SPE 49130 Redevelopment and Management of the Magnus Field for Post-Plateau Production

Simon Day, Tim Griffin and Paul Martins, BP Exploration

Copyright 1998, Society of Petroleum Engineers, Inc. This paper was prepared for presentation at the 1998 SPE Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition held in New Orleans, Louisiana, 2730 September 1998. This paper was selected for presentation by an SPE Program Committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents of the paper, as presented, have not been reviewed by the Society of Petroleum Engineers and are subject to correction by the author(s). The material, as presented, does not necessarily reflect any position of the Society of Petroleum Engineers, its officers, or members. Papers presented at SPE meetings are subject to publication review by Editorial Committees of the Society of Petroleum Engineers. Electronic reproduction, distribution, or storage of any part of this paper for commercial purposes without the written consent of the Society of Petroleum Engineers is prohibited. Permission to reproduce in print is restricted to an abstract of not more than 300 words; illustrations may not be copied. The abstract must contain conspicuous acknowledgment of where and by whom the paper was presented. Write Librarian, SPE, P.O. Box 833836, Richardson, TX 75083-3836, U.S.A., fax 01-972-952-9435.

Abstract Magnus is the most northerly field in the UK North Sea, with 14 platform and two subsea producers, and 13 injectors of which 8 are subsea. After 12 years of plateau production at 140,000 bopd, the field went on precipitous decline in 1995, with an underlying decline rate of 60% per annum. Although there had been significant preparation and investment for decline, the severity of the well-related problems had not been anticipated. Wells producing over 20,000 bopd fell over in a matter of hours as a result of severe barium sulphate scaling, amongst other factors. This paper discusses the causes of the severe declines, the increasing evidence of reservoir complexity, and the reengineering of the reservoir development that equipped the field for post-plateau production. During the first three years of decline, all production wells were either side-tracked or had major interventions to maintain production, as we moved from multi-zone to single zone completions. Crucial to the success of the performance recovery has been the drilling of several injectors, targeted to support specific zones/areas. Facilities upgrades were also made with increased water-handling capacity, gas lift capability, upgraded water injection pumps and a subsea injection manifold all being added. The subsequent reservoir and well management strategies used are discussed, together with a summary of lessons from the new wells. The main keys to success of the programme are presented, including base production focus and scale management operations. As a result of the re-engineering, the base decline rate has been substantially reduced and manageability has been restored to the field. The lessons learned on Magnus may have relevance for future developments reliant on a small number of wells, particularly if they are subsea.

Field Background Magnus is the most northerly of the presently producing fields on the UKCS. Discovered in 1974, the reservoir is a Upper Jurassic turbidite reservoir, with a high net to gross upper reservoir (Magnus Sandstone Member - MSM) and a low net to gross lower reservoir (Lower Kimmeridge Clay Formation - LKCF), both averaging approximately 100mTVT (Figures 1&2). The reservoir is a South-East dipping tilted fault block of 14km by 3.5km, overlain by Cretaceous mudstones. Reservoir quality improves towards the crest of the structure, with only limited permeability remaining at the oil water contact. Some faults can be seen on the seismic but these are of limited throw. Only the upper MSM sands were recognised when the development was sanctioned in 1978. The field was developed with a single platform with subsea wells on the flanks of the field to access areas that the drilling technology of the day could not reach. A two platform development was considered but rejected on the grounds of excessive cost in the deep waters (186m) and harsh environment of the Northern North Sea. Due to the limited permeability in the water leg, the development plan was for pre-produced injectors, completed in the oil leg then later converted, to sweep oil in a line drive towards the main producers. The first line of producers would in turn be converted to injection as the flood front advanced up dip. The pressure support from the water aquifer was inadequate due to its limited extent and poor permeability. STOIIP is presently estimated to be ~1650 MMSTB with recoverable reserves 797 MMSTB of sweet light 39o API oil (GOR 750scf/stb). The MSM has the majority of the reserves and STOIIP with an expected final recovery factor of ~65%; LKCF recovery factor ~30%. Initial reservoir pressure was 6653psi at datum (3050 mTVDSS) with a bubble point of 2750psi. The Magnus field is operated by BP on behalf of the Magnus License Partners (BP 85%; AGIP UK 5%; Nipon Oil E&P UK Ltd 5%; Petrobras (UK) Ltd 2.5%; Talisman Energy (UK) Ltd 2.5%) On plateau, production was processed through two identical trains, with first a high pressure (HP) separator, then a low pressure (LP) separator and finally a flotation unit, cleaning the produced water prior to overboard discharge. Oil was exported through a pipeline via Ninian to Sullom Voe. Gas was exported via the Northern Leg Pipeline System to Brent and finally St. Fergus. Gas compression was the main

SIMON DAY, TIM GRIFFIN AND PAUL MARTINS

SPE 49130

facilities limitation during plateau production. The highly productive nature of the Magnus sands (PIs of 100-200 stb/day/psi were common in conventional wells) allowed the field to be developed with relatively few wells. The platform was installed with only 20 well slots and space for 9 subsea wells. The field was brought onto production in August 1983 with water injection start-up following in August 1984 (delay due to the pre-produced injectors). Initial plateau rate was an annualised average 125 mstbd (daily peak 145 mstbd) but this was steadily increased to an annualised average 140 mstbd (daily peak 163mstbd) in 1988 as the facilities were debottlenecked. Water injection initially averaged ~150 mbwd but a major upgrade in 1991 increased this to ~240 mbwd (Figure 3). Due to the initial lag in starting water injection and the subsequent facilities upgrades, the field was under-voided throughout most of the 12 years of plateau production (Figure 3). In an attempt to keep a straight line drive, two of the highest injectors (M17:C5, M13:C7 on Figure 1) were choked back which also contributed to the under-voidage. As a result, the average reservoir pressure steadily dropped until, in the early 1990s, the crestal pressure was close to the oil bubble point. In 1993, all the injectors were opened to maximise injection and increase the reservoir pressure, regardless of whether the flood-front was skewed. Despite the pressure drop in the crest, the high productivity of the wells meant plateau production could easily be maintained. Plans were considered for dedicated crestal injectors but not carried out due to the difficulty of justifying the benefit with the existing reservoir description and a field limited by production facilities. Production and injection were generally perforated in all reservoir intervals encountered. These large multi-zone wells were PLT logged throughout their lives to track zonal pressure differences. Some wells were also perforated in stages to monitor the productivity of different zones. Although pressure differences were found in wells, these were never extensive and it appeared that most reservoir zones were in communication. Compartmentalisation was found in two places: The Northern area had some pressure differences from the North Central area, although compartmentalisation was not total; The Brent High held back significant pressure support from the Crestal area (Figure 1). The latter was the most significant from a reservoir development viewpoint - M6:B3 was planned to be one of the first wells in the field to water out, when it would be converted to injection, in fact it was one of the last wells to suffer significant water breakthrough in January 1995. The lack of support from M5:C4 to the crest contributed to the pressure decline in that area. In fact, the Crestal area was only being significantly supported from M17:C5 and M13:C7. The Brent High is the most significant pressure barrier in the field, holding back up to 4000 psi pressure difference. Other barriers marked on Figure 1 are at best leaky, generating some pressure difference but also allowing some sweep. Water analysis and the behaviour of the first wells to

water-out under waterflood had shown Magnus was very susceptible to barium sulphate scale formation. This scale forms when barium from the formation water mixes with sulphate from the injected seawater. The resultant compound is very insoluble and precipitates out in the well liner, limiting production and well access (scale can also form in the topsides pipe-work if the conditions are appropriate). Calcium carbonate scale formation was not expected (nor has proved) to be a significant problem. Performance Coming Off Plateau Production Water breakthrough had occurred in several flank producers during the plateau period, but none of the crestal producers (Figure 1) had significant water breakthrough until late 1994. The field well potential averaged very close to the plant capacity during most of 1994, but for approximately six months the well capacity was slightly lower than plant capacity. However, the field annualised average was still above the average plateau rate due to strongly increased plant efficiency - in fact the 1994 average of 144 mstbd was the highest in field history despite the marginal well stock. However, by late 1994 increasing signs of reservoir decline were visible and the field came off plateau production at the end of 1994 / beginning of 1995. The decline was in several wells but was driven in particular by three wells: A5 The first crestal well to break significant water in October 1994. The water-cut rose very rapidly, reaching 55% by the end of January 1995. A significant point is that the average reservoir pressure measured in this well only rose slowly and lagged the water-cut rise. As a result the lift performance and oil production from the well declined sharply - by the end of January the well was producing ~5 mstbd, down from ~28 mstbd in November. By June the well was essentially dead. A4 Another crestal well that broke water at a low level in April 1994. The water-cut remained low, usually averaging 23%. This well was not scale squeezed as field strategy had been to scale squeeze wells when they reached 5% to avoid any formation damage. A PLT in August 1994 showed a blockage just below the highest perforations, due to scale formation. From January 1995, production declined rapidly from ~20 mstbd as scale plugged off the well-bore. By March production was <10 mstbd oil, slugging and struggling to flow and the well died in April 1995. The scale plug had sealed off leaving only the upper perforations able to flow. Previous to the well declining in January, the water-cut had remained stable at 2-4%. A1 A flank producer in the North of the field (Figure 1) that broke water in August 1991. It was known that scale had formed in the well and in May 1993 a scale mill-out was performed. This uncovered a high permeability water stringer which produced sufficiently to kill the well. A plug was run and the well returned to production. In July 1993 the plug was blown up the hole and removed, water production did not rise and it was assumed that scale had again sealed off the water stringer. In January 1995 production from the well dropped

SPE 49130

REDEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE MAGNUS FIELD FOR POST-PLATEAU PRODUCTION

rapidly from ~15 mstbd to <4 mstbd and the well finally died in April 1995. Similar to A4 above, it was assumed that scale had blocked the wellbore, limiting production to the upper perforations. Production losses due to scale formation continued to be a major problem during the period 1995-7. Although scale squeeze inhibition chemicals were available, these were effective for only a limited time due to the strong scaling environment and the difficulties in placing the chemicals into the correct zone. Frequent squeezes were necessary, and occasionally even these were ineffective at stopping scale formation. As the different layers in the multi-zone wells watered out, large pressure differences developed - up to 1500psi. With the high PI of individual zones, it was often not possible to pump an inhibitor rapidly enough to gain injection into the higher pressure zones. Unfortunately these high pressure zones usually had the higher water-cut and scaling potential, limiting the effectiveness of the chemical injected. The pressure differences between layers led to severe cross-flow problems and instabilities. Some wells became unstable and would not return to normal production after a shut-down. While the well was shut-in, the higher pressure wet zones would cross-flow into the lower pressure dry zones, partially flooding them with water (cross-flow rates up to 10 mstbd). When the well was returned to production, the water-cut would be greatly increased as the low pressure zone would now be back-flowing water. On occasions the water-cut would be sufficiently high as to raise the BHFP above the reservoir pressure of the lower pressured zone. In this case cross-flow would continue even as the well was producing to surface. If the well did not have any artificial lift mechanism (gas lift was gradually being fitted throughout this period), the only solution was to perform a long nitrogen lift through coil tubing to lift the lower pressure zone back on to production. Some wells would require this after each scale squeeze and would only return to full production just in time for the next scale squeeze to be performed. In addition, it was extremely difficult to acquire data or perform maintenance as the risk of losing the well was so high. In M10:A3, the flow was so marginal that small changes in the plant operating conditions were enough to change it from stable oil flow to cross-flowing down-hole. A stable 20 mstbd oil well with a small water-cut ~10% could drop in a few hours to slugging 4-5 mstbd and ~50% water-cut (Figure 4). As zones and wells watered out and the pressure differences developed, evidence of the field complexity became much more pronounced. Especially in the crestal area, wells located a short distance from each other and ostensibly completed in the same zones behaved differently. Liner sidetracks located only 50 metres from the original well showed zones that were not in communication between the two wells. This degree of complexity was not expected in such a high net to gross turbidite sand that, to all intents and purposes, had behaved much like a big pile of sand for most of the plateau period. Repeated PLTs and open hole logs during plateau had given very limited evidence of the true

complexity of the reservoir. Actions Taken to Reduce Decline Planning previous to the end of plateau As well as increasing injection in 1993 to raise average reservoir pressure, planning for post plateau production focused on the expected poor lift performance of the wells as the water-cut rose and the ability to handle produced water. In particular three projects were put in place: Gas Lift Completions: In the absence of substantially increased reservoir pressures, the only way to maintain the high flow rates previously achieved by Magnus was to install gas lift completions. Accordingly topsides modifications were made for the work-over of 6 wells to gas lift completions during 1995-6. The first well to have a gas lift completion was a new drill well completed in April 1995 (M24:B4). Thereafter, all new producers (except one) have been completed with gas lift (10 completions to date). Water Handling Upgrade: The original water handling facilities processed water from the Lower Pressure (LP) separators and were theoretically capable of processing 60 mbwd. In practice however, 40-45 mbwd was the maximum whilst remaining within the assets tight limits on produced oil in water concentrations (~20ppm). Water handling upgrades were justified and designed during 1993-95 to process water directly from the High Pressure (HP) separators through two hydro-cyclones, also incorporating desanding facilities to cope with the expected increase in sand production. These facilities were installed in October 1995, only one month after the field was constrained by water production. These modifications took the field water processing capability to 250 mbwd (though further separator modifications would be required) with the goal that Magnus would never be water processing constrained. SWIFT - Subsea Water Injection Manifold: As stated previously, the Magnus platform was designed with only 20 platform well slots. Although the last slot was not drilled and completed until November 1995 (M27:B2), it was expected that as the field came off plateau more wells (and hence slots) would be required to maintain production. The 20 platform slots were split into 14 producer and 6 injector wells and the goal was to move all injection subsea, freeing up slots for conversion to producing wells. A subsea injection manifold with slots for 7 injection wells was installed 2km to the NorthWest of the platform and tied back with a single subsea pipeline. The first SWIFT injector was spudded in January 1995 and subsequently 3 more were drilled until escalating semi-submersible costs made further wells uneconomic at present. The first platform injector was converted to production in April 1997 and there are plans to convert further slots as required in the future. Additional Actions Taken During Post-Plateau Decline As can be expected, when faced with a previously productive field declining at 60% per annum, a number of actions to slow the decline were vigorously pursued. These primarily involved

SIMON DAY, TIM GRIFFIN AND PAUL MARTINS

SPE 49130

the wells as it was well performance that was driving the production decline. Production Wells: The most significant change in the field development strategy was a move from large multi-zone producers to dedicated single zone producers. Though not initially seen as a strategy for the entire field, this process was actually started in July 1994 when M22:B7 was completed in one zone shortly before the field came off plateau. Single zone completions improved the lift performance of the wells by reducing water-cuts and stopping cross-flow between zones. Production could now be optimised and interventions performed with confidence that the well would not die due to cross-flow. Single zone completions also enabled more effective scale squeezes as the reservoir pressures within the well were more uniform. Combined with more effective inhibition chemicals1,2 scale squeeze life was approximately tripled. It is likely that once pressures in the field are more uniform and the scaling tendency has reduced as the sea-water cut of the field increases, a return will be made to multi-zone wells. In a field with such a large well spacing, it was often not possible to predict the order in which layers watered out nor their individual water-cuts. As stated above, scale usually formed rapidly after water breakthrough, precluding the use of PLTs to measure layer water-cuts after breakthrough. In addition, due to the poor lift performance of the wells, if a scale mill-out was performed to regain access then the wells would likely cross-flow and die, making any PLT virtually worthless (although the drier zones were usually lower pressure this could not be guaranteed). The solution was to perform a series of liner sidetracks (8.5 sidetrack, usually ~50m from the original wellbore) and install gas lift completions instead of the originally intended gas lift workovers. Liner sidetracks offered numerous advantages including: assured shut-off of water intervals behind new liner and cement; open-hole logs, including accurate pressure for reservoir monitoring and perforation decisions; clean well bore without residual scale problems; only minimal increase in time required over a simple work-over and much quicker and more reliable if a water shut-off was planned as part of the work-over. Three wells did have a successful zonal shut-off to change them to single zone production - two with plugs immediately below the topmost zone and one with a more complicated cement squeeze shut-off. Two other wells were also directly worked over to gas lift rather than sidetracked. One was successful from a reservoir viewpoint but later failed due to mechanical problems. The other well struggled from difficulties in shutting off one zone and from much higher than expected zonal water-cuts (95% water under steady flow conditions 11months after first water breakthrough - zone ~50m thick). Obviously not all wells could be converted to single zone production immediately and interventions were required to maintain flow from existing wells. One of the most intractable problems was controlling scale in multi-layered wells with cross-flow - inhibitor had to be injected into the higher

pressure layers in the well. One solution was to inject inhibition squeezes at higher rates - Magnus now injects chemicals using the water injection system and can inject at up to 21bpm, depending on the fracture gradient in the well. The other solution was to reduce the injectivity of the lower pressure zone to divert chemicals to the higher pressure wet zones. First, mechanical diversion was considered but rejected due to lack of reliability in wells where scale had already formed in the liner (assuming access was even possible in the first place). The chosen method was to inject the inhibition chemicals in a series of stages, separated by wax diverters to progressively block the low pressure injectivity3. The reservoir interval was first cooled with sea-water and then the first stage of chemicals pumped followed by wax divertor. The wax was designed to solidify on the cooled rock, reducing the injectivity. Successive stages injected inhibitor and blocked the injectivity until all the open intervals had been inhibited. During the soak period the well would heat up, the wax melted and was subsequently back produced and processed normally with the oil stream. This method has been successfully used on several Magnus wells and has helped to extend squeeze lives. Wax diverted squeezes have been combined with PLTs to confirm diversion was successful. Injection: As Magnus has a limited aquifer, injection is of crucial importance to maintain production. The under-voidage had been a concern during plateau and efforts were made to improve injection volumes during the last 4 years of plateau. However, this focus has increased sharply post-plateau when the benefits of increasing individual well production rates through injection are more clear if the field production is limited by the well potential rates. Three routes were pursued to improve injection support in the field: Drilling Dedicated Zonal Water Injectors: As the understanding of field complexity improved, it was possible to target injectors to particular zones or compartments and locally boost production. In addition, the opportunity has been taken to convert one producer to injection duty where this was higher value. The programme has been very successful, with several wells doubling in oil production rate. Water Injection Upgrades: Several major injection upgrade options have been investigated, from additional main injection, boosting SWIFT manifold wells or boosting a single well (with an ESP). The highest value option was to add a sixth injection pump (cost ~6MM) and this may be implemented during late 1998 / early 1999. However, these investigations also highlighted the possibility of impeller upgrades for the present main injection pumps. The new impellers were optimised for the expected range in pressure and injection rates forecast for the field (short term, high pressure lower rates, longer term lower pressure higher rates). The pumps were upgraded on a rolling basis to minimise the injection loss. The performance improvement was equivalent to the addition of a new pump but at a cost of ~0.5MM. Water Injection Optimisation: As field oil rate dropped below plateau rates, the drop in reservoir barrel offtake was sufficient to take the field into positive voidage on an annual

SPE 49130

REDEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE MAGNUS FIELD FOR POST-PLATEAU PRODUCTION

basis for the first time (1995). This, combined with zonal dedicated injection wells and upgrades outlined above allowed the water injection system to be more closely optimised than the few years previously. The overall aim was to maintain field voidage balance while targeting water at the highest value (in terms of oil production) areas. The reservoir model was used to value each well in terms of barrels of oil production supported. A model of the water injection system using Petroleum Experts Prosper / Gap software was then used to optimise the injection to each well. The injection system was now optimised for maximum oil production rather than water injection. Production Result Post-Plateau Magnus production base decline rate reached 60% per annum for the first year post-plateau. Only a rapid succession of new wells and liner side-tracks sustained production - in January 1996, 58% of production was from wells drilled in the previous year. The focus on base well management, water injection optimisation and the move to single zone completions gradually stabilised the annual decline rates (Figure 5). Indeed, in recent months the decline rate has actually become negative as the field production rate has steadily risen due to improved injection support for two key zones in the crestal area of the field (G and A sands). This production is a combination of new oil and acceleration and base decline rates are expected to grow again during the latter half of 1998. However, manageability has be restored to the field and it is not expected that the high decline rates of 1995 will return. Wells are now more predictable and can in general be choked back or turned off if required for field management reasons without the fear that the well will die. As stated above, scale squeeze life has approximately tripled due to a combination of new chemicals and the single zone completions. Figure 6 shows the source of production since the end of plateau by year and type of operation. In this case interventions have been separated out from the base production rate used to calculate decline rates above. The high level of activity, spread almost evenly between new production wells, new injection wells and interventions can easily be seen. The pre-1995 base (i.e. base before end of plateau without new wells or interventions) drops close to zero in mid 1996 (~5 mstbd, 0 mstbd by March 1997). No wells in Magnus were side-tracked or had major interventions unless they had died, so this gives a good indication of the likely production rate without investment (although the lack of competition as wells died would probably have allowed the remaining wells to last longer). The present Magnus production of ~90 mstbd is entirely due to the investment carried out 1995-1998. The change in strategy to recomplete wells as single zone producers has essentially been completed within three years. Figure 7 shows the dramatic change from multi-zone producers to a pattern of single zone wells. The field now has several oil bearing zones behind pipe awaiting perforation

when the well performance allows it. The next stage of development where the present zones are shut-off and other zones opened up is presently just beginning. It is likely the field will gradually move back to multi-zone completions were pressure differences are not great and the scale can be controlled. This will be required in late life in order to cycle water and improve recovery. With such a high level of new wells and liner side-track activity, only one producer now remains that produced before the end of plateau. Figure 8 shows the cumulative percentage of production by the age of the well for the last months production. Even the one well still existing from before the end of plateau has had a major intervention and is actively supported by two new injectors, drilled or converted since the end of plateau. Water injection optimisation is estimated to have increased production by 1-2 mstbd over the last few years. However the drilling of new injectors (and conversion of one producer to injection) has produced more significant levels of new production as can be seen in Figure 6. Of the 19 platform and subsea wells drilled on Magnus since coming off plateau, 6 were injectors (not including the producer converted to injection). Injectors were targeted at particular zones and compartments - two deserve further description as they also show the increasing complexity of the reservoir description: Crestal A Sands This zone is a high net to gross sand of limited extent in the crest of the field. M26:A4 was a dedicated A sand producer completed in July 1995 (production rate ~16 mstb/d). The reservoir pressure was low, close to bubble point, pressure support coming from other zones and areas of the field. M5:C4 was originally planned to be the injector supporting the Crestal A sand, but the Brent High prevented adequate water flux. M5:C4 was highly pressured (~6500 psi) compared to M26:A4 (~2800 psi). It was decided to sidetrack M5:C4 to a location in better communication with the low pressure reservoir around M26:A4. The Brent High is not a single fault, but a line of thinned reservoir with small faults relating to a high in the underlying sediments. It was therefore extremely difficult to pick the exact structure that was causing the pressure barrier. The A sand thins and narrows updip, so the associated reserves were reduced rapidly the further updip the well was targeted. This tension between maximising reserves and achieving communication led to a stepwise approach, where the well was sidetracked a short distance first and tested. If the first location was a failure then the well would be sidetracked again over the final barrier on the seismic before M26:A4. M31:C4 completed drilling in October 1996 and encountered a high pressure but water swept A sand. As this was not in communication with M26:A4, the well was immediately sidetracked as M31z:C4. This well encountered low pressure unswept A sand, the same pressure as M26:C4. The well was completed and brought on to injection in early November 1996. Initial injection rates were >40 mbwd, but rapidly declined to ~4 mbwd over two days. The well was shut-in for a PFO and later returned to injection when it followed a

SIMON DAY, TIM GRIFFIN AND PAUL MARTINS

SPE 49130

similar pattern (40 mbwd dropping to 4 mbwd). The pattern was repeated several times in the following weeks and the sustainable injection rate remained at 4 mbwd. The PFO showed no problems with the well and the reservoir was interpreted as being connected to M26:A4 by long thin channels, thereby limiting the steady state injection rate. Injection of 4 mbwd was not sufficient to actively support M26:A4 production rate, so a further sidetrack was required. No further features were detectable on the seismic so defining the well target was problematic. In the intervening time, advantage was taken of the upper sands encountered by M31z:C4 as outlined below, therefore a different slot was used for the next updip sidetrack. M34:C3 was completed in September 1997, again encountering low pressure dry oil bearing A sands. The well was brought on to injection at a steady rate of 50 mbwd with the well choked back (rates of up to 70 mbwd were achievable). No problems were found with decreasing injection rates. M26:A4 production rate started rising within 2 days and eventually more than doubled to ~35 mstbd (Figure 9). Water breakthrough at low levels occurred in January 1998 and the main water breakthrough is expected June / July 1998. A second producer, further updip than M26:A4 is planned for late 1998 / early 1999 to take advantage of the good injection support from M34:C3. Crestal G Sands As the main sands in the crest watered out during 1995/6, three wells (M10:A3, M6:B3 and M24:B4 - Figure 1) produced the majority or all of their production from the topmost sand in the MSM (G sands). This sand remained at lower pressure than the main crestal sands and one of the new SWIFT injectors (F2) was targeted as a crestal injector to support these wells. F2 was completed in the upper MSM on January 1996 And brought on to injection at a rate of ~30 mstbd. M24:B4 showed a steady improvement in production rate, increasing by 50% in 3 months (Figure 10). However, neither M10:A3 nor M6:B3 showed any response, despite the fact that M6:B3 was the closest well to F2 and that M10:A3 was only 300m from M24:B4 - two of the closest wells in the field. The second sidetrack of C4 (M31z:C4), to support the A sands as outlined above, had a top hole section that passed within 50m of F2. The majority of the upper MSM showed high pressures (~5500psi), as would be expected so close to an active injector. However, one sand section within the G (it was split into two sands) showed much lower pressures (~3500psi). After the failure of the A sand injection, it was decided to perforate this lower pressure G sand to confirm whether it was in communication with M10:A3 (M6:B3 had died through raised water-cut and low reservoir pressure). M10:A3 showed a steady rise in production, confirming the connection (Figure 11). Although shut-in, M6:B3 had also showed a reservoir pressure rise. M6:B3 was lifted back onto production on August 1997 but produced at very high water-cut. It was decided to convert M6:B3 to injection duty to more actively support M10:A3. This was completed in late December 1997 and the well began injection at ~30 mbwd. M10:A3 production rate again showed a significant rise (Figure 11). In addition, M10:A3 water-cut

dropped from ~15% to ~8% as the sweep patterns in the field were changed. The patterns of connectivity between the above wells introduced a significant problem for sand correlation. Figure 12 shows the sand bodies as described by well picks and confirmed reservoir communication. For F2 and M24:B4 to be directly connected, the two sand bodies between the wells would have to cross - not geologically possible. No definitive solution to this has yet been determined - the present reservoir description has the sands between F2 and M24:B4 thinning and injection communication occurring via other lower sand bodies (Figure 13). The increasing complexity of the G sand can easily be seen on a plot of crestal RFT and PLT reservoir pressures taken in the zone during field life (Figure 14). During plateau, the pressures were relatively uniform. Post-plateau, the combination of dedicated crestal injection and the move to single zone producers has given rise to a wide range in zone G pressures, sometimes within the same well, as discussed above. The offtake from this zone has increased post-plateau, so the differences are probably the result of reservoir constraints rather than complete pressure barriers. However the plot shows how the real reservoir complexity may not be apparent while on plateau. Conclusions and Lessons Learnt The Magnus field has obviously required a substantial investment, both in plant and well facilities, to maintain production. Indeed, without the investment since the end of plateau, production would be close to zero instead of the present daily average of ~90mstb/d. All investments have been justified on the basis of the production / reserves that they accessed or protected. However, such a degree of late life investment had not been anticipated in the original development plan. The risk of requiring late life investment (and well access) to maintain production should be included in the planning of new developments. The relatively few highly productive wells means the field is very similar in concept to a number of developments taking place today, albeit that non-conventional well technology is now often used to achieve the high well productivity. Reservoir simulation and extensive PLT data gathering had not shown the extent of the problems the Magnus field would face as it came off plateau. Zonal pressure differences within wells were relatively modest during plateau production with no indication of the large changes that would rapidly occur. Although many of the main reservoir features could be identified, the full complexity of the reservoir was not apparent until the field came off plateau (and the degree of complexity is continually increasing). With relatively few wells and large inter-well spacing, reservoir description and performance uncertainty is substantially increased - prediction of the performance during decline is especially problematic. New developments that rely on small numbers of wells should include this uncertainty in their predictions. Developments that assume limited well access may especially be at risk.

SPE 49130

REDEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE MAGNUS FIELD FOR POST-PLATEAU PRODUCTION

Acknowledgments This paper is written by three reservoir engineers but obviously the successful redevelopment of Magnus has involved many hundreds of people, both onshore and offshore, past and present. We extend our thanks and congratulations to them. In particular, we would like to thank David Richards for the use of his illustrations. The authors would like to thank the Magnus License partners for their permission to publish this paper. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of BP Exploration. References
1. Collins, I.R., et al.: Extending Scale Squeeze Lifetimes Using a Chemical Additive: From the Laboratory to the Field, paper presented at the "Solving Oilfield Scale" Conference, Aberdeen Jan. 22nd - 23rd 1997 Bourne, H.M. et al.: Combining Innovative Technologies to Maximise Scale Squeeze Cost Reduction: A Laboratory to Field Study, paper presented at 9th International Oilfield Chemical Symposium, 22 - 25 March 1998 Geilo, Norway. Ravenscroft, P.D., Cowie, L.G. and Smith, P.S.: Magnus Scale Inhibitor Squeeze Treatments - A Case History, paper SPE 36612 presented at the 1996 Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition, Denver, Oct. 6-9

2.

3.

SIMON DAY, TIM GRIFFIN AND PAUL MARTINS

SPE 49130

12A-21:D9 M37:B1

12A-17:D4 M25:A1
M32:A2

Crest
M30Z:A5

M33:C7
M10:A3 M27:B2

M32Z:A2

Northern
M4:C2

SWIFT M24:B4
M26:A4 M28:A6 M6:B3

F3

North Central

M34:C3
F2

M31Z:C4

PLATFORM

Southern

F4z
M17:C5 12A-16:D3

M23:B6 F4

M36:B7

F1

M35:B5

OWC
M35z:B5 12A-11Z:D5

M29:A7

Production Injection

Brent High

Figure 1: Magnus field map with areas

SPE 49130

REDEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE MAGNUS FIELD FOR POST-PLATEAU PRODUCTION

NT E 20
0 GR

0 0.45
250 1.95

NPHI V/V RHOB G/CC

ILD
-0.15 0.2
2.95 0.2

Depth METRES 200

200

30
KHA98 0.5
0.5 CKHL

CPOR PU PERF
PHIT V/V

FOIL
01
01
00

0
PHIT V/V VSH V/V 0
1

5000 15
5000 0.3

ILM

2900
3250

3300

2950

3350

3000

3400

3050

3450

3100

3500

3150

3550

3200

Figure 2: Typical log showing MSM and LKCF reservoirs

10

SIMON DAY, TIM GRIFFIN AND PAUL MARTINS

SPE 49130

300000

Monthly VRR
275000 1

250000

Cumulative VRR

Production and Injection (Barrels / day)

225000

-1

200000

-2

175000

-3

150000

-4

Water Injection
125000 -5

100000

-6

75000

-7

50000

-8

Oil Production
25000 -9

Water Production
0 Sep-85 Sep-90 Sep-95 Oct-87 Oct-92 Jun-94 Jun-89 Jun-84 Feb-86 Feb-91 Feb-96 Apr-85 Apr-90 Apr-95 Dec-86 Dec-91 Aug-83 Aug-88 Aug-93 Dec-96 Oct-97 Jul-86 Jul-91 Jul-96 Mar-88 Mar-93 May-87 May-92 May-97 Nov-84 Nov-89 Nov-94 Mar-98 Jan-84 Jan-89 Jan-94 -10

Figure 3: Magnus production, injection and voidage history from start of field life

25

120

100 20

Gross Fluid Rate (mbbl/d)

15

M10:A3 Gross Rate M10:A3 Choke M10:A3 WHFP

80

60

10 40

5 20

0 0:00

0 2:00 4:00 6:00 8:00 10:00 12:00 14:00

Time in Hours

WHFP (barg) and Choke (%)

Voidage Replacement Ratio (VRR)

SPE 49130

REDEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE MAGNUS FIELD FOR POST-PLATEAU PRODUCTION

11

180000

160000

140000

120000

Production (stb/d)

100000

80000

60000

New Producers

New Injectors

40000

Base pre 1994

20000

Interventions
0
May-95 May-96 May-97 Mar-95 Mar-96 Mar-97 Nov-94 Nov-95 Nov-96 Sep-94 Sep-95 Sep-96 Nov-97 Sep-97 Mar-98 Jul-95 Jul-96 Jul-97 Jan-95 Jan-96 Jan-97 Jan-98

Figure 6: Magnus recent production by source

JAN. 1994
11 Wells 36 Open Zones 3.3 zones/well

A1
G E D C

A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 B1
G E C A L G E C A G E A G E L G E C E D C

B3
G E C A L

B5
G E

B7 D6
G E C G E D

JUN. 1998
14 Wells 17 Open Zones 1.2 zones/well

A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6
G E D C E D C G E C A L G E C A G L G E L G E C E G E C L G E C A L G E C L G E G E C

D9
G E D C

Figure 7: Showing wells with zones present and open perforations in black (D9 is a subsea well)

125%

Cumulative Percentage of Oil Potential

100%

75%

50%

25%

0% 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Number of Years Well on Production

Figure 8: Age of well versus cumulative percentage of present (June 1998) production. The remaining well existing from before the end of plateau has had one major intervention to restore production and is supported by two new injectors.

12

SIMON DAY, TIM GRIFFIN AND PAUL MARTINS

SPE 49130

60000

50000

50000

45000

Production / Injection bbl/d

40000
40000

Production / Injection bbl/d

35000

30000

30000
M31z:C4 INJECTION

M26:A4 GROSS PRODUCTION RATE

20000
M34:C3 INJECTION

25000

20000

M24:B4 GROSS PRODUCTION RATE

15000
COMPETITION FROM M30z:A5

10000

M31z:C4 INJECTION

10000
Mar-98 Nov-97 Dec-97 Jan-98 Feb-98 Apr-98 Oct-97

May-96

May-97

Aug-95

Aug-96

Aug-97

Mar-96

Apr-96

Mar-97

Nov-95

Nov-96

Apr-97

Jul-96

Sep-95

Sep-96

Jul-97

Sep-97

Dec-95

Dec-96

Jan-96

Feb-96

Jun-96

Jan-97

Feb-97

Jun-97

Oct-95

Oct-96

5000

F2 INJECTION

Aug-95

Aug-96

Aug-97

Apr-95

Apr-96

Apr-97

Dec-95

Dec-96

Dec-97

Jun-95

Feb-96

Jun-96

Feb-97

Jun-97

40000

35000

FLUSH PRODUCTION FROM INJECTION DURING PRODUCTION SHUTDOWN

30000

Production / Injection bbl/d

25000

20000
M6:B3 INJECTION

M10:A3 GROSS PRODUCTION RATE

15000

10000

5000

M31z:C4 INJECTION

May-97

Aug-96

Aug-97

Mar-97

Apr-97

Mar-98

Nov-96

Nov-97

Sep-96

Sep-97

Dec-96

Dec-97

Jan-97

Feb-97

Jun-97

Jan-98

M 10 :A 3
M 2 7 :B 2

Feb-98

Apr-98

Jul-96

Oct-96

Jul-97

Oct-97

M 10 :A 3
M 3 3 :C 7
M 2 7 :B 2

M 2 4: B 4
M 2 6 :A 4

M 2 4: B 4
M 6 :B 3
M 3 1z :C 4
M 2 6 : A4

M 6 :B 3
M 3 4 :C 3

12A-F 2

12A-F 2

M 3 1z :C 4

MS

ME Sup

por

Figure 12: Shows the correlation, evolved through time, of the crestal G sands using well picks and connectivity information from production data. Wells M24:B4 and F2 apparently have the same sand bodies in different depth order - a geological problem.

Figure 13: Problem resolved by assuming reservoir thinning (possible from seismic) and that connectivity between M24:B4 and F2 is via lower sands. Given the changes in G sand description to date, this is probably an interim resolution.

Feb-98

Apr-98

Oct-95

Oct-96

Oct-97

SPE 49130

REDEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE MAGNUS FIELD FOR POST-PLATEAU PRODUCTION

13

Plateau

Declin e

7000
Initial Reservoir Pressure

6000

Datum Pressure (psia)

5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98

RFT Data Surveillance Data

Year (start)

Figure 14: Shows RFT and PLT pressure data from the crestal G sands. The increasing range in pressures due to dedicated injection and zonal completions illustrates how the level of complexity of a field can be masked during plateau.