Trex 00082

REPORT OF SURVEY
Semi-submersible DEEPWATER HORIZON

Dropped Objects
Prepared for
BHP BILLITON AMERICAS, INC.
USA
By
MODUSPEC USA, INC.
Inspection dates: 15- 18 April2005
CONFIDENTIAL
EXHIBIT #_ '6_x...z;;Z ;::.__
WIT: ____ _
MODUSA 000386
1.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS
NOTE: The numbering system within this report relates to the ModuSpec inspection
program and items which are omitted from the sequential system apply to
equipment which was not reviewed on this occasion.
Page
1.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS ......... ........................................................... 2
2.0 INTRODUCTION ....... .. .. .. ........... ......................... ... ..................... .. .... 3
2.1 Rig Data .............. .' .................................. ......... .. ................................ 3
2.2 Survey Workscope ............................................................................ 3
2.3 Applicable Standards ..... .... .................................... .. .......................... 3
2.4 ModuSpec Equipment Rating ........................................... ..... ............ 4
3.0 Executive Summary .......... .............................................. ................ 6
3.1 Executive Summary .. ..................................... ......... ..... .. .................... 6
4.0 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS ...... ............. ......... ................ 9
5.0 AREA 1 - Crown and Water Table .......................... ........ .............. 13
6.0 AREA 2 - Section between the Crown and Monkey board .. .. ...... 16
7.0 AREA 3 - Monkeyboard Area .. ......... .......... ........................... ........ 18
8.0 AREA 4 - Section between the Monkey board and Drill Floor .... 23
9.0 AREA 5- Drill Floor and Wind Walls ...................................... .... .. 27
10.0 AREA 6 - Travelling Equipment. ............... .. .... .. ........................ ... . 30
11 .0 AREA 7 - External Substructure .... .. ............................................. 34
12.0 AREA 8 -Internal Substructure and Wellhead/Moonpool. .... .... . 36
13.0 AREA 9- Cranes and Miscellaneous .. ... ..................... ..... ............ 40
14.0 MANAGEMENT REVIEW ................................ ........ ... ... ...... ........... 60
Report of Survey (Dropped Objects) - DEEPWATER HORIZON 2
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000387
2 ~ INTRODUCTION
2.1 Rig Data
Vessel DEEPWATER HORIZON
Owner Transocean
Type Semi-submersible
Built 2001
Class ABS
Performance Water depth 10,000 ft
Drilling depth 30,000 ft
Location Gulf of Mexico
Inspection dates
References
2.2 Survey Workscope
15- 18 April2005
PS/dw/pk/hh - US1328.1
In accordance with the instructions received, we attended on board the DEEPWATER
HORIZON to complete a dropped objects audit of the derrick and elevated moonpool
equipment. The aim of the audit was to conduct a detailed derrick inspection to identify
all of the equipment that was currently housed in the derrick and the elevated section of
the moonpool.
The audit was conducted in good faith, but the inspection of individual items of
equipment was subjected to time and operational constraints imposed at the time of the
survey.
2.3 Applicable Standards
The inspection criteria, which have been used as reference during this inspection, are
internationally recognized standards, local legislative requirements, client' s safety and
operating standards, the original equipment manufacturer's maintenance and operating
specifications and accepted oilfield operating and safety practices.
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000388
2.4 ModuSpec Equipment Rating
Tile ModuSpec Equipment Rating (MER) is a unique system to:
measure the condition of an individual rig,
compare the inspection results of an individual rig with the industry average for this
particular type of rig, worldwide or in a specific area,
visualize the strengths and weaknesses of an individual rig,
benchmark the safety and maintenance standards of an individual rig against other
rigs or against the results of previous inspections,
use as a risk analysis tool to proactively prevent accidents and downtime.
The added value of the MER system is that it visualizes and measures the present
condition of a rig and its equipment. The MER allows a direct comparison of a rig with
other rigs of the same type Gack-ups with jack-ups etc.) located in a predefined area or
worldwide.
A series of bar charts representing the inspection results of the rig is included in the final
inspection report. These bar charts are only applicable to the scope of work as stated in
section 2.2.
The MER is presented as an average figure for the entire rig (chart 1) and for each
individual section of the inspection program (chart 3).
A low MER is an indication that certain steps must be taken, for instance:
1. to address the recommendations made in the report,
2. to effect structural improvements to the maintenance management system,
3. to conduct a recheck after the recommendations made in the report have been
addressed.
The following charts are included in the inspection report:
Chart 1: Rig Average Inspection Ratina
In comparison with an industry average, this chart shows:
the percentage of the ModuSpec inspection program which was completed for the
rig,
the average MER for the entire rig.
Chart 2: Percentage lnsoected
This chart shows the percentage inspected for each section of the rig in comparison
with the average coverage during an inspection.
Report of Survey (Dropped Objects)- DEEPWATER HORIZON 4
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000389
Chart 3: Detailed MER Results
This chart indicates how the rig is rated from a maintenance and safety
qualitative point of view, in comparison with an industry average for this type of rig for
each individual section of the inspection.
Chart 4: Detailed Critical Rating
This chart shows the percentage of critical non-conformances identified for each section
of the inspection program in comparison with the industry average. This chart is an
important indication of the risk to encounter a fatality or serious accident on the rig, and
the possibility of environmental damage caused by the rig.
Chart 5: Detailed Major Rating
This chart shows the percentage of major non-conformances identified for each section
of the inspection program in comparison with the industry average. It is an important
indication of the risk to encounter major equipment damage and/or operational
downtime of the rig.
Chart 6: Detailed Minor Rating
This chart shows the percentage of minor non-conformances identified for each section
of the inspection program in comparison with the industry average. It is an important
indication of the risk of lost-time incidents and it visualizes the overall safety and
maintenance standards on the rig.
Note: Charts 4, 5 and 6 indicate the probability far the rig to encounter accidents and
operational downtime measured against the industry average. These charts are very
important indicators to establish whether or not the rig is capable of operating in a safe
and reliable manner.
Validity of the MER
The MER is valid for the duration of one year after completion of the initial inspection.
If a recheck is conducted and completed within four months after the completion of the
initial inspection, only the non-satisfactory and non-inspected items will be checked
again. The MER is then valid for all equipment items which were inspected and found
satisfactory during the initial inspection as well as during the recheck.
Revalidation of the MER must be completed within a year after completion of the initial
inspection. An extension is possible for a maximum of three months after the expiry
date so as to establish the revalidation of the MER, provided that:
the inspection is completed within this three-month period,
the inspection is requested prior to the initial expiry date.
CONFIDENTIAL MODUSA 000390
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ModuSpec Equipment Rating- Report of Survey- DEEPWATER HORIZON
3.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3.1 Executive Summary
The DEEPWATER HORIZON was visited to perform a dropped object survey. At the
time of our survey, the rig had commenced a one-well contract for BHP Billiton.
Dedicated dropped object related routine tasks were performed only on the derrick and
there were no routine inspection tasks for areas outside the derrick such as the
substructure, moonpool and cranes with regard to possible dropped objects hazards.
The overall condition of equipment and supports was good and therefore immediate
dropped object potential was low in all areas. A few high-risk items were brought to the
attention of the crew and received immediate attention.
The planned short-term contract of eighty days would not allow sufficient time to
realistically warrant a thorough makeover of the DROPS management system nor was
this required due to the low dropped object potential observed. However, if it was
decided to contract the rig for extended periods of over six months, we recommend
increasing the DROPS managements system to include several more areas and to
significantly increase details of the management system.
The rig, as observed during our survey, was fit for service following BHP standards with
regard to dropped objects hazards if the few high-risk dropped objects potentials as
mentioned in the recommendations are attended to as soon as possible.
3.2 Conclusion
The DEEPWATER HORIZON was surveyed for potential dropped objects hazards. The
surveyor concluded that the amount of hazards was very low and thus a very
acceptable operational standard had been created with regard to possible dropped
objects potential. A few high-risk items were brought to the attention of t he crew during
the survey and these received immediate attention where possible. The fact that the
overall dropped objects hazard potential was low was partly due to the recent year of
construction combined with proper maintenance.
The DROPS managements system was basic in set up for areas outside t he derrick and
traveling equipment located inside the derrick. In the future when wear and tear of
equipment and structure becomes present, a significant increase in the DROPS
management systems details would be required. There existed routine tasks
implemented in the EMPAC rig-based maintenance system for the derrick which
required visual inspection of certain areas of the derrick. Drilling traveling equipment
would be inspected following OEM recommendations through the normal maintenance
routine tasks through EMPAC.
The cranes, moonpool area and substructure were not included in any DROPS
management system and no inventory list existed for items located at heights outside
the derrick. However, on nearly all occasions a secondary means of support was
available and the primary supports were all observed to be in good condition on items
that were located at heights. These facts were evident throughout the rig and therefore
the overall dropped objects hazard potential was observed to be very low.
Two high-risk items observed were bumper bars on crane boom rests that presented a
high dropped object potential and one damaged latch on the fixed fingerboard in the
derrick. Secondary, though very important, was the damage observed on both cranes
to lattices located at the boom tip section. This damage had likely occurred due to
clashing of the main block with the boom. Any heavy lifting greater than 45 mt should
be prevented until lattice replacement is completed or a statement indicating the crane
could operate up to the maximum SWL under all conditions from the OEM (Liebherr}
become available
The current condition of the rig relative to dropped objects potential was very
acceptable. If BHP Billiton decided to go for a long-term contract greater than six
months, we recommend requesting from the rig owners the addition of significant detail
in the DROPS management system, extending the DROPS to areas outside the derrick
and creating additional training and awareness for personnel. This was recommended;
however, the short term of this contract of eighty days will not allow sufficient time to
significantly increase detail and depth of the DROPS management system prior to the
completion of the contract.
MODUSPEC USA, INC.
18 Apri12005
20501 Katy FWY, Ste. 215
Katy, Texas, USA 77450
Tel. No.
Fax. No.
E-mail
Website
: +1 281 398 3998
: +1 281 398 8694
: usa@moduspec.com
: www.moduspec.com
Report of Survey (Dropped Objects) - DEEPWATER HORIZON
CONFIDENTIAL
7
MODUSA 000398
fA;rea 11
Crown and Water Table
- Crown Sheaves and Pins
- Snatch Blocks - Grating - Ughtlng
- Hand Railing
~
Section between the Crown
and Monkeyboard
- Service Loops- Ladders - Lighting
-
Monkeyboard Area
-Junction Boxes -Stand Pipe Support
- Ladder- Fingers - Lighting- Tugger
~
Sectron between the
Monkeyboard and Drill Floor
- Ladder- Drill Une Spooler- Stabbing Board
- Pipe Racker
~ ~ I
Travelling Equipment
-Travelling Block- Top Drive- Pipe Handl er
- Rotary Hoses- Wine Line Equipment
~ t 1 1
Internal Substructure and
Wellhead!Moonpool
- BOP - BOP crane - Grating - Lighting
-Winches
Report of Survey (Dropped Objects)- DEEPWATER HORIZON
CONFIDENTIAL
8
MODUSA 000399
4.0 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations in this report are categorized as follows:
High:
Condition or deficiency vital to safety, health or the environment
Loss of life I assets I significant harm to the environment
Medium:
Condition or deficiency that could impair drilling operations or efficiency
Serious injury, significant damage, some environmental damage
Low:
Condition or deficiency that can evolve into a dangerous situation if no corrective
action is performed.
5.0 AREA 1- Crown and Water Table
AREA 1 -Crown and Water Table:
Medium:
1. Attach a safety hang-off wire over the wire line sheave located at the water table.
6.0 AREA 2 - Section between the Crown and Monkeyboard
6.1 AREA 2 - Section Between the Crown and Monkeyboard:
Medium:
1. Secure the anti-collision light located in this area a second way by means of a
safety wire.
2. Provide a safety wire over all marine navigation lights located in this area.
7.0 AREA 3 - Monkeyboard Area
7.1 AREA 3- Monkeyboard Area:
High:
1. Repair the damaged finger latch located in the sixth row of the fixed fingerboard.
Medium:
2. Repair I replace the bent latch on the third row of the fixed fingerboard.
3. Re-torque the hold-down fasteners of the latch assemblies on the fi xed
fingerboard.
Low:
4. Provide safety wires for all monkeyboard cameras.
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000400
8.0 AREA 4 - Section between the Monkeyboard and Drill Floor
8.1 AREA 4 - Section between the Monkeyboard and Drill Floor:
High:
1. Repair the large quantities of finger latches prior to usage of the vertically stored
belly board if usage is planned.
Medium:
2. Replace the poor quality clips in use on lighting safety wires in the derrick area.
3 Add safety wire to derrick cameras.
4. Secure the anti-collision light located in this area.
Low:
5. Remove the obsolete heavy steel sling routed on a horizontal derrick beam,
forward side derrick.
9.0 AREA 5 - Drill Floor and Wind Walls
9.1 AREA 5- Drill Floor and Wind Walls:
High:
1. Execute an NOT wire rope inspection on the tugger cargo wires. Both LMA (loss
of metallic area) and LF (local fault) should be monitored. These inspections
should be performed at intervals not exceeding three months.
Low:
2. Provide safety wires on lighting fixtures and auxiliaries items located at heights 10
ft above the rig floor.
10.0 AREA 6 Equipment
10.1 AREA 6 - Travelling Equipment:
High:
1. Replace the damaged (sheared) stabbing guide on the PH-1 00.
Medium:
2. Replace the one bent height-adjusting cylinder on the RBS.
Low:
3. Provide lock nuts on the two U-bolts mounted on the TDS bail.
4. Prior to using the mini derrick, re-spool top layer on drum.
5. Remove the obsolete heavy sleet sling located on the horizontal beam of the mini-
derrick.
11.0 AREA 7 - External Substructure
11.1 AREA 7- External Substructure:
Medium:
1. Ensure that when a safety wire is used, it is routed to a strong point outside the
support structure of the particular item.
2. Ensure a secondary means of securing (safety wire) is installed on fluorescent and
flood lighting located in this area.
12.0 AREA 8 -Internal Substructure and Wellhead/Moonpool
12.1 AREA 8- Internal Substructure and Wellhead/Moonpool:
High:
1. Remove I repair the damaged end stop on the aft tracks of the BOP sea-fastening
gripper. (In progress)
Medium:
2. Properly secure the BOP personal platforms when not in use, located above the
BOP storage position.
3. Route the safety wires in the correct manner over the tugger sheave located in the
moon pool.
4. Remove I repair the damaged JCB above the rotary moonpool center, currently
supported only by the electrical wires.
5. Provide the flood lights located above walkways and above the rotary moonpool
center with a safety wire to decrease the dropped objects hazard.
13.0 AREA 9- Cranes and Miscellaneous
13.1 Cranes:
High:
1. Immediately replace the cushion pads on the port crane boom.
2. Replace the cushion pads on the starboard crane boom.
3. Repair or replace the damaged latticework on both port and starboard cranes prior
to any heavy lifting.
Medium:
4. Close or cover with grating the engine access hatch from the cab area on both
cranes.
5. Install a secondary safety securing wire or sling to the boom tip light and mounting
frames on both cranes.
6. Ensure that the brooms, ropes and other objects lying around on to grating at the
cab level on both cranes are removed to a safe storage location.
7. Install handrails across the gap on both cranes between t he A-frame access
ladder and the end of the boom winch.
8. Secure the beacon lights at the A-frame and boom area on both cranes.
9. Secure the nylon line guards installed on the bottom boom cross with a secondary
means such as a safety wires/ slings.
10. Install a safety wire on the light fixture on the back of the cab on both cranes.
11. Attach a safety wire to the light fixture under the grating behind the cab of the port
crane.
12. Replace the split pin in the shackle that attaches the pendant to the crane whip
line on the port crane with a split pin that is properly spread.
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000402
13. Replace the spring latches on the main blocks of both cranes with a positive
locking latch.
Low:
14. Clean the handrails on the pedestal walk around for the port crane that was
corroding at the base of the vertical posts
15. Remove the grease and tar build up on the sheaves.
16. Correctly install the clip on the safety tie-off line at the boom tip that was used for
the boom walkway on the port crane.
17. Adjust or replace the safety retaining bar on the outside of the cab window of the
upper left hand corner of the cab on the port crane.
18. Tighten and re-connect the wire retainers on the lad-safe system for the A-frame
access ladder.
19. Shorten the safety chains on the light fixtures at the_ boom end on both cranes.
20. Implement a change-out program for corroded bolts.
13.2 Riser Crane:
High:
1. Replace or properly secure where possible the loose riser gantry walkway and
access grating retaining clips.
2. Ensure that the riser lengths are not being stacked out of the flange support blocks
above the protection of the uprights in the riser bay area.
Medium:
3. Replace the hydraulic cylinder for one the riser capture devices that was damaged.
4. Ensure that the brooms and debris left on the grating beside the operators cab is
removed.
5. Change out common fasteners for lockable fasteners by either lock washer or
locking wire.
Low:
6. Repair the mounting for the hydraulic valve at the forward end of the riser crane.
7. Replace the bolts that attach the hydraulic piping to the structure of the gantry
structure with correctly sized bolts that are not corroded.
8. Ensure that the warning beacon has a secondary means of securing by means of
a safety wire.
9. Remove the bolts that hold the rack pinion gear segments in place and spot check
for corrosion.
14.0 Management Review
14.1 Management Review:
Low:
1. Implement deck cranes, riser gantry crane and moonpool area in the DROPS
routine tasks. Inventory and inspection tasks should be created for these areas
and items.
2. Create an inventory list for the derrick with all the auxiliaries listed and the means
of securing methods.
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000403
5.0 AREA 1- CROWN AND WATER TABLE
N<l major anomalies were observed in this area with regard to dropped object hazards.
Handrails, degasser vent line supports and ladders were all in good condition with no
corrosion present. Grating was factory welded to the derrick platforms thus there was
no possible hazard by failure of grating clamps. The tugger snatch blocks at the water
table were all properly secured with dual safety wire.
No deteriorated cable trays or other supports were present; however, a Schlumberger
wire line sheave located at the water table did not contain a safety hang-off wire. A
possible solution was similar to what had been done to the tugger snatch blocks which
would involve attaching a safety catch wire over the pad eye and through the wire line.
The theory of the routing is such that upon failure of the sheave the shaft load would be
suspended in the safety catch wire. The safety catch wire must be routed short to
prevent a high kinetic load build up after failure. Alternately, routing a steel wire through
the shaft bore to prevent the sheave from dropping upon failure of the shaft of sheave
frame would also be acceptable.
5.1 AREA 1 - Crown and Water Table Recommendation:
Medium:
1. Attach a safety hang-off wire over the wire line sheave located at the water table.
5.0 Properly secured tugger snatch blocks.
CONFIDENTIAL
14
MODUSA 000405
5.0 Steel wire needed on sheave.
CONFIDENTIAL
15
MODUSA 000406
6.0 AREA 2 - SECTION BETWEEN THE CROWN AND MONKEYBOARD
A few items of concern were observed in this area including several aircraft anti-collision
lights that were not wired securely. The safety wire must secure the glass protector and
the light housing even though present structural condition of supports and lights was
good. The steel protection cages over light covers had repeatedly become dropped
objects hazards on other rigs and should be safety wired.
Additionally marine navigation lights located in the areas both on the forward and aft
side of the derrick all needed to be secured with a safety wire. This was classed low at
the time of the survey since the structural condition of all items was excellent and
therefore a dropped objects risk was low.
6. 1 AREA 2- Section Between the Crown and Monkeyboard
Recommendations:
Medium:
1. Secure the anti-collision light located in this area a second way by means of a
safety wire.
2. Provide a safety wire over all marine navigation lights located in this area.
6.0 Glass protector needs to be secured with a safety wire.
6.0 Navigation lights need safety wires installed.
Report of Survey (Dropped Obj ects)- DEEPWATER HORIZON
CONFIDENTIAL
17
MODUSA 000408
7.0 AREA 3- MONKEYBOARD AREA
One high-risk hazard concerning a damaged latch in the remotely-operated Varco
fingerboard was observed in this area. Although the damage was significant and
required immediate repair, this particular latch was secured with a safety wired which
reduced the dropped object risk. Except for this item, several more items of low risk
were observed in the form of loose bolts on finger latches and monkeyboard cameras
that had no safety wires installed.
Overall the monkeyboard area was in good condition with regard to possible dropped
objects hazards. The fixed and adjustable pipe-racking board was in good structural
condition. A safety wire routed to the derrick substructure in the proper way secured
every individual finger and all latches were safety wired as per Varco safety alert PRS
02-05.
Control boxes, cable trays, ladders and platforms in this area were all in good condition
and did not pose any hazard. All platforms were provided with toe boards and no debri s
or non-secured tools were observed. A dedicated tied down toolbox was in place.
7.1 AREA 3 - Monkeyboard Area Recommendations:
High:
1. Repair the damaged finger latch located in the sixth row of the fixed fingerboard.
Medium:
2. Repair I replace the bent latch on the third row of the fixed fingerboard.
3. Re-torque the hold-down fasteners of the latch assemblies on the fixed
fingerboard.
Low:
4. Provide safety wires for all monkeyboard cameras.
7.0 Bent latch.
Report of Survey (Dropped Obj ects) - DEEPWATER HORIZON
CONFIDENTIAL
19
MODUSA 000410
7.0 Damaged finger latch.
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20
MODUSA 000411
7.0 Lock washers used to hold fasteners.
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21
MODUSA 000412
'
7.0 Cameras requiring safety wires for better securing.
7.0 Camera with missing safety wire.
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000413
8.0 AREA 4- SECTION BETWEEN THE MONKEYBOARD AND DRILL
FLOOR
This area was observed to be in good condition relative to possible dropped objects
hazards and no structural anomalies were observed. A belly board located in this area
was raised in the vertical storage position; however, it was in poor condition and would
require service prior to usage. It was indicated by the rig owner that the belly board was
to be replaced by a new one. Therefore, no additional recommendations were raised
against this item.
There were poor quality clips in use on lighting safety wires in the derrick area that
would not hold any dropped object. It was noted that the structural integrity of the
lighting supports was good therefore no immediate dropped object risk was present.
The anti-collision light located in this area needed to be secured in a secondary way by
means of a safety wire. The safety wire must secure the glass protector and the light
housing.
8.1 AREA 4- Section between the Monkeyboard and Drill Floor
Recommendations:
High:
1. Repair the large quantities of finger latches prior to usage of the vertically stored
belly board if usage is planned.
Medium:
2. Replace the poor quality clips in use on lighting safety wires in the derrick area.
3 Add safety wire to derrick cameras.
4. Secure the anti-collision light located in this area.
Low:
5. Remove the obsolete heavy steel sling routed on a horizontal derrick beam,
forward side derrick.
8.0 Sling needs to be removed.
8.0 Clips need to be replaced.
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24
MODUSA 000415
8.0 Belly board in poor condition.
8.0 Safety wires need to be installed.
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25
MODUSA 000416
8.0 Clips need to be replaced.
8.0 Anti-collision light requiring secondary means of securing.
CONFIDENTIAL
26
MODUSA 00041 7
r
9.0 AREA 5- DRILL FLOOR AND WIND WALLS
The drill floor, adjacent wind walls and mounted auxiliaries were in good condition
although the majority of fluorescent lighting fixtures and loud hailers did not contai n a
secondary means of securing. We recommended having a secondary means of
securing in place for lighting fixtures located 10ft above the deck level. However, at the
time of the survey the primary structure was in such a condition that the risk for dropped
objects hazard was low.
Air tuggers in this area were in good condition. A third party lifting gear inspection had
been performed by Hadco in September 2004 and documentation was available to
substantiate this. Additionally a third party company had performed a pull test on all
tuggers; however, the pull values were inconsistent and further details were omitted
from the documentation. Man-rider wires and the lift wires on both PRS columns were
changed at a pre-determined interval following the EMPAC (rig-based maintenance
system) work orders.
Cargo tugger wires were replaced based on visual and electromagnetic LMA (loss of
metallic area) condition monitoring. LMA condition monitoring was performed that last
tie by Southwest Wire Rope in July 2004.
NOT wire rope condition monitoring was relatively new to the offshore industry within
the past decade; however, it has been used in the mining industry for several decades.
The important facts with NOT wire rope condition monitoring in contrast to a fixed wire
change-out schedule is that a high inspection interval is maintained for trending
reasons. The reason is that although these instruments have the capability to provide
an effective enhancement to the reliability of rope inspection, these benefits are
conditional upon the operator's competence, experience and ability rather then the
performance of the instrument (just as is common with other NOT inspections). Thus to
reduce the risk of an operator error, it is common to increase inspection intervals so a
trend can be established rather than depending on individual readings.
This type of condition monitoring should be performed preferably at three-month
intervals. Therefore all wires should be NOT inspected. Both LMA (loss of metallic
area) and LF (local fault) should be monitored.
9.1 AREA 5- Drill Floor and Wind Walls Recommendations:
High:
1. Execute an NOT wire rope inspection on the tugger cargo wires. Both LMA (loss
of metallic area) and LF (local fault) should be monitored. These inspections
should be performed at intervals not exceeding three months.
Low:
2. Provide safety wires on lighting fixtures and auxiliaries items located at heights 10
ft above the rig floor.
Report of SuNey (Dropped Objects)- DEEPWATER HORIZON 27
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000418
9.0 Safety wire needed on light fixture.
9.0 Safety wire needed on speaker.
CONFIDENTIAL
r ---
28
MODUSA 000419
.. _: 't..

9.0 Objects over 10ft in height need to be secured with safety wires.
1 0.0 AREA 6 - TRAVELLING EQUIPMENT
The various pieces of traveling equipment included two Varco PRS-6i pipe rackers, a
TDS-88, cherry picker and Varco RBS. All of these items contained particular high-risk
dropped objects hazards due to the large quantity of connections by fasteners or pins
and the high level of operational vibration on this equipment. The high quantity of Varco
safety alerts directly related to dropped objects illustrated the always present high-risk
of dropped objects hazard. The only way to reduce the risk is by regular (daily)
inspection as per OEM instructions of the equipment and by locking all fasteners in a
proper manner.
Overall the equipment was in good condition with regard to possible dropped objects
hazards. No missing locking wires or other means that could increase the dropped
objects hazard was observed and PRS upgrades were in place. The cherry picker
service basket was in good and clean condition; however, the TDS did raise one minor
concern. With the exception of this issue, no damage was visible and locking wires
were in place. Dolly track rollers were outfitted with roller keepers.
The two vertical pipe rackers were in good condition and the cam followers were of the
new type as per Varco requirement (Varco safety bulletin PRS 98-03A). PRS lifting
wires appeared to be dry and without grease; however, the rig crew indicated that all
PRS lifting wires had recently been replaced. There was no documentation available to
substantiate this.
The TDS mounted Varco PH-1 00 pipe handler was inspected and no deficiencies were
noted other than a damaged (sheared) stabbing guide that needed to be replaced. The
RBS was locked in the upward position with the Varco mechanical locking device and
all fittings, attachments and electrical cabling were in good condition and properly
secured. One of the hydraulic raise /lower cylinders was bent and needed to be
replaced. The cylinder itself did not pose a dropped objects hazard; however, the
correct height adjusting of the RBS could not be assured with this damaged cylinder
and thus had the potential of becoming a hazard.
1 0.1 AREA 6- Travelling Equipment Recommendations:
High:
1. Replace the damaged (sheared) stabbing guide on the PH-1 00.
Medium:
2. Replace the one bent height-adjusting cylinder on the RBS.
Low:
3. Provide lock nuts on the two U-bolts mounted on the TDS bail.
4. Prior to using the mini derrick, re-spool top layer on drum.
5. Remove the obsolete heavy sleet sling located on the horizontal beam of the mini-
derrick.
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000421
10.0 Bent height adjusting cylinders.
CONFIDENTIAL
31
MODUSA 000422
10.0 Damaged stabbing guide.
1 0.0 Wire needs to be re-spooled.
CONFIDENTIAL
32
MODUSA 000423
10.0 Lock nuts need to be installed.
CONFIDENTIAL
33
MODUSA 000424
11 .0 AREA 7- EXTERNAL SUBSTRUCTURE
There were no concerns for the external substructure areas with regard to dropped
objects hazards. The layout of the substructure was clean and it was in good structural
condition with no corrosion present. Fluorescent and floodlights located on deck areas
at elevated levels did not normally contain a secondary means of drop protection and
several alarm lights were observed at heights without a secondary means of securing.
A iluorescent light located on the forward side of the upper drill floor structure contained
corroded supports and the safety wire was located over this corroded support which
wotJ!d not prevent the light from dropping upon failure of the support. A simple routing
of the safety wire to the handrail located nearby would provide a proper secondary
safety. A safety wire should be installed in such a way to create maximum protection
and in most cases where a safety wire was installed it was connected to a proper
strong point.
11 .1 AREA 7 - External Substructure Recommendations:
Medium:
1. Ensure that when a safety wire is used, it is routed to a strong point outside the
support structure of the particular item.
2 . Ensure a secondary means of securing (safety wire) is installed on fluorescent and
flood lighting located in this area.
11.0 Secondary safety wire needed.
Report of SUivey (Dropped Obj ects)- DEEPWATER HORIZON 34
11.0 Corrosion on light support.
CONFIDENTIAL
35
MODUSA 000426
12.0 AREA 8 - INTERNAL SUBSTRUCTURE AND WELLHEAD/MOONPOOL
The moonpool area was in good condition overall with regards to possible dropped
objects hazard. Structurally there was no concern in this area which ensured a minimal
dropped objects hazard. Recommendations raised for this area were medium.
Tugger wire sheaves located in this area had safety wires installed however they were
not routed in the preferred manner. The theory of the routing should be such that upon
failure of the sheave shaft the load will be suspended in the safety catch wire. It is
important to not allow the load to drop a certain distance as to prevent a high kinetic
load build up. Thus the safety catch wire must be routed as short as possible over the
tugger sheave.
The area where the BOP would be stored for maintenance was given particular
attention due to the presence of personnel in this area if the BOP was at the surface
which resulted in a few recommendations.
12.1 AREA 8- Internal Substructure and Wellhead/Moonpool
Recommendations:
High:
1. Remove I repair the damaged end stop on the aft tracks of the BOP sea-fastening
gripper. (In progress)
Medium:
2. Properly secure the BOP personal platforms when not in use, located above the
BOP storage position.
3. Route the safety wires in the correct manner over the tugger sheave located in the
moonpool.
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000427
4. Remove I repair the damaged JCB above the rotary moonpool center, currenily
supported only by the electrical wires.
5. Provide the flood lights located above walkways and above the rotary moonpool
center with a safety wire to decrease the dropped objects hazard.
12.0 Damaged end stop.
Report of Survey (Dropped Obj ects)- DEEPWATER HORIZON 37
12.0 BOP platforms.
CONFIDENTIAL
38
MODUSA 000429
12.0 Damaged JCB.
Report of Survey {Dropped Objects) - DEEPWATER HORIZON
CONFIDENTIAL
-- --- ~ -
39
MODUSA 000430
r
1 :!.0 AREA 9- CRANES AND MISCELLANEOUS
Deck Cranes:
Tile two deck cranes located port and starboard were Liebherr offshore pedestal cranes
type- CBO 3600- 92 0 Litronic. A four-part main block plus a single-line whip line was
in place. The cranes were not part of a dropped objects management plan and there
was no dedicated checklist or inventory list in place for identifying dropped objects
hazards.
The cranes and the surrounding area appeared to be in excellent condition with no
visible debris and a high degree of cleanliness was apparent. Everything from the main
deck to the cab level was being kept in good condition; however, an immediate high
dropped object hazard at the boom rest for the port crane was present.
The boom rest cushions had been damaged and needed to be replaced immediately.
At the time of our survey, they were being held in place with plastic tie wraps and metal
banding which was not acceptable. The starboard crane boom rest also required a new
set of cushions installed to prevent cord damage on the boom sections.
On both port and starboard cranes damage was apparent to the lattice work between
the cross members at the top of the boom. This damage likely originated from the main
block clashing with the boom. This had been recorded in the in the EMPAC rig
maintenance system and a work order was pending on this issue. Several days of
crane downtime would be required which would possibly be scheduled during a ten-day
maintenance period following completion of the BHP contract.
Du to the current damage, we recommended downgrading the crane to 50% until
written clearance was received from Uebherr. Since the cranes were rated for 92 Mt, a
downgrade would not affect normal operations and we recommended only heavy lifts of
greater than 45 Mt to be postponed until OEM clearance was received. Repair would
require the ordering of the proper steel grade, OEM repair procedure, removal of
damaged lattices, boom support, scaffolding, pre-weld treatment and post weld
treatment
The access hatch to the engine room from behind the cab area was commonly being
left open which created a dropped objects hazard. This was done to allow better
veniilation of the engine room. This was not a dedicated ventilation hatch and should
be kept closed or covered with a grating type protection. There were gaps around the
front side of the main winch that created a dropped object hazard and the handrail posts
on the pedestal showed signs of penetrated corrosion at the base which required
atte11tion.
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000431
The boom tip light and mount did not have any secondary means of securing and there
were light fixtures for flood lamps and beacons that were either not secured with safety
wires or the wires/chains were too long to hold the items without breaking due to high
kinetic forces after being allowed to drop. There was also debris such as brooms and
other objects being left on the walkway by the crane cabs.
A quantity of bolts and fasteners were beginning to show signs of penetrated corrosion,
especially on the backscratchers, bumper blocks and boom walkway mounts. A change
of these bolts should be commenced in the near future to prevent these corroded
fasteners from becoming a dropped objects potential.
The main blocks did not have a positive locking latch on the hooks and the split pin in
the shackle for the whip line pendant of the port crane was not spread out properly. The
cable clip on the safety tie-off line at the boom tip on the port boom walkway was
installed incorrectly and required a second bulldog clip installed adjacent to it.
The safety-retaining bar at the upper front left corner of the port crane cab was bent and
the retainer plate was located close to the crane window in case the window dropped
out it would not drop to the deck.
Riser Crane:
The riser crane and surrounding areas appeared to be in good condition with regard to
possible dropped objects hazards and were very well maintained. Hydraulic lines,
electrical cables and grating were well secured.
There were some items that needed immediate attention including riser joints that were
being stacked out of the flange support blocks above protection of the storage uprights
that created the risk of a joint being dislodged and falling to the deck. This type of riser
joint handling must be prevented. Sufficient clear space in other bays was available to
temporarily store riser joints if required. The riser capture device had a damaged
cylinder on the finger that needed to be replaced therefore this item was out of service
at the time of the survey. The grating on the walkways and access areas was well
placed and installed but all the grating retaining clips were loose and needed tightening
or replacing.
Hydraulic Knuckle Boom Crane:
A hydraulic knuckle boom crane was located on the forward side and was used for
loading drill pipe and drill collars on the pipe conveyors. The pipe handler was in good
condition with regards to possible dropped objects hazard. The few items that could
become a possible dropped objects hazard were safety wired with a secondary means
of securing.
Structural integrity of the crane and the various sized pipe grippers were good with no
corrosion present. Hydraulic hose failure would not result in the pipe gripper from
opening due to direct on the cylinders mounted POCVs.
13.1 Cranes Recommendations:
High:
1. Immediately replace the cushion pads on the port crane boom.
2. Replace the cushion pads on the starboard crane boom.
3. Repair or replace the damaged latticework on both port and starboard cranes prior
to any heavy lifting.
Medium:
4. Close or cover with grating the engine access hatch from the cab area on both
cranes.
5. Install a secondary safety securing wire or sling to the boom tip light and mounting
frames on both cranes.
6. Ensure that the brooms, ropes and other objects lying around on to grating at the
cab level on both cranes are removed to a safe storage location.
7. Install handrails across the gap on both cranes between the A-frame access
ladder and the end of the boom winch.
8. Secure the beacon lights at the A-frame and boom area on both cranes.
9. Secure the nylon line guards installed on the bottom boom cross with a secondary
means such as a safety wires/ slings.
10. Install a safety wire on the light fixture on the back of t h e c a ~ on both cranes.
11. Attach a safety wire to the light fixture under the grating behind the cab of the port
crane.
12. Replace the split pin in the shackle that attaches the pendant to the crane whip
line on the port crane with a split pin that is properly spread.
13. Replace the spring latches on the main blocks of both cranes with a positive
locking latch.
Low:
14. Clean the handrails on the pedestal walk around for the port crane that was
corroding at the base of the vertical posts
15. Remove the grease and tar build up on the sheaves.
16. Correctly install the clip on the safety tie-off line at the boom tip that was used for
the boom walkway on the port crane.
17. Adjust or replace the safety retaining bar on the outside of the cab window of the
upper left hand corner of the cab on the port crane.
18. Tighten and re-connect the wire retainers on the lad-safe system for the A-frame
access ladder.
19. Shorten the safety chains on the light fixtures at the boom end on both cranes.
20. Implement a change-out program for corroded bolts.
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000433
13.2 Riser Crane Recommendations:
High:
1. Replace or properly secure where possible the loose riser gantry walkway and
access grating retaining clips.
2. Ensure that the riser lengths are not being stacked out of the flange support blocks
above the protection of the uprights in the riser bay area.
Medium:
3. Replace the hydraulic cylinder for one the riser capture devices that was damaged.
4. Ensure that the brooms and debris left on the grating beside the operators cab is
removed.
5. Change out common fasteners for lockable fasteners by either lock washer or
locking wire.
Low:
6. Repair the mounting for the hydraulic valve at the forward end of the riser crane.
7. Replace the bolts that attach the hydraulic piping to the structure of the gantry
structure with correctly sized bolts that are not corroded.
8. Ensure that the warning beacon has a secondary means of securing by means of
a safety wire.
9. Remove the bolts that hold the rack pinion gear segments in place and spot check
for corrosion.
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000434
Report of Survey {Dropped Objects)- DEEPWATER HORIZON
CONFIDENTIAL
44
MODUSA 000435
13.0 Loose items need to be properly stored.
CONFIDENTIAL
45
MODUSA 000436
13.0 Safety retaining bar needs adjusting.
Report of Survey (Dropped Objects} - DEEPWATER HORIZON
CONFIDENTIAL
46
MODUSA 000437
13.0 Beacon light on A-frame.
CONFIDENTIAL
47
MODUSA 000438
. ..
. .
13.0 Tar accumulation on sheave.
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000439
CONFIDENTIAL
49
MODUSA 000440
13.0 Grating behind port crane cab.
CONFIDENTIAL
50
MODUSA 000441
13.0 Port crane whip line.
CONFIDENTIAL
- T
51
MODUSA 000442
13.0 Riser gantry walkway.

. ... ::::.; :
. .
13.0 Riser gantry walkway.
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000443
13.0 Hydraulic piping bolts.
13.0 Warning beacon.
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000444
13.0 Riser capture device.
CONFIDENTIAL
57
MODUSA 000445
13.0 Pin and shackle for riser capture device.
13.0 Riser in storage.
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000446
13.0 Riser in storage.
13.0 Spring latches on main blocks.
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000448
13.0 Ladsave retainers.
CONFIDENTIAL
53
MODUSA 000449
13.0 Damaged cushion pads.
13.0 Common fasteners.
Report of Survey (Dropped Objects}- DEEPWATER HORIZON
CONFIDENTIAL
54
MODUSA 000450
14.0 MANAGEMENT REVIEW
To alleviate dropped objects hazards, work order procedures for routine tasks had been
implemented into. the EMPAC system. These work orders contained fourteen daily and
three monthly inspections for derrick and derrick-mounted auxiliaries with specific
emphasis on dropped objects recognition. Dropped objects working sections had been
identified in the derrick.
For traveling and pipe-handling equipments such as PRS, TDS and RBS, notes were
present in the standard seven-day and fourteen-day repetitive routine tasks generated
by EMPAC to check for possible dropped objects hazard in addition to the standard
routine weekly maintenance and inspection (oil levels, etc).
The DROPS management system did not incorporate the external substructure,
moonpool or port and starboard cranes and marine riser gantry crane. These items
needed to be incorporated into a dedicated DROPS management system with inventory
list and secure methods described.
As mentioned in previous sections, the dropped objects hazard risk was low overall
which was partly due to the recent year of construction of the rig and the proper
maintenance of the supports, etc. Due to the short nature of the current eighty-day rig
contract for BHP Billiton, a full revision of the DROPS management was not realistic to
expect from the rig crew nor was this necessary at this point due to the very low quantity
of dropped objects hazards. However, if it was decided to contract the rig for an
extended period of six months or more, we would recommend revising the DROPS
management system entirely and to add significantly more detail into identifying
possible dropped object hazards, way of securing methods, areas of consideration, risk
rating and risk analysis. Additional training would be recommended for dropped object
emphasis.
A lack of clear guidelines and displayed company policy regarding which items should
be secured by secondary means (safety wire) and in which manner items must be
primary secured (steel slings around derrick beams) was obvious as per the following
section from the EMPAC, derrick inspection routine task:
CONFIDENTIAL
MODUSA 000451
Filt ! S nt: -U DA \'. D.O.C.FORD:ER.'Uct;: 11U LEYEL TO IDGER BOARD] -DRill.
;(cnDu: 1.: 11a.: ::
SITP I.D"E DESCIUl'TIID
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11 moLS n: ":l:::! OIt:eJ.C'"-

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t.OOP
Fill 9 ru: -lD DA \". D.O.C. FOR DER.'UCU:: EQl.iiPl!E:-"T AREA L"VEL TO ED'GER BOAJU>] . DJUI.U:R S<lu<hl>d
U:illcu: !'C'cstna.:. T.nquocy. lO OQ" l.!a: ! I!Dccn; 1 Cn!tL:: Dt.IL
14.1
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..

'l .. .:O.. iot."!:\ll SCl.1J) U.F.!'C'l'Ii'IED .U so:e: ,\:; X)">3UJ.:o!ED.A!:U PZOT.1'i0 TO !l-:!I?.1't.r.!it\1S0?-(1T !!i T"'MT ;.u.

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Management Review Recommendations:
Low:
1. Implement deck cranes, riser gantry crane and moonpool area in the DROPS
routine tasks. Inventory and inspection tasks should be created for these areas
and items.
2. Create an inventory list for the derrick with all the auxiliaries listed and the means
of securing methods.

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REPORT OF SURVEY

Semi-submersible DEEPWATER HORIZON

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