POLITICAL & SECURITY STATEWATCH

Monthly analytical bulletin on Moldova

issued by IDIS VIITORUL

Focus

Domestic Policy Sector:

Since its independence, the Republic of Moldova
is deemed as a “partially free” country

Foreign Policy Sector:

The never ending story: “we came, we saw and we
left”

Security Policy Sector:

Transnistrian conflict: old game-new players?
No. 1 (8), January 2008

The Institute for Development and Social

Initiatives (IDS) Viitorul is a research, education
and outreach organization which activates in the
field of economic analysis, governance, law, political
sciences, strategic and organizational science. It
was set up in June 1993 in Moldova as a non-
governmental, not-for-profit organization, non-
political entity.

www.viitorul.org
Political and Security Statewatch no. 1 (8), January 2008

Domestic Policy Sector

Since its independence, the

Republic of Moldova is deemed as
a “partially free” country

by Ion Marandici
ionmarandici@gmail.com

Although Freedom House classified Republic regions. Of course, the classification of FH

of Moldova as a “partially free” country and the is not convenient for the current party in
separatist region as a “not free” territory, one of government. However the scores for Moldova
the chief ideological leaders of the Communists did not change significantly from 2002. The
party was appointed as first vice-premier. The Law aggregate scores for Political Rights and Civil
208, that regulates the activity of petty traders, Rights remained the same 3 and respectively 4.
determined a chain of protests in the country. State Only during the period 1998-2001 the score
comes too close to the Church of the majority of for political rights was the best, namely 2.
the population. The state-owned media companies Since its independence Moldova is classified by
are not transparent, reluctant to any criticisms and Freedom House as a partially free country.
are still resistant to reform.
Freedom Years Political Civil Rights Status
Freedom House classified Moldova House Edition Covered Rights (PR) (CL)
as a “partially free” country 1991-92 1991 5 4 Partially Free
1992-93 1992 5 5 Partially Free
The Freedom House released its annual
1993-94 1993 5 5 Partially Free
ratings and classified Moldova as a “partially 1994-95 1994 4 4 Partially Free
free” country. The major criteria used by 1995-96 1995 4 4 Partially Free
Freedom House are the respect for political 1996-97 1996 3 4 Partially Free
1997-98 1997 3 4 Partially Free
rights and the respect for civil liberties.
1998-99 1998 2 4 Partially Free
Electoral process (A), political pluralism 1999-2000 1999 2 4 Partially Free
and participation (B), functioning of 2000-01 2000 2 4 Partially Free
government (C) compose the Political Rights 2001-02 2001 2 4 Partially Free
2003 2002 3 4 Partially Free
score. Whereas freedom of expression and
2004 2003 3 4 Partially Free
belief (D), associational and organizational 2005 2004 3 4 Partially Free
rights (E), rule of law (F), personal autonomy 2006 2005 3 4 Partially Free
and individual rights (G) are forming the 2007 2006 3 4 Partially Free
2008 2007 3 4 Partially Free
score for Civil Liberties.
Source: www.freedomhouse.org
Moldova’s neighbors Ukraine and
Romania are classified as free countries, Analyzing the subscores provided by
while Russian Federation is termed as a Freedom House since 1991, we observe that
“not free” democracy. At the same time, the the most problematic field during the years was
FH ratings regard the separatist region of the respect of civil liberties. During 2006 and
Transnistria as not free, while Abkhazia and 2007, the worst situation was in the areas of
Nagorno-Karabach are deemed as partly free Freedom of Expression and Belief (CL; D;10),

Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) “Viitorul” 2

Political and Security Statewatch
electoral process (PL; A; 9), Personal Autonomy
and Individual Rights (CL; G; 9).
The Party of Communists chief
ideologue was appointed as first vice-
premier
Even if ideology was not an obvious norm
when the discussion was about governmental
decisions, in January, Moldova’s government
was completed with Viktor Stepaniuc, which
was appointed as vice-premier, responsible for
the social policy of the Government. At the
same time, Stepaniuc is considered the chief
ideologue of the Communists Party and one of
the orthodox Communists. He is celebrating
every year the old Communist holidays like
Lenin’s birthday, the November Revolution and
also commemorating Lenin’s Death. Stepaniuc
was formerly the chief of the parliamentary
committee responsible for science and culture in
the Moldovan Parliament. He is also one of the
most prominent members of the Communists
Party.
However, even if Victor Stepaniuc is the
incumbent of a significant office, he does not
have a portfolio. It is likely that he will monitor
the activity of the Government in the field of
social policy, education, youth and culture. At
the previous parliamentary elections, Stepaniuc
was also the chief of the electoral staff of
the Communists Party. Education is one of
the fields, where also the Council of Europe
required more reforms. Hence it was probably
no surprise that the year 2008 was declared the
Year of the Youth. In that context, it should be
mentioned that Viorelia Moldovan-Batranac
was appointed at the end of 2007 as presidential
counselor. It seems that education will be the
main concern during 2008. Despite these
efforts, it remains to be seen if the education
and the youth will not come under the
ideological influence of the Government. The
attempts to introduce another course of history,
integrated history textbooks, in the secondary
schools encountered a strong disagreement
from the history teachers. Various sources
affirm that the Communists plan to introduce
the teaching of Moldovan language instead
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of Romanian language in schools. If such a
move would be undertaken, then there will be
immense protests, because the independence of
the country came into being in the context of
specific identity demands related to language
rights.
Protests against the Law 208 amplify
At present, protests occur in different
localities in Moldova, because for material
reasons. Petty traders protested in several
rayons (districts) against the Law 208. After the
protests in Ungheni, Orhei, Falesti, Edintet,
Floresti, Rezina, Soldanesti, Stefan-Voda,
it is likely that this protests would amplify,
because the last took place in the second
largest city Balti, where approx. 1000 persons
protested against the above-mentioned law.
The traders threatened that they would block
the international railway track and the national
road Sculeni-Balti-Chisinau. During the period
February 5 – May 30 the traders plan to organize
meetings in front of the national Parliament.
The people are dissatisfied, because the law
stipulates a series of changes in their activity.
Thus, they should register an enterprise and
they should have an accountant. There are
also other stipulations in the law that would
make their activity less profitable. However the
authorities are firm and insist to apply the Law.
The prime-minister Vasile Tarlev declared that
the organizers of the protests actually “want
to destabilize the situation in the country or
they follow mean goals”. The reaction of the
traders is understandable since they were not
consulted before the law as adopted. The
Law 208 was adopted as a consequence of the
recommendations of international experts,
but it is not excluded that its effects will
favor certain local economic interest groups.
Many traders think that actually there are
businessmen intending to invest in the opening
of new supermarkets that would then replace
the local markets. Anyway, the discontent with
the implementation of the Law will increase,
since the state structures are not prepared to
register such a great number of individual
firms. Regrettably no impact assessment of the

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Law was performed and thus the Government
is unprepared to cope with the situation.
The state comes too close to the
Moldovan Orthodox Metropoly
Latest signs show that the relations between
the Church and the high state officials tightened.
High state officials participate at all the most
important religious services and can be seen
very often accompanied by the Metropolitan of
the Moldovan Orthodox Church, the Church of
the majority of the population. The Moldovan
Orthodox Church is subordinated directly to the
Russian Patriarchate and the recent expulsion
of three priests pertaining to the concurrent
Bessarabian Church can be considered either
as “the fruit” of the friendship between the
Church of the majority and State or as the
result of the “appeasement” policy followed by
Moldova towards Russian Federation.
Bessarabian Orthodox Church, subordinated
to the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate, is
a rival for the Moldovan Metropoly and “a
thong” for the Moldovan authorities since the
independence. It was legally registered only
after its representatives have won the case at the
European Court for Human Rights. The interest
of the current state officials in a closer relation
with the Church has also an electoral tone.
Even if the current leaders of the Communists
Party refer to the Soviet period as a good one,
they forget with intention that communism is
irreconcilable with the religious beliefs. The
trust in Church is over 80%, hence the Church
is the most trusted public institution in the
country. Thus the party which is closer to the
Moldovan Orthodox Church has the greatest
chances of influencing the voters by using the
priests. The authorities diminish the influence
of the Bessarabian Orthodox Church and thus
win the trust of the other Orthodox Church
from Moldova. A possible solution for the
conflict between the two Orthodox Churches
would be their merger and the appearance of
an autocephalous Moldovan Orthodox Church
that would be independent from Bucharest
and Moscow. Still the solution was not fully
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2008
accepted by the heads of the two orthodox
churches. Under those circumstances, the
authorities often undertake steps that show a
clear endorsement of the Moldovan Orthodox
Church, making the distinction between state
and a specific cult vague.
The reform of the public-owned media
arrives before the court
The reform of the audiovisual is taking place
very slowly and in some sectors it is stagnating.
The reform of the state-owned company
“Teleradio Moldova” is particularly difficult.
Two members of the Council of Observers, a
structure that has to monitor and to guide the
reforms, published a report reflecting particular
deficiencies of the current reforms in the public
institution “Teleradio Moldova”. The reaction
of Valentin Todercan, the director of the
institution followed without delay; he accused
the two members of the CO of damaging the
image of the public institution and initiated a
lawsuit against them. The process is likely to
become a symbolic one, since the court will
decide whether the reform is ongoing or it is
actually lingering as the two authors assumed.
In addition to the fact that “Teleradio
Moldova” is not a really open media institution,
the Broadcasting Coordination Council
approved the creation of two networks: one TV
network and a radio-network. Of particular
concern is the fact that the TV network will be
composed of TV stations close to the party in
Government. In other words, the new network
will resemble a pro-governmental media trust.
At the same time, one could observe that
the respect for journalists is decreasing. Two
new cases were registered when journalists were
intimidated by personal bodyguards or police
forces. The first case refers to a journalist
from an online news portal that was treated
brutally by the presidential bodyguards, while
the second case relates to the interdiction to
access a building where numerous officials were
present. On the other hand, the Broadcasting
Coordination Council sent a notice to the
Radio “Noroc” station, because two of its

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talk show moderators did not react promptly
when a listener expressed certain xenophobic
statements. Yet, other journalists questioned
the reliability of the accusations brought by the
Broadcasting Coordination Council.
Prognosis
The Freedom House ratings did not improve
since the Communists Party came into power
and it is likely that they will remain the same
also in 2008. The appointment of the chief
ideologue of Communists Party in the office
The Never Ending Story: “We Came,
We Saw and We Left”
The political year 2007 has come to an
end. It is time for evaluations and assessment
of what has been good and what has been done
wrongly by those who represent the state on the
international scene. It is time for taking some
rest before the new hardships of Moldovan
political life will come back to the stage. It is
time to learn from the lessons given by 2007
and not to make the same mistakes in 2008.
The first month of the new 2008 year
was witnessing no crucial events determining
the path of the Moldovan foreign policy. As
expected, the Autonomous Trade Preferences
granted by the EU to Moldova have been
adopted by the EU Commission, however their
appliance will start only from March.
A fairly important event was the visit of
Italian foreign minister to Moldova who agreed
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no. 1 (8), 3, August2008
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of vice-premier will lead probably to the
ideologization of public policies in the fields
of social policy, education, youth and culture.
Civic unrest is likely to increase. When the
meteorological conditions will become more
suitable, the protests against the Law 208 will
amplify. Protests and pressures on the reform of
the public-owned media companies will increase
and might lead to certain improvements, but the
overall course of the reform in the audiovisual
is likely to be put in danger by certain political
interests.
Foreign Policy Sector
by Sergiu Panainte
sergiu.panainte@gmail.com
with his Moldovan counterpart the opening of
the Italian Embassy in Chisinau. This move
will enormously facilitate the life of hundreds
of thousand Moldovan citizens now working
in this country and will offer the possibility to
others for a legal employment there. On the
other side the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and European Integration announced
the opening of a General Consulate in the
Italian city of Bologna to protect and serve the
interests of its citizens.
However, the attention of the Moldovan
public has been kept by several visits related to
the same topic: Moldova’s never ending story –
Transnistria. Here one has to point out the visit
of the Finish Foreign Minister, who is holding
the chairmanship of OSCE to Chisinau and
Tiraspol. Mr. Kanerva expressed the support his

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country and the organization he is representing
will devote to the resolution of the Transnistrian
conflict and first of all to the resumption of the
negotiation process. Following the same topic
one should insert to the picture the visit of
President Voronin to Moscow where he met the
Russian Patriarch to be awarded the medal for
protecting the rightful Orthodox religion which
could be interpreted as a reward for suppressing
the non-rightful one (read as Bessarabian
Metropolitanate). Voronin met the Russian
president as well. With the renewed debates
over the possibility of Moldova’s federalization
the issue of a secret plan agreed between the
above two for solving the Transnistrian problem
sprang again. Hence, it is salient to follow the
outcome of this visit and what consequence it
may have for the country’s integrity. In relation
to this, the recent visit of Voronin to Brussels
raises big question marks. The president has
been allegedly promised significant support,
both political and financial for the resolution of
the conflict, in exchange for not opposing the
independence of Kossovo. Such a precedent will
aggravate even more the problem of separatist
movements in the post Soviet countries, where
Moldova is directly affected.
Last, but not least it is relevant to mention
the visit of Deputy Secretary General of NATO
to Chisinau. While the organization pledged
support for the resolution of the Transnistrian
conflict and Moldova’s neutrality, it reinforced
the cooperation the partners started within the
Individual Plan of Actions and Partnership signed
in 2005. Overall the picture did not change.
As in the past representatives of international
organizations are coming, making declarations
and then leaving. If to paraphrase the famous
Julius Caesar’s quote, one would have to say
“We came, we saw and we left”.
Back to the Origins: “Conquering the
Apennines”
The relations with the Italian Republic tend
to increase in intensity. The objective reason
for that is the permanently growing Moldovan
community on the Apennine peninsula. Either
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being there legally or illegally, the Moldovan
authorities have to take care of its citizens. On the
other side the Italian authorities are compelled
to do at least something in order to control the
migration of Moldovans to Italy. Making the
process as transparent as possible and offering
possibilities for legal work places should be the
primary concern of the Italian government in
the relationship with Moldova.
An expected and highly desired outcome was
the news about the opening of an Italian Embassy
in Chisinau announced by Massimo d’Alema,
the Italian foreign minister during his visit to
Moldova this month. While Moldova has an
Embassy in Rome for a long time, according to
the reciprocity principle the same thing had to
be done by the Italian authorities. However, at
that time Moldova did not justify the necessity
of having an Embassy in Chisinau. No doubt,
the circumstances have changed now and more
and more Italian citizens are visiting Moldova, a
thing which prompted the government in Rome
to take this decision. Needless to say, the newly
expected Embassy will ease the process of getting
the visa and documents legalization for the
Moldovan citizens working there. Moreover, it
will save them a lot of money and more important
– time for doing it as up to now Moldovan
nationals had to travel to Bucharest and apply
for visa at the Italian Embassy in Romania.
With Romania joining the EU, this category of
citizens joined those staying in the queues at the
Romanian Consulate in Chisinau.
Therefore, this event which may look like an
ordinary one for two states having diplomatic
relations represents a big relief first of all for
the Moldovans working or preparing to go for
work in Italy and second, it sets the premises
for making the migration of these people, either
for work or for permanent residence, legal. Mr.
D’Alema promised on behalf of his government
to increase the number of legal work places in his
country and to continue the good cooperation
with the Republic of Moldova.
Nevertheless, the sad part of the story is
that now the number of people willing to leave
the country for a better life on the Apennine

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peninsula could dramatically increase. Italy is
confronted with a huge number of migrants
coming from Eastern Europe, mainly Romania
and Moldova given the close resemblance
between the Italian and Romanian language. De
facto this process could metaphorically mean
the return to the origins where all the Latin
nations have their roots. However, even if the
Visa Facilitation Agreement between Moldova
and the EU has entered into force, the efforts
should be aiming at making this agreement work
properly. Adding to this more openness on behalf
of Italian authorities on the one hand and more
efficiency on behalf of Moldovan government
in lobbying the interests of its citizens should
establish at the end of the day a mechanism that
would ensure legal and advantageous working
conditions for Moldovan citizens and on the
other side the feeling of security for Italian
citizens.
Transnistria Stays on the Top of
the Agenda: OSCE, EU and Russian
Perspectives
OSCE is the single international security
organization directly involved in the resolution
of the Transnistrian conflict as a mediator in the
“5+2” negotiations format. The same OSCE has
the less effective tools and authority to play a key
role in these negotiations. With NATO as the
major security and military international actor
and the rising military capacities of the EU, the
OSCE as an organization has been sidelined
and deprived of both authority and resources to
accomplish its primary goals. Being too loose
and comprising a striking variety of members,
it is generically referred to as the organization
which ranges from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
Keeping a consensual procedure for adopting
major decisions the actual ability of OSCE to
take decisions is almost equal to zero.
That is why organization’s inefficiency has
been severely criticized both by its supporters
as well as the opponents. In this context the
OSCE Mission to Moldova makes no difference
from the general picture. Being present in
Moldova from 1994 with the aim of settling
and bringing the conflict to a lasting political
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solution, OSCE did not achieve too much in
this respect. Obviously the blame should not
be put only on OSCE as it is formed from
member states, some of which have been part to
the conflict e.g. Russia. Therefore, Russia as a
mediator to the negotiations format and OSCE
member, opposed for the last years the adoption
of the OSCE yearly final conference decisions
that made references to Russia’s legal obligation
to withdraw its troops and munitions from
Moldova and Georgia.
The recent visit to Chisinau and Tiraspol of
the Finish foreign minister Ilkka Kanerva who
undertook the chairmanship of OSCE brought
a new insight to the problem. The Finish official
stated that Transnistrian problem should find
its solution and the negotiations process has to
be restarted. Moreover, there are more and more
voices which brought back into discussion the
idea of federalization as a solution to the conflict.
Thus, it is clear that Finish presidency wants to
break the stalemate and give a new impetus to
the talks. While this should be understood as
an ordinary declaration of a country official
undertaking the chairmanship of OSCE,
nevertheless Western European countries, both
members of OCSE and EU try to speak with the
same voice and reach common goals.
From EU perspective this enhanced support
for the resolution process is determined by
another burning issue for the EU foreign agenda
and namely Kosovo. The struggle over the issue
of recognition or non-recognition of Kosovo
independence might and would create an
explosive precedent. If Kosovo independence is
to become a reality, Transnistria, South Osetia,
Chechnea and other separatist regions will claim
their independence too. During his first official
visit in the year 2008 to Brussels, president
Voronin has been allegedly promised support,
both political and financial for not blaming
the eventual Kosovo independence. How this
political support could materialize into practical
action it is very difficult to say since the EU
did not express the will to upgrade its status in
the negotiations format to that of a mediator.
However important, the financial support the
EU is up to offer will probably sink in offshore

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bank accounts of high officials from presidential
apparatus and government.
Federalization as a solution for Transnistrian
problem would meet Russian interest in the
region too. Though, the driving force behind
these interests is totally different from those of
the EU. At the last meeting between presidents
Voronin and Putin on January 23 the issue of
Transnistria was inevitably approached. Given this
was the last meeting with Voronin in his capacity
of President of the Russian Federation there were
speculations about making public the plan for
the settlement of the conflict secretly negotiated
in the second half of 2007.What Russia would
like to be the outcome of this federalization is
first of all the recognition of all the properties
and investments in Transnistria privatized and
owned by Russian businesses. Second, Moldova
has to reiterate once again its neutrality, but
allowing the Russian Federation to keep its troops
in Moldova. Third, the constitutional order has
to be changed in order to fit the interests of both
Chisinau and Tiraspol.
Nonetheless, even if Voronin would submit
to Russian conditions, he would have to face the
opposition back home. In spite of a dispersed
opposition, it can rally immediately as it did in
2003 to fiercely oppose the Kozak Memorandum.
No doubt, the Party of Communists holds all the
levers to control the country, but vital issues such
as Transnistrian problem and changing of the
Constitution is capable of bringing the people to
the streets. Whatever the situation may turn out,
keeping the status quo will also ensure Russia gets
most of the benefits. What concerns Voronin, he
supposedly made this kind of verbal promises to
Putin, but the actual legislation does not provide
for any of the above mentioned conditions to
take effect. That is why it will become clearer
about Voronin’s intensions regarding this issue
when respective actions will be taken.
Another reason for Russia to keep the status
quo is its ongoing presidential campaign. No
matter the fact that it is obvious who the next
Russian president will be, high Russian political
circles led by the incumbent president would
prefer to leave aside Transnistrian issue until the
new president, government and prime-minister
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are either elected or appointed. That is why
one has to expect the same position Russia was
displaying in 2007 at least for the first months of
2008 which means “Moldova, be still as long as
we give you gas and allow you to sell your wines
on our markets and don’t forget that we do keep
control over Transnistria, not you”. Therefore,
the ones who came, saw and did not leave are the
Russians. Probably it is early to say they won,
but they are not very far from doing so.
Moldova, EU and Central European
Initiative
2008 does not promise too much for
Moldova in its relationship with the EU.
The implementation of the Action Plan was
unsatisfactory for what reason it can be extended
for an undetermined period. Moldova looses
ground in Brussels and the support for Voronin
communist rule is vanishing. That is also a
consequence of the close relationship to Russia
and disregard for European norms and values.
One way out would be the successful
fulfillment of the Moldovan presidency in
Central European Initiative (CEI), a regional
organization aiming at helping the member
states overcome the transition and come closer
to the EU. This organization is more viewed as
a precursor of the EU as all Central-European
states now members of the EU joined CEI to
prepare their countries for EU membership. CEI
is first of all about developing trade relations and
economy on the regional level. Consequently,
Moldova would increase its European chances
by completing a successful presidency in CEI.
This means proposing an agenda for further
advancing the goals of the organization, regional
trade between the CEI members as well as
CEI members and EU. Second, this means
professional civil servants who would be able to
run smoothly the activities of CEI institutions
and a clear strategic leadership for enhancing the
ties between CEI members.
Unfortunately, it is memorable the failure
Moldova undergone when it held the presidency
in the Council of Ministers of the Council of
Europe. It has been a unique opportunity which
Moldova was not able to ripe benefits from. CEI

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presidency as well as the one in South-eastern
European Cooperation Process can follow the
same sad scenario. If Moldova is really poised
to make progress and to reach the status of an
EU member state ever, it has to start doing it
now.
Prognosis
First half of January was calm due to New
Year and Christmas celebrations. The political
life in the new 2008 year started with important
events such as several visits of Western officials
like the Italian foreign minister, Finish foreign
minister and chairman-in-office of the OSCE
and Deputy Secretary General of NATO.
Transnistria was by far the most important
topic discussed during all these visits. However,
Transnistrian conflict: old
game-new players?
Along with other habitual activities, each
beginning of the year is an appropriate time
to think ahead and to analyze further actions.
In other words, each beginning of the year has
some strategic weight. On the contrary, refer-
ring to the actions of Moldovan authorities,
the dose of arbitrariness and unpredictability
has increased progressively.
Despite the emphasis put by Moldovan
authorities on the resolution of Transnistrian
conflict and on the rehabilitation of Moldovan
statehood, this month has repeatedly shown
the lack of strategic thinking and the fragil-
ity of Moldovan statehood. In a broader sense,
during its short history of statehood, Republic
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the results do not give reasons for optimism
since the federalization of Moldova as a solution
for Transnistrian issue came back to the table.
Therefore, it is difficult to make any forecasts
until the negotiations in the “5+2” format will
be resumed.
It will be interesting to follow the position
of the EU on this issue and how efficient the
Finish presidency in the OSCE will be for the
resolution process. Given the rising interest for
the given issue it is expected that the debates
over Transnistria will intensify and it will
involve the major stakeholders like Russia and
the EU. However, unless a common ground is
found between these two, no major changes
shall be forecasted.
Security Policy Sector
by Alex Leşanu
leshanu@gmail.com
of Moldova has awaited for some Great Powers
to solve its security problems.
This attitude has been particular visible
from 14-th till 22-nd of January when Moldo-
van President Vladimir Voronin has attended
a series of meetings with NATO, OSCE, EU
and Russian top officials.
It seems that there is nothing strange about
these meetings: last year President Voronin has
had four meetings with, Russian President,
Vladimir Putin and one meeting in Decem-
ber with the President of the European Com-
mission, Jose Manuel Barrosso. Concerning
the visit of OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Ilkka
Kanerva to Chisinau, it has already become a

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good tradition, for each new appointed OSCE
top official to pay a visit to Chisinau.
Nevertheless, one might notice the absence of
NATO officials from the list of frequent quests
to Chisinau. It is without doubt that visit of
Robert Simmons, Deputy Assistant Secretary
General for Security Cooperation and Partner-
ship and Special Representative for the Cauca-
sus and Central Asia, could not be unnoticed
even if his visit corresponded with that of Ilkka
Kanerva, or it is precisely this coincidence that
should be taken into consideration.
Moldova-NATO: from mutual benefit to
mutual distrust?
As soon as the reform of the security concept
is concerned, since March 2006, it is linked
with the implementation of IPAP. Since then,
two evaluation reports has been drafted and
sent to NATO headquarters. The content of
these reports is not available to public. On the
other hand, Moldovan officials and external
observers acknowledge the sameness of IPAP
with EU-Moldova Action Plan. Thus, it is pos-
sible to evaluate the state of IPAP on the basis
of EU-Moldova Action Plan progress reports
issued by European Commission.
In this respect, the EC progress report
from December 2006, along with the decla-
rations of Jose Manuel Barosso, the President
of the European Commission, made, in Janu-
ary, during a press conference in Bruxelles, af-
ter a joint meeting with Moldovan President,
Vladimir Voronin, illustrate the abundance of
“good laws” and the scarcity of implementa-
tion mechanisms.
These observations are more or less appro-
priate for the description of reform process in
the security sector of Moldova. Moreover, if in
the case of EU-Moldova Action Plan there have
been drafted some 200 laws, when it comes to
IPAP, a number of important laws are missing.
The most important is The National Security
Concept, which is waiting for Parliament vote.
In fact, the modernization of security estab-
lishment is impossible without a comprehen-
sive long-term strategy. A project of the Na-
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tional Security Concept was designed with the
assistance of local and foreign experts, and it is
in the Parliament, already for several months,
waiting to be drafted.
During his visit to Moldova, Robert Sim-
mons, Assistant of NATO General Secretary
has repeatedly stressed the necessity to draft
The National Security Concept, in the frame-
work of IPAP implementation. In this respect,
NATO official has received an answer from
President Vladimir Voronin, who mentioned
that the draft law is in the Parliament, waiting
for some changes, which will reflect the recent
presidential initiatives for confidence building
between Tiraspol and Chisinau.
Immediately after the publication of the
presidential initiatives in the Russian press,
there were speculations that some of these ini-
tiatives, in particular demilitarization, are con-
tradictory to IPAP, which emphasize the need
to increase military capability. In other words,
it seems that that there is a contradiction be-
tween the principle of neutrality and the ne-
cessity to deploy troops in peacekeeping op-
erations. Nevertheless, there are neutral states
like Finland and Sweden, which participate at
NATO and UN peacekeeping operations.
On the other hand, the draft of National
Security Concept, which is published on the
website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Eu-
ropean Integration of Republic of Moldova, re-
fers to a strategic cooperation between NATO
and Republic of Moldova, for mutual benefit.
Taking into consideration, the fact that par-
ties and mediators of the 5+2 format, recognize
the crucial role of Russia in the resolution of
the Transnistrian conflict, and NATO is not a
part of negotiation process, there is a possibil-
ity that the new draft of The National Security
Concept, will stress the strategic importance of
Russia, and will consequently decrease the im-
portance of relations with NATO.
This situation might be confirmed in March
when according to Robert Simmons a delega-
tion from NATO will evaluate the implemen-
tation of IPAP, and afterwards will propose
some adjustments to this document. According
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to NATO official, IPAP is a changing entity and
it is not cut in stone. Thus, it might be subject
to some changes. Despite these changes, the one
thing is clear: The National Security Concept is
vitally needed, but its drafting must be preceded
by a strong public debate on this issue.
Referring to the modernization and reforma-
tion of the security sector, one must take into
consideration that despite the adoption of hi-
tech vocabulary, which talk about new security
threats like cyber war or terrorist attacks, accord-
ing to Ministry of Interior Affairs, Gheorghe
Papuc, only 50 out of 851 rural police stations
have a kind of transportation means. In addition,
some of these stations don’t have any technical
equipment and there are some 115 vacant places
of local police agents.
Another example is the program of neutral-
ization of some 1245 tones of toxic substances,
imported in the 1980’s for agricultural purposes.
From 2003 till 2007 this program was supervised
by Moldovan Ministry of Defense. According to
Moldovan Ministry of Defense, Vitalie Vrabie,
the storing facilities were frequently robed. What
kind of modernization of armed forces or increas-
ing of military capability is possible, if Ministry
of Defense is unable to protect its own facilities?
What is the role of NATO in the resolution
of the Transnistrian conflict?
At the annual press reception on the occasion
of the New Year, held at NATO Headquarters,
NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,
outlined the priorities of the Alliance for 2008.
He talked about the upcoming meetings of De-
fence Ministers in Vilnius in February, of Foreign
Affairs Ministers in Brussels in March, and about
the Bucharest Summit in April.
Asked about the priorities of NATO in 2008,
NATO Secretary General referred to the possible
enlargement of the Alliance, its threats and chal-
lenges, such as cyberdefence and energy securi-
ty, and NATO’s operations in Afghanistan and
Kosovo. Concerning the Western Balkans, Jaap
de Hoop Scheffer welcomed the three candidate
countries, but also stressed the necessity to see
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all the countries from the region, integrated into
Euro-Atlantic structures.
On the contrary, refering to the perspectives
of Georgia and Ukraine, which would like to ap-
ply for a Membership Action Plan, NATO of-
ficial hesitated to give an answer, suggesting that
the decision will be taken at the last moment.
This incertitude has grown even further amid
the speculations about the possible meeting of
NATO-Russia Council, in Bucharest, at the same
time with NATO Summit.
Taking into consideration the interest of
NATO in the question of CFE Treaty and the
ratiffication of The Adapted CFE Treaty only
after the Russian fullfilment of Istanbul OSCE
Summit commitments, it is highly likely that for
Republic of Moldova, the meeting of NATO-
Russia Council will be more important than the
organisation of NATO summit in its immediate
neighborhood.
On the other hand, the fact that all the im-
portant NATO events, including the Bucharest
summit, will take place in the first half of 2008,
at the moment when Russian political leadership,
will be involved in presidential elections, seems
to announce no major breakthrough in the devel-
opments around The CFE Treaty.
Apart from CFE Treaty, it is the Kosovo is-
sue that, suddenly became a highly-debated is-
sue, last year, after the declaration of Russian
President, Vladimir Putin that the resolution of
Kosovo conflict would be a precedent for other
frozen conflicts. Taking into consideration the
difficult situation of Russian national and reli-
gious minorities, it is highly likely that Russian
president did not expect that his declaration on
Kosovo precedent, will have such a great impact
on the international relations and on the devel-
opment of international legal norms.
Besides, what is the value of Kosovo precedent
in the case of Transnistrian conflict? From 1992,
despite its unofficial status, the separatist entity
on the left bank of Nistru, is a „de facto state”
with its own symbols, currency, Constitution. If
in the case of Kosovo, the probable scenario is
that its independence will be recognised by US
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and the majority of EU member states, what
is the possible application of this scenario to
Transnistria?
An easy answer would be that Russia will of-
ficially acknowledge the existence of Transnis-
trian state. Therefore, since 1992, Russia has
been the only state to provide financial, lo-
gistic and military support to the separatist
entity. A recent example would be 27 million
US dollars, granted to Transnistrian authori-
ties, in order to overcome the consequences of
drought and to diminish the deficit of local
budget. In addition, Russia has opened some
24 voting stations on the left bank of the river,
despite the note of protest delivered by Moldo-
van Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European
Integration. Thus, one can easily assert that
Kosovo precedent was deliberately launched by
President Putin in order to check the reaction
of West.
Refering to the ways in which NATO can
help Moldova with the resolution of Transnis-
trian conflict, Robert Simmons mentioned
that NATO cannot directly contribute to the
resolution of this issue, becuase it is not a part
in the negotiation process, but there are some
NATO member states that show their interest
to provide financial assistance in order to facil-
itate the withdrawal of Russian military forces
from the region. Nevertheless, the fact that
NATO is not a part in the negoriation process
does not necessarily presume the fact that it
will never be.
In the same key, Robert Simmons stressed
the importance of CFE, and declared that The
Adapted CFE will be ratified only after Russia
will comply with the commitments of OSCE
Istanbul Summit. NATO official also reasured
that no bargain will be possible on this issue,
and in case Russia will not respect the provi-
sions of CFE Treaty, NATO will respond ad-
equately by increasing its military capabilities
in its new member states. Thus, it seems that
despite the lack of a major breakthrough in the
resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, there
seems to be a new actor involved in the pro-
cess.
Prognosis
As soon as the Republic of Moldova does
not have a coherent strategic document like
National Security Concept, which will clearly
determine its long-term strategic goals, IPAP
remains only an example of wishfull thinking.
Either the drafted National Security Concept
will acknowledge a strategic cooperation with
Euro-Atlantic structures, or will focus on the
development of a priveleged cooperation with
Russia, depends on the performance of major
decision makers concerning the Kosovo issue
and CFE Treaty. Regarding the prospects for
the resolution of the Transnistrian issue, it is
clear that NATO will assume a more promi-
nent role, as it is interested in positive develop-
ments in Kosovo and around the CFE Treaty.

The Bulletin is a bilingual monthly publication aiming to provide analysis on various elements of
domestic and foreign policy, as well as on some issues of special interest for Moldova.

Political and Security Statewatch authors: Ion Marandici, Sergiu Panainte, Alex Leşanu.

In order to subscribe to the distribution list of Political and Security Statewatch bulletin, please
contact us by e-mail: ghenadie.mocanu@viitorul.org.
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Statewatch no. no.
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2008

The Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) “Viitorul”

is a research, education and outreach organization which activates in the
field of economic analysis, governance, law, political sciences, strategic and
organizational science. It was set up in June 1993 in Moldova as a non-
governmental, not-for-profit organization, non-political entity.

The IDSI’s mission is to contribute to the growth of independent thinking

environment in Moldova and in other emerging democracies; to contribute
to the strengthening of the local and regional governments; to assist the
expansion of the civil society in which the citizens act together to express
their own interests, to exchange information and to strive for mutual goals and
influence government.

IDSI is also a common platform that brings together young intellectuals who
are concerned with the models of transition towards the free market and the
open society. IDSI helps them to contribute with their energies, values and
virtues, providing its logistic, moral and intellectual support and advices them
regarding their future projects and initiatives. Consistent with this mission,
IDSI has forged several linkages between the academic and policy-making
environments, generating policy analysis and recommendations for various
areas of public interest, creating and disseminating of the best practices, good
governance and economic analysis.

Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDSI) “Viitorul” 13