Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 21, No. 2 The Author [2008]. Published by Oxford University Press.

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Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Interventionary Society1
MARK DUFFIELD Department of Politics, University of Bristol, 10 Priory Road, Bristol BS8 1TU m.duffield@bristol.ac.uk The focus of this paper is a global civil war being fought not between armies but at the level of existence itself. In order to explore such a war, development and underdevelopment are reinterpreted as a distinction between insured and non-insured life. That is, between populations supported by regimes of social protection as opposed to those expected to be self-reliant. While the complementarity of development and security is commonly asserted, from this perspective the nexus is incomplete without the additional term containment. The connection then becomes: you cannot have either development or security without containing the circulation of underdeveloped or non-insured life. Since decolonization, containment has been at the heart of an expansive international security architecture that both separates and reproduces the life-chance divide between the developed and underdeveloped worlds. The paper explores the origins, contours and implications of this global civil war, including the place of development and humanitarian assistance within it. Keywords: biopolitics, civil war, counterinsurgency, decolonization, development, immigration control, liberal interventionism, racism, security, terrorism, underdevelopment

Introduction A liberal problematic of security is well illustrated in the contemporary idea of human security. As its advocates claim, it prioritizes the security of people rather than states and, as such, is often seen as a progressive turn in international relations. Since the beginnings of modernity, however, a liberal rationality of government has always taken the protection and betterment of the essential processes of life associated with population, economy and society as its object. In this respect, liberalism embodies the idea of government of the population and the imperatives that are derived from such an idea (Dean 1999: 113). Development and liberalism are different but interconnected. While both take life as their referent object, development is more concerned with life experienced as somehow incomplete or lacking in

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the essentials for a proper existence (Mehta 1999); for example, through being in a state of human insecurity. In relation to such life, developments enduring institutional form is that of a moral or educative trusteeship (Cowen and Shenton 1996). Development as trusteeship aims to bring incomplete or underdeveloped life to its full potential. Rather than development as usually understood, for example, as the outcome of aid interventions to reduce poverty, encourage voice and consequently expand freedom, development is examined as a way of governing through these same acts of education, betterment and empowerment. In attempting to make what is incomplete a wholesome and known part of society, development functions as a liberal technology of security. Development as security is used to explore the possibility of a global civil war between developed and underdeveloped specieslife. Rather than competing ideologies, such a waror rather tableau of warspitches contrary ways of life against each other. Instead of conventional armies, both sides mobilize opposing assemblages of state and, especially, non-state actors that blur and operate across the national/ international dichotomy. It is a war that is characteristically fought on and between the relations and modalities of life itself. The military analyst Rupert Smith (2006) has called this phenomenon war amongst the people. In this war conventional military force has little utility. Indeed, rather than securing an unequivocal victory, it is more likely to entrench and internationalize the resistance it encounters. It is now commonplace for policy makers to assert that development and security are interconnected in the sense that you cannot have security without development or development without security. Indeed, this nexus has become an accepted truth of the post-Cold War period. However, it remains incomplete without a third category that is here called containment. That is, those various interventions and technologies that seek to restrict or manage the circulation of incomplete and hence potentially threatening life, or return it from whence it came. An expanded nexus would add the proviso that you cannot have development or security without containing the mobility of underdeveloped life. Besides increasingly stringent visa and immigration controls, this includes the transformation of the international refugee regime into one of restriction, return and reintegration (Barnett 2002). In policing the state of exception surrounding irregular circulation, industrialized countries now regularly spend more on immigration and asylum control than they do on development. As will be discussed below, the origins of global containment lie in decolonization. It emerges both as the heir of earlier colonial technologies of population management (see Mitchell 2002) and, at the same time, provides the backstop against which local practices of restricting and modulating circulation through zoning and architectural design have subsequently proliferated. In a global civil war being fought at the level of existence, containing the circulation of underdeveloped life is strategically vital. While hopelessly breached by history, containment functions as a global perimeter fence both

Global Civil War 147 separating and reproducing the generic life-chance divide between the developed and underdeveloped worlds. Compared to the regimes of social protection that characterize the former, underdeveloped life is expected to be essentially self-reproducing in terms of its basic biological, economic and social requirements. This biopolitical rather than geopolitical divide has been widening since the end of the nineteenth century and has deepened following decolonization. While trying to make self-reproduction sustainable at the level of population is developments enduring aim, self-reliance is ambiguous. Through the will to live beyond the limited basic needs ascribed to it, incomplete life is minded to make the wrong choices and, as such, to become dangerous. Radical self-reproduction equates with threatening forms of innovation and circulation, including the ability to survive beyond states and sap the walls they erect. Autonomous self-reproduction continually challenges attempts to achieve security through development as international containment. In examining the possibility of a global civil war at the level of life itself, the strategic nature of development is first discussed. The Strategic Nature of Development In grappling with our present security predicament, it is common for politicians and policy makers to assert that the traditional dichotomy between the national and the international has collapsed. At stake in this new and radically interconnected world is defending people with work to do, family life to balance, mortgages to pay, careers to further [and] pensions to provide (Blair 2001). Such visions of liberal order are validated by the very challenge of predatory international forces that, like the object they menace, are largely non-state and networked in character. While development has a long history as a strategic response to such threats, this role is not widely appreciated. One reason is that as a practical technology of security, development exists in the here and now. Its benefits are always cast as a future yet to be realized (Easterly 2002). If one steps back for a longer view, however, it is possible to see development operating more strategically. Since decolonization the regularly promised annulment of global poverty, for example, has proven elusive. More familiar has been a recurrent and indignant rediscovery not only of its persistence but the growing wealth gap between the developed and underdeveloped worlds (Myrdal 1957; OECD 1972; Brett 1985; UNDP 1996). After more than fifty years of strenuous development efforts, it is estimated that up to a third of humanity still lives in chronic poverty (CPRC 2005). Rather than simply focus on the reasons why poverty persists, it is important to examine the political function that its constant rediscovery serves; especially how it validates liberal order. While poverty did not directly cause, for example, the Third Worlds attraction to communism during the 1950s; or the refugee crisis of the 1970s; or the new wars of the 1990sor even todays threat of international terrorismin each case it has been discovered to lie at the root of the problem (Wilson 1953;

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Morawetz 1977; DAC 2003). From communism to terrorism, through its marginalizing effects, and its ability to foster resentment and alienation amongst ordinary people, poverty has been monotonously rediscovered as a recruiting ground for the moving feast of strategic threats that liberal order is constantly menaced by. As a liberal technology of security, development has a long history. Its essential features can be detected, for example, in its first fanciful imagining on the edge of a dawning modernity: the civilizing tutelage that, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Robinson Crusoe exerted over his manservant Friday. In practice, development inflected the later abolition of slavery (Duffield 2007: 1216) as well as the social effects of the rise of industrial capitalism in Europe (Cowen and Shenton 1996). Development emerges as a moral trusteeship over life experienced as either incomplete, redundant or somehow surplus to requirements (ibid.; Mehta 1999). In seeking to ameliorate the destructive effects of progress, liberal regimes of development typically attempt to re-establish acceptable forms of existence on the foundation of a reconstituted community life. Based upon Enlightenment views of progress, it appears as a set of educative technologies bringing surplus population to completion through training in the art of manners and freedom while, at the same time, assisting its aggregate self-reproduction. Through the trusteeship of experts (Mitchell 2002), historically this has favoured the encouragement of community self-reliance and local entrepreneurship based upon the small-scale ownership of land or property (Cowen and Shenton 1996: 266267). While today this is recognizable as sustainable development, it is also discernable in the abolitionist plans for the communal self-reliance of the freed slaves that struggled to found Sierra Leone in the 1780s (Hochschild 2006: 146147). The design of development can also be seen in the Baptist free villages in the Jamaica of the 1830s (Hall 2002: 120139). As an educative trusteeship, development operates as a fitness test in relation to incomplete life; when the wrong choices are made development can easily blur into states of emergency and exclusion. For development, decolonization is a site of both continuity and departure. As a liberal trusteeship development animated English colonial bureaucracy (Arendt [1951]; Shenhav and Berda 2007) and found expression in such practices as indirect rule (Lugard [1922]) and subsequently participatory community development (Batten 1957). The anti-colonial struggle, however, gave birth to the world of territorial nation-states; and this world of states necessarily called forth a world of peoples. In a project still only four or five decades old, for the first time Indians, Nigerians, Jamaicans, Sudanese and Ghanaians existed as citizens within their own national borders. During decolonization, development was reconfigured as an inter-state relation of governance; it moved from the colonial bureaucracy into the institutions of external expertise now lined up to help and support the newly discovered underdeveloped state. As a global design of power, this reconfigured development generically divides humanity into developed and underdeveloped

Global Civil War 149 species-life; and through the cultural and racial sub-divisions made possible it seeks to govern the world of peoples. The strategic importance of decolonization is examined from two interconnected perspectives. First, it fixed the biopolitical division of humanity into what can be metaphorically called insured and non-insured life and, as such, established the possibility of a global civil war at the level of species-existence itself. Second, in initiating a ban on the international circulation of underdeveloped life it also established an expansive risk-based security architecture that both separates and reproduces the life-chance divide upon which this civil war is based. Insured and Non-insured Species-life To understand the intrinsic rather than contingent relationship between development, security and containment, Foucaults work on biopolitics is important (Foucault [1976], [19751976], [19771978]). Within the more familiar frame of geopolitics, states control territories. Territories, however, also have populations and modern states define their effectiveness in terms of how well they support the life and well-being of their populations. The contemporary idea of human security, for example, is an essentially biopolitical concept; while it prioritizes the security of people rather than states, it privileges the state as vital for providing the public goods that constitute human security (Duffield and Waddell 2006). Consequently, implicit within the idea of human security is a distinction between effective and ineffective states in terms of how life itself is supported and secured. Encouraging life by enhancing a populations resilience, however, is not the same as promoting the active participation of citizens in political society. Biopolitics acts upon population as the disenfranchised object of policy. It animates those technologies and interventions that seek to discipline and regulate life at the mass level of population, that is, at the level where life appears in the form of aggregates, trends and statistical norms. In so far as biopolitics seeks to reduce the risks of collective existence, or compensate for their unavoidability, it functions in the interests of security. At the same time, the technologies used to support life also provide the means of its governance. Foucaults work, however, focuses on Europe; he did not specifically write on colonialism or development for that matter (Stoler 1995). Understanding development as a regime of biopower consequently requires interpretation. In distinguishing developed and underdeveloped life biopolitically, one is concerned with the concrete technologies that support and maintain collective life in their different ideal settings. Developed life is sustained primarily through regimes of social insurance and bureaucratic protection historically associated with industrial capitalism and the growth of welfare states. As a solution to the problem of an industrial surplus population, contributory social insurance first appeared in Europe towards the end of the nineteenth century (Thane 1989). It was more effective than coterminous attempts to promote community self-reliance through local entrepreneurship (Cowen and

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Shenton 1996: 284285). Despite having European origins, from this time on, self-reliance would be associated with the agrarian colonies. It was the end of the Second World War and the onset of decolonization, however, that saw the real expansion of the welfare state in Europe and its associated technologies of bureaucratic social protection. For developed, or what metaphorically could be called insured life, the contingencies of capitalist existence are ameliorated through risk-reducing and compensatory benefits funded through contributory social insurance, general taxation, private insurance and personal savings (McKinnon 2004). Together with help from voluntary agencies, developed life is maintained by a range of public welfare bureaucracies, benefit entitlements and safety-nets covering birth, housing, family support, education, health, employment protection, and pensions (Wood and Gough 2006). Within mass consumer society, these bureaucracies and safety-nets are integrated into systems of critical infrastructure (Reid 2006) involving extensive energy, transport, financial, media, and retailing networks. Together they constitute the matrix of relations and instutions that sustain an aggregate developed species-existence. Around 80 per cent of the workforce within industrialized countries is dependent upon some form of contributory social insurance scheme; globally, however, as little as 20 per cent of the worlds population is regarded as having adequate social insurance (McKinnon 2004: 910). Perhaps the larger part of humanitythose that exist beyond the perimeter fence of immigration and asylum controllives outside such regimes of social protection. Viewed internationally, conventional contributory approaches to public welfare fall significantly short of universal reach especially in developing countries (ibid.). In Africa or Asia, for example, only a small minority of people, usually less than 10 per cent of the population, are covered and typically for only a restricted range of contingencies. Underdeveloped life is, from a biopolitical perspective, non-insured. Ever since Natural Man stalked the Enlightenment it has been assumed that, compared to the complex division of labour and hence multiple dependencies that define civilized existence, the agrarian non-Western world is essentially self-reproducing. For two centuries or more Natural Man has been regularly witnessed first in romantic and now increasingly desperate settings satisfying his hunger under an oak, quenching his thirst at the first stream, finding his bed under the same tree which provided his meal . . . (Rousseau [1755]: 81). Within contemporary development discourse it is axiomatic that underdeveloped populations, except for a few essential public goods, like main roads, communal stand pipes, rudimentary shelter, pit latrines, basic medical facilities and primary education, are self-reliant in terms of their main economic, social and welfare requirements. The assumption of a self-reproducing natural economy is illustrated in the IMFs global futurology regarding post-Cold War welfare requirements. In the former Soviet Union, for example, where industrialization has already atomized households, it is felt that extended welfare safety nets are required. In less developed and more agrarian countries, however, the extended family

Global Civil War 151 and community operates relatively well as an informal social security scheme obviating the need for the urgent introduction of large-scale public pensions (Kopits 1993 quoted by Deacon et al. 1997: 64). Echoing this thought, we are told that in the global South, experience [. . .] reminds us of the central contribution of personal and family resources to the universal need for security (Wood and Gough 2006: 1697). One practical consequence of this ingrained assumption is that durable solutions for the problem of refugee return and reintegration have for decades aimed no higher than a reconstituted self-reliance (Betts 2004). Conveniently for neo-liberalism, a large part of humanity apparently exempts itself from the need for expensive systems of social protection through its own communal resilience. Since the emergence of an interconnected world market at the end of the nineteenth century, however, self-reproduction has been increasingly impossible (Davis 2001). If the stubborn statistics on global poverty and immiseration are themselves insufficient, since decolonization the back-toback humanitarian emergencies amongst the world of peoplesindeed, the permanent emergency of existence in the global Southsuggests that selfreliance is a deadly, if convenient, chimera. In the real world, those hapless populations fated to be self-reproducing survive on the threshold of societywide humanitarian emergency. In delineating a biopolitics of underdeveloped or non-insured life, one is confronted with a recurrent duality. On the one hand, there are those technologies of poverty reduction, local entrepreneurship and voice that aim to make self-reliance sustainable while, on the other, there is the constant reality of humanitarian assistance which functions for the non-insured as an international insurance of last resort. Compared to developed life supported by regimes of social protection, since decolonization a biopolitics of underdevelopment has been located in the essential circularity or mutual conditioning of relief and development. An expansive humanitarian assistance constantly invokes the need for a consolidating developmental self-reliance. Self-reliance, however, regularly collapses into humanitarian emergency which again enjoins a repeat of the governmental process of expansion and consolidation (Duffield 2007: 4251). The division between insured and non-insured life, and their contrasting regimes of social protection and critical infrastructure versus self-reliance and livelihoods respectively, constitutes the terrain of a global civil war fought at the level of existence. Self-reliance in this context, however, is ambiguous. While summarizing the defensive aims of Western aid agencies, as a lived reality it constantly blurs into the realm of actually existing development (Duffield 2002); that is, those autonomous and resistant forms of self-reliance where the will to live compels underdeveloped life to constantly transcend the comportment and forms of stasis ascribed to it. This dangerous restiveness, together with its penchant for innovation and unpredictability, highlights the importance for liberal order to contain and manage the circulatory flows linking the developed and undeveloped worlds in the interests of international security.

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Globalizing Containment Threats to critical infrastructure in the global North and livelihood wars in the South interconnect. Containing the circulatory effects of the latter, such as state failure, the emergence of transgressive international shadow economies or surges of irregular migration, is now routinely accepted as necessary for the defence and stability of mass consumer society. If only as a risk factor, politicians frequently assert that, in an interdependent world, unless stability exists abroad is it unlikely to exist at home (Blair 2001). As will be discussed below, the medium that is capable of translating external instability into attacks on mass societys critical infrastructure is the presence of nonintegrating minorities of migrant origin within the social body. While the need for containment in the face of international non-state threats is recognizable in the war on terrorism, a strategic architecture that so brackets together the developed and underdeveloped worlds has a longer genealogy: it first emerges with decolonization. Balibar (1991) has drawn attention to the importance of decolonization in changing the direction and perception of global migration. Previously it had largely followed a North-to-South dynamic, and was associated with exploration, escape and fortune. Following decolonization, however, the direction of global migration reformed along a South-to-North axis. From a Northern perspective, migration became the blow-back of immigration. Decolonization gave birth to the world of states, and the world of states called forth a world of peoples that, for the first time, had the potential to circulate globally. Rather than being associated with opportunity, immigration is more ambiguous; while providing a source of cheap labour, it also constitutes a locus of threat. In confirming the generic division of humanity into complete (or developed) and incomplete (or underdeveloped) species-life, development is intrinsic to the new or culturally-coded racism that moved into the political foreground with decolonization (ibid.; Barker 1981). Here, cultures or ways of life, while not ranked hierarchically, are nonetheless different and able to impact upon potentials for social existence and inclusion. In mid 1960s Britain, with the emergence of a political consensus to restrict immigration from its former colonies, one can detect the opening moves of what would become a global ban on the circulation of underdeveloped life. Reflecting todays concerns over asylum seekers (Fekete 2001a; Kundnani 2001), containment was presented as a legitimate response to the genuine fears of ordinary people over the destabilizing effects of cultural difference on community cohesion and the strain that immigration was placing on jobs, housing, schools and hospitals (Duffield 1988: 3637). Amongst other things, immigration was seen as a threat to what was then Europes main critical infrastructure: the welfare state. The Labour Partys 1964 election manifesto The New Britain contains a premonition of a planetary security architecture. It signals a willingness to connect the states readiness to act pre-emptively on the basis of genuine fears

Global Civil War 153 to contain international circulation, with a wish to improve community cohesion at home while, at the same time, justifying defensive development abroad. Within this architecture, containment is the lynch-pin that establishes and interconnects state-led regimes of internal development, aimed at integrating already settled migrant communities, and external development geared to bettering underdeveloped life and hence improving its ability to survive in situ. As a reaction to the fears over the asymmetric demands of non-insured life on the scarce resources of the welfare state, The New Britain also promised to give special help to local authorities where immigrants had settled (Labour Party 1964). Rather than improving universal welfare provision, the approach was to create special funds and targeted measures to compensate local authorities and communities for the effects of cultural difference. Section 11 of the 1966 Local Government Act, for example, gave local authorities additional funding to take on specialist staff. This was followed by special funding for schools trying to cope with non-English speaking pupils. Under the new 1969 urban renewal programme, a dozen Community Development Projects were initiated. This directed small grants to voluntary and community organizations (or internal NGOs) working in immigrant communities (Duffield 1988: 101). In this manner, the state quickly established itself as a source of funding for legal advice centres, selfhelp groups, adventure play grounds, youth clubs, training programmes and hostels. In order to compensate for containment, and in response to the dangers to social fabric and the critical infrastructure of the welfare state, a regime of state-led internal development was inaugurated. Although earlier external development initiatives had existed, these were essentially ad hoc colonial measures that, at best, sought to secure a continuing special relationship with the metropole (Hewitt 2006). The New Britain proposed something different, that is, a modern state-led regime of defensive development cognisant of a world of independent nation-states. This involved creating a new and centralized Ministry of Overseas Development which eventually became the Overseas Development Administration, the forerunner of todays Department for International Development (DFID). With the claim that more than half the worlds population was living in poverty, the manifesto warned that the growing tensions between rich and poor nations were in danger of accentuating differences of race and colour (Labour Party 1964). Not only did it promise to increase government aid spending, the manifesto also pledged to support the UN and encourage the work of NGOs. The proven enterprise of the latter, it was argued, must be matched with Government action to give new hope in the current United Nations Development Decade (ibid.). The interconnections between internal and external development are returned to below. During the 1970s, such early restrictions on immigration vectored into the beginnings of an EU-wide immigration policy (Huysmans 2000: 755). Measures to establish the internal market in jobs and welfare provision were accompanied, for example, by the strengthening of the EUs external border

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controls and alignment of member state visa policies (ibid.: 759). By the end of the 1980s, perceptive commentators were already warning of an emerging Fortress Europe with the restriction of immigration moving into the constitutional architecture of the EU. Less than a decade latter, the policing of immigration was being based upon criteria of security and efficiency rather than the law, with detention on administrative rather that judicial grounds becoming common (Hornqvist 2004: 44). Refugee, asylum seeker, economic and even criminal identities have tended to blur into an indistinct and negative category of irregular migration (Zetter 2007). This process is synonymous with a sharp deterioration in reception standards, growing levels of social control, heightened policing and stricter detention policies, and the growing sophistication of expulsion procedures (Barnett 2002: 14). Administered by an army of private security companies, irregular immigrants now find themselves subjects of an extensive prerogative state that has quietly appeared within the folds of mass consumer society. In making containment more effective, the management of immigration has also been externalized: for example, placing EU liaison officers at airports in critical countries to police points of embarkation (Fekete 2001a: 27); or instituting active measures to prevent immigration from countries such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, Morocco, Somalia and Iraq. Aid conditionalities, for example, have been used to encourage the compliance of underdeveloped states. In 2003 the British government announced plans for extra-territorial processing and protection centres in regions of migratory surges. It is argued that centres in such locations would prevent genuine refugees having to travel halfway around the world to have their case held (Noll 2003). While the original proposal has been modified several times and has yet to be fully implemented, the principle of processing and protection in regions of origin is symptomatic of the great strengthening of the Europes perimeter defences since decolonization. States within the global South, on whose territories the vast majority of all refugees, internally displaced and irregular migrants exist, have followed a similar path of containment (Crisp 2003). Compared to the highs of the mid 1990s, during the Cold War refugee flows were relatively small and host states more effective. Superpower rivalry also meant that, comparatively, the volume of international assistance for refugees was better. Today, countries that traditionally accepted large refugee in-flows such as Guinea, Malawi and Pakistan are now unwilling to do so. Not only are numbers larger, international commitment to long-term assistance has declined. Reflecting the trend in the West, pluralist politics have also often reduced refugees and irregular migrants to objects of xenophobic excess. The closure of previous open-door policies and forced repatriation has become common. Pakistans November 2001 decision to close its borders with Afghanistan, thus preventing refugees leaving a war zone, is symptomatic of the current dispensation. Being dependent upon states both financially and politically, UNHCRs changing refugee policy has reflected the global turn towards containment.

Global Civil War 155 While voluntary repatriation has always been the ideal solution, until the mid 1980s there was a general acceptance that in most cases resettlement within the host country was the only realistic option. Since then, policy has shifted progressively from resettlement to home-country return; involuntarily if necessary (Chimni 1999). From a concern with protection, activity now focuses upon reintegrating returned refugees. UNHCRs direct involvement with humanitarian assistance and livelihood support has consequently grown; including measures to incorporate refugees within existing country development programmes (Betts 2004). In other words, to return them to a putative state of self-reliance. The security architecture that interconnects regimes of internal and external development via the containment of circulation is episodic in nature. It expands and deepens with each crisis of international circulation and the consequent threat of irregular migration. Beginning with the originary crisis of decolonization, this architecture has matured in response to such events as the growing Third World crisis of the 1980s, the end of the Cold War, the early 1990s peak in the number of civil wars, and the effects of 9/11. The overall direction of this risk-based architecture has been towards more defensive and interventionary technologies of developmentboth internal and externaltogether with more restrictive and expansive forms of national and international containment. At the same time, in working across the national/international dichotomy, the need for security threatens to bring insured and non-insured life within a unitary framework of strategic calculation. Connecting Internal and External Development As a regime of internal development, multiculturalism involved meeting the special needs of migrant communities while encouraging the acceptance of cultural difference. During the 1990s, it entered a period of deepening crisis. In the summer of 2001, some weeks before the terrorist attacks in America, a number of northern towns in England experienced outbreaks of intercommunity violence between youths of white and Asian origin. These disturbances highlighted the high degree of ethnic and social segregation in many deprived inner-city areas, as well as the cultural radicalization of Muslim youth that had been developing over the previous decade (Burnett 2004). The violence also brought to a head doubts over multiculturalism, with many commentators arguing that it had encouraged communities to live separate lives (Cantle 2001). Multiculturalism is premised upon the belief that threats from the insurmountability of difference can be neutralized through educational programmes aimed at normalizing such differences plus compensatory initiatives to ameliorate those differences most judged to prevent social integration (Duffield 1984). The growing cultural radicalization of transnational Muslim communities, however, problematized this regime of internal development. Rather than occupying an allotted space within a typology of

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acceptable difference, it signalled the appearance of a radically cultured non-integrating enemy within (Fekete 2004). Over the intervening decades, moreover, the threat to critical infrastructure has widened. With the advent of mass consumer society, critical infrastructure has moved beyond the welfare state to encompass the nodal points of an increasingly centralized transport, energy and retailing matrix; a complex but open circulatory system that is vulnerable to enemies within. In relation to societal vulnerability, radically cultured minorities function as potential conduits for dangers originating abroad; they represent a weak point in the perimeter defences of containment. Such concerns have prompted a new regime of internal development in Britain, including the formation in May 2006 of a Ministry of Communities and Local Government. While still respecting cultural difference, under the rubric of community cohesion this new regime encourages local authorities and voluntary groups to bring white and ethnic minority communities together to foster a greater sense of shared belonging and identity. Improving community cohesion largely rests upon NGO technologies of conflict resolution pioneered in the livelihood wars of Africa and the Balkans (CMI 1997). That is, the highly malleable tactic of co-operative integration where, rather than meeting the special needs of one group, external aid is used to create an over-arching goal or shared aim that brings different groups together. Whether encouraging Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia to collectively repair their war-damaged homes, or establishing a twinning relationship between ethnically segregated schools in Bradford, the aim of co-operative integration is similar. That is, to use external aid or resources to bring together what has been divided, to break down artificial barriers, to foster confidence and reinforce shared needs and understandings in the interests of security. As with all development trusteeships, however, co-operative integration is also a fitness test to isolate the good from the bad; in this case, the life which can integrate as opposed to that which remains suspicious and self-segregating. In a radically interconnected world, defending liberal order through strengthening and externalizing mass societys perimeter defences alone is not enough. The mobility of cultural radicalism has meant that the search for community cohesion at home has been accompanied by the radicalization of development abroad. Of great strategic importance in this respect has been the reproblematization of political violence in the global South. That is, from being acceptable during the Cold War, and often justified in national liberation terms, to becoming universally unacceptable today (Tamas 2000). This reproblematization has had two main effects. First, the delegitimation of political violence has underpinned a resurgence of state-led humanitarian, development and peace interventionism within the worlds crisis zones. Not only has the number of UN peacekeeping missions significantly increased, for example, their size and responsibilities have also expanded. Second, delegitimation has transformed existing forms of community development based on self-reliance into technologies of conflict resolution. Without

Global Civil War 157 significantly changing what is done, and reflecting the intrinsic link between development and security, liberal practices of development traditionally associated with NGOs have been rediscovered as essentially civilian forms of counterinsurgency (Slim 2004). That is, through the deployment of such techniques as co-operative integration, development promises ways of changing the balance of power between social groups to produce desired political outcomes irrespective of military involvement. The radicalization of development has been largely dependent upon drawing in and orchestrating such NGO forms of non-state sovereign power within interventionary stateled assemblages of aid. Since the end of the Second World War, internal or civil war has been the most common form of global warfare. Fuelled by superpower rivalry, the number of civil wars in the Third World rose inexorably during the Cold War to reach a peak of around 50 or so in the early 1990s (HSC 2005). Given their geopolitical functionality, during much of this growth period international attitudes towards civil war were ambivalent. Viewed in relation to the left/right political categories of the time, warring parties were often cast in a progressive light: for example, as the vanguards of national liberation struggles. This was despite such wars contributing to state failure and growing refugee numbers. With the ending of the Cold War this mode of problematization quickly lost its immediacy just as the depth of the crisis of containment encouraged by superpower rivalry was revealed. This situation required a new and more functional way of experiencing political violence. The main intellectual thrust of this reproblematization is contained in the new war discourse that grew to dominance from the early 1990s (Kaldor 1999). Civil war was reinterpreted in terms of irrationality, the breakdown of order, deliberate violations of human rights, the growth of criminality and the erosion of aggregate self-reliance. Having comprehensively displaced earlier solidarist positions by the mid 1990s, this process of delegitimation was formally confirmed, as it were, in Britains 2000 Terrorism Act. For the first timeand before 9/11the Act proscribed a named list of mainly Middle Eastern and Asian political groups as terrorist organizations. A decade earlier many of the same groups would have been regarded as legitimate organizations struggling for self-determination or against religious or cultural oppression (Fekete 2001b). In changing the parameters of perception, new war discourse also helped reveal a hidden dimension of civil conflict. In terms of the resources they require, insurgents have become self-provisioning and effectively independent of either state sponsorship or a reliance on the people amongst whom they fight (RAND 2001). The classic Maoist doctrine of insurgency, for example, likens the insurgent to a fish that swims in a sea constituted by the people. The insurgent was reliant for food, shelter and information upon the people; in return, he or she identified with them and supported their struggles. This dependent relationship has changed, even reversed, as self-provisioning has internationalized. As the literature on war economies (e.g. Le Billon 2000)

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suggests, through the development of adaptable transborder shadow economies, insurgents have become radically self-reliant. Actually existing development has forged means of survival that, while able to work with and through states, can also exist outside and beyond them. It is a dangerous selfreliance forged, for example, from extra-legal trade in all manner of commodities and services. These economies have created new powers of resistance and, importantly, forms of local protection and legitimacy. Exploiting the public welfare vacuum within the underdeveloped state, some insurgent groups have taken on humanitarian and social support roles. Hamas, for example, provides the most comprehensive social safety net in the West Bank and Gaza (Goldenburg 2001). This is but one example of a wider phenomenon: compared to the classical insurgencies of decolonization, the economic relationship between insurgents and the population is exactly the opposite in some modern emergencies (Kilcullen 2006: 119). Supported by internationalized shadow economies, remittances and diaspora networks, many insurgents now routinely have access to more wealth, hardware and information than the impoverished populations amongst whom they are embedded; a factor that has considerably bearing upon the struggle for hearts and minds within an emergent global civil war. As a response to the dangers of autonomous forms of actually existing development, the delegitimation of political violence has prompted the radicalization of an already defensive development. If poverty, or rather the alienation and dissatisfaction that it encourages, can exacerbate conflict and terrorism, it follows that development agencies, in attempting to reduce poverty through strengthening self-reliance, are able to play a strategic role. Through the smart management of aid, for example, by selecting and encouraging social forces conducive to peace, NGOs rediscover themselves as potentially able to alter the balance of power within societies in the interests of stability (Anderson 1996). In this manner, liberal development has been transformed into conflict resolution, that is, an essentially civilian technology of counterinsurgency. The end of the Cold War has marked a period of rapid growth of conflict resolution. New NGOs have formed while, at the same time, established multifunctional agencies have widened their portfolio of activities (Duffield 1997). Such innovation, however, has drawn them inexorably towards the heat of the flame. The Advent of Post-interventionary Society Since the end of the Cold War, the step-change in Western humanitarian, peace and reconstruction interventionism has had a significant effect. Since the peak of 1992, it has been instrumental in more than halving the total number of ongoing civil wars in the world (HSC 2005). Even in Africa, the trend has been downwards. However, ending open warfare within ineffective states has proven relatively easy. As Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq suggest, more difficult is winning the peace. According to the strategic analyst

Global Civil War 159 Rupert Smith, all the major post-Cold War military interventions have failed to achieve the results intended: namely, a decisive armed victory which in turn would deliver a solution to the original problem, which is mainly political (Smith 2006: 4). While such interventions may have reduced the incidence of civil war, a some policy advisers have argued, the reduction in ongoing conflict is due to its suppression or containment rather than its resolution (Strategy Unit 2005: 22). From this perspective, the statistical decline in civil war is actually an inversely expanding zone of international pacification. Occupation is the corollary of containment and the externalization of the Wests sovereign frontier. Within the past decade what could be called a post-interventionary society has emerged in the global borderland. Within such societies, pacifying low-intensity insurgency is a long-term policing problem for the international community. Compared to the classic insurgencies of decolonization, conflict within post-interventionary societies resembles more the small wars of earlier colonial occupations (Kilcullen 2006). For Smith (2006), this constitutes a new paradigm of conflict which he calls war amongst the people. They are insurgencies in which military force has little utility; in fact, it entrenches and internationalizes the resistance encountered. In such wars, development as soft power finds itself at a new premium. In terms of periodizing the post-Cold War era, the modalities of soft power fall into two discernable assemblages reflecting the shift from an interventionary to a post-interventionary logic. Although this shift involves agencies and networks beyond the UN family, as a servant of states the changes in the nature of UN system-wide operations reflects this shift in the wider environment. Until the mid 1990s, the main form of UN intervention within ongoing war was negotiated access. In places like Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and Bosnia, a UN lead agency would secure agreement between the warring parties on the humanitarian terms and conditions whereby civilians could be accessed (Duffield 1994). On the basis of the agreement reached an assemblage of donors, UN specialist agencies, NGOs and, sometimes, militaries would emerge. Apart from its fragility, intrinsic to negotiated access was the implicit recognition conferred on rebels and other non-state political actors. Toward the end of the 1990s, reflecting the downward trend in the number of open civil wars, a tipping point was reached whereby intervention gave way to a post-interventionary condition. Rather than negotiated access, the key UN system-wide institution became the integrated mission (Eide et al. 2005). The nature of the intervention, and its associated assemblage of aid and security actors, is now shaped by the peace accord and how it was brokered or imposed. In addition to humanitarian assistance, aid actors have expanded into a wide range of demobilization, reintegration and reconstruction activities. During the Cold War, NGOs were at pains to position themselves outside states. Within todays integrated missions, however, they are more likely to be strengthening state capacity or acting as its surrogate.

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Compared to negotiated access, the integrated mission represents a relative closure of political space. Whereas humanitarian operations had recognized oppositional non-state actors as the price of access, the integrated mission closes ranks around support for the peace accord. In places like Haiti, Burundi, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and East Timor, for example, the UN is now prepared to take sides in support of the recognized transitional governmenteven to the extent of militarily confronting spoilers trying to undermine the transition process (ibid.: 6). This widespread institutional trend within zones of crisis, while relatively low key, resonates with the more visible instances of regime change, coalitions of the willing and political polarization in such places as Afghanistan and Iraq. The political architecture of the Cold War was based upon respect for territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs. While territorial integrity is still respected, sovereignty over life within the worlds crisis zones is now internationalized, negotiable and contingent (Elden 2006). Postinterventionary society is synonymous with contingent sovereignty and the competition between national and international actors over who controls a population conceived as self-reproducing. In response to the crisis of containment, and especially as a means of capturing and securing noninsured life, the underdeveloped state has once again moved to the centre of development policy. The need to reconstruct fragile states, for example, is high on the international security agenda (DFID 2005). During the classical insurgencies of decolonization, it was the communists or nationalists that struggled to seize the state and remake it the name of the people. Today, it is the West that appears radical with its utopian visions of transforming whole societies (Stiglitz 1998: 3). In the interests of equality, for example, NGOs regularly challenge the patrimonial and gender relations associated with a backward underdevelopment. Confronted by such liberal radicalism, it is tempting to see contemporary insurgency as essentially conservative; as a site where the insurgent fights to preserve the status quo of ungoverned spaces, or to repel an occupier (Kilcullen 2006: 113). In practice however, the responsibility to protect and reconstruct (ICISS 2001) usually translates into nothing more radical than the fragmented, contradictory and under-resourced attempts to invest underdeveloped states with the minimum capacity necessary to meet basic needs and launch their citizens on the uncertain path of self-reliance. Compared to such radicalism, actually existing development looks an attractive alternative. An important characteristic of war amongst people is that when the underdeveloped state moves to the centre ground of development policy, insurgents come to regard it with ambiguity and equivocation. Since it assumes its citizens are self-reproducing, the underdeveloped state has never provided much in the way of social protection. A related concern of the counterinsurgency lobby is that insurgencies today no longer appear directed at taking over a functioning body politic, but dismembering or scavenging its carcass, or contesting an ungoverned space (Kilcullen 2006: 112).

Global Civil War 161 With dismemberment forming one possible extreme, movements such as the Zapatistas, who seek non-violent ways to ignore or organize around the state (Olesen 2004), constitute the other. Traditional interstate war subordinated people to the nation-state for the purpose of mobilizing them for military victory; total war built on the inevitable logic of this mobilization, with states wantonly attacking populations, thus rendering the civilian and the soldier indistinct. In war amongst the people, the people have
turned on the nation state, whether through terrorist attacks or the use of force outside the framework of the state [. . .]. Whether we are living in a post-nationstate world remains to be fully clarified, but it is possible to believe that the nation state is fighting for its supremacy (Smith 2006: 305, emphasis added).

Perhaps one of the problems is that for the non-insured humanity, international intervention in support of the underdeveloped state promises little. What are being reconstructed are human security rather than forms of social security states. Compared to the welfare safety-nets and social insurance of consumer society, the future being scripted for the larger part of humanity is a more basic non-material stasis of self-reliance within a world market that knows only constant change and sets no limits on its own appetites.

Concluding Remarks This essay began with the proposition that to complete the nexus between development and security, the term containment needs to be included; in the sense that you cannot have development or security without containing the circulation of underdeveloped life. Rather than emerging with the end of the Cold War, or even less convincingly with 9/11, the origins of this nexus can be traced to decolonization. While its constituent parts have an even longer history, decolonization publicly signalled the generic division of humankind into insured and non-insured species-life. It foregrounded the coexistence of a developed life, supported by the welfare bureaucracies associated with social insurance, with an underdeveloped life expected to be self-reliant. While the former was secure within the juridico-political framework of the nation-state, the latter was synonymous with deficient but aspiring states. As an appendage of this new world of states, decolonization also called forth a volatile world of peoples having, for the first time, the potential to circulate globally. In meeting this threat, since the 1960s, the resilience of consumer society has been regularly scored in terms of the ability of effective states to contain the circulatory effects of the permanent crisis of self-reliance, including political instability and the mobile poverty of irregular migration. In the intervening decades, containment has deepened and extended to constitute a virtual global ban on the free movement of spontaneous or non-managed migration. This necessity was first articulated in terms of the risks posed to community

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cohesion and the finite resources of the welfare state. Spurred by the threat of terrorism, such concerns have now been generalized to include the critical energy, transport and service infrastructures of mass consumer society. The international security architecture that emerged with decolonization interconnects the containment of irregular migration with measures to integrate migrant communities already settled within consumer society and, at the same time, state-led development initiatives to improve the self-reliance and stasis of underdeveloped life in situ. This episodic architecture has deepened with each crisis of global circulation. It marks out a terrain of a global civil war, or rather tableau of wars, which is being fought on and between the modalities of life itself. Through their associated modalities of circulationand the need to police themglobal civil war connects the livelihood conflicts of the global South with threats to critical infrastructure in the North. Since the end of the Cold War, the radical interdependence of world events has placed a renewed emphasis on the need for social cohesion at home while, at the same time, urging a fresh wave of intervention abroad to reconstruct weak and fragile states, or remove rogue ones. What is at stake in this war is the Wests ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means. Supported by the massed ranks of career politicians and big business, there is a real possibility that this disastrous formula for sharing the world with others will be defended to the death. Certainly, that a large part of humanity is deemed to be self-reliant and potentially sustainableif limited to basic needsmust give hope to many in the environmental lobby. As a lived reality, however, it is less convincing. Reflected within the globalization of containment, imposing and maintaining this putative life-style has become increasingly violent and coercive. In one way or another, we are all involved in this war; it cannot be escaped since it mobilizes societies as a whole, including policy makers and academics. Because this war is being conducted in our name, however, we have a right as citizens to decide where we agree and disagree, and at what point, or over which issues, we need to establish our own terms of engagement.
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Elizabeth Colson Lecture, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University, 16 May 2007. I would like to thank Roger Zetter for his encouragement and helpful comments on the draft. Naturally, all errors, omissions and gross generalizations are my own.

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