A Theory of Escalation and International Conflict Author(s): Lisa J.

Carlson Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Sep., 1995), pp. 511-534 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/174579 . Accessed: 17/11/2011 12:34
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A Theoryof Escalation and InternationalConflict

LISA J. CARLSON
Universityof Idaho

conflict.However,a greatdeal Escalationprocesses arefoundin manytypes of international on of the theoreticaland empiricalliterature escalationis context specific and concentrateson explaining the outcomes of an escalation process. This approachhas generated numerous of insights; however, our understanding escalation processes, in general, remains partialand incomplete. In this article,the authordevelops a two-sided incomplete informationmodel to identifythekindsof escalationstrategiesstatesarelikely to adoptin conflict.Themodel produces several hypotheses, one of which is tested empiricallyin the context of militarizedinterstate disputes. The hypothesis states that as the disparity between the players' cost tolerances increases,the lower cost tolerantactoris more likely to escalate to the maximumof his or her ability on the first move in the conflict. The resultsof the test confirmthe theory'sexpectations of an inverse relationship betweencost toleranceand an actor'sescalationbehavior.The article concludes by notingimplicationsfor futureresearchon escalationprocesses.

The recent debate within the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization(NATO) formerYugoslaviaprovides over whatstrategyto pursuetowardthe war-torn exampleof thepassionatereactionsevokedby themeresuggestion apoignant of "escalation."The NATO debate exposes a serious problem for both relationsscholarsdedicatedto understanding policymakersandinternational escalationprocesses. Decision makersoften confronta dilemmain tryingto minimize the costs that must be paid to achieve their goal in conflict. Any attemptto analyze the likelihood that a state will prevail in a conflict must thatspecifies the relationshipsamong be guided by a theoreticalframework variablesaffectingescalationdecisions. key The problem of escalation has been widely discussed (Kahn 1965; Schelling 1960, 1966; Holsti 1972; Smoke 1977; Brecher 1994), but until recently there have been few attemptsto develop a generaltheory aimed at
AUTHOR'SNOTE:I thankCliffMorgan, Dacey,andRic Stollfortheirextremelyhelpful Ray commentsandsuggestions.Responsibility any errors for restswiththe author.
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION,Vol. 39 No. 3, September1995 511-534 ? 1995 Sage Publications,Inc.

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JOURNAL CONFLICT OF RESOLUTION

generatingtestable hypotheses of escalation processes. In the absence of empirical testing, it is difficult to assess the comparativeexplanatoryand predictivecapabilitiesof competingescalationmodels. Of those studiesthat have focused on escalationprocesses in general,many are wedded concepcontextsuchas armsraces(Richardtuallyto aparticular typeof international son 1960; Intriligatorand Brito 1984) or deterrencesituations(Brams and to Kilgour 1987, 1988; Zagare 1987, 1992). These studies have contributed remainspartial butourunderstanding ourknowledgeof particular processes, and incomplete. The purposeof this articleis to presenta theoryof escalationprocesses. The model is based on the theoryof games and is used to derive hypotheses identifying the conditions under which states escalate and the level of escalationstatesachieve duringconflict.The model is sufficientlygeneralto supporthypotheses in a variety of contexts in which escalation can occur. and These contextsinclude armsraces, crisis bargaining, deterrence, war.In this article,one of the model's hypothesesis testedempiricallyin the context of militarizedinterstatedisputes(Gochmanand Maoz 1984). More specifically, the hypothesis states that as the disparitybetween the players' cost tolerancesincreases,thereis an increasein the probabilitythat the lower cost tolerant(LCT) actor achieves his or her maximum level of escalationat the outsetof theconflict.Theresultsof the empiricaltest support the theory'sexpectationsand suggest thatfurtherresearchis warranted. The articleis organizedas follows. The firstsectionexaminestheprevious theoretical and empirical efforts to understandescalation processes. The second section develops the model used to identify the levels of escalation states are likely to achieve in conflict. The subsequentsection discusses the researchdesign used to test the hypothesisderivedfrom the model. This is followed by an analysisof the testresults.The final sectioncontainsconcluding remarks. LITERATURE REVIEW Escalationprocesses lie at the heartof manycontextsof stateinteraction. Escalationhas been studiedin connectionwith armsraces (Richardson1960; Intriligatorand Brito 1984), deterrence(Brams and Kilgour 1987; Zagare 1992), and escalation in war (Smoke 1977; Wittman 1979; Pillar 1983). focal pointfor research crises have been anespeciallyimportant International on escalation processes (Schelling 1960, 1966; Holsti 1972; Lebow 1981; Leng 1980, 1993; Siverson and Miller 1993; Brecher 1994). In a crisis situation,not only muststatesdecidewhetherto escalate,butactorsalso must

OF Carlson/ THEORY ESCALATION 513

consider the degree of coercive pressure to direct against an opponent (Lockhart1979). Althoughtherehas been a greatdeal of attentionpaidto the factorsthataffect a state'sdecision to escalateto the highest levels, thereare fewer systematic, theoretical,and empiricalstudies identifyingthe level of escalationstates achieve shortof war. Many of the earliestattemptsto addressthe questionof escalationplaced the bargainingprocess at center stage (Schelling 1960, 1966; Kahn 1965; Young 1968; Snyder 1972; Smoke 1977). According to Schelling (1960, 1966), one of the potentialeffects of escalationis to convince an opponent to back down by exploitinghis or her fear thatfutureescalationwill lead to disaster.Because both actors are engaged in demonstratingtheir superior ability to tolerate these risks, escalation is conceptualizedas a game of competitive risk taking (Schelling 1960; Kahn 1965; Powell 1987, 1988; Maoz 1985, 1990; Geller 1990). Although Kahn (1965) and others have recognized that the rate at which states escalate (impose costs) can have an effect on the bargaining process, few have specified, theoretically, important the conditions under which actors select different levels of escalation to achieve theirends duringthe bargaining process. Some case studies on escalationhave dealtmore directlywith identifying the kinds of escalationstrategiesstates adoptin conflict (Ikle 1971; Smoke 1977; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Pillar 1983; Haig 1984). In general, the discussion revolves aroundwhethera series of small escalation steps (low escalation)or a few decisive escalationmoves (highescalation)is morelikely to produce an opponent's concession. States that use a series of small escalationactionsminimizetheirrelativecosts; however,this optionrunsthe risk of counterescalation failing to isolate the opponent'stolerance for by escalation (Haig 1984; Patchen 1988). On the other hand, some arguethat high escalation offers a better opportunityto surpass the opponent's cost threshold,but the price of that concession may exceed what was necessary to securethe outcome (Bonoma 1975). There is by no means any consistent theoretical agreement on these propositions,however. Synder and Diesing (1977) have arguedthat, under certainconditions,high escalationis more likely to producecounterescalation than it is to producea concession. In addition,it has been arguedthat low, gradualescalation is more likely if states have greaterresources than does anopponent(Brecher1994) andthatlow escalationworksfor statesthat have fewer resources and for whom the issue in dispute is less important (Lockhart1979). Whereaspartof the inconsistencyin findings is due to the fact thatresearchin this areais guidedby differentassumptionsanddifferent one theoreticalframeworks, of the more seriousproblemsis thatfew of these debates are imbeddedwithin a theoreticalframeworkthat rigorouslyspeci-

514

OF JOURNAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

fies how the key variablesinteractand what conditionslead states to select among the variouslevels of escalation. Theredoes exist fairlywidespreadagreement actors'relativemilitary that and the value they attachto the issue at stake aretwo of the key capabilities variables affecting the decision to escalate (Leng and Gochman 1982; Gochmanand Maoz 1984; Siverson and Miller 1993). Militarycapabilities areclearlyimportant becausethey functionas theprimary meansof imposing costs on an opponentduringa crisis. Despite persistenttheoreticaldisagreements (Brecher 1994), there is a consistent body of empirical evidence indicatingthat states of relativelyequal power are more likely to go to war with one anotherthan are states with disparatecapabilities(Bremer 1992). There is also empiricalevidence suggesting that actorswho place a greater value on the issue in disputearemore willing to escalateto the highest levels to achieve a demand (Gochman and Leng 1983; Maoz 1983; Wilkenfeld 1991; Brecher 1994). These studies have been concernedprimarilywith explainingthe conditions under which states escalate to the extreme (i.e., war). How these variables interact at levels short of war to affect a state's choice over Recentattempts understand escalationstrategiesremainsunclear. to bargaining and/orescalationprocesses with formalmodels have begun to shed light on why weakeror unresolvedactorsdo not always capitulateimmediatelyto the strongerside's demands (Powell 1987; Morrow 1989; Lalman 1990; Zagare1992). Undercertainconditions,a strongeractorcan misperceivehis or her bargaining position and give in, or an unresolvedactorcan achieve his or her demandby bluffing a willingness to bearthe risks of escalation. Even though this literaturedoes not explicitly identify the theoretical and interactionbetween capabilities/values a state'sdecision to use a low or high escalation strategy short of war, it is clear that a player's optimal escalationstrategyis conditionedby his or her perceptionsof the opponent's the capabilitiesand value over the issue at stake.Moreover,by manipulating can attemptto send an opponenta signal regarding rate of escalation,a state the willingness to bearescalationcosts. and however,thereexists a largegapin ourtheoretical empirical Presently, treatmentsof escalation. Formalmodels of escalationprocesses have proover an opponent'swillingduced a greatdeal of insighton how uncertainty ness to bearcosts andthe evaluationof a demandaffectsescalationdecisions. Although there exists a general consensus on some of the key variables affecting states' escalation behavior in both the theoreticaland empirical thereis also a noticablelack of agreementon how these variables literature, interact to produce low- or high-escalation strategies short of war. The

Carlson THEORYOF ESCALATION 515

remainderof this article seeks to fill the gap between the theoreticaland empiricalresearchon this facet of escalation. A THEORY OF ESCALATION Escalation is conceptualized as a tool states use during bargaining (Schelling 1960, 1966;Kahn1965; Young1968; Snyder1972). The bargaining process is initiatedby one or both actorsto reconciletheirpositions over some issue in dispute. Actors begin the bargainingprocess by articulating their proposals for a negotiated solution, which can be either accepted or rejectedby the opposingplayer.If one side acceptsthe termsfor agreement, then actorsreceive the benefit they associatewith the proposedoutcome. If an offer is rejected,then the bargaining process continuesand neitherplayer receives any benefits until one of the sides concedes to a demand.l The problemfacing both actorsis to provide the opponentwith an incentive to make concessions. Actors can create that incentive by making it costly for the opponent to persist in rejecting demands (Cross 1969; Pillar 1983; Morgan 1990, 1994). Escalationis one way thatactorscan make bargaining costly. Escalationimposes costs on bothactors.For instance,the escalatingstate suffers the costs associated with expending resources and risking lives, whereasthe receiving state suffersthe costs of rebuildingindustrialcenters and the like. The benefit of a negotiatedoutcome decreasesfor both actors when one of them decides to escalate.As the costs associatedwith disagreement (or the value of a settlement)increase,players aremore likely to give in to their opponent'sdemand.An actor concedes if the costs of enduring furtherescalation will outweigh the benefits of giving in to the opponent. Thus, as Schelling (1966) points out, escalation is the coercive side of bargainingin which the fear of even greatercost impositionmotivatesstates to concede. The maximum escalation costs that a player will endure to achieve a to demandis referred as a player'scost tolerance.I assumethatthe pricethat an actor is willing to pay to play depends on how an actor evaluates the
of offeredhere differsfrommanyeconomic models of 1. The conceptualization bargaining as the bargaining (1982) conceives bargaining a problemover process.Forexample,Rubenstein how to divide a pie between two players. Players bargainuntil an offer is accepted by one side. In my conceptualizationof the bargainingprocess, the players are not concerned with distributingthe gains from a pie. First, players may or may not agree on the size of the pie. behavioris aimed at convincingthe opponentto concede to an Second, the players'bargaining entiredemand.

516

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importanceof the issue at stake.A playerwho considersthe issue at staketo be of greatersalience thansome otherissue thatmightariseshouldbe willing to pay greatercosts to securethe opponent'sconcession.Conversely,a player will tolerate fewer costs to achieve a demand when the issue at stake is Thusa playerwill continueto bargainonly deemedrelativelyless important. if he or she believes that the opponent'scost toleranceis lower than his or her own. To illustratethis idea, considera situationin which bothplayersknow the opponent'scost tolerance(players always know their own cost tolerance). The LCTplayer The predictionis thatthe LCTplayerconcedesimmediately. knows he or she will lose eventually to the higher cost tolerant (HCT) opponent.Thusthe formerconcedes immediatelyto avoidpaying escalation costs. It follows that escalationis possible only when players are uncertain aboutkey aspectsof theirstrategicenvironment (Wagner1982;Powell 1987, Lalman1990). Forexample,if PresidentLyndonJohnsonwould have 1989; known the outcome of the Vietnam War, he would not have escalated Americaninvolvementbeginningin 1964. underconditionsof incompleteinformation An actorescalatesbargaining to projectthe image thathe or she has a highercost tolerancethan does the opponent. The problem a player confronts is to determine whether the observed escalation behaviorprovides an accuratereflection of the oppoconclunent's truecost tolerance.A player's abilityto drawthe appropriate sion is complicatedby the fact that players of varying cost tolerances are motivatedto escalate at differentlevels dependingon theirbeliefs aboutthe adversary. All players are motivatedto minimize the costs necessary to achieve a mix demand.These costs can varydependingon theparticular of cost tolerant actorsengagedin a dispute.HCT actorsmay have an incentiveto escalateat lower levels early on in the conflict. If the opponentbacks down, the HCT actor obtains a greater net benefit than what would have resulted from escalating at higher levels. On the other hand, if the opponent refuses to concede, HCT players are willing to pay additionalescalationcosts during the next round(Ikle 1971;Patchen1988). LCTplayerscan also play thattype of escalation game, especially if they perceive that their competitoris also LCT.However,if the opponentis perceivedto be HCT,then a long series of escalationmoves might not convince the opponentto give in. In graduated escalating at higher levels from the outset of the conflict might particular, lead an opponent to believe that the escalating player has a higher cost tolerancethan is actuallythe case. Thus there is some chance that an LCT actor can achieve a demand by manipulatingthe costs of escalation. The

OF Carlson/ THEORY ESCALATION 517

question for the LCT player is, Which level of escalationmaximizes his or her expected utility? To analyze this question, a two-sided incomplete informationmodel is developed.Therearetwo actors,statesi andj. Eachplayerhas the choice of differin termsof the costs generated escalatinglow or high.2The alternatives by an actorfor carryingoutthataction(e.g., a higherlevel of escalationequals higher cost imposition). I assume that players are able to discern the cost differentialassociated with each escalationoption. Thus players can determine the choice made by the opponent.I assume thatnatureselects player i to move first and last in the game. Playerj has a single choice of escalating low or high.3 The key featureof the model is thati andj can be one of two types: LCT I or HCT.4 assumethatLCTactorswill withstandone high-escalationaction, takenby eitheractor,to achieve a demand.If high escalationfails to convince the opponentto backdown,thenLCTplayerswouldrather give in thansuffer additionalcosts over an issue deemed less importantthan some otherissue that might be contested. On the other hand, HCT actors will endure two high-escalationactionsto achieve a demand.The willingness of each type to suffer differentcosts is modeled by distinct preferenceorderingsover the outcomes. I returnto this point in the following section. of Both playersknow theirown type but areuncertain the opponent'strue type. Player i (j) knows only the distributionof types in the populationof possible j (i) players and the preferenceorderingassociatedwith eachj (i) type. These distributionsserve as the players' prior probabilitiesthat the type. Playeri's escalationdecision on the first move opponentis a particular additionalinformationthatj uses to revise his or her serves as an input or prior estimatesof i's type. I assume thatj uses Bayesian updatingto revise his or her priorbeliefs regardingi's cost tolerance.Playerj uses his or her updatedbeliefs abouti's type to determinewhetherhe or she should escalate low or high. Playeri has the finalmove, andeach i type selects the alternative thatproducesthe outcomewith the greaterexpectedutility.
2. A more realistic assumptionis that the level of escalationis continuous.Allowing the players to choose between two escalation options provides an extremely useful first cut for identifyingthe conditionsunderwhich the playersescalateto one of two clearly definedlevels. 3. The model could includeanothermove for playerj. In fact, the game could be extended indefinitely.However, the gain in descriptiveaccuracyis bought at the price of reducingthe outcomeafterincluding to the analyticrigorof the model.The calculation determine equilibrium an additionalmove would be identicalto the previous calculationwithoutthe extra play. The model produces a rich set of hypotheses whose expectationsdo not change substantiallyby includingadditionalmoves. of would involve a continuum playertypes. The LCT 4. Again, a morerealisticassumption in and HCTtype dichotomyis a useful approach the initialanalysis.Futureresearchextendsthe model by relaxingthis assumption.

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THE MODEL The two-sided incompleteinformationgame is representedin extensive form in Figures la and lb. I begin by presentinga set of assumptionsand thendiscusshow themodelis usedto identifythe escalationstrategiesplayers adoptin equilibrium. Prior to the game, natureassigns a cost tolerancetype to each player. one move to achieve Recall thatan LCTactorwill withstand high-escalation a demand, whereas an HCT actor will toleratetwo high-escalationmoves. Thus LCT and HCT types are distinguishedon the basis of theirpreference orderingsover the outcomes.An LCT i prefersgi > hi > di >f > bi> ci > ei > ai. An HCTi prefersgi > ci > ei> hi> ai >f > bi > ci.5Natureinformsplayers Eachplayer of theirtype, andeachplayer'styperemainsprivateinformation. knows the probabilitythat his or her opponentis an LCT or HCT type. In by Figures la and lb, LCT i andj types arerepresented p and s, respectively. HCT i andj types aredenoted 1 -p and 1 - s, respectively.Because thereare only two player types, p + (1 -p) = 1.0 and s + (1 - s) = 1.0. The limiting case occurs when p (s) assumes a value of 0 or 1. In either or both of these circumstances, (i) knows the opponent'scost tolerance.For the remainder j of the discussion,I assumethat0 <p and s < 1. Theplayersmove sequentiallyandchoose betweenescalatinglow orhigh. The combinationof the players'threechoices and the differentmixes of cost tolerantactorsproduces32 outcomesin the game,only 16 of which can occur generigiven i's type. The players'payoffs for each outcomearerepresented cally by letters, and the payoffs are common knowledge. To clarify the discussion, considerthe case in Figure la where an LCT i has observedtwo high-escalationmoves. Because LCT players are willing to suffer only one high-escalationmove, i escalates low on his or her final move and receives the payoff ,i. (Player i knowsj is HCT after observing two high-escalation moves.) Given the same sequenceof moves, an HCTi will escalate high and receive the payoff ki. Playeri's decision to escalatelow or high on his or herfinal move implies thati does not concede toj's demand.To put closureon the model, I assume thatescalatinglow on the last move is equivalentto zero cost imposition(i.e.,
5. Given these preferenceorderings,an LCT i will have greaterexpected utility for the outcomes associated with escalating low on his or her final move, except when both i andj escalate low on theirfirstmove. In this case, i escalates high (j concedes) and i receives payoff gi. The payoffs a throughh andk, m, n, r, t, v, andy indicatethat i is playingagainstan LCT or HCTj, respectively.I assume that i's expected utility for ki = ai, for mi = bi, for ni = ci, and so f on. Thusi's expectedutility does not change because ofj's type. An LCTJ prefers > hj > dj > gj > bj> ej > cj > aj. An HCTj prefersfj> bj > hj > dj > gj > ej > cj > aj.

* high /

(ai, aj)

h high J.--T*-i]^ -o_ hi hieh (fw fi)-i *ihJ, i j\ 1 ' hi i ^^ y ^ i ' low i l - ,' gj) ,Iw h/ * * ow E (ghi j * ( x(ki,hkj) *l~ -o---/ * .. -k) nk \\ \(high (niki high t, di. / ' d,j) (ei,ej) (eiee/ lw lo

hieh

*'lw.?

'

' \ __ ~i \. j
high

i >/

kj)" . /* (ki' ^o lo i Z
high

*(

^ J' f; (rijrj) 's-(' ^ Y (s;, i(, j)

! ',,,

(~~) i

/,o

w
I high.-

low\ w*

lb

n (hi

--

(h

ij)

Cost Tolerant Cost TolerantjjCost

Tole Cost Toler

520

OF RESOLUTION JOURNAL CONFLICT

i concedes toj's demand).This assumptionholds only for i's final move. If i escalateshigh on the last move, thenI assumethatj concedes to i's demand. Finally, if the players escalate high (or low) at each decision node, then I assume that natureends the game by imposing a solution that lies midway between the players'demands. Player i begins the game knowing thatj is LCT with probabilitys and HCTwith probability1 - s. Becauseneitherescalationoptiongives i a certain payoff, i mustconsidera set of gamblesin whichone of n outcomescan occur. I assume that i's preferencesamong these gambles are representedby von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions and that i chooses the level of escalationthat maximizes his or her expected utility.I also assume that i is risk neutral.6 I arguedpreviously that neitherplayer type has a dominantstrategy to escalate low or high. Because bothj types play low or high escalationwith i's some positive probability, best responsetoj's strategyis to play a mixed strategy.The mixed strategytells i to play high escalationwith probabilityx and low escalationwith probability1 - x. Player i uses j's payoffs to calculate the mixed strategy that makes j indifferent between his or her two strategy choices. Player i knows the ofj's preferenceorderingassociatedwith eachj type, but i remainsuncertain true type. Thus i calculatestwo mixed strategies:one used against LCTjs (escalate high with probabilityx' and escalate low with probability1 - x') and anothermixed strategyused againstHCTjs (escalate high with x" and escalate low with 1 - x"). However, i cannot play either mixed strategy with a 1.0 probability because j's true type remains private information. Player i randomizes between the two mixed strategiesusing the probabilitiesthatj is an LCT or HCTtype. This overallmixed strategytells i to escalatehigh withprobability x andescalatelow withprobability1 -x. This strategymaximizesi's expected utility by makingboth an LCT and an HCTj indifferentbetween escalating low or high. The strategiesthat players adopt in equilibriumare identified using the is perfectBayesiansolutionconcept.This equilibrium a strategycombination and a set of beliefs thatsatisfies two conditions.First,at each decision node of in the game, the strategiesfor the remainder the game areNash given the beliefs andstrategiesof the otherplayers.Second, the players'beliefs at each that set information arerationalgiven the evidence appearing farin the game i's equilibriumstrategyspecifies that i play a (Rasmusen1989, 110). Player mixed strategythatmakes bothj types indifferentbetweenescalatinglow or
6. The assumptionsmade aboutplayeri also pertainto playerj.

Carlson THEORY ESCALATION521 OF /

high. An LCT i determines his or her mixed strategy according to the following: + ps*[(x)*(b) (1 - x)*()] + p(l -s)*[(x)*(l) + (1 -x)*(y)] = + + ps*[(x)*(e) (1 - x)*(g)]+ p(l - s)*[(x)*(n) (1 - x)*(t)]. Isolatingx, the probabilitythat an LCT i escalates high, producesequation
1.1:7 p[(s*(g - t -f+ y) + (t - y)]

p*[(s*(b-f-

+ y - e + g + n - t) + (l - y - n + t)]

In equation 1.1, the dependentvariable,x, is the probabilitythat an LCT side variablesarelocatedon the right-hand i escalateshigh. The independent of the equation.The variablesreflectj's payoffs for differentoutcomesin the game and both players'priorestimatesof the opponent'stype. By manipulating the values of the independentvariables, equation 1.1 produces a plethoraof hypothesesidentifyingdifferentconditionsunderwhich an LCT i escalateslow or high. Additionalhypothesescan also be generated using an mixed strategyfor an HCTi. A sampleof equationreflectingthe equilibrium the hypotheses derived from equation 1.1 are listed here. Several of the become rather hypothesesappearintuitive;however,these interrelationships complex once they are operationalized. that 1: s, high likelyto escalate when theprobability Hypothesis AnLCTi is more decreases. j is LCT, between 2: highas thedifference Hypothesis An LCTi is morelikelyto escalate and thevalueof winning losingtoj increases. 3: highas theexpected utilityof Hypothesis An LCTi is morelikelyto escalate decreases. LCTorHCTjactors low foreither escalating The first hypothesis is tested empiricallyand then is discussed shortly. First,I expose the logic behindthe second hypothesisand then elaborateon j's rolein the game.The secondhypothesisis derivedby increasingj'spayoffs variablesconstantin equation for eitherbj,dj,orfjwhile holdingtheremaining 1.1. The same hypothesiscan be obtained'by decreasingj's payoffs for cj, ej, or gj while holding all other variables constant. The second hypothesis identifiesthe conditionsunderwhich an LCT i perceivesj to be HCT.Player i's perceptionmay be a functionof the issue at stakesuch asj's effortto build a state (e.g., Serbia). Because j will tolerate a great deal of cost before
derivationof this equation. 7. See AppendixA for the mathematical

522

JOURNAL CONFLICT OF RESOLUTION

conceding to i's demand, i can maximize his or her expected utility by concealinghis or herLCTtype andescalatinghigh at the onset of the dispute. to Playerj, who moves second in the game, has the opportunity observe i's escalationand to revise his or herpriorbeliefs concerningi's type. Player First,j knows the priorprobabilitythat i is j has two pieces of information. an LCT or HCT type. Second,j is awarethat neitheri type has a dominant strategy to escalate low or high. Assume thatj observes high escalation. that Playerj uses Bayes's ruleto calculatetheposteriorprobability the player escalatinghigh is also LCT: P(ple)*(p)
P(ple)*(p) + P[(1 - p)le]*(l -p)

wherep = the priorprobabilitythat i is LCT, (1 -p) = the priorprobability that i is HCT,P(ple) = the probabilitythatan LCT i escalateshigh, and P[(1 that -p)le] = the probability an HCT i escalateshigh. Playerj uses his or her revised estimatesof i's type to assess whetherthe outcomes associatedwith low or high escalationprovidej with greaterexpectedutility.
P(ple)*p + P[(1 - p)le]*( - p)

P(ple)*()

*(bj)+ -

P(pe)*(p)
P(ple)*p + P[(1 - p)le]*(1 - p)

1 (kj)=

P(pe)*(p) *(dj) + P(ple)*p + P[(1 - p)le]*(1 - p)

P(ple)*(p) *(j) P(ple)*p + P[(1 - p)le]*(1 - p)

wherep = priorprobabilitythat i is LCT, (1 - p) = priorprobabilitythat i is HCT, P(plx) = probabilitythat an LCT i escalates high (call this w), P[(1 p)ly] = probabilitythatan HCTescalateshigh (call this z), bj= the value toj of i's concession minus two high-escalationcosts (i is LCT), kj= the value toj of the nature'simposedcompromiseminus threehigh-escalationcosts (i is HCT),dj= the value toj of concedingto i minus one high-escalationcost, and mj= the value toj of concedingto i minus two high-escalationcosts. Isolatingw,8 w=
(m -k) m-k)(1.2) p*(b - k- d + m)'

The termw reflectsj's updatedprobabilitythatthe playerescalatinghigh is LCT; 1 - w is the updatedprobabilitythat the player escalating high is HCT. Equation 1.2 also producesa rich set of hypotheses that identify the
derivationof this equation. 8. See AppendixB for the mathematical

OF Carlson/ THEORY ESCALATION 523

conditions underwhichj types escalatelow or high. One of the hypotheses states thatas the value of w increases(i is more likely to be LCT), an HCTj is more likely to escalatelow. The theorystatesthatHCTjs are in a stronger position to secure the opponent'sconcession more cheaply than are LCT actors.If low escalationfails to convincei to concede,thenHCTjs arewilling to escalateto higherlevels. This completes a descriptionof the game. The first hypothesis derived fromequation1.1 is discussedandthenis testedempiricallyin the subsequent section. This hypothesis states that an LCT i is more likely to escalate high when s, the probabilitythatj is LCT,decreases. The hypothesisleads to the expectationthatLCT types aremore likely to escalate high as the disparitybetweenthe players'cost tolerancesincreases. The intuitionbehindthis hypothesisis illustratedby the Japaneseattackon Pearl Harborin 1941. The Japanesehigh command calculated that their militaryhad, at best, 4 to 5 months to solidify gains in South Asia and the Pacific before resources would be exhausted. To accomplish this goal, the U.S. Navy had to be renderedincapable of interferingwith the Japanese mission. The one thing of which the Japanesewere fairly certainwas that America's greaterresourceswould preventthe Japanesefrom prevailingin The a warof attrition. Japanesewere willing to gamblethatas a resultof their escalatinghigh fromthe outset,the UnitedStateswould come to termsrather than continuethe escalationgame. Statedmore generally,LCT actorsareless likely to obtainan opponent's concession by playing a game of low escalation. Thus LCT actors must behave as if they were HCT.One way to accomplishthis is by demonstrating a willingness to suffer higher escalationcosts early on in the game. If high fails to convincej to concede,thenLCTactorsarelikely to give in. escalation OPERATIONALHYPOTHESIS The dependentvariableof the hypothesis is the probabilitythat the first escalation action taken by the LCT actor will also be the highest level of the escalationthatactorwill achieve in the dispute.Operationalizing dependent variablerequirescomparingthe level of escalationassociatedwith two actions. A criterionis establishedto determinewhethera subsequentaction was takenat the same, a lower, or a higherlevel of escalationrelativeto the of to firstactionin the dispute.Therehavebeen a number attempts categorize differentescalationactions(BlechmanandKaplan1978;GochmanandMaoz 1984). These efforts guide the discussionhere. I assume that differentescalationactions can be distinguishedfrom one

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anotherin terms of the costs borne by an actor for carryingout an action. Certaingroupsof escalationtactics are consideredmore or less costly than costs thata playermustpay to execute the action. othersbasedon the current the lowest point on the escalationcontinuumis representedby no Clearly, action or zero cost imposition.An actor who fails to escalate is effectively choosing to withdrawfrom the escalation game. The second least costly optionis a threatto use force. An actorexperiencesrelativelyfew immediate costs in proclaiming that he or she will engage in some future coercive actorwill be paid at behavior.Many of the costs sufferedby the threatening a later date eitherbecause the threatwas actuallycarriedout or because the costs for failing to follow throughon a previousthreat actorincursreputation of escalation.A show of force is an implicitthreatto use force. Yet a show or display of force is considereda higherescalationlevel thanis a threatgiven thatthereareimmediatecosts associatedwithmobilizingtroopsandthe like. A use of force is considered the next highest level of escalation. These force (and their attenescalation tactics subsumethe acts of demonstrating costs by directlyengagingthe opponent's dantcosts) andgenerateadditional resourcesin hostile actions.Finally,the maximumlevel of escalationis war. The independentvariableof the hypothesis is the relative value of the players'cost tolerances.Recall thatcost toleranceis definedas the maximum costs an actoris willing to sufferto securesome value in conflict. Achieving betweenthe conceptualand operationalmeanings a perfectcorrespondence how an actorevaluatedan issue of cost tolerancewould requiredetermining in a dispute for all disputesincludedin the analysis.The limitationsassociated with this exercise are ratherserious; however, by stressing a state's ability to impose escalationcosts, it is possible to achieve a fairlyreasonable surrogatefor cost tolerance. Military capabilitiesare among the most importanttools states have to and imposecosts on theiradversary (Organski Kugler1980;SmallandSinger 1982). All otherthingsbeing equal,an increasein a player'srelativemilitary capabilitiesshould also be associatedwith an increase in thatplayer's cost tolerance.As Rosen (1972) notes, the per-unitcost of using force decreases as a player's military capabilities increase. In addition, the ability of a relatively strongeractor to replenish expended resources more efficiently also suggests thatcost per unitof force is decliningdue to economies of scale (Cannizzo 1980). It is also reasonableto suspect that states that are willing to consume the costs associatedwith developing strongermilitarycapabilities arelikely to be heavily involved in the issues of the international system and may feel that they have a stake in preservingthe status quo (Organski 1968). The argumentsuggests thatthereis an associationbetweencost tolerance

Carlson/THEORYOF ESCALATION 525

and militarycapabilities.Clearly,these variablesdo not overlapcompletely; of however, militarycapabilitiesserve as a reasonableapproximation cost tolerance. The operationalhypothesis leads to the expectation that as the disparityin the actors'militarycapabilitiesincreases,the probabilitythatthe weaker actor escalates to a higher level subsequentto the first escalation action decreases.In the following section, the researchdesign is presented, followed by an analysisof the resultsof the empiricaltest. RESEARCH DESIGN The hypothesis is tested in the context of militarizedinterstatedisputes (MIDs) (Gochmanand Maoz 1984). MIDs aredefined as a to or threats use military between amongstatesinvolving set of interactions force.Tobeincluded, forceoractual of military uses of force,displays military sanctioned. non-accidental government and be theseactsmust explicit, overt, (p. 587) The natureof MID crises means that there is an increase in the probability that one or both of the players will resortto the use of force to resolve the MIDs provide a rich context for analyzingthe theoconflict. Consequently, reticalexpectationsof the model. test of the theory requires that the dependent variable An appropriate levels of escalation. The militarized interstate incident capture different dispute data set (Gochmanand Maoz 1984) identifies the kinds of actions and the numberof incidents(actions)takenby each actorin a dispute. State in actions arerepresented the incidentdataset by a variablecalled a military confrontationaction (MCA). Thereare 14 differentMCAs that are grouped into four escalation categories:threatsof force, displays of force, uses of force, andwar.Accordingto the argument presentedearlier,the highestlevel of escalationis war,followed by a use of force, a displayof force, anda threat to use force.9 The dependentvariableis the escalationbehaviorof the LCT actor.The expectationis that the LCT actor will achieve his or her highest escalation level of the entiredisputeon his or her firstmove. Thusthe LCT actor'sfirst escalationlevel) must be comparedto the escalaaction (and its appropriate tion level of any subsequentactionin the dispute.A dichotomousdependent variablewas createdto identifycases in which an LCT actorescalatedat the same or to a higherlevel. The dependentvariablewas scored 1 if the firstand
in 9. The "no action or no escalation"categoryis not represented the data set. Therefore, the lowest level of escalationactionis a threatto use force.

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the highest actions in the disputerepresented same level of escalationor 0 if the LCT actorescalatedto a higherlevel. in The independent variable,cost tolerance,was operationalized terms of The capabilitiesdatawere obtainedfromthe Correlates militarycapabilities. of War (COW) data set (Small and Singer 1982). Military capabilities are measuredusing six differentindicators:militaryexpenditures,militarypersonnel, iron/steel production, energy consumption, total population, and urbanpopulation.These indicatorsare combined in the COW data set to create an index reflectinga state's percentageof the total capabilitiesin the world for each year.Fromthis index, I createda variablereflectingthe ratio of military capabilities of the actors per dispute. The stronger state is and The representedin the numerator the weakerstate in the denominator. ratio can vary from 1 (the actors' capabilities are equal) to any positive number. Because the hypothesis refers to dyadic disputes, any cases in which nationsjoined an ongoing dyadic dispute were excluded from the analysis. In addition,all minor-minor disputeshadto be excludedforlack of data.With these exclusions, the test was performedon 119 cases. The cases included the years from 1816 to 1976. Before proceedingwith the dataanalysis, it is importantto stress that the hypothesis is tested at the monadic level of analysis. The hypothesisrefersexclusively to the escalationbehaviorof the LCT (militarilyweaker)actor.The resultsof the empiricaltest arepresented in the following section. DATAANALYSIS The hypothesis was tested using logit. There are 39 cases in which the weaker side escalated to a higher level and 80 cases in which the first and highest levels of escalationwere the same. The estimatedequationincludes a control variable that identifies the first level of escalation taken by the variable weakerside in the dispute.The controlvariableis not an explanatory becausethe theorydoes not predictthe initiallevel of escalation.The theory does state that, given the first action (whateverthat action might be), the weaker nation is less likely to escalate to higher levels in the dispute. Excludingthis variablecould potentiallybias the findingsin favor of rejecting the null hypothesis. The reason is that states are constrained from escalating to higher levels dependingon the initial level of escalation. For instance,a state thatuses force from the outset can achieve a higherlevel of escalationonly by going to war,whereasa statethatstartsthe disputewith a

Carlson/THEORYOF ESCALATION 527

threatto use force can escalate to three higher levels. The test results are presentedin Table 1. The test results areconsistentwith the expectationof an inverserelationThis finding shipbetweencost toleranceandLCTactors'escalationbehavior. in lieu of the fact that there is a likely selection is particularly encouraging bias in the test cases. The selectionbias is a resultof the imperfectcorrespondence betweencost toleranceandits surrogate measure,militarycapabilities. The bias is againstthose cases in which less capable actors were excluded from the dataset becausethey did not place sufficientvalue on theirdemand to reach the crisis stage. Therefore,the less capableactorsthat are included in the analysis are likely to have higher cost tolerances relative to their This excluded,less capablecounterparts. selectionbiasprovidesfor a tougher test of the theory by making it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis. With this in mind, the test results indicate clearly that an increase in the disparitybetween the players'cost tolerancesis associatedwith a decrease in the probabilitythat LCT actorsescalate to higher levels. I also expected that the relationship between the variables would be modest given the associationbetweenmilitarycapabilitiesandcost tolerance.This relationship is also confirmedby the test results. The naive model, which simply predictsthe outcomebased on the modal By category,predicts67%of the cases correctly. comparison,the logit model reducesthe frequencyof incorrect by predictions 12%.The reductionin error of may appearmodest, but note thatthe distribution cases on the dependent variableallows the naive model to performquite well in the absence of any informationon the actors'relativecost tolerances.The explanatoryvariable must be able to discriminatestrongly between the cases to generate any in substantialimprovement the frequencyof accuratepredictions.The military capabilitiesvariableis distinguishingbetween the cases; however, for the reasons alreadymentioned,the effect of this variableis not particularly noting how differentvalues for the strong.This conclusion is corroborated of relativecapabilitiesvariableaffectthe probability observingweakeractors escalatingto higherlevels. Relativeto conditionsof roughmilitaryequality,actorswho are 100 times weakerthanthe opponentare 13%less likely to escalateto higherlevels. The parityto gross power differentials largechangein moving from approximate in the probabilitythat weaker actors fail to produces a fairly small change of achieve higher escalationlevels. The interpretation the logit coefficients confirms the expectationthat the capabilitiesvariablehas difficulty in discriminatingstronglybetweenthe cases. Contingencytablesareuseful diagnostictools for identifyingthe percent-

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TABLE 1

Logit Estimatesfor WeakerState'sEscalationBehavior (N = 119)

Variable Intercept Ratio First escalatingaction Coefficient 4.5139 (1.03) -.006 (.004) -1.63* (.333) AProbability

.01

NOTE: Numbers in parenthesesare standarderrorsof the estimates. Percentagespredicted correctly:null = 67%, logit = 78%. *p <.0001.

age of cases that fall within the predictedcategories. With this analysis, differentlevels of cost toleranceare comparedto the escalationbehaviorof weaker actors within each category.The contingency table is presentedin Table2. The columns representfour differentlevels of relativemilitarycapabilities. The values in each column were obtainedusing the interquartile range. The rows reflect the escalation behavior of LCT actors. No escalation representscases in which LCT actorsdid not escalate to higher levels. The second and thirdrows are cases in which LCT actors escalatedone or two levels higher, respectively.The expectationis that the percentageof cases falling within the no-escalationrow will decreasemoving left to rightacross the capabilitiescolumns. Similarly,I expect thattherewill be an increasein the numberof cases in the second and thirdrows, moving left to right. In the no-escalationrow, weakeractors,who were roughlyequal to twice as weak as theiropponent,failed to escalateto higherlevels 72%of the time. The first increase in the numberof no-escalationcases above 72% occurs when LCT actorsareroughly60 times weaker.I expectedthatthe numberof cases would increase consistently across all of the power categories. This expectationholds for slight and huge inequitiesin militarycapabilities.An examinationof cases in which weaker actors escalated one or two levels The higherreveals a similarpattern. percentageof cases in the fourthcolumn decreasesrelative to thatof the first column for both escalationlevels. This is also truefor cases in which weakeractorsescalate two levels higher and were 2 to 12 times weakerthanthe opponent. As mentionedpreviously,I assume thatthereis an association,although

Carlson/ THEORY ESCALATION 529 OF

TABLE2

Level of EscalationAchieved by the WeakerStatein a MilitarizedInterstate Dispute

Power Ratioa Ratio < 2.44 (N = 29) Escalationlevel No escalation One level higher Two levels higher Ratio > 2.44 and < 12.03 (N = 30) Ratio> 12.03 and < 59.31. (N = 30) Ratio > 59.31 (N = 30)

21 (72) 4 (14) 4 (14)

19 (63) 8 (27) 3 (10)

15 (50) 10 (33) 5 (17)

25 (83) 3 (10) 2 (7)

NOTE: Percentagesare in parentheses. in stateover weakerstate(e.g., a power a. Powerratio= disparity militarycapabilitiesof stronger ratio of 2 means that strongerstate is twice as strongas the opponent).

not a strong relationship,between military capabilitiesand cost tolerance. The contingency table analysis reveals that the association between the The variablesmay not be consistentacross all levels of power disparities.10 to theory does not identify the factors that may be contributing the uneven results across the set of dispute cases. Furtherinvestigationis requiredto determinethe natureof this relationship. Despite this empirical curiosity, the test results confirm the theory's expectations.It is clear that as the disparityin the players' cost tolerances increases, LCT actors are less likely to escalate to higherlevels relative to their first actions in the dispute.An LCT actoris aware thathis or her cost tolerance will be surpassedbefore that of an HCT adversaryby playing a game of low escalation. To have any chance of winning the opponent's concession, LCT actors must behave as if they are willing to bear greater escalationcosts. One way for LCT actorsto accomplishthis is to escalateto the maximumof theirability at the onset of the dispute.
10. The percentagesof cases fallingwithinall cells in the thirdcolumn(a 12:1 to 60:1 power ratio) are all inverse of the model's theoreticalexpectations.This suggests thatthere may be a systematicpatternto the cases in this category.An analysisof the cases in this columnrevealed that 25% of the cases were drawnfrom WorldWarII. This raises the possibility that the cases are not independentdue to a complex set of alliance patterns.A logit analysis was performed excludingthe WorldWarII cases. The resultswere consistentwith the first empiricaltest.

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CONCLUSION Escalationoccupies a centralplace in many studies of conflict resolution processes. To date, however, there have been few attemptsto develop a general theory of escalationaimed at deriving a set of testable hypotheses thathold acrossdifferentcontexts.One way of improvingourunderstanding of conflict processes and outcomes is to focus our attentionon escalation processes in general and to subject hypotheses to empirical tests across differentcontexts.One of the majorconcernsdominatingthe crisis behavior research has been to identify the conditions under which states escalate. Anotherimportant question,and one thathas received less systematictheois reticalor empiricaltreatment, the level of escalationthatstates are likely to achieve once the decision to escalatehas been made.This articleaddresses thatgap by presentinga generaltheoryof escalationthatproducesa rich set of hypotheses identifying the levels of escalation states will achieve in conflict. One hypothesisleads to the expectationthatas thedisparityin the players' cost tolerancesincreases,the probabilitythatLCT actors escalate to higher levels relativeto the firstdisputeactionsdecreases.An LCTactoris less likely to secureanHCTplayer'sconcessionusing a seriesof low-escalationactions. By escalatingto the maximumfrom the onset of the conflict, an LCT actor a can demonstrate willingness to sufferthe costs of escalation.Thus an LCT actoris motivatedto behave as if he or she has highercost tolerancethanis actuallythe case. The test resultsconfirmthe theory'sexpectations,and this betweenmiliis especially encouraginggiven the imperfectcorrespondence tarycapabilitiesand cost tolerance. This finding is consistent with the conclusions of many formal models seeking to explain why weakeractorsdo not capitulateimmediatelyto their strongeropponent(Morrow 1989; Lalman 1990; Zagare 1992). The theory explainswhy the level of escalationobserveddependson the players'beliefs and abouttheirenvironment theiropponent'swillingness to sufferescalation costs. Frequently,discussions pertainingto states' escalation strategiesassume that some optimal conditionor level of escalationexists independent of the strategiccontext (Ikle 1971; Lockhart1979; Haig 1984). Moreover, the findings indicate clearly that the theory merits further investigation.One of the model's hypotheses was tested in this article,but many other hypotheses could be tested to provide a more comprehensive of pictureof escalationprocesses. However,a morecompleteunderstanding escalationprocesses can be achievedonly when our thinkingis guided by a systematic,rigoroustheory.Escalationcan be too dangerousand costly for society when guided soley by policymakers'intuition.

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APPENDIX A A Lower Cost Tolerant i's Mixed Strategy

1. ps[(x)*(b) + (1 - x)*(]+p(s)[(x)*() +(1 )*(y)] = ps[(x)*(e) + (1 - x)*(g)] + p(l -s)[(x)*(n) + (1 -x)*(t)] 2. ps(bx +f+fx) + (p -ps)(lx + y- yx) = ps(ex + g- gx) + (p- ps)(nx + t - tx) + py - pyx - pslx - psy + psyx 3. psbx + -psf pslx psex + psg -psgx + pnx + pt - ptx- psnx - pst + pstx 4. (psbx-psfx - psx + psyx) + (plx - pyx) + (psf - psy) + py = (psex - psgx - psnx + pstx) + (pnx-ptx) + (psg - pst) + pt 5. (psbx-psfx -pslx + psyx- psex + psgx + psnx-pstx) + (plx-pyx- pnx + pt) = (psg - pst - psf+ psy) + (pt - py) n +t) =ps(g - t-f+y) +p(t - y) 6. psx (b -f- l+y - e+g+nt) +px(l-y- e + g + n- t) + (- y - n + t)] p[(s*(g - t-fy)+(t7. px[(s*(b -f)]

p[(s*(g- t -f + y) + (t - y)]
p[(s*(b -f-

l+y - e + g + n - t)+(l - y - n + t)]

on NOTE: payoffs-b,f, I,y, e, g, n, andt-are dropped. Subscripts playerj's

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JOURNAL CONFLICT OF RESOLUTION

APPENDIX B Revised Estimates of i's Type Playerj's

P(ple)*(p) P(ple)*p + P[(l -p)le]*(l - p)

1*(bj) +

P(ple)*(p)
LP(ple)*p + P[(1 -p)le]*(l

-p)

1*(kj) =

[wp

1 *(p)(b)+

1-wp

+ ()

*(k)=

wp 1 *(d)+l wp + z(l -p)J

wp
[wp + z(l -p)

1*(m)=

wpb + k - wpkl Iwp+z(1 -p) J

wpb + m - wpm1 wp + z(1 -p) J = = = = (wpd + m - wpm)*[(wp + z(1 - p)] wpd + m- wpm (m - k) (m - k)

(wpb + k - wpk)*[(wp+ z(l -p)] 1. dividing both sides by wp + z(1 -p), wpb + k - wpk 2. collecting termsand subtracting, (wpb - wpk- wpd + wpm) 3. takingout common terms, wp (b - k - d + m) 4. dividing by p*(b - k - d + m),

(m- k) *(b p*(b- k - d+ m)

thathigh-escalatingplayeris low cost tolerant(call this w). P[(1 NOTE:P(ple) = probability p)le] = probabilitythat high-escalatingplayer is high cost tolerant(call this z). Subscriptsare droppedafterequation.

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