Chemical Warfare in Colombia - The Costs of Fumigation Hugh OShaughnessy and Sue Branford (2005) Latin America Bureau

- London Despite the social cost, the fumigation is not eradicating coca. As is evident form Table 1, peasant families (for whom coca is the only crop that brings a decent income) have responded to the onslaught by planting more of the illicit drug, aware that they will lose part of their crop...it means that, unless the authorities are prepared to invest ever more heavily in fumigation, it will fail to to permanently reduce coca production. (1-2) Colombia was nit a big coca producer, but imported coca base from neighboring Peru and Bolivia. It then send the nished product to the US and Europe, using speedboats, containers, planes and human carriers known as mules. But in the 1990s the Colombian authorities cracked down on the Cali and Medellin cartels, disrupting the supply lines of coca from the neighboring countries. The new players - the so-called baby cartels preferred not to be dependent on imports but to encourage local production of coca, which was easy to do, as the intensication of the armed conict meant that large ares of the country lay outside the control of the state. As a result, Colombia became of the worlds largest coca-producing nation, cultivating three or four times as much as Peru or Bolivia. Within Colombia, Putumayo became the main producing area. By 1999 it was estimated to have just over 58,000 hectares under coca cultivation out of a total for the country of about 160,000 hectares. (5) With hindsight, it is clear that al the elements were present for a massive expansion of drug trafcking in Colombia. The country was conveniently located for access to the US market via hundreds of Caribbean islands, which meant that it was impossible for the US authorities to control all possible trafcking routes. Trafcking networks were easy to set up, as there was a large group of expatriate Colombians living in the US. There were extensive stretches of remote jungle in Colombia, which made it easy to hide laboratories and landing strips. And, more importantly than all these factors, the countrys turbulent history had created a tradition of political violence and lawlessness. The Colombian state did not control vast areas of the country where violent groups were battling for dominance. It was just the sort of chaotic situation in which drug trafcking gangs, attracted by the huge prots, could expand their activities with impunity. (23) Samper undertook a massive fumigation operation, which did not manage to reduce the overall level of coca production but, in a demonstration of the balloon effect (by which squeezing cultivation in one area increases it in another), displaced some coca from Gauiviare and Caqueta further south to Putumayo. (33) The US and Colombian authorities have repeatedly proclaimed the success of Plan Colombia in its stated objective of reducing the production of drugs (55) It is clear that the reduction in coca cultivation achieved in 2004 will be maintained only if the authorities are prepared to continue heavy fumigation - which is difcult to sustain from a political, social , nancial or environmental point of view (59) Washington has generally gone along with Uribes misleading claim that if Colombia did not have drugs, it would not have terrorists. It is a myth that suits them both, for it enables them to fuse the military and counter-narcotics aspects of Plan Colombia (63)

The real objective of Plan Colombia is to defeat the FARC, to drive peasant and indigenous families off land rich in economic resources, to integrate Colombia within the US empire and to groom the country for a key role in US expansionist plans for South America. Plan Colombia can thus be seen, as one writer has put it, as a program for militarized structural adjustment, that is, the forced imposition of neoliberal policies. (63) Figures from the CIA showed that the area planted with coca in just six of the countrys nature reserves increased by 6,550 hectares in 2004. To some extent, this is the result of Plan Colombia itself, which is leading peasant families to plant coca in more remote areas. (89) As if the glyphosate mix were not doing enough damage, there are now strong indications that Colombia is currently rethinking its earlier decision not to use biological weapons to eradicate coca and opium poppy crops. Fusarium oxysporum is a plant pathogen that causes withering, rot and death to a variety of plants. (89) While the controversy over fumigation raged, rumors circulated about the emergence of a new wonder kind of coca, known variously as supercoca, la millionaria and boliviana negra. This strain it was said, grew much taller than conventional coca, produced leaves with higher cocaine content, and, more most important of all, was resistant to Roundup. Speculation was that a scientist from one of the biotechnology companies had developed a genetically modied strain of coca. IF thus were the case, the GM coca would be exactly like Montsantos GM Roundup Ready soya, in that it would have a special gen introduced into it to make it resistant to glyphosate. The spraying of Roundup would kill all normal crops but not this coca. (93-94) Against this background the actions undertaken by the US government are increasingly being seen by the international community as unreasonable, unscientic and bullying. Many observers are beginning to say that it makes no sense to spray poison over the land of a large South American country, damaging human health and destroying plants, animals and the environment. Although the fumigation may lead to a temporary dip in coca cultivation, it will not permanently disrupt the ow of drug and may actually lead to an increase in the coca production, as peasant families, with their livelihoods destroyed, move onto remote areas and turn to coca and poppies as the only protable crop (121)