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Functional Analysis Author(s): Robert Cummins Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 20 (Nov. 20, 1975), pp. 741-765 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024640 . Accessed: 07/01/2012 01:22
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VOLUME LXXII, NO 20, NOVEMBER 20, I975

ture of functionalanalysisand explanation,beginningwith the classic essays of Hempel in 1959 and Nagel in 1961, reveals that philosophicalresearchon this topic has almostwithout * assumptions: exceptionproceededunderthefollowing in is characterizationscience to explainthe (A) The pointof functional that or process whatever) mechanism, presence the item(organ, of characterized. is functionally effects is to its (B) For something perform function forit to havecertain to on a containing which contribute the performance system, effects of in, of, of someactivity or the maintenance some condition that containing system. we Puttingthese two assumptionstogether have: a function-ascribcharacterized ing statement explains the presenceof thefunctionally s item i in a system by pointingout that i is presentin s because it thisfusionof (A) and on has certaineffects s. Give or take a nicety, (B) constitutes the core of almost everyrecentattemptto give an account of functionalanalysisand explanation. Yet these assump* Cf, Carl Hempel, of in Analysis," Aspects Scientific "The Logic ofFunctional from ed., Gross, Llewellyn Explanation(New York:Free Press,1965),reprinted Symposium SociologicalTheory (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), and on BraceJovanovich, of ErnestNagel, The Structure Science(New York: Harcourt of 1961),ch. 12, sec. x. The assumptions, course,predateHempel's 1959 essay. Explanation (Cambridge: Scientific See, for instance,Richard Braithwaite, "Thoughtson Teleology," Press,1955),ch. x, and Israel Scheffler, University 1959): 265-284. of for Journal the Philosophy Science, x, 36 (February British in Ayala, "TeleologicalExplanations More recentexamplesinclude Francisco of Biology,"Philosophy Science,xxxvii, 1 (March 1970): 1-15; Evolutionary in Explanations Biology," Hugh Lehman,"Functional ibid., XXXii,1 (January xiv, Philosophical Quarterly, 57 (Octo1965):1-20; RichardSorabji,"Function," PhilosophicalReview, ber 1964): 289-302; and Larry Wright,"Functions," Lxxxii, 2 (April1973): 139-168.

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on literature the naphilosophical SURVEY of the recent

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tions are just that: assumptions.They have never been systematically defended;generallytheyare not defendedat all. I thinkthere are reasonsto suspectthatadherenceto (A) and (B) has crippledthe and explanato mostseriousattempts analyzefunctionalstatements tion,as I will argue in sectionsI and II below. In sectionin, I will develop an alternativeapproach to the problem. This albriefly ternativeis recommendedlargely by the fact that it emerges as theobvious approach once we take care to understandwhyaccounts involving(A) and (B) go wrong.
II

I begin this sectionwith a critique of Hempel and Nagel. The objections are familiarfor the most part, but it will be well to have themfreshin our minds,fortheyformthe backdrop against which I stagemyattackon (A) and (B). of Hempel's treatment functionalanalysis and explanation is a classic example of the fusion of (A) and (B). He begins by constatement: singularfunction-ascribing sideringthe following
the of has (1) The heartbeatin vertebrates the function circulating blood the through organism.

He rejectsthe suggestionthat 'function'can simplybe replaced by of 'effect' the groundsthat,althoughthe heartbeathas the effect on thisis not its function.Presuming(B) from producingheartsounds, the Hempel takesthe problemto be how the effect having the start, of which is the functionof the heartbeat(circulation)is to be disof tinguishedfrom other effects the heartbeat (e.g., heartsounds). ensuresa necesbut not heartsounds, His answeris thatcirculation, sary condition for the "proper workingof the organism." Thus, Hempel proposes(2) as an analysisof (1).
has the effect circulatingthe blood, of (2) The heartbeatin vertebrates and this ensures the satisfactionof certain conditions (supply of for and removal of waste) which are necessary the proper nutriment of working the organism.

the As Hempel sees the matter, main problemwith thisanalysisis so that functional statements construedappear to have no explanatoryforce.Since he assumes(A), the problem for Hempel is to see whether(2) can be construedas a deductivenomologicalexplanans and, in general,to for the presenceof the heartbeatin vertebrates, statements having the formof (2) can be construedas see whether of deductive nomological explananda for the presencein a system characterized. thatis functionally some traitor item

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of the in we that areinterested explaining occurrence a then, Suppose, functimet),and thatthefollowing s trait in a system (at a certain i is analysis offered: tional of in adequately a setting kindc (characterized (a) At t,s functions conditions). and internal external byspecific of in adequately a setting kindc onlyif a certain (b) s functions n, condition, is satisfied. necessary n condition would in as i (c) If trait werepresent s then, an effect, be satisfied. in i 310). (d) Hence,at t, trait is present s (Hempel, (d), of course,does not followfrom(a)-(c), since some traiti' differof for ent fromi mightwell suffice the satisfaction conditionn. The argumentcan be patched up by changing(c) to (c'): "Condition n in would be satisfied s only if traiti werepresentin s," but Hempel rejectsthis avenue on the groundsthat instancesof the rerightly be sultingschemawould typically false.It is false,forexample, that since conditionforcirculationin vertebrates, theheartis a necessary pumps can be, and are, used to maintainthe flowof blood. artificial We are thus leftwith a dilemma. If the original schema is correct, explanationis invalid. If the schemais revisedso as thenfunctional to ensure the validity of the explanation, the explanation will be typically unsound,havinga falsethirdpremise. Hempel's a Ernest Nagel offers defenseof what is substantially schemawith(c) replacedby (c'). "The function A in a sysof of statement theform, . . . a teleological E C temS withorganization is to enable S in the environment to moreexplicitly every by: P," can be formulated engagein process in E C S organization and in environmentengages process system with E C P; if S withorganization and in environment does not have A, have C S thenS doesnotengagein P; hence, withorganization must A (Nagel, 403). that(3) is to be renderedas (4): Thus he suggests in of (3) The function chlorophyll plantsis to enable themto perform photosynthesis. is in plants of for condition theoccurrence photosynthesis (4) A necessary of thepresence chlorophyll. So Nagel mustface thesecondhorn of Hempel's dilemma: (3) is presumably true,but (4) may well be false. Nagel is, of course,aware of this objection. His rathercurious responseis that,as far as we in for is know,chlorophyll necessary photosynthesis the greenplants (404). This may be so, but the responsewill not survivea change artificial for pumps of example. Hearts are not necessary circulation,

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having actually been incorporatedinto the circulatory systems of vertebrates such a way as to preservecirculationand life. in A more promisingdefense of Nagel might run as follows.Although it is true that the presence of a workingheart is not a necessary condition of circulationin vertebrates under all circumstances,still, under normal circumstances-mostcircumstances in fact-a working heartis necessary circulation. for Thus it is perhaps true that, at the presentstage of evolution,a vertebratethat has not been tamperedwithsurgically would exhibitcirculationonly if are it were to contain a heart.If thesecircumstances specifically included in the explanans,perhaps we can avoid Hempel's dilemma. Thus, insteadof (4) we should have: a condition circulafor (4') At thepresent stageof evolution, necessary with tionin vertebrates havenotbeensurgically that tampered is the of operation a heart (properly incorporated into the circulatory system). (4'), in conjunctionwithstatements asserting thata givenvertebrate exhibitscirculationand has not been surgically tamperedwith and is at the presentstage of evolution,will logically imply that that vertebrate a heart.It seems,then,that the Hempelian objection has could be overcomeif it werepossible,givena truefunction-ascribing "normalcircumstances" such a in like (1) or (3), to specify statement the way as to make it true that,in thosecircumstances, presenceof conditionfor the performance of the itemin question is a necessary ascribedto it. thefunction has as This defense some plausibility long as we stickto theusual drawn from biology. But if we widen our view a bit, examples even within biology,I think it can be shown that this defenseof Considerthe kidneys. The function Nagel's positionwill not suffice. of the kidneysis to eliminatewastesfromthe blood. In particular, of the function my leftkidneyis to eliminatewaste frommy blood. Yet the presenceof my leftkidneyis not, in normal circumstances, conditionforthe removalof the relevantwastes.Only if a necessary abnormal should befall my rightkidneywould something seriously and this only the operation of my left kidney become necessary, on the assumptionthat I am not hooked up to a kidneymachine."
1 It might be objected here that, although it is the functionof the kidneys to eliminate waste, that is not the functionof a particular kidney unless operation of that kidney is necessary for removal of wastes. But suppose scientistshad initially been aware of the existence of the left kidney only. Then, on the account being considered, anything they had said about the function of that organ would have been false, since, on that account, it has no function in

havingtwokidneys! organisms

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fact derivesfromthe well-attested A less obvious counterexample of hemisphericalredundancyin the brain. No doubt it is in princonditionsunder which a particulardupliciple possible to specify cated mechanism would be necessaryfor normal functioningof but (a) in mostcases we are not in a positionactually the organism, stateto do this,thoughwe are in a position to make well-confirmed and (b) ments about the functionsof some of these mechanisms, Inare thesecircumstances by no means the normal circumstances. deed, given the fact that each individual nervoussystemdevelops the factors, environmental owing to differing somewhatdifferently for in question might well be different each indicircumstances times. vidual,or forthesame individual at different in Nagel was pursuingthe wrongstrategy attempting Apparently to analyze functionalascriptionsin termsof necessaryconditions. Indeed, we are still faced with the dilemma noticed by Hempel: an conditionsyieldsa valid but unsound analysisin termsof necessary conditionsalong schema; analysisin termsof sufficient explanatory the lines proposed by Hempel yieldsa schema with true premises, but validityis sacrified. to has Something gone wrong,and it is not too difficult locate the problem. An attempt to explain the presence of something by appeal to what it does-its function-is bound to leave unexplained why somethingelse that does the same thing-a functhis is not a serious tional equivalent-isn't thereinstead. In itself, matter.But the accounts we have been consideringassume that explanation is a species of deductive inference,and one cannot deduce heartsfromcirculation.This is what underliesthe dilemma we have been considering.At best, one can deduce circulators from circulation. If we make this amendment,however,we are tainted analysis; 'the functionof the heart leftwith a functionally is to circulatethe blood' is rendered'a blood circulatoris a (necescondition of circulation,and the heart is a blood sary/sufficient) circulator'.The expressionin italics is surelyas much in need of analysis as the analyzed expression.The problem, however,runs of much deeper than the fact that the performance a certainfunction does not determine how that function is performed.The problem is rather that to "explain" the presence of the heart in vertebrates appeal to what the heart does is to "explain" its by to that are causally irrelevant its prespresenceby appeal to factors ence. Even if it were possible,as Nagel claimed, to deduce the presthis ence of chlorophyllfrom the occurrence of photosynthesis, would fail to explain the presence of chlorophyllin green plants in just the way deducing the presence and height of a building

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fromthe existenceand lengthof its shadow would fail to explain why the building is there and has the height it does. This is not because all explanation is causal explanation: it is not. But to exor structure physical plain in the presenceof a naturallyoccurring process-to explain why it is there,why such a thing exists in the factors context)it does-this does require specifying place (system, or the thatcausallydetermine appearance of thatstructure process.2 There is, of course, a sense in which the question, "Why is x there?"is answeredby giving x's function.Consider the following exchange. X asks Y, "Why is that thing there (pointing to the gnomon of a sundial)?" Y answers,"Because it casts a shadow on the dial beneath, therebyindicating the time of day." It is exchanges of this sort that most philosophers have had in mind when they speak of functional explanation. But it seems to me that, although such exchanges do representgenuine explanations, the use of functionallanguage in this sort of explanation is quite distinctfromits explanatoryuse in science. In section iII below, I will sketch what I think is the central explanatoryuse of functional language in science. Meanwhile, if I am right,the evident proprietyof exchanges like that imagined between X and Y has led to prematureacceptance of (A), and hence to concentration explanation, an on what is, from the point of view of scientific irrelevantuse of functionallanguage. For it seems to me that the x's question,"whyis x there?"can be answeredby specifying function only if x is or is part of an artifact.Y's answer,I think,explains the presenceof the gnomonbecause it rationalizesthe action of the agent who put it thereby supplyinghis reason forputtingit there. In general, when we are dealing with the result of a deliberateaction,we may explain the resultby explaining the action, and we may explain a deliberate action by supplying the agent's reason forit. Thus, when we look at a sundial,we assume we know in a general way how the gnomon came to be there: someone deliberatelyput it there.But we may wish to know why it was put there. Specifyingthe gnomon's function allows us to formulate what we suppose to be the unknown agent's reason for puttingit there:he believed it would cast a shadow such that . . . , and so on.
2 Even in the case of a designed artifact, is at most the designer's belief that it x will performf in s which is causally relevant to x's presence in s, not x's f actually performing in s. The nearest I can come to describing a situation in which x performingf in s is causally relevant to x's presence in s is this: f the designer of s notices a thing like x performing in a systemlike s, and this leads to belief that x will performf in s, and this in turn leads the designer to put x in s.

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When we do this,we are elaborating on what we assume is the the crucial causal factorin determining gnomon'spresence,namely a certaindeliberateaction. If this is on the righttrack,then the viabilityof the sort of explanation in question should depend on the assumption that the is thingfunctionally characterized thereas the resultof deliberate the thing's false,specifying action. If that assumptionis evidently functionwill not answerthe question. Suppose it emergesthat the When the ancient building was sundial is not, as such, an artifact. fell on a kind of zodiac mosaic ruined, a large stone fragment and embedded itselfthere.Since no sign of the room remains,Y has mistakenly supposed the thingwas designedas a sundial. As it happens,the local people have been using the thingto tell time for of centuries; Y is rightabout thefunction the thingX pointed to.8 so But it is simply false that the thing is there because it casts a shadow, for there is no agent who put it there "because it casts a shadow." Again, the functionof a bowl-likedepressionin a huge stone may be to hold holy water,but we cannot explain why it is thereby appeal to its functionif we know it was leftthereby prehistoric glacial activity. If this is right,then (A) will lead us to focus on a typeof explanation which will not apply to natural systems:chlorophylland hearts are not "there" as the result of any deliberate action, and move in quesof hence the essentialpresupposition the explanatory tion is missing.Once this becomes clear, to continue to insist that there must be some sense in which specifyingthe function of chlorophyllexplains its presence is an act of desperation born of thinkingthereis no otherexplanatoryuse of functionalcharacterization science. in Why have philosophers identifiedfunctional explanation exin function explainingwhy clusively with the appeal to something's it is there?One reason, I suspect,is a failure to distinguishteleological explanation fromfunctionalexplanation, perhaps because functional concepts do loom large in "explanations" having a but teleologicalform.Someone who fails to make this distinction, who senses that thereis an importantand legitimateuse of func3 Is casting a shadow the functionof this fragment? Standard use may confera function on something: if I standardly use a certain stone to sharpen knives, then that is its function,or if I standardly use a certain block of wood as a door stop, then the function of that block is to hold my door open. If nonartifactsever have functions,appeals to those functions cannot explain their presence. The things functionally characterized in science are typically not artifacts.

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tional characterization scientific in explanation, will see the problem as one of findinga legitimateexplanatoryrole for functional characterization within the teleological form.Once we leave artifactsand go to naturalsystems, however, thisapproach is doomed to failure, critics teleology as of have seen forsome time. This mistakeprobablywould have sorteditselfout in timewere it not thatwe do reason fromthe performance a functionto the of presence of certain specific processes and structures, e.g., from photosynthesis chlorophyll, fromcoordinatedactivity nerve to or to tissue.This is perfectly legitimatereasoning:it is a speciesof inference to the best explanation. Our best (only) explanation of photosynthesis requires chlorophyll, and our best explanation of coordinated activityrequires nerve tissue. But once we see what makes this reasoninglegitimate,we see immediatlythat inferenceto an explanation has been mistakenfor an explanation itself.Once this becomes clear, it becomes equally clear that (A) has mattersreversed: given that photosynthesis occurring a particularplant, is in we may legitimately inferthat chlorophyll presentin that plant is precisely because chlorophyll entersinto our best (only) explanation of photosynthesis, givencoordinatedactivity the part of some and on tissue is presentpreanimal, we may legitimately inferthat nerve cisely because nerve tissue entersinto our best explanation of coordinatedactivity animals. in To attemptto explain the heart'spresencein vertebrates apby pealing to its functionin vertebrates to attemptto explain the is occurrence heartsin vertebrates appealing to factorsthat are of by causallyirrelevant its presencein vertebrates. to This facthas given "functionalexplanation" a bad name. But it is (A) thatdeservesthe blame. Once we see (A) as an undefendedphilosophical hypothesis about how to construefunctionalexplanationsratherthan as a statementof the philosophical problem, the correctalternativeis obvious: what we can and do explain by appeal to what something does is thebehaviorof a containing system.4 A much more promising in suggestion the lightof theseconsiderations is that (1) is appealed to in explaining circulation.If we a reject (A) and adopt thissuggestion, simple deductive-nomological explanation with circulationas the explicandum turnsout to be a sound argument.
4 A confused perception of this fact no doubt underlies (B), but the fact that (B) is nearly inseparable from (A) in the literature shows how confused this perceptionis.

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heartin theusualway(in the a (5) a. Vertebrates incorporatingbeating circulation. ways does)exhibit in a beating heart theusualway. b. Vertebrateincorporates s c. Hence,s exhibitscirculation. (5) Though by no means flawless, has severalvirtues,not the least of which is that it does not have biologistspassing by an obvious application of evoluation or genetics,in favorof an invalid or unsound "functional" explanation of the presence of hearts. Also, the redundancyexamples are easily handled; e.g., the removal of wastesis deduced in thekidneycase. The implausibilityof (A) is obscured in examples taken from stateuses of function biologyby the factthat thereare two distinct statements. mentsin biology.Considerthefollowing is vacuolein protozoans elimination (a) The function thecontractile of ofexcess from organism. the water of is in (b) The function theneurofibrils theciliates coordination the of activity thecilia. of can These statements be understoodin eitherof two ways.(i) They are generally used in explaining how the organism in question or comes to exhibit certain characteristics behavior. Thus (a) explains how excesswater,accumulatedin the organismby osmosis,is eliminatedfromthe organism;(b) explains how it happens that the activity the cilia in paramecium,forinstance,is coordinated.(ii) of They may be used in explaining the continued survivalof certain of organismsincorporatingstructures the sort in question by indicatingthe survivalvalue that would accrue to such organismsin of virtueof having structures that sort.Thus (a) allows us to infer that incorporationof a contractilevacuole makes it possible for membrane, the organism to be surrounded by a semi-permeable allowing the passage of oxygeninto, and the passage of wastesout of, the organism.Relatively free osmosis of this sort is obviously which solves advantageous,and this is made possible by a structure neurothe excess water problem. Similarly,ciliates incorporating locomotion, the survival fibrilswill be capable of fairlyefficient value of whichis obvious.'
5 Notice that the second use is parasitic on the first.It is only because the neurofibrilsexplain the coordinated activityof the cilia that we can assign a survival value to neurofibrils:the survival value of a structures hangs on what capacities of the organism, if any, are explicable by appeal to the functioning of s.

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The second sortof use occurs as part of an account which,if we are not careful,can easily be mistakenfor an explanation of the and this presence of the sort of item functionallycharacterized, has perhaps encouraged philosophersto accept (A). For it might seem thatnatural selectionprovidesthe missingcausal link between what somethingdoes in a certain type of organismand its presfunctheirrespective ence in that typeof organism.By performing help species intions, the contractilevacuole and the neurofibrils corporatingthem to survive,and therebycontributeto their own continued presence in organismsof those species, and this might in seem to explain the presenceof those structures the organisms them. incorporating Plausible as this sounds, it involves a subtle yet fundamental A theory. clue to the mistakeis of misunderstanding evolutionary found in the fact that the contractilevacuole occurs in marine problembut the reverseprobprotozoansthat have no excess-water is on lem. Thus the functionand effect survival of this structure Yet the explanationof its presencein not thesame in all protozoans. species is almost certainlythe same. This marine and fresh-water fact remindsus that the processesactually responsiblefor the occurrenceof contractilevacuoles in protozoans are totally insensidoes. Failure to appreciate this point tive to what that structure not only lends spurious plausibilityto (A) as applied to biological examples; it seriouslydistortsour understandingof evolutionary s Whetheran organismo incorporates depends on whether theory. s is "specified"by the genetic "plan" which o inheritsand which, of is at a certainlevel of abstraction, characteristic o's species.Alterationsin the plan are due to mutation.If a plan is alteredso that it s' specifies rather than s, then the organismsinheritingthis plan will incorporatest, regardlessof the functionor survival value of If s' in thoseorganisms. the alterationis advantageous,the number that plan may increase,and, if it is disadof organismsinheriting whatvantageous,theirnumbermay decrease.But thishas no effect on whatever the occurrence no everon the plan, and therefore effect in ofstin theorganisms question. hears it said that natural selectionis an instance One sometimes of negativefeedback.If thisis meant to implythat the relativesuccess or failure of organismsof a certain type can affecttheir inof it heritedcharacteristics, is simplya mistake: the characteristics organismswhich determinetheir relative success are determined of by their genetic plan, and the characteristics these plans are utterlyindependent of the relative success of organismshaving

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them. Of course, if s is verydisadvantageousto organismshaving s, a plan specifying then organismshaving such plans may disand s will no longeroccur. We could, therefore, appear altogether, thinkof natural selectionas reactingon the set of plans generated by mutationby weedingout the bad plans: natural selectioncannot alter a plan, but it can trimthe set. Thus, we may be able to explain why a given plan is not a failure by appeal to the functions have Perhaps this is what some writers it of the structures specifies. vacuoles had in mind.But thisis not to explain why,e.g.,contractile occur in certainprotozoans,it is to explain why the sort of protovacuoles occurs.Since we cannot apcontractile zoan incorporating peal to the relativesuccessor failureof theseorganismsto explain vacuoles, we cannot apcontractile whytheirgeneticplan specifies peal to the relativesuccessor failureof theseorganismsto explain vacuoles. whytheyincorporatecontractile Once we are clear about the explanatoryrole of functionsin evolutionarytheory,it emerges that the function of an organ or process (or whatever)is appealed to to explain the biological capacities of the organismcontainingit, and fromthese capacities conclusionsare drawn concerningthe chances of survivalfor organismsof that type.For instance,appeal to the functionof the contractile vacuole in certainprotozoansexplains how theseorganisms are able to keep fromexploding in freshwater.Thus evolutionary biologydoes not providesupportfor (A) but for the idea instanced the in (5): identifying functionof somethinghelps to explain the system.6 capacitiesof a containing what is functional explanationby misidentifying (A) misconstrues explained. Let us abandon (A), then, in favor of the view that functionsare appealed to in explaining the capacities of containto and ing systems, turnour attention (B). Whereas (A) is a thesis about functionalexplanation, (B) is a statements. Perhaps thesisabout the analysisof function-ascribing when divorced from(A), as it is in (5), it will fare better than it does in the accountsof Hempel and Nagel.
6 In addition to the misunderstandingabout evolutionary theory just discussed, biological examples have probably suggested (A) because biology was the locus classicus of teleological explanation. This has perhaps encouraged a confusionbetween the teleologicalformof explanation, incorporatedin (A), with the explanatory role of functional ascriptions. Function-ascribing statements do occur in explanations having a teleological form, and, when they do, their interest is vitiated by the incoherence of that form of explanation. It is the statementsthat needs examination, i.e., their legitimateuse of function-ascribing contributionto nonteleological theoriessuch as the theoryof evolution.

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as In spite of the evidentvirtuesof (5), (5a) has seriousshortcomings an analysisof (1). In factit is subject to the same objection Hempel brings to the analysis that simply replaces 'function' by 'effect': a incorporating workingheart in the usual way exhibit vertebrates is yet the productionof heartsounds, the productionof heartsounds not a function of hearts in vertebrates.The problem is that, is whereas the productionof certain effects essential to the heart's performingits function, there are some effectsproduction of of which is irrelevantto the functioning the heart. This problem theory,i.e., any theory is bound to infect any "selected-effects" built on (B). theoryis a general What is needed to establisha selected-effects Both Hempel and the appropriate effects.7 formulathat identifies the this problem by identifying functionof Nagel attemptto solve which contributeto the maintethose effects somethingwith just of nance of some special conditionof,or the performance some speIf this sort of solution is cial activityof, some containingsystem. to be viable, there must be some principled way of selectingthe For no matrelevantactivitiesor conditionsof containingsystems. of ter which effects somethingyou happen to name, therewill be conto system whichjust thoseeffects some activity thecontaining of which is mainor tribute, some conditionof the containingsystem for exHeart activity, tained with the help of just those effects. frombeing entirelyquiet, and system ample, keeps the circulatory the appendix keeps people vulnerable to appendicitis.8 that,in general,the crucial featureof a containHempel suggests of to contribution whichis to count as the functioning a ing system,
7 Larry Wright (op. cit.) is aware of this problem, but does not, to my mind, make much progress with it. Wright's analysis rules out "The function of the heart is to produce heart sounds," on the ground that the heart is not there because it produces heartsounds. I agree. But neither is it there because it pumps blood. Or if, as Wright maintains, there is a sense of 'because' in which the heart is there because it pumps blood and not because it produces heartsounds, then this sense of 'because' is as much in need of analysis as 'function'. Wright does not attempt to provide such an analysis, but depends on the fact that, in many cases, we are able to use the word in the required way. in But we are also able to use 'function' correctly a varietyof cases. Indeed, if Wright is right,the words are simply interchangeablewith a little grammatical maneuvering. The problem is to make the conditions of correct use explicit. Failure to do this means that Wright'sanalysis providesno insightinto the problem of how functional theories are confirmed,or whence they derive their explanatoryforce. 8 Surprisingly, when Nagel comes to formulate his general schema of functional attributionhe simply ignores this problem, and thus leaves himself open to the trivializationjust suggested. Cf., Nagel, op. cit., p. 403.

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contained part, is that the system maintained in "adequate, or be effective, proper workingorder" (306). Hempel explicitly deor clines to discuss what constitutes"proper working order," presumablybecause he rightly thinksthat thereare more seriousproblems with the analysis he is discussingthan those introduced by this phrase. But it seemsclear that forsomething be in working to orderis just forit to be capable of performing functions, its and for it to be in adequate or effective properworkingorder is just for or it to be capable of performing functions its adequately or effectively or properly. Hempel seemsto realize thishimself, in setting for forth a deductiveschemaforfunctional explanation,he glossesthe phrase in question as 'functionsadequately' (310). More generally,if we identify functionof something with those effects x which the of x contributeto the performance some activity or to the mainteof a nance of some condition c of a containingsystem then we must s, be preparedto say as well that a function s is to perform or to of a maintain c. This suggeststhe followingformulationof "selectedeffects" theories. (6) The function an F in a G is fjustin case (thecapacity f is an of for) effect an F incorporated a G in theusual way(or: in theway of in thisF is incorporated thisG), and thateffect in to contributes the G. performance a function thecontaining of of It seems that any theorybased on (B)-what I have been calling "selected-effects" theories-must ultimatelyamount to something like (6).9 Yet (6) cannot be the whole story about functional
ascriptions.

of "The function the contracSuppose we follow(6) in rendering, tile vacuole in protozoansis eliminationof excess water from the The resultis (7): organism." of of (7) Elimination excess waterfrom organism an effect a conis the tractile in and vacuoleincorporated theusualwayin a protozoan, that of to of effect contributes the performance a function a protozoan. of In orderto test(7) we should have to know a statement the form, "f is a functionof a protozoan."Perhaps protozoanshave no funcwe tions. If not, (7) is just a mistake.If theydo, then presumably attributshall have to appeal to (6) foran analysisof the statement ing such a function, and thiswill leave us with anotherunanalyzed or functionalascription.Either we are launched on a regress, the
9 Hugh Lehman (op. cit.) given an analysisthat appears to be essentially like(6).

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or analysisbreaksdown at some level forlack of functions, perhaps If forlack of a plausible condidateforcontainingsystems. we do not wish simplyto acquiesce in the autonomyof functionalascriptions, it must be possible to analyze at least some functionalascriptions of If withoutappealing to functions containingsystems. (6) can be shown to be the only plausible formulationof theoriesbased on (B), then no such theorycan be the whole story. a Our question,then,is whether thing'sfunctioncan plausiblybe contributingto production of identifiedwith those of its effects some activity or maintenanceof some conditionof, a containing of, system,where performanceof the activityin question is not a function of the containing system.Let us begin by considering Hempel's suggestionthat functionsare to be identifiedwith production of effectscontributingto proper working order of a containingsystem. claimed earlier on that to say somethingis in I its proper workingorder is just to say that it properlyperforms or functions.This is fairlyobvious in cases of artifacts tools. To make a decision about which sort of behavior counts as working amounts to deciding about the thing'sfunction.To say something is working,though not behaving or disposed to behave in a way having anythingto do with its function,is to be open, at the veryleast,to thechangeof arbitrariness. When we are dealing with a living organism, or a society of living organisms, situationis less clear. If we say,"The functhe vacuole in protozoansis eliminationof excess tion of the contractile water from the organism,"we do make referenceto a containing organism,but not, apparently,to its function(if any). Howvacuoles do a numberof things havingnothing ever,since contractile theremust be some implicitprincipleof to do with theirfunction, selection at work. Hempel's suggestionis that, in this context,to order"is simplyto be alive and healthy.This be in "properworking worksreasonablywell for certainstandardexamples, e.g., (1) and (3): circulation does contributeto health and survival in verteto does contribute health and survivalin brates,and photosynthesis greenplants.10 But, once again, theprinciplewill not standa change of example, even within the life sciences.First,there are cases in is which proper functioning actually inimical to health and life:
10 Even these applications have their problems. Frankfurtand Poole ["Functional Explanations in Biology," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, xvii (1966)] point out that heartsounds contribute to health and survival via theirusefulnessin diagnosis.

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functioning the sex organsresultsin the death of individualsof of many species (e.g., certainsalmon). Second, a certainprocessin an organism may have effects which contribute to health and survival but which are not to be confusedwith the functionof that process:secretionof adrenalin speeds metabolismand thereby conhutributesto eliminationof harmfulfat deposits in overweight in overweight of mans,but thisis not a function adrenalinsecretion humans. A more plausible suggestion along these lines in the special contextof evolutionary biologyis this: in of (8) The functions a partor process an organism to be identified are of to or of withthose itseffects contributing activities conditions the organism whichsustain increase organism's or the capacity conto tribute survival thespecies. to of Give or take a nicety, doubtlessdoes capture a great many uses (8) of functionallanguage in biology. For instance,it correctly picks out eliminationof excess water as the functionof the contractile the identifies vacuole in fresh-water protozoansonly, and correctly functionof sex organs in species in which the exercise of these organsresultsin the death of the individual."In spite of these virtues,however, (8) is seriously misleading and extremely limited in applicability even within biology. Evidently,what contributes an organism'scapacity to maintain its to species in one sort of environment may undermine that capacity in another. When this happens, we might say that the organ (or whatever) has lost its function. This is probablywhat we would say about the contractile vacuole if fresh-water protozoanswere successfully introducedinto salt water,for in this case the capacity explained would no longerbe exercised.But if the capacityexplained by appeal to the functionof a certain structurecontinued to be exercisedin the new environment, thoughnow to the individual's had lost its funcdetriment, would not say that that structure we ceased to contribute the capacity to tion. If, forsome reason,flying or even undermined that of pigeons to maintain their species, we capacityto some extent,'2 would still say that a functionof the wingsin pigeonsis to enable themto fly. Only if the wingsceased to
11 Michael Ruse has argued for a formulation like (8). See "Function Statements in Biology," Philosophy of Science, xxxviii, 1 (March 1971): 87-95, and The Philosophy of Biology (London: Hutchinson, 1973). 12 Perhaps, in the absence of serious predators,with a readily available food supply, and with no need to migrate,flyingsimply wastes energy.

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would we cease functionas wings,as in the penguins or ostriches, and the like with an eye analyze skeletal structure to functionally Flight is a capacitythat cries out for explanato explaining flight. of regardless its contribution tion in termsof anatomical functions to thecapacityto maintainthespecies. What thisexample showsis thatfunctionalanalysiscan properly conof be carriedon in biology quite independently evolutionary siderations:a complex capacityof an organism(or one of its parts may be explained by appeal to a functionalanalysisreor systems) gardlessof how it relatesto the organism'scapacityto maintain the which will be called species.At best,then,(8) picks out thoseeffects is when what is in the offing an application of evolutionfunctions As ary theory. we shall see in the next section,(8) is misleadingas are well in that it is not which effects explained but the styleof explanation that makes it appropriate to speak of functions.(8) explained which,as it happens, are typically effects simplyidentifies in thatstyle. We have not quite exhausted the lessonsto be learned from(8). The plausibilityof (8) restson theplausibilityof the claim that,for certainpurposes,we may assume that a functionof an organismis is to to contribute thesurvivalof its species.What (8) does, in effect, class of (uncontained)containing of a identify function an important of withoutprovidingan analysisof the claim thata function systems is to an organism to contribute thesurvivalof itsspecies. Of course, an advocate of (8) might insist that it is no part of to his theory claim thatmaintenanceof the species is a functionof an organism.But then the defenseof (8) would have to be simply contributthat it describesactual usage, i.e., that it is in facteffects organism'scapacity to maintain its species which evoluing to an Construedin thisway, (8) tionarybiologistssingleout as functions. are would, at most,tell us which effects picked out as functions;it are picked out as would provide no hint as to why these effects functions.We know why evolutionarybiologistsare interestedin to capacityto maintainits species, contributing an organism's effects but why call them functions?This is preciselythe sort of quesstatements tion that a philosophical account of function-ascribing should answer.Either (8) is defendedas an instanceof (6)-maintenance of the species is declared a functionof organisms-or it is of defendedas descriptive usage. In neithercase is any philosophical case (8) relies on an unanalyzed analysisprovided. For in the first and in the second it statement, (and undefended)function-ascribing

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failsto giveany hintas to the pointof identifying certain effects as functions. The failings (8) are,I think, of boundto cripple anytheory that identifiesthing's a functions effects with contributing someanteto cedently specified typeof condition behaviorof a containing or system. the theory an instance (6), it launches regress If is of a or terminates an unanalyzed in functional ascription; it is not an if instance (6), thenit is boundto leaveopen thevery of question at issue, viz.,whyare theselected effects as functions? seen In this section, willsketch I briefly account functional an of explanationwhichtakesseriously intuition the thatit is a genuinely distinctive style explanation. assumptions and (B) form of The (A) the core of approaches thatseek to minimize differences the between functional explanations explanations formulated funcand not in tionalterms. Suchapproaches havenotgiven muchattention the to of characterization thespecialexplanatory strategy science employs in usingfunctional language, theproblem it was conceived for as in suchapproaches to showthatfunctional was explanation not is really different essentials in from otherkindsof scientific explanation. Once the problem concenved thisway,one is almost is in certain missthe distinctive of to features functional explanation, and henceto missthepointoffunctional description. account The ofthis section reverses tendency placing this by primary emphasis on thekindofproblem thatis solvedbyappeal to functions.
1. Functionsand Dispositions.Something be capableof pumpmar it ing even though does not function a pump (ever)and even as On if though pumping notitsfunction. theother is hand, something s of functions a pumpin a system or if thefunction something as it in in a systemis to pump,then must capableofpumping s."s s be
13 Throughout of I thissection am discounting appeals to the intentions deto without accidents actuallybeing signers users.x may be intended prevent or it to capable of doing so. With reference this intention would be properin is to certaincontexts say,"x's function to prevent accidents, thoughit is not actually capableofdoingso." is function oftenidentified withwhat There can be no doubt thata thing's used to do, or withwhatit was designedto do. it is typically "standardly" or scientific for But the sortsof things whichit is an important problemto prosocial institutions-either vide functional societies, analyses-brains, organisms, or or do not have designers standard regularuses at all, or it would be inand a to appropriate appeal to thesein constructing defining scientific theory or devices becausethe designer use is not known-brains, dug up by archaeolo-

III

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statementsimply disposition statements; Thus, function-ascribing to attributea function to somethingis, in part, to attribute a of dispositionto it. If the function x in s to p, then x has a disposivacuole of if tion to d in s. For instance, the function the contractile protozoans is to eliminate excess water from the in fresh-water under which the conorganism,then theremust be circumstances tractilevacuole would actually manifesta dispositionto eliminate it. excesswaterfromtheprotozoanthatincorporates To attributea dispositiond to an object a is to assert that the behavior of a is subject to (exhibits or would exhibit) a certain lawlike regularity:to say a has d is to say that a would manifest d (shatter, dissolve) were any of a certainrange of events to occur associated (a is put in water,a is strucksharply).The regularity with a disposition-call it the dispositionalregularity-is a regularitythat is special to the behaviorof a certainkind of object and obtains in virtueof some special fact(s)about that kind of object. such thingsbehave in a special way is Not everything water-soluble: in virtue of certain (structural)featuresspecial to water-soluble things.Thus it is that dispositionsrequire explanation: if x has d, in thenx is subject to a regularity behaviorspecial to thingshaving d, and such a factneeds to be explained. is To explain a dispositional regularity to explain how maniof festations the dispositionare broughtabout given the requisite I In conditions. what follows, will describetwodistinct precipitating that the approthis.It is mycontention for strategies accomplishing statements correspondsto the appriatenessof function-ascribing of This, I think, propriateness the -secondof these two strategies. intuitionthat functionalexplanation is a special kind explains the of explanation. 2. Two ExplanatoryStrategies Suppose a has a dispositiond. The (i) The SubsumptionStrategy. consistsin the fact that certain associated dispositional regularity kinds of eventswould cause a to manifestd. One way to explain of thisfactwould be to discoversome feature a which allowed us to events and manirepresentthe connection between precipitating
gists-or because there is some likelihood that real and intended function complex computers.Functional talk may have origidiverge-social institutions, nated in contexts in which referenceto intentions and purposes loomed large, but referenceto intentions and purposes does not figure at all in the sort of natural scientists. functionalanalysis favoredby contemporary

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festations instancesof one or moregeneral laws, i.e., laws governas not generally, just thingshaving d. Brian ing the behaviorof things has O'Shaughnessy providedan example whichallows a particularly Consider the disposition he simple illustrationof this strategy.'4 of calls elevancy: the tendency an object to rise in water of its own accord. To explain elevancy,we must explain why freeinga subThis we may do as follows. mergedelevantobject causes it to rise.15 In every case, the ratio of an elevant object's mass to its nonpermeablevolume is less than the density(mass per unit volume) of water.Archimedes'principle tells us that water exertsan upward forceon a submergedobject equal to the weightof the water disexceeds placed. In the case of an elevantobject, thisforceevidently the weight of the object by some amount f. Freeing the object changes the net forceon it fromzero to a net forceof magnitude f in the directionof the surface,and the object rises accordingly. and risingsunHere, we subsume the connectionbetween freeings der a general law connectingchanges in net forcewith changes in motion by citing a featureof elevant objects which allows us (via freeingthemunder wateras an principle)to represent Archimedes' a instanceof introducing net forcein the directionof the surface. (ii) The Analytical Strategy.Rather than subsume a disposiunder a law not special to the disposed objects, tional regularity proceeds by analyzinga disposition d of a the analytical strategy had by a or compointo a numberof other dispositionsd1 . . . dn, of manifestation the di resultsin nentsof a such that programmed will fittoof or amountsto a manifestation d.16 The two strategies getherinto a unifiedaccount if the analyzingdispositions(the di) strategy. can be made to yieldto thesubsumption one is When the analyticalstrategy in the offing, is apt to speak of capacities (or abilities) rather than of dispositions.This shift will put a more familiar face on the analytical in terminology
14 "The Powerlessnessof Dispositions," Analysis, xxxi.1, 139 (October 1970): 1-15. See also my discussionof this example in "Dispositions, States and Causes," ibid., xxxiv.6, 162 (June 1974): 194-204. 15 Also, we must explain why submerging a free elevant object causes it to rise, and why a free submerged object's becoming elevant causes it to rise. One of the convenient featuresof elevancy is that the same considerationsdispose of all these cases. This does not hold generally: gentle rubbing, a sharp blow, or a sudden change in temperaturemay each cause a glass to manifesta disposition different. to shatter,but the explanations in these cases are significantly 16 By "programmed" I simplymean organized in a way that could be specified in a program or flow chart: each instruction (box) specifiesmanifestationof one of the d4 such that, if the program is executed (the chart followed), a d. manifests

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for strategy,17 we often explain capacities by analyzing them. Asexample of what I productionprovides a transparent sembly-line mean. Productionis broken down into a number of distincttasks. Each point on the line is responsiblefora certaintask,and it is the at functionof the workers/machines that point to complete that task.If the line has the capacityto produce the product,it has it in have the capacities to virtueof the fact that the workers/machines theirdesignatedtasks,and in virtueof the fact that when perform in thesetasksare performed a certainorganizedway-according to a productresults.Here we can explain program-the finished certain line's capacity to produce the product-i.e., explain how it is the able to produce the product-by appeal to certaincapacitiesof the and their organization into an assembly line. workers/machines we Againstthis background, may pick out a certaincapacityof an on individual exerciseof whichis his function the line. Of the many thingshe does and can do, his functionon the line is doing whatever it is thatwe appeal to in explaining the capacityof the line as a whole. If the line producesseveralproducts,i.e., if it has several capacities,then,althougha certaincapacityc of a workeris irrelevant to one capacityof the line, exerciseof c by that workermay be his functionwith respect to another capacity of the line as a whole. provide anotherobvious illusSchematicdiagramsin electronics any physicalobject whatever tration.Since each symbolrepresents having a certaincapacity,a schematicdiagramof a complex device an constitutes analysisof the electroniccapacitiesof the device as a Such an analysisallows whole into the capacitiesof its components. us to explain how the device as a whole exercisesthe analyzed capacity,for it allows us to see exercisesof the analyzed capacity as programmedexercise of the analyzingcapacities. In this case, the is "'program" given by the lines indicatinghow the componentsare functionsymbols.) hooked up. (Of course,the lines are themselves Functional analysis in biology is essentiallysimilar. The biocapacities of an entireorganismare explained logically significant
and capacities, and 17Some mightwant to distinguish betweendispositions to argue thatto ascribea function x is in part to ascribea capacity to x, not in (1) Certainly is strained a way(2) is not. as a disposition I haveclaimed. to (1) Heartsare disposed pump. to Heartshavea disposition pump. Sugaris capableof dissolving. to Sugarhas a capacity dissolve. (2) Heartsare capableofpumping. to Heartshavea capacity pump. to Sugaris disposed dissolve. to Sugarhas a disposition dissolve.

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by analyzing the organisminto a number of "systems"-the circuthe system, nervoussystem, etc.,-each of the latorysystem, digestive capacities.1S These capacitiesare in turn whichhas its characteristic Ideally, organsand structures. analyzedinto capacitiesof component takes over, i.e., until is this strategy pressed until pure physiology the analyzingcapacities are amenable to the subsumptionstrategy. theiranalysesin a form We can easilyimaginebiologistsexpressing with schematicdiagramsof electricalengineering, analogous to the analyses and for special symbols pumps,pipes, filters, so on. Indeed, of even simple cognitivecapacities are typicallyexpressedin flow analyses to designedspecifically represent forms chartsor programs, capacitiesgenerally. processing of information in use Perhaps themostextensive of the analyticalstrategy science job for occursin psychology, a large part of the psychologist's is to explain how the complex behavioral capacities of organismsare acquired and how theyare exercised.Both goals are greatlyfacilitatedby analysisof the capacitiesin question,forthenacquisitionof the analyzed capacity resolvesitselfinto acquisition of the analyzing capacities and the requisite organization,and the problem of resolvesitselfinto the problem of how the analyzing performance has dominated psycapacities are exercised.This sort of strategy chologyover since Watson attemptedto explain such complex capacities as the ability to run a maze by analyzingthe performance into a series of conditioned responses,the stimulus for each reencounteredas the sponsebeing the previousresponseor something Acquisitionof thecomplexcapacity resultof thepreviousresponse.19 is resolvedinto a numberof distinctcases of simple conditioning, i.e., the ability to learn the maze is resolvedinto the capacity for and the capacityto run the maze is resolved stimulussubstitution, into abilities to respond in certain simple ways to certain simple stimuli. Watson's analysis proved to be of limited value, but the analytic strategyremains the dominant mode of explanation in behavioralpsychology.20
is system thatits 18 Indeed,what makessomething part of,e.g., the nervous of in capacitiesfigure an analysis the capacityto respondto externalstimuli, is etc. movement, Thus, there no questionthattheglial cellsare part coordinate theyare part of the of the brain,but thereis some questionas to whether to or auxiliary it. system merely nervous 19JohnB. Watson, 1930)chs. ix and xi. (New York:Norton, Behaviorism 20 Writers especiallyJerryFodor, have of on the philosophy psychology, and characterization the analytical betweenfunctional graspedthe connection but theorizing, have not applied the lesson to the in strategy psychological occursin statement The clearest generally. explanation problemof functional this in Explanation," "The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge Psychological J.A. Fodor, 19, jouRNAL, Lxv, 24 (December 1968):627-640.

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3. Functions and Functional Analysis.In the contextof an appliexerciseof an analyzingcapacity cation of the analyticalstrategy, as emerges a function:it will be appropriateto say that x functions of as a p in s, or thatthefunction x in s is (-ing, when we are speaking against the backgroundof an analytical explanation of some capacityof s which appeals to the factthat x has a capacityto 4 in as s. It is appropriateto say thatthe heartfunctions a pump against capacityto system's the backgroundof an analysisof the circulatory wastes,and so on, which appeals to the fact food,oxygen, transport that the heart is capable of pumping. Since this is the usual background,it goes withoutsaying,and this accounts for the fact that and "The heartfuncas "The heartfunctions a pump" soundsright, sense. sounds wrong,in some context-free tions as a noise-maker" by is This effect strengthened the absence of any actual application whichmakes use of the factthat the heart of the analyticalstrategy makesnoise.2' We can capturethisimplicitdependenceon an analyticalcontext reconstrucin an by entering explicit relativization our regimented statements: tionof function-ascribing to of as (9) x functions a q in s (or: thefunction x in s is to 0) relative an to A account of s's capacity 'pjust in case x is capableof analytical for accounts s's caand 0-ingin s and A appropriately adequately of to appealing thecapacity x to p in s. to pacity 'p by,in part, Sometimeswe explain a capacity of s by analyzing it into other capacities of s, as when we explain how someone ignorant of cookeryis able to bake cakes by pointing out that he followed a of recipeeach instruction whichrequiresno special capacitiesforits of as execution.Here, we don't speak of,e.g.,stirring a function the has difSince stirring cook, but ratherof the functionof stirring. points in the recipes and at different ferentfunctionsin different of the like 'The function stirring mixture same recipe,a statement is to keep it fromstickingto the bottom of the pot' is implicitly relativizedto a certain (perhaps somewhatvague) recipe. To take schema: account of this sort of case, we need a slightlydifferent s where e is an activityor behavior of a system (as a whole), the functionof e in s is to (p relativeto an analytical account A of s's and adequately accounts capacityto , just in case A appropriately fors's capacityto q by, in part,appealing to s's capacityto engage in e. 21 It is sometimes function. do that suggested heartsounds have a psychological
appealingto the disposition of In the context an analysisof a psychological as "The heartfunctions a noise-maker" (e.g.,as heart'snoise-making capacity, would not evensound odd. a producer regularthumps), of

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(6): (9) explains theintuitionbehind theregress-ridden functional ascriptions require relativizationto a "functionalfact" about a do i.e., to the fact that a certaincapacityof a concontainingsystem, taining systemis approximatelyexplained by appeal to a certain functionalanalysis.And, like (6), (9) makes no provisionforspeaking of the functionof an organismexcept against a background (the hive, the corporation,the ecoanalysisof a containingsystem system).Once we see that functionsare appealed to in explainand indeed that it is the ing the capacities of containingsystems, for explaining these capacities applicability of a certain strategy why that makes talk of functionsappropriate,we see immediately What of we do not speak of the functions uncontainedcontainers. (6) fails to capture is the fact that uncontained containerscan be exfunctionally analyzed,and the way in which function-analytical planation mediates the connectionbetween functionalascriptions (x functionsas a 0, the functionof x is to q) and the capacities of thecontainers. Explanation. If the account I have been 4. Function-analytical the availability and approsketchingis to draw any distinctions, priatenessof analyticalexplanationsmust be a nontrivialmatter.22 So let us examine an obviouslytrivialapplication of the analytical whetherit can be dismissedon with an eye to determining strategy principledgrounds. system makesits own discirculatory (10)Each partof themammalian to These combine form tinctive sound,and makesit continuously. of The mamnoise" characteristic all mammals. the "circulatory maliancirculatory this system capableof producing soundat variis for The heartbeat responsible is and varioustempos. ous volumes of character thesound,and it is thecapacity the the throbbing of the of ratesthatexplains capacity thecircuheartto beatat various sound. tempoed to latory system producea variously true.The question is whetherit in Everything (10) is, presumably, allows us to say that the functionof the heart is to produce a variTo sound.28 answerthisquestion we must, ouslytempoedthrobbing I think,get clear about the motivationfor applying the analytical
22 Of course, it might be thatthere are none but arbitrarydistinctionsto be but I am unable to drawn. Perhaps (9) describes usage, and usage is arbitrary, take this possibilityseriously. 23The issue is not whether (10) forces us, via (9), to say something false. Relative to some analytical explanation, it may be true that the functionof the heart is to produce a variously tempoed throbbing.But the availability of (10) should not support such a claim.

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strategy. For my contentionwill be that the analytical strategy is mostsignificantly applied in cases veryunlike thatenvisagedin (10). The explanatory interestof an analytical account is roughly proportionalto (i) the extentto which the analyzingcapacities are less.sophisticatedthan the analyzed capacities, (ii) the extent to which the analyzing capacities are different type from the in analyzed capacities,and (iii) the relativesophistication the proof gramappealed to, i.e., the relativecomplexity the organizationof of componentparts/processes that is attributedto the system. (iii) is correlativewith (i) and (ii): the greaterthe gap in sophistication and type between analyzing capacities and analyzed capacities, the more sophisticated programmust be to close the gap. the It is preciselythe width of thesegaps which,for instance,makes automata theoryso interesting its application to psychology. in Automata theorysupplies us with extremely powerfultechniques for constructing diverse analyses of very sophisticatedtasks into veryunsophisticated tasks.This allows us to see how, in principle, una mechanismsuch as the brain, consistingof physiologically sophisticatedcomponents (relativelyspeaking), can acquire very sophisticatedcapacities. It is the prospect of promoting the capacity to store ones and zeros into the capacity to solve logic problemsand recognizepatternsthat makes the analyticalstrategy so appealing in cognitivepsychology. As the program absorbs more and more of the explanatory burden, the physical factsunderlyingthe analyzing capacities become less and less special to the analyzed system. This is why it is plausible to suppose that the capacityof a personand of a machine to solve a certain problem might have substantially the same explanation,althoughit is not plausible to suppose thatthe capacities of a synthesizer and of a bell to make similar sounds have substantiallysimilar explanations. There is no work to be done by a sophisticatedhypothesisabout the organization of various cathe pacities in the case of the bell. Conversely, less Nveight borne by the program,the less point to analysis.At this end of the scale we have cases like (10) in which the analyzed and analyzingcapacities differ littleif at all in typeand sophistication. Here we could apply the subsumptionstrategywithout significant loss, and thus talk of functions comparatively is strainedand pointless.It must be addistinctionhere, but mitted,however,that thereis no black-white a case of more-or-less. the role of organizationbecomes less and As the analytical strategy becomes less and less apless significant, and talk of functions makes less and less sense. This may propriate, but thereis no help forit. be philosophically disappointing,

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Almostwithoutexception, philosophicalaccountsof function-ascrib-

ingstatements offunctional and explanation havebeencrippled by adoptionof the assumptions and (B). Though there (A) has been wide-spread agreement extant that accounts notsatisfactory, are (A) and (B) have escapedcritical perhapsbecausetheywere scrutiny, thought as somehow of setting problem the ratherthen as part of proffered solutions. Once the problemis properly diagnosed, however, becomes it possibleto givea moresatisfactory more and illuminating account terms theexplanatory in of strategy prothat vides the motivation forms context function-ascribing and the of to statements, ascribea function something to ascibe a caTo is When a capacity a containing of capacity a containing of system. system appropriately is explained analyzing intoa number by it of a exercise othercapacities whoseprogrammed yields manifestation as of the analyzed the capacity, analyzing capacities emerge funcof tions. Sincetheappropriateness thissortof explanatory strategy of is a matter degree, is theappropriateness function-ascribing of so statements. The Johns Hopkins University
ROBERT CUMMINS

pacity to it which is singled out by its role in an analysisof some

BOOK REVIEWS The Anatomy the Soul. ANTHONY KENNY. Oxford:Basil Blackof well;New York:Barnes Noble, 1973.ix, 147p. $8.50. & I Not longbefore wasaskedto review bookI ordered copyof this a it from catalogueof its British the publishers, Blackwell, the on assumption that a new book of essayswould not, unlessclearly indicatedin catalogueand advertisements, consistof unrevised reprints already of published material. But no: not onlyhave all six of theseessaysappearedpreviously, no fewerthan four but of themare on my shelvesin othercollections, threein cheap paperbacks. There mustbe veryfewteachers philosophy, of and that do not already even fewer collegeand university libraries, if It own most, not all, of thesematerials. is naturalto ask,then, whatspecialvalue thisbook can haveforitsintended readers and buyers. is Well,there some new workhere,in theform an eighteenof of page Appendix, articleon consisting an intended encyclopedia