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Working paper presented at the conference After the Wahhabi Mirage: Islam, politics and international networks in the

Balkans European Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2010

Islam in Western Thrace-Greece after 1923 The role of internal and external actors By Ali Hseyinolu St Antony's College, University of Oxford December 2010

Islam in Western Thrace after 1923. The role of internal and external actors | A l i H s e y i n o l u | O x f o r d | 2 0 1 0

Working paper presented at the conference After the Wahhabi Mirage: Islam, politics and international networks in the Balkans European Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2010 Islam in Western Thrace-Greece after 1923 The role of internal and external actors

Ali Hseyinolu University of Sussex/UK A.Chouseinoglou@sussex.ac.uk

Introduction

Western Thrace is one of the ten regions of Greece. It extends to an area of 8,575 square kilometres in the northeast of the country. It is surrounded by the Maritza River in the East and the Nestos River in the West, the Rodopi Mountains in the North and the Aegean Sea in the South. It is composed of the three prefectures of Xanthi, Rodopi and Evros.

Islam in Western Thrace after 1923. The role of internal and external actors | A l i H s e y i n o l u | O x f o r d | 2 0 1 0

Muslims in Western Thrace number around 145,000 people.1 They are the only minority within Greece that is officially recognized by the Greek state. Apart from their constitutional rights, their citizenship and minority rights are protected by bilateral and international agreements that Greece signed and ratified. These people make up a predominantly agrarian community residing mostly in the Rodopi and Xanthi prefectures. Almost all of them are Sunni Muslims, while there are only a few minority villages in the highlands of the Evros prefecture with a concentration of followers of the Alevi-Bektashi sect. Before discussing the Muslims of Western Thrace, I will briefly explore the debates on the ethnic identification of the minority, which started in the early 1950s and still continues today. The Muslim minority in western Thrace has indeed been shaped to a significant extent by the two states with which they were associated: their home state Greece, and their ethnickin state Turkey. These states often promoted different models of identity based on religion or ethnicity.

Defining the Muslim minority of Western Thrace: Etic and emic perspectives

Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkish decision makers have insisted consistently on calling Muslims in Western Thrace Turkish, hence establishing proximity with other Turkish communities in the Balkans. In comparison, Greek policy regarding the definition of the minority has changed over time. From the 1920s until the mid 1950s, Greece referred to the minority either as Muslims or Turks and did not try to prioritise one identity over the other. Especially after the Greek Civil War in the late 1940s, the state promoted the Turkish identity in Western Thrace in order to increase the resistance against threats from its Communist neighbour, Bulgaria. The Fessopoulos order of 1954 is one of the most prominent examples for indicating the Greek promotion of the ethnic Turkish identity in Western Thrace. In this document, the general administrator of Thrace, G. Fessopoulos, following the order of the President, conveyed to the mayor of the prefecture of the Rodope, we ask you that from now on and all occasions the terms Turk-Turkish are used instead of the terms Muslim-of Muslim. 2 Around the same time, however, Turkish-Greek relations started to deteriorate as a result of the dispute over Cyprus. Between 6 and 7 September 1955, pogroms were organised against the Greek Orthodox minority in Istanbul. These events put an end to the
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According to latest figures, the minority population in Western Thrace varies between 140,000 and 145,000, constituting almost one-third of the Thracian population http://www.remth.gr [Retrieved on 22.7.2010]. Cited by Soltaridis, Simeon, [The History of the Muftis of Western Thrace] (Athens: Nea Synora, 1997), p. 210.
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1950s dtente across the Aegean. Since then, Greek officials gradually chose to refer to the Muslim minority in Western Thrace; eventually, any official reference to the existence of a Turkish minority within Greek national territories was strictly rejected. In the beginning of the 1990s, Greeces ethnic identification policy changed once more when the Greek Prime Minister, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, during his visit of Western Thrace from 14 to 15 May 1991, laid out a new model of identification. He referred to a Muslim minority, but one that was composed of three different ethnic groups: the Turkish-born (not Turks), the Pomak and the Roma.3 Since then, consecutive Greek governments have maintained this ethno-religiously differentiated policy of identification. Today, each member of the minority has the individual right to identify himself as Turk, Roma or Pomak, as any other Greek citizen. However, regarding the collective identification, there have been different possibilities: Pomaks and Roma have been allowed officially to identify as such, while Turks are denied the collective right of ethnic identification. That is to say, while Pomaks and Roma can form associations bearing terms like Pomak or Roma in their titles, Turks are prevented from forming Turkish associations in Western Thrace. In spite of relevant decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Greek courts are still refusing to register existing Turkish unions on the basis that the ECHR decisions do not supersede Greek law.4 Among the Muslims in Western Thrace, ethnic identification became a matter of debate especially in the 1960s, when Greece began to apply discriminatory measures against the minority. According to Oran,5 both identity layers, the Turkish and the Muslim one, had not gone beyond mere subconscious affiliation. However, the more individuals experienced discrimination, the more consciously they affiliated themselves with ethnic Turkish and religious Islamic values. Until the 1990s, when the Greek state began to differentiate between Turks, Pomaks and Roma, discriminatory measures targeted all Muslims of the region. In other words, as long as your name was not Alekos but Ali, you were likely to face a series of disadvantages and discrimination. Until the beginning of 1990s, even basic individual human rights were being been violated by local authorities and the Greek state at large. Muslim Turks were banned from using tractors and their rights to own property was severely restricted. The authorities refused them permits to build new houses, and even to repair existing ones. 6 Indeed, these policies actually promoted Turkeys increasingly central role as the mother3 4

Statements of Mitsotakis in his Komotini speech quoted in Paratiris, 15.5.1991. [The Court of Appeal in Thrace dissolves the Xan thi Turkish Union], Xronos, 11.12.2009. Baskn Oran, Trk- Yunan likilerinde Bat Trakya Sorunu [The problem of Western Thrace in TurkishGreek relations] (Ankara: Bilgi Yaynevi, 1991) p. 306. For more information see Ali Chousein, Continuities and Changes in the Minority Policy of Greece: The Case of Western Thrace, Unpublished MSc Thesis, Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University-Ankara/Turkey, 2005, pp. 81-117.
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land and the sole guarantor of Muslim Turkish existence in Greece. Even today, and despite Greeces membership in a range of bodies such as the European Union, the vast majority of Muslims in Western Thrace see Turkey as the main guarantor of their survival in Western Thrace and their primary safe haven in case of conflict in the Balkans. One of the key outcomes of my fieldwork in Western Thrace in 2008 and 2009 was that not only Muslims of Turkish origin in the region identify as such, but that also Pomak and Roma Muslims predominantly identify themselves with ethnic Turkish identity, despite the Greek policy of ethnic differentiation. Hence, I also use the term Muslim Turks while referring to the minority in Western Thrace. In doing so, I am not ignoring the internal ethnic and linguistic differentiation in the minority. I am simply employing the conclusions derived through my fieldwork: the Greek differentiation since 1991 has not stopped the last Ottomans in the Balkans from identifying themselves with ethnic Turkish identity.
A brief history of the Western Thracian minority

After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the region became a Greek territory in the early 1920s. Since then, as I mentioned above, the community has officially been defined as consisting of Greek citizens of Muslim faith, predominantly referred to simply as Turkish. In the last eighty years, a great number of ethnic and religious minority groups, like Vlachs, Arvanites and Macedonians, either stayed in Greece and largely assimilated within the greater Greek culture or left the country and found refuge in different parts of Europe and America. Unlike such groups, Muslim Turks survived in their region despite major discriminatory measures, imposed especially during the Cold War years. Compared to other minority groups in Greece, it can be argued that one of the main obstacles to the assimilation of the Muslim identity in Western Thrace was their dual affiliation with Islam and for the vast majority during the Cold War years, an attachment to ethnic Turkish identity. However, both of these identities became highly interrelated with each other even in cases of non-Turkish speaking Muslims in the region. From 1923 onwards, Islam was not only often interpreted as the historical enemy of Christianity, but also framed within the notion of enmity towards newly-founded Turkish Republic. For decades, Islam and Turkishness have often been perceived as synonymous and have been used interchangeably in Western Thrace. For most of the Greeks, Islam implied centuries of slavery under Ottoman rule, while Turks and Turkey represented neighbouring enemies and the primary threat from the East. Despite the rapprochement in TurkishGreek relations in the last decade and different attempts for inter-religious and intercultural dialogue across the Aegean ethnic, religious, and cultural boundaries still shape relations between Muslim Turks and Christian Greeks in Western Thrace.

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In spite of the Turco-Greek rapprochement following the earthquake diplomacy of the late 1990s, members of both communities have continued to behave with the hidden boundaries in mind, while socialising with one other. Despite growing levels of interaction in recent years, mixed marriages, for instance, continue to be major social taboos. Even the younger generations of the region, encompassing those who have not experienced the heydays of discrimination in the pre-1990s are still segregated along ethno-religious lines. The cafs in Komotini for instance, are frequented by Greeks and Turks alike on Saturday evenings. It is rare, however, to see Greeks and Turks sitting together at the same table.. Both ethnicity and religion have played a significant role for the continuity and survival of the Muslim and Turkish presence in the region; they remained the main shield against the assimilationist bent of the minority policies endorsed by subsequent Greek governments. This paper aims to discuss the forces that have shaped the minority community in Western Thrace by focusing on the main actors that have affected Muslim identity and religious institutions in Western Thrace since 1923: Greece, Turkey and external actors. Greece had a significant impact on the fate of Islam in Western Thrace; neighbouring Turkey played a major, if not always overt, role. Finally, international actors, including Arab and Islamic countries, have entered the scene with acute influence especially in the last three decades.

1. The role of the Greek state and the minority actors in Western Thrace

With the inclusion of Western Thrace into the Greek state, Greece assumed the most significant role in the religious life of the Muslim Turkish minority. The 1913 Athens Treaty between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, in which a number of measures for the regulation and practice of Islam in Greece were codified, determined religious rights.7 With Law No. 2345 of 1920,8 the provisions of the Athens Treaty were incorporated into Greek law,
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The Protocol No.3 of the 1913 Athens Treaty defined the religious rights of the Muslims in allover Greece. According to the treaty, both the chief mufti of Greece, other muftis and members of their offices would have the same rights and duties as all other Greek public officers. Also, members of the Muslim communities would be in charge of administration of their own waqfs. All the private Muslim schools, medreses both the existing ones as well as the ones created afterwards would be recognized. In fact, the 1913 Athens Treaty was signed between Greece and the Ottoman Empire before the inclusion of Western Thrace into Greek national territories in the early 1920s. However, according to Article 2 of the Treaty, Protocol No. 3 would be applied to all Greek territories. It means that it would be applied also in Western Thrace. For the full text of the 1913 Athens Treaty, see The Treaty of Peace Between Turkey and Greece, The American Journal of International Law, No. 1, 1914, pp. 46-55. The Greek Official Gazette, FEK A 148, 3.7.1920. However, it was replaced with the Law No.1920/1991 that provided significant authorities for the Greek state authorities on appointment of muftis and other matters regarding their functioning in Western Thrace. For the Law No.1920/1991 see the Greek Official Gazette, FEK A11, 4.2.1991.
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awarding a number of religious rights to Muslims. The most important provisions regulated the election of the religious leaders, i.e. the Chief mufti and the regional muftis, as well as the administration of Muslim foundations (waqfs). Many issues related to freedom of religion, conscience and belief in Western Thrace were reinforced under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty.
The leaders of the community: The Muftis

Greeces policy towards Islam in Western Thrace has been ambiguous, especially with regard to the representative capacity of religious leaders, i.e. the muftis. Although the Law No. 2345/1920 provided for elections of the head mufti (bamft), who would have represented all Muslims of Greece, such elections never occurred. The Greek state has been wary of the emergence of an institution that could assume a representative function with real authority vis--vis Athens. Consequently, no institution responsible for Muslim religious matters in Greece exists, while the issue of Muslim identity remains relegated to the local level. All other Muslim communities in different parts of Greece gradually disappeared.9 Yet even on the level of the three prefectures of Western Thrace, state policy remained inconsistent. From the 1920s, local muftis continued to be elected by the members of the Muslim community, highlighting the importance of the Mufti not only for religious matters, but also for the community as a whole. In 1990, however, the state introduced Law No.1920/1991,10 putting an end to the election of muftis in the three prefectures of Western Thrace. According to the new law, muftis were to be appointed by the Greek state for ten years due to their judicial functions in matters of marriage and inheritance arising from the application of Sharia Law. It was clear that this change in status was a response to the political mobilisation of the 1980s, when the elected muftis and imams played a major role in mobilising the Muslim Turks in the region against violations of their human and minority rights. The critical juncture that enabled the Greek authorities to reconsider their general minority policy of Western Thrace, however, didnt occur until 1988. For the first time since 1923, approximately 10,000 minority members, both men and women, gathered in Komotini in order to protest against the fundamental human and minority rights violations of the Greek state that had
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The Cham Albanians were forced to flee the Epirus region in Northeastern Greece in 1945. Furthermore, after the inclusion of the Dodecanese Islands into Greece by 1947, Muslims in Rhodes and Kos islands started to constitute a significant community. In time, however, their numbers decreased as a result of Greek policies of discrimination. For example, educational instruction in Turkish ceased in the 1970s, and most of the mosques remain closed. Today, there are only a few thousand Muslims residing on the two islands. For a recent synopsis, see The Situation of the Turkish Minority in Rhodes and Kos, Resolution taken by MPs from CoE-PACE available at http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents /WorkingDocs/Doc09/EDOC11904.htm [Retrieved 20.10.2010]. Konstantinos Tsitselikis, The Legal Status of Islam in Greece, Die Wielt des Islams, 44:3, 415-416
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made their daily lives unbearable. Elected muftis and their imams played a noteworthy role in the protest in Komotini. Noting this rising activism, the Greek state sought ways to control the religious leadership of the communities by replacing the elected Muftis. When the Mufti of Komotini died in 1985, his office was governed for five years by temporary officers. After the introduction of the new law in 1991, Greece appointed Meco Hafiz Cemali as the mufti of Komotini, whose tenure was renewed in 2001, after a decade, for ten more years. The authorities followed a similar policy in the Xanthi Prefecture. When the mufti of Xanthi died in 1990, his son, Mehmet Emin Aga, was appointed. However, he resigned in order to protest the appointment of Mufti in Komotini by the Greek state. Hence, Greece appointed Mehmet Sinikoglu as the new mufti of Xanthi under the new law. As for the Evros Prefecture, Mehmet Serif Damataoglu was appointed to the mufti office in Didimotiho. Not surprisingly, such appointment of muftis in the beginning of the 1990s created resentment in the Muslim community. Most congregations in the three prefectures refused the appointed muftis and instead elected their own. Furthermore, although both Ibrahim Serif and M.Emin Aga were elected in the Rodopi and Xanthi prefectures, they were put on trial in the 1990s for usurping the authority and title of the appointed mufti. Both Serif and Aga applied to the European Court of Human Rights in 1997 and 1999, respectively. Regarding the cases of Serif versus Greece11 and Agga versus Greece12, the ECHR concluded that Greece had violated the rights to the freedom of thought, religion and conscience. However, Greece continued to reject Serif and Aggas statuses as muftis. Thus, from the early 1990s until today, there are two parallel muftis in Komotini (Gmlcine) and in Xanthi (skee)13 and one in Didimotiho (Dimetoka)14. This contested structure leads to a number of problems in terms of the practice of Islam in everyday life, while simultaneously disregarding a clearly expressed popular will of the minority to elect their leaders in a democratic fashion.
The Islamic foundations as a remnant of Ottoman jurisdiction: The waqfs

Charitable foundations (waqfs in Arabic, vakf in Turkish) stand at the core of the religious and social lives of Muslims all over the world and even more so in countries with non11

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The decision of the ECHR available at www.echr.coe.int/ eng/press/1999/dec/serif_jud _epresse.htm [Retrieved on 3.5.2005]. The decision of the ECHR is available at www.echr.coe.int/eng/press/2002/oct/aggano.2judepress. htm. [Retrieved on 3.5.2005]. For more information about office and activities of the elected muftis of Komotini and Xanthi visit http://www.gumulcinemuftulugu.info/ and http://www.iskecemuftulugu.org. As for those of the appointed ones visit http://www.muftikomotini.com and http://www.iskecemuftulugu.com/ [All retrieved on 1.8.2010] The mufti of Didimotiho is appointed by the Greek state and no elections were conducted because the Minority concentration at this prefecture is comparably quite low.
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Muslim majority structures, where they play a major role in the organization of community life. In the absence of formal administrative structures such as municipalities manned by members of the community, these foundations played a major role in the life of Muslims in Western Thrace. Yet administrative measures to obstruct the operation of such foundations go back to the Junta regime of April 1967 and have been continued ever since. As part of the authoritarian measures of the Junta, the foundations elected minority members were all removed from the administrative boards of these organizations and replaced with appointed members. In fact, the colonels even appointed a non-Muslim Greek as the head of one of these boards in 1973.15 Effectively taking away the control of the foundations from the Muslim community also meant taking over the many properties that had belonged to the foundations in the main cities Komotini and Xanthi as well as in the villages. In this process, Muslim Turks not only lost the rights to administer their own foundations, they also lost the properties belonging to the foundations. In spite of their financial immunity as charitable organisations, Greek governments impose excessive taxes on waqf properties, precipitating their gradual decline. Under the new Law No. 3554/2007, all debts of waqfs to Western Thrace were expunged except the fines and income tax imposed by the Greek state. To give an example, the total debt of the Komotini waqfs recently rose to 775,463 Euros, resulting in the revocation of 23 shops and 1 farm owned by the administration.16 Due to the limited access to the accounts of waqfs, the number and revenues of waqf properties and the change so of these numbers is still not clear. What is clear, however, is that a number of valuable waqf properties do not belong to the administrations today. Many members of the minority have blamed the appointed board members for cooperating with Greek authorities to squander valuable properties in the city centres of Komotini and Xanthi. The Junta regime came to an end in 1974, unlike the administrative changes in Western Thrace, which were never retracted. In fact, minority members appointed by the military regime of 1967 still continue to administer waqf properties in all three prefectures. Given this history, the promise of the Karamanlis government (2004-2008) that elections for the administrative boards of Muslim waqfs would now finally be held seemed like a bold departure from established practice. In the end, no action was taken either by the Karamanlis government or by the current one to realize these promises.

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Tzn Baheli, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955 (Boulder: Westview Pres,1990) p. 181. Violation of Freedom of Religion or Belief: The Turkish-Muslim Minority of Western Thrace-Greece, Report submitted by WTMUGA at OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on Freedom of Religion or Belief, 9-10 July 2009, Hofburg-Vienna/Austria.
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Mosques, schools and the Ottoman heritage

Unlike the structural barriers to the operation of muftis and waqfs, the religious practice of Muslims has not been restricted. Mosques have been functional in localities with Muslim minority populations and the call to prayer, the edhan, with some exceptions, has not normally been obstructed, echoing throughout Western Thrace five times a day. The mosques also double as schools for instruction on the basis of Quran and religious practice. As of 2009, there were three hundred mosques in Western Thrace, and most of them were in use and had an imam.17 Problems do, however, occur regularly concerning the maintenance of the material heritage of the community. Since the promulgation of Law No. 1369/193818, Muslims were required to seek permission from the local Metropolitan Greek bishop in case of the construction of a mosque. The permission of the bishop needed to be further approved by the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs. Until the beginning of the 1990s, local Greek authorities, together with local metropolitan bishops, frequently delayed or refused to grant building permits for new mosques or obstructed the restoration of old ones. In the municipality of Iasmos (Yassky) for instance, local authorities refused the building permit of the Muslim community to complete a half-built minaret for more than 25 years.19 However, from the mid-1990s, such restrictions were imposed increasingly less often, and after 2006, the bishops role regarding the construction of places of worship was transferred to the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs.20 Today, the local metropolitan churches have no say in the establishment of mosques and it is hence easier for the minority to build new mosques in the region without having to confront major bureaucratic hindrances. Yet, as for the restoration of dilapidated places of worship, Greek authorities still postpone demands for the restoration of the Ottoman heritage in the region. For example, the restoration of the Bayazit mosque started in the mid-1990s and remains unfinished today.21 In addition to the state, however, there are also other actors in the region who often play a significantly more destructive role. All manifestations of Ottoman material culture, be they sacred places like mosques, cemeteries, or even bridges, are regularly targeted by extremist and ultra nationalist groups. Such attacks often include the defacing of monuments

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Mosques in Western Thrace, Report submitted by the Western Thrace Minority University Graduates Association (WTMUGA) at the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, 10.7.2009, Vienna. The Greek Official Gazette, FEK A317, 10.9.1938. Lois Whitman, Destroying Ethnic Identity-The Turks of Greece (NY: Helsinki Watch, 1990) p. 27. The speech of Marietta Giannakou, the then Greek Minister of Education and Religious Affairs at the Greek Parliament, 25.5.2006. Available at http://www.parliament.gr/ergasies/showfile.asp?file=es60525 .txt [Retrived on 11.6.2006] Maria Nikolaou, SOS [Didimotiho SOS from the oldest mosque of Europe], Makedonia, 1.12.2008.
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with slogans like Out the Turks from Thrace. Mosques and mesjids (prayer rooms) are also physically attacked. The mosque in Toxotes/ Xanthi (Okular), for instance, was attacked and severely damaged three times in the last six years.22 Especially in cemeteries, vandalism results in the destruction of Muslim tombs.23 Regarding religious schools in Western Thrace, since the 1950s, there are only two medreses, one in Komotini and the other in the Echinos municipality of Xanthi. This is a very low number in comparison to the situation in 1925, when there were 16 religious schools: 8 in Komotini (Gmlcine), 3 in Xanthi (skee), and one in each of the Ehinos (ahin), Paxni (Paevik), Dimario (Demercik), Oreo (Yassren) and Sappes (ap) villages.24 The main role of these schools was to provide imams. Since the 1970s, however, courses taught in Turkish, as well as those concerning Islam and its practice, were gradually replaced by courses taught in Greek. Greek state authorities gradually increased their control over these schools. As a result, the medreses largely ceased to function as religious schools of the minority. Today, the great majority of courses are taught in Greek. As a matter of fact, due to the discriminatory policies of the Greek state, the Turkish Muslim community has lost almost all of its religious and educational institutions and many of its properties. Even though open pressure against Muslims has largely dissipated since the 1990s, the autonomy of the community has effectively been destroyed.
2. Growing bonds with Turkey and Turkifying Islam

Since the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, Turkey has been the guarantor25 as well as the motherland of the Muslims and Turks living in Western Thrace. Considering the historic role of the Ottoman Empire in the region, it would not be exaggerated to argue that Turkey has been the most important actor from the point of view of the survival of Muslim communities, even though its impact has not been even. In 1923, for instance, and counterintuitively, it was the anti-religious worldview of the Kemalist regime that led to a strengthening of the religious life of Western Thrace. When the Kemalist reforms led to attacks on the institutions of Islamic learning and attempted to Turkify the practice of Islam, many religious scholars fled Turkey to take on positions in Western Thrace. Greek administrators, who were confident that these anti-Kemalist religious scholars would
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Evren Dede, Her Ikisi de barbarlik, Azinlikca, Vol.51, October 2009, 25. In 2009 and 2010, six major violent attacks were reported against mosques and cemeteries in both Komotini and Xanthi prefectures. For more information on these attacks, see the written report of the WTMUGA submitted to the OSCE Human Dimension Meeting, Combating hate crimes in Western Thrace, 30 September-8 October 2010, Warsaw/Poland. Cited in K.G Andreadis, The Moslem Minority in Western Thrace (Thessaloniki: 1956) p. 74. To note, the 1923 Lausanne Treaty doesnt give any status for Turkey and Greece as guarantor of their co-ethnies in Western Thrace and Istanbul.

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help to keep the Muslims of Greece in the fold of Islam and protect them from the secularnationalist influence of the Turkish Republic, welcomed these scholars. At this point in time, Islamic identity was clearly preferable to the emergence of a secular Turkish identity, which, in the eyes of Greek decision makers, would lead to irredentist stirrings in Western Thrace. Indeed, the hold of a rather conservative form of Islam further intensified with the arrival of the last eyhlislam, the highest religious authority in the Ottoman Empire in 1924. He was accompanied by other religious leaders, also known as part of the contingent of the Hundred and fifty (150likler), a group of leading personalities suspected of opposition to the Turkish Republic. Not only did they find a safe haven in Western Thrace, but they also contributed to the continuation of a specifically Ottoman religious life based on Islamic principles. However, their arrival did not lead to the emergence of a uniformly conservative way of life. Despite Greek policy to support Islamic over Turkish-nationalist actors, the values of the new Republic were promoted by Turkish emissaries and were generally brought home by Western Thracians who studied in Turkey. By the mid-1920s, a schism had already divided the community, pitting minority elites against the masses, with Kemalists and modernists on the one side and traditionalists and conservatives on the other. The Kemalists were supporting the highly regulated and Turkified Islam promoted by the Turkish state and its official religious authority (the Diyanet), while traditionalists remained staunch supporters of the institutions and practices of Ottoman Islam. In fact, and still not sufficiently known in Turkey or elsewhere, some minority newspapers refused to follow some of the most influential reforms of the Kemalist era, such as the abolishment of the Ottoman Arabic script and the introduction of the Turkish-Latin alphabet. The newspaper Sebat, for instance, continued to be published in the Ottoman script until the early 1970s, making Western Thrace the only place in the world where the Ottoman language was still visible almost half a century after its official demise. In time and is spite of the support of Greek authorities, the traditionalists lost ground and the influence of Turkey in the region proved to be too powerful. Thus, the schism between the traditionalist and the modernist reading of Islam faded. From the 1970s, the more ethnically defined Turkish Islam, promoted by the Turkish state and the Diyanet, came to flourish in Western Thrace, contributing to the strengthening of Turkish identity among all Muslims. Indeed, such a transformation from the more traditional and Ottoman-rooted Islam to a more Turkish-oriented contemporary form of Islamic practice remains visible today. Religious education in Turkey has been the single most important variable in terms of this development. The Muslim Turkish religious elite, educated in Turkey in the last decades, has played a very important role. The elected muftis in Komotini and Xanthias distinct from

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the Greek-appointed muftis formed strong functional bonds with the Diyanet (Presidency of religious affairs of the Turkish Republic). Today, imams associated with the elected muftis are sent to summer courses organized by the Diyanet, where they are taught in different matters of Islamic theology and practice. More recently, preachers of the Diyanet have also been allowed to give hutbas (Friday sermons) and talks on contemporary Islam during the holy month. From 1990s onwards, Turkish Television channels, widely available through satellites, provided another influential tool for the development of Islam in Western Thrace and for the growing role of Turkey. Secondary education in Turkey has provided other important opportunities for Muslim Turks of Western Thrace. For many decades, Turkey was the primary destination for young Minority students who wanted to develop their knowledge and understanding of Islam at religious high schools while keeping their conservative lifestyles. The attendance of religious high schools in Turkey, so called Imam Hatip schools, which provide both religious and scientific education, used to be highly popular. More recently, this trend has diminished in part to a change in the educational preferences and expectations of the families, who have begun to prefer educating their children in Western Thrace rather than sending them to Turkey. As a result, the majority of influential people within the Muslim Turkish community in Greece, including the elected muftis of Komotini and Xanthi and most leading imams and other religious personnel, now have a predominantly Turkey-based educational career and professional socialisation. It may hence not be surprising that the Greek state began to appoint muftis who were not educated in Turkey in the early 1990s, while the Turkish government has been emphatically supporting the Turkey-educated elected muftis and imams following them. Even today, in times of relative rapprochement, Turkish representatives visiting the region make a point in not meeting with Greek-appointed muftis and instead visit the elected ones. Representatives of the Greek state in the region likewise only recognise the appointed muftis as religious leaders of given prefectures. The elected muftis are still viewed as acting illegally and usurping the authority of mufti. Yet, for the Muslims Turks, the preferences are pretty clear-cut. Based on the general mood in the region, as reflected in journals, newspapers and popular discussions, it is fair to say that the great majority of Muslims in the three prefectures of Western Thrace accept the elected muftis as their legitimate religious leaders, while they keep at a distance those appointed by the Greek state, with whom they interact only if they need some officially-recognised services in matters of divorce and inheritance.

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3. The distant influence of Arab and Muslim Countries

Compared with Turkey, the influence of other Muslim countries in Western Thrace remained relatively low. Islamic groups and state representatives from the Muslim world have visited the region and raised concerns against the discriminatory policies of the Greek state. Colonel Qaddafi, for instance, reminded Greek officials of complaints about religious freedom in Western Thrace during his visit to Greece in the 1980s,26 while a group of journalists from Saudi Arabia who visited the region reported on the lives of Muslim Turks in Western Thrace.27 This, however, had no impact on Western Thrace itself. Yet, Muslim majority countries were influential in other ways. Particularly Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia constituted the main destinations for a few minority students, mainly graduates of the two medreses of the region, who opted for higher education outside Greece during the Cold War years. Greek authorities preferred education in such Muslim countries rather than in Turkey.28 However, by the 2000s, this phenomenon had largely subsided, and by 2010, there were almost no Muslim students from Western Thrace pursuing higher education in the Arab and Islamic world. In terms of the influence of religious networks, Western Thrace has been rather isolated. Compared to other countries in the Balkans, different Islamic groups like Naqshibendis or Wahhabis had little or no impact. Although some members of such groups continue to visit Western Thrace, none of them was able to establish any network of influence in the region. Thus, one can say that the phenomenon of different and competing versions of Islam does not apply to todays Western Thrace, as there remains a highly homogenised and shared common understanding of what constitutes Islam, a notion that remains heavily influenced by contemporary Turkish Islam and that is reflected in all levels of social, economic and political life. This relative insistence on a bounded way of life and the considerable orientation towards the mainstream Turkish tradition of Islam has kept Western Thracians away from the influence of Arab Muslim networks. Additionally, this insistence has also created a gulf between immigrant Muslim communities from Southeast Asia who have been settling in Athens since early 1990s and the Arab world. In spite of sharing the same religion, the Muslim minoritys religious elite, which could, at least in theory, play a role in the future of Muslim immigrant communities in Greece,
26 27

28

Bahceli, op.cit. p. 183. HakkaDavet, 9, August 1982:21. See S.Sonyel, Muslims in Greece-the forgotten alien elements in BatiTrakya, 208, 15.08.1984:2-5. In 1984, speaking with villagers of Echinos/Xanthi the Vice Minister of the Greek Foreign Affairs. M. Kapsis, had overtly suggested to them to replace their teacher of Turkish citizenship with another from Saudi Arabia as the former is ethnically less-dangerous [sic.] than the latter. (Ios tis Kiriakis, Eleftherotipia, 22.1.2005).

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Islam in Western Thrace after 1923. The role of internal and external actors | A l i H s e y i n o l u | O x f o r d | 2 0 1 0

shows little concern for the religious needs of the Athenian Muslim immigrants. Some minority NGOs and members of the religious elite, indeed, do not go beyond criticizing the Greek state at regional and international platforms for delaying the establishment of a mosque and a Muslim cemetery in Athens. Such a low level of interest might also be welcomed by the Greek state, who would not want to see the institutions of Western Thrace be revitalised and strengthened by the immigrant Muslim communities of Athens. This instance, among others, seems also to reflect the understanding that Islam and Turkishness have become so heavily intertwined that the absence of one of these elements (Turkishness) seems to diminish the other one (Islam) for the Muslims of Western Thrace as well as their religious and political leaders. Hence, Arabic and other non-Turkish Muslim networks never really assumed a decisive role in terms of the fate of the minority.
4. International and Intergovernmental Organizations

The role of international actors increased from the 1980s onwards, at a greater pace following Greeces entry into the European Union in 1981. With the new opportunities arising from this membership, the religious and political leaders of the minority, MPs, muftis and presidents of associations began to establish relations with regional and international bodies. Most notably, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe became key platforms for publicising information about the discriminative measures of Greek state agencies. Hence, and for the first time since its emergence in the early 19th century, the Greek state was confronted with criticism of its minority policy in Western Thrace. Criticism was voiced from a range of institutions of the EU and CoE as well as from international human rights organizations such Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International. The reports of HRW (1990, 1992, 1999) depicted clearly to what extent religious freedom, alongside with other fundamental issues in Western Thrace, was restricted by the Greek authorities. Both HRW and Amnesty granted special attention to the trials of the elected muftis of Rodopi and Xanthi prefectures, Ibrahim Serif and M. Emin Aga. These agencies also highlighted the obstructions of the building and repair permits of the mosques in Western Thrace.29 Another important source that brings the problem in Western Thrace to the attention of an international audience is the International Religious Freedom Report of the U.S. State Department. Since 2000, the US has been monitoring

29

For more information see Lois Whitman, Destroying Ethnic Identity-The Turks of Greece, (New York: Helsinki Watch, 1990), the 1992 and 1999 Reports of the HRW on Greece available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/index.htm and http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/g/greece/greece924 [Both retrieved on 1.7.2010]. See also the public statement of Amnesty International on 24.2.1998 available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGEUR250141998 [Discontinued]

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Islam in Western Thrace after 1923. The role of internal and external actors | A l i H s e y i n o l u | O x f o r d | 2 0 1 0

the level of religious freedom of different communities not only in Western Thrace but also in the remaining regions of Greece.30 Furthermore, since the 1980s, religious issues of the Muslim Turkish minority, especially those regarding the election of muftis and the administration of charitable organizations, have frequently been raised at the annual summits of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), an intergovernmental organization functioning since 1969. From time to time, elected muftis of Western Thrace participate at their meetings and summits where they inform OIC members about the latest developments concerning the place of Islam in Greece. The OICs role in Western Thrace has also been further strengthened by the fact that it is now presided by the Turkish Islamic scholar Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, who supports both the religious and the ethnic aspect of minority identity in the region. Yet, despite the opportunities such international organisations might have created for community leaders, it would still be fair to say that criticism from international bodies had little impact on the day-to-day policies of the Greek state.
Conclusion

In this brief overview, I have sought to show that Islam has survived in Western Thrace after the region was incorporated into Greece in 1923 and that it is alive today, even though Muslims of Western Thrace continue to face a range of problems regarding issues of religious freedom. Turkey has been a key actor in all respects of the shaping and sustenance of Muslim and Turkish identities in Western Thrace. Over the years, Turkish policy has led to an aggregation of the disparate identities in the region into a Turkish-Muslim identity. The Greek state has been concerned by Turkeys pro-active policy in the region and by the opportunity structures it created for the Muslims from Western Thrace, but it has done little to find a constructive engagement with the minority and its leaders. The persistence of the problems, from the obstruction of the election of muftis and the control of waqfs to the arson attacks against mosques and cemeteries, suggest that the Greek state has continued to see the Muslim minority as a security threat rather than a group whose members enjoy full and equal citizenship rights. This perspective has not changed with the entry of Greece to the European Union, but it neither seems to have been effectively reconsidered under the current PASOK government of Prime Minister George Papandreou.

30

The US reports are available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/ [Retrieved on 28.7.2010] Matters of religious freedom in Greece have also been evaluated at the US State Department Reports since the late 1970s.

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