PA 146: Administrative Law

Illustrative Cases

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Administrative Agencies

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Edu vs. Ericta

The case:

The petitioner assailed the validity of the Reflector Law and A.O. no. 2 which implements the statute on the ground that these transgressed the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

The Court held that there was no improper exercise of the delegated authority in the case at bar Ratio:

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority

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Edu vs. Ericta

Ratio:

A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the nondelegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety

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Eugenio vs. CSC (1995)

The case

Petitioner was recommended to be appointed as CESO Rank IV by the CESB which was abolished by the CSC through CSC Resolution no. 93-4359. She then proceeded to file a petition to annul CSC Resolution no. 93-4359 on the ground that CSC, in its issuance of the said resolution to abolish the CESB, usurped the legislative functions of Congress The Court annulled the assailed Resolution The Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created in the Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 1974. as The CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function
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Held

Ratio:

Garcia vs. Macaraig (1971)

The case

It was an administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable Catalino Macaraig, Jr., formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Justice, in his former capacity as judge, for alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge ... gross incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended Judge Macaraig was appointed as CFI judge in Calamba and, at the same time, worked in the DOJ

Held: The Court dismissed the complaint. However, it ruled that the practice of judges collaborating with other offices should be discontinued.

The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, least the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts a check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies.
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Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co. (1932)

The case

One of the main issues was the legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition Manila Electric Company requested the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation companies The Court ruled that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court to sit as board of arbitrators hence it declined to proceed further in the petition. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions
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Held:

Ratio:

Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co. (1932)

Ratio:

The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it could not only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court
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Ople vs. Torres (1998)

The Case:

WON AO no. 38 is unconstitutional for it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate.

Petitioner: The issuance of AO no. 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of Congress because the establishment of NCIRS requires legislative act and that the appropriation of public funds by the President for the implementation of the said AO usurps the exclusive right of Congress to appropriate funds for expenditure The AO was issued within the executive and administrative powers of the President without encroaching on the legislative powers of Congress The funds necessary for the implementation of the NCIRS may be sourced from the budgets of concerned agencies

Held:

AO no. 308 is invalid for being unconstitutional

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Ople vs. Torres (1998)

Ratio:

The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct.

Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper government organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations

A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order.

An administrative order must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy AO No. 308 does not merely implement the Administrative Code of 1987 (as argued by respondents) as it establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. It redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis--vis the State

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Powers and Functions of Administrative Agencies

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Calalang vs. Williams (1940)

The case:

Involved the authority of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to issue rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads as provided for by C.A. no. 548. In the exercise of this authority, the Secretary issued rules and regulations that prohibited animal drawn vehicles from passing along Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue for a certain duration and period of time Calalang contended that C.A. no. 548 is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

Held: The Court ruled that there was no undue delegation of legislative power, hence the law is not unconstitutional Ratio:

The Court drew the line between the delegation of power to make the law and the authority or discretion to execute the law. The former is not allowed while the latter should be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. Sec. 1 of C.A. no. 548 did not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. What was conferred upon them was merely to carry out the legislative policy- to promote safe transit upon and obstructions on national roads- and NOT to determine what public policy demands.

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Calalang vs. Williams (1940)

The delegated power is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be discharged directly by the National Assembly. The exercise of such authority is not the making of the law

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Chiongbian vs. Orbos (1995)

The case:

Validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated Issue: Whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in character, as petitioners contend, or whether it is executive in character, as respondents claim it is, and, in any event, whether Art. XIX, 13 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the President's discretion

Held: The provision was held valid as there was no abdication by Congress of its legislative power. Moreover, in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions, Congress provided a sufficient standard by which the President was to be guided in the exercise of the power granted
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Chiongbian vs. Orbos (1995)

Ratio: Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power "to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business.

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Garments and Textile Export Board vs. Court of Appeals (1997)

The case:

Involved the power or authority of the GTEB to grant or cancel export quotas or authorizations GTEB argued that it is the sole entity possessed with the power, jurisdiction, and discretion to grant and disapprove export allocations as provided for by E.O. no. 537 (as amended). The EO enumerates the functions of GTEB which includes the approval of export allocations AIFC, on the other hand, argued that inasmuch as on of the powers specified in the EO gives the GTEB any judicial powers, nor any specific jurisdiction to hear and decide actions, the GTEB has no jurisdiction over said cases

Held:

The Court held that the power and jurisdiction to adjudicate on the question of AIFCs entitlement to the export allocations, which includes the discretion to grant and disapprove said export allocations, belongs solely to the GTEB
The power to adjudicate on the question of an entitys entitlement to export allocations was expressly granted to the GTEB or at the very least, was necessarily implied from the power to cancel or suspend quota allocations

Ratio:

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Mateo vs. CA (1991)

The case:

The main issue was whether or not the approval of a notice of appeal by the trial judge is a ministerial duty enforceable by mandamus, and if it is, whether or not the appeal of the petitioners is meritorious
The Court ruled that it was the ministerial duty of the trial court to approve notice of appeal. The refusal of the trial court, therefore, to accept the said notice field by the petitioners in pursuance of their statutory right to appeal is clearly enforceable by mandamus. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. Ministerial duty vs. discretionary duty

Held:

Ratio:

Ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance (i.e., an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate or legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment) Discretionary duty is that which by its nature requires the exercise of judgment (i.e., when the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed)
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People vs. Vera (1937)

The case:

Act no. 4221 was questioned for being violative of the Constitution as section 11 endowed the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective provinces unduly delegating legislative power to the provincial boards

Held: There was undue delegation of legislative power because Act no. 4221 did not meet the requirements of (1) clear policy and (2) fixed standards. Ratio:

The Philippine Legislature may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle of potestas delegata non delegare potest The rule, however, is not absolute and inflexible. It admits exceptions.

Delegation of legislative powers to local authorities Legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself
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People vs. Vera (1937)

For there to be valid delegation, there must be (1) clear policy and (2) fixed standards. Act no. 4221 does not meet these requirements therefore, there was undue delegation In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing is left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. In the case at bar, the provincial boards of various provinces are to determine for themselves whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Law are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If a provincial board does not wish to have the Law applied, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
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Tanada vs. Cuenco (1957)

The case:

The case involved the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the compliance with the procedures The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertain the petition filed by Tanada, et al. was assailed upon the ground that the power to choose members of the SET has been expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate.

Held: The SC has jurisdiction to entertain the petition as it is within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the proceedings in connection with the exercise of the Senate in the selection of SET members Ratio:

The legislative power is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the two houses of Congress. And since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into legality of statutes enacted by Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said houses, like that of any branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions.
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