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Signaling, Investment Opportunities and Dividend Announcements. Pyung Sig Yoon Laura T.

Starks This article examines potential explanations for the wealth effects surrounding dividend change announcements. We find that new information concerning managers investment policies is not revealed at the time of dividend announcement. We also find that dividend increases (decreases) are associated with subsequent significant increases (decreases) in capital expenditures over the three years following the dividend change, and that dividend change announcements are associated with revisions in analysts forecast of current earnings. These results are consistent with the cash flow signaling hypothesis rather than the free cash flow hypothesis as an explanation for the observed stock price reactions to dividend change announcements. SEALES EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL

Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information. Merton H. Miller Kevin Rock We extend the standard finance model of the firm s dividend/investment/financing decisions by allowing the firm s manager to know more than outside investors about the true state of the firm s current earnings. The extension endogenizes the dividend (and financing) announcement effects amply documented in recent research. But once trading of shares is admitted to the model along with asymmetric information, the familiar Fisherian criterion for optimal investment becomes time inconsistent: the market s belief that the firm is following the Fisher rule creates incentives to violate de rule. We show that informationally consistent signalling equilibrium exist under asymmetric information and the trading of shares that restores the time consistency of investment policy, but leads in general to lower levels of investment than the optimum achievable under full information and/or not trading. Contractual provisions that change the information asymmetry or the possibility of profiting from it could eliminate both the time inconsistency and the inefficiency of investment policies, but these contractual provisions too are likely to involve death-weight costs. Establishing which route or combination of routes serves in practice to maintain consistency remains for future research. SEALES - TEORA

The Information Content of Share Repurchase Programs. Gustavo Grullon Roni Michaely Contrary to the implications of many payout theories, we find that announcements of openmarket share repurchase programs are not followed by an increase in operating performance. However, we find that repurchasing firms experience a significant reduction in systematic risk and cost of capital relative to non-repurchasing firms. Further, consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis, we find that the market reaction to share repurchase announcements is more positive among those firms that are more likely to overinvest. Finally, we find evidence to indicate that investors underreact to repurchase announcements because they initially underestimate the decline in cost of capital. ESTE NO PORQUE SE ENFOCA EN SEALES PERO DE LA RECOMPRA DE ACCIONES Special dividends and the evolution of dividend signaling. Harry DeAngelo Linda DeAngelo Douglas J. Skinner This paper documents that (1) special dividends were once commonly paid by NYSE firms, but are now rarely paid; (2) firms typically paid specials almost as predictably as they paid regular dividends; (3) despite the dramatic overall decline in specials, the incidence of very large specials increased in recent years; and (4) special dividends were not displaced by stock repurchases. Most plausibly, small specials disappeared because their predictability made them close substitutes for regular dividend signals, while large specials survived because their sheer size automatically differentiates them from regulars. SEALES EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL

Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the world. Rafael La Porta Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes Andrei Shleifer Robert W. Vishny This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the outcome model , dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the substitute model , insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay

dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4.000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends. NO APLICA ES OTRA LINEA DE ESTUDIO PERO NOS PUEDEN SERVIR ALGUNAS VARIABLES QUE UTILIZAN , ESTE PAPER ESTA MUY BIEN EXPLICADO. RECOMIENDO LEER. One Time Cash Flow Announcements and Free Cash Flow Theory. (Tengo solo el abstract) Keith M. Howe Jia He G. Wenchi Kao The leading explanation for the positive price response surrounding tender offer share repurchase and specially designated dividend (SDD) announcements is the information signaling hypothesis. This paper reexamines these announcements to Litzenberger s (1989) findings suggests an important role for the free cash flow theory in explaining the market s reaction to dividend changes. In contrast, we find the market s reaction to share repurchases and SDDs is approximately the same for both high-Q and low-Q firms. We thus have an empirical puzzle: If Jensen s free cash-flow theory applies to dividend changes, it is difficult to see why it does not also apply to the analogous events examined here. COSTOS DE AGENCIA EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. (Tengo solo el abstract) Jennifer J Gaver Kenneth M Gaver This paper presents additional evidence on the relation between the investment opportunity set and financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Our results are based on a sample of 237 growth firms and 237 nongrowth firms. We find that growth firms have significantly lower debt/equity ratios and exhibit significantly lower dividend yields than nongrowth firms. We also find that growth firms pay significantly higher levels of cash compensation to their executives and have a significantly higher incidence of stock option plans than nongrowth firms. However, controlling for firm size, the incidence of bonus plans, performance plans, and restricted stock plans does not differ between growth and nongrowth samples. COSTOS DE AGENCIA EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL

Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.

William H. Meckling Michael C. Jensen This paper integrates elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. We define theconcept of agency costs, show its relationship to the 'separation and control' issue, investigate the nature of the agency costs generated by the existence of debt and outside equity, demonstrate who bears the costs and why, and investigate the Pareto optimality of their existence. We also provide a new definition of the firm, and show how our analysis of the factors influencing the creation and issuance of debt and equity claims is a special case of the supply side of the completeness of markets problem. COSTOS DE AGENCIA - TEORIA Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers. Michael Jensen No tiene abstract, pero tengo el paper. COSTOS DE AGENCIA - TEORIA

The Role of Insiders and Dividend Policy: a Comparison of Regulated and Unregulated Firms. M. Cary Collins Atul K. Saxena James W. Wansley This paper explicitly recognizes the potential differences in dividend policy between regulates and unregulated firms and focuses on agency costs and monitoring explanations for the relevance of dividends. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of insiders in determining dividend policy for unregulated firms, utilities, and financial-services firms. Since utilities, and to some extent, financial-services firms, have regulators who serve as the low-cost informants to market participants, insiders play a reduce role in determining dividend policy compared to unregulated firms. A regression model is developed that addressed whether the role of regulators and insiders are substitutes or complements for utilities and financial services firms. The regression results reveal fundamental differences in the relationship between insider holdings and dividend policy for unregulated firms and utilities, but suggest that the regulatory environment enhances rather than mitigates the importance of the insider s role for utilities. For financial-services firms, the results do not support the hypothesis that increased equity risk through fixed-rate deposit insurance enhances the role of insiders when determining dividend policy. COSTOS DE AGENCIA EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL

Earnings Information Conveyed by Dividend Initiations and Omissions. Paul M. Healy Krishna G. Palepu This paper examines earnings changes surrounding firm s decisions to initiate or omit dividend payments. Firms that initiate (omit) dividend payments have positive (negative) earnings changes both before and after the dividend policy change. The subsequent earnings changes are positively related to the dividend announcement return. Also, the stock price reactions at the announcements of subsequent earnings are smaller than usual. These results suggest that: (1) dividend initiation/omission decisions reflect both past and future earnings performance; and (2) the market interprets the announcement of these decisions as manager s forecasts of future earnings changes. SEALES EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL Simultaneous Determination of Insider Ownership, Debt and Dividend Policies. Gerald R. Jensen Donald P. Solberg Thomas S. Zorn We examine the determinants of cross-sectional differences in insider ownership, debt and dividend policies. These policies are related not only directly, but also indirectly, through their relationship with operating characteristics of firms. To distinguish these affects, we examine the determinants of three policy choices within a system of equations. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that levels of insider ownership differ systematically across firms. Furthes, high insider ownership firms choose lower levels of both debt and dividends. Finally, the effects of profitability, growth and investment spending on debt and dividend policy support a modified pecking order hypothesis. COSTOS DE AGENCIA EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL

Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions. (Tengo solo el abstract) Kenneth Lehn Annette Poulsen We investigate the source of stockholder gains in going private transactions. We find support for the hypothesis advanced by Jensen that a major source of these gains is the mitigation of agency

problems associated with free cash flow. Using a sample of 263 going private transactions from 1980 through 1987, our results indicate a significant relationship between undistributed caash flow and a firm s decision to go private. In addition, we find that premiums paid to stockholders are significantly related to undistributed cash flow. These results are especially strong for firms that went private between 1984 and 1987 and also for firms whose managers owned relatively equity before the going private transaction. COSTOS DE AGENCIA EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL

Why Do Public Companies Begin Paying Dividends? (Slo abstract porque el sitio est cado) C. Maquierira W. Megginson This paper examines empirically whether the dividend initiation decisions of a sample of newlypublic firms are best explained by the predictions of the Miller and Rock (1985) cash flow signalling model, or by the competing agency cost models presented by Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986), and Rozeff (1982). Our results strongly support the agency cost models of dividend initiation. We document that dividend-initiating (DI) firms are older, larger, more profitable, and have higher levels of free cash flow at their initiation date than a matched set of non-dividend- initiating (NDI) companies. In the years after initiation, the DI firms issue equity and convertible securities more frequently, have higher levels of free cash flow, and have lower levels of and greater post-IPO reductions in insider shareholdings than do the matching NDI companies. These results suggest that firms begin paying dividends as a response to changes in the company s financial success and ownership structure. COSTOS DE AGENCIA EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL

The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend and Compensation Policies. Clifford W. Smith Ross L. Watts We examine explanations for corporate financing, dividend and compensation policy choices. We document robust empirical relations among corporate policy decisions and various firm characteristics. Our evidence suggest contracting theories are more important in explaining cross sectional variation in observed financial, dividend, and compensation policies than either taxbased or signaling theories. NECESITO EL PAPER NO ME QUEDA CLARO

The Impact of Dividend Initiation on the Information Content of Earnings Announcements and Returns and Volatility. (Tengo slo el abstract) P.C. Venkatesh This article provides some evidence on the empirical consequences of initiating dividends. First, it documents that the information content of quarterly earnings announcements decreases after the introduction of cash dividends. This suggests that dividends and earnings are partial information substitutes . The second finding is that the volatility of total daily returns decreases after the initiation of dividends and that most this decrease in the firm-specific volatility. A possible reason for this is that, in the postdividend period, investors place less weight (relative to the predividend period) on other information signals , and, hence, observed volatility may be lower. SEALES EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL Dividend Announcements: Cash Flow Signalling vs. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis. Larry H.P. Lang Robert H. Litzenberger We test the cash flow signaling and free cash flow/overinvestment explanations of the impact of dividend announcements on stock prices. We use Tobin s Q ratios less than unity to designate overinvestors. The average return associated with announcements of large dividend change ir significantly larger for firms with Q s less than unity than for other Brms. This evidence, the results of further tests involving a finer partition of the data, and an analysis of changes in analyst s earnings forecasts surrounding dividend announcements support the overinvestment hypothesis over the cash flow signaling hypothesis. COSTOS DE AGENCIA EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL

Growth, Beta and Agency Costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout Ratios. Michael S. Rozeff A model of optimal dividend payout is presented in which increased dividends lower agency costs but raise the transactions cost of external financing. The optima dividend payout minimizes the sum of these two costs. A cross-sectional tests of the model relates dividend payout to the fraction of equity held by insiders, the padt and expected future revenue growth of the firm, the firm s beta coefficient, and the number of common stockholders. The coefficients of all variables are significant in the predicted directions. The results indicate that investment policy influences dividend policy. COSTOS DE AGENCIA EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL

Dividend Payout and Agency Cost Factors: Study of Select Indian Companies. Jadab Krishna Das Sudipta Ghosh Agency problem is the conflicting situation between the principal and the agent. Agency costs arise due to conflicts of interest between shareholders and management. As owner s wealth (i.e. shareholder s fund) is managed by the managers in a joint stock company, there is very possibility of using shareholder s fund in private benefit of the managers. It is assumed that dividend payout may help to distribute funds in favour of shareholders and thus may be used to solve agency conflict. On the other hand agency cost factors like free cash flows; dispersion of ownership, leverage may have influential effect on dividend payout. Against this backdrop, in this paper a study has been made to understand the influence of agency cost variables on dividend payout in Indian context by selecting fifty Indian companies listed on BSE and/or NSE. COSTOS DE AGENCIA EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL

Determinants of the Dividend Policy in Emerging Stock Exchanges: The Case of GCC Countries. Duha Al-Kuwari This paper investigates the determinants of dividend policies for firms listed on Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) country stock exchanges. This is a case study of emerging stock exchanges, where the determinants of dividend policy have received little attention. This study used a panel dataset of non-financial firms listed on the GCC country stock exchanges between the years of 1999 and 2003. Seven hypotheses pertaining to agency cost theory were investigated using a series of random effect Tobit models. The models considered the impact of government ownership, free cash flow, firm size, growth rate, growth opportunity, business risk, and firm profitability on dividend payout ratios. The results suggest that the main characteristics of firm dividend payout policy were that dividend payments related strongly and directly to government ownership, firm size and firm profitability, but negatively to the leverage ratio. These results, taken as a whole, indicate that firms pay dividends with the intention of reducing the agency problem and maintaining firm reputation, since the legal protection for outside shareholders was limited. In addition, and as a result of the significant agency conflicts interacting with the need to build firm reputation, a firm s dividend policy was found to depend heavily on firm profitability. This may indicate that listed firms in GCC countries alter their dividend policy frequently and do not adopt a long-run target dividend policy. COSTOS DE AGENCIA EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL

Special Dividend Announcements: Signaling or Free Cash Flow Hypothesis? Evidence from UK Firms. Balasingham Balachandran Michael Dempsey Manali Mahamuni This study examines the impact of special dividend announcements in a partial imputation tax environment in the UK. We find that the market reaction is positive. The price reaction is negatively related with growth opportunities and positively related with pre-announcement cash flow and size of the special dividend. Abnormal future operating performance is positively related with growth opportunities for the year ended after the announcement and the year after, and is positively related with the size of the special dividend for the year ended after the announcement and insignificantly related thereafter. Overall, our findings support the conclusion that in a partial imputation tax environment, managers use special dividends both to signal future performance for firms with high growth opportunities and to reduce agency costs for firms with low growth opportunities. NI FU NI FA PARECE QUE ENCUENTRAN EVIDENCIA PARA LAS 2 HIPOTESIS, HAY QUE CHEQUEAR QUE TIPO DE EVIDENCIA PARA CADA UNA How Corporations Set their Dividend Payout Ratios. Michael S. Rozeff No tiene abstract, pero tengo el paper. COSTOS DE AGENCIA EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL

Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions REVISITED. Robert L. Kieschnick, Jr Lehn and Poulsen's (1989) paper is frequently cited as providing evidence supporting the applicability of Jensen's `free cash flow' hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) to levered going private transactions. They examined a sample of public corporations that went private during the 1980 through 1987 period and arrive at three basic inferences. First, the level of a firm's free cash flow is a significantly positive determinant of its probability of engaging in a going private transaction. Second, the level of a firm's free cash flow is a significantly positive determinant of the premiums paid to take the firm private. Third, the free cash flow hypothesis applies more strongly to firms

that went private during the 1984-1987 period than to firms that went private during the 19801983 period. In this paper, I present several different interpretations of Lehn and Poulsen's data as I conducted a statistical analysis of their data which accounts for particular attributes of their data and their sampling procedures, which they did not do. Specifically, I try to account for the influence of their choice based sampling scheme, outliers in their data, and potentially misspecified variables on their inferences. The importance of accounting for these considerations in the analysis of their data is demonstrated by the very different inferences which I draw from their data. First, in contrast to Lehn and Poulsen, I find that neither a firm's prior growth rate nor its prior level of free cash flow are significant determinants of the odds of it going private. Second, in contrast to Lehn and Poulsen, I do not find a firm's pre-transaction level of free cash flow to be a significant determinant of the premiums paid to take it private. Rather, I find the size of the firm and its potential for tax reductions to be significant determinants of the premiums paid to take it private. And finally, I do not find that firms that went private during the 1984-1987 period are distinguished from firms that went private during 1980-1983 by increased prior levels of free cash flows. Rather I find they are distinguished by greater prior takeover interest, slower prior growth, and less potential for tax reductions all of which are consistent with the overheated buyout market hypothesis of Kaplan and Stein (1993). To demonstrate these points, I will organize further discussion according to three questions. Does the free cash flow hypothesis correctly describe the kind of firms which engaged in a going private transaction? Does the free cash flow hypothesis correctly describe the determination of premiums paid to take a public corporation private? Was there a change in the attributes of firms that engaged in a going private transaction during the 1980s? After addressing these questions, I summarize my results and their implications for understanding going private transactions. COSTOS DE AGENCIA EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF REACTIONS TO DIVIDEND POLICY CHANGES FOR NASDAQ FIRMS Patricia A. Ryan Scott Besley Hei Wai Lee This study further examines the information content of dividend policy by concentrating on the rationale for the initiation or omission of dividend payments for NASDAQ firms. Cross-sectional weighted least squares regression provides strong support for the dividend signaling hypothesis, and only limited support for the free cash flow argument, in explaining stock price reactions to announcements of dividend policy changes. The use of an improved event study methodology that controls for fluctuations in idiosyncratic risk around the announcement, documents significant wealth and variance effects upon the initiation or omission of dividends by NASDAQ firms. SEALES EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL

Determinants of Dividend Policy: The Evidence from New Zealand Jianguo Chen Nont Dhiensiri In this study, we analyze the determinants of the corporate dividend policy using a sample of firms listed on New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSE). NZSE firms traditionally have high dividend pay-outs compared with companies in the US. This raises the question whether the existing dividend theories are applicable the NZSE firms. Our findings provide strong support to the agency cost theory and partially support transaction cost and residual dividend theory. We find that a dividend payout ratio is positively related to the degree of ownership dispersion and negatively related to the degree of insider ownership. We also find that firms that experience recent growth in revenues tend to pay lower dividends. There is a weak evidence to support the imputation tax credit hypothesis. We do not find evidence to support the dividend stability theory and the signalling theory. COSTOS DE AGENCIA EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL

Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy Evidence from the Tunisian Stock Market. Mondher Kouki Moncef Guizani The aim of this paper is to identify and analyse the influence of shareholder ownership identity on dividend policy for a panel of Tunisian firms from 1995 to 2001. Our results indicate that Tunisian companies with highly concentrated ownership distribute more dividends. We find that there is a significant negative correlation between institutional ownership and distributed dividend level. The relation between dividend policy and state ownership is positive. COSTOS DE AGENCIA EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL


While researchers have found that dividend payout ratios are negatively related to executive compensation in North America, a relevant question remains as to whether such relationships hold in other institutional environments. Evidence from this study suggests that, as in North America, there is a negative relationship between dividend payout ratios and executive compensations in Germany. This study shows that the role of dividends in resolving agency issues is relevant not only in market based systems like that in North America but also in bank based systems like Germany. Agency issues also appear to be partially mitigated by the influence of banks. Bank influence is also found to be positively related to dividend payout ratio and thus consistent with the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis of Jensen (1986) and Easterbrook (1984). COSTOS DE AGENCIA EVIDENCIA INTERNACIONAL BUSCAR: Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979)
DeAngelo, Harry, DeAngelo, Linda and Skinner, Douglas J., Corporate Payout Policy (May 7, 2009). Foundations and Trends in Finance, Vol. 3, Nos. 2-3, pp. 95-287, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1400682 DE ESTE ULTIMO, BAJAR LAS REFERNCIAS QUE TIENEN

Quarterly dividend and earnings announcements and stockholder returns: an empirical analysis. J. Aharony I. Swary http://www.jstor.org/pss/2327176 (no tiene abstract, ah aparece una pgina de la intro)

A theory of dividends based on tax clienteles. F. Allen A. Bernardo I. Welch This paper explains why some firms prefer to pay dividends rather that repurchase shares. When institutional investors are relatively less taxed than individual investors, dividends induce ownership clientele effects. Firms paying dividends attract relatively more institutions, which have a relative advantage in detecting high firm quality and in ensuring firms are well managed. The theory is consistent with some documented regularities, specifically both the presence and stickiness of dividends, and offers novel empirical implications, eg., a prediction that it is the tax difference between institutions and retail investors that determines dividend payments, not the absolute tax payments.

Payout policy. F. Allen R. Michaely This paper surveys the literature on payout policy. We start with a description of the MillerModigliani payout irrelevance proposition, and then consider the effect of relaxing the assumptions on which it is based. We consider the role of taxes, asymmetric information, incomplete contracting possibilities, and transaction costs. The accumulated evidence indicates that changes in payout policies are not motivated by firms desire to signal their true worth to the market. Both dividends and repurchases seem to be paid to reduce potential overinvestment by management. We also review the issue of the form of payout and the increased tendency to use open market share repurchases. Evidence suggests that the rise in the popularity of repurchases increased overall payout and increased firms financial flexibility.

Dividends, taxes and signaling: Evidence from Germany. Y. Amihud M. Murgia The higher taxation of dividends in the United States gave rise to theories that explain why companies pay dividends. Tax-based signaling models propose that the higher tax on dividends is a necessary condition to make them informative about companies' values. In Germany, where dividends are not tax-disadvantaged and in fact are taxed lower for most investor classes, these models predict that dividends are not informative. However, the authors find that the stock price reaction to dividend news in Germany is similar to that found in the United States. This suggests other reasons, beyond taxation, that make dividends informative.

The Dividend policy of German firms: A panel data analysis of partial adjustment models Christian Andres Andr Betzer Marc Goergen Luc Renneboog German firms pay out a lower proportion of their cash flows, but a higher proportion of their published profits than UK and US firms. We estimate partial adjustment models and report two major findings. First, German firms base their dividend decisions on cash flows rather than published earnings as (i) published earnings do not correctly reflect performance because German firms retain parts of their earnings to build up legal reserves, (ii) German accounting is conservative, (iii) published earnings are subject to more smoothing than cash flows. Second, to

the opposite of UK and US firms, German firms have more flexible dividend policies as they are willing to cut the dividend when profitability is only temporarily down.

Wealth Maximization and the Cost of Capital Alan J. Auerbach http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~dbackus/Taxes/Auerbach%20wealth%20QJE%2079.pdf (sin abstract)

Cash distributions to shareholders. L. Bagwell J. Shoven http://www.jstor.org/pss/1942765 (sin abstract).

Dividend clienteles and the information content of dividend changes. M. Bajaj M. Vijh We reason that dividend-yield surprises are perfectly correlated with dividend surprises. If investors with preference for dividends are the marginal investors in high-yield stocks, the price reaction to a dividend change should be larger, the higher the anticipated yield of the stock. An examination of over 8,500 dividend changes shows that price reactions to dividend increases are significantly more positive and to dividend decreases significantly more negative for high-yield stocks. Also, the price reactions to dividend changes are larger and the yield effect is stronger for low-priced and small-firm stocks, perhaps because of greater information content and higher transaction costs.

A Survey of Management Views on Dividend Policy H Kent Baker Gail E Farrelly Ricard B Edelman The effect of dividend policy on a corporation's market value is a subject of long-standing controversy. Black 2, p. 5 epitomizes the lack of consensus by stating "The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just don't fit together."