CORRELLATION BETWEEN PIRACY AND SUNNI INSURGENCY GROUPS

CECILIA ANASTOS

JUNE 2009

Awareness Paper No. 2

The views and commentaries expressed in this paper are exclusively the authors views and they do not reflect the opinions/views of the authors employer and/or the United States Government.

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Abstract
This paper intends to raise awareness about a potential correlation between Sunni insurgency groups and piracy attacks in the Strait of Malacca, Nigeria and Somalia. Following reports of open source information, the author noticed a pattern of increased piracy events in areas where Sunni insurgency groups are presently active and with access to coastal areas with important ports. Although one argue and it is certainly true that increased reporting is a result of the growth of media opportunities created by the internet, the reporting in the three named areas of interest far outnumber the reporting in other areas of the world. This paper will focus on the Strait of Malacca and the Sunni insurgency group of Abu Sayyaf, the coast of Nigeria and the Sunni insurgency group of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), and the coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden and the Sunni insurgency group of Al-Shabaab. It is important to note that all these groups have ties with and expressed allegiance to Al-Qaeda central. The author intends to stimulate discussion and further research in all areas of classification (U, S, TS, and above).

AbouttheAuthor
Cecilia Anastos holds a Masters Degree in Strategic Intelligence with Specialization in Middle East Issues, and a B.A. in Criminal Justice. She is currently employed as Senior Intel Analyst OSINT Specialist covering issues in the areas of counter-narcoterrorism, maritime, and illicit non-commercial air traffic. Besides being fluent in five languages, she is an avid reader and a source of knowledge in foreign policy, and international affairs.

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As a concerned citizen of the United States, and ad-honorem, she publishes BigEye News Compilations, a daily compilation of news of interest for the intelligence and law enforcement communities, and the Awareness Papers Series, which can be found at Intelink-U.1

https://www.intelink.gov/BigEye/BigEye.intel

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Introduction
Although piracy is an ancient profession, its incidence has increased by 68% between 2000 and 2006, when compared to the previous six years. More remarkable is the fact that since 2008, more attacks took place in Somalia and Nigeria than in any other part of the world.2 One must also take into consideration that not all piracy events are reported for fear and/or avoidance of investigation costs and increases in insurance premiums3, such as the premium increases for ships entering the Port of Yemen. Because the media treats all incidents of ships boarded or attacked at sea equally, it is important to clarify that the location of the boarded or attacked ship determines the legal consideration of the attack which could be a piracy attack or armed robbery at sea. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea defines piracy as follows:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

Nincic, D.J., Maritime Piracy: Implications for Maritime Energy Security, Journal of Energy Security, February 2009 RAND Air Force Project, Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: A Rising Challenge for U.S. Security, RAND Corp, 2008

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(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or
(b).4

The International Maritime Board, an organization created in 1992 with headquarters in Kuala Lampur, defines piracy as: Piracy is an act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.5 Based on the two definitions stated above, and for legal purposes, most of the attacks on ships reported by the IMB, and subsequently broadcasted by the media, are armed robberies at sea because the location of the boarded ship is within 200 miles of the state coast the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). For the purpose of this paper, pirate is any individual who engages in piracy attack or armed robbery at sea. Pirates modus operandi includes: harbor and anchorage attacks, attacks at moving vessels, hijacking, and kidnap for ransom.6 According to the International Maritime Organization of the United Nations (IMO), more than 350 sailors lost their lives to piracy attacks since 1995. Energy vessels represent the preferred target for piracy attacks taking place within the EEZ, with some exceptions such as the Sirius Star hijacking which took place at about 450 miles southeast of the Kenyan coast.7

Article 101, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm (accessed on 15 June 2009) Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), Memorandum 5 Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea. Raymond, C.A., Piracy in Southeast Asia New Trends, Issues and Responses, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2005
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Nincic, D.J., Maritime Piracy: Implications for Maritime Energy Security, Journal of Energy Security, February 2009

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The author has researched open source information material from 1994 to 2009, and she has found that when Sunni insurgent groups were actively operating in Malaysia/Philippines, Nigeria and Somalia, piracy in that area was also rampant.

StraitofMalaccaandtheAbuSayyafGroup
According to Open Source Center, provider of foreign mainstream media analysis, there were only seven articles published on piracy in the Strait of Malacca between 1994 and 1999; 93 articles published between 2000 and 2005, and two articles published between January 2006 and June 2009. Nexis8, an aggregator of news, indicates that there were 19 articles published in the United States about piracy in the Strait of Malacca between 1994 and 1999; 221 articles between 2000 and 2005; and 129 articles between January 2006 and June 20099. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is a violent Muslim terrorist group operating in Philippines and the Strait of Malacca whose leaders allegedly fought in Afghanistan during the Soviet war. The group professes allegiance to Al-Qaeda central. Besides the regular forms of attacks used by terrorists, such as bombing and beheadings, the Abu Sayyaf Group became known for its kidnappings for ransom. Between April 2000 and February 2004, the ASG engaged in the following attacks: April of 2000 kidnapping of 21 persons (10 Western tourists) resort in Malaysia 27 May 2001, kidnapping of three US citizens and 17 Filipinos, resort in Palawan, Philippines. US citizen Guillermo Sobero and other hostages were murdered. October 2002, bombing of a Philippine military base in Zamboanga that killed a US serviceman. February 2004, Khadaffy Janjalanis faction bombed SuperFerry 14 in Manila Bay, (~132 killed).

Note: Nexis search was conducted using US Newspapers and Wires Note: In many of these articles, the Strait of Malacca is mentioned as a refenrence of past piracy activities.

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In October 2005, Catherine Zara Raymond wrote in her Working Paper titled Piracy in Southeast Asia New Trends, Issued and Responses the following statement: In the last few years ASG has been successfully boarding vessels, kidnapping members of the crew and demanding a ransom for their release. [] According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), which collects and collates information on piracy attacks around the world, in 2004 alone there were an unprecedented number of kidnappings in which a total of 43 crewmembers were kidnapped by pirates in Southeast Asia. Thirty six of those attacks occurred in the Strait of Malacca. 10 In September 2006, a Philippines Marine Recon unit killed the ASG leader, Khadaffy Janjalani.11 Abu Sulaiman became the new leader and was also killed in January 2007 by Philippines troops.12 Subsequently, Radullan Sahiron was appointed the new leader in January of 200713. Zachary Abuza, a leading scholar on terrorism in Southeast Asia, wrote an article in June 2008 stating that Abu Sayyaf now lacks any semblance of central leadership."14 Jim Gomez, Associated Press, reported in January 2007 that Janjalani and Sulaiman were the main contacts to Islamic militants in Indonesia and Middle Eastern donors who have provided funding and

10

Raymond, C.A., Piracy in Southeast Asia New Trends, Issues and Responses, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005 De La Cruz, A, Janjalanis voice drew marines to him, Inquirer Headlines Nation, First Posted 02:05:00 01/22/2007 and accessed on 15 June 2009 at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/2007012244760/Janjalani%27s_voice_drew_Marines_to_him http://www.cfr.org/publication/9235/ (accessed on 15 June 2009)

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Gomez, J, No Strong Successor Seen for Abu Sayyaf, The Washington Post, 21 January 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/21/AR2007012100504.html (accessed on 15 June 2009) Abuza, Z, The Demise of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Southern Philipines, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Vol. 1, Issue 7, June 2008

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combat training, [according to] Romeo Ricardo, chief of the national police's Intelligence Group.15 The increase in Philippines troops operations against the Abu Sayyaf leadership correlates with decrease of media and IMB reports of armed robberies at sea and piracy attacks in the Strait of Malacca. However, one must not conclude that Abu Sayyaf was conducting terrorist attacks in the Strait of Malacca but using piracy and armed robbery at sea to fund its operations. The IMB believes that criminal syndicates are responsible for crimes in the Strait of Malacca. The International Institute for Strategic Studies published in July 2004 the following: Organized criminal syndicates, possibly with international links, appeared to be behind some of the increasingly competent attacks, which featured well-trained personnel using fast boats, modern weapons and sophisticated communications. The perpetrators were able to take advantage of weak law enforcement on the Indonesian side of the Straits, which effectively provided pirates and sea-robbers with sanctuary.16

NigeriaCoastandAlQaidaintheMaghreb
Open Source Center contains 30 articles of foreign media regarding piracy in Nigeria between January 1994 to December 1999; 222 articles between January 2000 and December 2005; and 395 articles between January 2006 and June 2009. Nexis contains two articles between January 1994 and December 1999; six articles between January 2000 and December 2005; and 565 articles between January 2006 and June 2009. One of these articles reported in the Lagos

15

Gomez, J, No Strong Successor Seen for Abu Sayyaf, The Washington Post, 21 January 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/21/AR2007012100504.html (accessed on 15 June 2009)

Ward, A., and Hackett, J., Piracy and Maritime Terror in Southeast Asia, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 10, Issue 6, July 2004

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Newswatch in English (an independent weekly news magazine noted for detailed and factual reports) states that Writing on "Terror on the High Seas," Sebastine Obasi reports that the Somali piracy experience was equally witnessed in Nigeria in 2008 in the Niger Delta region where fishing trawlers were hijacked.17 Analysts are concerned that oil-tankers are highly vulnerable to attacks in Nigeria and OSC reported the following: Nigeria ranked second in worldwide reported pirate attacks in 2008, including 27 vessels boarded, 5 hijackings, and 39 crew members kidnapped. Attacks continued unchecked in 2009, according to the IMB's Piracy Reporting Center (PRC). Nigeria's Navy has been hard-pressed to provide adequate security for the 853 km of coastline and its oil operations, fishermen, and shipping lanes.18 According to the Journal of Energy Security "2009 began with the capture of an oil supply vessel and a subsequent attack on a Royal Dutch Shell tanker," and on 21 January, "in one of the most worrisome attacks to date militants from the Niger Delta region attacked the MT Meredith, a tanker carrying 4,000 tons of diesel fuel, and kidnapped a Romanian crew member.19 The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) publishes an electronic map with the IMB piracy reporting figures. According to this reporting, there were 12 attacks in 2006 along the Coast of Nigeria, 42 reported attacks in 2007, and approximately 40 attacks in 2008. The ICC Commercial Crime Services website has a warning for Nigeria Coast: Pirates are violent and

17

AFP20090421619001 Nigeria - OSC Summary in English 20 Apr 09 - 27 Apr 09 AFP20090311423001 Nigeria -- OSC Report in English 11 Mar 09

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Nincic, D.J., Maritime Piracy: Implications for Maritime Energy Security, Journal of Energy Security, February 2009

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have attacked and robbed vessels / kidnapped crews along the coast and rivers, anchorages ports and surrounding waters. Vessels advised to be also vigilant in other parts in Nigeria.20 It is important to take into consideration that these numbers might not be accurate because piracy in Nigeria is seriously underreported as Cyrus Mody, manager of IMB, stated on 28 May 2009.21 The al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), previously known as Groupe Salafiste pour la Prdication et le Combat (GSPC) is a Sunni Islamist militia which aims to overthrow the government of Algeria.22 The renaming of the group, in September of 2006, was done to indicate the groups allegiance to Al-Qaeda central.23 Note that the surge of piracy coincides with the time that AQIM changed its name with the approval of Al-Qaedas second in command Aiman Al-Zawahiri; and began recruiting in other parts of Africa, being Nigeria one of them. In fact, Maghreb analyst Mohamed Ben-Madani said the group's influence is spreading and it now has small branches in places like Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Nigeria and Morocco.24 Lauren Vriens from the Council of Foreign Relations wrote in July 2008: Collusion between AQIM and al-Qaeda is not a new phenomenon. According to a 2007 report by Emily Hunt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Osama bin Laden provided funding for Algerian Islamists in the early 1990s and was involved in the GSPC's early formation. Many of the group's founding members trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. The GSPC declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda as early as 2003, but al-Qaeda's second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, officially

20

ICC, Piracy Prone Areas and Warning at http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=70&Itemid=58 (accessed on 16 June 2009)
21

Hand, M., Nigeria Pirate Attacks Going Unreported, Lloyds list, May 2009.

22

Watson, R., Algeria Blasts Fuel Violence Fear, BBC, 11 April 2007 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6545549.stm (accessed on 15 June 2009) Transnational Threats Update-Transnational Threats Project, Terrorism: New Activities of al Qaeda Allies in Africa, Center For Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Volume 6, Number 5, May 2008

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Adams, J., In N. Africa, Al Qaeda offshoot claims six Western hostages, The Christian Science Monitor, February 2009

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approved GSPC's merger in a videotape released on September 11, 2006. AQIM has since claimed responsibility for attacks under its new name.25

Somalia/GulfofAdenandAlShabaabGroup
Open Source Center has no articles between January 1994 and December 1999; one article between January 2000 and December 2005; and 1,686 articles from January 2006 and June 2009. Nexis has two articles between January 1995 and December 1999; 25 articles between January 2000 and December 2005, and more than 3000 articles between January 2006 and June 2009. In 2007, Somali pirates began a trend of attacking humanitarian relief vessels and using more violent techniques for their attacks. This prompt the international community to provide escorts of foreign military vessels to World Food Program vessels; and later on the 2 June 2008 UN Resolution 1816 authorizing foreign military vessels to enter Somalias territorial waters, with the consent of the Somali government, to use all necessary means to combat maritime piracy in a manner consistent with international law.26 In November 2008, Somali pirates became the attention of the world when they hijacked the Sirius Star, an oil tanker worth about $150 million, while en route from Saudi Arabia to the United States and at 450 nautical miles of the Kenyan coast. The Sirius Star is so far the largest vessel ever hijacked. On 9 January 2009, the Saudi owners paid an alleged ransom of $3 million and the ship was released with the crew unharmed.27

25

Vriens, L., Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or L'Organisation Al-Qada au Maghreb Islamique (Formerly Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat or Groupe Salafiste pour la Prdication et le Combat), Council For Foreign Relations, July 2008

26

Nincic, D.J., Maritime Piracy: Implications for Maritime Energy Security, Journal of Energy Security, February 2009 Nincic, D.J., Maritime Piracy: Implications for Maritime Energy Security, Journal of Energy Security, February 2009

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Michael Maples, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, stated on 10 March 2009 at a Congressional Hearing that recent propaganda from both al-Qaida and the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab highlighting their shared ideology suggests a formal merger announcement is forthcoming. Al-Shabaab has conducted near-daily attacks against regional government and security forces in Somalia, including suicide VBIED attacks in Puntland and Somaliland. Cooperation among al-Qaida inspired extremists throughout the region strengthens al-Qaida's foothold in Africa. Al-Shabaab is a group of Somali Islamists developed after the loss of the Islamic Courts Union caused by the intervention of the Ethiopian military and the Somalia Transitional Federal Government in 2006.28 It has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States Department of State.29 On June 2009, the author attended a forum on Piracy and the Crisis in Somalia hosted by the United States Institute of Peace. The forum was intended to provide Somali perspectives and the panelists were Abukar Arman, peace activist and writer; Shukria Dini, Somali-Canadian feminist researcher; and Qamar Ibrahim, African advocate and worker at the Partnership of African Communities. The panelists stated the following facts: Somalia has been a lawless land since 1992 It has no social services since 1991. Last statistics reported dated from 1992. In other words, there are no numbers for the past 17 years. There are about 1 million Somali displaced, and 3.5 million are on the verge of starvation The neighboring governments do not recognize and/or support the transitional government from Puntland. It is NOT in the best interest of Kenya and Ethiopia to have a stable Somalia country.

28

Ryu, A., Former Members of Radical Somali Group Give Details of Their Group, Voice of America, January 2007 United States Department of State (2008-03-18). Designation of Al-Shabaab. Press release. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/mar/102338.htm. Retrieved on 2008-03-18.

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No financial institutions and no infrastructure Fast development of Islamic extremism

Abukar Arman made numerous complains about the fashion of reporting piracy in Somalia. He believes that American media outlets are regurgitating news without providing an analysis with the country background in order to better understand the origin of piracy, which he attributes to some corrupted Puntland officials who after developing a force to stop the illegal fishing off the coast of Somalia came with the idea of hijacking food relief vessels. In fact, he also stated that pirates board vessels with intel in hand they know the name some of the crew members, the number of people on board, and other sophisticated data. Arman argues that these pirates are illiterate thus some high ranking individuals are providing them with this sophisticated analysis. Arman also defended Al-Shabaab against allegations of potential involvement of the group with piracy based on the logic that Al-Shabaab professes Sharia law, which forbids robbery. During the Q&A section, I remarked that when Al-Qaeda was operating under the protection of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Sharia law was put aside if the forbidden act was used to inflict damage to the infidel. Thus, based on Al-Zawahiris support to Al-Shabaab, there are no guarantees that Al-Shabaab will not twist Sharia law to fill up its coffers. Note that Abukar Arman serves as the President of the CAIR-Columbus, an organization allegedly associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic terrorist groups.

Conclusion
In June 2008, the RAND Corp published a study titled Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: A Rising Challenge for U.S. Security30 in which states that although piracy events have increased by 68% between 2000 and 2006, there is little evidence to state that piracy and terrorism are colluding. RAND further explains that the pirates goals are monetary gains and the terrorists goals are political statements.

30

RAND Air Force Project, Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: A Rising Challenge for U.S. Security, RAND Corp, 2008

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I must disagree with this assertion of lack of collusion because open source information indicates that members of Abu Sayyaf, Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and Al-Shabaab in Somalia are using piracy attacks as a mean to fund their operations. Note the surge in piracy attacks in Somalia and Nigeria and the support given by Al-Zawahiri to AIQM and Al-Shabaab. The United States and its allies have made difficult for terrorist organizations to collect funds through charity donations and other previously used means of money laundering. Therefore, the Sunni insurgency operating in Nigeria and Somalia have followed the Abu Sayyaf model of resorting to piracy to enlarge the terrorists coffers. As stated, the author believes that Islamic terrorist organizations are involved in piracy and armed robberies at sea but their involvement is not an end (terrorist attack) but a mean to collect money to fund their operations. Thus, as members of Al-Qaeda migrate from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Africa, piracy attacks could potentially increase in areas such as Dar Es Salaam (Tanzania) where pirates are currently targeting ships in port, anchorages and surrounding waters31, and where Al-Qaeda bombed a US Embassy in 1998.

31

ICC, Piracy Prone Areas and Warning at http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=70&Itemid=58 (accessed on 16 June 2009)

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Consulted Bibliography: Davis, A., Terrorism and the Maritime Transportation System, WingSpan Press, April 2008 RAND Air Force Project, Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: A Rising Challenge for U.S. Security, RAND Corp, 2008 Transnational Threats Update-Transnational Threats Project, Terrorism: New Activities of al Qaeda Allies in Africa, Center For Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Volume 6, Number 5, May 2008 Two Decades of Jihad in Algeria: the GIA, the GSPC, and Al-Qaida, The NEFA Foundation, Evan F. Kohlmann, May 2007, www.nefafoundation.org Guide to Wahhabi Organizations in North America, Appendix B: Overview of Selected Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), Jamaluddin B. Hoffman Ward, A., and Hackett, J., Piracy and Maritime Terror in Southeast Asia, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 10, Issue 6, July 2004 Abuza, Z., The Demise of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Southern Philippines, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Vol. 1, Issue 7, June 2008 Raymond, C.A., Piracy in Southeast Asia New Trends, Issues and Responses, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2005 Nincic, D.J., Maritime Piracy: Implications for Maritime Energy Security, Journal of Energy Security, February 2009

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