[LNU 2011-2012] [2AC Foucault K]

2AC Foucault Kritik

A) Our framework is that you evaluate the affirmative against a competitive policy option or the status quo. Prefer our framework because: 1. Plan focus we allow for a stable locus for links and comparison of alternatives. Their framework makes confusion and judge intervention inevitable. 2. Ground they access a massive amount of K frameworks, links, and impacts. They can leverage framework to moot the 1AC. We can never predict what we will have to compare the plan to. Even if we get ground, its bad and unpredictable. 3. Topic education their framework encourages generic Ks that get rehashed every year. We change the topic to learn about new things. B) Debating about space policies are necessary for effective decision making Huntley et al 2010 (Wade L. Huntley, US Naval Postgraduate School; Joseph G. Bock, Kroc Institute for International Peace
Studies; Miranda Weingartner, Weingartner Consulting; Planning the unplannable: Scenarios on the future of space, Space Policy 26) These prospects raise many issues. Accordingly, policies shaping current space activities are much debated in

many

arenas around the globe. The agenda of issues is wide-ranging, including improving space surveillance data and traffic management, preventing and mitigating space debris, concerns over space security and possible weapons deployment, the use of space travel for scientific advancement, the implications of space tourism, and the possibility of eventual space colonization for scientific, exploratory and commercial purposes. These debates benefit from considerable ongoing efforts to generate relevant information, both technical and political. The decision-making processes often reflect the input of the many constituencies with near-term stakes in their outcomes. But lacking from these debates is a comprehensive and informed set of visions for the overarching objectives of the advancing human presence in space. This absence is ironic, given that human interests in space are intrinsically visionary.
Perhaps no other element of contemporary human life so inspires the imagination. Science fiction wonderment has motivated careers. In many nations, space-related achievements epitomize national purpose and pride. At this level, we are rife with visions. But dreams do not constitute a basis for serious public policy planning. Lacking are what might best be termed realistic visions e that is, a set of

integrated ideas about possibilities cast against the background of varying constraints, tradeoffs, and uncertainties. Realistic visions would map out how interests and forces operating within the expanding human presence in space will interact to produce outcomes over longer-term time frames. Visions must also
account for variance on ultimate aspirations. Hence, no single vision can suffice; such visions are not themselves policy-setting directions. Rather, creative visions of this nature contribute to contemporary policy debates by providing a foundation,

beyond simple speculation, for tracing the potential longer-term consequences of immediate policy questions. Even in the absence of global value convergence, such visions can enable policy makers to anticipate and preemptively solve many of the challenges that the advancing human presence in space will pose. Without such reflection, policy making is driven by extant knowledge, current political forces and shortterm objectives. As in many other areas of human life, the long-term consequences of a perpetually ad hoc and unintegrated decisionmaking process may please no-one. The incorporation of serious visions into policy-making processes will not insure the best outcomes - impossible in the absence of global values consensus but they can help avoid the worst outcomes, which are easier to identify.

[LNU 2011-2012] [2AC Foucault K]

C) Extinction outweighs no coping mechanisms, no experience, no trial-and-error, future generations Bostrom 2 (Nick Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale.. www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.)JFS
Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as
dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things

from the perspective of humankind as a whole even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They havent significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the
exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in

The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might
human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. start a runaway chain-reaction by igniting the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If

we dont know whether something is

risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[2]At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[3]A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An
objectively all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that mighthave been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankinds potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that

nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century. The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points: Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to

anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.[5] Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat. Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits [15,16]. In view of its undeniable importance, it is surprising how little systematic work has been done in this area. Part of the explanation may be that many of

the gravest

see) from anticipated future technologies that we have only recently begun to understand. Another part of the explanation may be the unavoidably interdisciplinary and speculative nature of the subject. And in part the neglect may also be attributable to an aversion against thinking seriously about a depressing topic. The

risks stem (as we shall

point, however, is not to wallow in gloom and doom but simply to take a sober look at what could go wrong so we can create responsible strategies for improving our chances of survival. In order to do that, we need to know where to focus our efforts.

D) The alternative is dangerous. Abandoning state politics cedes it to the elites causing war, slavery, and authoritarianism Boggs 2k (CAROL BOGGS, PF POLITICAL SCIENCE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 00, THE END OF POLITICS, 250-1
But it is a very deceptive and misleading minimalism.

While Oakeshott debunks political mechanisms

and rational

planning, as either useless or dangerous, the actually existing power structure-replete with its own centralized state apparatus, institutional hierarchies, conscious designs, and indeed, rational plans-remains fully intact, insulated from the minimalist critique. In other words, ideologies and plans are perfectly acceptable for elites who preside over established governing systems, but not for ordinary citizens or groups anxious to challenge the status quo. Such one-sided minimalism gives carte blanche to elites who naturally desire as much space to maneuver as possible. The flight from abstract principles rules out ethical attacks on injustices that may pervade the status quo (slavery

[LNU 2011-2012] [2AC Foucault K] or imperialist wars, for example) insofar as those injustices might be seen as too deeply embedded in the social and institutional matrix of the time to be the target of oppositional political action. If politics is reduced to nothing other than a process of everyday muddling-through, then people are condemned to accept the harsh realities of an exploitative and authoritarian system, with no choice but to yield to the dictates of conventional wisdom. Systematic attempts to ameliorate oppressive conditions would, in Oakeshotts view, turn into a political nightmare. A belief that totalitarianism might results from extreme attempts to put society in order is one
thing; to argue that all politicized efforts to change the world are necessary doomed either to impotence or totalitarianism requires a completely different (and indefensible) set of premises. Oakeshotts minimalism poses yet another, but still related, range of problems: the

shrinkage of politics hardly suggests that corporate colonization, social hierarchies, or centralized state and military institutions will magically disappear from peoples lives. Far from it: the public space vacated by ordinary citizens, well informed and ready to fight for their interests, simply gives elites more room to consolidate their own power and privilege. Beyond that, the fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian civil society, not too far removed from the excessive individualism, social Darwinism and urban violence of the American landscape could open the door to a modern Leviathan intent on restoring order and unity in the face of social disintegration. Viewed in this light, the contemporary drift towards antipolitics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more authoritarian and reactionary guise-or it could simply end up reinforcing the dominant state-corporate system.

E) Perm do the plan and parts of the alt that is not mutually exclusive Only the permutation can solve their impactsfoucaultian analysis must be combined with conventional understandings of power in order to galvinize real change. White 92 (Lucie E White B.A. Radcliffe College, J.D. Harvard Law School, Cornell Law Review, SYMPOSIUM: SEEKING . . . THE
FACES OF OTHERNESS . . .: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS SARAT, FELSTINER, AND CAHN, Nexis)

While the Foucaultian lens reveals the fluidity of power, it does not show how power can become congealed in social institutions in ways that sustain domination. It may be true that everyday interactions create and maintain social institutions, but this insight does not enable us to map those interactions against the institutional matrices they create. Nor does this insight show us how institutions constrain the circulation of power, channeling it to flow toward some social groups and away from others. In short, the Foucaultian lens does not move us toward a theoretics and a reconstructive politics of institutional design. Without richer meta-theories -- stronger lenses -- that focus on institutional as well as interpersonal realities, we will remain bewildered by exactly how our actions reiterate what has been called "structural" or "institutional" subordination. n30 We will remain unable to critique and repattern our actions, so that we enact more democratic institutions as we seek to live more ethical lives. These other lenses need not replace Foucault's; rather, they can provide a second filter on the same landscape, enabling us to study the geology [*1506] of the ocean floor as well as the action of the waves. Without these other lenses, the dynamics of systemic injustice -dynamics that stunt the life-chances of some social groups with more than random frequency -- will remain invisible and therefore go unchallenged.

F) Only the aff can solve the most pernicious manifestation of their impactthe alternative is unable to resist neoliberal violence. Giroux 8 (Henry A. Giroux 2008 Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, Beyond the
biopolitics of disposability: rethinking neoliberalism in the New Gilded Age, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504630802343432) While there is little question that since the new millennium,

the United States has moved into lockdown (and lockout) mode both at home and abroad with its burgeoning police state, its infamous title as the world leader in jailing its own citizens, and its
history of foreign and domestic torture factories (Davis, 2005, p. 50)1 it is a mistake to assume that the Bush administration is solely responsible for transforming the United States to the degree that it has now become unrecognizable to itself as a democratic nation. Such claims risk reducing the serious social ills now plaguing the United States to the reactionary policies of the Bush regime a move which allows for complacency to set in as Bushs reign comes to a close on January 20, 2009. The complacency caused by the sense of immanent regime change fails to offer a truly political response to the current crisis because it ignores the extent to which Bushs policies merely recapitulate Clinton era social and economic policy. What

the United States has become in the last decade suggests less of a rupture than

[LNU 2011-2012] [2AC Foucault K] an intensification of a number of already existing political, economic, and social forces that have unleashed the repressive anti-democratic tendencies lurking beneath the damaged heritage of democratic ideals.What marks the present state of American democracy is the uniquely bipolar nature of the degenerative assault on the body politic, which combines elements of unprecedented greed and fanatical capitalism, called by some the New Gilded Age (McHugh, 2006; Greider, 2006; Davis & Monk, 2007; Krugman, 2007a; Uchitelle, 2007; Dreier, 2007; Trachtenberg, 2007), with a kind of politics more ruthless and savage in its willingness to abandon even vilify those individuals and groups now rendered disposable within new geographies of exclusion and landscapes of wealth that mark the new world order (Davis & Monk, 2007, p. ix). Neoliberalism and the return of the Gilded Age. The first Gilded Age, occurring at the end of the nineteenth century, serves as
both a historical landmark and a point of departure in American history. As a historical landmark, it marks the rise of the robber barons, the merging of various backlash, nativist, and right-wing populist movements, legally sanctioned segregationism, a celebration of free-market economics, evangelical revivals, law-and-order moralism, limited government, violent labor conflicts, massive inequality, and the rise of a daunting nationalist capitalist class (Josephson, 2001[1934]).2 As an all-embracing rationality, it made visible an economic, political, and cultural model that presented a powerful political challenge for various progressive struggles, which in turn needed to contest the official ideology, values, institutions, social relations that violently ordered American society around the discourses of racism, greed, unencumbered individualism, self-interest, and a rationality that recast all aspects of political, cultural, and social life in terms of the calculating logic of the market. Inherently anti-democratic, steeped in glamour and violence, the Gilded Age eventually gave way to progressive movements committed to the strengthening of the social state and a renewed sense of social citizenship under the New Deal, initiated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, which demonstrated both a conception of democracy extended primarily to its white citizenry that served as a corrective to the immediacy of the Great Depression of the 1930s and a political refusal to reproduce the corruption of turn-of-the century politics with its minimal taxation, absence of regulation and reliance on faith-based charity rather than government social programs (Krugman, 2007a). 588 H.A. Giroux Downloaded By: [CDL Journals Account] At: 08:24 2 July 2009 The Gilded Age offers us today a historical snapshot of the worst

underpinnings of an unchecked and unregulated capitalism, state-sanctioned racial repression, and modes of subjectivity, ideology, and politics that undermine any vestige of moral and political values that could sustain the public good and nourish a flourishing democracy. With the emergence of the
Great Depression of the 1930s, the rise of powerful labor unions, the establishment of the welfare state, and the redistribution of income and jobs, the worse excesses of the Gilded Age seemed to be under control, especially between the 1930s and the 1970s. Unfortunately, in the last few decades, the reformist legacy of the New Deal and its ideological successor, the Great Society, initiated by President Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s, has been removed from both the rhetoric of politics and the very meaning of governance. At the dawn of the new

millennium, the Gilded Age with its updated neoliberal dreamworlds of consumption, property, and power has returned with a vengeance (Davis & Monk, 2007, p. ix). The new exorbitantly rich along with conservative ideologues such as Rush Limbaugh and Marvin Olasky now publicly preach and celebrate the gospel of wealth associated with that period in nineteenth-century American history when corporations ruled political, economic, and social life and a divinely ordained entrepreneurial spirit brought great riches and prosperity to the rest of the country.

G) To create real change, the use of political institutions is essential. Though we may have the best intentions to create change and make a difference, there is no way that we can actually do anything without a foot in the political world. Cook 92 (Anthony, Associate Professor, Georgetown Law, New England LR, Spring, 26 New Eng.L. Rev. 751)
The effect of deconstructing the power of the author to impose a fixed meaning on the text or offer a continuous narrative is both debilitating and liberating. It is debilitating in that any attempt to say what should be done within even our insular Foucaultian preoccupations may be oppositionalized and deconstructed as an illegitimate privileging of one term, value, perspective or narrative over another. The struggle over meaning might continue ad infinitum. That is, if a deconstructionist is theoretically consistent and sees

deconstruction not as a political tool but as a philosophical orientation, political action is impossible, because such action requires a degree of closure that deconstruction, as a theoretical matter, does not permit. Moreover, the approach is debilitating because deconstruction without material rootedness, without goals and
vision, creates a political and spiritual void into which the socially real power we theoretically deconstruct steps and steps on the disempowered [*762] To those dying from AIDS, stifled by poverty, dehumanized by sexism and racism, crippled by drugs and brutalized by the many forms of physical, political and economic violence that characterizes our narcissistic culture, power hardly seems a matter of illegitimate theoretical privileging. When vision, social theory and political struggle do not accompany critique, the void will be filled by the rich, the powerful and the charismatic, those who influence us through their eloquence, prestige, wealth and power. and dispossessed.