, respondent did not present himself on the witness stand to testify and be cross-examined on his sworn comment; much less did he present his alleged paramour, Gina Espita, to disprove the adulterous relationship between him and their having begotten their illegitimate children, namely: Aurelle Dominic N. Espita and Kyle Dominador N. Espita. Worse, respondent's denial that he is the father of the two is a ground for disciplinary sanction (Morcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 467). Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the respondent subject to disciplinary action as a member of the legal profession. 25 In its Resolution 26 issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and approved the investigating commissioner's recommendation for the indefinite suspension of the respondent. 27 Subsequently the complaint sought the disbarment of her husband in a Manifestation/Comment she filed on October 20, 1997. The IBP granted this stiffer penalty and, in its Resolution dated November 30, 1997, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence presented by the parties, we find that the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of the penalty of disbarment. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent 28 to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. 29 Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. 30 Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree 31 or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. 32 We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol 33 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order to live with Gina Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 34 Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself. 35 were: Charlie Espita, 36 Magdalena Bautista, 37 Bienvenido Eugenio, 38 Alice Carag, 39 Dr. Jervis B. Narag, 40 Dominador Narag, Jr., 41 and Nieves F. Reyes. 42 Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita, corroborated complainant's charge against respondent in these categorical statements he gave to the investigating officer: Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag? A Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my sister, Gina Espita. Q If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him? A Yes, sir. (Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty. Dominador Narag) Q Why do you know Atty. Narag?

ATTY. NARAG: Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner. CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT A Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are now living together as husband and wife and that they already have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador. xxx xxx xxx During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself, Charlie Espita repeated his account that his sister Gina was living with the respondent, with whom she had two children: Q Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living with your sister as husband and wife. You claim that? A Yes, sir. Q Why do you say that? A Because at present you are living together as husband and wife and you have already two children and I know that is really an immoral act which you cannot just allow me to follow since my moral values don't allow me that my sister is living with a married man like you. Q How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your sister? Did you see them in the house? A Yes, si[r]. xxx xxx xxx Q You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador, is it not? A Yes, sir. Q How do you know that they are the children of Atty. Narag? A Because you are staying together in that house and you have left your family. 44 In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs. Narag the love letters respondent had sent to his sister, and (2) that Atty. Narag tried to dissuade him from appearing at the disbarment proceedings. 45 Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita in this wise: Q Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case? A I know him very well, sir.

Q Could you please tell us why do you know him? A Because he was always going to the house of my son-in-law by the name of Charlie Espita. xxx xxx xxx Q Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty. Dominador M. Narag? A At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo Angubong, sir. Q And this is located where? A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir. Q And you specifically, categorically state under oath that this is the residence of Atty. Narag? A Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx Q And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are allegedly living as husband and wife, is it not? A Yes, sir. 46 Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple, testified that she learned from the Narag children Randy, Bong and Rowena that their father left his family, that she and her husband prodded the complainant to accept the respondent back, that the Narag couple again separated when the respondent "went back to his woman," and that Atty. Narag had maltreated his wife. 47 On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able to establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived with another woman. Absent any evidence showing that these witnesses had an ill motive to testify falsely against the respondent, their testimonies are deemed worthy of belief. Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that respondent had sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly manifested his love for Gina and her two children, whom he acknowledged as his own. In addition, complainant, also submitted as evidence the cards that she herself had received from him. Guided by the rule that handwriting may be proved through a comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or treated by the respondent as genuine, we affirm that the two sets of evidence were written by one and the same person. 48 Besides, respondent did not present any evidence to prove that the love letters were not really written by him; he merely denied that he wrote them. While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished

profession is imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll of Attorneys. 49 This he failed to do. Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina Espita. At the same time, he depicts his wife as a "violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending," and as an "insanely and pathologically jealous woman," whose only obsession was to "destroy, destroy and destroy" him as shown by her filing of a series of allegedly unfounded charges against him (and Gina Espita). To prove his allegation, he presented ninety-eight (98) pieces of documentary evidence 50 and ten (10) witnesses. 51 We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did not establish the fact that he maintained that moral integrity required by the profession that would render him fit to continue practicing law. Neither did their testimonies destroy the fact, as proven by the complainant, that he had abandoned his family and lived with Gina Espita, with whom he had two children. Some of them testified on matters which they had no actual knowledge of, but merely relied on information from either respondent himself or other people, while others were presented to impeach the good character of his wife. Respondent may have provided well for his family they enjoyed a comfortable life and his children finished their education. He may have also established himself as a successful lawyer and a seasoned politician. But these accomplishments are not sufficient to show his moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession of law. We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good example; and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. 52 As a husband, he is also obliged to live with his wife; to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and support. 53 Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often away from home. But the evidence shows that he was away not only because of his work; instead, he abandoned his family to live with her paramour, who bore him two children. It would appear, then, that he was hardly in a position to be a good husband or a good father. His children, who grew up mostly under the care of their mother, must have scarcely felt the warmth of their father's love. Respondent's son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his father's moral frailties in his testimony: Q My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be forgiven, is there a fault that is so serious that it is incapable of forgiveness? A That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is with the emotional part of myself, I suppose I cannot forgive a person although am a God-fearing person, but I h[av]e to give the person a lesson in order for him or her to at least realize his mistakes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx COMR. JOSE: I think it sounds like this. Assuming for the sake of argument that your father is the worst, hardened criminal on earth, would you send him to jail and have him disbarred? That is the question. CONTINUATION. A With the reputation that he had removed from us, I suppose he has to be given a lesson. At this point in time, I might just forgive him if he will have to experience all the pains that we have also suffered for quite sometime. Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs in your veins, his flesh is your flesh, his bones are your bones and you now disown him because he is the worst man on earth, is that what you are saying. A Sort of, sir. Q You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because your father has sinned, you have no more father, am I correct? A Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father even when I was still a kid because my father is not always staying with us at home. So, how can you say that? Yes, he gave me life, why not? But for sure, sir, you did not give me love. 54 Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating officer the trauma he went through: Q In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which contains the fact that your father is maintaining a paramour, could you please tell this Honorable Commission the effect on you? A This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my brothers and sisters, especially my married life, sir. And it also affected my children so much, that I and my wife ha[ve] parted ways. It hurts to say that I and my wife parted ways. This is one reason that affected us. Q Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted ways? A Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family and that she could not face the people, our community, especially because my wife belongs to a well-known family in our community. Q How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us what are those. A Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my elder sister because she knows so well that my mother suffered so much and she kept on thinking about my mother. xxx xxx xxx

Q Why did your wife leave you? A The truth is because of the things that had happened in our family, Your Honor. Q In your wife's family? A In our family, sir. Q And what do you mean by that? A What meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and that my father went to the extent of scolding my wife and calling my wife a "puta" in provincial government, which my mother-in-law hated him so much for this, which really affected us. And then my wife knew for a fact that my father has an illicit relationship with Gina Espita, whom he bore two children by the name of Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador, which I could prove and I stand firm to this, Your Honor. 55 Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts prove otherwise. A husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage. Rather, he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death. We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova 56: "The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage." In Toledo vs. Toledo, 57 the respondent was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan, 58 the respondent was disbarred after the complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This Court declared that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar. In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting, 59 "a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court." WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision be in the personal record of Respondent Narag; and furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Paganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1 See records, Vol. I, pp. 1-2. Attached therein are photocopies of the marriage contract of the couple and of two "love letters" written by the respondent to his paramour. 2 Code of Professional Responsibility. 3 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-2. 4 Records, Vol. I, p. 11. 5 Records, Vol. II, pp. 13-14. 6 Records, Vol. II, pp. 15-16. 7 Records, Vol. II, pp. 17-18. 8 The Court noted the letter in its Resolution, dated July 30, 1990, and referred the same to the IBP. See records, Vol. II, p. 19. 9 Signatories therein are Numeriano G. Tanopo, Jr., president; Ernesto S. Salunat, Jose Aguila Grapilon, Beda G. Fajardo, Baldomero C. Estenzo, Rene C. Villa and Teodoro D. Nano, Jr., governors of Northern Luzon Region, Southern Luzon Region, Bicolandia Region, Eastern Visayas Region, Western Visayas Region and Eastern Mindanao Region, respectively; Mervyn G. Encanto, executive vice president; and Romeo T. Capulong and Didagen P. Dilangalen, governors of Central Luzon Region and Western Mindanao Region, respectively. 10 Records, Vol. III, pp. 34-37. 11 Through the office of then Chief Justice Fernan. 12 Dated November 11, 1991. 13 The children are Genevieve Narag Bautista, Dominador B. Narag Jr., Randolph B. Narag, Jervis B. Narag, Rowena Narag Addun, Cheryl Rita B. Narag and Christiana B. Narag. 14 Records, Vol. III, p. 23. The letter was forwarded to the Office of the Bar Confidant on December 2, 1991. 15 Records, Vol. III, pp. 40-42. 16 Records, Vol. II, pp. 15-16. 17 Ibid., pp. 17-18.

18 Ibid., pp. 40-41. 19 Records, Vol. III, p. 44. 20 Compiled Answer/Comment and Counter-Affidavits, records, Vol. II, pp. 1-11. 21 Ibid., pp. 1-3. 22 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 23 Memorandum for the Respondent, pp. 1-6; records, Vol. IV, pp. 299-304. 24 Records, Vol. I, pp. 17-59. 25 Report by Comm. Plaridel C. Jose, pp. 42-43; records, Vol. I, pp. 58-59. 26 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 27 Notice of Resolution from the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Board of Governors, Pasig City, signed by National Secretary Roland B. Inting. A copy of said notice was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant on September 16, 1997. Records, Vol. I, pp. 15-16. 28 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: "Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be . . . of good moral character; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied) 29 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 30 7 C.J.S., 14, p. 826; Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p. 751 citing In re Monaghan, 126 VT, 53m 222 A.2d 665, 674; and Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., p. 447, citing Arciga vs. Maniwang, 106 SCRA 594, 594, August 14, 1981. 31 Reyes vs. Wong, 63 SCRA 667, 673, January 29, 1975. 32 Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859, 869-870, April 30, 1963. 33 218 SCRA 30, 40, January 29, 1993, per curiam, citing Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 26, March 8, 1989, per Feliciano, J. 34 Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293, 297-298, October 27, 1983; Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622, 627 August 22, 1989; Adame vs. Aldaba, 83 SCRA 734, 739, June 27, 1978; Arboleda vs. Gatchalian, 58 SCRA 64, 67, July 23, 1974; and Go vs. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439, 442, October 23, 1967. 35 TSN, September 22, 1993, pp. 15-46. 36 Ibid., pp. 28-134.

37 TSN, November 3, 1993, pp. 16-41. 38 Ibid., pp. 42-55. 39 Ibid., pp. 58-71. 40 TSN, November 4, 1993, pp. 5-34. 41 Ibid., pp. 35-64. 42 TSN, January 17, 1994, pp. 3-14. 43 TSN, September 22, 1993, pp. 31-32. 44 Ibid., pp. 85-89. 45 Ibid., pp. 39 and 75. 46 TSN, November 3, 1993, pp. 43-44, 47-48 and 51. 47 TSN, January 17, 1994, pp. 6-8 and 11. 48 Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 49 Delos Reyes vs. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653, 658, November 28, 1989. 50 See Records, Vol. III, pp. 1-234. 51 Jude Sales (TSN, April 19, 1994, pp. 3-6); Atty. Virgilio A. Sevandal (TSN, April 19, 1994, pp. 6-16); Juanito H. Comia (TSN, April 19, 1994, pp. 17-24); Alfonso Tumamao (TSN, April 19, 1994, pp. 25-51); Ofelio Pablo (TSN, April 20, 1994, pp. 2-36); Judge Rolando L. Salacup (TSN, May 16, 1994, pp. 2-37); Romeo Calabaquib (TSN, May 17, 1994, pp. 2-21); Remigio Magundayao (TSN, June 7, 1994, pp. 2-6); Fr. Benjamin T. Lasan (TSN, June 7, 1994, pp. 7-19); and Alfonso C. Gorospe (TSN, June 7, 1994, pp. 19-27). 52 Art. 220, Family Code, See also Art. 356 of the Civil Code and Art. 3 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (or PD 603). 53 Art. 68, Family Code. 54 TSN, November 4, 1993, pp. 28-30. 55 TSN, November 4,1993, pp. 38-39 and 45-46. 56 179 SCRA 680, 683, November 29, 1989. 57 7 SCRA 757, April 27, 1963. 58 128 SCRA 485, April 2, 1984. 59 AC No. 4539, May 14, 1997, pp. 5-6, per curiam.

A.C. No. 6486

September 22, 2004

EMMA T. DANTES, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent.

DECISION PER CURIAM: Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement remains constant in all the jurisdictions where the practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she has "good moral character," and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance with the standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition precedent1 to the practice of law, but an unending requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.2 In an Affidavit-Complaint3 dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Emma T. Dantes, sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of immorality, abandonment, and violation of professional ethics and law. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 01-851. Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged in illicit relationships with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the time respondent s illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular support to complainant and their children, thus forcing complainant to work abroad to provide for their children s needs. Complainant pointed out that these acts of respondent constitute a violation of his lawyer s oath and his moral and legal obligation to be a role model to the community. On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order4 requiring respondent to submit his answer to the Affidavit-Complaint. Respondent submitted his Answer5 on November 19, 2001. Though admitting the fact of marriage with the complainant and the birth of their children, respondent alleged that they have mutually agreed to separate eighteen (18) years before after complainant had abandoned him in their Balintawak residence and fled to San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed that when complainant returned after eighteen years, she insisted that she be accommodated in the place where he and their children were residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone in a rented apartment. Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best school he could afford and provided for their needs. He even bought two lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave complainant adequate financial support even after she had abandoned him in 1983.

Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force him to remit seventy percent (70%) of his monthly salary to her. Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the complaint. Complainant presented her evidence, both oral and documentary,6 to support the allegations in her AffidavitComplaint. From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that on January 19, 1979, complainant and respondent were married7 and lived with the latter s mother in Balintawak. At that time, respondent was just a fourth year law student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged in the buy and sell business and relied on dole-outs from the respondent s mother. Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and Daisy, who were born on February 20, 1980,8 October 14, 19819 and August 11, 1983,10 respectively. Complainant narrated that their relationship was marred by frequent quarrels because of respondent s extra-marital affairs.11 Sometime in 1983, she brought their children to her mother in Pampanga to enable her to work because respondent had failed to provide adequate support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant worked abroad as a domestic helper. Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to live separately, complainant asseverated that she was just compelled to work abroad to support their children. When she returned to the Philippines, she learned that respondent was living with another woman. Respondent, then bluntly told her, that he did not want to live with her anymore and that he preferred his mistresses. Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin, Darling, and Christian Dave,12 all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his paramour13 to prove the fact that respondent sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two different women. Letters of complainant s legitimate children likewise support the allegation that respondent is a womanizer.14 In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine complainant, after he failed to appear during the scheduled hearings despite due notice. He, however, submitted his Comment/Opposition to the Complainant s Formal Offer of Evidence with Motion to Exclude the Evidence from the Records of the Proceedings15 on August 1, 2002. Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to Adopt Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism. Respondent s motion was denied because it was filed after the complainant had already presented her evidence.16 Respondent was given a final chance to present his evidence on July 11, 2003. Instead of presenting evidence, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, which was likewise denied for being a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent submitted his Position Paper on August 4, 2003.

In respondent s Position Paper,17 he reiterated the allegations in his Answer except that this time, he argued that in view of the resolution of the complaint for support with alimony pendente lite18 filed against him by the complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,19 the instant administrative case should be dismissed for lack of merit. On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar Confidant its Report20 and Resolution No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD Case No. 01-851.21 The IBP recommended that the respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: "Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." "Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar." "Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.22 To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyer s conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree23 or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.24 In Barrientos vs. Daarol,25 we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves.26

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.27 They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.28 Undoubtedly, respondent s acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainant s testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established respondent s commission of marital infidelity and immorality. Evidently, respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.29 In Toledo vs. Toledo,30 we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,31 we ruled that abandoning one s wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,32 that moral delinquency which affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community as exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.33 Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed.34 However, in the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent s record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales*, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario**, JJ., concur. Footnotes * On Official leave. ** On leave. 1 Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 2 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 3 Rollo, pp. 1-2. 4 Id. at 18. 5 Id. at 23-30. 6 Exhibits "A" to "Z", Rollo, pp. 72-96. 7 Rollo, p. 72. 8 Id. at 74. 9 Id. at 73. 10 Id. at 75. 11 TSN, April 17, 2002, p.11. 12 Exhibit "G", "G-1", "G-2"; Exhibit "H", "H-1", "H-2"; Exhibit "M", "M-1", "M-2", Rollo, pp. 77- 78, 83. 13 Exhibit "I"; Exhibit "J"; Exhibit "K"; and Exhibit "L", Rollo, pp. 79-81. 14 Exhibits "S"; Exhibit "T"; and Exhibit "U", Rollo, pp. 89-91. 15 Rollo, pp. 105-107. 16 Id. at 139. 17 Id. at 145-156. 18 Civil Case No. Q-01-45222. 19 Presided by Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, National Capital Judicial Region, Rollo, pp. 157-158.

20 Rollo, pp. 198-201. 21 Id. at 197. 22 Black s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p. 751 citing In re: Monaghan, 126 VT, 53m 222 A 2d 665, 674. 23 Reyes vs. Wong, A.C. No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667. 24 Royong vs. Oblena, A. C. No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 859, 869. 25 A.C. No. 1512, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 30. 26 Elliston, F.A. The Ethics of Ethics Tests for Lawyers, published in The Bar Examiner, vol. 51, no. 3 (August 1982) 8:16. 27 Cordon vs. Balicanta, A.C. No. 2797, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 299. 28 Rural Bank of Silay, Inc. vs. Pilla, A.C. No. 3637, January 24, 2001, 350 SCRA 138; Saburnido vs. Madroo, A.C. No. 4497, September 26, 2001, 366 SCRA 1. 29 Pangan vs. Ramos, Adm. Case No. 1053, August 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 1 30 Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963, 7 SCRA 757 31 Adm. Case No. 1392, April 2, 1984, 128 SCRA 485 32 November 29, 1989, 179 SCRA 680 33 Tapucar vs. Tapucar, A.C. No. 4148, July 30, 1998, 293 SCRA 331. 34 Resurreccion vs. Sayson, A.C. No. 1037, December 14, 1998, 300 SCRA 129.