THE BATTLE OF THE HYDASPES 1 This river is now called the Jhelum.

It was now the monsoon season of 326 BC. Alex had just taken control of the great and wealthy city of Taxila. 2 Porus' kingdom extended from the Hydaspes to the Punjab. He had a very large army at his disposal. Alex made sure to buy off Ambhi of Taxila first so that he would not combine forces. 3 Porus refused to submit Alex and said he would fight him at the Hydaspes. He probably had about 4,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry with 200 elephants and 300 war-chariots. 4 Alex's 1st need was for a transport flotilla and so he sent Coenus back to the Indus for the boats. The boats were brought on ox-carts, cut into sections. 5 There followed a war of nerves on the banks of the river which was probably about half a mile wide now. It looked like stalemate and Alex had huge consignments of grain and other supplies brought to the camp. 6 Porus probably believed that Alex would not attack till the monsoon was over, the high waters and elephants were quite a deterrent. 7 But to keep the enemy on their toes, Alex kept the army moving about constantly even at night. Eventually these manoeuvres were ignored. 8 Over 17 miles from base camp Alex's scouts found a potential crossing place. This was a large wooded island* with only a narrow channel on either side of it. 9 Every night a great deal of noise and fire was created in different places along the bank to confuse Porus. His men could not remain on the alert indefinitely and so he allowed them to relax. 10 Alex heard that an ally of Porus (Abisares) was not far off with a large army and he knew that he had to attack soon rather than letting them join forces. 11 The element of secrecy was only of so much use as once he started to cross, Porus would know about it. So a division of forces was necessary to keep Porus guessing. 12 So, the largest part of the army under Craterus stayed at base camp. Meanwhile Alex moved along the river bank with about

5,000 elite cavalry and 10,000 infantry to cross the river before dawn. Another group took up position halfway between the two, about 9 miles along the river bank. Craterus' instructions were not to move till Porus had moved to attack Alex and even then, not to move if there were any elephants left behind. 13 So whichever way Porus moved, he left himself open to attack from the rear, either by Alex or by Craterus. p.2 14 So Alex's group crossed the river in terrible storm conditions in the middle of the night. The daring and skill needed for this operation was astounding and the logistics involved were daunting. In one way the storm was good because of the noise but conditions were terrible. 15 On disembarking a terrible mistake was discovered * which was that in fact they had landed on another island instead of on the far river bank either due to faulty intelligence or perhaps the storm. Finally they struggled through the water and reached shore. 16 By now Porus was told what was happening. He sent a force of cavalry and chariots with his son to try to destroy Alex's group as they landed. After a brief skirmish the Indians fled leaving 400 dead including Porus' son. The Indian chariots were useless here. Although some accounts say there was no battle here. Bucephalas was possibly wounded here. 18 By now the middle force under Meleager had crossed the river and joined up with Alex who was pressing ahead with the cavalry. 19 Porus now decided correctly that the showdown had to be on his side of the river and moved to meet Alex. He left a holding force with elephants. He moved along the bank and picked his place carefully, a level sandy plain, free from mud. 20 Porus drew up his army in a wide, central front with the elephants stationed every 100 feet or so (looked like a castle with towers). On either wing he placed a row of chariots with infantry and cavalry behind them. The overall line was probably about 4 miles long of which most was infantry and its biggest drawback was probably lack of flexibility. 21 Alex could not risk bringing the horses face up to the elephants so he had to think of something else. He decided to send his cavalry in concentrated on the Indians' left wing and

hope that Porus would shift his right wing cavalry around to that side. 22 Meanwhile he kept 2 cavalry divisions (under Coenus and Demetrius) out of sight ready to sweep around behind enemy lines and attack from the rear. 23 The attack on the left wing began with mounted archers against the chariots. Then Alex charged at the head of his cavalry and Porus did exactly as he had hoped, he moved his right wing cavalry around to the left. At once Coenus led the other 2 divisions right around behind the enemy. 24 Then the infantry charged on Porus' centre. One great advantage was the type of bow used by the Indian archers rested on the ground which was now slippy. p.3 25 The real nightmare was the elephants. Alex decided that the best way to deal with them was 1st to let the archers shoot the mahouts, then spears and javelins at the animals themselves and finally scimitars and axes aimed at their trunks and legs. The sarissa proved very useful too. Once the momentum of attack was maintained the elephants proved to be just as much of a problem to their own side. 26 Finally Craterus crossed the river and attacked the camp. The final stage of the battle was hand to hand fighting at which the Macedonians were far more experienced. There were a huge number of Indian casualties. 27 Eventually when it was clear that there was no hope, Porus left the battlefield badly wounded (contrast to Darius). Alex sent Ambhi after him which was a mistake and then another messenger who fetched him. 28 Note description of the meeting of the two men, particularly Alex's response to Porus' dignity. Porus remained loyal to Alex for his lifetime. 29 Wisely, Abisares arrived too late for the battle. 30 "Gaugamela was fought against heavier odds and far more hung on its outcome but at the Hydaspes Alexander displayed a flexible resourcefulness of strategy which he never equalled on any other occasion, from his initial brilliant dispositions to the final ruse by which he outmanoeuvred Porus' cavalry". (Peter Green).

To Napoleon, this was Alex's finest battle.