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Journal of Historical Studies, 3(2005), 1-14.

APPROACHES OF ERF MARDN AND METN HEPER ON STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY Ali Rza Gngen and afak Erten Attributing a distinctive characteristic to Turkish social-formation and its state is an approach widely used in analysing state-society relations in Turkey. It is emphasised that Turkish society shows significant differences from both Western socialformation and Islamic societies. This emphasis brings about an idea that states the necessities of a distinctive ontology and a related particular epistemological position in Turkish social-formation in both the Ottoman and Republican periods. 1 This paper looks at the approaches of erif Mardin and Metin Heper, whose conceptual frameworks are based deliberately on such an understanding. We will evaluate critically Mardin and Hepers analytical frameworks, which are the centreperiphery dichotomy and the state tradition thesis, the fundamental conceptual tools of these scholars, respectively. Also, the methodologies of these approaches pave the ground for a political project in which the state and civil-society are put in an external and conflictual relationship in which democratic developments and civilsociety as such are identified, as will be discussed below. Before such a discussion, it should be put forward that there are two critical points to be emphasised about these approaches. The first refers to the distinctive characteristics of Turkish social formation that are defined in relation with the development of Western social formations, thus explaining the differences in such a relativist context 2 remains in an orientalist problematic. To illustrate, Mardin argues that civil-society is a Western phenomenon rooted in the autonomy of cities and trade practices in feudal Europe and the contractarian tradition institutionalised in the legal framework of the Stndestaat system. These were unique to Western feudalism and absent in the Ottoman State. 3 These absences resulted in a difference in the social evolution and political culture of Ottoman society. 4 As Turner indicates, Orientalism set out to explain the progressive features of the Occident and the social stationariness of the Orient. 5 Additionally, he states that the central question behind this comparison is the uniqueness of the West in relation to the alleged stagnation of the East and he attempts to account for the absence of capitalism in Oriental societies as a series of social and historical gaps. 6 In that sense, Eastern societies are seen as a deviant case since they were unable to develop the institutions taken as the causes of Western dynamism and democracy. Hence, the East is defined by the absence of such institutions and the alleged lack of development. 7 In the accounts of Mardin 8 and Heper 9 , the explanation of Ottoman-Turkish social formation is the absence of the factors that gave rise to the development of a coherent civil-society in the West. In these accounts, Ottoman society is taken as a deviant case, the particularity of which is to be grasped by looking at it in a somewhat different fashion. Since what is unique is the Ottoman social formation with respect to West, a particular epistemological position is required. In our opinion, the conceptualisation of the Ottoman-Turkish social formation of these authors is related strictly to their conceptualisation of Western development. The historical development of the West is understood within a composite model, 10

Ph.D. student, Department of Public Administration, METU.

Journal of Historical Studies

Approaches of erif Mardin and Metin Heper On State and Civil Society in Turkey 2 which was, in fact, no more than a reflection of a paradigm of capitalist development deeply entrenched in the Western academia, even though it was not necessarily derived from the experience of any specific European country. Nor is it possible to trace the origins of this paradigm to any particular school of thought, since it was rather a composite one. 11 Adapting a composite model (ignoring the society-specific characteristics and different trajectories of the development of state-society relations in the West) appears as a conceptualising tool of Western development in the context of comparing Ottoman state and society relations with Western social formations. As mentioned above, primarily the existence of autonomous cities and their development against the obstructions of feudal bonds, which obstructed trade practices for a long time in European history, is taken as the most critical factor in the modernisation of European countries. 12 Henceforth, along with the Stndestaat system that comprised a contractual relationship between feudal nobles, 13 the development of Western societies was marked by multiple confrontations between state and societal forces and also within society. 14 Such an account implicitly assumes an equation that takes the trade practices and cities, which were centers of trade in the context of Western feudalism, as identical with capitalism. From this point of view, the expansion of trade and the autonomy of the cities brought forth capitalist development in a linear fashion. Thus, not capitalism as such, but the emergence of feudalism is seen as a rupture in the historical process since it merely obscured this linear development of the West. However, the parcellised structure of Western feudalism and alleged autonomy of cities enabled the break down of the bonds of feudality. This linear model takes for granted and naturalises what should be explained: the emergence of capitalism and the related transformation of trade and market in terms of their nature. 15 Also, the role of cities in the rise of capitalism in the West is highly debatable. Instead of generalising this commercialisation model, 16 a more explanatory and historical approach which seeks to grasp the historical specificity of capitalism in terms of both its formation and nature is needed. For example, Brenner emphasises the unprecedented occurrence of capitalist relations in the context of class struggle within the agrarian relations of production of England against this progressivist approach. 17 We now turn to a discussion of the approaches of Mardin and Heper that reproduce the Orientalist view in itself and in which the composite model is widely used in the analysis of Western historical, social development. We will specifically give reference to the centre-periphery dichotomy of Mardin and the state tradition thesis of Heper. erif Mardin: Centre-Periphery Relations Remaining within the above-mentioned methodological framework and emphasizing that the positivistic social theory is not adequate for analysing the distinctive features of Islamic societies, 18 Mardin states that centre and periphery can be used as key concepts in explaining Turkish politics. According to Mardin, every society has a centre. 19 Multiple confrontations between centre and periphery taking place in the process of centralisation and the results of these confrontations played a significant role in the formation of different political structures and cultures. The forces that gave shape to the state in the West were different from those in Ottoman society. The creation of the modern state included a series of confrontations leading to Journal of Historical Studies

3 Ali Rza Gngen and afak Erten compromises with what may be called the forces of periphery: the feudal nobility, the cities, the burghers and later, industrial labour. 20 The autonomy of the periphery was also protected in the West and in that sense there can be claimed to have been a well-integrated structure. However, when the Ottoman State before the nineteenth century becomes the case, a lack of the above mentioned multiple confrontations is seen. A unidimensional confrontation between the periphery whose autonomy was only de facto and a centre that was relatively well-organized formed the major clash. 21 For Mardin, centre and periphery were two loosely related worlds. No attempt was made for a more complete integration when loose ties proved workable. 22 The main connections between the centre and periphery were religious institutions, the judicial system and the tradition of public works. The modernisation process provided the conditions for the estrangement of the periphery from the centre and it is seen that the peripheral forces at an increasing rate defined themselves with religious rituals and identities. A well-trained bureaucratic centre that did not look warmly at compromise was emerging on the other side. While technological developments and innovations led to better penetration of the centre into the periphery, no such thing as control of the centre by the peripheral forces was seen. 23 For Mardin, the centre-periphery duality remained the basic duality into the Republican period and the lack of integration was not overcome by the implementations based on the hierarchical logic of integration from above. The secret duality of Turkish politics is claimed to be between the ruled and ruler, those who want to be entrepreneurs and those who do not want to share power with them. The elite conflict is also of great importance. These basic dualities continue to shape the Turkish political structure. 24 As seen, Mardin argues that the penetration of the periphery into the centre is a process of compromise. The basis of the compromise in the West is the existence of institutions mediating between the state and its subjects, and these institutions existed as Stndestaats, etats and parlements. Their content was individual contracts and compromises and formed the basis of the public law of Europe. 25 Thus, Leviathan and the nation statepresent structural contrasts to Ottoman institutions[T]he process of centralization that created the modern state included a series of confrontations leading to compromises [C]onfrontations and co-optations had important consequences [T]he centre existed within a system of linkages with peripheral elements: Medieval estates found a place in parliaments; the lower classes were accorded the franchise. 26 Additionally, The difference [with the Ottoman case] only stands out when we remember that in the Western context liberties, orders and estates were all legally enforceable structures. The whole point of the Western concept of oriental despotism was that there existed no oriental equivalent of the legal force of contract in the West. 27 By calling the modern state Leviathan, Mardin is referring to Hobbes contractarian theory in order to confirm that the formation of the modern state in the West is a result of the mutual contract between the state and societal forces. Also, the legally enforceable nature of the mediating structures is seen as evidence of the

Approaches of erif Mardin and Metin Heper On State and Civil Society in Turkey 4 contractarianisms success in accounting for the historical evolution of civil society in the West. 28 Some objections can be raised here. With regards to Leviathan, Hobbes conceptualises the state not as a naturally given side of the contract made with societal forces, but as an artificial product of the contract between legally equal individuals who willingly surrender their rights of self-government to a powerful single authority. 29 Additionally, explaining the contractual tradition with corporate institutions (or Stndestaats) is somewhat problematic: neither Hobbes, since there was no corporate fragmentation of the state in the case of England, nor Rousseau, since the destruction of those structures of the ancien regime was needed to put an end to the alienated condition of the individual 30 , refers to corporate structures as a positive basis of contractarianism. Moreover, very interestingly, it seems that the fact that this contractarian approach was not at all concerned with the historical origins of the state, but rather engaged in a logical exercise, seems to have been glossed over. 31 This means there was no such contract tradition in Western societies in this sense, which was legally enforceable. On the other hand, corporate structures has a positive meaning in another tradition of thought critical of contractarianism. For Hegel, corporate institutions are complementary to the universal authority of the state, as the bearers of the particularity of their members, in which the specific aim of the member and common interest become identical. 32 However, Hegels organic conception of state and society aims at an integration of both within the states universality. 33 Notwithstanding the description of the Ottoman state in Hegelian terms in the accounts of both authors, 34 that is a state which is a sublime entity and which does not need any source of power distinct from itself, selfknowing and both a state in itself and a state for itself, their political motive is obviously different from that of Hegel. Their main concern is the formation of an independent civil society depending on economic rationality, which is prevented by the political centre (or in Hepers terms, strong state/high stateness). 35 Much more strangely, Mardin places Stndestaats, i.e. the corporate fragmentation of feudal states as the historical basis of the development of civil society. The constitutive element of these structures is lordship, in which the exploitation of the serf exists as a political domination. 36 Moreover, corporate fragmentation, for example in France, was a characteristic of the ancien regime, which was a surplus extraction and distribution mechanism 37 as much as the Ottoman state, against which a bloody battle was fought in the process of the formation of the modern, centralized state. 38 So, the corporate structures of medieval Europe reflected the relations between hierarchically dependant persons whose differentiation of rank was determined by noble privileges; thus they were in direct contrast with the abstract and equal individuals of contractarian thought. In this sense, for Mardin, the forms through which the feudal lords domination over the serfs was established and reproduced became the foundation of Western democracy. Metin Heper: State Tradition Emphasizing that there is the need to take the state as the object of inquiry and to look at the state tradition in Turkey to understand Turkish politics, Heper introduces his state tradition thesis. According to him, personal interest conflicts or the political culture cannot be counted as the causes of the political instability in Turkey, since personal conflicts are always present in politics and political culture does not Journal of Historical Studies

5 Ali Rza Gngen and afak Erten crystallize in a vacuum. 39 To reach a better understanding of politics, taking the state into account is necessary since those countries with a state tradition show significant differences from those without such a tradition. 40 Heavily affected by the statistinstitutionalist perspective, what Heper argues corresponds to bringing the state back in. 41 This perspective claims that an explanation that gives the state its proper place in the analysis of social reality, taking the state as an explanation, the explaining factor or independent variable in other words, is functional. Positioning itself against the so-called society-centred perspectives, such as liberalism or Marxism, statist-institutionalism offers a state-centred perspective. The state is defined in the Weberian framework as those human associations that successfully claim the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. 42 This Weberian notion of state defines the state as an entity separate from civil society. Using a different formulation in which the sovereignty of the state is not taken for granted and emphasising the degree of independence of the state vis--vis other associations and collectivities, Heper uses the concept of stateness in the analysis of state-society relations. Stateness depends upon the extent to which the major goals for society are designated and safeguarded by those who represent the state, independent of civil society. 43 Referring to the contractarian tradition in Western Europe, accepting the Stndestaat argument of Mardin and claiming that the ability to create consensus after multiple confrontations and conflicts determines the extent to which a state is sovereign and autonomous vis--vis civil society, Heper states that there emerged variations in the early forms of Western European states. Variations in state formations led to the emergence of different political cultures. In that sense, the phenomenon of the state gives birth to a particular political culture. 44 Heper uses the concepts of Berki to define different political cultures and activities. Transcendentalism, meaning the priority of the community, connoting concepts such as duty, service, leadership and instrumentalism, meaning the priority of the individual and connoting concepts such as freedom, diversity and plurality, are used to define forms of polities. Extreme and moderate forms of these orientations exist in different societies. In moderate transcendentalism, it can be claimed that a consensus is created by the imposition of the state norms on civil society. Whereas a degree of institutionalisation is seen in moderate form of transcendentalism, personal rule becomes the tenet of extreme transcendentalism. While goals for society were designated by civil society and no sovereign state vis--vis civil society is seen in moderate instrumentalism the extreme form is conceptualised by the efforts to gain the active support of the ruled. 45 According to Heper, the dominant paradigm in the study of Turkish politics lacks systematic attention to the political structure and culture of the phenomenon of the Turkish state. Thus, some aspects of Turkish politics remain a puzzle for many. 46 However, the contradictions that appear in Turkish politics can be fully explained if the state is put into its proper place in the analysis. Only from this vantage point, Heper claims that Ottoman political culture was characterised by a tension derived from the bureaucratic centres nervousness toward the periphery and the peripherys effort to circumvent the centre whenever it could. 47 Similar to Mardin, Heper emphasises the lack of control of the centre by peripheral forces in Ottoman society and defines the Ottoman rule as patrimonial. The Turkish Republic seems to have inherited from the Ottoman Empire a strong state and a weak civil society. 48 What lies behind the tribulations of Turkish politics, crises of legitimacy and integration is

Approaches of erif Mardin and Metin Heper On State and Civil Society in Turkey 6 the duality between the strong state and weak civil society. In other words, the asymmetric relationship between the strong centre and the weak periphery paves the ground for the emergence of a state autonomous vis--vis civil society in designating goals for it. About the nature of Turkish politics, in a way similar to that of Mardin, Heper claims that the dichotomy between state and civil society continues to be a basic problematic. The Ottoman legacy was inherited by the new Turkish state. In his efforts to found a moderately transcendental state, Mustafa Kemal attempted to plant the seeds of liberal democracy in terms of both the horizontal and vertical dimensions. 49 The horizontal dimension is related to participation mechanisms whereas the vertical dimension is related to leadership and responsibility. The importance of state tradition in the foundation of the Turkish state is that a statedominant political system was to be established. Since the basic cleavage was the one between a dominant centre and a fragmented periphery, Turkish politics lacked a tradition of multiple confrontations as a way of resolving conflicts. 50 A tradition of politics is lacking in that sense, and the political parties in Turkey have been nothing more than a means of elite conflict. 51 Having assumed such a demarcation between state and civil society, Heper reads the politics in Turkey in terms of elite confrontation. Bureaucratic elites, representing the state tradition against political elites, which emerged with the establishment of multi-party democracy 52 is the main theme of Turkish political history that merely reflects cultural cleavages, because functional cleavages cannot be developed. Also, the group of economic elites, or the bourgeoisie, was not formed independently from the state, nor could it formulate economic policies in spite of the state. 53 As seen, another assumption underlying the line of argument is that, since the Ottoman-Turkish social formation was not characterised by a separation of the political and the economic, as is the taken-for-granted fact for the West, the high stateness results in the obstruction of the development of economic rationality along with civil society. 54 This brings about an ahistorical reading of the relations between the state and economy putting all different forms (feudal rent squeezing, etatism, planning) into the same box of state tradition. The critical demarcation between state and civil society along with the methodological position of statism inevitably impacts Hepers understanding of democratic politics in Turkey. For Heper, In some Western European countries democracy has faced difficulties whereas in Turkey from time to time democracy has needed to be consolidated or re-established. Turkey represents a polar case of the phenomenon of the state giving birth to political instability, and making transition to democracy extremely precarious. 55 Here, Heper supposes that the strong state tradition, having its roots in the absence of moderating structures in the Ottoman Turkish polity, results, especially in the post-1973 era, in an easy shifting of the political regime between extreme transcendentalism and extreme instrumentalism. 56 Besides, the incapacity of the political elites to create a dynamic consensus due to the lack of links within the civil society forced the military to attempt to re-equilibrate democracy. The coup detat of 1980, in that sense, can be taken as a transient transcendental state to reach a moderate instrumentalism in which the fertile ground for the enhancement of liberal Journal of Historical Studies

7 Ali Rza Gngen and afak Erten democracy was created. The developments that took place after the coup presented hopeful signs for the institutionalisation of the moderate instrumentalism in Turkey. 57 In this respect, the consolidation of democracy or continued progress towards liberal democracy depends on the creation of a dynamic consensus among the political elites 58 and the willingness of the state elites to form a rationalist democracy. 59 In our opinion, the way that Heper adopts the Weberian framework is somewhat problematical. First of all, ideal-types in a Weberian account should be a mental construction in order to understand the complexity of social phenomena. It is a subjectivist tool to interpret the actions of individuals from a particular vantage point, i.e. the norm according to what ideal type is established. 60 So, they are intended to measure the discrepancy between a particular segment of empirical reality and the constructed norm, not to provide a direct representation of the reality. In other words, ideal-typical constructs are always perspectival. 61 However, the way that Heper uses the ideal-type is in sharp contrast with the original usage of the analytical tool. Heper directly refers to the empirical reality by using the concepts derived from the methodological framework. Second, while defining the Ottoman state as patrimonial, Heper attributes a substantive rationality to its central bureaucratic apparatus. As nalck puts it, patrimonialism, and in the extreme case, sultanism, is a purely personal instrument of the master to broaden his arbitrary power, and in sultanism, domination operates on the basis of discretion. 62 Patrimonial rule was distinguished first and foremost by the absence of such a bureaucratic separation of the private and the official sphere which, in turn, makes the exercise of power entirely discretionary Yet, some of the statist theorists were at pains to stress, at the peril of their theoretical consistency, as one of the virtues of the philosophy and the tradition of the Ottoman-Turkish state that it provided a government of reason which was essential for the maintenance of law and order which was, in turn, essential for wealth creation. 63 That is, although the concept patrimonialism in its original usage does not imply rationality in terms of its bureaucracy, since in Webers account of patrimonialism, one cannot speak of any institutional differentiation, that brings about a separate bureaucracy. 64 Last, but not least, Hepers claim that state should be taken as an independent variable, results in ignorance of explaining the state itself. Thus, the state, since its existence is taken for granted, becomes an enigma to be explored in terms of its formation, its historical nature and development. The lack of a substantive theory of state results in the circularity in argument: while the strong state tradition is taken as the explanation of a weak civil society, at the same time the argument is constructed in an inverse way that the weakness of civil society becomes the cause of the strong state. Thus, it should be debated that whether conceptualising state and civil society as separate entities and placing them as externally related, as Heper does in his analysis, makes sense in solving the complexity of Turkish politics or not. Left Liberalism: The New Cult of Civil Society

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The state tradition thesis, which reads Turkish politics through a clear line of demarcation between state and civil society and identifies the degree of development of democracy as the degree of development and strengthening of civil society is also used by left liberalism. In the first part of the dichotomy through which Turkish politics is understood, state, military or bureaucracy take place. The second part is somewhat defined in a form that takes the bourgeoisie in itself. 65 Coups detats are analysed as attempts at the restoration of the bureaucratic power and the reflections of the ceberrut state tradition. Left liberalism, which attributes a democratic essence to civil society, defines it as the source of all freedoms. From such a perspective, civil society, the autonomy it gained from the state and the energy and dynamism such autonomy gives way, provides economic development, struggles against oppression, democratisation, and emancipation in history, etc. On the other hand, the state stops, or obstructs, such developments and places humanity in a backward position. 66 This dichotomycorresponds to opposition between coercion, as embodied in the state, and freedom or voluntary action, which belongs to civil society [T]he concept of civil society recognizes and celebrates difference and diversity. 67 However, the differences (e.g. class differences) that cannot be celebrated are simply ignored. Moreover, neither the totalising logic of capitalism nor its coercive totality in the form of market imperatives (which are not only monopolies or conglomerates, but the market relation itself subordinating all human values, actions and relationships) is taken in relation with the problem of human emancipation. Thus, the fact that the coercion is a constitutive factor of civil society and the states coercive functions in large part are occupied with the enforcement of domination within civil society means nothing in such an account. 68 Market relations so far as taken in an opposition with so-called state intervention are seen as a basis of independent civil society. 69 This particular reading of Turkish politics through the dichotomy between state and civil society corresponds to a neo-liberal hegemony project the rise of which was seen in the last two decades of the twentieth century. This political project set itself to the task of demolishing the myth of the benevolent state, if only to replace it with another age old myth namely that of the market as a self regulating entity. 70 Left-liberalism, having assumed the separation of the political and the economic along with a state/civil society distinction in the West, seeks a political project similar to neo-liberalism in its class character: A bourgeois state defined in terms of the Weberian concept of instrumentalism, harmonious with the domain of economic rationality, i.e. the brgerlichegesellschaft. Conclusion In this paper, we tried to outlay the methodological presuppositions of erif Mardin and Metin Heper in particularly and in general of a political project, namely left liberalism, which has some of its roots in the study of these authors. The primary object was to deal with the problems in these methodological positions. As discussed above, their assumptions and the particular reading of Turkish politics remain in an Orientalist problematic. Such an approach not only conceptualizes Western history as continuous progress in terms of the development of civil society (which is taken both as an analytical ideal-type and, in turn, a political ideal), but also reads Turkish politics as a continuity whether with respect to state tradition or centre-periphery confrontation. Journal of Historical Studies

9 Ali Rza Gngen and afak Erten This leads to an assumption in which the tribulations of Turkish democracy are attributed to a strong state tradition or to the weakness of civil society. It has affinities with an ideological position, namely neo-liberalism, which establishes state-economy and state-society relations in a similar way that state deserves always a negative moment while civil society possesses a positive attribution. Democratic developments are identified with the strengthening of civil society vis--vis the state, the relations of domination (class, gender, race etc.) within civil society and the progressive role the state may assume in particular conditions in terms of democratization are simply ignored. Moreover, as the state is described as an entity external to societal forces, such an account is not responsive to struggles around and over the state apparatus, which brings about many democratic and social gains to the working class and other repressed sections of the society. 71 The aforementioned assumptions and the ideological position still are effective in the analyses of Turkish politics. These analyses all emphasize the continuity in Turkish history, forming a wide range ranging from crude applications of centreperiphery relations 72 to ones that try to inspire class related concepts. 73 They all show the dominance of this particular approach in the studies of contemporary developments in Turkish politics. In our opinion an alternative methodology is needed against such a particularism, which is both analytical, since it uses categories derived from the particular case, and historical, since it describes specific processes of historical formation and accordingly puts that they make it impossible to apply universal categories to the case. 74 The alternative lies in a common methodological framework, which is analytically universal, 75 and sensitive to the historically specific characteristics of a given social-formation. Such a view should not be satisfied with aphorisms like every society has a centre, but asks why it has and what is about the social relations that bring about a political authority apparently autonomous from society. So, it should not understand history in terms of a confrontation between a self-evident state and a civil society that has self-validating democratic virtues. The most important question is not only what the underlying social relations giving rise to different forms of power are in a capitalist society, i.e. state and economy, but also in what way they give rise to this dichotomy in appearance. Only such an attempt to understand Turkish politics can place the specificity of Turkish state-society relations and the development and characteristics of Turkish democracy into a general theoretical account.


Galip Yalman, Bourgeoisie and the State: Changing Forms of Interest Representation Within the Context of Economic Crisis and Structural Adjustment:

Approaches of erif Mardin and Metin Heper On State and Civil Society in Turkey 10

Turkey During the 1980s. (Ph.d. diss., University of Manchester, 1997), 84. See also Galip Yalman, The Turkish State and Bourgeoisie in Historical Perspective: A Relativist Paradigm or a Panoply of Hegemonic Strategies? in The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State, ed. Sungur Savran and Neecan Balkan (New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 2002), 24. 2 Yalman, The Turkish State and Bourgeoisie in Historical Perspective, 24. 3 erif Mardin, Btn Eserleri 6, Makaleler 1, Trkiyede Toplum ve Siyaset. ed. Mmtazer Trkne and Tuncay nder, (stanbul: letiim, 2002), 10-13 and 15. 4 Ibid., 18. 5 Bryan Turner,Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism (London: Routledge, 1994), 22. 6 Ibid. 7 Turner, 23. See also Simon Bromley. Rethinking Middle East Politics (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 7. 8 Mardin, Btn Eserleri 6. 9 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Northgate: The Eothen Press, 1985). 10 The concept is owed to Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Pristine Culture of Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991). 11 Yalman, Bourgeoisie and The State, 101. 12 Mardin, Btn Eserleri 6, 10. 13 Ibid., 12. 14 Ibid., 23. See also erif Mardin, Center-Periphery Relations: A Key To Turkish Politics?, Daedalus, no. 102 (1973), 170. 15 Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999), 1-27. 16 Ibid., 11. 17 See Robert Brenner, The Origins of Capitalist Development: a Critique of NeoSmithian Marxism. New Left Review, no. 104 (1977), 25-92. For an elaboration of this approach see Wood, The Origin of Capitalism, 67-104. 18 Mardin quoted in Yalman, Bourgeoisie and The State, 84. 19 Mardin, Center-Periphery Relations, 169. 20 Ibid., 170. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid., 171. 23 Ibid., 173-180. 24 Mardin, Btn Eserleri 6, 118. 25 Ibid., 10-12. 26 Mardin, Center-Periphery Relations, 169-170. 27 Mardin quoted in Yalman, Bourgeoisie and The State, 99. 28 Ibid. 29 David Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), 77. 30 Yalman, Bourgeoisie and The State, 100. 31 Ibid., 98. 32 Glnur Savran, Sivil Toplum ve tesi Rousseau, Hegel, Marx (stanbul: Alan Yaynclk, 1987), 154. 33 Yalman, Bourgeoisie and The State, 101. 34 Ibid., 89. Journal of Historical Studies

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Ibid., 91. Wood, The Origin of Capitalism. See also Colin Mooers, Burjuva Avrupann Kuruluu Mutlaklk, Devrim ve ngiltere, Fransa, Almanyada Kapitalizmin Ykselii (Ankara: Dost, 1997). 37 For French absolutism in particular see Mooers, 62-85. 38 Wood, The Origin of Capitalism, 30-35. 39 Heper, The State Tradition, 3-4. 40 Ibid., 5. 41 Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research, in Bringing Back the State In, ed. Paul Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). For explicit emphasis see Metin Heper, The Strong State And Democracy: The Turkish Case in Comparative and Historical Perspective, in Democracy and Modernity, ed. S. N. Eisenstadt (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992). 42 Heper, The State Tradition, 5. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid., 7. 45 Ibid, 6-10. See also Metin Heper, State and Society in Turkish Political Experience, in State, Democracy and the Military in Turkey in the 1980s, ed. Ahmet Evin and Metin Heper (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1988). 46 Heper, The State Tradition, 12 and Metin Heper, Introduction, in Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, ed. Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau. London: I. B. Tauris. 1991. See also, for a similar view, Clement Dodd. Political Modernization, the State and Democracy: Approaches to the Study of Politics in Turkey, in State, Democracy and the Military in Turkey in the 1980s, ed. Ahmet Evin and Metin Heper (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1988). 47 Heper, The State Tradition, 16. 48 Ibid. 49 Heper, Introduction, 1. 50 Heper, The State Tradition, 149. 51 Ibid., 150. 52 Ibid., 99. 53 Heper, The State Tradition, 103; Heper, The Strong State and Democracy, 147. 54 Yalman, Bourgeoisie and The State, 86. 55 Heper, The State Tradition, 150. Hepers own emphasis. 56 Ibid., 117. 57 Ibid., 154. 58 For Heper, the problems of Turkish democracy can be eradicated if politics is understood not on the basis of ideological positions, but suggestions for solutions. A structural transformation may be accomplished if realist policies are advocated without discrimination between we and they. The unjustified emphasis of Heper on the relationship between problems of Turkish democracy and ideological positions reminds us the depoliticization of politics throughout the 1980s and 1990s. See Metin Heper, Demokrasimizin Sorunlar, Dou Bat, no. 21 (2002), 159-168. 59 Heper, The Strong State and Democracy, 163. 60 Wolfgang Mommsen, The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), 122. 61 Ibid., 124.


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Halil nalck, Comments on Sultanism: Max Webers Typification of the Ottoman Polity, in Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies 1 (1992), 49. 63 Yalman, Bourgeoisie and The State, 105-106. 64 Ibid. 65 Sungur Savran, Trkiyede Snf Mcadeleleri Tarihi Cilt 1: 1919-1980 (stanbul: Kardelen, 1992), 112. 66 Savran, Sol Liberalizm : Maddeci Bir Eletiriye Doru, 11. Tez, no. 2 (1986), 18. 67 Wood, Democracy Against Capitalism Renewing Historical Materialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 243. 68 Ibid., 246, 254-255. 69 Savran, Sol Liberalizm, 17. 70 Yalman, The Turkish State and Bourgeoisie in Historical Perspective, 21-22. 71 Savran, Sol Liberalizm, 25-26. 72 For popular examples see Aye Kadolu, Ankarada Dans, Radikal ki, 17.11.02 and Ali Ulusoy, Brokratik ktidar Siyasal ktidara Kar, Radikal ki. 10.11.02. 73 Ahmet nsel, 12 Eyllden k Kaps, Radikal ki, 10.11.02. 74 Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 1996), 12-13. 75 Ibid.


Journal of Historical Studies

13 Ali Rza Gngen and afak Erten

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Journal of Historical Studies