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1. Libi vs.

IAC FACTS: Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with the latter after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day, there were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same gun. The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA. ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such damages. HELD: The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. However, Wendells mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise admitted that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free access of the mothers bag where the key was kept. The spouses failed to observe and exercise the required diligence of a good father to prevent such damage. FACTS Son of Libi spouses, Wendell was a sweetheart of the private respondents (Spouses Gotiong) named Julie Ann who eventually fell out of love from the former (due to being sadistic and irresponsible) which led to a fateful day of their death by a gunshot from a gun owned by Wendells father. The Gotiongs believe that Wendell caused the death of their daughter and himself due to frustration while the Libis believe that some unknown third party did it in relation to Wendells work as informer for Anti-Narcotics Unit. Spouses Gotiong sued Libi spouses for damages invoking Art. 2180 of the Civil Code for Vicarious liability of Parents with respect to their minor children. RTC ruled in favor of Libis by reason of lack of evidence. CA held the reverse holding them subsidiarliy liable. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N Libi spouses are subsidiarily liable in the instant case. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI CA wrongly interpreted the vicarious liability of parents. It must be primary using Article 101 of the RPC. If subsidiary only: the diligence of bonus pater familias will not lie since they will answer for the minor at any rate but if primary: it will be direct, hence the defense. In this case however, the parents as still failed to discharge themselves of any defense because evidence shows Wendell knew of the location of the keys for the Gunsafe, Libis do not know of his being a CANU agent and photography of Julie Ann was with the accused upon his death with the gun. 2. Exconde v. Capuno

FACTS: Dante Capuno, 15 years old, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School, was instructed by the city schools supervisor to attend a parade in honor of Rizal in San Pablo City. From the school, the students boarded a jeep, and when it started to run, Dante took hold of the wheel, while the driver sat on his left side (remember that the steering wheel is at the LEFT side). The jeep turned turtle and 2 passengers died. Delfin Capuno, the father, was not with Dante at the time of the accident, nor did he know that Dante was going to attend a parade. He only found out after the accident when Dante told him about it. Criminal case: TC: Dante was convicted for Double homicide through reckless imprudence. CA: affirmed Civil case: against Delfin and Dante Capuno (reserved by Sabina Exconde, mother of one of the deceased): TC: Convicted ONLY Dante to pay the damages. CA: certified to SC ISSUE: WON Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son for damages. HELD: Yes. TC Modified. Delfin and Dante are jointly and severally liable for the damages. Art. 1903 applies: The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those persons for whom another is responsible. The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them. Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. 1. School is NOT liable Art. 1903 (now 2180) about teachers applies only to institutions of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Balintawak Elementary School is an academic institution, hence neither the teacher nor the head can be held liable. Even if Dante was on the jeep pursuant to the city school supervisors instruction, neither the head of the school nor the city schools supervisor could be held liable because Dante was not a student of an institution of arts and trades. 2. Delfin, as the father IS liable. He failed to prove that he exercised all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent the damage. The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, or the mother as the case may be is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them. This parental authority imposes upon the parents the duty to support and instruct them in proportion to their means and gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation. How to avoid liability: prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage,

DISSENT: Reyes He wants TC affirmed (relieving Delfin of liability): There is no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic institutions. The phrase teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades does not qualify teachers but only heads of establishments. If the basis of presumption of negligence in Art. 1903 is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, hence, when the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the teacher, and not the parent should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody. Why? for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. If there is no authority, there can be no responsibility. Hence, Delfin should not be made liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent, and which he had every right to assume the school authorities would. He rebutted the presumption of negligence under 1903 when he proved that he entrusted custody of Dante to the school authorities. RULES: Majority: Liability of teachers or directors are limited to institutions of arts and trades. Dissent: 1. Art. 1903 interpretation too limited. Teacher, master, or in the absence of, school authorities should be liable for the negligence. 2. Once the parent entrusts custody to the school authorities, presumption is rebutted and burden of proof is shifted to claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable. 3. Araneta v. Arreglado Manuel S. Araneta and Benjamin Araneta, father and son, appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in its case No. 24322) sentencing defendants Juan Arreglado, his wife, and his son, Jose Dario Arreglado, to pay the former only P3,943 damages in lieu of the P112,000 claimed in the complaint. FACTS: On March 7, 1951, while plaintiff Benjamin Araneta was talking with the other students of the Ateneo de Manila while seated atop a low ruined wall bordering the Ateneo grounds along Dakota Street, in the City of Manila, Dario Arreglado, a former student of the Ateneo, chanced to pass by. Those on the wall called Dario and conversed with him, and in the course of their talk, twitted him on his leaving the Ateneo and enrolling in the De La Salle College. Apparently, Arreglado resented the banter and suddenly pulling from his pocket a Japanese Lugar pistol (licensed in the name of his father Juan Arreglado), fired the same at Araneta, hitting him in the lower jaw, and causing him to drop backward, bleeding profusely. Helped by his friends, the injured lad was taken first to the school infirmary and later to the

Singian Hospital, where he lay hovering between life and death for three days. The vigor of youth came to his rescue; he rallied and after some time finally recovered, the gunshot wound left him with a degenerative injury to the jawbone (mandible) and a scar in the lower portion of the face, where the bullet had plowed through. The behavior of Benjamin was likewise affected, he becoming inhibited and morose after leaving the hospital. Dario Arreglado was indicted for frustrated homicide (Criminal Case No. 15143, of Manila) and pleaded guilty; but in view of his youth, Dario being only 14 years of age, the court suspended the hearings as prescribed by Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, and ordered him committed to the care of Mr. Deogracias Lerma, under the supervision of the Commissioner of Social Welfare, conformably to Republic Act No. 47. Because Arreglado observed proper conduct and discipline while on probation, the court, upon recommendation of the Social Welfare Administrator, finally discharged him on May 22, 1953, and quashed the criminal case. Thereafter, on October 13, 1954, an action was instituted by Araneta and his father against Juan Arreglado, his wife, and their son, Dario, to recover material, moral and exemplary damages. After trial, the Court of First Instance found that Dario Arreglado's father had acted negligently in allowing his son to have access to the pistol used to injure Benjamin Araneta, and sentenced defendants to pay P3,943, damages and attorney's fees, as stated at the beginning of this decision. The trial Judge also overruled the claim of the defense that because the court failed to award any damages to Araneta in the criminal case, a separate civil action for their recovery is now foreclosed. The Arreglados did not appeal the decision but the Aranetas did; and in view of the amount originally claimed (P112,000), the case was taken directly to this Court. We agree with the appellants that the damages awarded by the lower court for the injuries suffered by Benjamin Araneta are inadequate. In allowing not more than P1,000 as compensation for the "permanent deformity and something like an inferiority complex" as well as for the "pathological condition on the left side of the jaw" caused to said plaintiff, the court below overlooked the clear evidence on record that to arrest the degenerative process taking place in the mandible and restore the injured boy to a nearly normal condition, surgical intervention was needed, for which the doctor's charges would amount to P3,000, exclusive of hospitalization fees, expenses and medicines. Furthermore, the operation, according to Dr. Dio, would probably have to be repeated in order to effectuate a complete cure, while removal of the scar on the face obviously demanded plastic surgery. We are not impressed by the reasoning of the court a quo in refusing to consider the cost of plastic treatment as a proper element of the indemnity for damages. It argued that . . . if this was really necessary it is peculiar that the father, Manuel S. Araneta, would have allowed himself to wait for the outcome of this case in order to secure funds to bring his son to America; it is admitted that plaintiff is a man of much more than moderate means and no father in his position would have let pass the present situation; he would without loss of time, have taken his son to America, cost what it may, if it was necessary; and the fact that he has waited and waited in the opinion of the

court would prove that after all plastic surgery was not and is not very necessary. (Rec. App., p. 63) The father's failure to submit his son to a plastic operation as soon as possible does not prove that such treatment is not called for. The damage to the jaw and the existence of the scar in Benjamin Araneta's face are physical facts that can not be reasoned out of existence. That the injury should be treated in order to restore him as far as possible to his original condition is undeniable. The father's delay, or even his negligence, should not be allowed to prejudice the son who has no control over the parent's action nor impair his right to a full indemnity. We do not believe that plaintiffs-appellants should recover the cost of a plastic operation and surgical treatment in the United States, since their own experts asserted that the operation could be competently performed here by local practitioners. Still, taking into account the necessity and cost of corrective measures to fully repair the damage; the pain suffered by the injured party; his feelings of inferiority due to consciousness of his present deformity, as well as the voluntary character of the injury inflicted; and further considering that a repair, however skillfully conducted, is never equivalent to the original state, we are of the opinion that the indemnity granted by the trial court should be increased to a total of P18,000. It is also the hope of the Court that the award in the present case will remind licensed possessors of firearms of their peremptory duty to adequately safeguard such dangerous weapons at all times, and to take all requisite measures to prevent minors and other unauthorized parties from having access thereto. Competent observers have recently called attention to the fact that the growing teenage hooliganism in our society is principally due to parent's complacency in and neglect of their progeny. Appellants complain that the court should have allowed more than P500 to compensate Benjamin's lost school year. We find this complaint unjustified, since the damages due to the lost schooling and the resulting reduction in the lad's future earning capacity are manifestly speculative, and may not exist at all. Moreover, the record does not show facts sufficient to justify a larger award on this account. As to the moral damages for pain, anxiety and suffering undergone by the father, Manuel Araneta, our ruling inStrebel vs. Figueras, 96 Phil., 321, has settled that question. We held there that moral damages in case of physical injuries are only recoverable by the party who suffered them and not by his next of kin, unless there is statutory provision to the contrary. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed with the modification that plaintiff Benjamin Araneta shall recover damages in the amount of Eighteen Thousand Pesos (P18,000.00) from defendants Dario Arreglado and his parents Mr. and Mrs. Juan Arreglado, who shall answer in solidum for the payment of the indemnity, pursuant to Article 2194 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Costs against appellees. So ordered. 4. Salen and Salbanera v. Balce FACTS: Carlos Salen (single) died due to wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, 18, single and living with Jose Balce, his father. Gumersindo was convicted of homicide and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay Carlos heirs

indemnity. But Gumersindo was insolvent, hence Severino Salen and Elena Salbanera (Salens), the parents (and heirs) of Carlos, demanded from Jose to pay but he refused. Hence the suit. TC: dismissed. Sustained Joses theory that the civil liability of Gumersindo arises from his criminal liability and therefore must be determined under the RPC, and not under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, which only applies to obligations arising form QDs. There is no law which holds the father either primarily or subsidiarily liable for the civil liability incurred by the son who is a minor of 18 years. ISSUE: WON Jose Balce can be held SUBSIDIARILY liable to pay the indemnity his son was sentenced to pay in the criminal case against him (the son). HELD: Yes. Jose Balce is ordered to pay the indemnity. TC reversed. As a rule, the civil liability arising form a crime shall be governed by the RPC. But since the RPC is silent as to the subsidiary liability of parents for a minor over 15, who acts with discernment, resort should be made to the general law which is the Civil Code. And Art. 2180 is the law that applies. To hold that Art. 2180 applies only to QDs will result in an absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes, the father or mother may be held subsidiarily liable, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. The void that apparently exists in the RPC is subserved by 2180 of the Civil Code as may be gleaned from some recent SC decisions: Exconde v. Capuno-where the father was held solidarily liable for the crime his son committed. Araneta v. Arreglado-(where Arreglado fired at Araneta because he resented the remarks Araneta made about his leaving Ateneo and enrolling in La Salle. The court convicted Arreglado but suspended his sentence because he was only 14.) The court held the father, the mother and the son to pay the Aranetas damages. SEVERINO SALEN and ELENA SALBANERA vs. JOSE BALCE Facts: Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died from wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of defendant who was then single, 18 yrs old and was living with defendant. As a result of C. Salen's death, G. Balce was accused and convicted of homicide and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay the amount of P2,000.00. Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant before CFI to recover the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest. Defendant, in his answer, set up the defense that the law upon which plaintiffs predicate their right to recover does not here apply for the reason that law refers to quasidelicts and not to criminal cases. CFI sustained the theory of defendant. Issue: WON appellee can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity in accordance with Art. 2180 of the CC. Ruling: Judgment reversed. Art 2180 CC applies in the case at bar. To hold otherwise would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand

subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void that apparently exists in the RPC (art.101) is subserved by this particular provision of our CC, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of the SC which cover equal or identical cases.

The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic incident. In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident. FACTS: Adelberto Bundoc, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle, causing injuries which resulted in her death. Adelbertos natural parents for damages. Adelberto was living with his natural parents at the time of the accident but a petition for his adoption has already been filed by the Rapisura spouses. This petition was granted after the shooting of Jennifer. The Tamargos filed: 1. criminal complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence but Adelberto was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he had acted without discernment. 2. civil complaint against the Bundocs, the natural parents of Adelberto. The Bundocs claimed that the Rapisuras should be held liable instead, that they are indispensable parties because parental authority had already shifter to them the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. TC: dismissed the complaint. The Bundocs are not indispensable parties to the action. CA: dismissed petition. Tamargos lost their right to appeal. ISSUE: Who are the indispensable parties? The Bundocs or the Rapisuras? HELD: The natural parents, the Bundocs, are the indispensable parties. CA reversed and set aside, complaint reinstated and case remanded. When Adelberto shot Jennifer, parental authority was still lodged in the Bundocs, his natural parents. Hence, they who had actual custody of Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Ratio: The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on QD, under 2176 against him. On the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. The principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of imputed negligence, where a person is not only liable for the torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents their parental authoritywhich includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.

5. Paleyan vs. Bangkili

Facts: Carlos Bangkili, 19 yrs. of age killed Balos Paleyan. As a result of the death of Balos Paleyan and of the wounding of another victim, Bangkili was accused of the crime of homocide with less serious physical injuries. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly, but no desicion as to the civil indemnity which should be paid to the heirs of the deceased was made. Plaintiffs filed an action for damages against Carlos Bangkili and his mother, Victoria Bangkili. Complaint was dismissed against Victoria because his son was already 19 yrs. of age at the time he committed the offense. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON the mother of Carlos should be liable with him for the amount which he was sentenced to pay considering that he was then a minor of 19 yrs. Ruling: Victoria Bangkili is liable solidarily with her son. Ratio: Art. 2180 is aplicable in this case. Considering that her son, although living with her, was already 19 yrs. of age and hence mature enough to have a mind of his own. This fact is not a legal defense, however, and does not exempt the appellent from her responsibility as parent and natural guardian. Art. 2180 does not provide for any exemption except proof that the defendant parent "observed all the diligence of a god father of a family to prevent damage." 6. Tamargo v. CA

FACTS: On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, 10 yrs old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. A civil complaint for damages was filed by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without discernment. Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted on, 18 November 1982, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.

7. Cuadra v. Monfort Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were both classmates in Mabini Elementary School Bacolod City. In July 1962, their teacher assigned to weed the school premises. While they were doing so, MT Monfort found a headband and she jokingly shouted it as an earthworm and thereafter tossed it MT Cuadra who was hit in her eye. MT Cuadras eye got infected. She was brought to the hospital; her eyes were attempted to be surgically repaired but she nevertheless got blind in her right eye. MT Cuadras parents sued Alfonso Monfort (MT Monforts dad) based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court ruled that Monfort should pay for actual damages (cost of hospitalization), moral damages and attorneys fees. ISSUE: Whether or not Monfort is liable under Article 2180. HELD: No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or death, the mother, is responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the Alfonso Monfort could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the childs character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents. JUSTICE BARREDO Dissenting: MT Monfort is already 13 years old and should have known that by jokingly saying aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her, it was likely that something would happen to her friend, as in fact, she was hurt. There is nothing in the record that would indicate that he had properly advised his daughter to behave properly and not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates, he can be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in the record to show that he had done anything at all to even try to minimize the damage caused upon by his child. 8. Joaquin v. Aniceto This case comes to Us for review directly from the Court of First Instance of Manila. The facts are not in dispute. They are as follows: While Pilar Joaquin was on the sidewalk of Aviles Street, Manila, on April 27, 1960, a taxicab driven by Felix Aniceto and owned by Ruperto Rodelas bumped her As a result, she suffered physical injuries. At the trial of this case, the plaintiff blocked all attempts of Rodelas to prove that, as employer, he had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee, on the ground that such a defense is not available in a civil action brought under the Penal Code to recover the subsidiary civil liability arising from the crime. The lower court sustained plaintiff's objection. However, it dismissed the case on the ground that in the absence of a final judgment of conviction against the driver in the criminal case, any action to enforce the employer's subsidiary civil liability would be premature. Such liability, the trial court added, may only be enforced on proof of the insolvency of the employee. Hence, this appeal WJQuMf. The issue in this case is: May an employee's primary civil liability for crime and his employer's subsidiary liability therefor be proved in a separate civil action even while the criminal case against the employee is still pending? To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract, quasicontract, crime and quasi-delict.1According to appellant, her action is one to enforce the civil liability arising from crimes. With respect to obligations arising from crimes, Article 1161 of the New Civil Code provides: Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary, Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. (Emphasis supplied) The Revised Penal Code provides in turn that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable"2and that in default of the persons criminally liable, employers, teachers persons and corporations engaged in any kind of industry shall be civilly liable for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices or employees in the discharge of their duties.3 As this Court held in City of Manila v. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil. 586: ... The Penal Code authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its applicability providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. It is now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable, the following requisites must be present: (1) That an employee has committed a crime in the discharge of his duties; (2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability; (3) that the employer is engaged Aniceto was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Municipal Court (now the City Court) of Manila. He was subsequently found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment. However, no ruling was made on his civil liability to the offended party in view of the latter's reservation to file a separate civil action for damages for the injuries suffered by her. Aniceto appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of First Instance of Manila. While the criminal case was thus pending appeal, Pilar Joaquin, the injured party, filed this case for damages in the Court of First Instance of Manila, in accordance with the reservation which she had earlier made. Felix Aniceto and Ruperto Rodelas, driver and owner, respectively, of the taxicab were made party defendants.

in some kind of industry. (1 Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code 794 [1964]) Without the conviction of the employee, the employer cannot be subsidiarily liable. Now, it is no reason to bring such action against the employer on the ground that in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, Article 33 of the Civil Code authorizes a civil action that is "entirely separate, and distinct from the criminal action," (Carangdang v. Santiago, 51 O.G. 2878; Reyes v. De la Rosa, 52 O.G. 6548; Dyogi v. Yatco, G. R. No. L-9623, January 22, 1957). Can Article 33 above cited be made applicable to an employer in a civil action for subsidiary liability? The answer to this question is undoubtedly in the negative. What this article 33 authorizes is an action against the employee on his primary civil liability. It cannot apply to an action against the employer to enforce his subsidiary civil liability as stated above, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case. Any action brought against him before the conviction of his employee is premature. In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice, between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Articles 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. (See Barredo v. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607; Parker v. Panlilio, et al., 91 Phil. 1) If he chooses an action for quasi-delict, he may hold an employer liable for the negligent act of the employee subject, however, to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. (Art. 2180, Civil Code) On the other hand, should he choose to prosecute his action under Article 100 of the Penal Code, he can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon prior conviction of the employee. While a separate and independent civil action for damages may be brought against the employee under Article 33 of the Civil Code, no such action may be filed against the employer on the latter's subsidiary civil liability because such liability is governed not by the Civil Code but by the Penal Code, under which conviction of the employee is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. If the court trying the employee's liability adjudges the employee liable, but the court trying the criminal action acquits the employee, the subsequent insolvency of the employee cannot make the employer subsidiary liable to the offended party or to the latter's heirs. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. 9. Manalo v. Robles Transpo FACTS: -On August 9, 1947, a taxicab owned and operated by defendant Robles Transportation Company, Inc. (the Company) and driven by Hernandez its driver, collided with a passenger truck. In the course of and a result of the accident, the taxicab ran over Armando Manalo, an eleven year old, causing him physical injuries which resulted in his death several days later. -Hernandez was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence and after trial was found guilty. He served out his sentence but failed to pay the indemnity.

2 writs of execution were issued against him to satisfy the amount but both writs were returned unsatisfied by the sheriff. -On February 17, 1953, plaintiffs Emilio Manalo and his wife Clara Salvador, father and mother respectively of Armando filed the present action against the Company to enforce its subsidiary liability, pursuant to Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code. -It also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint unless and until the convicted driver Hernandez was included as a party defendant, the Company considering him an indispensable party. The TC and CA both correctly ruled that Hernandez was not an indispensable party defendant. The Company is now before SC. -To prove their case against the defendant Company, the plaintiffs introduced a copy of the decision in the criminal case convicting Hernandez of homicide through reckless imprudence, the writs of execution to enforce the civil liability, and the returns of the sheriff showing that the two writs of execution were not satisfied because of the insolvency of Hernandez, the sheriff being unable to locate any property in his name. Over the objections of the Company, the trial court admitted this evidence and based its decision in the present case on the same. -The Company contends that this kind of evidence is inadmissible. The Company also claims that in admitting as evidence the sheriff's return of the writs of execution to prove the insolvency of Hernandez, without requiring said opportunity to cross-examine said sheriff. ISSUE: WON the Company is correct. HELD: NO. The Company is mistaken. A sheriff's return is an official statement made by a public official in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law and forming part of official records, and is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. (Rule 39, section 11 and Rule 123, section 35, Rules of Court.) The sheriff's making the return need not testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry. In the case of Antillon vs. Barcelon, 37 Phil., 151 citing Wigmore on Evidence, this court said: To the foregoing rules with reference to the method of proving private documents an exception is made with reference to the method of proving public documents executed before and certified to, under the land of seal of certain public officials. The courts and the legislature have recognized the valid reason for such an exception. The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed, the occasion in which the officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness is numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which testimony is not needed from official statements; host of official would be found devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witness in court or delivering their depositions before an officer. The work of Administration of government and the interest of the public having business with officials would alike suffer in consequence. And this Court added: The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their several trust with accuracy and fidelity; and therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and circumstances of each a case may appear to require. 10. Steinmetz v. Valdez Not raised in this matter but a matter purely of law, it has risen to this superiority, by virtue of a judgment of the Court

of Appeals. The facts are undisputed and that the judgment appealed from are substantially as follows: At the intersection of the streets of Azcarraga and Lepanto City of Manila, the 27th of April 1938, while the plaintiffappellant was driving his car along Calle Azcarraga's vehicle collided with defendant-appellee, that the seasoning was crossing the intersection of that street and that of Lepanto. At the time of the collision, the appellee's car was led by his driver, Basil Bayukan. As a result of this collision, the driver was sued and convicted for the crime of property damage.Since the mentioned driver was unable to meet the compensation to which he was ordered to pay the applicant submitted the application, object of appeal, to try to collect from the defendant-appellee such compensation. In support of its claim, the appellant invokes the provisions of Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which copy reads as follows: ART. 103. - Civil Liability subsidiary of others. - The subsidiary liability established in the preceding article shall also be extended to the masters, teachers, individuals and companies engaged in any kind of industry, for the crimes they had committed by their servants, disciples, journeymen, apprentices or dependent on the performance of its obligations or service. The provisions of this article are negative the contention of the appellant. This acknowledged that the defendantappellee is a private person who has no business or industry, and use your car for private purposes. Clearly, then, that does not fall within the classification made by the said Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This proved that at the time of the accident, the appellee was not in his car, and more, exercised all diligence in the selection of his driver. The case is therefore identical to that of Rosalio Marquez, etc.. against Bernardo Castillo, R.G. No. 46237, whose decision was promulgated on 27th of September 1939. Therefore be applied in this case the doctrine established at that. We confirm, therefore, the court ruling in its entirety, with costs in both instances by the appellant. So ordered.

Appeal on a pure question of law from an order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. The lower court, after noting that the case was on appeal before it from the Bacolod city court's order dated March 30, 1966 dismissing plaintiff's complaint, related in its own dismissal order of August 29, 1966 the factual background of the case thus: "(I)t appears that in the evening of February 1, 1961, while Antonio Regoles was driving the truck of the defendant Federico Serfino, through his negligence and carelessness, said truck collided with another truck parked on the right side of the road near kilometer 5 in the Municipality of Talisay, Negros Occidental. As a consequence of said collision his coemployee Artemio Jamelo suffered injuries and he died. The mother of the late Artemio Jamelo filed in the Court of First Instance Civil Case No. 6198, entitled 'Anita Jamelo vs. Antonio Regoles' for damages on May 15, 1961. On August 26, 1963 the Court of First Instance rendered a decision declaring the defendant Antonio Regoles responsible for the death of Artemio Jamelo, and ordered Antonio Regoles to pay P6,000.00 to the plaintiff Anita Jamelo and to pay an additional sum of P2,000.00 as moral damages. The Court of Appeals, affirmed on June 10, 1965, the decision of the Court of First Instance. On October 25, 1965, a writ of execution was issued by the Clerk of Court. On November 17, 1965 the provincial sheriff of Negros Occidental returned unsatisfied the writ of execution, stating that the defendant Antonio Resoles was insolvent. Consequently, the plaintiff Anita Jamelo filed this present action against the defendant Federico Serfino for subsidiary liability as owner of the truck and employer of the driver Antonio Regoles, claiming that said defendant Federico Serfino is subsidiarily liable to pay the amount of P8,000.00 adjudged by the Court of Appeals against the defendant driver Antonio Regoles who was insolvent." 1 The lower court then recounted that "(T)he defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, and if there is any action, same has already prescribed. Defendant brought (out) the fact that there was no criminal complaint filed against the driver Antonio Regoles. Plaintiff filed only a Civil Case No. 6198 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the driver Antonio Regoles. The present defendant owner of the truck, Federico Serfino, was not included as one of the party defendants. The plaintiff evidently filed this present complaint under the provisions of Art. 103 in relation with Art. 102 of the Revised Penal Code. Defendant contends that, there being no judgment in a criminal case filed against the driver Antonio Regoles, the defendant in this present case Federico Serfino is not subsidiarily liable." 2 On the strength of Martinez vs. Barredo 3 ruling that the judgment of conviction, in the absence of any collusion between the driver-accused and the offended party, binds civilly the employer as the person subsidiarily liable under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code such liability not being a primary liability under the provisions on quasi-delict of the Civil Code but "a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his driver's criminal negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action" the lower court found defendant's motion to dismiss to be meritorious. The lower court held that "subsidiary liability presuposes that there was a criminal action. If no criminal action was instituted, the employer's liabilitywould not be predicated on Art. 103, (Revised Penal Code)" and accordingly ordered the dismissal of plaintiff's action, which sought to declare



FACTS: On May 9, 1975, Joselito Aizon, the driver-employee of an Isuzu Passenger Bus operated by Felipe Aizon, caused the bus to turn turtle as a result of which two of his passengers on board sustained injuries which caused their death. Thereafter, an information was filed in the CFI of Zamboanga City charging the accused with double homicide through reckless imprudence. Upon arraignment, respondent pleaded guilty and the court rendered a judgment convicting him and to pay the amount of P12, 000.00. Due to the insolvency of the accused, petitioner Lucia S. Pajarito, mother of the deceased passenger, filed with the court a motion for the issuance of subsidiary writ of execution against the operator Felipe Aizon. The court denied petitioner's motion for subsidiary writ of execution. ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in denying the motion for subsidiary writ of execution. HELD: Yes, the institution of the criminal action carries with it the institution of the civil action arising therefrom. Considering that Felipe Aizon does not deny that he was the registered operator of the bus, the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of judgment. 12. Jamelo v. Serfino

defendant-employer subsidiarily liable to pay the P8,000.00-damages awarded plaintiff in her civil judgment against the insolvent driver. Plaintiff-appellant formulates her issue on the case thus: "(I)s the conviction of the driver Antonio Regoles of the criminal case filed against him for the death of plaintiff's son, Artemio Jamelo, a condition precedent in order that an action for subsidiary liability based on Arts. 103 and 102 of the Revised Penal Code may lie against the defendant Federico Serfino as owner of the truck and employer of the driver Antonio Regoles?" and submits "that the conviction of the employee of the crime he was charged while in the performance of his duties is not a legal requirement before an action for subsidiary liability against his employer under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code could be predicated." Plaintiff-appellant's position is untenable. There can be no automatic subsidiary liability of defendant-employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code 4 where his employee has not been previously criminally convicted. What apparently unfortunately happened here is that plaintiff filed an independent civil action for damages solely against the erring driver Antonio Regoles based on his criminal negligence resulting in the death of plaintiff's son and secured the P8,000.00 damage judgment against him alone, which she could not collect, however, due to his insolvency. Plaintiff does not state what ever happened to the criminal action against him except to contend in her brief that in filing such independent civil action, "she loses her right to intervene in the prosecution of the said criminal case against Antonio Regoles and that its dismissal will not bar the civil action she had already filed against the said Antonio Regoles." 5 Such civil judgment is enforceable solely and exclusively against the only defendant therein, the erring driver, Regoles. But this is an entirely different matter from trying now to enforce said civil judgment in this action on the groundless basis of an alleged subsidiary liability against defendant-employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The basis is groundless without the prior criminal conviction of the driver-employee which is a condition sine qua non for the subsidiary liability of the employer to come into being under the cited provision of the Revised Penal Code. It is clear then that there having been no criminal conviction of the employee wherein his civil liability was determined and fixed, no subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code can be claimed against defendant-employer. A direct and separate civil action for damages against defendant-employer for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, subject however to the defense therein provided of proving due diligence in the choice and supervision of the employee, would have lain against defendant, if timely filed. Even if the Court were to hold that the action filed below by plaintiff-appellant could be considered such a separate and direct action for damages on the basis of quasi-delict against plaintiff's own disclaimer and insistence that she wants to enforce the non-existent subsidiary liability of defendant-employer the Court is constrained to sustain the dismissal order of the lower court, since such an action is now clearly barred by prescription as duly invoked by defendant-appellee in his dismissal motion. Actions based upon quasi-delicts prescribe after four years from the commission of the fault or negligent deed. 6 Since

the accident causing the death of plaintiff's son occurred on February 1, 1961, the filing of the complaint below only on March 10, 1966 was already barred by the lapse of more than a year beyond the four-year prescription period.

13. Mercado vs. Court of Appeals FACTS Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. are both pupils of the Lourdes Catholic School, Kanlaon, Quezon City. A pitogo (an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank) belonged to Augusto Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that the pitogo belonged to Augusto. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. thought it was Benedictos, so when Augusto attempted to get the pitogo from Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of the pitogo. Augusto resented his remark and pushed Manuel, Jr., which started the fight. After successive blows to Manuel, Jr., Augusto cut him on the right cheek with a piece of razor. Manuel, Jr. and his father filed a complaint against Ciriaco Mercado, Augustos father. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the father? o Petitioner: Since the incident occurred in the school during recess time, through no fault of the father. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI NO. CHILDREN WERE NOT IN THEIR CUSTODY. Petitioner rests his claim on the last paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code: o Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. That clause contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. 14. Palisoc v. Brillantes FACTS: Dominador Palisoc, 16 years old and Virgilio Daffon, of age, were classmates at the Manila Technical Institute. During recess, while working on a machine, Daffon made a remark that Palisoc was like a foreman because he was merely watching them. Irked, Palisoc bitch-slapped Daffon. In retaliation, Daffon gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, followed by fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc tried to retreat, but Daffon followed him. They exchanged fist blows until Palsioc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. He fainted and never regained consciousness. The autopsy report said he died of broken ribs and hemorrhage on the brain caused probably by strong fist blows. TC: Daffon liable for QD under 2176.

Absolved the following because 2180 is not applicable: It applied Mercado v. CAs definition of custody 1. Brillantes-member of the board of directors of MTI 2. Valenton, president of MTI 3. Quibulue, instructor of the class. ISSUE: WON the other defendants (board member, president and instructor) should be held solidarily liable with Daffon HELD: Yes. TC Modified. Daffon, Valenton and Quibulue are solidarily liable for damages. Under 2180, the president and instructor are liable solidarily for damages. Brillantes is not liable because he is a mere member of the board (he could have been liable if not for the incorporation of the school, making a corporation the owner of the school and not him anymore). The school cannot be held liable as it was not impleaded as a party defendant. The TC based its decision on Mercado v. CA, which in turn was based on a dictum in Exconde v. Capuno. The case here was instituted directly against the defendants (as against the cited cases where the father was the defendant). The parents here are not involved since Daffon was already of age at the time of the incident. MTI is unquestionably a nonacademic school. 1. custody The TC erred in absolving the defendants on the ground that they can only be held liable if they lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants-school officials. The phrase so long as (the students) remain in their custody means THE PROTECTIVE AND SUPERVISORY CUSTODY THAT THE

F2: In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years old) was watching Virgilio Daffon and Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in their laboratory class in the Manila Technical Institute (a school of arts and trades), Daffon scolded Palisoc for just standing around like a foreman. This caused Palisoc to slightly slap the face of Daffon and a fistfight ensued between the two. Daffon delivered blows that eventually killed Palisoc. The parents of Palisoc sued Daffon, the school president (Teodosio Valenton), the instructor (Santiago Quibulue), and the owner (Antonio Brillantes). The basis of the suit against Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that only Daffon is liable for damages and that Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes are not liable because under Article 2180, they are only liable so long as they [the students] remain in their custody. And that this means, as per Mercado vs Court of Appeals, that teachers or heads of establishments are only liable for the tortious acts of their students if the students are living and boarding with the teacher or other officials of the school which Daffon was not. 4. Mercado overturned. Reyes dissent rules! Adheres to Reyes dissent in Exconde: If the basis of presumption of negligence in Art. 1903 is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, hence, when the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the teacher, and not the parent should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody. Why? for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. If there is no authority, there can be no responsibility. Hence, the president and instructor must be held solidarily liable unless they prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage-which they failed to do. Dissent: Makalintal Wants Mercado sustained. Its unfair to hold teachers and/or administrative heads responsible for tortuous acts of their students considering the high number of enrollment. It would demand responsibility without the commensurate authority. Moreover, since the responsibility stems from loco parentis, then it follows that 1. custody= live in company (like for parents and guardians) and



The rationale of the liability of school heads and teachers is that they stand to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis, and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. 3. Governing Principle in law of torts In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some students themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.

2. responsibility limited to minors only (like for parents and guardians) Concurring: Reyes Concurs with majority but dissents with the dissent. Makalintals interpretation not in accord with the law. 1. Only the guardians and parents are exempt once the child reaches majority 2. The authority and custodial supervision (of the teachers and heads) over the pupil exists regardless of the pupils age. RULE: 1. Mercado doctrine abandoned/overturned 2. Wants to overturn Exconde (to include academic institutions in the scope of 2180) but has no chance because MTI is anon-academic institution. 3. Definition of custody= the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. 15. Amadora v. CA FACTS: Alfredo Amadora, 17 yrs old, was shot by his classmate Pablito Daffon, 3 days before his high school graduation, while he was at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recolectos either to finish a Physics experiment or to submit a Physics report. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. The Amadoras sued for damages against the School (Colegio), the dean of boys and, the physics teacher and Daffon. April 13, 1972: Alfredo Amadora, a high school graduating student of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos went to school to finish a Physics experiment. However, while he was in the auditorium, his classmate Pablito Daffon fired a gun that hit him. He died at 17. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Amadoras parents filed a civil action for damages under CC Art. 2180 against the school, its rector, HS principal, dean of boys & Physics teacher, plus Daffon & 2 other students thru their parents. Complaint against students was later dropped. CFI Cebu: defendants were liable in the sum of P294,984.00 (death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages & attorneys fees) CA: reversed, all defendants absolved completely. 1. As per Rules of Court (ROC) Rule 45, CC Art. 2180 is not applicable since the school was an academic institution of learning & not a school of arts & trades. 2. Students were not in custody of the school at the time of the incident since the semester had already ended. 3. No clear identification of the fatal gun. 4. Defendants exercised necessary diligence in preventing injury. Petitioners claim their son was still under schools custody because he went to school to comply w/a requirement for graduation. Respondents: Amadora went to school to submit a Physics report & he was no longer in their custody since the semester was over.

A gun was confiscated by Sergio Damaso, dean of boys, from Jose Gumban on April 7, 1972. It was an unlicensed pistol w/c was later on returned to Gumban w/o reporting such to the principal or taking further action. Gumban was one Daffons companions when the incident happened. Petitioners claim it was this gun that killed their son w/c respondents rebutted by saying there was no proof that they were one and the same. TC: defendants are liable for damages CA: All the defendants were absolved. Colegio is not a school of arts and trades and Daffon was not in custody since the semester already ended. ISSUE: Interpretation of Art. 2180 HELD: Petition denied. None are liable. The SC summarized 3 cases which have been decided in connection with 2180: Exconde-school not liable because it is not a school of arts and trades -Reyes dissent-rule was imposed on teachers in general and heads OF establishments of arts and trades. Mercado-reiterated Exconde. School not liable because it is not an establishment of arts and trades -Defined custody as living and boarding with the teacher Palisoc- Set aside/abandoned the doctrines in Exconde and Mercado. -Defined custody to mean that the protective and supervisory custody of the school and its heads and teachers over the students are in force so long as they remain in school including recess time. -in a footnote, Tehankee (the ponente) said that he agreed with Reyes in his Exconde dissent to include academic schools but had no chance because the school involed is a non-academic one. Amadora is the case! 1. Art. 2180 applies to both academic and nonacademic schools Reddendo Singula Singulis a. if academic- teacher is liable for the pupils and students (General Rule) b. if non-academic- head is liable for the apprentices (Exception) *But same vigilance is required! Reason for disparity: historically the heads of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of an academic school. There is no substantial distinction between an academic and a non-academic school insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school he is teaching. 2. Art. 2180 applies so long as the student is under the control and custody and within the school premises, regardless of whether the semester has

not yet begun or has already ended (Duration of Responsibility) Even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere in the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Art. 2180. Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence. 3. Liability imposed not on the school itself It should be noted that the liability imposed is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers and heads under the general principle of respondeat superior, it may exculpate itself by proof of exercise of diligence of bonus paterfamilias.defense which is also available to the teacher or the head. 4. Pupil not required to be a minor to hold teacher liable Unlike the parent who will be liable only for his minor child, the teacher is answerable for torts of his students regardless of the students age. Hence: 1. Alfredo Amadora was still in the schools custody when the incident happened 2. rector, high school principal and dean of boys NOT liable because none of them were the teacher-in charge (they only exercised a general authority and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher-in-charge) Dean of boys not liable although he earlier confiscated a gun because it was not shown that the gun he confiscated and the gun that was used in the shooting were the same. 3. Physics teacher not liable because there was no showing that he was negligent in his duties. His absence cannot be taken against him as he was not required to report to school that day. 4. Colegio not liable because 2180 does not apply to school but only to its teachers and heads. CONCURRING & DISSENTING: Melencio-Herrera -teacher in 2180 should not be limited to the teacher-incharge -the school may be held responsible under 2180 as the employer of the teachers and heads CONCURRING: Gutierrez, Jr. -reiterates the need for an amendment due to the nonexistent disparity between teachers of academic schools and heads of arts and trades RULE: 1. Custody definition

2. application of 2180 to both academic and non-academic schools 3. teachers is to pupils and students as heads is to apprentices 4. school not directly liable under 2180 par 7. NOTES: dangerous definition of custody because it is so broad (even if just walking around school enjoying its ambience and atmosphere) 16. FACTS: Ylarde vs. Aquino

1962: Sergio Banez started burying huge stones which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II because they were serious hazards to the schoolchildren October 7, 1963: Edgardo Aquino gathered 18 of his male pupils, aged 10 to 11, after class dismissal and ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. o The work was left unfinished. October 8, 1963: Aquino called Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde of the original 18 pupils to continue the digging o they dug until the excavation was 1 meter and 40 centimeters deep o Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging o When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, they got out of the hole o Aquino left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about 30 meters away to key to the school workroom where he could get some rope A few minutes after Aquino left, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. o without any warning at all, Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time o unfortunately for Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position o Ylarde sustained the following injuries:

1. Contusion with hematoma, left inguinal region and suprapubic region. 2. Contusion with ecchymosis entire scrotal region. 3. Lacerated wound, left lateral aspect of penile skin with phimosis 4. Abrasion, gluteal region, bilateral. 5. Intraperitoneal and extrapertitoneal extravasation of blood and urine about 2 liters. 6. Fracture, simple, symphesis pubis 7. Ruptured (macerated) urinary bladder with body of bladder almost entirely separated from its neck.

1. 2. 3.

3 days later, Novelito Ylarde died. Ylarde's parents filed a suit for damages against both Aquino and Soriano, principal lower court: digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence CA: affirmed

ii. he required the kids to remain inside the pit, knowing that a huge block was just nearby iii. the stone was obviously at the brink of falling, yet he require the kids to level the soil around the excavation iv. he left the kids v. he left the kids near an attractive nuisance b. the negligent act of Aquino in leaving the kids in such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of Ylarde. It was but natural for kids to play around c. digging was not part of work education/ d. a truly careful and cautious person wouldve acted in all contrast to the way Aquino did. 4. Ylarde imprudence cannot be charged with reckless

FACTS: Edgardo Aquino, a teacher in Gabaldon Primary School gathered his male students aged 10-11 to clean-up the remnants of WWII. They had to dig a hole to bury the concrete blocks. He left while the work was unfinished and the kids, jumped in the pit. One of the kids jumped on the concrete block causing it to fall in the pit and pinning Ylarde who was not able to get out of the in time. Ylarde sustained injuries which caused his death 3 days later. The Ylardes (mom and dad) sued Aquino and Soriano, the principal for damages. TC: dismissed the complaint. 1. digging was part of work education 2. Aquino exercised utmost diligence 3. Ylardes death was due to his own reckless imprudence. CA: Affirmed TC ISSUE: WON both Aquino and Soriano may be held liable. HELD: Aquino is liable for indemnity, ED and MD under 2176 (art. The petition is based on) and may be held liable under 2180. Soriano, as a head of an academic school, cannot be held liable. CA reversed and set aside. 1. Soriano cannot be held liable a. He is a Head of an academic school and not of a school of arts and trades (in line with Amadora) b. He did not order the digging 2. Ylarde may be held liable under 2180 as the teacher-in-charge He was negligent in his supervision and he failed to take the necessary precautions. BUT, the Ylardes based their petition on 2176.

The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience, The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. 17. PSBA vs. CA

FACTS: Carlos Bautista was stabbed to death by outsiders within PSBAs premises. The Bautistas sued PSBA and its corporate officers for damages. PSBA and its officers filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that 2180, as per jurisprudence, does not include academic institutions. TC: MTD denied CA: Affirmed TC coz 2180 applies to all kinds of educational institutions. ISSUE: WON PSBA can be held liable under 2180 HELD: No. But case is remanded to determine if PSBA failed to discharge its obligations under its contract with Bautista CA correct in denying MTD but on the wrong grounds. 1. Art. 2180 doe not apply because offender was not a student of PSBA Under 2180, the offender should be a pupil of the school. In this case, it was established that the offenders were not PSBA students. 2. PSBA may be held liable based on breach of contract

3. Aquino is liable for damages under 2176 (Q: WON the act or omission of Aquino amounting to fault or negligence has a direct causal connection to Ylardes death) a. 5 negligent acts of Aquino i. he shouldve used adult laborers and not 10 year olds

When a student enrolls, there is an established contract between him and the school, resulting in a bilateral obligation---therefore, this is not based on a QD which arises when parties are not bound by any contract. Although a QD may still arise even when there is a contract, if the act which breaches the contract is done in BF & be violative of Art. 21. In this case though, PSBAs negligence would only be relevant in the existence of a contract. PSBAs negligence cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Art. 21. RULE: Art. 2180 applies only if the offender was a student of the school 18. Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon

Absolved other defendants IAC: Affirmed but modified award ISSUE: WON Salvosa and BCF can be held solidarily liable with Abon for damages under 2180. HELD: No. Abon was not in the custody of BCF at the time of the incident. IAC Reversed in so far as it holds Salvosa and BCF solidarily liable with Abon. 1. Rationale for liability Reiterated Palisoc: The rationale of the liability of school heads and teachers is that they stand to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis, and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. 2. Abon was not in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon DEFINITION

FACTS: Maximo Soliman Jr, a student of the Republic Central Colleges, was shot by Jimmy Solomon, a security guard assigned to the school. Solomon was employed by RL Security Agency. Soliman sued Solomon, RCC and the RL for damages. RCC filed a MTD on the following grounds: 1. RCC not the employer of Solomon 2. Art. 2180 n/a because Solomon was not a student of RCC TC: granted MTD ISSUE: WON the RCC may be held liable under 2180 HELD: No. Because Solomon was not an employee of RCC and neither was he a student. But, under the case of PSBA, RCC may be held liable under the a contract. Case remanded to determine if there was a breach of contract.







RECESS BY ITS NATURE DOES NOT INCLUDE Plus, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute attending school or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school, as contemplated in the law.

1. Art. 2180, par 5 does not apply RCC was not the employer of Solomon. RCC was only a client of RL-the employer of Solomon, hence RCC had no hand in the selection and supervision process. 2. Arts. 2180 par. 7, 349, 350, & 352 does not apply Solomon was not a student of RCC. Hence, school had no substitute parental authority over him. 3. PSBA applies RCC may be held liable under the implied contract between RCC and Soliman. Under this contract, the school has an implicit obligation to provide students with an atmosphere conducive to learning. 19. Salvos v. IAC

Abon cannot be considered to have been in attendance in the school, or in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon. Plus, he was supposed to be working when the incident happened. 20. St. Francis High School vs. CA

FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, 13, and a freshman at St. Francis High School, drowned during a school picnic while trying to save a female teacher. The Castillos sued the school, the principal and the 6 teachers who were at the picnic for damages. TC: Held the 6 teachers solidarily liable for AD & MD Absolved the school and the principal Both appealed CA: Modified TC. Held the school, the principal and 4 teachers solidarily liable for AD, MD and ED. ISSUE: WON 2180 is applicable. HELD: No. CA set aside. No one is guilty under 2180. No MD coz case does not fall under any of the grounds for MD and they are not guilty of negligence. 1. None of them are guilty of either their own negligence or of the negligence of those under them

FACTS: Jimmy Abon, was a student of the BCF and an employee of AFP (as an armorer for the BCF-ROTC unit) with work premises inside the BCF. Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a commerce student of BCF with an unlicensed gun from the ROTC armory, at the BCF parking lot at around 8pm. He was convicted of Homicide. Napoleons heirs (Castros) sued for damages impleading Abon, The ROTC Commandant, B. Salvosa-president and chairman of BCF board, J. Salvosa-the EVP of BCF, the dean and BCF. TC: Solidary liability of Abon, B. Salvosa and BCF

2. School not liable under 2180 TO


HELD: No. 1. Balingit is not the manager contemplated in 2180 The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. The terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise DOES NOT INCLUDE THE MANAGER OF A CORPORATION . THE



ASSIGNED TASKS. The picnic was not a sanctioned school activity nor an extra-curricular activity.

3. The Principal is not liable under 2180 Mere knowledge of the picnic is not enough He did not consent to the picnic 4. Teachers are not negligent hence not liable instructors and scout masters who had knowledge in 1st aid and swimming were invited b. life savers were brought c.they did all that is humanly possible to save Ferdinand DISSENT: Padilla 1. teachers were negligent. a. They failed to observe the proper diligence BEFORE THE INCIDENT (water was deep, only oral instructions were given) b. The supposed life guards were not there! They were having a drinking spree 2. Principal was negligent He knew of the activity and he did not take the appropriate measures to ensure the safety of his students. 3. School is liable under 2180 par. 5 The negligence of an employee in causing injury or damage gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner and/or manager of the establishment. Activity was stamped with school authority. Many of the teachers were present, and the activity was organized by the teachers for the students. RULE: Liability only for failure to perform assigned tasks NOTES: Authority in saying that diligence should be BEFORE and not after the FACT Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Phil-American Forwarders, Inc FACTS: Fernando Pineda, driver of a Philippine American Forwarders freight truck hit a Philippine Rabbit Bus along a national highway. The bus driver suffered injuries and the bus was unusable for 79 days resulting in loss of income. Balingit, as the manager of PAF and Pineda were sued based on a QD. (Balingits defense was that he was not the employer of Pineda) TC: Dismissed complaint against Balingit as he is not the manger contemplated under 2180. ISSUE: WON Balingit is liable under 2180. (WON employers/owners/managers of an establishment/enterprise includes managers of corporations)









2. PAF is a corporation with a personality separate and distinct from that of Balingit (this was not alleged in the complaint). The argument that PAF is a mere business conduit of the Balingit spouses implies the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction. Since this was not raised in the lower court, it cannot be countenanced in this appeal. 5. Employers NOTES: JURIS TANTUM (REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION ) WHY?-coz hard for victim to prove that employer was not negligent (similar to res ipsa), hence employer should prove diligences as a defense WHY OWNER?-deeper prockets ***COMPILED ONLY***

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