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In endless space countless luminous spheres, round each of which some dozen smaller illuminated ones revolve, hot at the core and covered over with a hard cold crust; on this crust a mouldy film has produced living and knowing beings: this is empirical truth, the real, the world. (Schopenhauer)

At first blush it might appear like quite a stretch to compare Platos Timaeus with Arthur Schopenhauers philosophical system. This is understandable. Prior to this investigation I never considered Schopenhauers magnum opus The World as Will and Representation a creationstory. It is quite clear that the Timaeus is indeed a creation-story, but yet, How is it that Schopenhauers philosophy could be viewed from such an angle? Schopenhauer did in fact view The World as Will and Representation as a complete philosophical system and after numerous readings I too am convinced that his system is indeed complete, that is not to say it doesnt need to be brought up to date with contemporary physics. However, it is the completeness of this system that persuades me to think that in a certain sense it does in fact fit the criteria of a creation-story. Nevertheless, The World as Will and Representation is not in any way whatsoever, a creation-story in the same sense as the Timaeus, on the grounds that Schopenhauer based all his observations and conclusions on empirical observation, right down to his discovery of the mysterious and illusive will and the means through which he described this subject matter is undoubtedly philosophical to the core. Yet, it fits the criteria in the sense that in its completeness it deals with time, space, the origin and development of matter, cosmos, and mankind, in short many of the aspects of creation found in the Timaeus; however, without the loose ends and obscurities that commonly surround Platos cosmology. For the sake of this essay, I plan to bring to light several debatable points that arise in the Timaeus and then proceed to explain how Schopenhauer worked his way around these crucial problems with his brilliant discovery of the complex of reality and the will, as the thing-initself. Time, chra (trans. space, room to move) and matter, are three areas of Platos cosmology subject to the most speculation. Schopenhauers account of these three areas proves

to be a much more concise and likely alternative to Platos and, in effect the different path Schopenhauer takes puts him in a position to steer away from many of the philosophical pitfalls brought forth by the text. One possible defense on Platos behalf is that the Timaeus is a myth and many of the sources of confusion are due to the readers inability to get passed a literal interpretation of the text. Therefore, before proceeding to the current investigation it is imperative to determine whether or not the Timaeus should be treated as a myth. The importance of this question was inspired by a reading of Gregory Vlastos essay Disorderly Motion in Platos Timaeus and so, it made its way into the series of questions I am to address concerning this issue. In addition, it is nearly impossible to form the necessary links between Plato and Schopenhauer without taking a position on the mythical status of the story. There are grave consequences that pivot on the mythical status. For instance, it would be fruitless to compare the Timaeus as a myth with Schopenhauers philosophical system. The former would constitute a metaphorical interpretation and the latter would constitute an exegetic examination. A metaphorical interpretation allows for too much leeway to be compared and contrasted with a purely philosophical text such as The World as Will and Representation. 1 IS THE TIMAEUS A MYTH? Ultimately, this depends on how one defines myth. The Merriam-Webster dictionary definition of myth is:
n 1: a usu. legendary narrative that presents parts of the beliefs of a people or explains a practice or natural phenomenon 2: an imaginary or unverifiable person or thing.

For renowned mythologist Joseph Campbell, the myth takes on a completely different meaning than the standard dictionary definition, and for that matter even Gregory Vlastos definition. Campbell has a unique kaleidoscopic vision of the myth and defines myths as reflections of spiritual depth potentiality, public dreams.1 From what I gather, Vlastos accepts the definition
1

Bill Moyers, interview with Joseph Campbell, The Power of Myth

of the myth Plato puts forth in the Phaedo: a story and whether the story is a myth or natural history depends on what kind of story it is. From these very brief definitions it is completely obvious that both men would disagree as to the mythical status of the Timaeus. The former understands the myth as an inherent and timeless spiritual expression and the latter sees the myth as a story intent on explaining a belief or natural phenomenon. More importantly this shows the protean nature of the myth and its imperviousness to linguistic pigeon holing. This issue was of profound importance to Gregory Vlastos and the subject of many of his essays. In Disorderly Motion in Platos Timaeus, he approaches this question with the intention of disavowing his contemporaries opinions that the Timaeus is a myth and therefore immune to certain contradictions and inconsistencies concerning the notion of disorderly motion.2 He attacks this problem on four fronts:
I. II. III. IV. That the Timaeus is a myth; The testimony of the Academy; That motion could not antecede the creation of time; That motion could not antecede the creation of soul.

Sections I & III are the only ones that take on the Timaeus as a whole rather than in relation to disorderly motion and therefore the only two relevant to this essay. First, Vlastos calls into question the nature of the speaker. He concludes that Timaeus serves as an unlikely mouthpiece for a myth taking into consideration his reputation as astronomiktatos and the high regard, which Plato places, on the speakers scientific and philosophical insight. Moreover, Vlastos feels the tone that Timaeus uses to address such a dialogue is dry, clear-cut, and free of the poetic allusions commonly woven into the myths. Thirdly, he interprets the absence of poetic allusions as a literary tool in the Timaeus as indicative of the level of scientific probability Plato placed on the dialogue. In short, poetic allusions jeopardize and take away from scientific probability. Vlastos links the notion of scientific probability with eikos, which he defines in this context as the metaphysical contrast of the eternal forms and their perishing copy [that] determines the
2

Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Plato, and Their Tradition, ed. Daniel W. Graham (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995) 247.

epistemological contrast of certainty and probability.3 Eikos is a very important word and in this context it is the key that turns all the locks when determining the importance Plato places on scientific probability, viz., science. If it is true as Plato claims that the physical world, that which is always becoming is fleeting and always in flux then in this light, science is a matter of verisimilitude. However, as Vlastos notes verisimilitude does not imply falsity. It expresses the importance of probability. Since, the Timaeus deals with the sculpting of the visible world it must necessarily imply that since it is visible it is also probable. By dealing with the probable and not the fanciful the creation-story of the Timaeus remains a matter of scientific probability and not fanciful mythology. On the other hand, if the Timaeus assumes a mythical form, it is always possible that this whether intentional or not is the very result of Platos method of dealing with matters that reach beyond the empirical or cognizable and so, the story form or myth is inherent to such discussions. Perhaps, Plato uses the myth as a vehicle to explain the creation-story, so as to demonstrate the natural limitations of reason and the shadowlike vision one has of the empirical world. The linguistic inadequacies and failure of speech to pin down that, which is, might also be another factor that explains Platos choice to use the myth as a literary tool. However, this means Plato intentionally introduces confusion into the text something, which is non-licet in any genuine philosophical investigation. It is foolish to charge Plato with this crime. Vlastos fails to mention the consequences of demythologizing the Timaeus, probably to avoid the grim reality that the only hope in saving Platos cosmology represented in the Timaeus is to preserve the mythical status of the text; otherwise it lends itself to a demythologized reading cum grn salis. If one eliminates the mythical content from the Timaeus it is rendered impotent and completely useless as a creation-story against the backdrop of contemporary physics, and in effect it would necessarily collapse in on itself. Unfortunately, the evidence supporting the
3

Ibid., 250.

mythical content of the Timaeus is not nearly as strong as the evidence denying the mythical content from the text. This particular issue has been a source of debate for many years and at times it seems like an impassable wall. The question remains, Are the Timaeus inspirational powers cryptically enveloped behind this impassable wall? The debate itself is impassable, this is why one has to come to terms on a decision without any outside sources, or secondary literature, and only then begin to gather evidence supporting their findings. Now that we have negotiated this obstacle we could move onto some of the debatable issues introduced in the text and then explain Schopenhauers solutions to the problems. 2 Chaos and Order Motion and Time The notion of time is one of the greatest sources of confusion in the text and indeed it is one of the most important constituents of the creation-story, or for that matter any creation-story. Chronologically, the insertion of time into Platos creation-story happens fairly early on in the text (37c6-38b5); it follows a series of postulates dealing with the union and composition of the worlds soul and the worlds body. For Plato, time has a beginning and motion is eternal. To the philosophically attuned ear the concept of time before time sounds contradictory but in this case there is indeed a period before time. This was a period marked by disorder, chaos and irregular motion. Time is second to arrive on the scene after motion, and comes to be once the Maker sets the heavenly bodies in order. In this case the order set to the heavenly bodies is key to understanding Platos notion of time. Time is only time when it could be measured. This implies that there was a period when motion could not be measured. As far as measurement is concerned, the planets play the role of markers; in that, time is cyclical in nature and measured via completion according to a single revolution back to a marked planet. The cyclical notion of time is not to be misinterpreted as a form of eternal recurrence that one finds in Nietzsches work or

metempsychosis the migration of the soul and release from the samsara familiar to the Hindu and Buddhist traditions. On the contrary, the Platonic notion of cyclical time is similar to the Jungian interpretation of the circle: The circle is the center, from which you came and represents that to which you go. Emerson eloquently describes the circle as the highest emblem in the cipher of the world.4 As we can see, even after demythologizing the text it is hard to get around the mythical explanation of the cyclical nature of time because of its practicality as an efficient pedagogical tool. In short the heavens are used as measuring devices. It becomes obvious that without order, there can be no time that is if one makes measurement a necessary constituent of time. So, in one sense time is something outside the individual and on the other hand the individual is part of time. Of course, this completely goes against the Kantian and Schopenhauerian tradition, as we will soon see. The distinction between chaotic immeasurable time and orderly measurable time was of supreme interest to Gregory Vlastos. Vlastos approaches this topic in the same essay mentioned in the previous section, Disorderly Motion in the Timaeus. He claims that at one period scholars resorted to labeling disorderly motion a mythical symbol just to get around some of the supposed contradictions a literal interpretation introduced into the text. Luckily, Vlastos was not one to be wearied by contradiction. He tackles this problem head-on and the results he finds are astonishing and clear up the confusion that surrounds the possibility of time before time. Yet, it is interesting to note that even Vlastos issues a disclaimer at the beginning of the essay:
Shall we assume that Platos philosophy is immune from contradiction? This would be wishful thinkingPlato himself has warned us of rough sailinghis physics must have a fringe of inconsistency (253)

In part III of the essay he addresses the question which we are currently grappling with How is it that motion antecedes the creation of time? In response to this question he quotes A.E. Taylor:
4

Ralph Waldo Emerson, Selections from Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Stephen E. Whicher (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957) 168.

7 No sane man could be meant to be understood literally in maintaining at once that time and the world began together (38b6), and also that there was a state of things, which he proceeds to describe, before there was any world.5

However, Vlastos demonstrates that Taylor failed to think his way around this contradiction. The answer lies in the notion of time according to order and circular movements, and as Vlastos notes this is a red thread that runs throughout most of Greek thought. He brings Aristotle into his argument, noting that Aristotle was a sane man, as far as we know, and established both of the supposed contradictory propositions mentioned in the Taylor quote. According to Aristotelian physics, there is no other uniform circular movement aside from that of the heavenly spheres. So therefore, the uniform circular movement of the spheres is the only uniform movement. This point of view necessarily incorporates measurement and number in time. In a long but powerful quote Vlastos states:
So long as there is only irregular motion, there would be no time in this strict sense of the word. It is only when the regular motion of the heavenly bodies comes into being that time begins. This is in fact the hypothesis of the Timaeus.6

Following this proposition, time must necessarily suggest periodic motion, on the grounds that without periodic motion there is no time. Vlastos takes this a step further and claims that time is the finished product7 of the ordering of the cosmos. The image of time as a finished product introduces an array of problems into his description, which in this case deserves an examination. It is quite a perplexing task to imagine the simultaneous coming to be of time and the ordering of the heavens. Vlastos describes time as a finished product, and to a certain extent he is correct, however he fails to place emphasis on the fact that time and the heavens are not inextricably linked, but rather time is linked with order and the heavens are summoned as the means to bring order to the cosmos and, in effect time developed in direct proportion to the

Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Plato, and Their Tradition, ed. Daniel W. Graham (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995) 247. 6 Ibid., 254 7 Ibid., 273

progression from disorder to order. Are we to think of order as a radical () or progressive change? I would have to say progressive on the grounds that order is introduced as an unfolding of proportions directed to the good. As the heavens became progressively more ordered, also did the nature of time. When it reached the finished product stage it was then ready for division into the motions of becoming. Time is always standing in the shadow of order, and it grows and develops at the same rate as the progression to the final order. This is still unclear. Perhaps its a good time for a metaphor. 8 There is one apparent benefit to this approach to Platos notion of time: It bypasses all the propositions concerning time, before time, scholars have for ages deemed either contradictory

And so we call in the music of the spheres. There is a genre of music characterized by free-form improvisation. In the simplest terms, all the rules of conventional musical composition go out the window no score, no key signature, and no specific time. This form of music was introduced by John Cage with the advent of the avant-garde movement, shortly afterwards making its way into the world of jazz via Miles Davis and John Coltrane, and then to be revived in a new shape in the midsixties with the birth of the legendary band the Grateful Dead. [From this time on I will refer to the Grateful Dead as GD.] How is this relevant to the Timaeus? Trying to form a mental picture of the role of time as the finished product of the ordered cosmos, and yet also begotten coterminous as the heavens is enough material to fill any mental canvas. Free-form improvisation represents a unique metaphorical relationship to the nature of time, order, and the heavens put forth in the Timaeus. The individual notes represent the heavens. The shift from free-form to form represents the shift from disorder to order. The shift from free form to form also represents the developing of time into a finished product, in direct proportion to the ordering of the heavens. The GD incorporated free-form improvisation into traditional songs that were written in a specific key and time signature. So, in effect, these improvisational interludes would take a song with the usual duration of 5 minutes and stretch it to often as long as 30 minutes. (There is a version of the song Dark Star that reached the 40-minute mark.) During a personal correspondence with Tom Constanten, former Harvard professor of music and keyboard player for the GD during the sixties described the song thusly: Dark Star, for example, is quite another situation, where after the opening ritornel and lead in to the jam, nearly anything could happen. A given night would reveal events unique to that performancebut thats not so much a definition as a symptom. Throughout the songs there are distinct shifts from free-form to form. The shift from free-form to form is the image that I want to zero in on. When the band is in free-form mode, they are not playing according to any set timesignature or set-score its chaotic, and disorderly, yet an interpersonal experience for the musicians and the band as a whole, just as the sun, moon, and stars had to cooperate to form, time. This is much like the state the cosmos were in prior to being set to order by the Maker. There was no time, only motion. This shift from free-form to form happens progressively not radically, just as time came to be with the progressive ordering of the cosmos. During the shift from free-form to form, time begins to come together and develop in proportion to order; sonically this translates into, the bass falls into a time signature, guitar slips in on the time signature, the keyboards find there way in between the guitar and bass, and the drums supply the rhythm or speed of which they all come back together. Can we say the band is in time only when they bring the song to form. Is time, inherent to the process itself? I think so. Time was in the process of coming to be throughout the transformation from free-form to form. And with the final order, or when the song train comes back on the tracks, time is only then in the finished product stage - the heavens are finally in harmony with their dance. This digression was necessary. The idea of time as a finished product might not be as precise an explanation as Vlastos believed it to be.

or a problem for the church. For instance, St. Augustine worked with this problem and felt that he found a solution by proposing the idea that God simultaneously created matter and time. After centuries of debate, the question remains that if the world is modeled after an eternal and timeless form, How is it that change is introduced into the image? Having considered this question, Vlastos introduces the distinction between raw genesis and created chronos. The former refers to the primordial soup or arch from which the cosmos were created and the finished product is represented by created chronos. This distinction proves that this notion of time is not in opposition to the eternal model, rather it is a necessary constituent of the imaging process. Periodic motion represents the likeness of the eternal model. The state of likeness represents the completed model or created chronos. Vlastos brings to light a factor I previously glossed over and that is often overlooked in the Timaeus. The Demiurge did not create motion; he had to contend with it. And since order is better than disorder the world was thus transformed from chaos to order. It had to be so, in order to introduce time into the cosmos via periodic motion. 3 Space and Matter There is another issue of great importance that because of its puzzling nature often gets swept under the rug. Puzzling does not do any justice in trying to explain the confusion that surrounds this part of the creation-story; it is enough to drive any serious student of philosophy absolutely insane. All the cards are against anything that resembles a concrete understanding of this problem. It is plagued with translation problems and Platos relentless obscurities. In fact, I am filled with fear and contempt just thinking about the task of unraveling this tangled line of reasoning. All one can do is square off with the text one-on-one, the reader and the Timaeus. The confusion begins with section (48e3) and continues to (53b8), and then slips into in my opinion total lunacy with the explanation of stoicheia and the ultimate geometric constituents of matter. In (48e3) Timaeus reverts back to the beginning of the creation-story and states that

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the original explanation in the prologue outlining the duality of that which always is and has no becoming, is inadequate and for the sake of clarity a third part is necessary. The new starting point in my account of the universe needs to be more complex than the earlier one. Then we distinguished two kinds, but now we must specify a third, one of a different sort. 9 The infamous third part sets the stage for a festival of philosophical head butting and linguistic acrobatics. Plato recounts his bipartite ontology of the world made up of the eternal forms and their copies, for a tripartite ontology that consists of an additional counterpart he describes as the wetnurse of all becoming. For ages, scholars have debated the interpretation of the third part. Two of the more popular translations describe the wetnurse of all becoming as chra (space, room to move around) or stuff. During the course, chra was the preferred translation and the subject of much classroom and post-lecture discussion. In this context, the wetnurse of all becoming was characterized as that which always is and always becoming, the scene of dynamic reactions, the reflection of an eidos consumed in a diaphanous haze. One could imagine this particular reading as probable on the grounds that Plato does in fact describe this mysterious third part as space (chra) which provides a fixed site for all things that come to be (53a5), one that receives all things (51b), receptacle of all becoming (49a7). From Platos description all the arrows seem to point to chra as the most exact translation. However, why is it that space and becoming are listed separately in Platos ontology and also described as distinct entities? It would seem commonsensical to view space and becoming under the same category if the receptacle is to be considered the location of all becoming. This implies the false conclusion that space is the cause of the agitating motion that jostles the elements of air, earth, water, and fire. This is clearly nonsensical, How is it that space could
9

Plato, Timaeus, trans. Donald J. Zeyl (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2000) 37.

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initiation motion, if all that moves, moves in space? Now as the wetnurse of becoming turns It seems likely that if one translates the third part as chra then by necessity it follows that chra is inextricably linked to motion. The closest we come to any hint of such a notion is in Platos explanation of health as a state of accord between internal and external motions. (88d) Zeyl brings to light another crucial problem in translating the wetnurse of all becoming as chra, opposed to stuff. Simply put, if we are to think of it as chra (trans. space, room to move) then the locations of the different parts must be described by spatial coordinates, therefore making it impossible by logical necessity for the parts to remain the same character and travel through space. Anything moving through the Receptacle from one place to another could not be identified as the same part of it throughout.10 This contradicts the stuff translation that interprets the identification of an object in space as possible only against the backdrop of a material substratum. Nevertheless, Zeyl is correct to assert the interplay between both of these translations and even claims to have found a solution to the problems one encounters in both translations. Before we proceed to Zeyls solution, let us examine the stuff translation. This alternative translation of wetnurse of all becoming as stuff closely resembles one of the earliest forms of materialism commonly characterized by concept of prote hule, prime matter. There are just as many reasons to believe this interpretation of the text, and yet, it also brings its own problems into the mix.

The first indication in the text that supports this translation is in section (49b9) when Plato calls into question the status of the four elements air, earth, water, fire and whether or not one could actually say with epistemic certainty that this is fire, earth, etc. The many changes the elements go through make it difficult, if not impossible to say what something is. Rainwater
10

Donald Zeyl, introduction, Timaeus, by Plato (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2000) lxiii

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disappears, snow melts, and fire turns to ash how can one say with any certainty, what something really is if it is always in flux? At the outset, Plato appears to be drawing a distinction between form and matter. The forms are always changing and yet in order to guarantee epistemic certainty one needs a substratum from which all forms and qualities come to be. From this particular reading, matter or prime matter, in the Aristotelian sense represents the substratum needed to support the forms. Platos description in this passage shows the possibility of such an interpretation:
Now the same accounts holds also for that nature which receives all bodies. We must always refer to it by the same term, for it does not depart from its own character in anyway. Not only does it receive all things, it has never in any way whatever taken on the characteristic similar to any of these thingsit is modified, shaped, and reshapedthings that enter it and leave it are imitations of those things (50b9)

How would one read prime matter into this passage? By referring to it as the same term and that which remains the same character implies that matter is indeed a fixed site for all becoming and yet remains neutral throughout the many changes. In contemporary philosophical language, the substance changes and matter is permanent and that which always stays the same. How is it that matter, receives all things? In answering this, Plato was right to claim that matter is always ready for the impressions and reshaping left behind by the eternal forms. In essence, the forms leave impressions on substance, thus changing its substance, but leaving prime matter untouched. Form and quality are merely mediums of expression that stand in to create the toiouton of the impression. Another interesting passage that seems to point to this translation is Platos description of the relationship between mother, father, and offspring and that which comes to be, that in which it comes to be, and that which the thing coming to be is modeled and which is the source of its coming to be. In this respect, the mother could be read as matter, the father or source the idea, and the offspring would necessarily be the sensible world of objects, the physical world. The notion of this third kind as a wetnurse seems to mend perfectly with this interpretation of

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matter, Idea, and objects of perception. A wetnurse or nanny is usually defined as a woman who cares for children that are not her own. In essence, matter as a mother cares for children (forms) that are not her own; after all, she receives all and yet remains neutral to any permanent impressions. Its probably not unimportant to keep in mind the tendency to describe nature or the physical world as Mother Nature. What a sad life this mother has caring and nurturing for that which is not her own. However, this might explain how the wetnurse is the unchanging matter from which substance, form and quality arise, but how is it that wetnurse cares for the other children. This takes us headlong into Schopenhauers description of matter as a manifestation of causality, and finds its place at the end of the discussion. Even if matter seems to mend perfectly into the text, there is no way to deny Platos incorporation of space into his discussion of form and matter; after all, he spends a great deal of time explaining how the agitating motion of the receiver spreads the impressions throughout space. The most probable solution to this problem is that Plato introduces space into the discussion of form and matter to show that although both are inextricable linked to the eternal, unchanging forms, they never make their way into space and since, they are not in space one is often led to disbelieve their existence. Zeyl claims to have found a solution to the problem of chra and stuff. Ultimately, he finds that if we view space in terms of Newtonian of Einsteinian space, Platos description falls apart and one is never able to conjoin chra and stuff. He reinterprets space, as we noted before as room to move around in and with this reinterpretation fails to see why the Receptacle cant be both stuff and the room to move around in. He claims that, thought of in this way, the Receptacle is a plenum or stuff, not sheer empty space, which also provides room for certain parts to travel through.11 Zeyl failed to see the complete picture. This vision of stuff and room to move around is very much in accordance with the position most
11

Ibid., lxiii.

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contemporary physicists take on creation theory. This is applicable to both the theories of special relativity and string-theory. Both competing camps assume to a certain extent that space was created coterminous with matter. The Friedman Model is a perfect example of the union between space and matter. At the time of the Big Bang space was created out of the explosion of matter at a point of singularity. In addition, the language of space within space is common to theorists examining what they called Calabi Yau shapes, or for that matter the notion of wormholes. This is a topic for another day, but we can clearly see how Zeyl might have been on the right track but failed to take the claim a bit further by applying it to special relativity and string-theory. In fact, if he had the intention of aiming in such a direction he could have easily stated the fine line between matter and space by noting that space as we now know it is no longer considered empty but rather filled with matter in the form of particles: There are 400 million photons to every cubic meter of space this is considered a universal principle.

4 THE COMPLEX OF REALITY

This brings me to my mentor, the sage of Frankfurt, Arthur Schopenhauer: the most underrated, overlooked, and misinterpreted philosopher of all time. I have no room in this essay to express my sincere gratitude for this great man; moreover, it is a kinship beyond explanation. This is the first attempt ever to join Schopenhauer and Plato in such a way, I could only hope for the best. Cazart! Schopenhauer was very much at home in the world of empirical science and proud of the fact that his system unites both metaphysics and empirical science. My system therefore, far from soaring above all reality and all experience, descends to the firm ground of actuality, where its lessons are continued by the Physical Sciences.12 Throughout his life he maintained an interest in the rapidly developing world of science and was even to a certain degree an active participant: he observed inmates in the asylum nearest his house, performed dissections of the
12

Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and On the Will in Nature, trans. Mme. Karl Hillebrand (London: George Bell and Sons, 1891) 216.

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human body, and collaborated with many of the leading scientists of his time.13 It is no surprise that Schopenhauers work influenced Darwin (he is even quoted in The Origin of Species) and Schrodinger. He is accredited with anticipating Einsteins theory of general relativity, Dawkins Self-Gene theory, and is well deserved of the title father of modern psychology through his influence on Sigmund Freud; even though the self-important doctor was unwilling to admit his knowledge of the philosophers work. Its paradoxical to state that Schopenhauers creation-story begins with the universe in any particular state. There is no beginning to Schopenhauers creation-story, but because of the linearity of time, one could trace the causal chain as far back as the empirical sciences will allow, which to date is about 100th of a second after the Big Bang. In effect, there is no causa prima, and he felt that both Kant and himself dealt the cosmological proof a mortal blow. For Schopenhauer the causal chain reaches back ad infinitum, and he supplies proof of this by demonstrating the a priority of space, time, and causality. His explanation is as valid for the heavens as it is for the emergence of organic life. Yet, where does matter find its place? Schopenhauer describes matter and causality as one and the same thing. This will become clear further on in the essay. In his earliest studies, Schopenhauer introduced a wildly interesting idea: the complex of reality. Time, space, and causality, form a matrix governed by the universal and necessary formulas creating the empirical world. Schopenhauer states:
The empirical representations, belonging to the ordered and regulated complex of reality appear in both forms simultaneously; in fact, an intimate union of the two is the condition of reality. To a certain extent, reality grows out of them as a product out of its factors. What produces this union is the understanding which, by means of its own peculiar function, combines those heterogeneous forms of sensibility so that from their mutual interpenetration, although only for the understanding itself, there arises empirical reality as a general and comprehensive representation. This creates a COMPLEX, held together by the forms of the principle of sufficient reason...14
13

Schopenhauer charged three famous scientists with plagiarizing his work. He waited for one (Dr. J. D. Brandis) of these particular individuals to die and then went over his house and searched his library. It wasnt a surprise to Schopenhauer that he found The World as Will and Representation amongst the books in his library. 14 Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and On the Will in Nature, trans. Mme. Karl Hillebrand (London: George Bell and Sons, 1891) 32.

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Although, the objective real world exists for us in this complex, the complex, as such, is not a single representation; it is a matrix within which there emerge the possible representations of space, time, and causality that constitute our various real world experiences and support a universal principle to explain the universe. For the sake of this essay, we could use the complex of reality as a tool to peer into the deep past, as if looking through a telescope at the light from a distant star billions and billions of light years away. All the necessary tools to perform such a Herculean task are self-contained in the individuals a priori faculties of knowledge. This is the extent of Schopenhauers link with Kant. His philosophical system is fundamentally idealistic. Schopenhauer opens his magnum opus thusly: The world is my representation: this is a truth valid with reference to every living and knowing being, although man only can bring it in reflective, abstract consciousness. If we are to use the complex of reality as our telescope, then before we can peer back into time, we must first ask the question: What is knowledge? Knowledge is mainly representation. What is representation? Schopenhauer describes representation as a complex physiological occurrence within an animals brain, creating a mental picture thereof 15 Knowledge divides into outer and inner sensibility. Outer sensibility is empirical reality, the outside world of phenomena, the material and physical realm. Outer sensibility or empirical reality must operate under the three a priori forms of knowledge: time, space, and causality. The complex of reality must be present in order to create the proper environment for bringing outer experience to fruition. If time were the only form of the phenomenal world there would be no coexistence. There is no coexistence in time because time is linear and one-dimensional. Proof of this is the fact that our thoughts occur one at a time, linearly and as if pushed along in a straight line, rather than simultaneously with other thoughts. So therefore, cognition is necessarily linear, in that it is subject to the form of time and only one representation at a time is
15

Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation: Volume II, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1958) 191.

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possible. Yet in space, there is coexistence without succession. Linear modes of thought are therefore chainlike in structure, in that each representation links back to previous representations. The empirical world is therefore a slideshow, in which, the pictures change at such a fast rate as to form a continuum. The world as we come to know as empirical reality becomes possible only with the union of space; the primary form of the outer sense, and time, the primary form of the inner sense. How can the external world maintain objectivity as a subjectively conditioned series of representations? The external world maintains its objectivity due to the law of causality and the faculty of understanding. Following Kant, Schopenhauer makes it clear that the individual can never reach knowledge of the thing-in-itself by using the causal law because the causal law deals exclusively with changes in the physical world. The causal law is responsible for making objectivity possible, and without it the empirical world would lose all objectivity. For Schopenhauer, the empirical world is completely intellectual, which is why Schopenhauer claims that the world of representation as it appears to the conscious mind is product of perception and not of the senses. Schopenhauer makes an important distinction between sensation and perception. The senses supply only the raw material and not the finished product. In this sense, the faculty of understanding orchestrates with assistance from the law of causality the shift from raw sensation to refined perception. Sensations are to perceptions as the individual notes are to symphonies. The conductor is the faculty of understanding. This conclusion further proves the ideality of empirical reality and the many changes it undergoes before it comes to fruition in consciousness. Schopenhauer repeatedly states that the senses merely supply the data, immediately handed over to the faculty of understanding, and only then converted into intuitive perception. The understanding gathers the data passed on from the senses, designates every change as an effect and links it together with its cause. Schopenhauer says that physiologically the brain

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creates perception, but actually it is the faculty of the understanding employing the a priori complex (space, time, and causality) that puts together empirical reality. Without the faculty of understanding and the law of causality, the empirical world would be little more than what Nietzsche called an anarchy of atoms. Inner sensibility is of a different nature than outer sensibility in that it is only subject to the form of time. The absence of the form of space does not imply that the inner sense is totally separated from empirical reality. Concepts the main tool of the inner sense, borrow their content from the world of representation: empirical reality. This leads us to the question as to how representations lead of concepts. The faculty of reason organizes the content supplied by empirical reality, just as the faculty of understanding shapes the world of phenomena. However, when and how does knowledge change from perception into abstract knowledge? Or put it differently, how does knowledge pass over from immediate representations to abstract concepts? Cognition seems too fluid and seamless to contain so many dead ends and reversals of direction. Even Schopenhauer recognizes the peculiarity of this shift and on numerous occasions even refers to it as mysterious. In a beautiful passage, he describes the shift thusly:
As from the direct light of the sun to the borrowed reflected light of the moon, so do we pass from the immediate representation of perception, which stands by itself and is its own warrant, to reflection, to the abstract, discursive concepts of reason, which have their whole content only from that knowledge of perception, and in relation to it.16

By concept, Schopenhauer refers to a special class of representations. Concepts do not just emerge immediately in the conscious mind; rather concepts are merely, representations of representations. Their content derives from representations belonging to the first class of the principle of sufficient reason: intuitive, perceptive, complete, empirical representations. As Schopenhauer says; The abstract representation has its whole nature simply and solely in its relation to another representation that is its ground of knowledge. The individuals mind would
16

Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation: Volume I, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1958) 35.

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undergo sensory overload were it to retain every minute detail of experience. Instead, the faculty of reason changes the form of knowledge from the empirical to the abstract. Much is lost in the abstractification process and ultimately for very good reason. Schopenhauer describes the abstractification process as getting rid of unnecessary baggage, or even to working with extracts instead of the plant species themselves, with quinine instead of bark.17 One would never be able to link concepts together if one were to retain every detail of every experience. In effect the faculty of reason screens and locates the major elements of intuitive perceptions. This is why we remember only the crucial elements of our childhood and not the meaningless events. Matter has a unique relationship to time, space, and especially causality. Schopenhauers position on matter closely resembles the stuff that was discussed in 3 under the title Space and Matter. Here are some of Schopenhauers descriptions of matter18: 1.
There is only one matter, and all different materials are different states of it: as such it is called substance. 2. The annihilation of matter cannot be conceived, yet the annihilation of all its forms and qualities can. 3. Matter exists, i.e., acts in all the dimensions of space and throughout the whole length of time, and this unites and thereby fills the two. In this consists the true nature of Matter. It is therefore through and through causality. 4. Matter has no origin or extinction, but all arising and passing away are in matter. 5. We know the laws of the substance of accidents a priori. 6. Matter is merely conceived a priori. 7. Matter is absolute

In No. 1 Schopenhauer describes how changes in states of materials refers to changes in substance and not matter as a whole. This is why in No. 6 he claims matter is conceivable a priori, and not perceivable a priori, that is because our perception of the external must operate under the forms of space and time. Time implies change and change implies causality. So therefore, matter is one with causality since it is the receiver of all change.

17

Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, trans. E.F.J. Payne (Illinois: Open Court, 1995) 151. 18 Arthur Schopenhauer, Praedicabilia A Priori, The World as Will and Representation: Volume II, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1958) 48.

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The principle of sufficient reason proves that everything must have a ground and every change can be linked back to a cause. This is the causal law. Changes refer exclusively to the external world and the external world is by necessity a plurality, therefore changes belong not to matter but to substance, on the grounds that matter is one and only through accident infinitely divisible into substances. This idea resembles the classical notion of stuff discussed in the previous section. Time and space, as a priori forms of knowledge can exist without matter; yet, matter is inextricably linked to time and space. A material object must necessary fall under the form of space as in extension, etc., and in the form of time as in its acting. Schopenhauer designates action as inherent to matter, in that it is the manifestation of causality and hence change. From this point, the reasoning of No. 3 grows clear; time and space are united by causality. Schopenhauer states:
Thus change, i.e., variation occurring according to the causal law, always concerns a particular part of space and a particular part of time, simultaneously and in union. Consequently, causality unites space and time.

However, causality is not applied to matter itself, but rather, matter is action in the abstract and brought forth by causality. Therefore, matter as part of the a priori complex and because of its bond to causality is regarded as the indestructible basis of all that exists. Up to this point we considered the empirical world from merely the subjective side as forms of knowledge and part of the a priori complex of reality, yet, we failed to mention the inner nature of all that appears in consciousness and hence consciousness itself. I discussed the world as representation produced by the complex of reality and yet there is another angle from which we can reflect upon the matter: the objective side of all phenomenon, the thing-in-itself, the essence of all nature. Schopenhauer states that the will is the inner nature of all existence, and the force that pervades over all matter, regardless if it is organic or inorganic, and in all its vary degrees of objectification. He states:

21 That what Kant opposed the thing-in-itself to mere phenomenon called more decidedly by me representation and what he held absolutely unknowable, that this thing in itself, the substratum of all phenomena and therefore the whole of Nature, is nothing but what we know directly and intimately and find within ourselves as will; That accordingly, this will, far from being inseparable from, and even a mere result of, knowledge, differs radically and entirely from knowledge, which is secondary and of latter origin; That this will, being the one and the only thing-in-itself, the sole truly real, primary, metaphysical thing in a world in which everything else is only phenomenon i.e., a mere representation gives all things, whatever they may be, the power to exist and act19

Schopenhauer means by objectification that all matter, from the smallest particle to the largest galaxy, from a bacterium to a man, is manifestation of one and the same will. That is because matter, in addition to being for others, must also be being-in-itself, which Schopenhauer designates as will. If matter were simply being-for-others, then the empirical world would lose any sense of reality and fade away into phantasmagoria. Following this line of thought, one easily slips headlong into a solipsistic trap.
Yet the perceived object must be something in itself, and not merely something for others; for otherwise it would be positively only representation, and we should have an absolute idealism that in the end would become theoretical egoism, in which all reality disappears, and the world becomes a mere subjective phantasm. 20

In other words, the will (being-in-itself) is the root of all phenomena and the underlying element of all matter. The will is real and the phenomenal world is ideal; without the real, everything remains ideal. At bottom, Schopenhauer characterizes the will as mainly will-to-live, in as much as, all matter or phenomena spring naturally towards life and existence. Kant deemed this task fruitless, how far Schopenhauer stands above Kant in this regards. The degrees of objectification are manifested at the lowest levels as the universal forces of nature, which during Schopenhauers time was gravity, inertia, etc Today contemporary physics traditionally explains these forces as the nuclear force, electromagnetic force, gravity, and the weak force. Schopenhauer reminds the reader that these universal forces are not to be confused with the thing-in-itself, and that one must keep in mind they are merely the manifestation of the thing-in-itself.
19

Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and On the Will in Nature, trans. Mme. Karl Hillebrand (London: George Bell and Sons, 1891) 216. 20 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation: Volume I, trans. E.F.J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1958) 193.

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In a glissando of metaevolutionary stages, the will takes hold of matter and manipulates it by way of different combinations of forces, wherein the lowest degrees of objectification algorithmically gives birth to higher degrees of objectification culminating with its most noticeable achievement, self-consciousness21. Schopenhauer often states that this was the wills ultimately goal. I disagree with Schopenhauer and look at self-consciousness as a stage of metaevolution. Since the will is the eternal force that makes everything possible; and consequently, time, space, matter, and causality, the complex from which the will is revealed to the individual is also without beginning or end. Then ultimately one must view the universes metaevolution as without beginning or end and therefore self-consciousness22 is merely a stage along the way. Schopenhauer sets off from the principle that the external world, the subject of creation, is to be observed more closely from within the nature and framework of consciousness by taking the Kantian standpoint of fundamental idealism: the empirical world is conditioned by the subjective of our own consciousness. On the contrary, Platos Timaeus describes the creation of the universe from high above the lofty peaks, and as result, Timaeus has to call upon the gods before his exposition. Whereas, Schopenhauer uses the individuals own cognitive power and inner essence as all the necessary tools a narrator needs to peer as far back and forward as possible in time. The further science takes us back on the cosmological causal chain the closer we get to revealing different universal forces of nature, with the firm understanding that this type of examination can never reveal the thing-in-itself, only its physical manifestation of the will in all matter.
21

Schopenhauer considered the intellect as a tool for the will in its effort to reveal itself to the individual in selfconsciousness. 22 For Schopenhauer, self-consciousness is the light from under which the stirrings of the will are revealed to the individual. It is the light from within, just as nature offers signs of the manifestation of will. Previously, inner sensibility was described in reference to the forming of concepts and its relationship to the faculty of reason, without taking note of its twofold nature as reason and self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, or the inward observation of our will, is different from empirical reality in that it is free from the forms of space and causality and only subject to the form of time. Proof of this is apparent in that the monologue of our self-conscious reverie is not physically extended in space.

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This approach eliminates many problems that came up in the Timaeus and on the other hand some striking similarities arise between both creation stories. Schopenhauer held Plato in the highest regard and considered him one of the most important philosophers and a gem in the world of philosophy. The subjective standpoint answers many of the questions that came up under the topic of 3 Motion and Time. Although Schopenhauer and Plato would agree that motion is eternal, they disagree in the temporal status of time. The subjective standpoint Schopenhauer adopts bypasses the temporal status of time. For Schopenhauer, There is only one time, and all different times are part of it, Time has no beginning of end, but all beginning and end are in time, Time is without rest. Eternal motion and time come together in the complex of reality and yet leave unscathed the notion of time and its relationship to counting. Schopenhauer dedicates chapters examining the subject of time and counting and his conclusions are many times aligned to the concept of periodic time in the Timaeus. Except of course, Schopenhauer perceived time as a line, whereas one could read a cyclical form of time into the Timaeus. By forming an a priori bond between time, space, causality/matter, and will, Schopenhauer was not only able to join motion and time, but also, space and matter; two areas which we found very problematic in the Timaeus. Schopenhauer describes, the mother of all permanence as matter, and the father as that which is always becoming and reliant upon matter. Earlier in the essay, I discussed the necessary bond between matter, time, and space. In order, for an object to exist it must come under the forms of time and space. Matter not only fills time and space, but also unites them under the law of causality. This is indeed a very unique approach to several different creation stories, written in different eras, and from under a different light; yet, both are equally important. Its quite a relief to express my ideas on such topics. Often contemporary philosophers pay little or no attention to many problems that once puzzled the greatest of scholars. Uncontested, science has grown so

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expansive that scholars rarely rack their minds over good old-fashioned philosophical problems. Perhaps that is why interest in the question of space and time has fizzled out in the philosophical world, to such an extent that students of philosophy are usually more likely to find stimulating advanced discourse on such topics at physics forums rather than in philosophy classrooms. The advances made in quantum physics overshadow the great philosophical systems that dealt with the questions of space, time, and causality, notwithstanding that many philosophical issues are still open to debate. After all, metaphysics takes up where physics ends.

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Space, Time, and the Cosmos: The Timaeus and The World as Will and Representation. By: Frank A. Sicoli 12/20/04