Calalang vs. Williams This 1940 case is known primarily for Justice Jose P. Laurels definition of social justice.

The classic case of Calalang vs. Williams, (70 Phil. 726)1940, tackled the issue of police power for public welfare but is remembered because it contains a definition of social justice. Facts: A traffic regulation in Manila banned Calesas from some streets in Manila during certain afternoon hours. A citizen challenged this regulation. Issue: Was the regulation valid? Ruling: Yes. The supreme court upheld the regulation as valid exercise of police power in the interest of public welfare. This case is known primarily for the words of Justice Jose P Laurel defining social justice: Social justice is neither communism nor despotism nor atomism nor anarchy but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the state so that justice in its rationale and objectively secular conception atleast be at approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people the adaption of government of measures calculate to insure economic stability of all the components of the society thru the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the inter relations of the members of the community, constitutionally, thru the adoption of measures legally justifiable or extra-constitutionally, thru the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all government on the time honored principle of salus capuli est supremo lex.

Battered Wife People vs. Genoza

2004

This case, esteeming from a wifes killing of her husband in 1995, is the first to use battered womans syndrome as a defense. The case of People versus Genoza, G.R. 935981, January 15, 2004, is the first to use the defense battered womans syndrome in the Philippines.

Facts: The wife had suffered maltreatment from her husband for over eight years. She was eight months pregnant, when, one evening, her husband came home drunk and started to batter her shouting that his wife might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag him, he dragged her towards a drawer where he kept a gun but was not able to open the drawer because it was locked. So she got out a cutter from his wallet but dropped it. She was able to hit his arm to a ppip The wife, thinking of all the suffering that her husband baha f inflfkc ti ton And her unborn child, distorted the drawer and got the gun. She shot her husband who was by then as lecked. She was tried and convicted for parricide which is punishable by reclusion pertpetua (20 years and 1 day to forty years). On appeal she alleged battered womans syndrome as a form of self-defense.

Issue: May battered womans syndrome be regarded as a form of self defense to

Ruling: Yes. The supreme court said, how, that the recored show lack Of the battered womans syndrome as manifested

More specifically the court stated the court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman's syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized atleast two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produce in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an eminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force inorder to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable-notnecessary and actual grave harm to the accused based on the history of violence perpetrated by the harmer against the latter. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, to all of this elements were duly established.

By the time the wife killed her husband, there was no longer any aggression on his part to justify a claim of self defense. However, the court also found that the cycle of abuse inflicted by the hsuv aa resulted in post-traumatic stress disorder on the part of the wife, which lessen her freedom of action, intelligence, and intent, resulting in a psychological paralysis. Also, the battering she received at his hands before she killed him produced passion and obfuscation which overcame her reason. These were appreciated by the court as mitigating circumstances. Also, the court found that there was no treachery. The wifes conviction was affirmed, but considered the mitigating cuyirm am fat, her sencte awas redufce. Sonc adhre has already served the min sentence, the court said that she might be considered for parole.

Premesias vs. Fugoso

In 1947, the Mayor of Manila refused to grant a permit to hold a really at Plaza Miranda. The Supreme Court said that the Mayor's fear that trouble may arise during the rally was not enough reason to suppress the fundamental right of the people to free speech and peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances. In the case of Premesias vs. Fugoso, G.R. No. L-1800 January 27, 1948, the Supreme Court said the fear that trouble may arise in the rally was not enough reason to suppress the fundamental right of the people to free speech and peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances. FACTS In November 1947, the Mayor of Manila refused to grant a permit to hold a public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of grievances. The Mayors reason: that there is a reasonable ground to believe facing upon previous uttereancaed and upn the fact that passion s esp on the part of the losing gfrou remains biitetter and That similar speeches be delivered And in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of peace and a disruption of public order, a manila ordinance at that time required a Mayors permit to hold a parade, procession, public meeting or assembly. Premisias f

ISSUE May the mayor be compelled to grant the permit?

RULING. Yes. The supreme court ordered the mayor to grant the permit interpreting the ordinance to mean that the mayor did not have the power to grant or refuse the permit only that discretion to specify with the pareader amy pass or the meeting may held. The court said that the constitutional right to free speech and peaceful assembly was the fundamental right of the people and may not be suppressed unless there was a

probability of a serious umnfu and quoted U.S. Supreme Court brandase in Whitney vs. Calif: fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly.