J.

DUERLINGER

VASUBANDHUS PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF THE  IPUTR IYAS THEORY OF PERSONS (II) VATS

INTRODUCTION

This is the second of three articles in which Vasubandhus philosophical critique of the Vtsputryas inexplicablist theory of persons is a reconstructed and assessed.1 The critique appears in the Refutation   of the Theory of a Self (Atmavadapratisedha), which is his prose . addendum to his Treasury of Knowledge (Abhidharmakosa). The set of objections to their theory with which I am concerned is a philosophical critique in the sense that Vasubandhu attempts in it to use logic (tarka) to demonstrate that the theory is not reasonable (na yukta) rather than  simply to show that it contradicts scripture (agama). My reconstruction of this critique is a logically perspicuous formulation of the arguments  it contains which reveal the theses (siddhanta-s) upon which they are based. The purposes of my reconstruction are the recovery of the theses of the theories of persons of Vasubandhu and the Vtsputryas and an a assessment of the extent to which Vasubandhus critique is successful. In this second article I shall begin the process of recovering the major theses of the Vtsputryas theory of persons. In the third I shall coma plete this process and then list the major theses of Vasubandhus theory. A thorough philosophical discussion of the substantive issues recovered by my investigation will be undertaken elsewhere. In the rst article I reconstructed and assessed Vasubandhus objection from the two realities to the inexplicablist theory, the Vtsputryas a reply from aggregate reliance to this objection, Vasubandhus causal objection to this reply, the Vtsputryas re and fuel reply to the a causal objection, and the Vtsputryas middle way argument for their a theory.2 To facilitate a summary of the results of my investigation in  the rst article I shall list the theses of the Vatsputryas theory of persons (VTP) which come into play in the part of the critique with which the rst article was concerned. For each of these theses I have created a descriptive name so that references to it may be made which will help the reader recall its content. The rst four are as follows:
Journal of Indian Philosophy 26: 573605, 1998. c 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

574 VTP(i) VTP(ii) VTP(iii) VTP(iv)

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The reality thesis: we possess real existence.3 The nonotherness thesis: we are not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from aggregates. 4 The nonsameness thesis: we are not reducible in existence to aggregates.5 The reliance thesis: we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates.6

In the objection from the two realities Vasubandhu argues that since what possesses real existence is either an ultimate reality or a conventional reality,7 the nonsameness thesis is false if the reality thesis is true.8 The Vtsputryas reply from aggregate reliance is that we are a neither ultimate realities nor conventional realities, since the reliance thesis is true. In his causal objection to this reply Vasubandhu argues that since the reliance thesis is inconsistent with the nonsameness thesis it remains true that the nonsameness thesis is false if the reality thesis is true.9 The Vtsputryas re and fuel reply to the causal objection a is an attempt to show that the reliance thesis is consistent with both the nonotherness and nonsameness theses. Vasubandhus critique of the re and fuel reply is intended to show that this attempt fails. I include here a full reconstruction of the objection from the two realities (OTR) which more accurately captures its form than the reconstruction presented in the rst article. According to the Vtsputryas, a OTR(i) We possess real existence.

However, Vasubandhu argues, OTR(ii) If we possess real existence, we are entities which possess by ourselves single natures and are conceived on the basis of our possession of these natures or we are collections of different kinds of such entities and are conceived on the basis of these collections. If we are entities which possess by ourselves single natures and are conceived on the basis of our possession of these natures, we are ultimate realities. If we are collections of different kinds of such entities and are conceived on the basis of these collections, we are conventional realities.

OTR(iii)

OTR(iv)

Therefore, from OTR(i), OTR(ii), OTR(iii) and OTR(iv) we may infer that

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OTR(v)

We are ultimate realities or we are conventional realities.

In the text Vasubandhu argues that if we are ultimate realities, we are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from aggregates, since we shall possess a different nature than possessed by any of the aggregates. But why this should be true he does not explain. He is assuming, I believe, that the nature on the basis of which we are conceived if we are ultimate realities is not possessed by any of the phenomena included among the aggregates. The nature he has in mind I shall take to be that of being an owner or possessor of aggregates which employs the aggregates to perceive objects, think thoughts, perform actions and experience the results of actions. But an entity possessed of such a nature, he believes, is not found among the aggregates themselves. Hence, to bring out more fully the premises of this argument, we may add the following assumption: OTR(vi) We are ultimate realities if and only if we are owners or possessors of aggregates we use to perceive objects, think thoughts, perform actions and experience the results of actions.

However, OTR(vii) We are owners or possessors of aggregates we use to perceive objects, think thoughts, perform actions and experience the results of actions if and only if we are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from aggregates.

Therefore, from OTR(vi) and OTR(vii) we may infer that OTR(viii) We are ultimate realities if and only if we are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from aggregates. The argument in the text proceeds on the assumption that OTR(ix) If we are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from aggregates, we are either causally conditioned phenomena or causally unconditioned phenomena.

Since the Vtsputryas do not provide an account of what our causes a are, he also assumes that they accept the following: OTR(x) We are not causally conditioned phenomena.

a Moreover, he argues that the Vtsputryas, like all other Buddhists, reject the Forders view that we are causally unconditioned phenomena

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on the ground that if we were, we could not, as we can, be affected by anything or produce effects (nisprayojanatvam). So Vasubandhu . believes that the Vtsputryas accept an argument of the following a sort: OTR(xi) If we are causally unconditioned phenomena, we do not suffer in cyclic existence and cannot bring about our noncyclic existence.

However, OTR(xii) We suffer in cyclic existence and can bring about our non-cyclic existence.

Therefore, from OTR(xi) and OTR(xii) we may infer that OTR(xiii) We are not causally unconditioned phenomena. Therefore, from OTR(ix), OTR(x) and OTR(xiii) we may infer that OTR(xiv) We are not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from aggregates. Therefore, from OTR(viii) and OTR(xiv) we may infer that OTR(xv) We are not ultimate realities.

Therefore, from OTR(v) and OTR(xv) we may infer that OTR(xvi) We are conventional realities. However, OTR(xvii) We are conventioned realities if and only if we are reducible in existence to aggregates. Therefore, from OTR(xvi) and OTR(xvii) we may infer that OTR(xviii) We are reducible in existence to aggregates. a But if OTR(xviii) is true, the nonsameness thesis of the Vtsputryas theory of persons is false. Hence, from the assumption that the reality thesis of the Vtsputryas theory of persons is true, Vasubandhu infers a that we are reducible in existence to aggregates. This is Vasubandhus root objection to the Vtsputryas theory of persons. The point of a putryas only alternative to adopting the objection is that the Vts a Vasubandhus own theory of persons is to accept that of the Forders, and they do not accept that of the Forders. So how can we possess real existence if we are not reducible in existence to aggregates?

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a The Vtsputryas reply from aggregate reliance to this objection is to deny that OTR(v) is true. They argue that we are neither ultimate realities nor conventional realities, since we are conceived in reliance    ~ upon aggregates (skandhanupadaya pudgalah prajnapyate). In this . reply, I believe, the Vtsputryas assume the following to be true: a VTP(v) The reliance denition: we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates if and only if (a) we do not possess by ourselves a nature or natures on the basis of which we are conceived, (b) if we do not possess by ourselves a nature or natures on the basis of which we are conceived, we are neither clearly and distinctly separable in existence from aggregates nor reducible in existence to aggregates, and (c) aggregates are the cause of the conception of ourselves.

The denial that we are ultimate realities or conventional realities may now be derived. From VTP(iv) and VTP(v) we may infer the following three theses: VTP(vi) The nonessentialist thesis: we do not possess by ourselves a nature or natures on the basis of which we are conceived.10 The nonessentialist implication: if we do not possess by ourselves a nature or natures on the basis of which we are conceived, we are neither clearly and distinctly separable in existence from aggregates nor reducible in existence to aggregates. The causal basis thesis: aggregates are the cause of the conception of ourselves.

VTP(vii)

VTP(viii)

From VTP(vi) and VTP(vii) we may infer both the nonotherness and nonsameness theses, and from the nonotherness thesis, the nonsameness thesis, OTR(viii) and OTR(xvii) we may infer that we are neither ultimate realities nor conventional realities.11 Vasubandhus objection to the reply from aggregate reliance is directed against the incomplete statement it receives in the text. Because the Vtsputryas do not explain what the reliance thesis means, Vasubandhu a assumes that the reliance thesis has the same meaning as the causal basis thesis. His objection is that if we are conceived in this way in reliance upon aggregates, we are reducible in existence to aggregates, since the object of the conception of ourselves is the same as its cause. 12 I call this his causal objection because in it he interprets the reliance

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thesis in accord with what I shall call the causal principle, which is that the object of a conception is always the cause of the conception.13 The Vtsputryas reply by presenting an analogy which is intended a to show that the reliance, nonotherness and nonsameness theses of their theory of persons can all be true, and hence, that the causal principle upon which Vasubandhus objection is based is false. The analogy is that re is conceived in reliance upon fuel without being either clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel or reducible in existence to fuel. Because this re and fuel reply, as I call it, is the target of the set of objections I shall reconstruct and assess in the present article, I shall repeat here, with a few minor modications, the reconstruction I gave it in the rst paper. I shall once again add descriptive names for the crucial premises of this reply, as well as for the crucial arguments and premises of all subsequent objections and replies. The re and fuel reply (FFR), in its full reconstruction, is made up of four component arguments. The rst is the reliance argument, which is not actually formulated in the text, but may be assumed on the basis of the replies the Vtsputryas will make to Vasubandhus objections a to the reply. This argument begins with the denition of re: FFR(i) Fire is what causes fuel to burn.

To this premise we may add that FFR(ii) If re is what causes fuel to burn, re is conceived in reliance upon fuel.14

Therefore, from FFR(i) and FFR(ii) we may infer the reliance premise with which the Vtsputryas statement of the re and fuel reply a explicitly begins in the text: FFR(iii) Fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel.15

In support of the view that re is not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel the Vtsputryas present the nonotherness argument. a They argue that if re is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel, fuel which is burning is not hot, which is absurd. This argument is based on three assumptions the rst two of which I reconstruct as follows: FFR(iv) If re is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel, the heat which burns fuel does not unite16 with fuel which is burning.17 If the heat which burns fuel does not unite with fuel which is burning, fuel which is burning is not hot.

FFR(v)

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The third assumption of the argument is the fuel premise: FFR(vi) Fuel which is burning is hot. a From FFR(iv), FFR(v) and FFR(vi) the Vtsputryas infer the nonotherness premise of the reply: FFR(vii) Fire is not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel.

In support of the nonsameness premise of the reply the Vtsputryas a present the nonsameness argument, which is that if re is reducible in existence to fuel, fuel causes itself to burn, which is absurd. FFR(viii) FFR(ix) If re is reducible in existence to fuel and re is what causes fuel to burn, fuel causes fuel to burn.18 Fuel does not cause fuel to burn.19

Therefore, from FFR(viii), FFR(i) and FFR(ix) we may infer the nonsameness premise of the re and fuel reply. FFR(x) Fire is not reducible in existence to fuel. a At this point the Vtsputryas believe that they have provided an example of something besides ourselves which is conceived in reliance upon something else without being clearly and distinctly separable in existence from it or reducible in existence to it. To show exactly how the reply fully answers the causal objection we need to add two further arguments to this reconstruction of the re and fuel reply. The rst pertains to re and fuel: FFR(xi) If re is not reducible in existence to fuel, fuel is not the object of the conception of re.

Therefore, from FFR(x) and FFR(xi) we may infer, FFR(xii) Fuel is not the object of the conception of re.

Therefore, from FFR(iii) and FFR(xii) we may infer, FFR(xiii) Fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel and fuel is not the object of the conception of re.

Since re being conceived in reliance upon fuel is for fuel to cause the conception of re, FFR(xiii) by itself constitutes a counter-example to the causal principle upon which the causal objection is based. The second argument pertains to ourselves and aggregates. According to the analogy,

580 FFR(xiv)

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If re is conceived in reliance upon fuel and fuel is not the object of the conception of re, we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates and aggregates are not the object of the conception of ourselves.20

However, FFR(xv) If we are conceived in reliance upon aggregates and aggregates are not the object of the conception of ourselves, then the object of the conception of ourselves is not the same as the cause of the conception of ourselves.

Therefore, from FFR(xiii), FFR(xiv) and FFR(xv) we may infer that FFR(xvi) The object of the conception of ourselves is not the same as the cause of the conception of ourselves.21

But if FFR(xvi) is true, Vasubandhus causal principle is false. The Vtsputryas argument from the middle way for their theory of a persons is modelled after the re and fuel reply. It is the argument that both the reliance and nonotherness theses of their theory of persons are true, since otherwise the reicationist theory of persons would be true, which it is not, and that both the reliance and nonsameness theses of their theory are true, since otherwise the nihilist theory of persons would be true, which it is not. In the rst article I suggested that they believe that the nihilist theory would be true because they think that an agent which appropriates aggregates possesses real existence and that we are correctly conceived to be appropriators of aggregates.22 On the basis of the use I assume it has in the Vtsputryas argument a from the middle way for the inexplicability of ourselves I shall add to their theory of persons the following thesis: VTP(ix) The appropriator thesis: we are correctly conceived to be appropriators of aggregates.

And since Vasubandhus objections to the Vtsputryas re and fuel a reply will also concern its consistency with two further theses he assumes to be part of their theory of persons, it will be convenient to add these two theses now:

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VTP(x) VTP(xi)

The nondependence thesis: we do not exist in dependence upon aggregates. The inexplicable identity thesis: we are correctly conceived to be the same over time and are neither permanent phenomena nor impermanent phenomena and we are not the same over time by way of being conceived to be so because the impermanent aggregates in reliance upon which we are conceived exist in a causal continuum.

Vasubandhus objections to the re and fuel reply do not take up the question of our unity. But for the sake of formulating a statement of the basic theses of their theory of persons we may also add the following thesis to their theory: VTP(xii) The inexplicable unity thesis: we are correctly conceived to be one and are not partless substances or one by way of being conceived to be so because the aggregates in reliance upon which we are conceived always arise together as a collection.

In what follows I shall refer to Vasubandhus specic objections to the re and fuel reply which concern the consequences the reply has for the Vtsputryas theory of persons as consequences. a
VASUBANDHUS CALL FOR ANALYSES OF FIRE AND FUEL

Vasubandhus critique begins with a call for explanations of re and fuel which will enable him to determine how the reliance premise of their reply is known to be true.
They must explain, rst of all, what fuel and re are so we shall know how [it is known that] re is conceived in reliance upon fuel. [They say that] fuel is what is burned and re is what burns it. [But these are mere conventional denitions which by themselves do not enable us to know what re and fuel are in themselves.] What is burned and what burns it are the very things we need to have explained [if it is to be known whether re is correctly conceived in reliance upon fuel].23

The Vtsputryas seem to be represented as holding the view that it is a known that the reliance premise is true because of the way in which re is conventionally dened. If re is dened as what burns fuel, re is known to be conceived in reliance upon fuel because it is dened by reference to fuel. But Vasubandhu objects that the conventional denitions of re and fuel do not, as analyses of re and fuel would, reveal the true natures of re and fuel; they merely tell us what they

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are by convention said to be, not what they are in themselves. Even if re is by denition what burns fuel, we still need an analysis of what burns fuel, and this is re. The point is that analyses of re and fuel may show that re does not in fact burn fuel. Vasubandhu and the Vtsputryas will disagree about how re and a fuel are to be analyzed. Vasubandhu will present a reduction analysis, while the Vtsputryas will present an agent and patient analysis. a Vasubandhu will argue that his own analysis shows not only that re does not in fact burn fuel, but also that it is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel and is impermanent. He will also argue that the Vtsputryas statement of their own agent and patient a analysis implies that re is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel, that re is not conceived in reliance upon fuel, and that re can cause fuel which is burning to be hot even if it is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel. To determine whether or not he is successful in the arguments he uses to support these beliefs is one of the objectives of my own inquiry into his critique of their re and fuel reply. Vasubandhu is correct that the conventional denitions of re and fuel need to be supplemented by metaphysical analyses of re and fuel if the re and fuel reply is to enable us to know that re is correctly conceived in reliance upon fuel. The conventional denition of re they present here was incorporated into my reconstruction of the re and fuel reply in order to explain why the Vtsputryas initially assert a the reliance premise to be true. In the rst article I also called upon the Vtsputryas agent and patient analysis of re and fuel in order a to help me to reconstruct the re and fuel reply. In this second article I shall try to determine whether or not their own analysis survives his critique of the re and fuel reply.
THE FIRST OBJECTION BASED ON REDUCTION ANALYSIS: THE OBJECTION FROM THE OTHERNESS OF FIRE

Vasubandhu presents three objections to the Vtsputryas re and fuel a reply on the basis of his own reduction analysis of re and fuel. In the rst, Vasubandhu argues that even if the reliance premise of the reply is true, analysis shows that its nonotherness premise is false.
It is commonly said that fuel is material24 which can burn but is not burning and that re is the burning [material] which burns fuel. [It is also commonly said that] a blazing, intensely hot re burns or ignites fuel in the sense that it brings about an alteration in its continuum. [But analysis shows that the] re and fuel [of which these things are said] are composed of the eight [elemental] substances, 25 and [also shows

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that] re arises in dependence upon fuel in the way that curds arise in dependence upon milk and sour [milk] upon sweet [milk]. So we say [that re is conceived] in reliance upon fuel, even though it is other than fuel by reason of existing at a different time [as a different collection of elements].

Vasubandhu acknowledges that in our everyday lives we conceive re to be an agent which produces burning as an alteration in fuel and fuel to be a continuum of elements in which this alteration can take place. Because we conceive re and fuel in this way, he grants, re is conceived in reliance upon fuel. But he does not thereby commit himself to view that re is being correctly conceived when it is conceived in this way. In fact, reduction analysis of re and fuel shows that re is not an agent which burns fuel and that fuel is not caused to burn by re. From the perspective of my reconstruction of the re and fuel reply, Vasubandhu implies that the conventional denition of re does not portray re as it really exists.26 Since Vasubandhu believes that the Vtsputryas denition of re a misrepresents the nature of re, when he grants that the reliance premise is true, he must be assuming that it is true because in everyday life re is incorrectly conceived in reliance upon fuel. Because in Vasubandhus objection his belief that the conventional denition of re misrepresents the nature of re is not made explicit, his statement of the objection hides the fact that he and the Vtsputryas assert the reliance premise a to be true for different reasons. In his view, although in everyday life re is conceived as what causes fuel to burn, re does not in fact cause fuel to burn, since re arises in dependence upon fuel. Vasubandhu illustrates how re arises in dependence upon fuel by reference to how curds arise in dependence upon milk and to how sour milk arises in dependence upon sweet milk. The reference assumes the correctness of reduction analysis of these analogues to re and fuel, and hence also implies that re is no more an agent which produces an alteration in a patient than curds produce an alteration in milk or sour milk produces an alteration in sweet milk. He believes that re arises in dependence upon fuel in the way that one collection of momentary elemental substances arises in dependence upon another. He assumes that what arises in dependence upon something else must be clearly and distinctly separable in existence from that in dependence upon which it arises, since he adopts the theories that all causally conditioned phenomena (samskrta-dharma-s) are momentary (ksanika) and that . . . . momentary phenomena, even those within a single causal continuum, are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from one another. I shall incorporate into the reconstruction of Vasubandhus argument, which I shall call the objection from the otherness of re (OOF),

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his assumption that re is conceived in reliance upon fuel because it is incorrectly conceived as the cause of the burning of fuel. My reconstruction begins with a statement of the ambiguity of the basis upon which the reliance premise is asserted: OOF(i) If re is correctly or incorrectly conceived in reliance upon fuel as what causes fuel to burn, re is conceived in reliance upon fuel.

To this premise we may add reduction analysis itself: OOF(ii) Fire is burning material reducible in existence to a collection of momentary substances which arises in dependence upon fuel and fuel is material which can burn and is reducible in existence to a collection of momentary substances which is a prior causal condition of the arising of re.

In the objection from the otherness of re Vasubandhu also assumes the truth of the denitional implication of reduction analysis: OOF(iii) If re is burning material reducible in existence to a collection of momentary substances which arises in dependence upon fuel and fuel is material which can burn and is reducible in existence to a collection of momentary substances which is a prior causal condition of the arising of re, then re is not what causes fuel to burn.

Therefore, from OOF(ii) and OOF(iii) we may infer Vasubandhus rejection of the denition of re: OOF(iv) Fire is not what causes fuel to burn.

But if OOF(iv) is true, the conventional denition of re is false. So we may take this part of the objection from the otherness of re to imply that the reliance argument of the Vtsputryas re and fuel reply is a unsound if reduction analysis of re and fuel is correct. The objection continues as follows: OOF(v) If re is not what causes fuel to burn, re is incorrectly conceived in reliance upon fuel as what causes fuel to burn.

Therefore, from OOF(iv) and OOF(v) we may infer that OOF(vi) Fire is incorrectly conceived in reliance upon fuel as what causes fuel to burn.

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Therefore, from OOF(i) and OOF(vi) we may infer that OOF(vii) Fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel.

But OOF(vii), according to Vasubandhu, is the reliance premise of the re and fuel reply. In the text Vasubandhu does not present the above argument for this premise. The premise is simply assumed to follow from his own statement of what is commonly said about re and fuel. Vasubandhu believes that the reliance premise is not true for the reasons a the Vtsputryas would give, but for the reasons set out above. Vasubandhu continues by arguing that the nonotherness premise of the re and fuel reply is false. He begins by noting the causal implication of reduction analysis: OOF(viii) If re is burning material reducible in existence to a collection of momentary substances which arises in dependence upon fuel and fuel is material which can burn and is reducible in existence to a collection of momentary substances which is a prior causal condition of the arising of re, then re arises in dependence upon fuel. However, since Vasubandhu accepts the thesis that what arises in dependence upon another is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from the other, he believes that OOF(ix) If re arises in dependence upon fuel, re is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel.

Let us call this the otherness implication of the causal implication of reduction analysis. Therefore, from reduction analysis, its causal implication, and the otherness implication of its causal implication we may infer the main conclusion of the objection: OOF(x) Fire is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel.

If OOF(x) is true, the nonotherness premise of the re and fuel reply is false. The full statement of the conclusion of the objection may be inferred from OOF(vii) and OOF(x): OOF(xi) Fire is conceived in reliance upon fuel and is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel.

Vasubandhu is objecting that even though the reliance premise of the re and fuel reply is true, reduction analysis shows that its nonotherness premise is false.

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The Vtsputryas reply to this objection will be to offer a different a analysis of re and fuel. Without presenting a sound argument for his reduction analysis of re and fuel Vasubandhu cannot be said to establish that the nonotherness premise of the re and fuel reply is false, since the Vtsputryas do not believe that his reduction analysis a of re and fuel is correct. Their reply will also imply that Vasubandhus rejection of the denition of re at OOF(iv) begs the question, since it is based on his own reduction analysis of re rather than on theirs. Finally, although they do not do so, the Vtsputryas might also have a replied to Vasubandhus objection by denying that the reliance thesis is true if re is incorrectly conceived in reliance upon fuel. In this case, they could deny that OOF(vii) has the same meaning as FFR(iii), and on this basis they could deny that reduction analysis of re and fuel is consistent with the view that re is conceived in reliance upon fuel.

THE SECOND OBJECTION BASED ON REDUCTION ANALYSIS: THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE OTHERNESS OF PERSONS

Vasubandhu presents two more objections to the re and fuel reply on the basis of his reduction analysis of re and fuel. The rst is as follows:
And [so] if a person arises in the same way in dependence upon aggregates [as re arises in dependence upon fuel], it must be other than them.

Vasubandhu argues that since reduction analysis shows that re arises in dependence upon fuel, it will also show that we arise in dependence upon aggregates. But since what arises in dependence upon something else is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from it, he concludes, we shall be clearly and distinctly separable in existence from aggregates. In other words, he believes that reduction analysis shows that the re and fuel reply may be rejected because it implies that the nonotherness thesis of the Vtsputryas theory of persons is a false. This objection, which I shall call the consequence of the otherness of persons (COP), is continuous with the objection from the otherness of re. From reduction analysis and its causal implication we may infer that COP(i) Fire arises in dependence upon fuel.

However, according to the analogy proposed by the Vtsputryas in a their re and fuel reply, we may say that

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COP(ii)

If re arises in dependence upon fuel, we arise in dependence upon aggregates.

Therefore, from COP(i) and COP(ii) we may infer that COP(iii) We arise in dependence upon aggregates.

And since Vasubandhu ascribes to the view that what arises in dependence upon another is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from the other, he assumes that COP(iv) If we arise in dependence upon aggregates, we are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from aggregates.

Therefore, from COP(iii) and COP(iv) we may infer that COP(v) We are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from aggregates.

If COP(v) is true, the nonotherness thesis of the Vtsputryas theory a of persons is false. But since the falsity of the nonotherness thesis has been derived from reduction analysis, which is not accepted by the Vtsputryas, it is clear that Vasubandhu cannot use this objection as a a part of his argument to prove that the Vtsputryas re and fuel reply a is not reasonable.

THE THIRD OBJECTION BASED ON REDUCTION ANALYSIS: THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE IMPERMANENCE OF PERSONS

Vasubandhus next objection is that another consequence of the re and fuel reply, if reduction analysis of re and fuel is correct, is that we are impermanent phenomena.
[Moreover, contrary to their view that a person is not impermanent,] it must also be impermanent, [since it will arise in dependence upon aggregates]. 27

Vasubandhu is minimally arguing that the Vtsputryas must abandon a the thesis that we are not impermanent phenomena, since re, our analogue in their reply, arises in dependence upon fuel, the analogue of aggregates in their reply, and all dependently arising phenomena are impermanent. But the argument may also be understood to be directed to the Vtsputryas inexplicable identity thesis. This brief argument, a which I shall call the consequence of the impermanence of persons (CIP), is a continuation of the consequence of the otherness of persons. It begins with the following assumption:

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If we arise in dependence upon aggregates, we are impermanent.

Therefore, from COP(iii) and CIP(i) we may infer that CIP(ii) We are impermanent. But if CIP(ii) is true, the inexplicable identity thesis of the Vtsputryas a theory of persons is false. Since this objection is based on reduction analysis, which is not accepted by the Vtsputryas, it does not have a any independent force.

AGENT AND PATIENT ANALYSIS

Vasubandhu has thus far demonstrated, according to his own analysis of re and fuel, that the re and fuel reply fails to show that the reliance, nonotherness and nonsameness theses of the Vtsputryas theory of a persons are consistent. So he now has the Vtsputryas present an a analysis of their own which they believe will support their re and fuel reply. The Vtsputryas reply to Vasubandhus three objections based on a reduction analysis is to introduce an analysis of re and fuel which avoids these objections.
[The Vts yas believe that these objections fail because] they assert that re a putr is the heat present in the above-mentioned burning material and that [the] fuel [in reliance upon which re is conceived] is comprised of the three elements [of earth, air, and water] which conjointly arise with it [in burning material].

Vasubandhus view, that re is burning material, is replaced in this analysis by the Vtsputryas view that re is the heat present in burning a material. Vasubandhus view that fuel is combustible material which is comprised of eight elemental substances and is a prior causal condition of the arising of re, is replaced in the Vtsputryas analysis with a the view that fuel is the collection of the earth, air and water elements which conjointly arise with re in burning material. The analysis, which I shall call the agent and patient analysis (APA), is comprised of the re analysis and the fuel analysis: APA(i) APA(ii) Fire is the heat present in burning material. Fuel is comprised of the earth, air and water elements which conjointly arise with re in burning material.

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a To explain how the re analysis enables the Vtsputryas to avoid Vasubandhus objections we need to suppose that they make what I shall call the causality assumption of the re analysis: APA(iii) The heat present in burning material is what causes fuel to burn.

From the re analysis and the causality assumption of the analysis we may derive the Vtsputryas denition of re. From their denition a of re and its implication the reliance premise was derived in my reconstruction of the reply. The Vtsputryas thus provide a metaphysical a justication for their use of the reliance premise. The Vtsputryas are certainly aware that if re is the heat in burning a material which causes its fuel to burn, then re is not reducible in existence to the eight elemental substances of which Vasubandhu believes that burning material is composed. So their analysis is inconsistent with reduction analysis. Moreover, since an agent of a change does not arise in dependence upon its patient in the way sour milk arises in dependence upon sweet milk, re does not arise in dependence upon fuel if re is what causes fuel to burn. Again, if re does not arise in dependence upon fuel, re need not be clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel. So from the agent and patient analysis it does not follow that re is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel. And since in the fuel analysis fuel is said to arise with re in burning material, and a cause must precede its effect, fuel is not a cause of re. Finally, since in the fuel analysis it is said that fuel is comprised of just three elements, it follows that it is not comprised of eight elements.
THE FIRST OBJECTION BASED ON AGENT AND PATIENT ANALYSIS: THE DEFINING PROPERTY OBJECTION

Vasubandhu now presents three arguments which purport to show that if the Vtsputryas agent and patient analysis of re and fuel is correct, a one of the premises of their re and fuel reply is false. Vasubandhus rst objection is that even according to their own analysis of re and fuel, the nonotherness premise of the re and fuel reply is false, since the analysis implies that re and fuel possess different dening properties.
[However, according to their own analysis,] re must still be other than fuel, since there will be different dening properties.

When Vasubandhu says that there will be different dening properties he means that the dening property of re is other than any of those of the earth, air and water elements of which fuel is comprised.

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Vasubandhu does not explain why he believes that re as analyzed by the Vtsputryas must possess a different dening property than any a possessed by the other three elements. But it is clear that he assumes that the re to which they refer is the re element he himself considers to be an elemental substance with a dening property. Hence, he also assumes the truth of the theory that the re element is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from the three elements of which fuel is comprised because it possesses a different dening property. The argument, which I shall call the dening property objection (DPO), begins with the assumption that if the re analysis is correct, re is the re element. Let us call it the re element implication of the re analysis. DPO(i) If re is the heat present in burning material, then re is the re element.

Therefore, from the re analysis and its re element implication we may infer the re element assumption of the objection. DPO(ii) Fire is the re element.

However, since the four elements have different dening properties, Vasubandhu assumes the truth of what I shall call the dening property implication: DPO(iii) If re is the re element and fuel is comprised of the earth, air and water elements which conjointly arise with re in burning material, then the dening property of re is different from the dening properties of the earth, air and water elements of which fuel is composed.

Therefore, from the re element assumption, the fuel analysis and the dening property implication we may infer that DPO(iv) The dening property of re is different from the dening properties of the earth, air and water elements of which fuel is composed.

However, DPO(v) If the dening property of re is different from the dening properties of the earth, air and water elements of which fuel is composed, re is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel.

Therefore, from DPO(iv) and DPO(v) we may infer,

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DPO(vi)

Fire is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel.

If DPO(vi) is true, then the otherness premise of the re and fuel reply is false. Although no reply to the dening property objection is presented in the text, it is clear that the Vtsputryas would have a reasonable reply. a They could simply deny that the re element implication of the re analysis is true, since re does not, as the re element does, possess by itself a nature on the basis of which it can be conceived. Even if they should say that re has heat as a dening property, they would not say that this property belongs to re by itself. If the dening property of re does not belong to re by itself, then even if re has heat as a dening property, it does not follow that re is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from any other phenomenon. Since the Vtsputryas clearly do a not identify re with the re element, Vasubandhus dening property objection is based on a misinterpretation of their agent and patient analysis.
THE SECOND OBJECTION BASED ON AGENT AND PATIENT ANALYSIS: THE OBJECTION FROM THE PRESENCE OF FIRE

Vasubandhus second objection to the re and fuel reply based on agent and patient analysis is that the analysis implies that the reliance premise of the re and fuel reply is false.
Moreover, the meaning of in reliance upon must be explained, [since according to their analysis of re and fuel] how is re conceived in reliance upon fuel? For [if the analysis is correct, it is true not only that] fuel will not be a cause of re, [but] also [that] it will not even be a cause of the conception of re, since re itself will be the cause of the conception [of re].

Although in this passage Vasubandhu calls attention to the fact that if the Vtsputryas agent and patient analysis of re and fuel is correct, a fuel is not a cause of re, in doing so he is not presenting an objection to the re and fuel reply based on their agent and patient analysis. Rather, he is pointing out that an implication of their analysis is the denial of a thesis he himself believes to be true on the basis of his own reduction analysis of re and fuel and its causal implication. Not only is this implication true, he is saying, but there is an implication which contradicts the reliance premise of their re and fuel reply. Vasubandhus objection is that since, according to their own analysis of re and fuel, re is present in burning material, re is not conceived in reliance upon fuel. He assumes, I believe, that re which is present

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in burning material is perceived, that re which is perceived is discriminated, that re which is discriminated is the cause of the conception of re, and that if re is the cause of the conception of re it is not conceived in reliance upon fuel. This objection may be called the objection from the presence of re (OPF). Because both Vasubandhu himself and the Vtsputryas a believe that heat is directly perceived by means of a body, it is taken for granted that OPF(i) If re is the heat present in burning material, re is perceived.

But the Vtsputryas have said that a OPF(ii) Fire is the heat present in burning material.

Therefore, from OPF(i) and OPF(ii) we may infer that OPF(iii) Fire is perceived.

However, Vasubandhu believes that OPF(iv) OPF(v) OPF(vi) If re is perceived, re is discriminated. If re is discriminated, re is the cause of the conception of re. If re is the cause of the conception of re, re is not conceived in reliance upon fuel.

Therefore, from OPF(iii)OPF(vi) we may infer that OPF(vii) Fire is not conceived in reliance upon fuel.

But if OPF(vii) is true, the reliance premise of the re and fuel reply is false. a The obvious reply the Vtsputryas can make to this objection is to argue that OPF(iv) is false, since, even though re is perceived, it does not possess by itself a nature or natures on the basis of which it can be discriminated, and so, it cannot be the cause of the conception of re. No such reply is made in the text.
VASUBANDHUS ANALYSIS OF THE MEANING OF RELIANCE

Vasubandhus objection from the presence of re took the form of saying that the meaning of in reliance upon must be explained, since the Vtsputryas analysis of re and fuel implies that re itself is the a cause of the conception of re. In order to complete the thought of the

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objection he considers two possible meanings which in reliance upon a might have and argues that the Vtsputryas cannot answer that it has either of these two meanings.
If the meaning of in reliance upon is support or inseparable concomitance, then aggregates must also be said in the same way to be the supports and inseparable concomitants of a person, in which case they clearly must say that aggregates are other than a person, [since the supports and inseparable concomitants of something are other than it.] And [they must also say, contrary to their theory that a person does not exist in dependence upon the existence of aggregates, that] a person does not [in fact] exist unless aggregates exist, just as re does not [in fact] exist unless fuel exists.

Since the Vtsputryas cannot assign either of these two meanings to a in reliance upon, Vasubandhu would have us conclude, the reliance premise must be false. The Vtsputryas, of course, do not believe that re being conceived a in reliance upon fuel means that fuel is a support or inseparable concomitant of re. In their view, if fuel is a support of anything, it is a support of the conception of re, not re itself. Hence, by analogy, they would say that aggregates are a support of the conception of ourselves, but not that they are a support of ourselves. The cause of the conception of ourselves and the conception of ourselves, they would unproblematically concede, are clearly and distinctly separable in existence. Moreover, if they should believe that fuel is an inseparable concomitant of re, they could not believe, as their analogy to aggregates and ourselves implies they do, that re can exist without fuel. What they believe in reliance upon means I have embedded in my reconstruction of the reliance denition of their theory. Finally, by drawing as a consequence of these two possible meanings of in reliance upon that we do not in fact exist unless aggregates exist, just as re does not in fact exist unless fuel exists, Vasubandhu implies that this consequence is unacceptable to the Vtsputryas. Therefore, the Vtsputryas are thought to be a a asserting that we do not exist in dependence upon aggregates. Hence, Vasubandhus account of the two possible meanings of in reliance upon does not show that the Vtsputryas cannot explain how re, a although present in burning material, is conceived in reliance upon fuel.

THE THIRD OBJECTION BASED ON AGENT AND PATIENT ANALYSIS: THE OBJECTION TO THE NONOTHERNESS ARGUMENT

Vasubandhus third objection to the re and fuel reply based on agent and patient analysis is explicitly directed against the otherness argument of the Vtsputryas re and fuel reply. The objection turns on an a

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alleged ambiguity in the fuel premise of the reply. To this argument Vasubandhu presents the following objection:
What does hot signify in their earlier assertion that if re were other than fuel, fuel [which is burning] would not be hot? If it signies heat, then fuel itself is not hot, since it [is, according to their own analysis, what] possesses the natures of the other [three] elements [rather than the nature of the re whose presence in something is the cause of its heat. There remains the possibility that] what is hot, even if it is other than re, which is hot by its own nature, can be shown to be hot in the sense that it can be combined with heat. [But] in this case re being other than fuel is not a problem [for the view that fuel which is burning is hot].

Vasubandhu assumes in this objection that heat is either the re element itself or its dening property, that if heat is the dening property of the re element, what is combined with the dening property of the re element is combined with the re element, and that phenomena which are combined are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from one another. These are assumptions he believes to be true and needs in order to infer that fuel is not hot if hot in Fuel which is burning is hot signies heat and that re is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel if hot in Fuel which is burning is hot signies what is combined with heat. Vasubandhus objection to the nonotherness argument (ONA) begins with what I shall call the semantic premise: ONA(i) Hot signies heat or hot signies what is combined with heat.

If we assume that Vasubandhu identies heat with the dening property of the re element, the objection continues as follows: ONA(ii) If hot signies heat, hot signies the dening property of the re element.

However, since the four elemental substances do not share dening properties, ONA(iii) If hot signies the dening property of the re element, hot does not signify a property which belongs to the earth, air and water elements.

But the Vtsputryas believe that a ONA(iv) The earth, air and water elements are fuel.

Therefore, from ONA(ii), ONA(iii) and ONA(iv) we may infer that

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ONA(v) However, ONA(vi)

If hot signies heat, hot does not signify a property which belongs to fuel.

If hot does not signify a property which belongs to fuel, fuel which is burning is not hot.

But the Vtsputryas assume in the nonotherness argument of the re a and fuel reply that ONA(vii) Fuel which is burning is hot.

Therefore, from ONA(v), ONA(vi) and ONA(vii) we may infer that ONA(viii) Hot does not signify heat. Therefore, from ONA(i) and ONA(viii) we may infer that ONA(ix) Hot signies what is combined with heat.

But what is the implication of the thesis that hot signies what is combined with heat? Vasubandhu assumes that what combines with the dening property of the re element combines with the re element. ONA(x) If hot signies what is combined with heat, then hot signies what is combined with the re element.

Therefore, from ONA(ix) and ONA(x) we may infer that ONA(xi) However, ONA(xii) If fuel which is burning is hot and hot signies what is combined with the re element, fuel which is burning is combined with the re element. Hot signies what is combined with the re element.

Therefore, from ONA(vii), ONA(xi) and ONA(xii) we may infer that ONA(xiii) Fuel which is burning is combined with the re element. But phenomena which can combine, Vasubandhu assumes, are clearly and distinctly separable in existence from one another. ONA(xiv) If fuel which is burning is combined with the re element, re is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel. Therefore, from ONA(xiii) and ONA(xiv) we may infer that

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Fire is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel.

If ONA(xv) is true, the nonotherness premise of the re and fuel reply is false. Hence, Vasubandhu would have us conclude, it is not true, if the agent and patient analysis is correct, that if re is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel then fuel which is burning is not hot. The Vtsputryas are not made to formulate a reply to Vasubandhus a objection to the nonotherness argument. Nonetheless, we can easily formulate a reply for them. Their reply would be to deny the truth of the semantic premise on the ground that since hot in Fuel which is burning is hot signies what unites with heat in the way an inexplicable phenomenon unites with the explicable phenomena in reliance upon which it is conceived, it signies neither the dening property of the re element nor what is combined with heat. So they would claim that Vasubandhus objection to the nonotherness argument may be rejected because its semantic premise begs the question.
IDENTITY ANALYSIS

When Vasubandhu presented his reduction analysis of re and fuel, he identied burning material with re and claimed that fuel, as material capable of burning, is a causal condition of the arising of re, and so is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from burning material. When the Vtsputryas presented their agent and patient analysis, they a identied part of burning material with re and part with fuel. Now that Vasubandhu believes that he has shown that if this second analysis is correct, key premises of their re and fuel reply are false, he considers and rejects one last attempt which might be made to salvage the re and fuel reply. Perhaps burning material is not part re and part fuel, but instead is as a whole both re and fuel. In this analysis, it may be thought, the re and fuel reply can avoid the problems created by the agent and patient analysis. This analysis, which I shall call the identity analysis, is presented as follows:
:::

burning material is as a whole [the same as] both re and fuel

:::

We can be sure that the Vtsputryas themselves would not have a presented this analysis of re and fuel, since they would not, as we have seen, agree that the agent and patient analysis is inconsistent with any of the premises of their re and fuel reply. Vasubandhu includes this third analysis, we may assume, so that he may block an

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a attempt the Vtsputryas might make to save the re and fuel reply by propounding an analysis of re and fuel which cannot possibly give rise to the objection that re is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel. He believes that he has shown that both reduction analysis and agent and patient analysis give rise to this objection, and now he seeks to show that an analysis which makes both the same as burning material will not save the re and fuel reply. Vasubandhu assumes that the identity analysis means that burning material as a whole is the same as both re and fuel individually considered rather than as a collection. He seems to believe that if burning material as a whole were said to be the same as both re and fuel as a collection, what is said would be equivalent to the claim that burning material is part re and part fuel. Since the identity analysis does not seem to be an account of re and fuel the Vtsputryas would a present, I shall not bother to reconstruct how it might be used by them to avoid the conclusion that re is clearly and distinctly separable in existence from fuel.
THE FIRST OBJECTION BASED ON IDENTITY ANALYSIS: THE OBJECTION FROM INCONSISTENCY WITH RELIANCE

In Vasubandhus rst objection to the re and fuel reply based on identity analysis he claims that if burning material as a whole is the same as both re and fuel, then the reliance premise of the re and fuel reply has lost its meaning. The objection is as follows:
But should they say [in order to avoid the objection that re is other than fuel] that burning material is as a whole [the same as] both re and fuel, they must explain what it can mean in this case to say [that re is conceived] in reliance upon [fuel. For if burning material is as a whole the same as both re and fuel, fuel will be the same as re, and that in reliance upon which re is conceived will be re itself, a putryas deny]. which the Vts 

In suggesting that the reliance premise has lost its meaning Vasubandhu means that it is false. The intervening steps of the objection are easily supplied. First of all, a clear implication of identity analysis is that fuel is the same as re. Secondly, Vasubandhu reasons, if fuel is the same as re, and re is conceived in reliance upon fuel, as the Vtsputryas claim it is, then re is conceived in reliance upon re. a But the Vtsputryas imply that re is not conceived in reliance upon a re when they assert that it is conceived in reliance upon fuel. Therefore, Vasubandhu concludes, if burning material as a whole is the same as both re and fuel individually considered, the reliance premise of the re and fuel reply is false.

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Vasubandhus argument I shall I call the objection from inconsistency with reliance (OIR). It begins with the identity implication of identity analysis: OIR(i) However, OIR(ii) Moreover, OIR(iii) If re is conceived in reliance upon re, re is not conceived in reliance upon fuel. If fuel is the same as re and re is conceived in reliance upon fuel, then re is conceived in reliance upon re. If burning material is as a whole the same as both re and fuel, then fuel is the same as re.

Therefore, from OIR(i), OIR(ii) and OIR(iii) we may infer that OIR(iv) If burning material is as a whole the same as both re and fuel, re is not conceived in reliance upon fuel.

However, according to the identity analysis, OIR(v) Burning material is as a whole the same as both re and fuel.

Therefore, from OIR(iv) and OIR(v) we may infer that OIR(vi) Fire is not conceived in reliance upon fuel.

But if OIR(vi) is true, the reliance premise of the re and fuel reply is false. Since this objection is not based on an analysis of re and fuel the Vtsputryas would accept, it cannot be used to show that they are a committed to the falsity of the reliance premise of their re and fuel reply.

THE SECOND OBJECTION BASED ON IDENTITY ANALYSIS: THE CONSEQUENCE OF INCONSISTENCY WITH NONSAMENESS

Vasubandhus second objection based on identity analysis concerns a consequence the re and fuel analogy will have for the Vtsputryas a theory of persons. It is the objection that since the analysis implies that fuel is the same as re, we may infer, by the Vtsputryas own a analogy, that aggregates are the same as ourselves, which is inconsistent with the nonsameness thesis of their theory of persons.

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Moreover, since the aggregates themselves would then also be [the same as] a person, it follows that they could not avoid the theory that a person is not other than its aggregates.

When Vasubandhu says in the text that the Vtsputryas could not avoid a the theory that we are not other than aggregates, he must be using is not other than to mean is the same as, since the view that we are not other than aggregates is a thesis of their theory of persons. Vasubandhu is arguing that identity analysis implies that the nonsameness thesis of their theory of persons is false, since by analogy from the re and fuel reply it can be used to infer that we are reducible in existence to aggregates. Vasubandhus argument, which I call the consequence of inconsistency with nonsameness (CIN), begins by supposing that, from identity analysis and its identity implication, we may infer that CIN(i) Fuel is the same as re.

Rather than simply conclude that the nonsameness premise of the re and fuel reply is false, Vasubandhu skips over to the consequence for the nonsameness thesis of their theory of persons. He claims that CIN(ii) If fuel is the same as re, then aggregates are the same as ourselves.

Moreover, the Vtsputryas must agree that a CIN(iii) If aggregates are the same as ourselves, we are reducible in existence to aggregates.

Therefore, from the identity analysis, CIN(i), CIN(ii) and CIN(iii) we may infer that CIN(iv) We are reducible in existence to aggregates.

But if CIN(iv) is true, the nonsameness thesis of the Vtsputryas a theory of persons is false.

THE CONCLUSION OF VASUBANDHUS CRITIQUE

Vasubandhu concludes, on the basis of his critique of the re and fuel reply, that the Vtsputryas have failed to provide an analogy that a shows that we can be conceived in reliance upon aggregates without being clearly and distinctly separable in existence from aggregates or reducible in existence to aggregates.

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Therefore, they have not shown that a person is conceived in reliance upon the aggregates in the way [in which they believe] that re is conceived in reliance upon fuel.

In other words, the re and fuel reply does not provide an example of a phenomenon other than ourselves which is conceived in reliance upon something without being either clearly and distinctly separable in existence from it or reducible in existence to it. The reason the example fails, he believes, is that no analysis has been found of re and fuel according to which all of the premises of the reply are true or according to which there is an unwanted consequence for the Vtsputryas theory a of persons.

GENERAL ASSESSMENT

All of Vasubandhus objections, we have seen, rely on premises which the Vtsputryas do not accept as true. The Vtsputryas would deny a a the correctness of Vasubandhus reduction analysis of re and fuel, his interpretation of their own agent and patient analysis of re and fuel, his interpretation of the two possible meanings of in reliance upon, his account of what hot signies in the fuel premise, and the identity analysis of re and fuel. So his critique has not shown that either the reliance, nonotherness or nonsameness premise of the re and fuel reply must be false. It might be thought that Vasubandhus critique of the re and fuel reply presupposes that (a) the only possible analyses of re and fuel are the reduction analysis, the agent and patient analysis and the identity analysis, and proceeds by arguing that (b) according to the reduction analysis, the agent and patient analysis and the identity analysis, either premises of the re and fuel reply are false or theses of the inexplicablist theory of persons are false. Above I have already argued that (b) is false. To decide the question of whether or not (a) is false would take more space and time than available here. In any case, I doubt that Vasubandhu assumes (a) to be true, since he need not assume it to be true if the main thrust of his critique is that premises of the re and fuel reply or theses of the inexplicablist theory of persons are false both according his own analysis of re and fuel and according to their own. The third analysis, if this interpretation of his argument as a whole is correct, is added simply for the sake of blocking a path of retreat the opponent might be tempted to take. Hence, it seems best to reconstruct Vasubandhus re and fuel critique (FFC) as follows:

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FFC(i)

FFC(ii)

FFC(iii)

If the re and fuel reply is correct, none of its premises is false and none implies the falsity of theses of the inexplicablist theory of persons. If none of the premises of the re and fuel reply is false and none implies the falsity of the inexplicablist theory of persons, then none of the premises of the re and fuel reply is false and none implies the falsity of the inexplicablist theory of persons according to either the reduction analysis, the agent and patient analysis or the identity analysis of re and fuel. Either some of the premises of the re and fuel reply are false or some imply the falsity of the inexplicablist theory of persons according to the reduction analysis, the agent and patient analysis and the identity analysis of re and fuel.

Therefore, from FFC(ii) and FFC(iii) we may infer that FFC(iv) Either some of the premises of the re and fuel reply are false or some imply the falsity of the inexplicablist theory of persons.

Therefore, from FFC(i) and FFC(iv) we may infer that FFC(v) The re and fuel reply is not correct. Vasubandhus critique of the Vtsputryas re and fuel reply, so a construed, is valid, but not sound, since we have found that FFC(iii) is false. Vasubandhus failure to refute the Vtsputryas re and fuel reply a does not imply that this reply and their replies to his objections to the reply are without problems. There are problems both of completeness and of plausibility. We have already seen that the incompleteness of their replies to Vasubandhus objections to the re and fuel reply enables Vasubandhu to object to them on the basis of theses they themselves do not accept. If we judge their replies from the point of view of their incompleteness, they fail to turn aside the objections to which they are addressed, since they are, simply as stated, amenable to Vasubandhus interpretations. Indeed, it is because of the incompleteness of their replies that we must in the end conclude that Vasubandhu at least shows that the Vtsputryas re and fuel reply is inconsistent with the theses he a uses to reject them. The reason or reasons for the incompleteness of the Vtsputryas replies, both in Vasubandhus critique of the re and a

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fuel reply and in the remainder of his philosophical critique of their theory of persons, I shall discuss in the concluding section of the third article of this series. There are three difculties of plausibility which are faced by the Vtsputryas re and fuel reply itself. The rst is that the reply implies a that re can exist even if fuel does not, since re and fuel are the analogue of ourselves and aggregates and we are believed to be capable of existing even if aggregates do not. Since this view is intuitively implausible, it needs to be supported by independent argument. Presumably, the role played by the re element in Vasubandhus system of thought would be taken up by inexplicable re in the system of the Vtsputryas. In this case, re would function like the re a element, except that it would lack a nature of its own by virtue of which it can be conceived and could nevertheless be perceived when fuel is perceived. We might attempt to reconstruct their account of this inexplicable element and its role in their own system of thought, but even if we should be able to succeed in the attempt, the reconstruction would need to make it plausible that this inexplicable re could continue to exist after its fuel has been consumed. A second problem arises because their reply implies that there is some justication for conceiving inexplicable phenomena as agents which produce changes in explicable phenomena. What can this justication be? Inexplicable phenomena cannot be agents by their own nature, since they are inexplicable. And if they are agents merely by convention, why are they conceived as agents rather than merely as inexplicable phenomena which are perceived in conjunction with the perception of changes in certain explicable phenomena? The perceptions of constant conjunctions between explicable phenomena of different kinds have been cited by philosophers to explain why phenomena of these different kinds are believed to be causally related. But in the case at hand, phenomena of different kinds are not perceived. How does the mind construct an idea of a causal connection between inexplicable phenomena and other phenomena if it cannot independently identify inexplicable phenomena? I am not saying that a plausible account of how inexplicable phenomena can be conceived as agents which produce change cannot be formulated. I am saying that such an account needs to be constructed if the view that there are inexplicable agents is to be rationally acceptable. A third problem is that the re and fuel reply is based on the prima facie implausible view that there are phenomena which lack by themselves a nature or natures on the basis of which they are conceived and yet are known to possess real existence because they are perceived

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when the phenomena in reliance upon which they are conceived are perceived. Why should we believe that they are known to possess real existence if they are not perceived independently? And even if somehow it were to be shown that they exist in this way, why should we believe that they exist apart from being perceived? The weakness of the Vtsputryas theory of persons, as their later Mdhyamika a a critics insist, may be that it lacks a cogent theory of how inexplicable phenomena can be known to possess real existence.

NOTES
1 See James Duerlinger, Vasubandhus Philosophical Critique of the Vts  a putryas Theory of Persons (I), Journal of Indian Philosophy (25: 307335, 1997). See the notes of that article for information concerning translations and secondary source materials. Those who wish to read the rst article before reading this second one are advised to read the introduction to this second article before proceeding to the rst, since it corrects errors I have found in the rst. A reading of the rst article, nonetheless, is necessary if the reader is to understand properly the meanings of the terminology I use in the second and third articles. 2 In the rst article I called these the two-realities objection, the aggregate-reliance reply, the causal objection, the re-fuel reply and the middle-way argument. I have decided in this article to abandon the use of hyphens in my titles of objections and replies. 3 In the rst article I stated that both Vasubandhu and the Vts yas assume a putr that we possess existence apart from being perceived or conceived. I now think that I did not make my statement of their assumption strong enough. They in fact also assume that we exist apart from other phenomena. To convey this stronger sense of existence I here use real existence instead of existence apart from being perceived   or conceived. The denial of real existence is precisely what nihsvabhavata signies . a as it is used by the Mdhyamikas. 4 For the reason explained in the rst article (pp. 311312) I use is not clearly and distinctly separable in existence from in place of Vasubandhus is not other a putryas thesis that we are not other than our than in my comments on the Vts  aggregates. 5 For the reason explained in the rst article (pp. 311312) I use is not reducible in a yas existence to in place of is not the same as in my comments on the V tsputr thesis that we are not the same as our aggregates. 6 Here I am not using in reliance upon in the technical sense in which it was a yas in their reply from aggregate reliance to Vasubandhus introduced by the Vtsputr objection from the two realities, but in the generic sense in which Vasubandhu uses it in his causal objection to the reply from aggregate reliance. I do this because Vasubandhu goes on to use in reliance upon in this nontechnical sense everywhere else in the Refutation and I wish my use of this expression to correspond to that of the text. 7 In the Refutation Vasubandhu uses dravyasat to refer to an ultimate reality and ~ prajnaptisat to refer to a conventional reality (called a deceptive conventional reality in the rst article). I now prefer to translate these terms, respectively, as possesses the reality of a substance and possesses reality by way of being conceived. 8 Although in the rst article I believe I correctly explained the theses upon which the objection from the two realities is based, I mistakenly took the thesis that we are

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either ultimate realities or conventional realities to be the conclusion of the objection. This error is corrected below. 9 Because of the error I made in the rst article in interpreting the objection from the two realities I also mistook the conclusion of Vasubandhus causal objection, which was expressed simply as the difculty is the same, to be that we are either ultimate realities or conventional realities. So once again, although I believe I correctly explained the theses upon which the causal objection is based, I failed to see that its point is to reiterate the conclusion of the objection from the two realities, which is that the nonsameness thesis is false. This error is corrected below. 10 See the rst article (p. 313, 11. 2837 and p. 315, ll. 2224) for an explanation of why this thesis is presupposed. 11 Here I have presented a different reconstruction of the reply from aggregate reliance from that presented in the rst article (pp. 315316) in order to highlight a putryas theory of persons. important theses of the Vts  12 Hence, the reconstruction of the causal objection I made in the rst article (pp. 319320) should end at proposition (vii) rather than at proposition (x). 13 In the rst article I called this principle Vasubandhus theory of cause-dependent objects of concepts. 14 In the rst article of this series I used in dependence upon instead of in reliance upon in my reconstruction of the re and fuel reply since I was reconstructing a putryas own version of the reply. Vasubandhu assumes that since in the the Vts  a putr Vts yas reply from aggregate reliance a denition of in reliance upon is not presented, he may use it simply to mean in dependence upon. Here I shall follow Vasubandhus usage in order to conform to the usage in the text. 15 I remind the reader that at this point in reliance upon has not been explicitly dened in the text. 16 In the rst article I wrote that re is present in fuel rather than that it unites with fuel. I now think that this better captures their view, since it suggests that re lacks by itself a nature or natures on the basis of which it can be conceived. 17 In the rst article I should have included which is burning after fuel in FFR(iv) and FFR(v). I have also changed which burns, to which is burning here and elsewhere. 18 Here I have changed Fuel is what causes fuel to burn. which occurs in the rst article (p. 328), to Fuel causes fuel to burn. 19 Here I have changed Fuel is not what causes fuel to burn, which occurs in the rst article (p. 328), to Fuel does not cause fuel to burn. 20 In the rst article I had FFR(xiv) be If re is conceived in reliance upon fuel and fuel is not the object of the concept of re, then that in reliance upon which something is conceived need not be the object of the concept. In FFR(xiv), FFR(xv) and FFR(xvi) in this second article I have chosen to make the upshot of the reply specically concern the analogy of re and fuel to persons and aggregates. 21 In the rst article I had FFR(xvi) read That in reliance upon which something is conceived need not be the object of the concept. 22 Here again I have slightly amended my account in the rst article in order to facilitate a summary of the earlier exchange which shows how the theses of the a putr Vts yas theory of persons are engaged. 23 In my translations of passages from the Refutation I place in brackets words, phrases, or sentences which I believe will help the reader to grasp unexpressed parts of theses and arguments presented in the text. So the reader may distinguish what Vasubandhu actually says from what I add in an effort to make it clearer, I have translated the text so that it can be read without these additions. To make grammatical sense of the unembellished translation the reader needs to disregard punctuations and capitalizations required for the readability of the expanded translation.

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I have substituted material for the more literal wood, etc. in this translation. Among the eight elements of which all bodies are composed, Vasubandhu believes,   are the four primary elements (mahabhuta-s) called re, air, water, and earth. These eight are the phenomena to whose existence the existence of every body is reducible. Each of the four primary elements has its own dening property (laksana) by which . . it is known, re by heat, air by motion, water by cohesion, and earth by hardness or repulsion. The remaining four, called the secondary elements (bhautika-s), are the momentary elements that comprise what we call the sensible qualities of such bodies, and they are perceived, respectively, by means of the eye, nose, tongue and body. The dening properties of the four elements are themselves counted as objects perceived by means of the body. If and when a body makes a sound, it will also contain momentary elements that comprise its sound, which is perceived by means of the ear. 26 Notice that Vasubandhus appeal to what is commonly said includes an appeal a putr to re being said to be burning material which burns fuel. When the Vts yas present their own analysis of re and fuel they will imply that re is not in fact burning material. Perhaps they would deny that re is commonly said to be burning material. 27 According to what may be called the Vtsputryas implicit theory of personal a identity the view that we are impermanent is the nihilist extreme, and the view that we are permanent is the reicationist extreme. Vasubandhus attempt to reduce our sameness over time to the imperfect identity possessed by the momentary aggregates in a causal continuum is rejected by them because it too falls to the nihilist extreme.

University of Iowa Iowa City, IA, U.S.A.