History and Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Earth Penetrating Applications Grant Elliott

MIT Program in Science, Technology, and Society (Dated: May, 2005)

1.

INTRODUCTION

enough to contain its own fallout and destroy any chemical or biological agents the target may

The 1960s saw the rise of a new kind of destructive force - the tactical nuclear weapon. Unlike strategic nuclear weapons, designed to attack carefully calculated targets from great distance, the comparatively small tactical weapons are meant to be used by soldiers in battleeld environments. As such, tactical weapons blur the line between conventional and nuclear weapons by making the use of nuclear capability a feasible option. While this exibility oers considerably increased options to military planners, opponents fear that the fallout of even a small nuclear weapon makes its use unwise and, more importantly, that battleeld nuclear capability will lead to increased global proliferation. Today, tactical nuclear weapons remain a contentious subject as the United States considers

contain? Opponents argue that both clauses are dicult, if not impossible, to achieve. Second, at the risk of renewing the arms race or hampering international disarmament eorts, do the abilities aorded by such a weapon warrant the potential political damage? We primarily consider the technical issues involved in the nuclear earth penetrator debate. Before doing so, however, we investigate the histories of tactical nuclear weapons and conventional earth penetrators. We then consider the three purported abilities of nuclear earth penetrators - destructive power, fallout containment, and chemical and biological agent destruction and assess the likelihood of successfully deploying a weapon capable of each.

2.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

the development of a new earth penetrating nuclear weapon intended for destruction of hardened underground targets. This possibility raises both technical and political questions. First, can a weapon be developed which not only destroys the intended target but can also penetrate deeply First, it is important to understand what characterizes a tactical nuclear weapon. The clearest denition is based on intended use. While strategic weapons, like those installed in Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), generally target missile silos or cities, tactical weapons
Electronic

address: gelliott@mit.edu

are intended to be retargeted with the changing

conditions of war. Unfortunately, this denition is largely subjective and attempts to formulate objective criteria reveal that the line between strategic and tactical weapons is not as clear as one would expect. Obvious possibilities for classication include range and yield. Intercontinental capabil-

ity seem a unique characteristic of strategic weapons, but at least three nuclear states France, India, and Pakistan - have no nuclear weapons with intercontinental capability, although their arsenals are clearly used for strategic purposes [5]. Yield as a criterion is even more troubling. Tactical nuclear weapons are often referred to as low yield, a term which extends as far as one megaton and would include the bulk of strategically deployed nuclear weapons. Just as the line is blurred between strategic and tactical weapons, disarmament activists fear a blurring of the line between tactical nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. While strategic nuclear weapons, owing to their tremendous (and lasting) destructive power, have become largely unusable, a battleeld variant oers pinpoint attacks with less risk of massive retaliatory strikes. With mutually assured destruction less of a hinderance to use, critics of tactical nuclear weapons fear that their existence will inevitably lead to extensive proliferation and potentially even wartime use. Tactical nuclear weapons may be deployed in missile warheads, gravity bombs, demolition munitions, artillery shells, or even land-mines [5]. Today, the United States arsenal includes approximately 1,300 tactical gravity bombs and 320 cruise missiles, though other forms have been deployed and subsequently withdrawn (See Section 3). Consider, for instance, the W54 Davy Crockett, a 51 pound warhead launched from a recoilless rie with a maximum range of two miles. The Davy Crockett (depicted in Figure 1) was intended for use against troop formations [4]. A variant, the B54, was used in the Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM), a 163 pound bomb with a yield of under one kiloton [4]. The SADM was developed for the Navy in the 1960s and intended for deployment by a two man parachute team, who would set a timer and be recovered by submarine. These examples exemplify the wide range of forms a nuclear weapon could take in tactical use, most of which have
FIG. 1: The Davy Crockett W54 warhead, launchable from a recoilless rie. Photo from [4]

been thought of as upgrades to existing conventional capability rather than fundamentally new destructive power. This same pattern has repeated in recent years as most discussion of nuclear earth penetrating weapons similarly fails to acknowledge the fundamental dierences associated with adding nuclear capabilities to the battleeld. Even their colloquial name nuclear bunker busters implies that such a weapon is merely a nuclear modication of the existing weaponry for attacking underground targets (see Section 4.1).

curity of Soviet nuclear weapons, the Bush administration announced dramatic reductions in the United States nuclear arsenal. In addition to reductions in strategic ICBMs, then President Bushs September 27th address stated that the United States would eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched short range... nuclear weapons and withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface ships, attack submarines, as well as those nuclear weapons associated with our land-based naval aircraft. [11] Further, the Soviet Union was urged to do the same, destroying both its short range nuclear

3.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPON DISARMAMENT

warheads and artillery and its nuclear air defense and land mines - programs which, as the President pointed out, had already been discontinued in the United States. This proposal of unilateral reductions has come to be known as the Presidential Nuclear Initiative (PNI) and is the most signicant tactical nuclear disarmament eort to date. What President Bush proposed was not a total elimination of tactical nuclear weapons; only nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic missiles were slated for destruction. The remaining tactical weapons were simply withdrawn. Soviet President Gorbachevs response contained equally varied wording. Nuclear artillery ammunition and warheads for tactical missiles were slated for destruction, while nuclear warheads for anti-air missiles, nuclear mines, tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships and submarines, and

As with strategic weapons, the current distribution of tactical nuclear weapons is weighted heavily towards the United States and Russia, each of which maintains an arsenal including several thousand such weapons. The United

Kingdom and China also have several hundred each. The history of tactical nuclear weapon disarmament, like strategic weapon disarmament, therefore consists primarily of talks between the United States and Russia. While the INF Treaty of 1987 began the process of eliminating intermediate and shorterrange strategic missiles [9], the disarmament movement did not move into the realm of true tactical weapons for several more years. Following an attempted Soviet coup in August of 1991 and amidst increased concern over the se-

ground based naval aviation nuclear weapons were to be removed and placed in storage in central bases [5]. He went on to claim that in many Soviet states, this process had begun several years prior. By the end of 1992, the unilateral reductions appeared largely successful. President Bush

fact, several policy-making bodies in the United States have called for increasing the arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. Although the Nu-

clear Posture Review (NPR) produced by the Department of Defense in 2002 proposed eliminating the capability to deploy nuclear weapons on naval surface ships [24], it also promoted the development of improved earth penetrating weapons (EPWs) to counter the increased use by potential adversaries of hardened and deeply buried facilities [5]. It further called for the National Nuclear Security Administration to perform a feasibility study of such weapons. This move came several years after the quiet introduction of the B61-11, a gravity bomb designed for earth penetration and described in detail in Section 4.2. This proposed development of a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator could involve a repackaging of an existing weapon or, even worse according its many critics, the development of a new low yield weapon. Such a move would not only counteract recent disarmament successes, but could also require that the United States return to nuclear testing. Such testing was ended by Congress in 1994 and is forbidden by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has been ratied by the United States, but is not yet in force. Finally, though not explicitly a move towards disarmament, the International Court of Justice ruled in 1996 that the use of nuclear weapons is against international law unless a nations sur-

had conrmed the worldwide withdrawal of the United States ground and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons and Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine had completed transfers of all tactical nuclear weapons to Russia [5]. Critics are quick to point out several problems with the initiative, however. Since it is not legally binding, either side can withdraw without notice. Further, with no verication mechanism, the initiative leads to great uncertainty as to actual arsenals and disarmament progress. Finally, the initiative makes no attempt to restrict research and development of new tactical weapons, only to reduce the number of deployed weapons. Openings of this nature enable development eorts like the W61-11 (See Section 4.2) or the Bush Administrations Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Initiative. Ultimately, these critics claim that an agreement of this nature, made in good faith, should be used as a stepping stone to a binding treaty agreement, rather than as a replacement. To the chagrin of such critics, the issue of tactical weapon disarmament has since been largely ignored in favor of reducing strategic arsenals. In

vival is at risk [19]. Such a ruling could arguably include all use of tactical nuclear weapons. Further, the Nuclear Posture Review [24], in justifying the need for nuclear earth penetrators, implies that they are needed to combat several nonnuclear states. Historically, conventional penetrators like the GBU-28 and BLU-118, have seen most of their use in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to being against United States policy, the justication of a nuclear attack on a non-nuclear state would be extremely dicult in light of the International Courts ruling.

4.1.

Conventional Earth Penetrators

Among the most successful earth penetrating weapons to date is the GBU-28, developed during the Gulf War to destroy Iraqi command centers unreachable by conventional weapons. The weapon measures nineteen feet in length and only 14.5 inches in diameter and weighs 5000 pounds, including 650 pounds of tritonal explosive. Originally laser guided, it has since

been enhanced with Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) guidance, so that it may be used at higher altitude or with poor visibility [12]. Penetration ability is estimated at 100 feet (30m) in hard

4.

EARTH PENETRATING WEAPONS

sand or 20 feet (6m) in concrete. The GBU-28 proved extremely successful in the Gulf War.

In principle at least, an earth penetrating weapon is simple. A long slender heavy tube is dropped from high altitude and penetrates the ground by several meters. An explosion below the ground surface results in a seismic shock wave that reects o the earth-air boundary. This coupling eect results in considerably more energy being transferred to the underground target. In an above ground explosion, most energy is instead reected o the earth-air boundary. As a result, an explosion at the surface must be both very large and very well targeted to eectively damage a hardened underground target. Earth penetrating weapons are therefore not designed to penetrate deeply enough to reach the target, but simply deeply enough to benet from coupling with the ground. A number of new technologies, in addition to GPS guidance, have improved the abilities of conventional earth penetrators. First, depleted
238

U , a byproduct of nuclear power generation,

may be used in the weapon case. Uranium has a density twice that of iron and a Brinell hardness a full order of magnitude larger. Weapons made with depleted Uranium can therefore penetrate considerably deeper than weapons made from iron. Secondly, the advent of hard target smart fuses (HTSFs) [13] has led to weapons with dramatically improved detonation timing. In contrast to fuses on early earth penetrators, which consisted of contact fuses with timers, HTSFs are accelerometer based fuses which trigger detona-

tion after passing through a certain number of hard layers or voids. Such fuses are useful both in earth penetration, where they allow detonation at optimal penetration depths for ground coupling, as well as for bombing buildings, where they may count oors before detonating. Today, the BLU-118 has surpassed the GBU28 in eectiveness. By using thermobaric explosions which re in sequence, the BLU-118 is able to produce sustained and powerful shock waves, in contrast to the single sharp shockwave produced by the GBU-28. Unfortunately, its penetration ability remains limited to several meters of rock [17] and, even with coupling eects, it is unable to destroy targets buried hundreds of meters under the surface. Nuclear penetrators would produce much larger shock waves, possibly making them the only weapons capable of destroying deeply buried targets.

27 m) in hard sand [14]. Interestingly, after more than 50 years, earth penetrators are still limited to depths very close to these. For the next twenty years, there was little perceived need for earth penetrators. As nuclear weapons improved, the most powerful bombs of the day could be detonated at ground level and be more eective at destroying underground targets than streamlined earth penetrators. The tremendous degree of collateral damage these weapons would cause was seen as almost irrelevant by comparison to the nuclear war that would have warranted their use. One such weapon was the B53 gravity bomb, rst deployed in 1962 and still considered usable against bunkers until 1997, when it was supplanted by the B61-11 (see below). Originally conceived of as a city buster, the B53 had a yield of nine megatons, making it the most powerful weapon in the United States arsenal at

4.2.

Nuclear Earth Penetrators

the time of its introduction [6]. The B53, beThe application of nuclear weapons in hard target penetration was realized early on. The Mk-8 Light Case, also known as the Elsie, was developed for the Navy in the early 1950s and later adapted for the Air Force as the Mk-11. It was a simple gun-type gravity bomb much like Little Boy repackaged in an earth penetrating case [2] and wired with a delayed action fuse for earth penetration. Penetration claims vary, but it has been claimed to achieve depths of 22 ft (7 m) in concrete and between 40 and 90 ft (12 to ing a large bomb, can be delivered by a B-52 bomber, a vulnerable low-ying plane, but not by the more stealthy B-2. In the absence of nuclear war, the tremendous collateral damage and diculty of delivery make the B53 eectively unusable. As a result, its use as a tactical weapon produces no credible threat. The W86, a nuclear penetrator based on the B61 bomb, was developed in the late 1970s for the Carter administration, but the project was canceled when the primary target of the Persh-

ing II missile was switched from underground bunkers to surface-based missile launchers [2]. Instead, the W85, with a dialable yield from 5 to 50kT and also based on the W61, was installed on a maneuverable reentry vehicle and mounted in Pershing II missiles where it served an intermediate range strategic role. Ironically, following the withdrawal of these missiles in accordance with the INF treaty (see Section 3), the W85 warheads were modied into B61-11 earth penetrators [16] (see below). During the Reagan administration, research began on an earth penetrating ICBM warhead. This would require a steerable reentry vehicle that could impact the ground at a suciently slowed speed and at the proper angle. The

the B61-11s penetrating ability is no better than that of its conventional forerunners, with a penetration depth of seven meters. It should be noted that the B61-11 was developed despite a prohibition of developing low yield nuclear weapons (less than ve kilotons) in United States weapons labs. This prohibition was included in the 1994 defense authorization bill and signed into law by President Clinton [15]. The Department of Defense insists that the B6111 is not a new weapon, but rather a repackaging of the old B61-7 physics package with new fusing and a new case, so this restriction does not apply to it. Many critics disagree with this claim, arguing that the weapon provides a new capability and is therefore a new weapon. To say otherwise, they argue, undermines nonproliferation eorts. Consequently, the quiet development of the B61-11 was loudly protested by groups such as the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists [2] and the Los Alamos Study Group [19]. Further, development and deployment of the B61-11 were rushed to completion, much to the chagrin of the projects critics. In April of 2005, the B61-11 was referenced by the Pentagon with respect to a suspected chemical weapons factory in Libya. One spokesman pointed out that while no conventional weapon could destroy the plant from the air, the B61-11, which would be deployed before the factorys completion, would be able to [19]. The thinly veiled threat, criticized in diplomatic circles as a violation of the United

project was abandoned after several years, but an oshoot project to develop a cruise missile carrying a B61 bomb persisted until the Cold War ended and the need for such a capability vanished [2]. When the Nuclear Posture Review of 1994 recommended replacing the B53, largely citing safety issues with the weapons outdated security measures, funds were requested to begin the development of an earth penetrating form of the B61, widely considered the most versatile nuclear weapon in the United States arsenal. The resulting weapon was the B61-11, essentially a B61-7 in an earth penetrating package. The

yield is assumed to be dialable from .3 to 340 kT [2], matching that of the B61-7. Unfortunately,

States policy against rst strikes, was later retracted by the Pentagon. Most recently, the current Bush administration has pushed the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator initiative with the intent of developing a weapon to supplant the B61-11 in destroying hardened underground targets. Following the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, a study was begun in April 2002 under the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy to evaluate the production of a new weapon with penetrating ability superior to that of B61-11. While the project originally proposed the development of a new low yield weapon, it is increasingly turning to modication of existing bombs. Livermore and Los Alamos are taking part in the project, modifying the B83 and B61 respectively.

Weapons [20], producing an equivalent underground shockwave to that created by an earth penetrating weapon would require the contact burst of a weapon with yield tens of times higher. Figure 2 presents the eective yield factor (as compared to a contact burst) as a function of the ratio of depth of burst to weapon yield. For instance, a 300kT weapon detonated at just 3 meters below ground has a ground-shock coupling factor of 20, indicating that the contact burst of a 6MT weapon would produce the same shockwave damage below ground. The size of these equivalency factors oers some insight into the importance of underground detonation. The vibrational eects of these shockwaves may be sucient to devastate nearby tunnel networks and heavy equipment. Fordens analysis [10] of the 1960 GNOME shot (a 3.1kT

5.

FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATORS

weapon detonated underground by the Plowshare Project with the intent of testing peaceful applications of nuclear weapons) reveals that a 1kT weapon detonated at a depth of just

5.1.

Penetration and Destructive Capability

While most hardened underground targets are buried at a depth of several hundred meters, an earth penetrator need not reach nearly this depth. As with a conventional weapon, the

30m could eectively destroy heavy equipment (large fermentation tanks, generators, and motors) within approximately 160m of the blast. Objects of this size are sensitive to extremely low frequency vibrations, on the order of 10Hz, which the GNOME shot data reveals to be prevalent in a nuclear explosion. Lighter equipment, requiring higher frequencies to cause extensive damage, is far less susceptible to shockwave damage at these distances.

shockwave from a below-ground nuclear explosion is reected o the earth-air boundary and the resulting coupling enhances the destructive power of the shockwave. As calculated

by the National Academies Committee on the Eects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other

FIG. 2: Eective yield factors due to coupling for nuclear weapon detonation below ground. Yields are normalized to a contact burst. Note that negative depth corresponds to above ground detonation. Figure adapted from [20]

In a nuclear airburst, however, it is the emitted heat and light (soft x-rays) that are responsible for most of the resulting devastation. As Eden [8] describes in Whole World on Fire, a nuclear detonation causes a restorm that expands rapidly and can consume areas far from the blast zone of the explosion. These eects are equally signicant in an underground explosion where they rst serve to vaporize a large spherical cavity in the rock. Beyond this cavity, the intense heat causes a network of cracks and ruptures to expand horizontally outward as well as slightly downward. Examination of the rupture zone formed after underground nuclear

testing reveals that much of the rock is charred [10], possibly from a restorm like those that follow airbursts. While a facility on a platform suspended by shock absorbers is far less susceptible to shockwave damage (Forden points out that this technique is used in Minuteman missile silos), it remains highly vulnerable to rupture. However, since the rupture zone does not extend far vertically, burying a facility at several hundred meters is sucient to avoid damage from this eect. The rupture zone, particularly with the possibility of a restorm, remains eective against shallow tunnel networks, such as those leading into

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underground bunkers and storage facilities. With this in mind, one must consider how deep a nuclear weapon can realistically penetrate. In order to preserve the integrity of the weapon payload, the impact velocity must be limited. In the case of a nuclear weapon, this limit is approximately three kilometers per second [22]. For these speeds, the theory of long-rod penetration approximates the ratio of the maximum penetration depth, D, to penetrator length, L, as proportional to penetrator density and weakly dependent on penetrator yield strength: p Y p D ln L t Y t (1)

Long rod penetration (1) is used as an order of magnitude approximation to understand the approximate eects of changing casing materials or targets. Using Youngs formula (2), Table I estimates the maximum penetration depth in various mediums of three variants of the W86 [20]. As described in 4.2, the W86 nuclear earth penetrator was designed in the 1970s but never built. Calculations reveal that the optimized design of the W86 would be capable of penetrating about seven meters in hard rock. The B61-11 earth penetrator, with a dialable yield from 300 tons to 340 kilotons, is also claimed to achieve penetration depths of about seven meters. Earth penetration may generally be improved in two ways: increasing the length of the weapon or increasing the impact velocity. Weapon size is strictly limited by delivery capability. Indeed, one advantage of the B61-11 is that its size allows for delivery by B-2A bombers or F-16 ghters [2]. Impact velocity for a gravity bomb is gen(2) =

in which is density, Y is yield strength and p and t refer to penetrator and target [22]. From long-rod penetration, the ratio of penetration depth to weapon length is typically on the order of ten for iron penetrators impacting hard rock. This is typically an overestimate. A much more complete model of penetration is given by Youngs Empirical Equation [20] D = Ks SN m A
0.7

(Vs 30.5)

erally limited to the terminal velocity achieved from free fall. In theory, a rocket could be red before impact to increase this speed, but the sudden deceleration at impact must not be sufcient to destroy the payload. Nuclear weapons are particularly sensitive to this impact due to the importance of maintaining a symmetrical pit and properly timing the conventional explosives to form a spherical inward shockwave. Consequently, deceleration is limited to approximately

where D is penetration depth (m),

0.0000175, m is penetrator mass (kg), A is crosssectional area (m2 ), Vs is impact velocity (m/s), N is a function of nose parameters, Ks is a scaling factor dependent on m and the type of target material (soil or rock), and S is an empirical constant dependent on the target material. When considering the penetration depth of a weapon, Youngs empirical formula (2) is generally used.

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Weapon Strategic EPW Strategic EPW Strategic EPW Target S N m (kg) A (m2 ) Vs (m/s) D (m) 411 411 411 184 184 184 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.107 0.107 0.107 700 1200 1500 1000 1500 1500 500 500 500 3.7 11.1 86 7.2 18.7 115 7.5 12.8 79

Medium Strength Rock 0.76 0.85 Low Strength Rock Silty Clay 1.30 0.85 8.00 0.85

Low-Yield EPW Medium Strength Rock 0.76 1.00 Low-Yield EPW Low Strength Rock Low-Yield EPW Silty Clay 1.30 1.00 8.00 1.00

Optimized EPW Medium Strength Rock 0.76 1.00 2668 Optimized EPW Low Strength Rock Optimized EPW Silty Clay 1.30 1.00 2668 8.00 1.00 2668

TABLE I: Estimated penetration depths of W86 earth penetrator variants, calculated using Youngs empiricle formula (2). Table adapted from [20].

10,000g [20]. In practice this means that increasing impact velocity is not a possibility. (In fact, some weapons must use parachutes for this reason, particularly when fused for laydown.)

5.2.

Fallout

Airburst nuclear explosions are associated with large amounts of radioactive fallout over large areas, particularly in dust within their character-

Ultimately we may conclude that hard rock penetration may be feasible to a depth of several dozen meters, (The Robust Earth Penetrator Initiative aims for 80 feet of penetration, about 25 meters [17].) We will see in section 5.2 that even this generous estimate of future capabilities is insucient for containing fallout. However, these seemingly miniscule depths (as compared to the several hundred meters below ground that one expects to nd targets) are sucient to enable large degrees of ground coupling, producing devastating shockwaves. While this shockwave may damage large equipment hundreds of meters below, rupturing ground and ash re at the level of the burst may be eective at destroying tunnels and other surface linkages to the buried target.

istic mushroom clouds. These radioactive particles, measuring 10m to 20m are dispersed by wind and may take months to settle globally, leading to the term world-wide fallout. Conceivably, an underground detonation could reduce this fallout by restricting it to within the cavity. In addition to worldwide fallout, surface and underground detonations produce local fallout composed of larger particles ranging from 100m to several mm. These larger particles settle

quickly - on the order of days - and settle over tens to hundreds of kilometers. Underground detonations are further aected by base surge, a uid ow of large solid particles outward from the crater. [22] Nuclear tests in the Nevada desert were largely conducted underground, providing a consider-

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FIG. 3: Cavity formation from detonation of a 1kT nuclear weapon at various depths (indicated in feet) below ground level. Notice that, for this relatively low yield weapon, a large crater forms at detonation levels less than approximately 550ft (170m), accompanied by radioactive fallout. Figure from [22]

able knowledge base for understanding cavity formation. Figure 3 shows the eects of detonating a 1kT nuclear weapon at various depths. Notice that a depth of 550ft (170m) is necessary to prevent the ejection of radioactive material into the surrounding environment [22]. At depths measured in tens of meters, the reball itself is likely to breach the surface. Like a low level airburst, local fallout will likely be extremely high. Further understanding of the eects of relatively shallow depth detonation comes from the Plowshare program, initiated with the intent of applying nuclear weapons to peaceful uses. The previously mentioned GNOME shot was the

rst Plowshare detonation. It was followed by the more famous Sedan test, performed in the Nevada test site with a 104kT weapon at a depth of more than 600 feet (180 m). The Sedan test was intended to determine the ecacy of using nuclear weapons for excavation and the resulting crater, shown in Figure 4, is a testament to the weapons ability to move earth. The ejection of 12 million tons of rock produced a crater 320 feet (100 m) deep and 1,280 feet (370 m) across and the radioactive debris plume reached an altitude of 12,000 feet (3.7 km). Nelson [22] claims that roughly half of the radioactivity produced in the Plowshare tests was

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released, with the other half contained in the cavity. This release took the form of local fallout and a base surge which spread for more than a mile. Nelson also points out that even if a weapon were somehow capable of burrowing suciently far as to contain its fallout (recall the estimate of 550 ft for a 1kT weapon), it would likely vent radioactive material through its entry hole. The earlier mentioned GNOME shot demonstrated this phenomenon when its entry shaft failed to collapse properly and instead vented radioactive steam for several hours. Certainly, the Sedan test must be viewed in light of the fact that the conguration of the weapon was intended to produce a crater, but the weapon involved had a yield less than the maximum yield of a W61-11 and was buried at a depth several orders of magnitude deeper than the W61-11 is capable of reaching. In light of this evidence, it is unlikely that a nuclear earth penetrator may be used without producing extensive local fallout, though worldwide fallout may be limited. Lindon Brooks, chief of the National Nuclear Security Administration, understands this and maintains that the Bush administration does as well. In testimony on March 2, 2005, he stated, I really must apologize for the my lack of precision if we in the administration have suggested that it was possible to have a bomb that penetrated far enough to trap all fallout... I dont believe the laws of physics will ever let that be true. [3] A common claim of some proponents of nuclear earth penetrators is increased ability to destroy chemical and biological agents stored in underground facilities targeted by the weapon. Since the coupled shockwave produced by the explosion would likely rupture storage or fermentation tanks, it is important to understand the eect on these agents if an attack is to be planned on such a facility. A nuclear weapon could conceivably neutralize agents through intense radiation or heat. As described in section 5.1, the nuclear earth penetrator is also quite distant from its target, reaching only tens of meters (generously) into the ground. Nelson [21] points out that neutron and gamma radiation produced by a nuclear explosion can5.3. Chemical and Biological Agent Destruction FIG. 4: The Sedan crater produced by a 104kT nuclear weapon burried 635 feet below ground. The crater is 320 feet deep and 1,280 feet across. The radioactive dust cloud reached an altitude of 12,000 feet.

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800K 1000K 1500K Sarin VX 20s 0.7s 1s .01s 0.01s .0001s

fuel air explosive (FAE) could be quite eective in destroying biological weapons, but this argument only holds if an FAE can be introduced to the system, as is likely not the case for a buried facility. Levi also grants that a facility of this nature may not contain sucient oxygen

Mustard 0.03s 0.002s 0.00005s TABLE II: Necessary times at various temperatures to neutralize 99.999% of chemical agents. Table from [18].

not penetrate more than a few meters through rock and is therefore impotent against chemical or biological agents in a facility below. Extreme temperature is thus the most feasible means by which agents may be neutralized. We rst consider the temperatures and times necessary to destroy chemical and biological weapon samples. Table II summarize this information for several chemical agents of particular concern. Neutralizing chemical agents is generally far more dicult than destroying biological agents, and consequently 1,500K, the temperature necessary to neutralize 99.999% of sarin in 10ms, is often quoted as the necessary temperature for destroying chemical and biological agents. Levi [18] points out that non-viral, non-spore-forming organisms can be 99.999% destroyed in milliseconds at temperatures below 400K (120o C). Even for spore-forming organisms such as anthrax, temperatures of 510K (240o C) may achieve 99.999% neutralization in ve milliseconds. The destruction of spores, however, is critically dependent on spore conditions. The temperature quoted above corresponds to the worst case scenario of dry heat and dry spores. From this, Levi [18] argues that a conventional

for consumption by a fuel air explosive. A conventional weapon of this nature is a reasonable option for attacks on above ground plants that must be penetrated then neutralized, such as the suspected chemical weapons plant in Libya which was threatened with attack from a B6111 (see Section 4.2). It may also be a reasonable follow-up to a nuclear attack on a buried facility. Based on data from the Ranier underground test of a 1.7kT weapon, the air temperature in the cavity left by detonation is estimated as 1,500K for the rst several minutes following the explosion. This temperature decays to ambient within two to three cavity radii [21]. Not surprisingly, the nuclear penetrator will neither heat nor irradiate agents at the level of the facility. However, any materials ejected through the chimney formed by the explosion will be exposed to these extreme temperatures for several milliseconds, which should be adequate to destroy most biological agents. Destruction of chemical weapons is much less certain, but these are generally considered more easily contained and therefore pose a somewhat smaller (but still very signicant) risk to the nearby populace. It is of course possible that agents will remain

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in the facility, liberated from their storage tanks but not ejected through the hot cavity. These unneutralized agents will leak out over time, posing a threat. As such, a nuclear detonation is far from a complete solution in the destruction of an underground agent storage facility and its contents. When considering the issue of neutralizing chemical and biological agents, this analysis reveals that the two must be treated very dierently. Many critics of nuclear penetrators dismiss their neutralizing ability as absurd, citing the necessary sustained temperatures to destroy a chemical weapon such as sarin, but neglecting to mention the much cooler temperatures needed to destroy biological weapons. As with all weapon systems, an imperfect ability is afforded by a nuclear earth penetrator and it is critical that military planners have an accurate assessment of the actual capabilities of these weapons prior to considering their use. The use of this weapon on a facility under the assumption that it can neutralize an agent stored there could potentially be disastrous, but at the same time the potential use in neutralization should not be ignored. As such, intelligence gathering is crucial to the eective use of a nuclear penetrator. Ultimately, a nuclear earth penetrator may provide only part of the solution. Follow-up attacks with fuel air explosives or similar conventional weapons may be necessary to completely decontaminate an area.

6.

CONCLUSIONS

Evidence is strong that a nuclear earth penetrator such as the W61-11 or the proposed Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator can eectively damage hardened underground facilities through a coupled shockwave and destroy shallow tunnel networks through ground rupture. While this is not unlike conventional penetrators like the GBU-28 or BLU-118, a nuclear penetrator can be expected to function on much more deeply buried targets. Ground coupling makes the use of small nuclear weapons eective so that fallout may be minimized, but not eliminated, as the weapon simply cannot penetrate deeply enough to achieve complete containment. A nuclear penetrator may also be capable of destroying most biological and some chemical agents liberated by the explosion, though such neutralization would be generally incomplete. Two questions arise from this analysis. First, is a nuclear earth penetrator a usable weapon? Second, is the gain from adding a new nuclear penetrator to the arsenal worth the political losses? While a nuclear penetrator may be more effective in certain situations (destroying deeply buried targets and more completely neutralizing biological and chemical agents) than its conventional equivalent, it also introduces unavoidable fallout and could potentially release unneutralized biological or chemical agents. In attacking

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a facility in an unpopulated region, these risks may be acceptable. In a populated area, however, the risk of civilian casualties may make the nuclear option unpalatable. A low-yield tactical nuclear weapon such as the B61-11 does make the threat of use considerably more real. While an enemy state

load at ground level. The low level to which its yield may be adjusted also makes the B6111 a credible threat. As such, it is a reasonable weapon to have in the arsenal for consideration in missions unachievable with conventional penetrators. The need for a new nuclear earth penetrator is far less clear. Some proposals call for

likely recognizes that the United States cannot attack it with standard nuclear weapons, it may have to consider the threat of small nuclear weapons capable of destroying central command and weapon bunkers with minimal collateral damage. The existance of a credible threat may prove more useful than the weapon itself. Any attack, however, would likely vio-

weapons with yields as low as ten tons. It is difcult to imagine a nuclear weapon more likely to see actual use, assuming it can penetrate deeply enough to be useful. This credibility is exactly what worries many opponents of the project, who feel that the use of a nuclear weapon is something to be avoided at all costs, citing impaired disarmament eorts and increased use of nuclear weapons in the future. Whether or not the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator weapon project proceeds, the current arsenal already oers these risks. The most significant political damage would come as a result of breaking the self-imposed bans on new weapon development and nuclear testing, though modication of existing weapons could, in a supercial way, avoid these problems. The Los Alamos Study Group claims that the development and certication of the B61-11 without testing undercuts [the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty] and could provide political cover to countries which have their own unsatised nuclear ambitions. [19] These concerns are reasonable and the continuation of nuclear weapon development,

late United States policy which, since 1978, has explicitly forbidden the use of nuclear weapons against signatories of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (with the exception of states allied with nuclear states engaged in acts of aggression) [2]. Further, it would break the nuclear taboo against the wartime use of nuclear weapons. Such political setbacks would certainly aect US status in global policy making and would have a particularly harsh eect on United States eorts towards international nuclear disarmament. The B61-11 nuclear earth penetrator is already present in the United States arsenal. Clearly, it is a superior alternative to the enormously powerful B53, claimed to be capable of destroying underground targets by detonating its 9MT pay-

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even in the form of modications, would likely have lasting eects on both nonproliferation and disarmament eorts. In light of recent Nuclear Posture Reviews, the quiet development of the B61-11, and the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Initiative, it appears that there is a strong movement to increase the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in the United States arsenal. In part, this is because a low yield weapon could potentially be used, but more importantly it is because enemies of the United States will believe it can be used. Ultimately, however, the political risks of actu-

ally using even a low yield weapon are likely too great. Like their strategic counterparts, tactical nuclear weapons will serve a purpose of deterrence; the existence of an earth penetrator may temporarily discourage the use of underground bunkers and storage facilities. For this purpose, and in the event that one must be used, it is important that these weapons be known to be functional and eective. Regardless of the politics of their construction or use, politics must not interfere with the understanding of the weapons actual capabilities.

[1] Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, The B61 Family of Bombs, www.thebulletin.org/article nn.php? art ofn=jf03norris. [2] Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, New Bomb, No Mission, www.thebulletin.org/article.php? art ofn=mj97mello [3] Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 2005 Archives, www.thebulletin.org/weblog/archives/2005/03/ [4] The Brookings Institution, www.brook.edu. [5] Center Brieng for Arms on Control and Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons,

control/npt/chron.htm. [10] Forden, Georey, USA Looks at Nuclear Role in Bunker Busting. Janes Intelligence Review, March 12, 2002. www.janes.com/press/pc020312 1.shtml [11] George Bush Presidential Library and Mu-

seum, Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons, bushli-

brary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1991/ 91092704.html. [12] GlobalSecurity.org, Enhanced Guided Bomb Unit

Book

Tactical

(EGBU)-28, www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ munitions/gbu-28e.htm [13] GlobalSecurity.org Hard Target Smart Fuze [HTSF], www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/ fmu-157.htm

www.armscontrolcenter.org/prolifproject/tnw/. [6] Center for Defense Information United States Arsensal, www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/database/ usnukes.html#b53 [7] Congressional Research Service, Bunker Busters:

[14] GlobalSecurity.org

MK.8

Light

Casee,

Sources of Confusion in the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Debate, http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/ resources/20040922 crs rnep confusion.pdf [8] Eden, Lynn, Whole World on Fire. Cornell University Press, 2004. [9] Federation of American Scientists, Nuclear Non-

www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/mk8.htm [15] GlobalSecurity.org Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/rnep.htm

[16] GlobalSecurity.org W85, www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/w [17] Koch, Andrew, The Bunker Buster Nightmare Goes Nuclear, Popular Science. October, 2002. [18] Levi, Michael A., Written Statement of before The Na-

Proliferation Treaty Chronology, www.fas.org/nuke/

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tional Academy of Sciences Study on the Eects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator Weapon and Other Weapons, www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/fellows/ levi20040427.pdf [19] Los cerns Alamos and Study Background, Group, B61-11 10, Con1997. clear Weapons, Federation of American Scientists.

www.fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n1/weapons.htm [23] Union of Concerned Scientists, Earth Penetrating

Weapons, www.ucsusa.org/global security/ nuclear weapons/page.cfm?pageID=777. [24] United States Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr95/npr .html. of Nu-

February

www.lasg.org/archive/1997/b61-11.htm [20] National clear Academies Earth-Penetrator Press, and Eects Other

Weapons, APPENDIX A: EDITING NOTE Busters

www.nap.edu/books/0309096731/html [21] Nelson, Robert W., Nuclear Bunker

Would More Likely Disperse Than Destroy Buried Stockpiles of Biological and Chemical Agents,

The formatting of this document causes it to appear shorter than it actually is (approximately 25 standard Word pages).

www.princeton.edu/ rnelson/papers/agent defeat.pdf [22] Nelson, Robert W., Low Yield Earth-Penetrating Nu-