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Book I, Chapters 1-5 Summary

The first chapter opens with the famous phrase: "Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains." These "chains" are the constraints placed on the freedom of citizens in modern states. The stated aim of this book is to determine whether there can be legitimate political authority--whether a state can exist that upholds, rather than constrains, liberty. Rousseau rejects the idea that legitimate political authority is found in nature. The only natural form of authority is the authority a father has over a child, which exists only for the preservation of the child. Political thinkers--particularly Grotius and ##Hobbes##--have asserted that the relationship between ruler and subject is similar to that between father and child: the ruler cares for his subjects and so has unlimited rights over them. This kind of reasoning assumes the natural superiority of rulers over the ruled. Such superiority is perpetuated by force, not by nature, so political authority has no basis in nature. Nor is legitimate political authority founded on force. The maxim that "might makes right" does not imply that the less strong should be obedient to the strong. If might is the only determinant of right, then people obey rulers not because they should, but because they have no choice. And if they are able to overthrow their ruler, then this also is right since they are exercising their superior might. In such circumstances, there is no political authority; people simply do whatever is within their power. Rousseau's suggested answer is that legitimate political authority rests on a covenant (a "social contract") forged between the members of society. He has a number of predecessors in theorizing a social contract, including Grotius, who proposes that there is a covenant between the king and his people--a "right of slavery"--where the people agree to surrender their freedom to the king. Grotius is less clear what the people get in return for their freedom. It is not preservation: the king keeps himself fed and contented off the labor of the people, and not the other way around. It is not security: civil peace is of little value if the king makes his people go to war, and desolates the country by stockpiling all its goods for his own consumption. Yet it must be something, because only a lunatic would give up his freedom for nothing, and a covenant made by a lunatic would be void. Besides, even if people were able to surrender their own freedom, they could not justifiably surrender the freedom of their children as well. It is impossible to surrender one's freedom in a fair exchange. By surrendering their freedom to their ruler, people surrender all their rights, and are no longer in any position to ask for something in return. More importantly, Rousseau links freedom with moral significance: our actions can only be moral if those actions were done freely. In giving up our freedom we give up our morality and our humanity. Rousseau also objects to the suggestion that prisoners of war could become slaves through an even exchange, where the conqueror spares the life of the vanquished in exchange for that person's freedom. Wars

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have nothing to do with individuals. Wars are conducted between states for the sake of property. When an enemy surrenders, he ceases to be an enemy, and becomes simply a man. The people in an absolute monarchy are slaves, and slaves have no freedom and no rights. A people only become a people if they have the freedom to deliberate amongst themselves and agree about what is best for all.

The community that is formed by this social contract is not simply the sum total of the lives and wills of its members: it is a distinct and unified entity with a life and a will of its own. This entity, called a "city" or "polis" in ancient times, is now called a "republic" or a "body politic." Some further definitions: in its passive role it is a "state," in its active role a "sovereign," and in relation to other states a "power"; the community that forms it is "a people," and individually they are "citizens"; they are "subjects" insofar as they submit themselves to the sovereign. Because the sovereign is a distinct and unified whole, Rousseau treats it in many respects as if it were an individual. Since no individual can be bound by a contract made with himself, the social contract cannot impose any binding regulations on the sovereign. By contrast, subjects of the sovereign are doubly bound: as individuals they are bound to the sovereign, and as members of the sovereign they are bound to other individuals. Though the sovereign is not bound by the social contract, it cannot do anything that would violate the social contract since it owes its existence to that contract. Further, in hurting its subjects it would be hurting itself, so the sovereign will act in the best interests of its subjects without any binding commitment to do so. Individuals, on the other hand, need the incentive of law to remain loyal to the sovereign. Self-interested individuals might try to enjoy all the benefits of citizenship without obeying any of the duties of a subject. Thus, Rousseau suggests that unwilling subjects will be forced to obey the general will: they will be "forced to be free."

Book I, Chapters 6-9 Summary

There reaches a point in the state of nature, Rousseau suggests, when people need to combine forces in order to survive. The problem resolved by the social contract is how people can bind themselves to one another and still preserve their freedom. The social contract essentially states that each individual must surrender himself unconditionally to the community as a whole. Rousseau draws three implications from this definition: (1) Because the conditions of the social contract are the same for everyone, everyone will want to make the social contract as easy as possible for all. (2) Because people surrender themselves unconditionally, the individual has no rights that can stand in opposition to the state. (3) Because no one is set above anyone else, people don't lose their natural freedom by entering into the social contract.

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In contrast to the Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau here draws a distinction between nature and civil society that heavily favors the latter. While we lose the physical liberty of being able to follow our instincts freely and do whatever we please, we gain the civil liberty that places the limits of reason and the general will on our behavior, thereby rendering us moral. In civil society, we take responsibility for our actions, and become nobler as a result. Rousseau concludes Book I with a discussion of property. He suggests that ownership of land is only legitimate if no one else claims that land, if the owner occupies no more land than he needs, and if he cultivates that land for his subsistence. In the social contract, each individual surrenders all his property along with himself to the sovereign and the general will. In doing so, he does not give up his property since he is also a subject of the sovereign.

the will of the people, the sovereign can only exist so long as the people have an active and direct political voice.

Nor is sovereignty divisible: the sovereign always and necessarily expresses the will of the people as a whole, and not of some part. An expression of the general will takes the form of law, whereas the expression of a particular will is at best an application of law. Rousseau accuses other philosophers of failing to understand this distinction. They take particular acts (administration, declarations of war, etc.) to be acts of sovereignty, and since these acts are not undertaken by the people as a whole, they conclude that sovereignty is divisible. This conclusion permits thinkers such as Grotius to then invest sovereign power in the particular will of a single monarch, thus robbing the people of their rights.

Book II, Chapters 1-5 Summary

Society can only function to the extent that people have interests in common: the end goal of any state is the common good. Rousseau argues that the common good can only be achieved by heeding the general will as expressed by the sovereign. The sovereign is inalienable: it cannot defer its power to someone else, or be represented by a smaller group. It expresses the general will, which will never coincide exactly with any particular private will. As

Though the general will always tends toward the common good, Rousseau concedes that the deliberations of the people do not always necessarily express the general will. He draws an important distinction between the general will and the will of all, stating that the latter is simply the sum total of each individual's desires. These particular interests usually balance each other out unless people form factions and vote as a group. Rousseau insists that no factions form within a state, and that each individual should think for himself.

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While he claims that the sovereign has absolute power over all its subjects, Rousseau is careful to carve out a space for private interests as well. A citizen must render whatever services or goods are necessary to the state, but the state cannot demand more than what is necessary from the citizen. Furthermore, the sovereign is only authorized to speak in cases that affect the body politic as a whole. Cases that deal only with individuals or particularities do not concern all citizens, and so do not concern the sovereign: the sovereign deals only with matters that are of common interest. As a result, each citizen is free to pursue private interests, and is only bound to the sovereign in matters that are of public concern.

The earlier discussion of the social contract and the sovereign explain how the body politic comes into being; the question of how it maintains itself calls for a discussion of law. Rousseau suggests that there is a universal and natural justice that comes to us from God, but that it is not binding. Evil people will not obey God's law, and so we must set up positive, binding laws within society, or else those who obey God's law will suffer at the hands of those who disobey it.

Rousseau supports the death penalty, arguing that the sovereign has the right to determine whether its subjects should live or die. His strongest reason for this position is the claim that wrongdoers, in violating the laws of the state, are essentially violating the social contract. As enemies of the social contract, they are enemies of the state, and must either be exiled or put to death. It is possible to pardon criminals, but both pardons and punishments are signs of weakness: a healthy state has few criminals. Book II, Chapters 6-7

Rousseau defines law as an abstract expression of the general will that is universally applicable. All laws are made by the people as a whole and apply to the people as a whole: the law does not deal with particularities. The law can never deal with individual people or groups, so while it can say that a certain group should have certain privileges or that a certain person should be the head of state, it cannot determine which particular individual or group should receive these privileges.

The law is essentially a record of what the people collectively desire. A law can only be enacted if the people collectively agree on it, and it must apply to all of them. A declaration of the sovereign that applies only to certain people or certain objects is not a law, but a decree.

Summary The existence of civil society hinges on the existence of laws. However, Rousseau acknowledges the problem of

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how laws should be laid down. How can a people as a whole sit down together and write up a code of law? There is not only the problem of how such a large number could write up such a document together, but also the problem that the people do not always know what they want or what is best for them. Rousseau's proposed solution comes in the form of a lawgiver.

An ideal lawgiver is not easy to find. He must be supremely intelligent, and willing to work selflessly on behalf of a people. Because the laws shape the character and behavior of the people to a great extent, the lawgiver must exhibit great insight. In order for the laws to be unbiased, the lawgiver should not himself be a citizen of the state to which he gives laws. He is outside and above the authority of the sovereign. Remarking on the difficulty of finding such a person, Rousseau notes: "Gods would be needed to give men laws."

Not only is there the difficulty of finding a lawmaker of genius who does not himself wish to govern; there is also the difficulty of making the people obey the laws. People are unlikely to simply accept the laws given to them by a particular person. Rousseau notes that throughout history, lawgivers have used the authority of God or some other divine power to support them. Moses, for instance, claims that God gave him the Ten Commandments. An appeal to the supernatural origins of the laws is generally a good means of ensuring that they are obeyed.

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