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Alderete.Randall.Blank.Farra
PTC Affirmative
NATIVES PTC AFFIRMATIVE 1.0
NATIVES
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383838 PTC AFFIRMATIVE 1.0...................................................................................................................................1
IAC..................................................................................................................................................................................2
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PTC→ ECONOMIC GROWTH..................................................................................................................................13
PTC→ RENEWABLES................................................................................................................................................14
RENEWABLES→ECONOMIC GROWTH................................................................................................................15
PTC→ WIND................................................................................................................................................................16
PTC→ WIND................................................................................................................................................................17
PTC→ WIND................................................................................................................................................................19
TRIBAL WIND SOLVES ENERGY............................................................................................................................20
INTERNAL SELF DETERMINATION SOLVES SECESSION.................................................................................21
INTERNAL SELF DETERMINATION SOLVES SECESSION.................................................................................22
INTERNAL SELF DETERMINATION SOLVES SECESSION.................................................................................23
INTERNAL SELF DETERMINATION ≠ SECESSION.............................................................................................24
INTERNAL SELF DETERMINATION ≠ SECESSION.............................................................................................25
SECESSION≠ DESTROY DEMOCRACY.................................................................................................................26
SELF DETERMINATION K/T US HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERSHIP.....................................................................27
SELF DETERMINATION K/T HUMAN RIGHTS.....................................................................................................28
SELF DETERMINATION SOLVES CONFLICT.......................................................................................................29
US MODELED.............................................................................................................................................................30
US K/T KASHMIR.......................................................................................................................................................31
PAKISTAN K/T SOLVE TERRORISM.......................................................................................................................32
NO IMPACT TO SECESSION.....................................................................................................................................33
PLAN POPULAR.........................................................................................................................................................34
PLAN POPULAR.........................................................................................................................................................35
PLAN UNPOPULAR...................................................................................................................................................36
A2 SPENDING.............................................................................................................................................................37
A2 SPENDING.............................................................................................................................................................38
Michigan Debate Institute
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Alderete.Randall.Blank.Farra
PTC Affirmative
IAC
Current U.S. tax policy denies Native Americans access to tax credits for renewable energy
American Indian Law Review 2008 [Mark Shahinian, third-year law student at the University of
Michigan] SPECIAL FEATURE: THE TAX MAN COMETH NOT: HOW THE NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF
TAX CREDITS HARMS INDIAN TRIBES American Indian Law Review 2007 / 200832 Am. Indian L. Rev. 267.
"The power to tax involves the power to destroy," has become a shibboleth of any economic reading of U.S.
constitutional law. 1 Yet behind Justice Marshall's oft-repeated words lies an important insight into the
balance of power between sovereign entities. That insight is essentially this: the ability of an entity to
maintain its sovereignty depends on economic power, and that economic power can be taken away by
taxation. With the power to tax also comes the power to push, to encourage, to foster and to favor. If taxation
can sap economic power, tax policy can also confer vast economic rents on certain favored groups. However,
America's Indian tribes are a group not favored by federal tax policy. 2 This paper is concerned with elements
of U.S. tax policy that do [*269] unrecognized harm to Indian tribes. In the standard analysis, Indian tribes
benefit from tax-free status - it is a bright line rule of U.S. tax policy that tribes and their subsidiary
corporations do not pay federal income taxes. However, the guarantee of tax-free status for Indian tribes also
guarantees the tribes cannot use tax credits granted by the federal government.
Plan: The United States federal government should authorize American Indian Tribal
eligibility for a permanent Production Tax Credit as identified in Internal Revenue Code
45.
or
Plan: The United States federal government should authorize American Indian Tribal
eligibility for a permanent Production Tax Credit.
Michigan Debate Institute
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Advantage: Self Determination
Current federal tax code creates an unequal economic playing field for American Indians
Tex Hall, President of the National Congress of American Indians, 3-1-2004,
http://www.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/windpoweringamerica/filter_detail.asp?itemid=678&print
Second, Congress must authorize the Tribal eligibility for the Production Tax Credit (PTC) that drives all
wind projects in this country. Tribes are now penalized in that they cannot attract the private investor to
develop partnerships for projects on Tribal lands. Indians are the only people with a "trust relationship" with
the federal government. Our treaties require the federal government to assist us in developing our reservation
economies. But all renewable energy incentives go to tax-paying developers via the PTC or to states or
subdivisions of state through the Renewable Energy Production Incentive (REPI). Indians are the only group
excluded from any of the federal renewable energy incentives, yet we are the only ones with a legal
obligation — our treaties — for federal assistance! Currently, because Tribes are not taxed entities (a status
we secured from the United States in return for our giving them most of this continent), any developer that
teams up with a Tribe in a joint venture for wind development is penalized by only being able to use a portion
of the available PTCs, which are apportioned under federal law by the percentage of ownership in the
production facility. So if a tribe has any ownership in a project on Tribal lands, our partner must forego any
incentives represented by our ownership. The PTC is the main driver for wind development in this country,
but this federal incentive policy steers investment capital away from Indian lands. Intertribal COUP once
proposed a Tribal energy production incentive to correct this federal oversight. Wryly called a "TEPI", it
gently reminded Congress that it had an obligation to provide an equal playing field for Indian energy
development. The Senate version of the federal energy bill contains language to allow Tribes and other non-
taxed entities (such as municipal utilities and rural cooperatives) to sell, assign, or trade any tax credits that
might become available to them, but those provisions were removed by the House in the conference
committee. A current COUP proposal is a little more restrictive in scope, allowing joint ventures between
Tribes and non-Indian developers to allocate the Tribe's share of the credits to their tax-paying partners. This
proposal would be tax neutral, but it removes the penalty for investment in Indian Country through Tribal
joint ventures. Tribes could still be principal owners of the project, but our partners would not be financially
penalized.
Tradable tax credits will reduce tribal dependency and increase tribal sovereignty
American Indian Law Review 2008 [Mark Shahinian, third-year law student at the University of
Michigan] SPECIAL FEATURE: THE TAX MAN COMETH NOT: HOW THE NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF
TAX CREDITS HARMS INDIAN TRIBES American Indian Law Review 2007 / 200832 Am. Indian L. Rev. 267.
The argument for a tradable tax credit is, at root, an argument for equity. Legal scholarship has a history of
arguments for a federal tax treatment of tribes that allows tribal economies to develop. 23 The moral basis of
arguments for an equitable - even favorable - tax treatment of tribes tends to rest on the federal trust
responsibility toward tribes established early in U.S. history and articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. 24 Writing of the Tribal Tax Status Act of 1982, legal scholar Robert Williams
said "To satisfy the 'moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust' incumbent upon the United
States in its dealings with Indian nations, federal Indian Country development policy must address itself to
the structural barriers currently preventing tribal economic and social self-sufficiency." 25 Lack of tribal
access to tax credits is one of today's structural barriers. Addressing those barriers will help alleviate the
federal concern for tribal economic development expressed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
"On Pine Ridge, Lower Brule and Rosebud reservations," a bank publication found, "roughly half of Indian
families are poor." 26 By aligning the tax incentives tribal businesses face with those faced by the rest of the
business community, the federal government will meet its goals of energy development, reduced tribal
dependency and increased tribal sovereignty. That alignment of incentives can be made a reality by making
wind energy tax credits tradable. More broadly, allowing tribes to utilize all tax credits now available only to
Michigan Debate Institute
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tax-paying entities will better align the interests of tribal business and U.S. policy, and also will better
provide for tribal economic development.
Michigan Debate Institute
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PTC Affirmative
IAC
IAC
Indigenous Indian development creates a solvent global model
Miriam Jorgensen, Research Associate for the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development and
consultant to the Standing Rock Sioux and White Mountain Apache Tribes, 1997, American Indian Studies, p. 137
In particular, the challenge for American Indian economic development is for it to be indigenously defined
and institutionally based. As such, development will be a process which takes account of Native assets and
goals and incorporates them into specific plans for the future. It will be capable of addressing welfare issues
generally, and not income issues alone. Because it concentrates on institutional development, it will not put
limited projects ahead of broader policy-making. It will create a political-economic environment which is
conducive to investment by tribal members and non- members alike. Furthermore, its political and social
institutions will together promote the continued success of these designated welfare- improving investments.
Clearly, development that succeeds at combating poverty and its concomitant ills is not narrowly "economic."
Finally, if Native nations achieve this kind of development, their success will be a beacon not only to other
indigenous peoples whose colonizers allow a measure of political independence, but to all nations which are
restructuring their development outlook. American Indian nations have the potential to show other countries
—from Eastern Europe to Asia and beyond -how development can be done "right."
IAC
Scenario One: Biodiversity
A right to Self Determination will maintain indigenous peoples’ connection to the land and
their cultural identity
Quane 2005 [Helen, Lecturer in Law, University of Wales, Swansea, United Kingdom]“The Rights of Indigenous
Peoples and the Development Process” The Johns Hopkins University Press Human Rights Quarterly 27.2 (2005)
652-682.
The article begins with a brief examination of the definition of an "indigenous people." It then examines the
scope of several rights claimed by indigenous peoples. The emphasis is on rights of particular significance to
indigenous peoples in a development context, namely, the right to self-determination, the right to participate
in public affairs, and the right to enjoy one's culture. As previously noted, the right to self-determination
underpins all other claims advanced by indigenous peoples. If they are successful in claiming this right, it
could be used to exert greater control over development projects on ancestral lands such as the construction
of dams, the extraction of mineral resources, and the use of traditional plants and indigenous knowledge for
pharmaceutical products. In the present context, [End Page 656] the right to participate in public affairs could
be significant in enabling indigenous peoples to participate effectively in the formulation of development
projects that affect them. Finally, the right to enjoy one's own culture could have important implications in a
development context given the close connection between lands traditionally owned or occupied by
indigenous peoples and the preservation of their cultural identity. For this reason, the right to enjoy one's
culture could have an impact on development projects affecting indigenous land and resources.
IAC
Scenario Two: Pakistan
U.S. pressure for internal self determination is key to prevent India-Pakistan nuclear
conflict
Michael Kelly, Director of Legal Research, Writing & Advocacy at Michigan State University's Detroit College of
Law, 1999, Drake Law Review
Kashmir is now occupied by three sovereign nation-states: India, which controls the lion's share; Pakistan,
which occupies a small western portion; and China, which controls Ladakh. Various mediations of the
situation have been attempted (the United Nations from 1948-58, the U.S.S.R. from 1965-66, and the United
States in 1990), but to no avail. Predictably, the situation in Kashmir has degenerated. There are both
secessionist groups and unionist groups taking militant action against each other and the Indian army that has
occupied the state to enforce military rule for most of the 1990s. Violence has become the daily norm for this
region. In 1990 alone, there were 3000 deaths related to the unrest in Kashmir. Complicating matters, and of
concern to the world community and the United Nations, is the recent development of nuclear capabilities on
the part of both India and Pakistan. Indeed, as the realistic and potential flashpoint amongst the three
occupying nuclear powers, Kashmir has been referred to as a "nuclear tinderbox" waiting to be ignited. One
formula recently put forward, and significantly based on principles of self- determination, calls for the
creation of a "Kashmiri Autonomous Region" under nominal Indian control that would exist until a
referendum can be held, at which point the various parts of Kashmir can freely choose with which sovereign
they wish to associate without the entire region going as a single entity. This appears to be a rational
suggestion. But until the United States can weigh in to pressure the concerned parties into a joint settlement,
it is likely to go unrealized. Thus, self-deterministic issues continue to fester and foment further violence
while simultaneously offering an elusive solution to the problem.
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The multilateral coalition is key to solve terrorism and maintain U.S. leadership
Newsweek, 10/15/2001
We can define a strategy for the post-cold-war era that addresses America's principal national-security need
and yet is sustained by a broad international consensus. To do this we will have to give up some cold-war
reflexes, such as an allergy to multilateralism, and stop insisting that China is about to rival us militarily or
that Russia is likely to re-emerge as a new military threat. (For 10 years now, our defense forces have been
aligned for everything but the real danger we face. This will inevitably change.) The purpose of an
international coalition is practical and strategic. Given the nature of this war, we will need the constant
cooperation of other governments--to make arrests, shut down safe houses, close bank accounts and share
intelligence. Alliance politics has become a matter of high national security. But there is a broader
imperative. The United States dominates the world in a way that inevitably arouses envy or anger or
opposition. That comes with the power, but we still need to get things done. If we can mask our power in--
sorry, work with--institutions like the United Nations Security Council, U.S. might will be easier for much of
the world to bear. Bush's father understood this, which is why he ensured that the United Nations sanctioned
the gulf war. The point here is to succeed, and international legitimacy can help us do that.
IAC
Scenario Three: Democratization
Global democratic consolidation is essential to prevent many scenarios for war and
extinction.
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, October 1995, “Promoting Democracy in
the 1990’s,” http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/dia95_01.html, accessed on 12/11/99
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming
years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could
easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime
syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the
institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate.
The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new
and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of
democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that
govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress
against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not
ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency.
Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to
use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading
partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more
environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the
destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal
obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely
because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of
law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and
prosperity can be built.
Michigan Debate Institute
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Alderete.Randall.Blank.Farra
PTC Affirmative
IAC
PTC for Tribes is a narrow targeted fix to a problem enhancing sovereignty and solving
energy resource shortfalls
American Indian Law Review 2008 [Mark Shahinian, third-year law student at the University of
Michigan] SPECIAL FEATURE: THE TAX MAN COMETH NOT: HOW THE NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF
TAX CREDITS HARMS INDIAN TRIBES American Indian Law Review 2007 / 200832 Am. Indian L. Rev. 267.
To help resolve the problems outlined above, Congress should institute tax- credit tradability for tribes,
including a tradable PTC. Congress should change the current non-assignable status of tax credits and allow
tribes to trade their tax credits to business partners with tax liabilities in return for cash, equity or other
consideration equal to the value of the credits minus any (presumably minor) transaction costs. This is a
narrow, targeted fix to a problem, which does not require large-scale revisions of the tax code or of the
federal-tribal [*283] relationship. With this sort of provision in place, tribes could become involved in
businesses that make heavy use of tax credits.A. Tradable PTC is Win-Win Tradable tax credits would be an
ideal solution for all parties - tribes, government and private business. Tribes would gain economic
development opportunities; government would be able to further promote the business ventures it is trying to
encourage through the tax code and would reduce tribal dependency on federal dollars; private business
would be able to partner (and profit) with tribes in developing an important natural resource. Each party
would bring something to the table. The tribes would contribute the resources - land, wind and labor. The
outside investor would contribute the capital. The federal government would contribute the tax credits. The
tribes and the outside investor would be partners, both sharing in the venture's profits. The tribe would take
much of the cash flow, while the outside equity investor would take all of the tax credits and, depending on
the arrangement, some of the cash flow from the project.
Michigan Debate Institute
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Changing the tax code will simultaneously achieve goals of tribal and renewable energy
development
American Indian Law Review 2008 [Mark Shahinian, third-year law student at the University of
Michigan] SPECIAL FEATURE: THE TAX MAN COMETH NOT: HOW THE NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF
TAX CREDITS HARMS INDIAN TRIBES American Indian Law Review 2007 / 200832 Am. Indian L. Rev. 267.
There are three clear rationales for this change in the tax code. First, the change will give tribes the same
incentives as the rest of the business community as tribal economies develop. Second, the change will reduce
tribal dependence on federal grants, as larger pools of investment capital become available to tribes. Third,
the change will increase tribal sovereignty, as dependence is reduced.
1. Aligning IncentivesMaking tax credits tradable by tribes - and thereby aligning the financial incentives of
tribes with the rest of the U.S. business community - promotes the federal goal of guiding economic activity,
whether in the wind power industry or in other industries with substantial tax credits.
Congress is bent on fostering renewable energy production in the United States. Congress is also bent on
fostering tribal energy development. If Congress made the PTC tradable, tribes would face the same tax
incentives as the rest of the business community, renewable energy development on tribal lands would
increase, and Congress would take a step forward in achieving its goals of tribal and renewable energy
development. Tax credits are economic incentives the government provides to promote certain activities. 76
With these incentives, the government is trying to encourage economic activity (such as charitable giving or
pollution-free energy production) that the government considers socially beneficial. 77 The government has an
interest in promoting those activities targeted for promotion to the fullest extent possible, including in Indian
Country.
Michigan Debate Institute
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PTC→ RENEWABLES
Changing the tax code will simultaneously achieve goals of tribal and renewable energy
development
American Indian Law Review 2008 [Mark Shahinian, third-year law student at the University of
Michigan] SPECIAL FEATURE: THE TAX MAN COMETH NOT: HOW THE NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF
TAX CREDITS HARMS INDIAN TRIBES American Indian Law Review 2007 / 200832 Am. Indian L. Rev. 267.
There are three clear rationales for this change in the tax code. First, the change will give tribes the same
incentives as the rest of the business community as tribal economies develop. Second, the change will reduce
tribal dependence on federal grants, as larger pools of investment capital become available to tribes. Third,
the change will increase tribal sovereignty, as dependence is reduced.
1. Aligning IncentivesMaking tax credits tradable by tribes - and thereby aligning the financial incentives of
tribes with the rest of the U.S. business community - promotes the federal goal of guiding economic activity,
whether in the wind power industry or in other industries with substantial tax credits.
Congress is bent on fostering renewable energy production in the United States. Congress is also bent on
fostering tribal energy development. If Congress made the PTC tradable, tribes would face the same tax
incentives as the rest of the business community, renewable energy development on tribal lands would
increase, and Congress would take a step forward in achieving its goals of tribal and renewable energy
development. Tax credits are economic incentives the government provides to promote certain activities. 76
With these incentives, the government is trying to encourage economic activity (such as charitable giving or
pollution-free energy production) that the government considers socially beneficial. 77 The government has an
interest in promoting those activities targeted for promotion to the fullest extent possible, including in Indian
Country.
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RENEWABLES→ECONOMIC GROWTH
Renewable energy development serves as a model for self-development
Bismark Tribune, August 19, 2001
The Blackfeet, whose reservation borders Glacier National Park and the Canadian province of Alberta, also
have timber and water resources that could play a role in a long-range economic plan, Parsons said. In
North Dakota, the Three Affiliated Tribes also are looking at wind generation as a source of electricity for
reservation businesses and residents, Chairman Tex Hall said. The Three Affiliated Tribes also see wind
energy as a possible job creator. 'Wind energy can help reduce (electricity) costs of each household but
still provide a profit for economic development to generate new jobs,' Hall said. Successful projects
between Indians and outside partners could serve as a model for other tribes, and allow for an exchange of
ideas among cultures, said Larry Flowers, with the National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Prospects for
wind energy development have some residents on the Blackfeet reservation excited. 'It would provide
jobs, you could train people. I don't see any bad in it,' Yvonne Night Gun said. 'It's a natural resource that
should be tapped into,' William Wade Running Crane said. 'The wind keeps on coming.'
PTC→ WIND
Federal tax credits are necessary for American Indian Tribes to develop wind power
industries
American Indian Law Review 2008 [Mark Shahinian, third-year law student at the University of
Michigan] SPECIAL FEATURE: THE TAX MAN COMETH NOT: HOW THE NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF
TAX CREDITS HARMS INDIAN TRIBES American Indian Law Review 2007 / 200832 Am. Indian L. Rev. 267.
In certain industries, federal tax credits play such an important financial role that entities unable to use those
tax credits are at a significant financial disadvantage to entities able to utilize the tax credits. Federal tax
credits play a key role in the coal bed methane extraction industry, 3 the low-income housing development
industry 4 , and the wind power industry, 5 among others. In some of these fields, tribes cannot make use of
the tax credits, and so face a severe financial handicap as compared to entities that can utilize the tax credits.
Perversely, this handicap is present in precisely the industries the federal government has decided to nurture
and encourage - for instance, the wind energy industry.To bring focus to the discussion of tax credits and
tribes, this article examines how the inability of tribes to access federal tax credits handicaps tribes' ability to
own and develop wind farms. Indian tribes could be a major force in the growing U.S. wind industry. Wind
power from tribal lands could provide 22% of installed U.S. electric power generation capacity. 6 Renewable
energy development is an issue with broad support in the United States and has the potential to bring
significant economic benefits to the tribes.
PTC→ WIND
Lack of credits puts Natives at a competitive disadvantage
American Indian Law Review 2008 [Mark Shahinian, third-year law student at the University of
Michigan] SPECIAL FEATURE: THE TAX MAN COMETH NOT: HOW THE NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF
TAX CREDITS HARMS INDIAN TRIBES American Indian Law Review 2007 / 200832 Am. Indian L. Rev. 267.
Wind projects are extremely capital-intensive but have low overhead once up and running. 31 As
investments, they are conceptually similar to long-term bonds - low risk, fixed-income investments. Like any
capital project, three parties have a role in building a wind farm: (1) the customer, (2) the financier, and (3)
the project owners. The customer: In a wind project, the customer, once identified and locked into a long-
term contract, is a relatively silent element. The customer is the buyer of the electricity the project produces,
and is usually a utility or power marketer. 32 The customer's main role is to provide the project with a Power
Purchase Agreement (PPA). The PPA is usually in the form of a ten- to fifteen- year year output contract for a
set price per kWh generated, with built-in escalators. The financier: The developer uses that PPA as the
finance-able asset, and with that PPA in hand, finds money to build the project. Financiers of wind projects,
for reasons discussed below, are typically large investors with a significant tax liability. The project owners:
Project ownership is the key to the issues discussed in this paper. Only certain owners will find profit in wind
farms. These owners must, for financial reasons, meet two criteria. First, they must have easy access to the
capital markets. Wind farms are extremely capital intensive. A 30MW 33 wind farm (enough to power, on
average, 12,000 homes) such as one proposed for the Rosebud Reservation can cost $ 48 million to build. 34
Modern wind farms are generally in the 100-200MW range, and can represent capital investments of half a
billion dollars. 35 Second, the owner must have a large, steady tax liability from non-wind operations that they
can offset with the PTC credits. A 30MW wind farm throws off more than $ 1.6 million per year in tax credits
for the first ten years of its operation. 36The two requirements above - access to capital markets and large tax
liability - mean wind farm owners tend to be some of the largest corporations in the world, and that the
owners and financiers of projects tend to be one in the same. American investment bank Goldman Sachs,
financial giant General Electric and Australian investment bank Babcock & Brown all own or have owned
significant wind properties. 37III. Tax Credits and Tribes However, the two requirements - access to capital
markets and large tax liability - also work to wreck the hopes for tribal ownership of wind projects. Tribes, as
discussed infra, are non-taxable entities. As such, they cannot use tax credits, and are at a competitive
disadvantage compared to taxable owners of wind projects.
US MODELED
U.S. Indian policy is modeled
Fourth World Center for the Study of Indigenous Law and Politics (Marc Sills and Glenn Morris),
Spring/Summer 1996, Fourth World Bulletin, http://carbon.cudenver.edu/public/fwc/Issue10/fwbtoc.html
In the summer of 1994, following the conclusion of the 12th session of the UN Working Group on
Indigenous Peoples, the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of
Minorities sent the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to the UN Commission on Human
Rights. This was a necessary step for the Draft in route to the ultimate approval by the UN General Assembly
that its proponents hope to achieve. But in February 1995, the Draft Declaration was put in jeopardy of de-
railment when the Human Rights Commission ordered the Draft reviewed by a new working group. That
group, named the "Open-ended Inter-sessional Working Group" (referred to herein as the "Inter-sessional"),
held its first meeting from 20 November to 1 December 1995. The proceedings from the meeting
demonstrate an attempt by a coterie of states, led by the United States, to commandeer the debate on
indigenous rights, as they try to maintain their control of international law and the United Nations' role in
enforcing the principles found in the Draft Declaration. Because of its role as the one surviving super-power
at the end of the Cold War, with the financial leverage to determine the future of the United Nations, the US
has inordinate control over the way the Draft Declaration is being worded and what exactly the document
will imply as policy. The United States intends that its own model for treatment of indigenous peoples should
be emulated by other states, and therefore that the Draft Declaration should reflect the order of US Indian
Law. The agenda is not merely to define a simple moral order; more important, the US is attempting to create
a broader, more encompassing hegemony that minimizes the possibility that indigenous peoples might
actually be protagonists of their own destinies.
A state’s practice to recognize the right to internal self-determination is the only means by
which international law can be created
Quane 2005 [Helen, Lecturer in Law, University of Wales, Swansea, United Kingdom]“The Rights of Indigenous
Peoples and the Development Process” The Johns Hopkins University Press Human Rights Quarterly 27.2 (2005)
652-682.
Under current international instruments, distinct ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups within states do not
appear to have a legal right to external or internal self-determination. An examination of the wording,
context, drafting history, and subsequent practice of the relevant provisions of the UN Charter, the ICCPR,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and General Assembly
Resolution 2625 (XXV) tends to support this view.37 This view might seem over cautious, especially when
one considers recent events in Central and Eastern Europe. It is also at [End Page 660] odds with a growing
body of opinion in the academic literature that suggests that groups within states have a right to internal, and
possibly external, self-determination. Arguably, this cautious approach can be defended, especially if one
examines the literature in light of the relevant state practice. The importance of state practice cannot be
underestimated, even in this age of globalization, because it remains the only means by which new rules of
customary international law can be created.
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US K/T KASHMIR
U.S. pressure is key to solve Kashmir
Business Recorder, 1/18/2002
America is the only country, which can help resolve Kashmir dispute that remains the main cause of tension
between India and Pakistan, said Roger Godsif, Chairman Parliamentary Kashmir Group in House of
Commons on Thursday. "No other country in the world has got the power to compel or force them for the
resolution of Kashmir dispute," he told APP in an interview while commenting on President General Pervez
Musharraf's address to the nation on Saturday to curb terrorism and extremism. Godsif said, "I applaud any
step taken by General Musharraf to eliminate indiscriminate terrorism. I hope it will contribute towards
reduction of tension between India and Pakistan. Pakistan has made repeated offers to India for a
"meaningful" and "purposeful" dialogue for finding a peaceful settlement of the issue but New Delhi has so
far not responded positively. - The main cause of tension between two countries is the Kashmir dispute, said
the British parliamentarian. Godsif said, he did not believe bilateral talks "will bring about resolution of the
dispute," threatening peace and stability in a nuclearised South Asia. "America has both the financial ability
and the ability to put pressure both upon India and Pakistan in order to move towards resolution- of the
dispute. No other country has the capacity to do it," said Roger Godsif.
Michigan Debate Institute
32
Alderete.Randall.Blank.Farra
PTC Affirmative
NO IMPACT TO SECESSION
There is no impact to secession
Daniel Philpott, assistant professor of Political Science at UC-Santa Barbara, 1998, National Self-Determination
and Secession, p. 91
Even if secessions did proliferate, though, which I do not advocate, we should be clear why it would be a
problem. It is not necessarily a problem, for instance, for there to be small states. As I claimed in my original
argument, there is no reason why even a city or tiny region cannot be self-determining. Andorra, Monaco,
Liechtenstein, Singapore, and (up until this year) Hong Kong have all fared perfectly well as tiny
sovereignties. There are some limits to how small a sovereign entity can be, but these arise from the necessity
of providing certain public functions: maintaining roads and utilities, educating children, preserving minimal
order, and providing basic public goods.2” It is not necessarily a problem, either, for there to be a large
number of states. International stability and peace has endured among the many and collapsed among the
few. Compare Europe’s fate with one Germany in the first half of the twentieth century with Europe’s fate
with 300 German states during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.2’
No impact to secession
Kai Nielsen, Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy, the University of Calgary, 1998, National Self-
Determination and Secession, p. 114
Of course, the existing states in the UN and in the international law establishment will stick together to seek
to sustain the idea of the territorial integrity of states, i.e. of the existing states. They are pretty much, in this
respect, like an old boys club. And, of course, we do not want a circus of anarchy, but, as a matter of
historical fact, states come and go and it is not such a terrible thing if changes occur, particularly if the
societies in question are liberal democratic ones with very distinct nations hamessed together rather
artificially, and where the flourishing of these nations, or at least the smaller nations, within the umbrella
state, could be enhanced by separation and no great harm would accrue to the remainder state by separation.
A state should not, and indeed in most instances will not, break up without good reason. And when it does
break up there will always be some dislocation and not all the after effects will be good. But some of them
will be very good indeed. A nation or a people—which before had been treated as a national minority or
worse still like an ethnic group—can now be in control of its own destiny as much (and as little) as any
nation-state can be in the modem world.23 States do come and go, and sometimes they break up, perhaps
without the conditions that Remedial Right Only Theories could sanction obtaining, with no great harm
resulting, and arguably sometimes with considerable gain, e.g. Iceland from Denmark and Norway from
Sweden. If Quebec should secede from Canada, Scotland from Britain, and Wales from Britain, their
thoroughly liberal democratic environments staying intact, it is anything but evident that that would not give
more people more control over their lives and a fuller self-realization than the continuing of the status quo.
Moreover, this could obtain without harming others in the remainder state. Quite possibly more good would
obtain all around. At the very minimum, this idea should not be rejected out of hand. Perhaps in some of
these cases—the case of Wales, for example—it would not be practically feasible. Here we should go case by
case. But there are no good grounds for the rejection of the putative right to secession on high moral or legal
principle. And, at the very least, none of the dire results that Buchanan believes must just go with secession
seem at all to be in the cards in such cases. It looks at least like it is better to go in the more permissive
direction of what Buchanan calls Primary Right Theories than in the direction of Remedial Right Only
Theories.
Michigan Debate Institute
34
Alderete.Randall.Blank.Farra
PTC Affirmative
PLAN POPULAR
This congress recently renewed the PTC for a decade and enacted portions of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 both are consistent with the mandates of the plan.
American Indian Law Review 2008 [Mark Shahinian, third-year law student at the University of
Michigan] SPECIAL FEATURE: THE TAX MAN COMETH NOT: HOW THE NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF
TAX CREDITS HARMS INDIAN TRIBES American Indian Law Review 2007 / 200832 Am. Indian L. Rev. 267.
The PTC is a tax credit Congress created to foster the production of renewable energy. The PTC is a broad
incentive - it has aided renewable energy developments from California to Maine. An examination of the
record of congressional debates surrounding the renewal of the PTC in 2005 makes clear Congress was
interested in both reducing dependence on foreign fossil [*286] fuels 78 and stimulating the growth of
domestic renewable energy businesses. 79 To this end, Congress decided to enact a tax incentive (the PTC)
that will cost taxpayers over $ 300 million a year over the next decade. 80 Congress has acted on its goals of
increasing renewable energy production by enacting the PTC - Congress has also acted on its goals of
increasing tribal energy resource production by enacting parts of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Congress
would like tribal corporations to work toward resource development in the same manner as non-reservation
businesses. The 2005 Energy Policy Act articulates Congress' intent to foster energy development on tribal
lands. 81 The Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, in its report on the bill, wrote "There are
abundant energy resources available for production on Indian lands. Development of those resources must be
encouraged." 82 Making the PTC tradable would merge those two goals. Congress should - and, the record
indicates, does - want Indian tribes to face the same set of incentives as non-Indian business entities. Both
logic and congressional action indicate that the government would want all economic activity within the
boundaries of the United States to face the same incentive system, in order to broadly encourage the activities
targeted by tax credits. Congress has articulated its goals of energy security and clean energy production.
Tribes, given the proper incentives, and a tradable PTC, can help the U.S. meet those goals.
Wind is politically popular and cost effective boosting domestic manufacturing industries
American Indian Law Review 2008 [Mark Shahinian, third-year law student at the University of
Michigan] SPECIAL FEATURE: THE TAX MAN COMETH NOT: HOW THE NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF
TAX CREDITS HARMS INDIAN TRIBES American Indian Law Review 2007 / 200832 Am. Indian L. Rev. 267.
Traditional methods of electricity generation are faced with increasing difficulties: coal-fired generation is a
liability in the age of global warming; 7 natural gas prices are high and unpredictable; 8 nuclear power still
poses [*270] storage problems; 9 and there are few rivers in the U.S. left undammed for hydroelectricity. 10
These problems have opened up a market opportunity for wind-generated electricity. Wind power has stepped
in to fill the gap left by traditional power sources and provides new generation capacity. 11 Builders of wind
farms will add about 2750 megawatts (MW) of generating capacity in 2006, which will produce about as
much electricity as is used by the entire state of Rhode Island. 12 Wind enjoys three main advantages: price,
environmental benefits and economic benefits. When coupled with federal tax credits, new wind turbine
designs are now cost-competitive with new coal plants and natural gas generation. 13 With concerns of global
warming rising, wind is an energy source that results in few greenhouse gasses. Wind power also enjoys
political support for the positive impact it can have on domestic manufacturing industries. 14 Renewable
energy development brings high levels of economic benefits to the local community, when compared to
fossil-powered electricity. 15 Renewable energy is particularly popular in rural areas with few [*271] other
economic prospects. In 2006, a successful challenger for a U.S. Senate seat in Montana made wind power a
prominent part of his campaign. 16There is potential for tribes to play a major role in the U.S. wind industry.
As noted above, wind power on tribal lands could provide a substantial portion of U.S. electricity needs. 17
The Great Plains have wind in abundance, and many tribal reservations are located in the Great Plains. Wind
developers are interested in working with tribes because tribes are single landowners over vast, windy tracts
of land - the area within the Rosebud Reservation boundaries alone is larger than the land area of the entire
state of Rhode Island. Additionally, some power purchasers, realizing the economic plight of the reservations,
are willing to give the tribes better-than-market prices for tribally generated electricity. 18
Michigan Debate Institute
35
Alderete.Randall.Blank.Farra
PTC Affirmative
PLAN POPULAR
There has been bipartisan support for over a century to lessen tribal dependence on the
federal government--energy development policies like the plan are empirically popular.
American Indian Law Review 2008 [Mark Shahinian, third-year law student at the University of
Michigan] SPECIAL FEATURE: THE TAX MAN COMETH NOT: HOW THE NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF
TAX CREDITS HARMS INDIAN TRIBES American Indian Law Review 2007 / 200832 Am. Indian L. Rev. 267.
Increasing tribal revenues from wind energy production - or any other economic activity that prospers off-
reservation in a tax-credit environment and could benefit tribes if tax credits are made tradable - is a good
way to meet federal goals of reducing tribal dependence. The reduction of tribal dependence has been a
congressional goal since the nineteenth century. Even during the passage of the Allotment Acts in the late
nineteenth century, the twisted logic of the time said that forcing tribal members into farming would push the
Indians toward "real and permanent progress." 83 This goal of reduced tribal dependence was first codified in
the economic development context nearly 100 years ago - in the Buy Indian Act of 1908. 84 The Act directs
the Department of Interior to give preference to Indians as far as is practicable in hiring and procurement. 85
The Buy Indian Act has been expanded over the years. In 1974, it was made to apply to all federal contracts.
86
Congress has been willing to extend the same type of support evinced by the Buy Indian Act to tribal
energy programs. For example, in 2001, the full House of Representatives passed the Hayworth amendment
to the proposed energy bill adding "energy products and energy by-products" to the categories of materials
covered under the Buy Indian Act. 87 That bill, House Bill 4, died in conference committee in 2002. However,
the ideas from the Hayworth amendment are incorporated into the Energy Policy Act of 2005 - the Act
provides for federal purchases of power generated by Indian tribes. 88 Even outside the energy development
or economic development contexts, the Federal Government has made clear through the years that it would
like to see the tribes less dependent on direct grants of federal dollars. The Reagan administration advocated
reduced tribal dependence in an important policy statement issued in 1983. "It is important to the concept of
self-government that tribes reduce their dependence on federal funds by providing a greater percentage of the
cost of their self-government," the administration wrote. 89 Any measures that give the tribes a leg up in the
economic development game reduce their economic dependency on the federal government. Wind power
development could play a role in this economic development, but only if tribes have access to the PTC. Wind
power development would provide the "greater percentage of the cost of [tribal] self government" that the
Reagan administration sought and it would push the tribes toward "real and permanent progress".
Michigan Debate Institute
36
Alderete.Randall.Blank.Farra
PTC Affirmative
PLAN UNPOPULAR
A2 SPENDING
A2 SPENDING
The federal government has already authorized the PTC for wind farms the plan makes
tax code revenue neutral allowing natives to compete for investors
American Indian Law Review 2008 [Mark Shahinian, third-year law student at the University of
Michigan] SPECIAL FEATURE: THE TAX MAN COMETH NOT: HOW THE NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF
TAX CREDITS HARMS INDIAN TRIBES American Indian Law Review 2007 / 200832 Am. Indian L. Rev. 267.
Under the proposal, the tribes can partner with an outside investor, and no matter what the respective
ownership percentages, the outside investor could still get the PTC's full value (and the tribe would be paid
consideration in fair exchange for this value). Ideally, the tribe would want to leverage the deal as much as it
could - borrowing its share of the project and bringing in an outside investor who could take the tax credits,
bring in cash and/or a good credit rating to satisfy the lender as to the project's viability, and drop out after
ten years. Importantly, the proposed change is revenue neutral. Very few wind farms of any size are built
without access to the PTC. So, whether a wind farm is built under partial tribal ownership or without tribal
ownership, the tax credits the wind farm generates - and, therefore, the cost to the U.S. government - would
be the same. A tradable PTC may meet some opposition from non-Indian landowners who are afraid of wind
projects moving to reservations instead of their land. However, wind sites are chosen for a multitude of
factors, including wind speeds and access to transmission - the tribes will be competing with others based on
these many factors, and the most economically feasible projects will [*285] go forward. Clearly, the
Western Governors' Association did not feel it much of a concern - they have backed the idea of a tradable
PTC. 75