reater respect forthe sople contributed 10 Sixporitions. See R. sttusios Philosophie here the question of cet, Some indication Kant on the Destiny 1, Canadian Journal of 6, p. 157. ew Jersey, Princeton i 2 f ON THE USE OF TELEOLOGICAL i PRINCIPLES IN PHILOSOPHY (1788) Immanuel Kant” [159] If we understand by natire the sum-total of everything that exists determinately according to laws and by world (as nature propedly so-called) these things together with their supreme cause, we can attempt f© investigate nature following, evo Uiferent methods. The first of these methods is called physic, the second metaphysics. ‘The method of physics is :heoretizal and employs only such purposes as can be known to ts through experience. By contrast, the method of metaphysics is tlolagial and can “Employ only a puspose established by pare reason for its end, [ have demonstrated E chewhere that, in metaphysics, reason cannot secure the compete end it desires = (with regard t0 knowledge of God) following the theoretical method of natural S nvertigation. Consequently, the teleological method is the only one that remains for | metaphysics. The deficiencies of inadequate theory will, therefore, have to be supple- dniented not by natural purposes that rest only upon the evidence of experience, “hue instead by a purpose deterninately given 4 priori by pure practical reason (in the “jdea of the highest good). in a litle essay on the human races, I have tied to ‘Abmonseace a similar warrant, indeed a need, to proceed from a teleological principle Sphere theory forsikes us. However, both of these cases include a demand to which “Inudentanding submits oaly reluctantly, and one which can give rise to misunderstand- ons, 7 in every investigation of nature, xezson properly appeals first to theory and only later © {0.4 determination in terms of purposes. No appeal to teleology or practical purpo- 4 os cn up re ene on Wo emia bout ficient causes even when we are able to make plausible the appropriateness of our smption by appealing to final causes, be they from nature or our will. This ipline seems to be most justified when (a in that metaphysical case) even practical ‘must take precedence in order to specify, frst of al, the purpose for the sake of ich T intend to determine the concept of a cause. This concept, however, is one ich has nothing to do with the nature of the object [160] but seems instead to be "2 preoccupation with our own ends and needs.IMMANUEL KANT imacan ‘without © gloriously inany ind the great “examples “those who ‘stablishe Let us distinetio: “wanted © Forstor sa fr who v tural hi between time in ac the force: far as per snot only the theor i theories « cem over this possible — rewon. However, ly be cleared away. oe tn fhe Teicher Merkur of October/November 1786, Councilor Georg Foster & and in Presented objections against an explanation published in the Berliner 3 careful se November 1785 concerning my ou splendor hypothes ever), on most que ‘and prese | of nature two kind right be history (f edge of according One mi matters, carclestne pointed ¢ vied th of hetercrable, ciples ig the ae has erent rresent but in ten by one of physical from ency of exstood ow the suffice. dence be ies fall ie that it advance ‘ss might sount on, soretical~ yon con= ve use off aces to ‘g Forster tscrift for cept and | aly from a nan found ae basis of sxvation.of ‘which we vation that it Bot this + purposiv 1 without : bserving: knows ead of t (ON THE USE OF TELEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES IN PHILOSOPHY (1788) 39 Linnaean principle of the perseverance of the character of the pollinating pacts in plants ‘without which the systematic natural desnipron of the plant kingdom would not be so gloriously ordered and widely extended as itis. But, unfortunately it is quite true that ‘many individuals are so careest a8 to carry their ideas into their own observations (even the great naturalist himself probably took the similarity of characters, dve to certain examples, 2 an indication of the similarity of the powers of plans). Thas, the lesson for those who reaon too quickly (which presumably does not pertain to either of us) is well cstablished; but this misuse of the rule certainly cannot mlify its validity Let us retum, however, to the subject of the contested, indeed entirely rejected distinction between the description of nature and natural history. If by the latter one wanted to understand a narrative acount of natural events to which human reason cannot extend, ©, the fir appearance of plants and animals, then to,.be sure, a5 Fonter says, this would be a science for gods, who were present atthe time of creation ‘or who wete themselves the creators, and not one for human beings. A science of natural history would, by contrast, concer itself with investigating the connection between certain present propertics ofthe things of nature and their causes in an earlier ‘ime in accordance with causal laws that we do not invent but rather derive from [162] the forces of nature as they present themselves to us, pursued back, however, only so fac as permitted by analogy. Indeed, this would be of a kind of natural history that is not only possible, but one which is atempted frequently enough, as, for example, in the theories of the earth formulated by carefal natural scientists (among which the theories of the fimous Linnaeus ako find their place). These individuals may have accomplished much oF litle through their research. Likewise, Forster's conjecture concerning the origin of the Neg certainly does aot belong to the description of nature, but instead only to natural history. This distinction lies in the mature of things; and in making this distinction 1 am demanding. nothing new but instead only the cerefill separation of one activity from the other, because they are totaly hetrogeneus. Farther, if the description of narare makes its appearance at science in all the fall F splendor of a great system, natural history can only offer us fiagments or shaky hypotheses. But even if natural history can, at the present time (and perhaps for ‘evet), only be presented moze in outline than in a work of practicable science (2c. | ivactivty in which one might find a blank space already marked out for the answers to © most questions), such efforts are not, [ hope, without value. For the result of separating dnd presenting natural history asa special science distinguishable from the description of nature is that one might not do something with supposed insight for one of these bio’ kinds of investigation which properly belongs to the other. I also hope that we ‘might become more definitely acquainted with the sphere of real knowledge in natural thtst make allowances to me for the awkwardness of my exposition in chese lattes; since I have come to know so much hatm in other cases caused by the B fblesincs of lowing the borders of the sciences t ran into one another (a I have : ‘it, not exacdy to everyone's liking). Iam now nevertheless thoroughly con~ fel hit an entirely new light often dawns for the sciences through the mere analysis bh