THEORIES OF "Coordination is the philosopher's stone of public management" (Harold Seidman)

BUREAUCRACY

Bureaucracy is an important macrolevel unit of analysis, but not so all-important that every theory of bureaucracy is a theory of public administration or a theory about society as a whole. Opinions vary over the importance as well as definition of bureaucracy. Hill (1991) boils down the scientific debate into three opinions: (1) those who say bureaucracies are powerful and inevitably dominate the policy process; (2) those who say bureaucracies are in-between powerful and powerless and best described as pathological entities which only have instrumental influence on policy; and (3) those who say bureaucracies may be significant, but are not all that powerful as actors in the political process. Clearly, a diversity of opinion exists, and the literature is full of value-laden (normative) as well as value-neutral (empirical) conceptualizations. Bureaucracies have been blamed for everything from "passing the buck" to the downfall of civilization. Some common stereotypes include being wasteful, inefficient, overly large, and a threat to liberty. Bureaucracies are often criticized for being "out of touch" and exhibiting the qualities of sluggishness, complacency, and arrogance. Everybody seems quick to point the finger of blame at bureaucracy when things go wrong, including media, politicians, special interests, academicians, and average citizens. Working in a bureaucracy is supposed to be thankless, boring, mindless, stupid work. It's not that they don't return your calls (that would be pre-bureaucratic behavior, or laziness), it's just that bureaucracies can only handle routine matters, and if something is out of the ordinary, it's "I have to check with my supervisor." Bureaucracy is the whipping boy for when people are really referring to organizations which don't work, don't plan, and don't innovate. Not all countries define their bureaucracy in the way Americans do, and further, as Riggs (1993) points out, virtually all countries in the world have more powerful bureaucracies than the U.S. Perhaps the reason why so many people over-inflate the importance of the concept is because the stakes are high. After all, a bureaucracy's greatest strength lies in its ability to coordinate complex operations, and coordination is what people expect out of their government. Public administration involves the coordination of resources to get complex tasks done, so it is easy to conflate the concepts of bureaucracy with public administration buzzwords like "administrative state" and "administrative systems" as Waldo (1948) and others (Jreisat 2002) have done. The most reasonable stance toward a meaningful conceptualization of bureaucracy seems to be toward adoption of opinion #2 (above), and Riggs (1994a) calls this the "semipowered" institutional approach. Another referent for something which is considered "in-between powerful and powerless" is middle-range theory. Middle-range theories, or theories of the middle range, are quite common in many fields of study. The idea of creating middle-range theories (MRT) is usually attributed to the sociologist Robert Merton (1949; 1967), but there were others, going back to Plato, Bacon, J.S. Mill, and T.H. Marshall, who advocated such things as middle axioms, middle principles, limited theories, and stepping stones in the middle distance. According to Merton (1967), a middle range theory consists of "a set of assumptions from which specific hypotheses are logically derived and subsequently confirmed by empirical research." Such theories, according to Merton (1967), are intended to be building blocks of larger, more "grand" theories, but several

theories in social science have never made it past the middle range. Morrow and Muchinsky (1980) list the examples of dissonance theory in psychology, collective behavior theory in sociology, reference group theory in social psychology, and oligarchy theory in political science as middle-range theories. Bureaucracy theory deserves to be added to this list of middle range theories because they only explain a small part of the puzzle. The term "bureaucracy" is derived from a French word negatively referencing all the scribes, clerks, functionaries, and other officials who serve as the "middle men" in government. The French saw bureaucracy as a dangerous "fifth branch of government" much like the dangerous "fourth branch" or famous Fourth Estate (as the news media or press are sometimes called). The bureaucracy is not called the Fifth Estate, which refers to organized crime (and the First Estate to clergy, the Second Estate to nobility, and the Third Estate to middle class). From the beginning, the concept of bureaucracy has always had negative connotations. For example, Harold Laski, in the 1930 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, defined bureaucracy as "a system of government the control of which is so completely in the hands of officials that their power jeopardizes the liberties of ordinary citizens; the characteristics of which include a passion for routine in administration, the sacrifice of flexibility to rule, delay in the making of decisions, and a refusal to embark upon experiment; in extreme cases resembling a hereditary caste manipulating the government to its own advantage" (Laski 1930:70). Also, the Austrian economist and libertarian Ludwig von Mises said: "The worst law is better than bureaucratic tyranny" (Mises 1944:76). Even the renowned sociologist Max Weber (1947:328) -- often championed as the father of bureaucracy -- defined the term as referring to an organization of administrative hierarchy characterized by loyalty to the office, a highly specialized division of labor, and impersonal relationships based on prestige, power, and control. Weber's influence, of course, was greater than this, and people often cite Weber (1947) for his other insights into bureaucracy as a master trend (Gerth & Mills 1976). With the exception of a small sociological tradition led by Selznick (1943) and foreshadowed by Barnard (1938) which holds that expanding bureaucracy assists with leadership development, most scholarly inquiry since the 1940s has been directed toward finding ways to downsize, reform, reorganize, reengineer, or manage the bureaucracy in order to make it more accountable, more humane, or more responsive. The Marxist critique of bureaucracy has always been in this direction, toward the lowering of government salaries to that of the average worker (as Marx himself wanted) and taking bureaucrats "down a peg" from their status of unearned privilege and self-esteem. Marxists also argue that what bureaucrats really do is manage class conflict, and additionally, this is important -- they do not directly produce any good or service for society (O'Connor 1973). On the issue of whether bureaucracies are as worthless as Marxists say, suffice it to say that opinions vary. THE DIFFICULTIES OF DEFINING BUREAUCRACY To denigrate bureaucracy is not to define it. One needs a good definition if a concept is to be a unit of comparison. The task is not easy. There are many difficulties. The simplest way to measure a bureaucracy would be to count the number of government workers. However, this simple way is the most hazardous way since it just might include elected officials when a bureaucracy should only properly include "appointed" workers. There is also the need to screen out managerial and clerical officials too high and too low in hierarchies (the supervisory/non-supervisory problem). A person too high up is a policy maker, not a bureaucrat; and a person too low doesn't possess the requisite discretion to make decisions of enough prestige or power. A bureaucrat, by definition, is someone who has decision making authority, but who regularly defers in their decision making to rule or precedent. In addition, some government employees do produce a direct service to society -- police patrolling a beat or soldiers carrying a rifle -- even though such actors are NOT normally thought of as part of the bureaucracy, at least in the American conception, but sometimes there are good reasons for including the police, the armed forces, corporations, hospitals, courts, ministries, schools, and universities as part of the bureaucracy (although this is highly debatable). In countries where the military does not subordinate to civilian leadership, there is certainly good reason for

including the armed forces as part of the bureaucracy. In some places, bureaucrats have seized power in a coup d'etat led by military officers (Riggs 1994b). When you think about it, both military officers and civil servants share the same grievances and depend heavily on the same source of politicoeconomic considerations for their livelihood. The typical "count" of bureaucrats in any government is usually no more than 2% of the workforce (Heady 2001), although in some countries like Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, the count can run higher simply because a third of the population works for the government (as opposed to the standard U.S. practice of keeping government employment around 15%). The reason for being conservative when counting the membership of a bureaucracy is that scholars are normally only interested in the "middle-top" levels of management. These levels form the relatively permanent "action group" of the "higher civil service" (Marx 1961). Those at the very top have short tenures of office, and those far down the middle never have a chance to influence policy. Those at the top are either temporary political appointees who hide behind executive privilege or semi-temporary political appointees who practice their own "spin control" and hence serve as "frontbench" players. Those at the bottom, ordinary levels ought to possess competence, experience, and expertise to a high degree, and so must be "multifunctional," meaning that they don't just do their job well, but articulate and aggregate interests (as the voice for public interest groups). It is customary in public administration to say that three (3) levels describe the ranks from which a bureaucracy is drawn, as follows:
y y y

top civil service -- a small group of "frontbench" executives, ministers, secretaries, and deputies higher civil service -- a large "elite" and educated group of permanent, high-ranking employees ordinary civil service -- a large body of "knowledgeable" permanent, public employees

In a way, it's wrong to paintbrush a whole sector as part of the bureaucracy or not because it's the mindset not the organization, which matters. The two are sometimes conflated, as for example when Marxists count up the number of relatively "non-productive" employees. Marxist-oriented scholars have always claimed to be able to detect non-productivity, but their methodology is evasive (O'Connor 1973). Identifying such employees might be easy in a market or business environment where a human capital perspective would look at things like salaries in relation to overhead, but it is extraordinarily difficult in a public sector environment to identify who's productive or not. Nonetheless, bureaucrats are kind of like capitalists in that they accumulate things (added value or self-valorizing labor), and contractors, of course, are expected to be both capitalists and bureaucrats. In regard to the mindset needed for becoming a bureaucrat, a person can be a bureaucrat and may not know it. Few bureaucrats self-identify because there are so many negative connotations associated with the term. At best, Marxist perspectives only add a little to our knowledge about bureaucracies. Experience and expertise are what matter, and these qualities are only thinly captured by a performance or accountability approach. THE WEBERIAN APPROACH TO BUREAUCRACY

Max Weber (1864-1920): the founding father of sociology, father of bureaucracy, and pioneer of scientific management did not have his works translated into English until long after his death. In organizational science, Weber is known for advocating a Western civilization approach to rationality (the logical synchronizing of means and ends) which elevates it to a mode of thought appropriate for all spheres of action, e.g., education, science, art, law, economy. Weber defended Western-style capitalism as the only politicoeconomic institution with rational laws, logical rules, bounded government, and trained administration. Weber not only enumerated the characteristics of bureaucracy but also analyzed the three forms of authority in organizations: 1. Charismatic -- the appeal to emotions and affections; charisma 2. Traditional - the sanctification of tradition or habit 3. Rational-legal - the valuation of something because it embodies an ultimate value; a disinterested, professional attitude of valuation toward a thing for its own sake Weber's (1947) paradigmatic studies on the subject are nothing less than brilliant, and according to his analysis, a proper bureaucracy (bureaucracy in its purest form), from a purely technical point of view, all other things being equal, always displays the characteristics of rational legal authority, as follows:
y y y y y y y y y y

a continuous organization of official functions with rule boundaries specialization via specified spheres of competence in a division of labor a clearly defined organization of offices based on the principle of hierarchy rules which require qualifications and training to understand and administer impersonality via equality of treatment for all clients of the organization appointment and promotion on the basis of merit and not bias or favor payment on the basis of rank accompanied by pension rights separation of public and private life in terms of interests and finances strict, systematic discipline and control of day-to-day work decisions, acts, and rules formulated and recorded in writing

One is likely to see the above list in various forms, but be advised that when trying to simplify or abbreviate Weber, there is dangerous risk of oversimplification in making Weber seem cold and heartless to such a degree that an efficiently-run Nazi death camp might appear admirable. Weber had a strong belief in the use of logic and reason to improve the human condition (he favored casuistry and typology), and his purpose was clearly to develop an "ideal-type" model that was just that -- ideal -- a standard by which to judge and evaluate all other forms of organization. His model was an abstraction weaving an exaggeration of certain elements of reality into a logically precise conception based on a combination of inductive and deductive analysis, and it has heuristic value even if it does not match any existing instances of the phenomenon in reality (Arora 1972). Shorthand versions of Weber's principles abound; e.g., from Harmon and Mayer (1986):
y y

Division of labor -- the principle of fixed delegation of authority and responsibility inside the organization Structure based on hierarchy -- a pyramid of control like in the military where higher-level officials supervise lower-level officials inside the organization

Administration based upon information -- about employees, processes, records, reports, data, etc. Employment which presupposes expert training -- all employees hired by the organization must demonstrate their qualifications for the job through education, training, or experience y Employees are full-time career workers -- this fosters increased organizational control over employees y Operation of the organization is based upon rigid and impersonal rules of behavior -- this is usually taken to mean that bureaucracy is dehumanized; and from Heady (2001) who says the pivotal elements of Weber's conception are as follows: y Hierarchy -- the element which most closely applies rationality to administrative tasks; firmlygraded levels of superordination and subordination in which higher offices supervise lower offices y Differentiation or Specialization -- differentiation is what sociologists mean by roles; specialization is the result of division of labor; both are necessary for cooperation to accomplish complex goals in organizations y Qualification or Competence -- neither is the same as professionalism; competence means being a "fit" for the job and qualification means some degree of preparation and education.
y y

Weber's characteristics of a bureaucracy are so pure that few organizations or associations would ever come close to complete realization of all of them. Nonetheless, they stand as the list of things which everyone agrees provides the highest degree of efficiency from among the choices for type of organizational structure (Denhardt 1998). A definition which similarly overemphasizes purposiveness or efficiency is the one provided by Jackson (1982:121): "a bureaucracy is a particular form of organization composed of bureaus or agencies, such that the overall system consists of conspicuously coordinated activities which have been explicitly created to achieve specific ends." What this efficiency-driven approach boils down to is the idea that bureaucracy rests on a notion that the complete ordering of time and space is possible. Think of the concept as a bureau or desk with drawers in it, which seems to call out to you, demanding that everything must fit in its place. Things that are untidy, or do not fit in some place, cannot be tolerated. This way of thinking is the bureaucratic mentality, and ultimately, when we are talking about bureaucracy, we are talking about a mindset, but one which exhibits a lot of variation. One of the areas where this mindset plays out has to do with control -- social control --and its ideal sanctioning system, criminal justice. Often, the following shorthand list of Weber's characteristics of bureaucracy is seen in criminal justice textbooks:
y y y y y

Rulification and routinization -- effort-saving rules and equal treatment Specific spheres of competence -- clear division of labor, specialization The principle of hierarchy -- leave no office uncontrolled Expertise of office holders -- managers to have technical training Written record-keeping -- everything to be recorded and filed; red tape

Since the more we simplify Weber, the more we make bureaucracy sound bad, it might be helpful to examine some of the reasons why Weber (1947) thought bureaucracies were good. The following are those reasons, and they are largely indisputable. The Reasons Why Bureaucracies are Good 1. Bureaucratic organizations are the most efficient means of controlling the work of large numbers of people. 2. Bureaucratic organizations are technically superior to any other type of organization in accomplishing complex goals. 3. Bureaucratic organizations bring about equality since civil service rules and codes conduct reduce discrimination. 4. Bureaucratic organizations are rational, efficient, and expert because they master a problem

through specialized knowledge. THE SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT MOVEMENT At about the same time Weber's ideas were being formulated, another influential figure would emerge to change the way the world looked at something so basic as what it meant to "manage" something. You see, prior to this individual entering the stage, most people worked for autocratic family businesses where there only existed various degrees of familial benevolence to guide management practice. The individual who changed all that was F.W. Taylor, and his ideas merit at least a brief sidetrip here. Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856-1915): the founder of scientific management, father of efficiency experts, Isaac Newton of work, and first management consultant, held numerous patents and authored five books, the most notable being Principles of Scientific Management (1911). Taylor revolutionized ("Taylorized") the steel industry, the paper industry, the defense industry, and along with Henry Ford improved mass production in the auto industry. "Taylorization" meant continuous production processes which are continuously improved with workers following orders on specific instructions about how to do the job. In 1935, Stalin started imitating Taylorism in the Soviet Union, and today, companies like Toyota Motor Corp. still run on Taylorist principles. In 1940, one of Taylor's associates, Morris Cooke, started applying Taylorist principles to education (he started the practice of using adjunct professors) and government work, but most people now realize that the first book on public administration (White 1926) was as much inspired by F.W. Taylor as it was by Woodrow Wilson. Scientific management reached its peak in America during 1900-1930, but it had lasting effects beyond that. Taylor himself was not a very good speaker, and he always had to explain himself over and over again in front of congressional committees about things like his concept of "first class man." A first class man was usually the rate-buster, or the person stopwatch studies indicated could get the most work done in the shortest amount of time. Because Taylors scheme was rational, perhaps too rational, it came to be seen as denigrating to workers as human beings, so many in the federal government (the military, particularly) thought his ideas were dangerous, with scientific management banned by federal law from ever being implemented in that sector. However, one of Taylor's followers, Henry Gantt (famous for inventing "Gantt Charts" used to track project deadlines) eventually got PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique) and CPM (Critical Path Method) to be accepted by the military and other government sectors. Some of Taylor's other followers, Frank & Lillian Gilbreth -- the "founders of time-motion studies" and "1st lady of management" -- invented various devices (the chronocyclegraph) using stopwatches and strobe lights which workers put on and had their movements tape-recorded while they worked -- discovered 17 basic movements of the hand (all based on the ability to search, grasp, load, select, hold, and transport) and more efficient eye-tracking habits; and experimented with different types of factory whistle blasts, suggestion boxes, and intramural programs among employees. Lillian Gilbreth is particularly known for her contributions to administrative theory in general. F.W. Taylor was a pragmatist and a perfectionist, always looking for the "one best way." He hated "soldiering," the term in those days for workers just doing what the informal workgroup had established as a fair days work (no rate-busting). "Speedy" Taylor wanted everybody to be a rate-buster, and he thought unions were unnecessary. Whenever he was brought in as a consultant, he would typically achieve a 200% increase in productivity with only a 50% increase in wages. People would say all sorts of bad things about his methods, but they couldn't argue with his results. It may be significant to note that social problems, like

alcoholism and divorce, went down considerably wherever his methods were implemented. His methods and principles were as follows: Create a time study rate system -- Taylor would find the fastest worker in the organization, the fastest "rate-buster" whom, of course, everybody else in the organization hated. If one didn't exist, he would "scientifically" go out, recruit, hire, and train somebody. He then examined that person's movements on the job, suggested the elimination of unnecessary movements, and took the speediest rate at which this "first class person" could work to hold the other workers accountable to it (with minor adjustments for newness at the job, rest periods, and unavoidable delays). y Create "functional foremen" -- Taylor fought against using the military model in organizations. No manager was to have disciplinary powers; that was the job of a special "Disciplinarian Office" which are known today as Personnel Offices. The notion of "functional" means supervision over some aspect of work, not supervision over people. This notion essentially meant the creation of specialized clerks with oversight over some aspect of the production, which today we call "expediters" or "quality control/assurance" clerks. These clerks had the authority and were known as functional foremen while the regular foremen practiced the exception principle where only big problems come to their attention. Because most assembly-line productions involve 8 major steps to a finished product, Taylor advocated a span of control of 8. y Establish cost accounting -- also known as task management, this approach involved the use of instruction and routing cards and a timekeeping system where workers punched a clock when they finished a job. Labor variance could then be analyzed, and management had the reporting tools they needed to identify bottlenecks. Rewards and punishments would be doled out by how the numbers looked on paper. Unions would not be allowed to stand in the way. y Pay the person and not the position -- end-of-year bonuses were considered too late by Taylor, who instituted a system of inequitable pay for workers. Those that looked good on paper (via the Accounting Office) were paid more (a system of high salary rate and low salary rate), and they were supposed to keep their salaries secret, especially from the union (which the unions didn't like). There were no attempts under Taylorism at job rotation; each worker was expected to specialize in a particular task they did well. The 13 Scientific Management Principles 1. Regularized operations which conserve investment, sustain the enterprise, and assure continuous operation 2. Assurances of continuous operation and employment by planned and balanced continuous earning opportunities 3. Waste-saving techniques which entitle workers and management to increased wages and profits 4. A higher standard of living for all workers 5. A happier home and social life for all workers 6. Assurances of healthful and socially agreeable conditions of work 7. Opportunities for improvement of individual capacities thru scientific methods of work analysis, selection, training, assignment, transfer, and promotion of workers 8. Assurances by training and functional foremanship the opportunity for workers to develop new and higher capacities, and eligibility for promotion to higher positions 9. The development of self-confidence and self-respect among workers 10. The development of self-expression and self-realization among workers thru an atmosphere of research and validation 11. The building of character thru the proper conduct of work 12. The promotion of justice thru the elimination of discrimination in wage rates and elsewhere 13. The elimination of factors in the environment which are irritating and cause friction; the promotion of common understanding, tolerances, and the spirit of team work
y

FOUR THEORIES OF BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS The field of public administration has always been interested in bureaucratic behavior, either from the organizational theory point of view or the "ecology of administration" (Gauss 1947) point of view, the latter being a focus upon bureaucracies interact with their larger environment, particularly their political environment. From the field of political science, then, comes four (4) theories of bureaucratic politics. These theories are designed to shed light on the inner workings of bureaucracy as well as how bureaucracies interact with political systems. Political scientists examine factors that influence the exercise of discretion and policy implementation, and they are not much concerned with the reasons why bureaucracies exist in the first place, such as was the concern of French sociologists like Crozier (1964). Different research questions exist, and the four theories of bureaucratic politics represent neatly laid-out areas of inquiry which allow political scientists to conduct research. #1. The politics-administration dichotomy is a theory which holds that bureaucrats are experts who should be left alone to do their job without political interference. It derives from the Woodrow Wilson days of the "founding" of public administration, and is easily found expressed in both "old" and "new" textbooks of public administration (e.g., White 1926; Goodnow & Rohr 2003). It holds that there should be no favoritism in hiring or contracting decisions. In its strictest form, the theory holds that there should be a complete separation of administration from politics. Students are most likely to encounter the theory when studying the council-manager form of municipal government where the city manager is expected to be some kind of outside "neutral expert." In criminal justice, it is most often encountered in the literature on court management or court reform. It is also likely to be encountered when the topics of ethics or efficiency are discussed in the field of public sector management. While the theory has long been useful for marking off the boundaries of public administration as an intellectual field, application of the theory in reality and practice has yielded very little by way of insight into bureaucratic behavior or a better understanding of the policy-making process. Montjoy and Watson (1995) argue that the theory was never intended to be applied strictly and should be used only as a guide for assessing normative behavior, or professional ethics. Further, Svara (1999) argues that the word "dichotomy" (which implies strict separation) should be replaced by "complementarity" since the thrust of public administration literature from Wilson (1989) onward has stressed such concepts as interdependency and reciprocal influence. It is probably accurate to say that politicians and public administrators regularly negotiate their mutual influence upon one another. Politicians, for their part, who are used to a much more "rough and tumble" world than public administrators, sometimes try to control bureaucracies by appointing directors who are completely opposed to the mission of the bureaucracies they are supposed to manage. Public administrators, for their part, tend to react to this by re-emphasizing merit, demanding disclosures, or engaging in various kinds of ethical whistleblowing or workarounds. Of course, sometimes bureaucracies can choose to blindly follow political leadership for purposes of enhancing their power position or in hopes of being able to exercise more discretion over an important agency function. Most governments generally face continual struggles with establishing the proper balance between political control of bureaucracy and democratic control of bureaucracy, and such struggles are a hallmark of democratic systems. #2. The iron triangle theory holds that three groups feed off of each other and develop long-term, regularized relationships, those three groups usually being identified as: special interest groups; congressional subcommittees; and bureaucratic agencies. Special interest groups are major contributors to political campaign finances, and either have their own in-house lobbyists or retain one of the several wellestablished lobbying firms who all seem to have offices along Washington's legendary K Street. European (EU) lobbying takes place mainly in Brussels and is rapidly growing to resemble the U.S. pattern although the job title "consultant" is more common overseas for what Americans call a lobbyist. In the U.S., OpenSecrets.org says the biggest spending on lobbying activity comes from the medical and/or pharmaceutical industries, followed by the energy industry, followed by defense contractors, followed by

realtors, followed by telecoms, and followed by automobile manufacturers, and so on. Lobbyists sometimes hire celebrities to be their spokesperson (an example would be that guy, "Cliff" or John Ratzenberger, from the TV show "Cheers" who represents the manufacturing industry), but far more often, lobbying firms actively recruit and hire from the ranks of staffers (legislative staff assistants or LSAs) on congressional committees or subcommittees (an example would be an LSA to some Senator on the Senate Committee for Homeland Security who takes a job as manager of governmental relations for the travel industry). Thus, the travel lobbying firm capitalizes on its "connections" and political access to at least one important politician who heads an important Senate committee. Since the lobbying firms gain so much influence to "steer" legislation, the bureaucratic agencies have no choice but to align themselves with such firms (which they call "working a constituency") in hopes of "steering" legislation favorable to the agency itself. Iron triangle theory assumes bureaucratic behavior is guided by a kind of "squeaky wheel gets the grease" philosophy (Downs 1993), which in more technical terms means that agency power is derived from satisfying constituents, not consumers. A staple of public administration thought (e.g., Rourke 1984; Knott & Miller 1987) is that consumers make the worst constituents, as they only represent the poor, uneducated, general public who seldom vote, have no financial muscle, and have short little attention spans. In short, iron triangle theory does a good job of explaining things like regulatory capture, which occurs when a state agency fails to act in the public interest and instead starts acting on behalf of special interests. Sometimes, iron triangle theory is stretched to support conspiracy theories about military-industrial complexes and the like. #3. The issue network theory holds that bureaucracies are not as rigid or rational as iron triangle theory portrays them to be, and that, also, more than three actors are involved in the process, such as other members of congress, the president, political candidates, special interest groups, advocacy or watchdog groups, and interested citizens. The word "issue" in this theory's name stems from the idea that for every issue, there are a number of political elites or parties who are involved in and know each other via the issue. The word "network" implies the existence of a loose set of relationships between people (elites and nonelites) who only have limited interest and/or control over resources that a bureaucracy needs for policy continuity. An "issue network" is typically regarded as a much looser process than a much-tighter "policy community" (Marsh 1998). In public administration, the idea that bureaucracies are influenced by issue networks comes from the field of organizational behavior (Kickert & Koppenjan 1997). Research indicates that people who work in organizations often influence those around them (e.g., family, friends) with thoughts about what policies their organization ought to be pursuing, and are simultaneously bombarded by similar messages from a variety of actors which might include special interest groups, politicians running for office, media pundits, and/or prominent, outspoken neighbors or friends. In strategic management terms, an issue network represents "strategic alliances" of parties with diverse interests who come together for a brief period of time to help shape the direction of policy formulation on a single issue, but more importantly, they create path dependencies that bureaucrats come to rely upon for feedback on implementation. Issue network theory appeals to those who agree with the notion that "bureaucrats are people too," and the theory does a good job of explaining such things as the personality factors behind bureaucratic politics as well as the many policy discontinuities which result from the open conflict, or gamelike nature, of issue network outcomes. The field of public management has recently developed an interest in finding ways to harness the power of issue networks. #4. The principal-agent theory holds that bureaucratic behavior is best explained by the interplay between two groups: principals (buyers in the language of economic theory) who want to control as much as they can of the bureaucracy; and agents (sellers or providers) who strive to avoid having any control by principals placed over them. In practice, principals are synonymous with supervisors and agents are the same as subordinates (Horn 1995). The theory rests extensively upon what is known about the nature of working in hierarchical organizational structures where one of the main problems is a lack of upward (vertical) communication so that supervisors can know if subordinates are, in fact, carrying out their orders (Jackson

1983; Miller 2005). Agents control this information flow, and are often as diffuse or obscure as possible about it. In such a diffuse information environment, principals often further seek to manipulate and mold the behavior of agents so that they will act in accordance with the principals' preferences. However, principals tend to know less than agents about what is really important, and principals often lose control over their agents except for episodic times when they exercise power over salary contracts. In many ways, principal-agent theory is really about the management of incentives, or what motivates people to communicate and perform under various incentives. Clearly, an obvious finding is that principals who underpay their agents can expect little effort in return as well as downright resistance to change, a phenomenon which managers would do best to not take personally (Barzelay 1992). Principal-agent theory is constantly being applied in a variety of contexts with mixed empirical results. Some particular research areas where the theory might make valuable contributions would be the study of bribery and corruption, since these things can easily be seen in supply-and-demand terms as a kind of market transaction. Also, the notion of a "fair day's work" is undeveloped in the theory. BUREAUCRATIC DEFECTS AND PATHOLOGIES There are many criticisms of bureaucracy, and the most important ones raise questions about its impact on society without making it a convenient scapegoat for all of society's ills. The first and foremost question to ask is whether bureaucracy is compatible with democracy. There are many who say it is not. For example, Hayek (1994) in his book, The Road to Serfdom, makes the argument that bureaucrats represent central planners who are interested in increasing governmental control of everyday life to the extent that every bureaucratic society runs the risk of becoming a totalitarian society. Mills (2000) makes a similar point in The Power Elite about the kinds of expertise power and superior technical skills which tend to concentrate in bureaucracies. Scholars in public administration (e.g., Jreisat 2002) usually just point out that bureaucracies represent unelected officials and to some extent are accountable to no one. Then, there are those who just dislike bureaucracies because they represent rules, regulations, hierarchy, standardization, and impersonality. It's difficult to assess whether large bureaucracies tend toward totalitarianism because few empirical studies exist on the subject. In historical context, it may be true since countries like Germany, Italy, and Japan did increase the size of their bureaucracies before starting World War II, but there have been numerous examples of other countries, like India, the U.K., and U.S., which created large bureaucracies and simultaneously safeguarded democracy. A second possible defect/pathology concerns whether a large bureaucracy actually hinders or stunts a developing country's development in other ways, such as political development. Heady (2001) calls this the "imbalance thesis" and it argues that a large bureaucracy displays elements of nepotism and political favoritism, and, more importantly, overparticipates in the political affairs of state, to the detriment of elected politicians who are challenged whenever they try to implement reforms in a more democratic or representative direction. Riggs (1994a) agrees with Heady (2001) that imbalance in development can occur, and certainly common sense would suggest that growth and efficiency would be stifled whenever a large bureaucracy suffers under its own weight of swelled ranks and too many public employees. In far too many countries of the world, the only hope for a viable job is that of a "government worker." Whether or not a government payroll economy stunts private sector development and development in other ways is an empirical question which researchers do investigate, but usually come up with mixed results. What has arisen in recent years, interestingly enough, are numerous "consultants" and a whole consulting industry who will tell you if your bureaucracy is "imbalanced" or not. Such downsizing consultants do not normally address whether bureaucracies usurp power, however. A third defect/pathology charges that bureaucracies are too rigid and unable to change or be innovative. Crozier (1964) exemplifies this view that bureaucracies simply take too long to get anything done. It is a widespread perception. Consultants as well as government executives have, for many years, subjected

bureaucracies to the latest management fads, like team building, total quality management (TQM), reinvention, reengineering, etc. Often, such reform attempts fail to understand that a certain amount of bureaucratic ritualism -- in the form of rules and standards -- may be quite beneficial for a society. Rules exist for a reason -- to prevent chaos and ensure accountability. Following the rules means preventing punishable mistakes, and every bureaucrat knows this because it is part of their survival instinct to seek safety thru compliance and avoiding risk. On the other hand, when rules are used to cover up mistakes, poor judgment, or a lack of intelligence, those are different matters and indeed some pathological phenomena. There is no such thing as the perfect bureaucracy. The real world of public management is always going to be different from any academic characterizations of it. Realizing this does not mean that academic pursuits should be abandoned, but instead, a doubling of effort is called for in attempts to rid the study of bureaucracy from pre-conceived perceptions. There are likely much more variant forms of bureaucracy than the ideal-type which intrigued Weber (1947). The full Weberian bureaucratic model rarely exists in practice, but some features of it are found in all bureaucracies. A number of complex and diverse views exist on the subject, and surely it is premature to call any of them "right" or "wrong." THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO BUREAUCRACY Comparative public administration has long recognized that bureaucracy is inevitable. There is little doubt that any sizeable, viable polity in the world today must have a public service which meets the criteria for a bureaucracy (Heady 2001). It may also be true that globalization can be seen as the expansion of bureaucratic structure. However, the inevitability of bureaucracy does not mean uniformity, as there is much variation throughout the world. So-called "deviant bureaucracies" may exist, especially in newer developing nations and in socialist societies (Kulcsar 1991). Bureaucracies vary by departmentalization, which references the number of cabinet agencies or ministries the government has. Chapman (1959) argued that, at minimum, any government needs five (5) departments: foreign affairs; justice; finance; defense, and internal affairs. Most growth comes from adding new departments off the internal affairs category (like education, transport, health, etc.) Other departmental growth occurs when regulatory commissions grow in size and become full-fledged departments, or when quasi-public "government corporations" become full-fledged government agencies. According to Chapman (1959), the worldwide average back around 1959 was fifteen (15) departments, Russia being the exception because in its Soviet heyday it had fifty (50) different government departments. According to Heady (2001), the worldwide average nowadays is still about 15 (the number of cabinet agencies and ministries in the U.S. and U.K.) although some countries (mostly small ones) get by with as few as 10 or 12, and another cluster of countries (Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea, Mexico, Canada, and Greece) have "bloated" bureaucracies of 20 departments or more. Obviously, the larger the number of departments, the harder it is to coordinate them, and the interrelationship problem will result in fragmented decision making when policy requires different agencies to work on different facets of the same social problem. Bureaucracies also vary by the nature of their civil service system, which references how someone goes about getting a job with the federal government. Variation can occur not between countries, but within countries as different departments do their hiring differently. The most important factor is perhaps whether people wind up in government jobs by accident or not. In other words, one should ask whether public service really has any meaning. One should also ask if people are prepared by training or ability to work in the civil service. One of the findings from the comparative literature is that in developed countries (as opposed to developing countries), more people work at the state and local levels of government (Heady 2001). In other words, developing countries hire more people at the central, or federal, level, even though the extent of public employment is higher in developed countries. Qualifications for public service depend

upon the political system, and party loyalty or patriarchal patronage are the only requirements in some countries. Political system and regime type will always be a factor. Significant also is a country's historical legacy, which references all sorts of things, mostly negative, such as being a former colony, having experienced disasters, to having a hardened culture of bureaucratic inertia or dependency. Some of these factors are difficult but not impossible to put into a model (see Prof. Fred Riggs Home Page), but the end result is usually that the government's bureaucracy will have a semidifferentiated (or prismatic) interlocking mixture of bureaus, chambers, offices, and rooms. Such governments will essentially be wasting a lot of resources to try evening out the unequal distribution of services under such arrangements, and in the end, it all comes back to arrangements -- organizational issues; or how structures are set up to perform functions -- regardless of the debates about bureaucracy, regardless of all the talk about culture -- it all boils down to the social scientific need to classify before analyzing. A bureaucracy is not an autonomous unit in a political system, but it can be as self-directing as it wants to be as well as responsive to its environment. For example, in Japan the practice of gaiatsu is common, where Japanese bureaucrats ask foreign government officials to lobby the Japanese government on issues favored by Japanese bureaucrats. Such "hidden activism" by bureaucrats is not uncommon in countries other than the US, and may very well be prevalent among American bureaucrats as well. Nonetheless, it is often the case that politics gets the type of bureaucracy it deserves, and along those lines, the model produced by Heper (1987:20) is illuminating as to the associated types of polity and bureaucracy: Heper's Six Types of Bureaucracy Personalist polity Ideological polity State=Ruler State=Ruler State=BureaucracyState=Party

Liberal polity Praetorian polity Absence of a predominant No state state

Personal servant bureaucracy

"Machine model" bureaucracy

"Bonapartist" Rechtsstaat bureaucracy

Party-controlled Spoils system bureaucracy with or Weberian bureaucracy as residues of "legal-rational" part of a historical bureaucratic bureaucracy Hegelian civil ruling society tradition

THE STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS "Political power is the capacity to control the relational system, as a system" (Talcott Parsons) The reason why political scientists prefer the term "political system" for "state" is because it is a valuefree term, and more importantly, because the sphere of politics is much wider than that of a state. The word "political" refers to a context of power and authority which extends beyond the normal confines of geography. An analogous term is "system." A "system" refers to an organized whole with interdependent (moving) parts, regular patterns of interaction, known boundaries, structures, and functions performed by structures. Max Weber, the famous sociologist, once said: "a political system is one which successfully claims a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force." What this means is that a political system refers to security organizations which help maintain domestic order in a society. What holds such systems together and makes them work is the subject matter of political theory, one of the main subfields of political science, but it's also the reason why some political scientists study criminal justice, since criminal justice is also the study of security organizations which maintain order. A political system, however, may include not only security organizations, but a variety of groups in society, such as kinship clans and caste or class

stratifications, and the defining feature of when a "nation" or "state" emerges is when these smaller groupings, such as clans or tribes, transfer their commitment and loyalty to a larger, usually central, government. A state is also a political system which has sovereignty (roughly defined as the right to selfdetermination). In this lecture, we are concerned with discovering the essential structures, and essential functions performed by structures, which allow a political system to emerge and be maintained. Some background is necessary for understanding structural-functional approaches. When Gabriel Almond (1956) first published his article, "Comparative Political Systems," it brought sociology, and particularly the ideas of Talcott Parsons to the forefront of political science and public administration. Parsons studied under the renowned anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski and came to be influenced by the thought of Max Weber, but while Weber believed in voluntarism (free will), Parsons believed in determinism, not unlike the sociological determinism of Emile Durkheim. In the hands of sociological determinists, the word "structure" took on the meaning of mostly-invisible, background factors which cause people to act in ways they wouldn't ordinarily act. These mostly-invisible factors are social (created by groupthink, if you will) and very multiplex (using code to communicate a vast number of consequentialist ideas all at once). I'm sure my old sociology professors would scold me for oversimplifying it like this, but a structural-functional approach can be said to be one which looks for mostly "hidden" (low-key) structures that have multiple consequences (functions), good and bad. The fundamental starting point of Parsons was to ask the question "What makes a society stable?" He answered that question by developing a theoretical system based around the concepts of equilibrium, evolutionary universals, and the identification of properties that are common to all societies. In his theory, stable societies exhibit the same characteristics as stable biological systems, which evolve or modernize by being adaptive, differentiating (incorporating specialized institutions and increasing the division of labor), upgrading (seeking greater freedom from want), inclusive (tolerating normative diversity), and generalizing (developing values that are more reflective of the needs of an increasingly complex system). These good functions, or modernizing factors, were also considered to be inevitable, "functional imperatives" every society eventually goes through. And, as ethnocentric as this sounds --- along these criteria, Parsons believed the United States represented the most stable, evolved, and modernized society the world has ever seen. His reasoning went like this: the U.S. simply had so many low-key structures (like families and neighborhood groups) performing mostlygood functions, day in and day out, without need of recognition, that the U.S. simply could not help itself from becoming so highly evolved. During the years between 1950 and the late 1970s, Parsonian structural-functionalism was the dominant theoretical force in social science. It was "the theory" -- the biggest of all theories; the grand, master theory, and Parsons had many followers. For example, there were luminaries like Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) who is known for the claim that Western democracies were stable because of the existence of a large middle class as well as a tradition of opposition parties being respectful of the dominant party. Then, there was Robert Dahl (1971) who defended the U.S. system as a type of politically advanced society he called "polyarchy" because it created multiple centers of political power. There were many others, but for present purposes, we shall be concerned primarily with the ideas of the foremost structural functionalist in public administration -- Gabriel Almond (1911-2002), who argued that American political systems were more stable because they exemplified a high degree of consensus on both political means and ends, and also because the political roles of individuals and institutions were clearly differentiated and delineated. Almond et al.'s (2007) book, now in its ninth edition, is standard reading in political science. His smaller book (Almond et al. 2004) is standard reading in comparative politics. When these books first came out, they introduced a novel structural functionalist approach to comparing political systems. The authors argued that in order to understand a political system, it was necessary to understand both institutions (another name for structures, both low-key and high-key) and their respective functions, and further, that institutions must be studied in their dynamic and historical contexts because it is possible for essential

functions to be carried out by different, but similar, structures in different settings. These ideas stood in marked contrast to David Easton's (1953) systems approach which prevailed at the time, consisting of statesociety theory and dependency theory, both viewpoints which saw all political systems as essentially the same, subject to the same laws of "stimulus and response" (inputs and outputs) while paying little attention to the unique context of systems. Yet, Almond's (2007) structural-functional approach only recognized context to a limited extent because it largely disregarded culture (generational fads or fashions) which provided freethinking openings. It's still a systems theory, and based on the view that any political system is made up of seven key functions which are usually carried out by certain key actors, as follows:

The Seven (7) Functions Political Systems Need to Perform function political definition actors involved

getting people to fulfill all the political roles associated families/schools/ with the political system from voters to leaders; forming recruitment and positive attitudes, values, beliefs and opinions which parties/ media socialization maintain or sustain the political system political transmitting politically-relevant information to citizens communication interest expressing/making demands upon the political system articulation interest aggregation selecting demands and combining manageable number of alternatives them parties/ interest groups/ media

parties/ groups

pressure

into a parties/ bureaucracy the

rule-making

taking demands and converting them into authoritative decisions of the political system

legislature

rule application rule adjudication

administering or putting the decisions into effect; policy executive implementation making authoritative decisions about whether or not a rule judiciary has been transgressed in given cases

A political system operates by performing two basic types of functions. The first four functions are called "input" functions (recruitment and socialization, communication, interest articulation, and interest aggregation). Of these, interest articulation is probably the most important, involving what Easton (1953) called "demands" which consist of such things as calls for more wages, fixed working hours, open educational institutions, provision of recreational facilities, well-maintained roads, and law and order. The last three are called "output" functions (rule-making, rule application, and rule adjudication), and it is

readily apparent they are other words for the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. Almond and Powell (1966) have also classified functions into three types: capability functions; conversion functions; and communication functions. The capability functions include those with extractive capability (to extract taxes and obedience from people), regulative capability (how far the system is allowed to go to enforce law and order), distributive capability (how goods and services are distributed), symbolic capability (whether the political system is in a position to get love for its symbols such as the national flag, or the national anthem, etc.), and responsive capability (how responsive the system is as perceived by citizens). The capability functions play a role in how a political system conducts transactions between its domestic and foreign environments. The conversion functions are the same as interest articulation and interest aggregation, and are simply called conversion functions because they convert inputs from the environments to outputs in the environments. The communication functions are also the same as socialization and recruitment and communication, but they are also sometimes referred to as "developmental" processes. Admittedly, all this is an elaborate taxonomy (classification scheme), but here's how it works: According to Cammack (1998), in order for a political system to run smoothly and enjoy a healthy autonomy or boundary maintenance between polity and society, there must be a way to avoid any rush of unprocessed claims or demands without direction or control by the political system. Citizen demands must be selected, channeled, and controlled. Any "rush" or "eruption" of diverse claims by the citizenry is to be avoided; otherwise the political system will become overwhelmed by direct societal pressures. This kind of predicament can be avoided not simply by the presence of interest group, political parties, and mass media of some kind, but by having specific types of these institutions: associational interest groups, secular, pragmatic, and bargaining parties, and free and neutral mass media (such as those found in the U.K. or U.S.). An ideal political system utilizes such unfragmented and differentiated structures for interest articulation, and the political parties, for example, are not overly politicized nor tied to particular ideologies or interests. These institutions do not monopolize the function of interest articulation, but they help to regulate it. A free and neutral mass media, for instance, also helps to "regulate the regulators." Further, because autonomous structures are helping with regulation of this important function (interest articulation), the political system is freer to exercise control over capability functions involving "enforcement" of the overall boundaries which enables "cultural penetration" -- the fusion of modern and traditional through penetrating the "traditional" styles of diffuseness, particularlism, ascription, and affectivity by more "rational" styles of specificity, universalism, achievement, and affective neutrality. In other words, a perfectly functioning political system would be modernizing, not necessarily because of any direct government effort, but by the process of encouraging increased subsystem autonomy and rationality. ALMOND'S SEVEN POLITICAL FUNCTIONS IN DETAIL Political recruitment and socialization In every society, new members must be inducted into the political culture to sustain the set of attitudes necessary for the system to survive. Socialization into this culture may be manifest or latent. If latent, then some non-political attitudes will be cultivated, but that is the nature of socialization. It's never perfect, and always involves some degree of risk. Recruitment is more direct, involving the hiring and training of individuals for specific roles. Every political system, whether Western or non-Western, has to perform the function of political recruitment and socialization. Political communication While it is true that all functions are performed by means of communication, it is the content and not the form which matters most. In modern systems, the media have developed a vocational ethics of neutrality and therefore perform a function separate and autonomous from other types of adjective communication. There must be a free flow of information from society to polity and from one political structure to another as

well as an open feedback mechanism. Almond (2007) holds that one can compare the political systems of different countries quite well by only looking at the political communications. Interest articulation Demands for political action need to be formulated and expressed properly, and it normally occurs at the boundaries of various subsystems. The structures which help perform this function also make up environmental boundaries for the system as a whole, separating the polity from society. In Almond's (2007) classification, there are four main types of interest articulation structures: institutional interest groups, nonassociational interest groups, anomic interest groups, and associational groups. The institutional interest groups include legislatures, political executives, bureaucrats, armies, and churches, etc. Non-associational interest groups include kinship and lineage groups, ethnic, regional, religious, status and class groups (such groups often only perform the articulation function intermittently or sporadically). Anomic interest groups are also sporadic, and explosive too, since they only want to press their demands through riots or demonstrations. Associational groups (the best kind) consist of specialized structures like trade unions, business and professional associations, civic associations, and educational associations. If groups do not find open channels to express their interests and needs, their demands will go unsatisfied and they may erupt in violence, requiring suppression by the elite. The manner of expression can also either mitigate or intensify an ongoing conflict. Interest aggregation Somehow, demands must be converted into policy alternatives, and political parties are the main instrument for this, but in some instances, the aggregation function may be performed by the legislature, the bureaucracy, the mass media, and interest groups of a civic type. The bureaucracy, for example, often consists of persons with experience at working out whatever regulatory codes are needed to elaborate upon some general policy, within limits of how much interpretation the bureaucracy is given. Rule-making Sometimes in some countries it's not called legislation, so the word "rule-making" is preferably used. However, rules must be made in a certain way and by specific institutions with certain kinds of limitations. What's important is the way people interact to make the rules. Rule application Rules are made to be enforced, and it is up to the bureaucracy to do this. A bureaucracy is at the core of modern government. However, there also needs to be some central, decision-making authority to offset the inevitable trends toward inertia and decentralization. The presence of differentiated and well-developed rule application structures greatly expand the capability of a political system to manipulate its environment. Rule adjudication It is the duty of the judiciary to interpret the laws and determine guilt or innocence. An independent judiciary also works best for resolving conflicts which break out between citizens. An ideal judiciary operates on a certain set of settled rules which have been applied to past conflicts in society. THE SIX TYPES OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS Attempts to classify political systems have been a fine art for many years. Aristotle (the famous ancient Greek philosopher) had a handy sixfold typology which consisted of the following: monarchy (rule by one for good of whole), tyranny (rule by one for self interest), aristocracy (rule by few for good of whole), oligarchy (rule by few for own interest), polity (rule by many for good of whole), and democracy (rule by many in their own interest). Aristotle did not think any rule in the interest of a particular class (even the masses) was good. Hence, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy were bad; and monarchy, aristocracy, and

polity were good. Aristotle did not trust pure democracy. Instead, he favored "polity" as the best representative form of government because it gives a share in the regime to the many while also leaving a role for the rich and and virtuous. Oligarchies and democracies were second-best after the good types. Subsequent attempts to classify have been either complex or simple. For example, Almond and Coleman (1966) devised a complex typology as follows: political democracies, tutelary democracies, terminal colonial democracies, modernizing oligarchies, traditional oligarchies, and colonial or racial oligarchies. However, Almond et al. (2004) later devised a simple typology of: watchman states (basic law and order), police states (communist or fascist), welfare states, and regulatory states. One can end up endlessly defining and re-defining the categories of a typology, and make them as simple or complex as one wants, but sooner or later, one has to settle for something useful at the time. Since the purpose of this lecture is to educate students about what exists around the world today, a useful typology is DK Publishing's (2006) How Governments Work (previously published as The Book of Rule). It holds that there are six main types of political systems: monarchal, theocratic, military, democratic, single party, and transitional; each of which are explained and illustrated below. (1) MONARCHY -- a system whereby one person rules for life as the head-of-state and passes on power to their children or family (dynasty or royalty) when they die. There are currently 31 true monarchies in the world today, and that's not counting places which have a symbolic king or queen in name only nor the dozens of little provinces or territories (mostly in Africa) where somebody has declared themselves the sultan or chief. A monarchy is not the opposite of democracy. The proper distinction in political science is between monarchy and republic. Classic political theory distinguishes between two types of monarchies: absolute (true); and constitutional. An absolute monarch rules by whim, although is not a tyrant or dictator (as is more common with military or single party rule). In fact, a true monarch may not be the real ruler, as state power might be wielded by ministers, regents, or advisors, with policy determined more by palace intrigue than anything else. In the subtype known as a constitutional monarchy (a French Revolution innovation), there are elected officials who make policy decisions, and a prime minister usually leads the government with the King or Queen as a figurehead. An absolute monarchy may also have cabinet officials or symbolic parliaments, but such institutions can be dissolved or altered at will. Some common justifications for monarchies include the need to keep the aristocracy and clergy in line, as well as reduce the uncertainty which would occur with continual changes in the head-of-state. It is sometimes argued that monarchies are inexpensive to maintain (because they save the cost of holding elections), but the fact of the matter is they are very expensive systems. The most common causes of monarchies are political necessity, tradition, greed, and a desire for conquest and sovereignty. Monarchies are usually dissolved by revolution. The most absolute monarchies are the Arab "oil monarchies" (Gause 1984), and include: MOROCCO (where the Alaouite dynasty has been the longest-running kingdom in the Arab world); SAUDI ARABIA (ruled by the House of Saud with over 25,000 family members helping run the government); JORDAN (ruled by the Hashemite clan of tribal alliances); OMAN (where Sultan Qaboos bin Said is considered the world's last benevolent despot, despotism implying that everyone under the ruler is considered a slave); QATAR (where the typical chain of succession involves deposing one's father); BRUNEI (where polygamist Sultans have amassed sizable fortunes via total control of the economy); the UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (which consist of seven ruling families, but in practice, the ruler of Abu Dhabi city runs the country); and KUWAIT (the most politically open of all the Arab monarchies). A few Buddhist nations have monarchies, and include: NEPAL (technically a Hindu nation, but being the birthplace of Buddha has more meaning); CAMBODIA (site of some of the world's worst instances of genocide); and BHUTAN (ruled by whomever is the current Dragon King from the Wangchuck dynasty).

Christian nations with monarchies include: LESOTHO (a fairly unstable, land-locked region within South Africa); SWAZILAND (another little land-locked region within South Africa); TONGA (the only remaining monarchy among the Pacific Island nations); and MONACO (a French principality and tax haven with a casino economy ruled over by the ancient Grimaldi family as long as they keep producing male heirs; and which, by the way, has the highest number of police officers per capita than any other nation on the planet). (2) THEOCRACY -- a system where the roles of priest and ruler are combined, or more generally, where there is a claim to divine mandates or divine powers that govern civil affairs. Only when temporal and spiritual affairs are combined is there a true theocracy (Clarkson 1997), and so-called "shadow theocracies" (Phillip 2006) don't count, as when observers claim that even democracies like America draw upon divine principles. A theocracy is also not to be confused with secular forms of government which have an official state religion, no matter how strong, because in these cases, the religious hierarchy is usually still subordinate to secular leadership, the secular leadership only ceasing to be secular when they claim direct, personal direction from God. However, such "divine guidance" leadership is still human leadership because there is a "law-giver" in human form interpreting God's will. What may happen in these cases is that a particular form of theocracy called ecclesiocracy might come into existence when some divine guidance leader, centralized state religion, or dominant religious hierarchy claims that no human direction or interpretation is necessary because God's will has already been infallibly received. "Infallibility" is the notion that someone or something is free from error, mistake, and/or contradiction. For example, Christians believe that the Church is infallible but that the Bible may exhibit limited "inerrancy" (minor contradictions in history, geography, or science that don't really matter). Muslims believe that the prophet Muhammad and the Koran are both infallible, but the Shi'a sect believes that Muhammad and his family and descendants could still make mistakes, this being a main factor in Shiite--Sunni sectarian strife. Such strife is not reconcilable by logic or science. However, it is curious to note that astronomy has long been the science of choice among theocrats. Historically, there have been numerous examples of rule which looked like theocracy but were not. Such cases are usually called caesorapapism, and consist of when an emperor (Caesar, Czar, or King) usurps spiritual authority (i.e., makes himself head of the Church) for political purposes. Henry VIII of England is perhaps best known for this by making himself the head of the Church of England, but the antipope movements in the 11th and 12th centuries also illustrated it, as did the Byzantine Empire (Eastern Christian Church) and Ivan the Terrible (Russian Orthodox Church). Technically speaking, the Egyptian pharaohs were a caesorapapist order up until Ramses the Great who saw himself as a living, incarnate God much the way Persian emperor Xerxes the Great saw himself. Seeing oneself as God is a case of megalomania and should NOT be considered any form of theocracy. Far more common have been rulers seen as "semidivine" representatives of God, such as the Dalai Lamas of Tibet. Such leaders have usually done two things: (a) set up a priestly order to lead their cult following; and (b) set up sacred rituals bordering on shamanism or what Queenborough and Miller (1976) mean by the term, occult theocracy. Alas, there are more things in this world that look like theocracy than really are. Today's world only has two true theocracies: Iran and Vatican City. IRAN became a theocracy under Ayatollah Khomeini (1900-1989) who claimed all power to establish laws belonged exclusively to God, and implemented a conception of Sharia law known as velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurists). Hence, the government of Iran is administered mainly by the ranking ayatollah (Supreme Leader) who is surrounded by various Councils like the Council of Guardians (12 jurists selected by the Supreme Leader), the Assembly of Experts (96 elected clerics), and the Expediency Council (34 advisors to the Supreme Leader). A few offices are filled by elections, such as the office of President, and the legislative and judicial branches, but these exist just for the show and allow Iran to technically call itself a republic. Anyone claiming to be a jurist/cleric should have attended a seminary, but Shiite seminaries are highly unorganized, decentralized establishments which more closely operate as political

parties than church institutions. Some of the notable characteristics of Iranian theocracy include a disdain for international law; an uneasy relation with what passes for "modernity" across the rest of the globe; opposition to the principle of separation of church and state; opposition to the idea of equality for women; and intolerance of other religions. A significant amount of the budget is spent on military affairs and meddling in the affairs of other nations via groups like the Qods Force. VATICAN CITY is an old theocracy located with the city of Rome. The government is ecclesiastical with a constitution and legal system based on canon (Church) law. There is no legislative branch. An elected Pope is the head of the executive and judicial branch, and one cardinal is appointed to be the Secretary of State (who acts much like a Prime Minister). Other cardinals are appointed to oversee various tribunals, commissions, and councils. The Vatican recognizes international law and diplomatic relations are enjoyed with 173 nation-states. Of notable interest is the Swiss Guard which protects the Vatican. They look like a ceremonial group but are actually a highly trained mercenary security force. The Vatican also has a small standing military. Although there is no evidence that the Vatican uses security forces to meddle in the affairs of other nations, the use of mercenaries (and meddling in international affairs) may very well be a common characteristic of theocracies. (3) MILITARY -- a system of rule by military strongman or junta (pronounced "hun-ta" or "jen-ta" and coming from the Spanish word for committee). It typically occurs as part of the evolution of single-party rule (the populism route) or when some national emergency merits the declaration of martial law and the leader in office happens to have (or assumes) some military rank. It can also occur as a result of occupation (belligerent or for liberation purposes) where the eventual regime type is a stratocracy controlled by the military. In many cases, rule is obtained by rejecting a popular referendum calling for leadership to step aside; and in other cases, rule is maintained with the help of foreign intelligence agencies. Strongman or junta leadership is technically distinct from a military dictatorship, which like all dictatorships may come about officially or unofficially, but a military dictatorship more correctly comes about via a coup-d'etat which empowers a kleptocracy (elites enriching themselves via foreign aid) or narcokleptocracy (elites enriching themselves with drug money). When power resides within small elite segments of society, this is called oligarchy, and the form of it when the military and business classes come together is called khakistocracy (from the olive drab colors of military uniforms). Dictatorships can also be examples of autocracy (single self-appointed rule), the word tyranny describing the more nepotistic forms of it where family connections matter, and the word despotism describing a leader or oligarchic group who see citizens as their slaves. Not all autocracies are non-oligarchic, but all oligarchies are non-autocratic. Military rule should be distinguished from ordinary militarism (the belief or desire that a country should maintain a strong military capability and be prepared to use it). The civilian culture of a society may be the source of militaristic impulses, and what may be called "neomilitarism" (Roberts 2008) is most likely going to be the state of affairs for any advanced market society for years to come. Militarism can co-exist with democracy, but most military rule is non-democratic and further makes any transition to democracy difficult. For example, some common characteristics of military rule include sacking Parliament (suspending the legislature) and controlling the judicial branch (no appeals allowed on verdicts favorable to the military). Some typical countries under military rule include: PAKISTAN, founded and formed in 1947 by an interesting character named Muhammad Ali Jinnah, its first Governor-General (later to become the office of President, with the powers of this office expanding greatly over the years); CONGO, which since 1965 has seen nothing but crisis after crisis, with the military leaders having to perpetually serve as judges or adjudicators in tribal provinces; MYANMAR (aka Burma) which has been under 50 years of military junta rule with a disastrous human rights record; and SUDAN, which has moved toward a curious mixture of military rule with Islamic law after repeated failures over the years with other political experiments. Numerous other countries could be added to the list since 64 nations around the world have some form of

military-controlled governments where military officials hold key positions and/or otherwise enforce law and order (DK Publishers 2006). (4) DEMOCRACY -- a system of rule by the people in which supreme power is vested in them and exercised directly by them or for them via their elected agents under a free electoral system. This is the dictionary definition, and it should be quickly noted that there is no accepted, scholarly definition of democracy (Dahl 2000). There is sufficient agreement that a democracy is always a creative work in progress that tries to institutionalize freedom, although the two terms -- freedom and democracy -- are not synonymous. Besides competitive elections, some of the essential elements of a democracy include: separation of powers; separation of church and state; human rights; freedom of expression; and equality before the law. It is correct to say that democracy as an experiment is built around time-honored principles such as these essential elements. It is also correct to distinguish a democracy by what it is NOT; which is to say that it can be defined by its opposite -- an authoritarian or totalitarian regime, although there can exist dictatorships which utilize some features of democracy, these being call "anocracies." Most democracies in the world today are called "republics" because people power is represented indirectly via elected officials, a direct democracy only being possible in small groups of, say, 5000 or less. There are many different types of democracies, the Wikipedia Entry on Democracy listing twenty (20) distinct varieties, and currently, there are 123 nation-states that can be counted as democracies. Perhaps the simplest typology is provided by Lijphart (1999) who argues that there are two basic types of democracies: majoritarian and consensus. A majoritarian system (also called the Westminster model) has two-party elections, a one-party executive and cabinet, a unicameral legislature, and a weak judiciary (e.g., England and its former colonies) while a consensus system has a power-sharing, multiparty-coalition executive, a consensus-oriented legislature, and strong judicial review (e.g., Switzerland and Germany). While majoritarian governments do better in terms of efficiency, durability, and governability, consensus governments do better in terms of economic growth and freedom. Westminster systems transplant well in some countries but not in others for various reasons primarily having to do with the problems of civil service reform and "hollowing-out" processes (Rhodes & Weller 2005). A "hollowing-out" process is when some national state function is delegated upward to a supraregional or international organization, usually some multinational corporation in the case of capitalist states and usually some international relief organization in the case of underdeveloped states. Common distinctions are also made between parliamentary democracies and presidential democracies. In a parliamentary democracy, like ENGLAND, the lowest house of Parliament is venerated or honored; i.e., the House of Commons. The upper house; i.e., the House of Lords, is just for show and subordinate to the lower house. The House of Commons has a "Question Time" every Wednesday when the Prime Minister (as first among equals) must answer questions regarding the activities of government. There is seating for the public and debates are broadcast live on the internet. There are parliamentary commissions which look into public complaints about government maladministration. Cabinet officials also must come from the Parliament. The 15-department cabinet of the executive branch represents an interesting look at the often-emulated BRITISH MODEL (aka the Westminster and Whitehall model) of how a parliamentary democracy divides up national affairs, as follows: The Cabinet of the United Kingdom 1. Cabinet Office - administers the cabinet, supports policy implementation, coordinates disaster and intelligence 2. H.M. Treasury - administers financial policy, controls inflation and unemployment, manages growth 3. Home Office - responsible for domestic affairs, control of crime, stimulates a safe, tolerant

society 4. Transportation - administers domestic transportation system, implements far-reaching policies 5. Education and Skills - administers education system, stimulates improved training and skills development 6. Health - administers health and well-being, directs National Health Service, sets standards for care 7. Defense - administers Armed Forces, veterans programs, works toward international peace 8. Constitutional Affairs - administers justice system, and is essentially the judicial branch of government 9. Office of Deputy Prime Minister - administers social inclusion, renewal, housing, and monitors local policy 10. Foreign and Commonwealth - promotes British interests abroad, both business and political 11. International Development - works with nations and organizations to reduce worldwide poverty 12. Trade and Industry - manages sustainable growth, technological innovation, and startup ventures 13. Environment, Food, Rural Affairs - manages and protects food supply, animal welfare and environment 14. Culture, Media, Sport - manages nation's heritage, historical venues, creative arts, sports, tourism 15. Work and Pensions - assists the population in becoming financially independent

Parliamentary democracies typically spend less on defense than on matters like education and health, the exception being the hybrid system of ISRAEL which spends a lot of defense. Certain "reconstructed" democracies, like JAPAN and GERMANY, have constitutional limits on how much they can spend on defense. Almost all "island" democracies as well as small democracies, like the SOLOMON ISLANDS, ICELAND, VANUATU, SAMOA, ST. LUCIA, ST. VINCENT, GRENADA, ANDORRA, LIECHTENSTEIN, and SAN MARINO, spend zero or near-zero on defense. The most distinguishing features of parliamentary democracies, however, are the ongoing reviews, checks and balances by the legislative branch and a cabinet government of the Westminster type which produces a fusion of executive/legislative power. Prezorski and his associates (Przeworski et al 1996) have found that parliamentary democracies last longer, are easier to govern, and are arguably "better" than other systems of political rule. Parliamentary democracies also have some standard patterns of cabinet formation depending upon party system and election results, as illustrated below: Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies Party System Election Result Two-party => Majority situation => Multiparty => Minority situation =>

Cabinet Type Majority single-party cabinet Majority coalition cabinet; minority coalition cabinet; or minority single-party cabinet

Presidential democracies usually exists in one of two forms: (1) a presidential system (which strongly separates the executive from the legislative branch by making the president perform combined or multiple roles -- such as head of state AND head of government as well as commander-in-chief -- for a fixed term); and (2) a semi-presidential system (where the president and prime minister, or vice-president, can come from different parties - called cohabitation -and the legislature can force the President's cabinet to resign through votes of no confidence). Presidential democracies are often referred to as presidentialist regimes so as not to confuse them with some parliamentary democracies who happen to call their chief executive a president. Presidential democracies are also sometimes referred to as congressional systems because there almost always is an elected legislative body called a Congress which co-exists with the president on the basis of the separation of powers principle and also on a fixed term. It is a fact that the presidentialist system first evolved in and became the model of the UNITED STATES, and is widely copied in Latin America but less widely copied elsewhere (Mainwaring & Shugart 1997). Hence, it is sometimes (but not often) called the AMERICAN MODEL (aka the Washington type). Cabinets are important, but not that important in presidentialist systems. Debates rage among political scientists about the merits of presidentialist systems, but for a basic understanding, the following chart may be helpful to compare the two types of democratic systems: Comparison of Parliamentary and Presidential Systems Head of Government Fixed Term Selected by Yes Presidential Voters (United States) Hybrid Legislators (Switzerland)

No Hybrid (Israel) Parliamentary (Great Britain)

(5) SINGLE PARTY -- a system of authoritarian rule where only one political party is constitutionally allowed to govern and no other parties are permitted to run candidates for election. It is not to be confused with a dominant party system (also called electoralism) where opposition parties are simply too weak to win or the dominant party engages in dirty tricks like gerrymandering, press bans, lawsuits, constitutional quirks, and/or outright voter fraud to keep the opposition down (examples include CAMBODIA, EGYPT, EL SALVADOR, IRELAND, MALAYSIA, RUSSIA, SINGAPORE, SWEDEN, VENEZUELA, and many African nations). Single party rule is essentially government without opposition, and is the kind of system which allowed Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, Castro, Ho Chi Minh, and Mao Zedong to become dictators. Some single party states only outlaw opposition parties while allowing subordinate allied parties to exist as part of a coalition or front. Also, some single party states allow non-party members to run for legislative but not executive office. CHINA is the most well-known single party state, and indeed, wherever rulers subscribe to some form of Marxism-Leninism, a single party, or communist, state will inevitably emerge. Certain Islamic states also practice single party rule. Currently, the following single party states exist in the world: CHINA (Communist), CUBA (Communist), ERITREA (Marxist), NORTH KOREA (Stalinist), LAOS (Communist), LIBYA (Socialist), SYRIA (Baath Party), TURKMENISTAN (Communist), and VIETNAM (Communist). The appeal of single party rule for many years was a desire to emulate the Soviet Union, with modern appeal being based on the desire to achieve a sense of unity, strength and commonality. (6) TRANSITIONAL -- a system of temporary or reconstructive rule while a nation is undergoing some crisis from war, civil unrest, corruption, or disaster. A transitional government is one which serves while a nation is forming or in the process of drafting a constitution. Recovery from war often requires a transitional government where military rule is imposed, and most military rule of the kind here relies heavily upon martial law, which is typically used to suspend civil liberties such as freedom of speech and assembly and/or the carrying of firearms. The doctrines of military necessity and orderly administration of

territory (upon which martial law is based) also allows removal of officials, anti-corruption measures, and the possibility for economic reform. However, martial law itself is something of an oxymoron since it's not really any kind of law at all, but the suspension of standing law. The only real alternative to martial law occurs when the UN, the US, or an international coalition imposes a temporary rule. Recent examples include AFGHANISTAN, BAHRAIN, BURUNDI, IRAQ, LIBERIA, MALDIVES, RWANDA, and SOMALIA. When an external power or coalition sets up a transitional government, the 1907 Hague Convention and the 1947 Geneva Convention apply, and the occupying power is only supposed to be a temporary steward or "conservationist." This means that an occupying power is only supposed to be a temporary custodian of the status quo in the territory it controls. Occupation, should it occur, should only occur over a limited time period between the cessation of hostilities and the implementation of a final peace treaty. Thus, an occupier enjoys only de facto power, and is not supposed to make sweeping, permanent changes to legal and political structures. Any such changes should be self-determination choices left up to the indigenous people upon the return of some semblance of governance after the occupation. However, if the existing laws of the land are themselves in violation of international law (subject to international opinion on what constitutes this), then there may be an obligation to reform on the part of the occupying power. It is this obligation to reform which makes up the foundation for the concepts known as nation-building or statebuilding. Transitional systems tend to resemble occupied regimes from within or without. Since occupation is usually only thought of as involving outside interference, let's consider some examples of that. If an occupier keeps the old laws and structures in place, running the country in the same manner as the ousted regime with a puppet government, that would be colonialism. If the occupier insists on full and complete mimicry of the governance structures of another state, that would be annexation. If the occupier keeps troops on the ground to support indoctrination of the masses, that would be imperialism, or creeping annexation. None are good choices. The only proper and appropriate form of nation building is to seek a balance between the obligation to reform and the right to self-determination. Both of these things have to be motivations that spring from indigenous impulses or motivations. An outside force can try to inject these impulses into an indigenous population, but most likely what will happen is something like what Michael Ignatieff (2002) calls "nation bulding lite" where it's all done on the cheap, with the least intellectual talent applied, and the process will be perceived (as is America's war on terror) as an exercise in imperialism. In practice, nation building, like transitional government maintenance, is a long, complex, and drawn-out affair that is usually described or rationalized as "a work in progress" or "the book is being written as we go along."