Case Digest on PELAYO vs. LAURON (Mutual Support) Facts: Oct.

13, 1906, nighttime Arturo Pelayo, a physician based in Cebu, was called to the house of Marcelo Lauron & Juana Abella (defendants) in San Nicolas. Their daughter-in-law was about to give birth & they requested him to render medical assistance. Since it was a difficult birth, he had to perform a surgery to remove the fetus using forceps. He also removed the afterbirth. He finished all of these until the following morning. He visited the patient several times the following day. Just & equitable value for the services he rendered: P500.00. Without any good reason, defendants refused to pay said amount. Thus he filed a case praying for a judgment in his favor against defendants for the sum of P500.00 + costs along with other relief that may be deemed proper. The Defendants alleged that their daughter-in-law died in consequence of the childbirth. Also, that their son & daughter-in-law lived independently & her giving birth in their house was only accidental. They prayed that they be absolved. CFI: Defendants absolved due to lack of sufficient evidence to establish right of action. ISSUE: WON the defendants are bound to pay the bill for the services Pelayo has rendered. HELD: NO. CFI judgment affirmed. RATIO: Rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is among the mutual obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 & 143, CC) The party bound to give support should therefore be liable for all the expenses including the fees of the physician. Thus, it is the husbands obligation to pay Pelayo and not the defendants. The husband would still be liable even if his parents were the one who called & requested for Pelayos assistance. The defendants are not under any obligation to pay the fees claimed (An obligation according to CC Art. 1089 is created by law, contracts, quasi-contracts, & by illicit acts & omissions or by those in which any kind of fault/negligence occurs.). There was no contract between Pelayo & the defendants thus they cant be compelled to pay him.

Barzaga vs CA 1998 (DELAY) Facts: Petitioners wife died and her wish is to be buried before Christmas. After her death on Dec 21, 1990, in fulfillment of her wishes, petitioner went to respondents store to inquire the availability of materials to be used in building his wifes niche. Respondents employee advised petitioner that to come back the following morning. That following morning, petitioner made a payment of P2,100 to secure the delivery of the materials. However, the materials were not delivered on time. Several times petitioner went to respondents store to ask for the delivery. Later that day, the petitioner was forced to dismiss his laborer since there is nothing to work with for the materials did not arrive. Petitioner however purchased the materials from other stores. After his wife was buried, he sued respondent for damages because of delay For his part, respondent offered a lame excuse of fortuitous event that the reason for delay is because the trucks tires were flat. Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of delay that will entitle petitioner for damages, although it was not specified in the invoice the exact time of delivery? Held: Yes! The law expressly provides that those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. (Art 1170 of the Civil Code). The appellate court appears to have belittled petitioners submission that under the prevailing circumstances time was of the essence in the delivery of the materials to the grave site. However, we find petitioners assertion to be anchored on solid ground. The niche had to be constructed at the very least on the twenty-second of December considering that it would take about two (2) days to finish the job if the interment was to take place on the twenty-fourth of the month. Respondents delay in the delivery of the construction materials wasted so much time that construction of the tomb could start only on the twenty-third. It could not be ready for the scheduled burial of petitioners wife. This undoubtedly prolonged the wake, in addition to the fact that work at the cemetery had to be put off on Christmas day. This case is clearly one of non-performance of a reciprocal obligation. 7 In their contract of purchase and sale, petitioner had already complied fully with what was required of him as purchaser, i.e., the payment of the purchase price of P2,110.00. It was incumbent upon respondent to immediately fulfill his obligation to deliver the goods otherwise delay would attach.

Agcaoili v. GSIS
G.R. No. L-30056 August 30, 1988 [Narvasa, J.:] Facts: Petitioner was awarded the house by GSIS on the condition that he should reside on it immediately. As the house is uninhabitable, petitioner vacated the area after 1 day and refused to pay further installments until respondent make it habitable. Respondent cancelled the award. Issue: W/n the petitioner incurred delay in fulfilling his obligations HELD: In reciprocal obligations, a party incurs delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. Respondent did not fulfill its obligation to deliver the house in a habitable state, therefore, it cannot invoke the petitioners suspension of payment as a cause to cancel the contract between them. There was a perfected contract of sale, it was then the duty of GSIS as seller to deliver the thing sold in a condition suitable for its enjoyment by the buyer and for the purpose contemplated. The house contemplated was one that could be occupied for purpose of residence in reasonable comfort and convenience.

La Mallorca vs De Jesus

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21486

May 14, 1966

LA MALLORCA and PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. VALENTIN DE JESUS, MANOLO TOLENTINO and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. MAKALINTAL, J.: La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., commonly known as La Mallorca-Pambusco, filed this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in its Civil Case No. 2100, entitled Valentin de Jesus and Manolo Tolentino vs. La Mallorca-Pambusco. The court a quo sentenced the defendant, now petitioner, to pay to plaintiffs the amount of P2,132.50 for actual damages; P14,400.00 as compensatory damages; P10,000.00 to each plaintiff by way of moral damages; and P3,000.00 as counsel fees. Two errors are attributed to the appellate Court: (1) in sustaining the decision (of the court a quo) holding that the petitioners were liable for the accident which was caused by a blow-out of one of the tires of the bus and in not considering the same as caso fortuito, and (2) in holding petitioners liable for moral damages.

The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita de Jesus, 20-year old daughter of Valentin de Jesus and wife of Manolo Tolentino, in a head-on collision between petitioners bus, on which she was a passenger, and a freight truck traveling in the opposite direction, in a barrio in Marilao Bulacan, in the morning of October 8, 1959. The immediate cause of the collision was the fact that the driver of the bus lost control of the wheel when its left front tire suddenly exploded. Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for negligence, citing the rulings of the Court of Appeals in Rodriguez vs. Red Line Transportation Co., CA-G.R. No. 8136, December 29, 1954, and People vs. Palapad, CA-G.R. No. 18480, June 27, 1958. These rulings, however, not only are not binding on this Court but were based on considerations quite different from those that obtain in the case at bar. The appellate Court there made no findings of any specified acts of negligence on the part of the defendants and confined itself to the question of whether or not a tire blow-out, by itself alone and without a showing as to the causative factors, would generate liability. In the present case, the cause of the blow-out was known. The inner tube of the left front tire, according to petitioners own evidence and as found by the Court of Appeals was pressed between the inner circle of the left wheel and the rim which had slipped out of the wheel. This was, said Court correctly held, a mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more thorough, or rigid check-up before it took to the road that morning. Then again both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found as a fact that the bus was running quite fast immediately before the accident. Considering that the tire which exploded was not new petitioner describes it as hindi masyadong kalbo, or not so very worn out the plea of caso fortuito cannot be entertained. The second issue raised by petitioner is already a settled one. In this jurisdiction moral damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier, as provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code. These articles have been applied by this Court in a number of cases, among them Necesito, etc. vs. Paras, et al., L-10605-06, June 30, 1958; Mercado vs. Lira, L-13328-29, Sept. 29, 1961; Villa-Rey Transit vs. Bello, L-18957, April 23, 1963. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against petitioners. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

REPUBLIC VS. LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION 21 SCRA 279 FACTS: In the early afternoon of August 17, 1960, barge L1892, owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation was being towed down the Pasig River by two tugboats when the barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan bailey bridge, smashing the posts and causing the bridge to list. The river, at the time, was swollen and the current swift, on account of the heavy downpour in Manila and the surrounding provinces on August 15 and 16, 1960. The Republic of the Philippines sued Luzon Stevedoring for actual and consequential damage caused by its employees, amounting to P200,000. Defendant Corporation disclaimed liability on the grounds that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees that the damages to the bridge were caused by force majeure, that plaintiff has no capacity to sue, and that the Nagtahan bailey bridge is an obstruction to navigation. After due trial, the court rendered judgment on June 11, 1963, holding the defendant liable for the damage caused by its employees and ordering it to pay plaintiff the actual cost of the repair of the Nagtahan bailey bridge which amounted to P192,561.72, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint. ISSUE: Was the collision of appellant's barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge caused by fortuitous event or force majeure? RULING: Yes. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary object and uncontrovertedly provided with adequate openings for the passage of water craft, including barges like of appellant's, it was undeniable that the unusual event that the barge, exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. For in the ordinary course of events, such a thing will not happen if proper care is used. In Anglo American

Jurisprudence, the inference arises by what is known as the "res ipsa loquitur" rule The appellant strongly stressed the precautions taken by it on the day in question: that it assigned two of its most powerful tugboats to tow down river its barge L1892; that it assigned to the task the more competent and experienced among its patrons, had the towlines, engines and equipment double-checked and inspected' that it instructed its patrons to take extra precautions; and concludes that it had done all it was called to do, and that the accident, therefore, should be held due to force majeure or fortuitous event. These very precautions, however, completely destroyed the appellant's defense. For caso fortuito or force majeure (which in law are identical in so far as they exempt an obligor from liability) by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, "events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable" (Art. 1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It was, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as was commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening was not impossibility to foresee the same. The very measures adopted by appellant prove that the possibility of danger was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was not caso fortuito.