Calo vs Fuertes 5 SCRA 399 29June 1962

FACTS: In Cadastral Case No. 84, Butuan City entitled Francis C. Calo, claimant-contestant, vs. Delfin C. Fuertes, applicant-respondent, the Director of Lands rendered an opinion denying and dismissing former's claim and contest against the homestead application of Delfin C. Fuertes and ordered him to vacate the premises within 60 days from receipt of a copy of the opinion and stating that, upon finality thereof, the homestead patent would be issued to Fuertes. His request for reconsideration having been denied by the Director of Lands, Francisco C. Calo brought to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the case, who modified the opinion of the Director of Lands, ordering Fuertes to reimburse Calo of the difference between the value of the improvements that the latter introduced on the land in controversy and the value of the consequential benefits derived by him therefrom. Still dissatisfied with the opinion, Calo appealed to the President of the Philippines, but withdrew it before the President could act thereon. He later filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan a petition for writs of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction praying that the enforcement of the opinions of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be enjoined among others. For failure to state a cause of action, for lack of jurisdiction and for not exhausting all the administrative remedies available to the petitioner in the ordinary course of law, the Court resolves to dismiss as it hereby dismisses the herein petition with costs against petitioner. The petitioner then appeals to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the appeal to the President is a condition precedent to the appeal to the Courts of Justice.

HELD: Yes. The appellant s contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal from the decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands, he had exhausted all the administrative remedies, is untenable. The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal because the appeal to the President is the last step he should take in an administrative case. Furthermore, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In the case at bar, appeal from an opinion or order by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. Therefore, the judgment appealed from had already become final and cannot be reviewed. The appeal is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant.

Manila Electric Company vs Pasay Transportation Company, et al. 5 SCRA 399 November 25, 1932

FACTS: The Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) filed a petition before the court requesting the members of the Supreme Court sitting as board of arbitrators to fix the terms upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the MERALCO. MERALCO submits the petition before the court by virtue of Act No. 1446, section 11, which states: Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final. Copies were sent to the affected transportation companies (one of which is the Pasay Transpo) and to the Atty-Gen, who disclaimed any interest.

ISSUE: Whether the members of the SC can sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and compensation as is asked of them in this case.

HELD: No. MERALCO is banking on the case of Tallassee Falls Mfg Co vs Commissioners Court where it was held that a state legislature authorizing the commissioners' court of a certain county to regulate and fix the rate of toll to be charged by the owners of a bridge is not unconstitutional as delegating legislative power to the courts. However, that is not the question before the Supreme Court. Here, the question is not one of whether or not there has been a delegation of legislative authority to a court. More precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity. The Supreme Court is therefore faced with a dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as board of arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi-judicial functions. There is an important distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court. The first case would appear not to fall within the jurisdiction granted to the Supreme Court. More so with the second case, where the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be considered as administrative or quasi-judicial in nature, which would result in the performance of duties that the members of the Supreme Court could not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. Therefore, confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further in the matter.