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Worldwide Petroleum Fiscal Regimes Development:

Observations and Trends

Petroleum Fiscal Policy Analyst, OPEC

Benny Lubiantara

December, 2011

Disclaimer:
The views expressed in this presentation represent my personal views; This presentation contain references to materials from third parties whose copy right must be acknowledged by citing the sources of reference.

Presentation Outline
Theoretical Background Update on Selected Countries Observations and Trends Possible Applications (in Indonesia)

Theoretical Background

Upstream Petroleum Contract

Simplified Flow-charts
Royalty Tax
Gross Production Royalty Costs Deductions Royalty Cost Oil (Cost Recovery) Profit Oil (P/O) Income Tax Companys Production Cost Oil (Cost Recovery)

PSC
Gross Production

Service Contract
Gross Production

Govts Productions Ctrs P/O

Ctrs Fee

Govts P/O Ctrs Tax

Ctrs Tax

Upstream Petroleum Contract

*) Authors illustration - Modified from Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE)

Governance of the Upstream Petroleum


Policy
Ministry

Directorate/ Govt Body/ Agency

NOC

IOCs

Authors illustration - adopted from various sources: Al-Kasim (2008), Thurber, M.C et al (2011), Tordo, et al, (2011)

Governance of the Upstream Petroleum


Policy
Ministry

Directorate/ Govt Body/ Agency


Norway Brazil Indonesia Algeria

NOC

IOCs

Nigeria Mexico (2008)


9

Authors illustration - adopted from various sources: Al-Kasim (2008), Thurber, M.C et al (2011), Tordo, et al, (2011)

Governance of the Upstream Petroleum


Policy Ministry Policy

NOC

IOCs

IOCs

NOC

Saudi Arabia

Malaysia Kazakhstan

Russia Iran

Venezuela Angola
10

Authors illustration - adopted from various sources: Al-Kasim (2008), Thurber, M.C et al (2011), Tordo, et al, (2011)

Governance of the Upstream Petroleum


Policy Ministry Policy

Directorate/ Govt Body/ Agency

Private companies

Private companies

USA United Kingdom Canada

Australia

Authors illustration - adopted from various sources: Al-Kasim (2008), Thurber, M.C et al (2011), Tordo, et al, (2011)

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Update on Selected Countries

12

Update on Selected Countries

Algeria Brazil Iran Iraq Nigeria Venezuela Development in Arctic


13

Algeria
2005 : Law 05-07 & its Amendments
Providing a clear simple and competitive fiscal regime and contractual conditions Separating the operations of the state from Sonatrach Establishing two independent regulatory Agencies (ALNAFT & ARH) Establishing transparency in contract awards The windfall profit tax
State/ MEM State/ MEM

Sonatrach

ALNAFT

Regulatory Authority

Foreign companies

Sonatrach

Company X

Company Y
14

Source: Djermane, O, Recent Changes in the Algerian Hydrocarbon Law, Vienna, April 2008

Algeria
The Windfall Profit Tax:
Applies to partnership contracts under 1986 law , on exceptional profits made by foreign partner when monthly arithmetic mean of Brent Price > 30 $/barrel, The rate is between 5% and 50% based on the type of contract and the daily production.

Exploration and/or exploitation contract:


Sonatrach Other parties : Minimum 51% : Maximum 49%
15

Brazil
Royalty/Tax Model:
Typical T&C: Royalty: 5 - 10%, Special Participation Fee (SPF) = 0 40%, Income Tax = 30%,

Petrobras:

Government share: 48% Foreign Investor: 32% National/Private Investor: 20%

Royalty/Tax

Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) ? - SOC, 100 % Gov. Share (Pre_salt Petroleum SA/PPSA)
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Iran
Buyback Contract
The IOC, acting essentially as a contractor, provides all the capital required to finance a specific development or rehabilitation project. The contractor is paid back capital expenditure and associated financing costs plus an agreed profit over a specified period, usually 3-6 years from the date of the first production, from up to 60-65% of the fields output. The profit or ROR on the IOCs investment varies from project to project, is normally between 15 and 20%. NIOC takes over the operation of the field upon the commencement of production and is responsible for the operating costs. The contractor holds no equity in the field.

Source: Otman, W.A, The Iranian Petroleum Contracts: Past, Present and Future Perspectives , OGEL, VOL 5, April 2007

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Iran
Production
Sale of Oil/Condensate by NIOC

IOCs Portion of Revenue

NIOCs Portion of Revenue

- Up to 60 - 65% - Equal Installment During Recovery Years - Up to Maximum X% ROR - Grossed up to Compensate Tax
Adopted from : Ebrahimi, S.N, An Overview on Regulatory, Fiscal and Contractual Aspects of NIOCs Buy-Back Contract, Vienna, April 2008 18

Iraq
Technical Service Contract (TSC)

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Main characteristics of Iraqs TSC


There are two biddable parameters in the tendering process, namely: Plateau Production target (PPT) and Remuneration (profit) fee. The service fee payment starts once production reaches the First Commercial Production (FCP) threshold; in many cases, FCP is 10% above the production baseline. Duration of contract: 20 years (with negotiable extension). Signature bonus State Partner: A 25% equity holder Corporate income tax is 35% on net taxable profits (aggregate remuneration fees).

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Iraqs TSC summary


Contract Area Consortium BP PetroChi na Eni Occi dental Kogas ExxonMobi l Shel l CNOOC TPAO Lukoi l Statoi l Shel l Petronas PetroChi na Petronas Total Petronas Japex Gazprom Kogas Petronas TPAO Sonangol Sonangol Participation Plus 25% for State Partner 38 37 32.81 23.44 18.75 60 15 63.75 11.25 56.25 18.75 45 30 37.5 18.75 18.75 45 30 30 22.5 15 7.5 75 75 Remuneration Fee (US$/b) 1 Rumai l a 2.00 Plateau Production Target (b/d) 2,850,000 Initial Production Rate (b/d) 1,066,000 First Commercial Production (b/d) 1,173,000 Signature Bonus (US$ mi l l i on) 500 Minimum Expenditure Obligation (US$ mi l l i on) 300

Zubai r

2.00

1,200,000

182,775

201,000

100

200

West Qurna (Phase 1) Mi ssan West Qurna (Phase 2) Majnoon

1.90

2,325,000

244,000

268,000

100

2500

2.30

450,000

96,000

n.a.

n.a.

1.15

1,800,000

120,000

100

250

1.39

1,800,000

175,000

150

300

Hal faya

1.40

535,000

70,000

150

200

Garraf

1.49

230,000

35,000

100

150

Badra

5.50

170,000

15,000

100

100

10 11

Qai yarah Najmah

5.00 6.00

120,000 110,000

30,000 20,000

100 100

150 100

Adopted from: Arab Oil and Gas, Vol XXXIX No 929, 1 June 2010

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Nigeria
Nigerian Fiscal Terms
LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Concessionary System
Royalty/Tax system. Operator owns part Interest or all of license/Lease

Contractual System
Operator is contractor to the License/Lease holder (NNPC).

Multinationals in JVs
55 - 60% NNPC Equity interest Governed by the MOU and the JOA Multinational operators have minority interests ~95% of Nigeria oil production

Indigenous Producers
60% or more Equity held by Indigenous company 40% or less Interest held by technical partners who, in some cases, carry Indigenous Co. s cost and recover from production NNPC - 50% back - in to Ind. Prod Equity ~5% of Nigeria oil production

Risk Service Contracts


Agip Energy 1979 & 2001 NNPC holds the lease. Contractor bears all costs & recovers same from production Contractor has first option to buy fixed amount of crude from contract area

Production Sharing Contract


Contract type of choice in the 1990s (1st in 1973 with Ashland) NNPC holds the License. Contractor bears all cost & recovers same from production Profit Oil split after Royalty, Cost recovery and Tax

Royalty: 16.67% - 20% Tax Rate: 65.75/85% Capital Recovery: 5 years ITA: 5 515% ITA*): 5 - 15% 5 MOU applies

Royalty: 16.67% - 20% Tax Rate: 65.75/85% Capital Recovery: 5 years ITA: 5 -15% MOU does not apply

Contractor :
Royalty Tax ITA

CITA

Shallow Water
For W.D. <200m Sliding royalty Tax Rate:

Deepwater (WD>200M)
Sliding royalty rate based on water depth Lower tax rate - 50%/Flat ITC rate - 50% for PSC signed 1993, Post 1993 ITA Sliding profit oil share to contractor based on cum production MOU does not apply

Leaseholder - PPTA
16.67 - 20% 65.75/85% 5 - 15%

65.75/85%

Capital Recovery 5 years

ITA : 5 - 15%

Profit split based on production rates (BOPD)

MOU does not apply

MOU applies

Source: Muhammad, Uthman, The Nigerian Oil Industry Fiscal Terms, Vienna, April 2008

*)ITA: Investment Tax Allowances

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Nigeria
CONCESSIONARY SYSTEM
EXAMPLE OF A JV CONCESSIONARY SYSTEM- GOVT/COY

NNPC

60%

COY

40%

(NON - OPERATOR)

(OPERATOR)

JV
Annual Budget Allocation 60% GOVT. Revenue Opex & Capex
PRODUCTION

Profit Capital Recovery

40% COY Royalty Taxes

FEDERATION ACCOUNT
The overall production from JVs account for approximately 90% - 95% of Nigerias crude oil production, with Shell produces nearly 50% . Source: Muhammad, Uthman, The Nigerian Oil Industry Fiscal Terms, Vienna, April 2008 23

Venezuela
Principal Actor(s) Historical Overview
1910 1975, Ministry (MENPET) 1976 1998, NOC (PDVSA) 1999 Present, Ministry (MENPET) Minimum effective Royalty Rate increased to: 30% for PDVSA (new Hydrocarbon Law, 2002) 16.67% for existing contracts with private parties (2004) 33.33% for everybody since 2006 Income Tax Rate increased to 50% (2007) Fiscal Floor: Royalty + Income Tax never less than 50% of Gross Revenues. Export Tax about to be created

PDVSA is required by law to be the majority shareholder in all joint ventures (2002) In Practice: minimum of 60% All existing OSA and Association Agreements were invited to migrate to the new law (2005/7)
Source: Mommer, B, Venezuela Fiscal Regime, Vienna, April 2008 24

Petroleum Activities in Arctic


USGS: The Arctic holds up to 25% of Yet to Find Resources Huge resource potential, 2/3 in Russian basins

Significant challenges: Access Arctic Climate Winter Darkness Remoteness

Source: Runi M. Hansen, The Arctic Comparative Analysis of the Fiscal Regimes, Presented during the 22nd Petroleum Taxation Conference, Oslo, 2 3 November 2011

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Expected Contribution of Arctic in future Norways Production

Source: Gaute Erichsen, Petroleum Activities in the Artic Whats up at the NCS, Presented during the 22nd Petroleum Taxation Conference, Oslo, 2 3 November 2011 26

The Arctic Comparative Analysis of Fiscal Regimes

Source: Runi M. Hansen, The Arctic Comparative Analysis of the Fiscal Regimes, Presented during the 22nd Petroleum Taxation Conference, Oslo, 2 3 November 2011

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Observations and Trends

28

Oil Price ($ per bbl)

Yearly average

120

Historical Perspective
100

Contract Renegotiation

80

New Seven Sisters?


60

Old Seven Sisters Participation Contract 50/50 Model

- Limited E&P Access - Tougher T&C

40

Growing Intl NOCs Inc. Participation & Nationalization OPEC 1973 Oil CrisisPSC -2 - New Blocks offered - Attractive T&C

20

Old Concession

PSC -1
0

PSC -3
Incentive (IP) CR Issues

Link:NOC

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Share of SOC to Domestic Production

30

Poor T & C Design


Kashagan Field, - CRL = 80% - P/O split, based on IRR, IRR Contractor P/O 0 17% 90% 17 20% formula > 20% 10%

Re-negotiation?

Kazakhstan

New Law Retroactive Changes to PSA

Bolivia

Giant Gas Fields, - Royalty = 18%

18% - 82%

Giant Gas Fields, - Royalty = 18% 82% - 18% - Direct Tax on HC = 32% - State Participation = 32%

Venezuela

Operating Service Agreement - Minimum Royalty Rate = 1% - Income Tax = 34%

Operating Service Agreement - Minimum Royalty Rate = 33.3% - Income Tax = 50% - Fiscal Floor: Royalty + Income Tax never less than 50% of Gross Revenue

Authors illustration, compiled from selected sources: Johnston (2006), Kahale III (2010), Mommer (2008).

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Pacta sunt servanda* vs. Rebus sic stantibus**


UK (Concession, increased Supplementary charge, 2006) Algeria (PSC, WPT introduced, 2006) China (PSC, WPT introduced, 2006) US, Alaska (Concession, Profit tax increased, 2006 Ecuador (PSC, WPT increased, 2007) Venezuela (Concession, WPT introduced, 2008) PNG (Concession, Add. Profit Tax re-introduced, 2008)

Canada, Alberta (Concession, Royalty rates increased, 2007) Vietnam (PSC, Export duty rates increased, 2008) Bolivia (Concession, Contract overhauled, 2005 2007) Kazakhstan (PSC, Law passed to allow retroactive changes to PSC, 2008)

Source: Cameron & Kellas, Contract and Fiscal Stability, Rhetoric and Reality, September 2008 *) Latin, Promises must be kept **) Latin, At this point of affairs; in these circumstances. Contract will no longer be binding as soon as the state of facts and conditions upon 32 which they were based changes to a substantial degree.

Progressive and Self-adjusting Profit Oil Split


Malaysia (R/C Criteria equivalent to R Factor). Russia Sakhalin Project, POS based on tranches of ROR. Kazakhstan POS based on ROR, R Factor. Azerbaijan POS based on tranches of ROR Angola For Deepwater, ROR system instead of cumulative production that is used in shallower blocks.
Link: Why?
Source: Duval, et. al, International Petroleum E & P Agreements: Legal, Economics and Policy Aspects, 2nd edition, 2009 33

> Link

Is the there any relationship between upstream costs and type of contract?

Adopted from: Attar & Alomair, Evaluation of Upstream Petroleum Agreements and E & P Costs, OPEC Review, December 2005

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One-size-fits-all model does not exist


For the purpose of Illustration only

Profitability Based ?

More advanced & complicated terms and conditions (commercially). Borrow elements from other systems.
The involvement of NOC & Local companies.
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The Role of NOC/SOC and The Upstream Arrangement


Lower Risk

Service Contract

Iran (Buy back) Iraq (Technical Service Assistance) Venezuela (Service Contract)

Percentage of NOC/SOC Participation? Production Sharing Contract


Higher Risk
Indonesia Libya (EPSA) Kazakhstan Angola Malaysia Nigeria DW Algeria

Concession Royalty & Tax


Canada (unconv. heavy oil) Brazil US GOM Norway Nigeria Russia UK
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IOCs are forced to enter Partnership with NOC


Liquids Production vs. Reserves

IOC & NOC

NOC & NOC

Increasing trend of collaborating among NOCs


Authors illustration: modified from Deloitte, Seizing Opportunities: A New era for national oil companies, 2008

37

Long-term Oil Supply Cost Curve

$/bbl

Source: International Energy Agency (IEA)

38

Oil Price ($ per bbl)

Yearly average

120

What Next ?
Contract Renegotiation

Access to Reserves (Link) Major IOCs are forced to enter Service Contract More focus on EOR and Unconventional Oil and Gas Oil Sand, Heavy oil, Shale Oil/Gas, GTL, Ultra DW, Arctic Partnership NOC with IOC, NOC with NOC and NOC with Oil Services Companies

100

80

New Seven Sisters?


60

Old Seven Sisters Participation Contract 50/50 Model

- Limited E&P Access - Tougher T&C

40

Growing Intl NOCs Inc. Participation & Nationalization OPEC 1973 Oil CrisisPSC -2 - New Blocks offered - Attractive T&C

20

Old Concession

PSC -1
0

PSC -3
Incentive (IP) CR Issues

- One size fits all model does not exist! - The Need to have Flexible T & C

39

Possible Applications in Indonesia

40

The Issue of Cost Recovery

PSC without Cost Recovery..??? PSC Gross..???

Direct Sharing Model (DSM)


> Link
Cartoon: Courtesy Google

41

Direct Sharing Model (DSM)


Single Split
Governments Perspective:

PSC = 85% : 15%

65% : 35% 60% : 40% 55% : 45%

Link: price assumptions

42

Improving Direct Sharing Model (DSM)


Single Split
40% 35% 30%

Contractors Perspective: 55% : 45% 60% : 40% PSC - 85% : 15% 65% : 35%

IRR Contractor

25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 45% 55% 65% 75% 85%


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MARR

Project Profit

Possible Implications:
Direct Sharing Model (DSM), X % : Y % (ex: 60% : 40%) Contractors Profit = 40% x GR - Costs
Less incentive to make capital investment than PSC (from the contractors time value of money perspective), since it implies that only 40% Access to Gross Revenue (AGR), compare to PSC with 80% - 85% AGR. Due to the natural production decline, the easiest way to maintain profit is to lower the costs (i.e. no more investment) Consequently: higher decline rate (faster production decline) is expected it also means, lower production, lower GR, and finally lower share of governments (X%), compare to PSC.

Larger Share but Smaller Pie??


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Direct Sharing Model (DSM)


95%

Multiple Splits
DSM - Sliding Scale ROR

90%

Government Take

85%

80%

DSM - Single Split (60% : 40%)

75%

40%

45%

50%

55%

60%

65%

70%

75%

80%

85%

90%

Pre Take IRR

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The shortcomings of DSM with Sliding Scale ROR model


1. In the context of the idea of introducing the new model that directly shares the gross revenue, the DSM with Sliding Scale ROR model satisfies both parties. However, another crucial issue which is the possibility of loosing government control may emerge. The Government should prepare for the fact that by using this model, the governments control will be minimized. 2. Moreover, this may bring another philosophical issue, since government control is the main idea behind the birth of the Production Sharing Contract (PSC) in early sixties. If government control no longer exist, is it still valid to categorize this model as a type of PSC?. 3. In addition, the main idea of DSM model is to eliminate the cost assessment. Meanwhile, the DSM with Sliding Scale ROR model (as any profitability based model) needs more government supervision to verify the costs in order to avoid the gold-plating issues. 4. In order to minimize the impact of this problem, for the purpose of re-obtaining the control, the government may adopt an approach which is typical in some oil resource abundant countries, which establish joint venture companies or partnership between the NOC and the IOC.

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Direct Sharing Model (DSM)


Without NOC Share/Participation

Profitability

Profitability

47

Direct Sharing Model (DSM)


With 50% NOC Share/Participation

Profitability

Profitability

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Commercial Aspects of Petroleum Fiscal Systems


(Design issues)
Licensing Exploration Appraisal Development Production

E&P Project Life Cycles


End of Contract Period

(Optimization, EOR) Abandonment

Trade-off between front-end loaded features (bonus, export duty, royalty, cost recovery ceiling, etc.) and back-end loaded features (Profit Split, Income Tax, Supplementary Tax, etc.)

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Searching for Win- Win Solution (?)


Back-end loaded features(?)
EOR Projects
Appraisal Development Production

Licensing Exploration

End of Contract Period

Front-end loaded features(?)


EOR Projects Marginal Fields/Projects
(Optimization, EOR)

New Blocks Offered

Marginal Fields/Projects

Existing Contracts

Extension Contracts?

Abandonment

More sophisticated incentives to improve exploration performance?


> Link 1 > Link 2

Win-Win (?): Improve profitability of marginal projects Capture a large share of excess profit
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Some Alternatives Applications


The past decade has witnessed an increasingly interest in the development of flexible fiscal elements in upstream petroleum contracts in order to better allocate the economic rent
Licensing Exploration Appraisal End of Contract Period Back-end loaded features(?) Front-end loaded features(?)

Profit based PSC??


Development

EOR Projects

Profit based PSC?? Marginal Fields/Projects

EOR Projects Service Contract ?

New Blocks Offered Royalty Tax??

Marginal Fields/Projects
Production

Profit based PSC??

(Optimization, EOR)

Existing Contracts
Tax or POS vs. State Participation (Link)

Extension Contracts?
NOC, Local Co, Direct Gov. Participation

Abandonment

Out of the box approach ??


Attract Investors ? Combination of Back end loaded features : lower royalty, moderate share? And Front- end loaded features : progressive share, additional taxes, etc.

DSM with NOC Participation

Lowering asymetric information between Gov and IOC (Norwegian Model) Cost recovery issue will be minimized

Higher NOC (up to 100%) Participation depending upon the risk profiles

Higher NOC Share Less issue on commercial Terms and Conditions More Issue on the ability of NOC to finance the current and upcoming E & P projects

51

Terima Kasih

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Linked from previous slides

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Back to Main Slide

NOC Creation (1920 1980) NOC Privatization (1990 2000)

Source: Center for Energy Economics (CEE), Commercial Frameworks for National Oil Companies, Working Paper, Revised March 2007

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Back to Main Slide

The New Seven Sisters ?


The new seven sisters, or the most influential energy companies from countries outside the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have been identified by the Financial Times in consultation with numerous industry executives Financial Times (2007) ranked the New Seven Sisters on the basis of resource base, level of output, company's ambition, scale of their domestic market, and influence in the industry. In order of prominence, they are Saudi Aramco, Russia's Gazprom, CNPC of China, NIOC of Iran, Venezuela's PDVSA, Brazil's Petrobras and Petronas of Malaysia.

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Responsiveness of Fiscal Provisions to Determinant of Project Profitability


Reserves/ Production Yes No Yes No Partly Yes Oil Prices Change No Yes Yes No Partly Yes Timing of Cash Flows Partly Partly Partly Partly No Yes Cost of Capital No No No Partly No Yes

Profit Oil Linked to: Production (daily or cummulative) Price (price caps or base prices) Revenue (price and production) Cost Recovery Simple Indicators (fixed share, location, etc) Rate of Return

Costs No No No Yes Partly Yes

Source: Palmer, K and McPherson, C.P, New Approaches for Profit Sharing in Developing Countries, Oil and Gas Journal, 1984

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Back to Main Slide

Misunderstanding of Cost Recovery


Royalty Tax
Gross Production Royalty Costs Deductions Royalty Cost Oil (Cost Recovery) Profit Oil (P/O) Income Tax Companys Production Cost Oil (Cost Recovery)

PSC
Gross Production

Service Contract
Gross Production

Govts Productions Ctrs P/O

Ctrs Fee

Govts P/O Ctrs Tax

Ctrs Tax

57

Back to Main Slide

Oil Price Assumptions for DSM Exercise:

58

Back to Main Slide

Foreign company access to proven oil reserves, end-2007

Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook, 2008

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Back to Main Slide

How to increase Government Take while maintaining investments attractiveness?


FTP, Profit Split or Tax ? State Participation ?

Government Take

Government Take

Government Take

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Risk and Reward Mechanism in Malaysian R/C Model

50%

50%

Adopted from : Barrows, Malaysian R/C PSC Model Contract, 2006 Adopted from: Amr Rezk, Economic Modeling for Upstream Petroleum Projects, 2006

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Back to Main Slide

Ranking Based on: Average Discovery Size (mmboe)


Source: PEPS, IHS Energy*) 2010 Data
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Last 5 Years Rank


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 Iran Iraq Ghana Kuwait Brazil Saudi Arabia Papua New Guinea Israel Venezuela Azerbaijan Turkmenistan Angola Mozambique Bolivia Norway Peru Trinidad and Tobago Australia Uganda Myanmar China Equatorial Guinea Chad Kazakhstan Oman Falkland Islands Sao Tome-Nigeria JDZ Congo Tanzania Malaysia Algeria UK Libya Vietnam Denmark Mexico Brunei Nigeria Russia Sierra Leone

Last 10 Years Rank


Turkmenistan Iran Kuwait Iraq Saudi Arabia Brazil Ghana Bolivia Venezuela Myanmar Angola Papua New Guinea Israel Nigeria Vietnam Libya Congo Trinidad and Tobago Azerbaijan China Norway Mozambique Kazakhstan Oman Equatorial Guinea Malaysia Peru Mauritania Australia Denmark India Algeria UK Cote d'Ivoire Chad Uganda Egypt Gabon Indonesia Uzbekistan
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 Russia Mexico Falkland Islands Sao Tome-Nigeria JDZ Tanzania Syria Ireland Pakistan Angola/Congo Netherlands Brunei Sierra Leone Cameroon Colombia Thailand Tunisia Ecuador New Zealand Ethiopia Yemen Kyrgyzstan Ukraine Sudan Italy Cambodia Faroe Islands UAE - Dubai Malaysia/Thailand JDA Bangladesh Timor Sea JPDA Benin South Africa Greece Poland Romania Argentina Philippines Bulgaria Morocco Belize

41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

Uzbekistan India Ethiopia Syria Gabon Ireland Egypt UAE - Dubai Indonesia Thailand Ecuador Colombia Cameroon Netherlands Tunisia Pakistan Malaysia/Thailand JDA Yemen Italy Timor Sea JPDA Philippines Sudan Morocco Bulgaria Poland Bangladesh Romania New Zealand Mongolia Georgia Kenya Cote d'Ivoire Chile Argentina Germany Greenland Slovakia Cuba Turkey Hungary

*)IHS Energy notes: Exploration performance statistics for the US and Canada are not directly comparable to those of the rest of the world because IHS does not have a comparable individual field database for these countries

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Back to Main Slide

Ranking Based on: Resources Added (mmboe) divided by New Field Wildcats (NFW)
Source: PEPS, IHS Energy*) 2010 Data
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Last 5 Years Rank


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 Iran Iraq Kuwait Brazil Saudi Arabia Ghana Papua New Guinea Israel Venezuela Azerbaijan Turkmenistan Angola Mozambique Bolivia Peru Norway Australia Uganda Trinidad and Tobago China Equatorial Guinea Chad Oman Falkland Islands Sao Tome-Nigeria JDZ Congo Kazakhstan Tanzania Myanmar Algeria Denmark Malaysia Libya UK Vietnam Mexico Nigeria Sierra Leone Russia Uzbekistan
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 Brunei India Ethiopia Ireland Egypt Syria Cameroon Gabon UAE - Dubai Indonesia Thailand Ecuador Colombia Netherlands Tunisia Pakistan Malaysia/Thailand JDA Yemen Italy Timor Sea JPDA Sudan Morocco Philippines Poland Bangladesh Romania Bulgaria Mongolia Georgia Kenya Cote d'Ivoire Chile Argentina New Zealand Greenland Slovakia Cuba Ukraine Turkey Germany

Last 10 Years Rank


Turkmenistan Iran Kuwait Iraq Saudi Arabia Bolivia Brazil Ghana Papua New Guinea Angola Venezuela Israel Nigeria Azerbaijan Vietnam Myanmar Mozambique Norway Trinidad and Tobago China Congo Equatorial Guinea Peru Libya Australia Oman Kazakhstan Malaysia Algeria Cote d'Ivoire Uganda Chad Mauritania India UK Egypt Denmark Tanzania Mexico Russia
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 Falkland Islands Sao Tome-Nigeria JDZ Indonesia Ireland Uzbekistan Angola/Congo Gabon Cameroon Sierra Leone Netherlands Syria Pakistan Colombia Thailand Brunei Ecuador Tunisia Ethiopia Yemen UAE - Dubai Italy Bangladesh Sudan Timor Sea JPDA Cambodia Malaysia/Thailand JDA Benin South Africa Greece Poland Ukraine New Zealand Argentina Romania Kyrgyzstan Morocco Belize Philippines Guinea-Bissau Georgia

*)IHS Energy notes: Exploration performance statistics for the US and Canada are not directly comparable to those of the rest of the world because IHS does not have a comparable individual field database for these countries

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