A Prelude to Hitler's Greater Germany Author(s): Robert Lewis Koehl Source: The American Historical Review, Vol.

59, No. 1 (Oct., 1953), pp. 43-65 Published by: American Historical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1844652 Accessed: 16/05/2010 03:27
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A Preludeto Hitler'sGreaterGermany
ROBERT LEWISKOEHL

HITLER'S Greater German Reich was foreshadowed in the many plans and partially completed framework for the victorious imperial Germany which so many Germans expected to see emerge from the First World War. The empire was to be expanded. It was to be the uncontested economic and military master of Europe. On its eastern and western frontiers it was to have subsidiary or client states closely connected with it economically, politically, and militarily. Above all, it was to be oriented politically and economically toward further eastern colonization and expansion. These plans originated in the facts of military occupation of areas outside the Second Reich, and in the economic necessity of the Central Powers, cut off from the rest of the world by the Allied blockade. On the eve of the First World War Germany had abandoned all but the semblance of Bismarck's system of security through a European balance of power, in exchange for a role in world politics which was, in fact, ill suited to preserve the peaceful world which not only her industrial and trading economy but her very geographic location and political history required. The stage was set in I914, not only for war but for a complete reorientation of German political and economic ambitions. In spite of her navy, her colonies, and her world trade, Germany at war became once more a continental state in the heart of Europe. As an industrial state, Germany needed food and raw materials which she did not have within her borders. During the war years and afterwards, she had to find more secure and defensible sources for these necessities. Germany needed a system of security to replace the Bismarckian one which had worked until modern capitalism overtook the Prussia-Germany of I890. The actions of William II and his ministers up to I9I4 indicated that they had not really foreseen the possibility of world war. A substitute system had to be constructed in wartime for the contingencies of a warring world. At the outbreak of the war most Germans, like the other people of Europe, expected a short period of hostilities, conducted with limited ob43

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Robert Lewis Koehl

jectives in view, followed by a more or less negotiatedsettlement.The aftera long process Germansalso believedthat Germanyhad been attacked of encirclement: they thoughtthat the war had been thrustupon the Reich. said the kaiseron August This was a defensivewar, not a war of conquest, 4. In his reply to the kaiser,the SocialDemocraticpartychairman, Haase, demandeda war "for securityonly" and a peace "justto all neighboring therewere otherswho welcomedthe war as an opporpeoples."Certainly, to tunityfor Germany breakout of "encirclement."' that a world war did During the fall of I9I4 the Germansdiscovered not develop exactly after the fashion of i866 or I870. As casualties,war regulations,and the continualdrafts of men for the front impressedthe Germans with the magnitudeof the war,therewas a shift fromthe talk of a Dr. Spahn,speaking I94 "purelydefensivewar."Even beforeChristmas, in the Reichstagfor all partiesexceptthe Socialist,demandedfor Germany "at the conclusionof the most seriousof all wars, a peace which offers to the Germanpeople a securityagainstall enemies,comparable the sacribut fices made."2The idea of defensehad not disappeared; besideit were and introduced vision of a futureReichwhich could not be attacked the the made. for sacrifices already ideaof compensation German filledwith speculaAfterNew Year'sDay 19I5, the Germanairgradually tion and then with demandsthat the settlementwhich Germanywould reach after the ultimate victory should make impossiblesuch unpleasant Therewas talk of "guaraneventualities actualinvasionof the fatherland. as tees, not merely on paper."People in high positionsbegan to realize the gravity of Germany'sposition,in case of prolongedhostilities,becauseof her relianceon foreign products.The Reichstagitself becamemore and with the problemsof a war economy.To these men, more preoccupied clearthat Germany must play a carefuleconomic at least,it was increasingly of game to survive.3 It was inevitablethat the economicrequirements warof time shouldsuggestsolutionsinvolvingthe use of the products territories to contiguous Germanywhich were being occupiedin the courseof military
1 Ralph H. Lutz, Fall of the German Empire: Documents of the German Revolution (Stanford University, 1932), I, 8-9, i5-;6; Salomon Grumbach, Das annexionistischeDeutschland (Lausanne, 19I7), pp. 284-85, 289, 313-15. 2 Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusammenbruchesim Jahre z918 (Das Werk des Untersuchungsausschussesder VerfassungsgebendenDeutschen Nationalversammlungund des DeutI91 schenReichstages -r926)

citedas Ursachen. (Berlin,x926), VIII,55. Hereafter

8 Grumbach,pp. 7, 55, 69, 77-78; Ursachen,VII, 57; Louis Guichard,The Naval Blockade, (New York, 1930), p. 39: Guichardinterpretsthe German "War Zone Declaration," 19z4-z9z8

which opened the first submarine campaign in February, I9I5, as evidence that the German leadershiphad detrmined to accept the challengeof economic warfare.

a Prelude to Hitler's Greater Germany

45

operations. Whenthese short-term solutions merged long-range with schemes for strategical economic and security, resultwas whathas beencalled the "annexationism." Areasbelonging the enemy themselves to lent easily expansionist to planning. In the east the most obvious regionsof this kind were the Baltic and provinces Poland. the historically To of minded, Balticprovinces the Russiaoffered sparsely a to populated for settlement whichGermany area hada goodclaim.Hadnot Germans staked thisclaimin the thirteenth out century, were not German and barons the culture-pioneers still (Kulturtrdger), in especially Courland? Polandwas an even betterprize,lying temptingly outstretched (geographically speaking)to be cut off from "Mongol" Russiaand reunited with the Westby German Poland beenPrussian civilization. had Congress and Austrian for and territory twelveyearsin the lateeighteenth cerntury, and German had businessmen craftsmen foundtheirwaythere, reinforcing still olderGerman communities times.Polandwas datingfrommedieval an economic asset, for not onlydid it havea productive too, but agriculture for mineral and deposits industrialization promised greatfuture capitalist a here ran exploitation. a Unfortunately, the Germany nationalist up against sternopponent: hardyPolishnationalism a to Polandfor anxious develop had the Poles.In the Balticstatesthe localpopulation beensubordinatd and for to nationally economically Germans centuries.4 The fantasies dreams the futurerife in Germany her armies and of as in pushedforward I9I5 into Polandand into the Balticstatessuddenly a AfterAugustandSeptember, acquired basisin fact:conquered territory. I9I5, the speeches and declarations morespecific: became "We shallnot surrender whatwe haveconquered our blood. . ." Chancellor with Bethon of the stated he hoped mann-Hollweg announcing capture Warsaw that and Germany Polandwouldembark upon a new era of peacetogether. in April,I9I6, he remarked Europe Later, that couldnot go backto the status ante,thatthe border quo peoples theRussian of Empire wouldnever return Russian to bondage. of these Back noble sentiments thepsychologilay cal temperof the German people. Beforetheireyesat last weretangible fruitsof victoryin the occupied territories. New hopeswere aroused in several sections the populace. of Th'ose one section in the occupied of saw
4 Max Sering and Carl von Dietz, Agrarverfassungder deutschen Auslandssiedlungen in Osteuropa, Schriften der Internationalen Konferenz fur Agrarwissenschaft (Berlin, 1939), I, preface, especially pp. xiv-xxiii; W. J. Rose, "RussianPoland in the Later Nineteenth Century," The CambridgeHistory of Poland, II (Cambridge, 1941), 393-394, 395 ff.

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Robert Lewis Koehl

land in which regionsof France,Belgium,Poland,and the Balticprovinces they and their children could settle; those of anothersection saw official positions;those of a third saw a marketpossibilityfor their wares.5 got In the west the Germans the Belgianand Frenchcoal minesinto production by means of rigorousmilitary measures.Naturally,they did not eastward.' as economicestablishment they marched find any such developed to The Russianshad allowedtheireasternfrontierprovinces remainwithout adequaterailroadand road facilities.Economicdislocation,which always of by accompanies war, was heightened the withdrawal all governingofficials (namely, Russians,ratherthan local population).Merely to enable them to carryon the war, the Germanoccupyingforceshad to undertakeconfacilities,developdevicesto regulatethe economic of struction transportation take upon themlife of the areasthey occupied,and, in general,completely selves the governmentof the regions of Poland, Lithuania,and Courland which they occupiedduring the summeroffensiveof I9I5. most supplies The Germaneconomicpositionin 1915 was not desperate: were receivedin quantityvia the neutrals,Holland and the Scandinavian countriesand even Italy. Home stocks were not yet exhausted.However, with Americaafter of the expertscould see the possibility losing connection incident in May (and the Germanstried to maintain the the Lusitania their submarineoffensivepolicy throughout connectionby circumscribing I9I6). The experts also knew that the home stocks could not last much longer. The most they had was a two years'supply.Lack of the proper
fertilizers and a declining supply of agricultural labor due to recruitment

also lowered domesticcrop yields. In the fall of 19I5 the Germanharvest failed. Thereforeit was insistedthat the occupiedregionsbe made to run on a payingbasis.7 from the other From the outset,occupiedRussianPolandwas separated
5 Grumbach, p. 30; Ursachen, VIII, 60-62, 313-14. In spite of the fact that the German offensives on the eastern front served to reinforce the annexationist trend in Germany, the seizures of Poland in July and August and of Lithuania and Courland in September were not politically motivated. Poland was occupied in an attempt to encircle the Russian army, which withdrew before German and Austrian forces could join in its rear. The occupation of the southern Baltic provinces was the result of a similar ill-timed flanking movement which became stalled. See Liddell Hart, A History of the World War (Boston, 1935), pp. I99-20I. 6 For a discussion of coal, see Montague W. W. P. Consett and Octavius H. Daniel, The An Account of the Transactionsby Which Germany Triumph of Unarmed Forces (i914-19I8): during the Great War Was Able to Obtain Supplies prior to Her Collapse under the Pressureof Forces (New York, 5923), p. 114; for a general picture of conditions in eastern Economic Europe, see Erich Ludendorff, My War Memories (London, n.d.), I, i88 ff., and Das Land Ober Ost: Der Ausbau der Militirverwaltung, herausgegebenim Auftrag des Oberbefehlshabers Ober Ost (Berlin, 1917), pp. 93-94. Ost, Presseabteilung 7Ludendorff refers to the blockade as the deciding factor in the case (Memories, I, I88); see also Consett and Daniel, p. 43; Guichard, pp. 38, 47, 52, 263-65, 279, 285; Maurice Parmelee, Blockade and Sea Power (New York, 1924), pp. 210-I4.

A Prelude to Hitler's Greater Germany

47

occupiedareasand split betweenthe Germansand the Austrians.In fact, On Poland had been a politicalissue from the very beginningof hostilities. August 6, 1914, JosephPilsudskiwith seventeen "legionnaires" officially had captured Kielcein RussianPoland (with the help of the Austrianarmy) and set up a provisionalgovernment.Thus it was the Austriansand not the Germanswho began to deal with Poland'sfuturefirst.Moreover, Austhe The trianinterestin Polandwas of lastingimportance. Polesin Galiciawere not particularly discontented with theirlot. The landowningPolishnobility, which had a voicein the Austrianparliament, alreadydominated non-Polish EasternGalicia.They hoped,by extendingHabsburgcontrolto the bulk of CongressPoland,to becomethe leadersof a Polish kingdomwhich would form the third partnerin a trialisticstate. Unalterablyopposedto their scheme were the Hungarians,who did not wish to see their power in the diminishedin this way. However,throughoutthe war Habsburgstructure Burian and it was the aim of the foreign ministersof Austria-Hungary, Czernin, to win Poland for the Habsburgs,whether by annexationto Austriaor in somecomplicated Ausgleich.' Czernin says, "At the occupationof Poland we were alreadyunfairly the treated,and the Germanshad appropriated greaterpartof the country." Actually, German and Austrian delegatesto a conferenceat Kattowitz in May, I9I5, before the offensive had divided the zones of occupation. For occupationpurposesthe Austrianswere assignedthe smaller section around Lublin, while Germanytook the northernand western sections. Each state set up a militarygovernmentin its region. The first move of the Germanstoward a planned exploitationof their section was to commission Dr. Max Sering, an economist,to make a trip of inspectionin Poland in September,I915. His report was not filed until July, I9I6; meanwhile the Germansremoved Poland from its insignificantstatus as Government" whichwas a zone of communications settingup a "General by to at leasttheoretically directlyresponsible the kaiser.9 for At the headof this Germangovernment Polandwas a militarygovernor, General von Beseler.Under him there developedan administrative unfit for systemafterthe Prussianpattern,utilizing both militarypersonnel
8 St. Estreicher, "Galicia in the Period of Autonomy and Self-Government, I849-1914," Cambridge History of Poland, II, 447-60; R. Dyboski, "The Polish Question during the World War," ibid., pp. 463-66, 48I-83; Count Ottokar Czernin, In the World War (London, I919),
pp. 200-205.

D. Schaefer,"Die Schuld an der Wiederherstellung Polens," a pamphlet published by Die Monatschrzftfar das Deutsche Volk (Munich, n.d.), quoted in Erich Ludendorff, Die Urkunden der Obersten Heeresleitung (Berlin, 1920), pp. 297-98.

9 Dyboski, p. 467; Ursachen,VIII, 312-13;

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Robert Lewis Koehl

in Poles had no part in this government the combatand Germancivilians: Austriansin their years I915-19i6, although some were employedby the was typicallythorough,even to the creationof zone. The administration school inspectors;it was greeted with completeoppositionby the Poles. upwardsin the poor channelsof communication Owing to the notoriously Generalvon Prussianadministrative system,the peopleat the top, especially Beseler,were of the opinionthat the systemwas workingsmoothly,in spite including not only a of rigorousGermaneffortsat economicexploitation, the of systemof taxationbut the dismantling factories, draftingof the unemof ployed for work in Germanplants, and the requisitioning agricultural produce.In fact, Generalvon Beseler,misled by the continuedexistence army,believedthat he legion within the Habsburg of a small Austro-Polish for could get a largenumberof recruits a Polish armyunderGermandirecHe tion, if he could offer the Poles some semblanceof self-government. wished,however,to take over the whole of Poland,which of coursedid not suit Austrianplans. in On the contrary, I9I5 the Austrianforeign minister,Count Burian, had already discussedthe Austrian desire to include Poland within the and statewith the Germanchancellor had beenput off. BethmannHabsburg Hollweg seems to have hoped for a more Germansolution tol the Polish problemeven then,althoughhe was carefulto limit himselfin his August I9, aboutthe commonfutureof the Germans generalities I9I5, speechto friendly to at and the Poles. The Germannewspapers this time were instructed "go The of easy"on the Poles.The Poles,then, were to be persuaded something. that Germanyhad not announce;d next April (I9I6) Bethmann-Hollweg openedthe problemof Poland but that a returnto the statusquo was imwith the remarkthat Russiacould not possible;he connectedthis statement again be allowed to controlthe gates of invasiontoward Germany.'0 At the same time Burian was insisting on the Austrianpoint of view
that Poland should be opened up at least economically for both partners.The

to result was a visit paid by Bethmann-Hollweg Vienna on August ii and it At the two-dayconference was decidedthat Poland should be 12, I9I6. in monarchy the nearfutureby proclamahereditary set up as a constitutional and monarchs. Boundaries actualimplemention of the GermanandAustrian of the proclamation were to awaitthe end of the war. A Polish army tation was to be called into being immediately, however,and the Polish railways Therewas somedifference wereto be dividedbetweenAustriaand Germany. of opinion about the future economicstatus of Poland, but the German
10 Lutz, I, x85-86; Ursachen,VIII, 3I3-14.

A Prelude to Hitler's Greater Germany

49

inclusionin a Germantariffunion. view was more positivelyrepresented: to Neither state would surrender territory the new Poland.-" any If the agreement seemsto favorGermanplans,it will help to recallsome othereventsgoing on in August,I9I6; the Brusilovoffensivehad reoccupied Bukovinaand EasternGalicia.The Austrianmilitarymachinewas going to need a transfusion militarystrengthfrom Germany,and the German of of armywas aboutto undergothe shake-up August 28. The teamof Hindenburg and Ludendorff was aboutto be given controlover the armiesof both powers.The Austriansmight well look to their interests,and Bethmannwould support von Hollweg must have realizedthat a man like Ludendorff in Beseler's point of view. In a letterto a Germanpaperpublished Lodz in February, I9i6, the then chief of staffof the Army of the East had written that "Lodz would retain its historicalsignificancein a western society: Mitteleuropa." Ludendorff was sold on reconstitutingPoland, and the since chancellor seems to have been happyenough to get started,especially from he feareda counter-proclamation the Russianside in October.'2 The actual proclamation not appear,however,until November 5. did How closelythis proclamation connected was with von Beseler's notionthat is he "couldraisefour divisionsof Polish troops" shown by the proceedings of a preparatory to conferencecalled by Bethmann-Hollweg which some governmentofficialsand some of the German nobility were invited on October2I. Here von Beselerwas allowedto announce German-Austrian the decisionof August I2 and to explainhow he was going to use the imperial was proclamation raisetroops.The Reichstag not told of the proclamation to of did beforehand. The vague character the announcement not preventbut perhapsinvited criticismby some of the Germanparties,as usual not for
similar reasons.13 Apparently, the Austrian and German proclamationsdid not provoke any great stir in Poland, beyond questions as to how soon the German administrators would give place to Poles. As this query had no answer as yet, the Polish attitude probably worsened. In any case practically no recruits turned up for the Polish army.'4 Von Beseler then took it upon himself to implement the proclamation beyond the decision of August I2. On November I3, I9I6, he proclaimed the nomination of a Polish council of state and promised the election of a united diet, without waiting for permission to come down from
11Ludendorff, Urkunden, pp. 298-300. 12Ludendorff letter to the Deutscher Lodzer Zeitung, dated Feb. 9, I9I6, p. 24; Ursachen, n. VIII,3I8-I9, including I8, p. 3I8. 18 The proclamation givenin Lutz,1, 760; Ursachen, is VIII,3I6-I7. 14 Ibid., VIII, 3I9.

in Grumbach,

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Robert Lewis Koehl

thc Germangovernment,and without notifying the Austrianauthorities. To prevent this developmentfrom getting out of hand, von Beselerwas which set up a twenty-five-man to instructed issue still a thirdproclamation, was councilof state but no diet. A similarproclamation issuedfor the Auszone. Von Beseler was not punishedor removed.The effect of the trian however,was to involve Germanyin the creation,during announcement, the war,of a realpuppetstate. The Polish council met in January,I917, and, of course,functionedin a purely advisory manner. It had a few organizing and administrative approval."Its functions subject to German and Austrian commissioners' and disregarded all executivepower was in the hands projectswere largely ContinuedGermaneffortsto developa Polish of Germansand Austrians." army were made especiallydifficultby the attitudeof Pilsudski,who had legion at the close of the resigned from leadershipof the Austro-Polish to Brusilovoffensive.He professed believethat the Germans(who werenow in commandof the whole easternfront) were using the Poles as cannonfodder. The Russian revolutionof March, I9I7, also seemed to promise somethingbetter for Poland than the CentralPowers could offer. When againsttheir for by Pilsudskiwas arrested the Germans makingpropaganda the councilof stateresigned.15 "PolishArmy"in July,1917, their interestin Poland.Czernin,who The Austrianshad not abandoned carriedon had replacedBurianafterthe Rumanianattackon Transylvania, In win Polandfor Austria-Hungary. April, I9I7, attemptto his predecessor's to at the new emperor,Karl, appeared supremeheadquarters persuadethe kaiserto allow the archdukeStefan to be nominatedas regent of Poland. This attemptfailed; the militarypoint of view was getting an ever larger hearing in Germanyas the collapseof the Russianfront developed.This with getting for Germanyvery largesectionsof Poland view was concerned solution.After a by pure annexation,and in no way with an "Austrian" few months in office, Czernin seems to have understoodbetter than his just how serious a position the Central Powers German contemporaries Reichstag, of the July,I917, peaceresolution the German werein. Even before plan an to Czerninhad submitted the Germangovernment entirelydifferent and that with Poland,whichcorresponded his expectation Germany regarding be fortunateto get off with a negotiatedpeace."6 would Austria-Hungary inheritance, was Germany to be allowedto havePolandas a Hohenzollern
15 16

Dyboski, PP. 467-70 6 Czerinin, i 45-46, :zoo-2o6; Ludendorif, Memories, 1, 398-400;

Ursachen, VIII, 320.

a Prelude to Hitler's Greater Germany

Si

in for wouldcedeAlsace-Lorraine including Galicia, return whichGermany as backto France makepeace. and he AfterMichaelis office chancellor, took officially refused Czernin the at of offer. Apparently the behest Ludendorff, he alsoseemed of state(after willingto seewhatremained a Polish Germany had takenwhat it wanted)exercise even self-determination to the extent of joining could witha Russia (withwhichin August, 1917, Germany probablyhavemade peace). The Polishstatehad,however, That temporarily out of existence. gone it was not the purpose the kaiser his advisers losethe valueof a of and to puppet regime a territory in whichtheywerestilloccupying exploiting and can be seen in theirnext creation: regency a of council, consisting three Poles-Prince Lubomirsky, mayor Warsaw; the of Archbishop Kakowsky of and Cracow; Ostrowsky, largelandowner. Austrian a The government also this recognized new council well as a second, as of council state. restored, Thesenew organs government setup in September, by letters of were I9I7, fromthe German kaiser von Beseler, wasinstructed issue who patent to to themjointly withtheAustrian in The governor Lublin. governors' proclamations announced the new Polish"government" that wouldhave a prime and minister thatit wouldgo beyond previous its advisory functions. They did not announce that everyclauseof the six-article letterspatentwas hedgedwith extraordinarily carefulcontrols, leavingnothingto the sole
decisionof the Poles.17

By Christmas, Ludendorff his subordinate, I917, and General Hoffmann, had developed strongdifference opinionas to how muchof Poland a of shouldbe annexed Germany. to line Ludendorff's ran closeto Warsaw, sevenmillion whichwouldgiveGermany nearly Poles;Hoffman wished to limit Germany "absolutely to rectifications prevent to necessary" strategic suchpolitical as imbalance Ludendorff's suggested.'8 plan at on Meanwhile, Kreuznach December the high command 12, had
tentatively of agreedto a solutionto the disposition Polandwhich Michaelis'

successor, had arranged with Czernin. Hertling, Polandwas to formthe third member a trialistic of state.This solution Habsburg was certainly "Austrian," it although guaranteed economic German concessions, asin such on the Dombrowa fields,andwas-based "adequate" coal frontier modificationsin Germany's favor.Ludendorif stated he hadonly agreed later that
17 Dyboski, p. 473; the letters patent and other related documents are given in Lutz, I, 760-64. 18 Ursachen,VIII, 220, 32I-23.

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Robert Lewis Koehl

to this settlementon the basis of his broad defensivebelt. The Austrians of they must have beenleft in ignorance this interpretation; neverwantedto acceptsucha tag-endPolandas wouldhavebeenleft to themby Ludendorff's
partition.'9 On the eve of the peace with Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary seemed to have reached an agreement about the future of Poland. That agreement was more apparent than real, for Czernin had not silenced Hungarian opposition to trialism and Ludendorff did not completely dominate Hertling's government. Left-wing Reichstag members had not grown silent either since their peace resolution.20And at the conclusion of peace in the east, Austria-Hungary and Germany would find themselves not with fewer problems but with more-even with regard to Poland. The German experience in the Baltic provinces of Russia was very different from that in Poland. In the first place, there was no rival such as AustriaHungary. In the second place, this region had been even less developed economically and culturally under Russian administration than had Poland. In the third place, the Germans found not one nationality but several. Yet the Germans did not have an easier time of it here in this far-off corner of Europe than they had in Poland at the crossroadsof eastern Europe. They reckoned as falsely here on co-operation from the population as; they had farther south; furthermore, inner political quarrels within the German government and army sabotaged the common plans. In German hands by September, I9I5, were the Russian provinces of Courland, Kovno, Vilna, Grodno, and Bialystok, as well as the appendage of Congress Poland called Suwalki. From the fall of I9I5 until Hindenburg's order of June 7, I9I6, these regions were each administered as part of the rear echelon of military units of the Army Command Upper-East (Ober Ost). Hindenburg's order recognized the necessity of unifying the administration of this sizable area, especially since the eastern front in the north had become very stable. Even before his order, the military commands of Suwalki and Vilna had been unified, as well as Bialystok and Grodno.21 As a result of the June 7, i9i6, order, a military government was set up
19For the Hertling-Czernin agreement see Dyboski, p. 487; on the Kreuznach conference see Ludendorff, Memories, II, 53I-35, 545-48; Czernin's attitude toward a "tag-end" Poland is given in his memoirs, pp. 206-207. 20 For their complaints see Lutz, I, 78I. 21 "Der Ausbau der Milifirverwaltung," Das Land Ober Ost, pp. 78-84; Ursachen, VIII,
329-30.

S3 commands forthewholeregion, function to alongside rear-echelon which the remained. This strictlymilitaryformation contained almostno German civilian personnel fewernatives. theheadof themilitary and At government was the firstquartermaster the staffof the ArmyCommand OberOst, of whichwas Hindenburg's command August28, I9I6, whenhe became until supreme commander the German Austrian of and forces. Therewereten staffmembers, including firstquartermaster, the concerned themilitary with government. Eachof the othernine had a "section," as the political such section, finance the section, agricultural the economy section, In thefield, etc. therewerethreedistrict of commanders, corresponding the old provinces to Courland, Suwalki-Kovno-Vilna (Lithuania), Bialystok-Grodno. and They hadsmaller staffs correspondingthemilitary to government of members the
X

Prelude to Hitler's Greater Germany

army staff. In each county (Kreis) a reserveofficerwas responsible the to

district commandant. systemwas so complicated a military The that personage responsible everytownship was for (Amtsbezirk) village. and Much of this system Ludendorff's work.He was veryfondof his plan was own to makethisLandOberOsta colonial for of territory the settlement "his" afterthe war,as well as a havenfor the refugeeGermans soldiers from
inner Russia.22 the Administratively, regiondid not undergoany seriouschangesin 1917. The city of Riga was addedto the Courlanddistrictafterits capturein the fall of I917. The districtof Bialystok-Grodno joined to the region of was Lithuania,also in the fall of I917. This consolidation markeda point in the Germanplans when it seemeddesirable preventPoland from becoming to so large (by demandingthe Lithuanianarea) as to become a political Frankenstein her creators. population Bialystok-Grodno neither to The of was Polish nor Lithuanian;it was Ruthenian White Russian,but withoutany or political tradition of its own. Another administrative change which had
little effect upon the actual management of the region occurred in the fall of

A governorgeneral,Count Waldersee,took over the responsibilities of the first quartermaster the militarygovernment with staff,but unlikevon the Beseler,Walderseestill only represented Army Commander Ober Ost, who was now PrinceLeopoldof Bavaria. an equalrankwith Waldersee, On of however,was an undersecretary the ministryof the interior,Freiherr von who borethe title Reichskommissar the BalticTerritories Falkenhausen, for A and Lithuania. more complicated systemof administration scarcely can be two parallel military systems (military governmentand rearimagined:
1917.
22

"Ausbau," Land Ober Ost, pp. 86-93; Ludendorff, Memories,I, 2o6; II,

471,

521.

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Robert Lewis Koehl

who had no civil administrator echelon commands) and a "responsible" and the personnelat his disposal!Of course,the situationreflected rivalries at government thisperiod.23 of indeterminacies the German had of Thus far, politicalconsideration the localpopulation playedless of were corEconomicrequirements a part in the areaof the Balticprovinces. respondinglymore significantand were pursuedmore ruthlesslythan in were moved to occasionally administrators Poland, where the semi-civilian orderof June 7, I9I6, exHindenburg's look out for the native population. presslystated that "The interestsof the Army and the Reich must always This precedethoseof the occupiedterritory." was not living up to the Hague the powerto administer revenues the which required occupying Convention, of a regionfor the good of its inhabitants.24 The region was primarilydevoted to agricultureand forestry.Consequently, the greatest efforts were made by the military government to exploit

the raw materialsavailable.That the rye and potato harvestof 19I5 was quick was due to Ludendorff's largely securedfor the army of occupation
action on arriving at his new headquartersat Kovno in September. So-called

experts"(also militarypersonnel)were assignedto the reserve "agricultural to in officers each county.These men were supposed help the countyofficers and forest productsfor which they were to get the quotas of agricultural The Germanswere not content with the backwardforms of responsible. They repaired which they found on the greatestatesof Courland. agriculture
the drainage systems, so important to the swampy sections. They took over

many of these estatesand ran them with militarypersonnel,using army horsesfor plowing, etc. They had farm machinerysent from Germanyas was experimentation begun, and better farming well as seed, agricultural to theseeffortsshowed According Ludendorff, methodswere propagandized. results,too, for in I9I6 das Land OberOst not only providedfor itself and its militaryburden,but also suppliedthe city of Berlin with some food. Not only did the local Lumberproductionwas also of great significance. troopsrequirethe wood for buildingsheltersand for fuel but wood was also were Resinandcharcoal shippedbackto the Reichand as far southas Serbia. other productsof the Baltic forestsimportantto the Germanwar effort.
23 Preface, Land Ober Ost, pp. vi-vii; Ursachen, VIII, 330-31; after the November, I9I6, proclamationconcerning the re-creationof a Polish state, the Poles had begun to use the German and Austrian disagreements, not to speak of the Allied promises as political ammunition (Ursachen, VIII, 319); the Polish nobility of Lituania even called for reunion of the two kingdoms and the restorationof the frontiers of 1772 in May, I917. See "Litauen" in Handworterbuch des Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschtums,III, Lieferung 5 (Breslau, I939), 373. 24"Ausbau," Land Ober Ost, pp. 84-85.

a Prelude to Hitler's Greater Germany

55

Ludendorff wrotelater,"Wealsosupplied WarDepartment skins with the The andhides,copper brass(salvaged course), andscrap-iron." and of rags existing factories Libau, in Kovno, Bialystok and wererunby the German army, among themonethatmade barbed wire.25 Not the leastsignificant theeconomic of resources anylandis itslaborof power. I9I6 Germany in greatneedof mento replace menwho By was the hadbeencalledto the army. Ludendorff hopedto usethe localpopulation of threemillion a reservoir labor-power, someefforts as of weremadeto and to get laborers go to Germany. the However, bestuse for locallaborwas foundto be in theregion itself.In fact,onlythrough useof therationing the systemwas it possible the occupying for forcesto get workdoneby the civilian whichhadno partin themanagement itsownaffairs population, of andlittleinterest a German in victory. Germans The couldnot understand thatnew railroad lines (on whichonlyGermans rode)andschool systems (with purelyGerman instructors, therewereno trained since Lithuanians orLetts)couldnotmakeupforendless requisitions, taxes, thedaily new and friction between Prussian autocratic thoroughness an almostmedieval and peasant culture.Y Farfromaccepting conditions whattheyregarded a backward, the of as "colonial" region,the Germans aboutcreating bureaucratic set a paradise, oblivious thebasic thattheirhuman of fact "material" afterall,human, was, and undercertainconditions, unco-operative. muchthey succeeded How in doingtellsus moreabout slowdevelopment localresistance this the of in regionthan aboutGerman organizing ability. Manyprojects remained on Not paper. in thiscategory, however, the financial was system dasLand of Ober The Germans Ost. created theirown banksandtheirown Ober Ost the currency relieve loadon the homefinancial to system. AfterOctober, I9I6, the wholeregionoperated a yearly, on self-sustaining budget. From the pointof view of the hopeful Ludendorff roadto soundeconomic the had withrestrictions development butto be paved against "speculators," and theBaltic wouldhavebecome important an provinces element theGerman in The economy. general, was however, evena worseeconomist he was than a politician. region probably important Russia The was more to economically, as a window theBaltic, it couldeverhavebecome Germany. on than to That Ludendorff not alonein his interest someformof annexation was in for
Land Ober Ost, passim, especially pp. 195-97, 2I6-I8; Ludendorff,Memories,I, I94-200. 26Ibid., II, 52I; "But it was hard to persuade the population that they had not only rights but also duties," Oskar Woehrle, "Wilna," Land Ober Ost, p. 59; "Litauen,"ibid., pp. 380-8I (railroads), (schools);Ursachen, 391 VIII,330, 335-36 (friction).
25

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Robert Lewis Koehl

to is the Balticprovinces traceable the old view that this areaaboveall was that at (urdeutsches colonialterritory" "original Germany's Siedlungsland), least in Courlandand in the thin strip of coast from Memel to Riga, the was "onlyexistingcivilization" German.27 The facts were very different.In Courland,where the Germanswere reallythe landowningnobility,they formedonly eight per cent of the total which otherwisewas Lettish.The Germansformedtwenty-five population, per cent of the "Germancity" of Riga. In Lithuania,and especiallyin of Suwalki,which had been part of the Neuostpreussen I795,the Germans Lithuania, at in were represented the townsbut scarcely all in the ruralareas. had largePolish (in and aroundVilna) and by as constituted the Germans, Ruthenianminoritiesand a small Germanminority;the restof the population was Lithuanian.We have observedthat the area which the Germans in called "Lithuania" I9I7 was much largerthan the area of "Courland."
By that year the German government had begun to take a political interest in

the Baltic provincesfor at least the reasonthat the Poles were beginning
to talk about absorbing Lithuania into a new state, a suggestion which also

At had its historicalprecedent. the same time that the civil governmentof
Germany found use for a politically conscious Lithuania, the Lithuanians

began to rediscovertheir old nationalism.It is hardly coincidencethat a Lithuaniannewspapers appeared, Lithuanianrefugee committeewas set wereextended-all at the of boundaries Lithuania up, and the administrative attemptsat electinga diet or seimas,the same time. After severalunofficial the Germansfinally sanctioned formationof a councilof state or tarybain I9I7. The Lithuanianpatriotswere led by Anton Smetona,an September, to admirerof Western(or German?)culture.In opposition the tarybawere federalunionwith the new which desired forcesof Lithuania, the democratic The taryba was moreinRussianstate,and lookedto the alliesfor salvation. with Germany.28 clinedto a closeworkingrelationship the same time that the Lithuaniancouncil of state was formed, in At I917, a similarcouncilfor Courlandwas calledinto being with September, of by the consentof the militarygovernment the old feudalassembly knights of This undLandschaft). new politicalunit wascomposed and gentry(Ritter therewasno opposition In Germans with a few LettsandLivonians. Courland called afterits appointment, to worryabout.This very council,immediately
27 Otto Fischer, "Geld und Kreditwesen," Land Ober Ost, pp. I03-I05; Ludendorff, Memories,I, I78-79; Ursachen,VIII, 336. 28 Leon Dominian, Frontiers of Language and Nationality (New York, 19I7), pp. 105-108 (Dominian's figures are taken from H. Rosen, Die ethnographischeVerliltnisse in den baltischen Provinzen and in Litauen, Pet. Mitt., Sept. 1915, pp. 329-33); "Unsere Kriegspresse,"Land Ober OstJ, I38-42; "Litauen,"Handwirterbuch, pp. 372-74; Ludendorff,Memories,I, I92. pp.

a Prelude to Hitler's Greater Germany

57

uponthe German of kaiserto assume crownas archduke Courland.9 the should That it was the high command's intention that the Lithuanians memoirs. makea similar The offerto William is clear II fromLudendorif's Lithuanians not evenin thehand-picked taryba. were,however, so obliging, Onereason in the better lay bargaining position whichtheyfoundthemin selves. Furthermore, wereCatholic, Lutheran, thewholepopulathey not as tionof Courland As earlyas August,19I7, Matthias of was. Erzberger, the GermanCenterparty,speaking a Catholic in had at gathering Zurich, takentheirpart,urging"self-determination." sametime,the Social At the Democrats werecallingfor broader representation boththe Lithuanian for andCourlandish "governments." fact,neither (In council morepowerhad and probably less-than the Polishcounterpart.) Therewas evidence that the armycommand holdingbacktravelpermits was in fromLithuanians thetaryba wished discuss Lithuanian who to the status theGerman in system withtheGerman government.30 Two daysbefore formal the negotiations opened Brest at Litovsk, on i.e., December I9I7, thetaryba ii, issued "declaration a ofindependence" directed primarily against Russia.(Finland madea similar had declaration without the impetusof German occupation.) taryba The was declaration not especially popular themilitary with admingovernment withtheHertling nor one istration; has to lookin vainfor a similar from declaration the Courlandish whichfromthe German council, pointof viewwasbetter regulated. The Lithuanians showing littletoomuchself-determinationmany were a for
Germans.3' When the Germannegotiators went to BrestLitovskthey were prepared

to set the seal of permanency upon the German handiwork Poland, in Lithuania, Courland making definite and by a settlement theireastern with opponents. Furthermore, went as conquerors, they planning economic the exploitation onlyof the areas not already butof widerandricher held territories: Ukraine, Caucasus, evenTurkestan. agitations the the and The of earlier seemed bebearing fruit. to years rich German economic strategical and seemedalmostachieved. security Actually, Germans the were aboutto embark upona lessandlessrealistic policyas a result theirignorance of of theconditions in prevailing eastern Europe.
29Preface, Land Ober Ost, p. viii; Ursachen, VIII, 335; "Lettland," Handwdrterbuch,III, 353-5530Ludendorff, Memories, I, 471. The good Lithuanian bargaining position was due to the Polish "Frankenstein"threat as well as to good connections with the Entente and the U.S.A. via Switzerland ("Litauen," Land Ober Ost, p. 373). For Erzberger and the Social Democrats see Ursachen,VIII, 331, 33637, for travel restrictions,see Lutz, 1; 78I. 81 "Litauen,"Land Ober Ost, p. 374.

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Robert Lewis Koehl

"Greater Germany" looked closest to realization just when the pressure

of the economicand militaryforceswhich had calledit into being reached imports from defeat.Germany's a point wherenothingcould save Germany She from the neutralshad dried up. Her stockpileshad disappeared. was venturewouldcontinuethroughout The greatimperialist shortof manpower.
I9I8, but in vain-it was too late, though few Germans realized it.32

for In preparation making peace, the Germansheld two consultations among themselvesin December,I917. The first occurredunder the chairin manshipof the chancellor, Berlinon the sixth.The secondtook the form on supremeheadquarters, the eighteenth. of a crown councilat Kreuznach, The amazing thing about this secondmeeting, at which were presentnot only Hertling but von Kiihlmann,the future negotiatorat Brest Litovsk, and as well as Hindenburg,Ludendorff, GeneralHoffmann,was the failure to reachany unanimityaboutthe kind of peaceGermanywished to make. in Naturally,the militarypoint of view includedGermanexpansion Poland and a union of Lithuaniaand Courlandvia the Hohenzollerncrown.Von Kiuhlmann alreadyseems to have expectedthat BrestLitovskwould be the preludeto a generalpeace,and held back on his views at this time. As a at result,he went to the conference BrestLitovskawarethat he would have to opposethe high commandwithoutever havingtold them his reasons.33 This indicationof fear of the militaryparty by the governmentmight well be taken as a symbol for the whole of Germanpolicy in I9I8. The civil governmentwas not in agreementwith the high command,but in the last analysisit had to submitto militarydictation.The result was that wherevermilitaryforce could show victoriesin I9I8 (and this was certainly possibleat Brest Litovsk), Germanyseemed to progressfartheralong toelement.This progress, however,did not ward the goals of the expansionist representthe well-plannedrealizationof both short-termgoals (survival of in wartime) and long-termones (the creation a powerfuleconomic,milimerely the militaryoccupationof tary, and political bloc). It represented
more territory, the creation of more and more offices and agencies, the

signing of treatieswith puppet governmentsincapableof fulfilling their of promises economicaid. The type of negotiationswhich von Kiihlmanncarriedon behind the and Day offerto the Ententeof "No annexations no faqadeof the Christmas The proposalswhich indemnities"was in fact expansionistin character.
82

3 Czernin, In the World War, p. 223; John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Forgotten Peace: Brest-Litovsk, March igI8 (New York, I939), pp. 104-Il; Ursachen, VIII, 218 (see also n, I

Guichard,Naval Blockade,pp. 127-29,

257-302 passim.

on this page),

59 the Germans the madeto the Russian delegation regarding evacuation of Polandandthe Baltic to provinces indicate theyintended stayin these that areas. Von Kiihlmann devoted had that greatenergy persuading to Turkey sheshould demand not on immediate evacuation theCaucasus of region the partof the Russians, thatwouldembarrass Germans, wished since the who to stayin theiroccupied zones.Evenat its mostidealistic the stage, German party Brest at did whose Litovsk notconsider abandoning system the groundworkhad been laid down in the pastyearsof warfare. Excitedprotests fromLudendorif Hindenburg this timeindicate the highcomand that at mand objectedto the Germangovernment's conceptof Angliederung in (affiliation) theplans Poland theBaltic for and region.34 Czernin, wassubjected pressure home; too, to from food Austrian supplies wereextremely andonlyimmediate low, imports grainfromtheUkraine of wouldenable DualMonarchy holdout.Therefore, the supplies the to after of resumption the negotiations the Russians January Germany with on 9, and Austriaentered into private discussions the delegates with from the Ukrainian People's Republic regarding political and economic questions. Thus, not only wouldthe Ukrainians provide usefulweaponfor von a Kiuhlmann against Bolshevik maneuvering Czernin ableto seehope but was for the survivalof Austria-Hungary throughthe trade with the new Ukrainian state.Furthermore, German the high command anxious was to furtherUkrainian aspirations the expense Poland,still fearingthe at of appearance Germany's boundary a formidable on east of Polishstate.The attentions the German Austrian of and parties turned moreandmoreto the "bread with the Ukrainian peace" and Republic, a treaty withthe Ukraine actuallywas signedon February the day beforeTrotskybrokeoff 9, negotiations.35 At the Homburg conference the thirteenth, whichthe kaiser on at presided,von Kiihlmann's Fabian policywasdefeated the Ludendorff by plan of a limited military demonstrationstraighten theGerman around to out lines Dvinsk and remindthe Bolsheviks which side the powerlay. Apon parently, Hertlingagreed this plan,not awarethat Ludendorff to would carryout not only the preventive occupation the northern of the of half Baltic coast,inland as far as Lake Peipus-thus denyingLivoniaand Esthonia the Bolsheviks-but to wouldalsosupport wavering the governmentof the Ukraine military by action against troops. Kiihlmann Red Von
84Czernin, pp. 228, 231;
35

zi Prelude to Hitler's Greater Germany

Wheeler-Bennett, 123-28; pp.

Ursachen, VIII,225, 238.

Czernin, pp. 230-31, 237-44; Ludendorff, Memories, II, 468, 554-55; Lutz, I, 802-809; Ursachen,VIII, 327, n. 46.

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Robert Lewis Koehl

with Germanpublicopinion opposedany militaryactionto the last,probably in mind, if not with fear of the effecton worldopinionand of the effecton the Germanmilitarymachine.36 the As a result of the Germanmilitaryoperations, signatureof a Russian delegationwas obtainedon March3, to a treaty which recognizedthe governmentof the Ukraine,abandoned independence the anti-Bolshevik of immediate and Poland,Lithuania, Courland, promised and claimto Congress withdrawalof all Red forcesfrom Esthonia,Livonia,and Finland.German
troops were sent into Finland to prevent the collapse of the anti-Bolshevik

governmentrecognized by Germanyon March 9. As the great western offensivegot under way in Marchand April, Germandivisionswere pushing their way into the Donets Basin toward Rostov, against varying resistance.

The objectswere food, coal,and oil (from the Caspian region), and perhaps couldnot sustainthe Republic the cottonof Turkestan. When the Ukrainian the CentralPowers,Ludendorff governmentwhich had made peace with and set up a puppet regime under Hetman Skoropadsky, carriedon with his penetration into the Crimeaand into Georgia.Naturally,the presence of German troops was not regardedfavorablyby the Turkish allies, but Ludendoriffeared the British in Persia and doubtedTurkish powers of resistance. Besideshe did not care to see even his allies get controlof the
Caucasian oil.37

The Germanswere getting some oil from Rumaniain I9I7, even before on the armistice 9, by concluded thatgovernment December 1917, at Focsani. was drawing maize and other grains from Similarly, Austria-Hungary Wallachia that year. When the Germans presented an ultimatum to Ferdinand's governmenton February6, I9I8, to "makepeace within four days,"they had the following plan in mind. Rumaniashouldbecomea perwith Germany manenteconomicvassalof Germanyand Austria-Hungary, holding the whip hand.Rumaniashouldcede her oil wells, harborfacilities, and railroads Germancompaniesand place the controlof state finances to
in German hands. There should be an agricultural quota to be delivered

annuallyfor a certainnumberof years,and Rumaniashould be occupied

for at least five or six years. The Germans were not anxious to see the whole

condominiumwas Dobrudjaarea go to Bulgaria,so a German-Austrian

86 Count Karl Herding, Ein Jahr in der Reichskanzlei: Erinnerungen an der Kanzlerschaft meines Vaters (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1919), pp. 72-76; Ludendorff, Urkunden, p. 470; Friedrich von Payer, Von Bethmann-Hollweg bis Ebert (Frankfurt am Main, I923), pp. 6x-65. 37 Ludendorff, Memories, II, 6I-924, 659; see also CambridgeHistory of Poland, II, 475.

A Prelude to Hitler's Greater Germany

Dobrudja.38

6I

proclaimedfor the area at the mouth of the Danube, including northern The treatyof Bucharest May 7, I9I8, was not so harshas this program, of owing to lack of Austriansupport,but it indicateswell enough what the Germanswere seeking here, where there could be no questionof German annexations.(Annexationsby Austria-Hungary such as Czernin had contemplatedwere not welcome.)At Bucharest Germans the receiveda ninetyyear leaseof the Rumanian wells; Rumaniaboundherselfto makegrain oil deliveriesfor some time; the occupation was to be continuedat least until a generalEuropeanpeace;Germanyand Austria-Hungary assumedcontrol overthe mouthof the Danube.39 As the Germantroopspushedacrossthe Marneagain in July,it looked to many Germanswho had been hesitantearlierthat the high command was making all of its propositions pay. But a glance at what Liddell Hart callsthe "military balance-sheet the pastsix months'transactions" of showsus what few Germans knew.Ludendorff openedhis campaign had with a credit balance 207 divisions, of with 82 in reserve. "Now he hadonly66 'fit'divisions in reserve,most of them reallyso watereddown that they could hardlybe counted as sound assets."The German break-through Reims required at more reserves than Ludendorff could supply.Yet on the easternfront there werethreecavalry divisionsin idlenessat this time.The eastern frontwas not a war front, exceptas the Germansencountered some especially determined band of Red guards. But the great area to be patrolledabsorbedmen. Furthermore, BolshevistRussia was not good trainingground for reserve troops.GeneralHoffmannadmittedlaterthat some units actuallywere not dispatchedwestwardbecauseof the fear of spreadingthe Bolshevik infection.40

Nor did the vast operationpay in materiel.The disappearance the of Ukrainiangovernment,which had made the February9 treatiesoffering grainfor independence, Germany Austria-Hungary a badposition and put in inside that country,in spite of their armed forces.Militaryrequisitioning could not solve the problemsimply becausethere were no great food supplies in the Ukraine after four yearsof war, and a sabotagepolicy of the Red troops and Bolshevizedpeasantrymerely added the finishing touch. The grain harvestof I9I8 had to go to feed the troopsin occupation well as
88 Czernin, pp. 238, 267; Ludendorff, Memories, 1, 355-60; Ursachen, VIII, 253-59. 89 Czernin, pp. 207-208; Lutz, I, 832-35; Ursachen,VIII, 241-51. '0Hart, History of the World War, p. 535; Ludendorff, Memorties, 572-73; WheelerII, Bennett, pp. 327, 352.

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Robert Lewis Koehl

as the localpopulace, before couldbe shipped any westward. Shipping was so tied up withtroopmovements during frantic the months the of summer were westernoffensive and Allied counteroffensive, what foodstuffs that available a hardtime leavingOdessa. had Some of the grainfrom the Ukraine fromRumania to go to Bulgaria as a bribe, it was and had too, for with Franchet feared,and rightlytoo, that Bulgariawas negotiating
d'Esperet for peace. When it was too late, the Bulgarian shipments were

orderedstopped.Czerninwrote laterthat the food that was importedsaved

livesin Austria-Hungary. rawmaterials The whichGermany (coaland got

oil) might have enabledher to hold out industriallyin i9i8, and in an

economic afterwards, she couldhave madepeacewith the Allies war if on better and couldhavecontained Allied the terms, if the highcommand counteroffensive mastered fears. therewerenot enough and reserves its But
to give Ludendorff confidence holding out.41 in

The fate of German expansion restedin I9I8 with the powerof the German army. long as German As victory seemed assured, visionof a the Greater Germany notlessbright I9I8 butbrighter To thevacant grew in still. of thrones Poland, and were thoseof EsthoniaLithuania, Courland added Livonia, later and Finland. Germany gota foothold theBlack and had on Sea had comenearthe Caspian. The greatoverland empireseemedcloseto
realization.42

Butevenwithout defeat wasbrewing thewest,Germany the that in was of not master the innercontradictions her new system it tookshape in as
during the year I9I8. Above all, a strong opposition to "annexations,"which

included had in Angliederungen,developed Germany. seeds disagreeThe of ment aboutthe war aims whichhad manifested themselves the first in of Social Democratic into Reichstag speech the warhaddeveloped a pacifist strikes worked and movement whichcalled withtheBolshevist general Joffe a for an immediate PaulRohrbach, journalist the school Weltof of peace. the the Leaguefor havingcorrupted will to politik,attacked Pan-German insistence only an anthat of victory the German peopleby a misleading wouldbe a victory all.Whenthe German at connexationist victory people said cludedthattheycouldnot win sucha victory, rejected, Rohrbach, they out. of the possibility merely holding The separate peacein the eastwasa
41 Czernin, pp. 251-54; Arthur Dix, Wirtschaftskriegund Kriegswirtschaft (Berlin, 1920), pp. i87-88; Hart, p. 48I; Harry R. Rudin, Armistice I9I8 (New Haven, 1944), pp. 12-13. 42 The Esthonian-Livonian crown, see Ludendorff, Memories, II, 66i, and Payer, pp. 241-45. The offer of the Finnish crown to a German prince, see Parmelee, Blockade and Sea Power, P. 75.

A Prelude to Hitler's Greater Germany

divided Germanpublic opinion,but becauseit did not end the war.48

63

greatblow to morale, because was annexationist, not it this although fact abouthow the German Nobodyeverreallycameto decisions Empire shouldprofitby the greatexpanses territory of whichlay moreor less in German power. The Germans of brought the administrationthe areas in to question astounding an ignorance the peoples of and involved a veryhigh opinionof the favorthey wereconferring backward on Slavsand Balts." The factthatthere wereold German traditions empire, colonization, of of of cultural leadership areassuchas the Dual Monarchy, in Poland,and the Baltic region, notinsure thepopulations thoseareas did that of wouldaccept German domination thetwentieth in century. Other nationalisms besides the German grownstrong thenineteenth had in century, theGermans but acted as if all nationalism theirown was trivial. instance, Germans but For the neversolvedthe problem the Cholmregion,now partof the Soviet of Ukraine. They had awarded to the Ukrainian it People's Republic the in recognition of treaty February as a result werebesieged thePolish they by 9; council change minds-aswasCzernin theAustrian regency to their by Poles. A new agreement to be madewiththe laterpuppet had government the of Ukraine thelinewouldbe setlater, slapping Ukrainian that thus at national pridewithoutsatisfying Polishclaims. How long couldthe Polesand the Ukrainians putoffandstillbeuseful Germany ? 45 be to The ridiculous picture theGerman of princes running Baltic after crowns while Germany fightingits last losingbattleof the war is sharply was drawnin PhilippScheidemann's Zusammenbruch. failure the Der The of Germans comprehend forceswith whichthey had to deal is well to the illustrated the quarrel the Lithuanian by over crown. Erzberger's candidate, the Catholic William Urach, actually of was chosen thetaryba: Gerby the man government, whichstill hopedfor a Hohenzollern settlement the for wholeof the Baltic littoral, regardless religion-frowned thechoice. of upon At the sametime,the Saxon monarch putforward a candidate, was as with someviewto his securing Polish the throne well.(TheGermans as could not get awayfromthosehistorical precedents.) Neither Lithuanians the the nor Poles showed any great interest in this Angliederung process,however, whenGerman especially victory beganto slipfarther farther in the and off
43Paul Rohrbach, with Max Hobohm, Die A4ldeutichen, Chauvinismus und Weltkrieg, II (2d ed., Berlin, I9I9), preface,pp. iv-v. 44For German ignorance, see Land Ober Ost, p. 8I, and Ludendorff, Memories, I, i88; for German condescension,ibid., II, 66i, and Gustav Stresemann'sReichstag speech of Apr. 6, 19T6,quoted in Lutz, I, 340. '5 Czernin, pp. 208-209; Ursachen,VIII,323-25.

64 Robert Lewis Koehl mindedLetts,too, who, like summer I9I8. Thereweredemocratically of the PolesandLithuanians, learned I9I8 how to playoff onegroup had by of Germans werealsotaking against another. now the BalticGermans By
an activepart to get their views represented, by favoringthe kaiseras first uniteddiet of the Baltic rulerin the April,i9I8, decision the so-called of (Vereinigter Landrat das Baltikum),later shifting their interest to fur

he with AdolfFriedrich Mecklenburg, of perhaps because waslessinvolved to the fateof the war.In Augustthe Russian was government forced sign an annexto the Brest all and Litovsk agreement yielding claimto Esthonia Livonia.46 This annexwas signedon August28, I9I8. The German government Europeto German adwas still pursuing policyof developing a eastern vantage, the military but powerto backup thatpolicywason the decline. on The "Black of the German Day Army" occurred August8; on conhad kaiser concluded he had that sultation with his commanders, German the power whichhad mustmakepeace. Few Germans realized themilitary that made their easterndreamspossible so was evaporating rapidlythat the Ukraine, Caucasus, the Poland,and the Balticareacouldnot be held by before populations these the of Germany. it wasonlya matter months Yet of quartered among them,troops countries weredisarming German the troops
on the whole not unwilling to be disarmed,troopswho had mutiniedin

in revolution theirgarrisons as of almost soonas theyheard theNovember were of governBerlin. The famous Freikorps not a creation the imperial it if of mentof Germany; theycanbe calledthe creation anygovernment, was the Republic whichsoughtby theirhelpto retain someof Germany's "settlement lands."47 eastern a of The Greater thingalbeit Germany I918 was a merebubble, fragile There anoldmilitary is from constructed veryrealmilitary expresoperations.
sion that says,"You can do anythingwith a bayonetexceptsit on it." The earlierstagesof Germanexpansion duringthe war seemedto makeheadway of becauseto some extent they fitted into a larger,fortunateconstellation

the hatredfor the tsarist universal circumstance: oppressors, firstglow of to the German character temporary promises theoccupied regions, seemingly
Germanefficiency, the which any occupationat first assumes,the apparent

state.A morewidespread of failure the tsarist feelingamongthe Germans aboutthe justiceand the moderation theirclaimsgavepurof themselves
46 Claus Grimm, Jahre deutscher Entscheidung im Baltikum: (Essen, 1939), g918-1g9g pp. 72-7g; "Litauen," Handwdrterbuch,III, 374; Philipp Scheidemann, Der Zusammenbruch (Berlin, 1921), pp. 154-56; Ursachen,VIII, 344-45. 47 Dyboski in CambtidgeHistory of Poland, II, 479; Grimm, pp. II7-2I.

65 poseand direction German to policyat lowerlevels, evenwhileit suffered froma plethora high-level of planning anelaborate of character. By I9I8 all thishadchanged. Germans not haveenough did The troops to do everything the occupied in territories whichhad to be done.They refused let non-Germans anything to do their important, distrusting competence theirgoodfaith.Furthermore hadoutworn and they theirwelcome in everyareawheretheyhadbeenfor sometime,so thatwordwentahead to newly occupied territories abouttheirfoibles. Their rivalsin the east wereno longer tsarist officials nationalist Bolshevik but and agitators. Finally, German troops the homefronttoo had begunto doubtif war for a and Greater German worthwhatit cost,particularly was underthe effectof Alliedpropaganda. multitude plansandplanners The of neverdiminished; if theyhadgot in eachother's before way I9I8, in thatyeartheyvirtually canceled otherout.WhenGermany's each western frontbroke, withit and the will of the German leaders, therewasnothing the German in structure whichcouldsustain youngsystem the whichsupposedly beenfashioned had for justsuchan eventuality. andthere, Here especially theBaltic in regions, anti-Bolshevist military units couldbe formedfrom German troops, but therewasnothing unitethemintoa system more, thewillto use to once and sucha system in simplydid not reappear Germany untilit was too late.48 Instead creating powerful of a Mitteleuropa,even an enlarged or and protected German the Reich, German expansionists to participate the had in of liquidation the Bismarckian and the cessionof ancientPrussian state was frontiers. a Germany leftneither world-power position a continental nor empire. The forceswhichhad combined firstto stimulate into beat her and whichlaterhad impelled cominga greattrading power to Germany of attempt creation an impregnable the continental position herself for had beendeflected. theyhadnotbeen But canceled. Massachusetts Institute Technology of
48 Grimm, pp. 199-2I8 f. See also the story of OberkommandoGrenzschutzNord at Kovno Lithuania,in "Litauen,"Land Ober Ost, 375.

A Prelude to Hitler's Greater Germany