Vastar Resources, Inc.

DeepwaterHorizon TechnicalPositionPaper (Revision5)

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lssue: Date: Dlsclpline: Regpon6ible:

EDS/DMS DisconnectPhilosophy September 1999 13, Engineering, Subsea, Drilling and Systems MikeL. Byrd,P.E.

lssue: lniliSlibnof either the EmergencyDisconnectSequence(EDS) or Deadman System (DMS) requires certain functions the stackto o<ecute on rlithin a certainambuntof time. This paperdescribes the'sequ6ncei.timinq.anO overallphilosophy these events. Basedon this lnformation, v6nitor shouH be able to desigri the ctntrol for the systemlo accommodate theserequirements. Declslon: Tffifrillbe three (3) possiblemodesof disconnecting LMRPfrom the lower stack. They are initiatedin the lhe priodties. following d'eirendinq the natureof eventsdfrvino needfor disconnect on the 1. CotfrblldDlcoorinect (CDS)- Thls allowsi manualty $quence controlled disoonnect the LRMP from the of lower stack when adequafewaming ii providedand sufficient iime exists to executethese functions. The functionsare all operat<ir frth do aubrnationft,omthe conbol Bystem. controlled 2. EnlqryencyDiscohnect (EDS)- This is a PLC drivendisoonhect Sequence sequenceinitiatedfrom a PushHold button located on the DrilleCsPanel (located in the drille/s work station), and the Toolpushe/s Panel requiring disconnect or is rapid&Oeterioratino. has 0ocabd in the Bridge).This is to be usedwhenthe situalion I The rigidconduitsysfemwill closethe SBR'sand casingshears,depending the modeseleited. A manuEl on modeselector runningpipgor casing,which ls set priorto startingthe respectlve for operatlons, determine wilt the e:act sequenceof the EDS. 1f t7 3. Deadman - This is an aulomaticdisconnect (DMS) Sysbm Disconnect responsein the eventof catastrophic eventsreguiring manual no intervention rig personnel.The dedicated by shearbottlecircuitwill driveSBR's. The riser connectorshouldbe lockedat 1,500 psiwith 500 psi maintained the lock side during operations. on Duringboth. EDS and DMS seguences, ionnector shoutdbe unlockedwith 3,000 psi. applief t6 Uottritre the the unlockclrcdlts. The hydraulic supplyfor the primaryand secondary unlobktunctionin the Pqtlary and secondary EDSrnodewillbe supplM via two SPMvalvesdownstreiiniof the niain su-pply sorrroe. In'the DMSmode.due lo limited quanti$ of acidmulator boftles, therewill be one supply boththe pririrdry to and secondary unlocktunction. goalsfor all disconnect Theprimary sequences are: 1. Provide reliableabilityto disconnect from the stack,hang-offthe LMRP,and allowthe rig to moveoff location. 2. Safetyof all rig personnel. or into of 9 Minimize prwent discharge hydrocarbons the environment. 4. Minimize prevent or damaqe-to ca6itatequipment 5. Limitpipemirdedisconnedt no morettiai hirty (30)seconds. Llmlt modedisconneCt disconnect to than thirtv thirty 6. Limitdasingmodedisconnect as closeto thirty(30Jseconds possible. to as Oiscussion: CLOSING SEQUENCES surnmary (for 1) seeAttachment Prlmary . CONTROLID DTSCOTVwECT SEQUEATCE fCDS) The controlled disconnect the primarymodeof discoilnecting LMRPfrom the lowerstack. In this mode.the is the assumption that there is adequate is warningof deteriorating wbatheror cunentconditions. This wouldallowlime to manually,a!_o.Pposed PLC or auto-sequence to driven,initiateany hang-offand disconnect tunctionsat the cliscretion RBF/Operato/s of representatives. Secondary. EMERGENCyD|SCOTV,VECT (EDS) SEQUENCE
philosophy, fOeepwater Horizon, Tectrnical Position Paper,EDS/DMS (Confd) Disconnect Page1 of7

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Exhibit No. Worldwide Court Inc.

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RB FalconDeepwater Horiz I TechnicalPositionPaper

) This.isthe secondarymeansof disconnecting LMRPtrom the lowerstack. This event could be driven bv the or 3?.lg,y_qptel9lqting.weather cunent conditionsor fault with the dg power managementor Dp systerir causing fig to rapidlydrifi off location the pointof requiring disconnebt the to a Ine systemshall have a mode selectorbr ddllingand caslng-operations which is selectedprior tc beginning the respec{lve openalion. Properoperatioiral procedures have to be in place to ensure that the conect mode is and tower.change will priorto runningdrill pipeor casing. selected DrillMode(Attachment ) 2 ;-_Tn Ule'Drll plpe-, will a -qtV ihe-SBR's close,shear,and prorride wellboreseaf. Anythingacrossthe SBR's whl*t b S7n',24.7-wt, $fE6 or smaller, be cut in'thismode. will . Estimated time for thisoperation approximately is 27-30seconds. CasingMode(Attachment -WOAuto-Shear.4 -WAuto-Shear) 3 . Tn-ffisihg mode,the casingshearswill'close ftrst to enable'shearing the pipe, then the SBR's will of close.effecUng wellboreseal. This will minimizepotentialdamag-e the SeR's from closing on to $9 somethingon whi:lr hey can not out . Ihe $8Fs can be efthbr porvered.by.pressure rigid conduitor be adivated by the auto-shear toF th_9 ctruit Utilizing the auto'-shear circirit will minimize the lime needed to execute th'e seouence bv qpprox*nf,l9ly l0 seconds. Hotrever,there is oonoemslnce trls funcdontakes pface after the LtUnp na's GrconnedtU. In the event of closing the SBR's with lhe rigid conduit supply, the estimatedtirne for executionis 48 seconds. Uqlngthe aulo-shearclrcuil reduoeslhe time to apprbfiinatelv 37 seconOi.--TiG decisfonls to close the. SBR'swith the rigld conduit llne. The prefenedmdttrodof cfbsingthe SBR,s fs throught rigidconduitsystem. the . Thg via initiatedfiom the Dp f:.fts-willbe operatorihitiated push-holdbutlonsand will not be automatcalty orDrlllecfi systema. Teftiary- DEADIItrAN SySfEllt (DMS./(Attachment5 ) The.Deadrnal sysleqr is the firial meansof shuttingih the well and effectingan environmental Dadrnal seal across the wellbore.lt is anticipatedthat this would be-an emerg$gy measurionly,-initiated -and tt dntigipated thiswouldbe an emergency that by events iuirriJnre-oi {9L9919t pprling Jnqasqq onii,-iniiiateJ'bt'&;nti such as fre or explosion, exPlosion,

a a

--. The DMSwill activateuponloss of ALL of the following: v pods 1. Communication between 2. Powerand siqnalfromthe MUXcables 3. Hydraulic pre6sure from the rigidconduit

of riset or powLr,'ano p-ower, signal ca.taskophic frhictf!f-r{s.otffryadfufic, event shuts P.arling theriser, qnycatastrophic w_hich off hydrirulic, iig;ailourcJs'i;tnl sources the to subsea pods. Theoverall control philosophy the DMSis to brovide reliability of rdliabilitv throuqh simolicitv. This means theferrver me,ans the feurerdecisions systemhas to make more reliable witlbe in executino ore-6rooiarnmed that that decisions system the the has niake themorereliableit the executingit! pre-progiammed its ) logic.

The DMSwill cfoeeonly the SBR'susingthe dedicatedshear botUe circuit. The casing sheans not be closed will dueto acqlmulatorvoldmetic constraint5. This shouldcoverapproximately 95-97% ait Oritting of activities. RISER CONNECTOR (Attachment ) 6 TheCameron Type'HC' 18-314" connector usedto connec{ 10M is and disconnect LMRPfrom the lower stack. the TheHC connec[dr: . Has one fock circuit only. ' lhc a prirnaryand secondaryunlockcircuit. . Unfock circuitprovidesapprciximatety timesnpre unlocking 1.24 force thanlockingforceat a given pressure.

. arer suppliedby Cameron was

The piston

F"H:lnryqg"_14_9g"_q ]9. psi .300:500 duringilrillingoperations. Hydrauliicircuitniis ratedftir 3.000o and is testedto 4,500psi. circuitry for 3,000psl

pressure 1,500 andmaintaining locking psi. have locking a of pressure a of

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,RBFalcon Deepwater Horii ,l Technical Position Paper

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Secondary.unlock.clrcuit provides additional.untocking no forge.ab.ove primary the unlock circuitat a given pressure.lt doeshowever, provide redundancy ttreprimary circuitin sbme to lock c6noiiions.
pressire is applied the lockport,drivingthe lockingpistondown,whichdrawsthe colletsaroundthe To lock,. to qlandrelhub,pre-badingthe connector the mandref.Theorelically. actuator qnndrelfiub, pre{oading connectoi themaidref.Theo-rdticatty,dctuaior is heldin place the to the the dns dno heH olacewith the win tiie

Thefundamental operatlon theconnector as follows: of is

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collefts from the mandielhub. ln lhe eventof fiailure the seals used in Sreprimaryunlockbetweenthe actuatorrinq and the outer bodv. of pressurecan be applledto the secondaryunlock port-whicfiwill nrove the piston umnt tt will then comJiri contact with the actuatorring drivlng ringupward,unlocking connecfor. the -seal the acfuator As seenin the drawing, primaryand se.-condary the diameters between-the unlockchambers the sarne. are This is why there is no additionalunlockforce generated wh'enboth the pninaryand iemnO-ary clrcuiis a?i pressured. lt can also be seen that if the sourceof the primaryand secondarypressureis the same, failure of the primary uplocfseals,will causethe pressure bleedtherebyneverallowinf pressure buitdin'thesecondaryuntoCfr to to chamber.

the dng Thishowever, highly is dependent thecoeftient of ftiction on --r-orver 3" Fper between actuator andcolletts. between two.parts. Delweql two.parls. th-e m.e muEh fiictioqr hlgher locking-and biring Sntt udocking uritocxins torces. forces. Lorer fridloncan friabn iin -_Too _Toomuch fpqol requlres caqs-e nqQ.Plgcl( wlthout prssurc. off mairntainlng maintaintng cbnebnt conebnl Usins a opErated operated Cnec[ check vitve (PQCV)or valve(POCV) tg dng iressurc.,Using pilot iFoCVt;; $_q9.e_PF lolack ofu4r.foq! maintaining psi 30G500P9ion$.9 normally controls plob-leq bctuator back-off.ror ihts ttrg ring l9:lt?iryry_ryt?9.9 used to"f 9lpryb9r 9f qeslgn, ptssure be pocV. prssure cleslgn, wlll to mafntain ontherbnnector fock instsid of a To unloi:k, port. Normally, secondary to. unlock pistonremains lhe untock I9-tnld,.pryssure. is applied the primary. lhe body, whichcauses actuatoi to be driven the ring upwani, reteasing the Tfl?q pginft thestgp.gn outer

Thereare severalchoices plumbing supplypres$treto the connector.Theyare: for the 1. Slnglehydraulic supplles elttrer-prlmary'cir-s.dcondary oort tb unhck 2. Sin0lehydrautic subidyto boththe primaiyand secondarv untoik Dort (DMS) 3. Separate hydraulic-s'uilplieseachof thi primary to andsticondary'unbikporG(eOS) The benefits and risksare shownin the tablebelow: unlocKsupply Method Dng|esupPty ro secondary primary or unlockport. pnmary and secondary unlock ports. (DMSMode) urscrere supptEs to primary and secondary unlock ports (EDSMode)
Dtngle suPPty ro DoIn

t'enelfis
O

KISKS
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r pped, this will minimizethe possibilig . of a leakin thesuppfy. Feweraccumulator bottlesrequired.

rr lne nyqrauilcs are Pnmaflty naro

rrPrngrs srmPre Primary has held 500 psi prior to operating so confidence is high as to seal inteoritv

. lr upper seals Detweenactuator nng o and outer body fail, the unlock piston ' will move upward until it is in full contactwith actuatorring, driving the actuator upvardto unlock ring Failure to open the connectorwould require failure of both sets of seals between lhe actuator ring and outer bodyor failureof bothsupplycircuitsto the primary andsecondary unlockports Secondary unlock port is truly redundant Would requirefailure of entire supply circuitdownstream SMPvalves. of

Failure upperseatsDetween or aduator ring and outer body may prevent connector from ooenino. Sinqlepointfailuremedhanism vrPm9 morecomplex ts lf upper seals between actuator ring and outerbody leak, secondaryunlock chamberwifl not build up pressureto drivesecondarv unlockpistonuoward. lf piping systi:m leakS upstrbam of unfock ports, both pnmary and portsare madeineffective secondary Ptpingis morecomplex Additional shear seal valves are reqiured

AIOIE: The abovetable, whendesaibing a seatfailure,assu/res a catastrophic failurein which altftuid pumped in ip_lkcnapea thrcugh the seal intertace.- actuatity, tn that prcbabitity very iow. rne mostiiieiyiaiturc fiediianisii is tv a sealwouldbe localizeddamagedue to saring or trcshbuild-upon tie seating surfaces-,h thrscase the leak .t would tend to De slow. Tnehyctrailic nuidiupu! wbuldliketyexree:i ine-huia-di;ch;ry;{htor;i th; A;;;g;;;""i '4nd just causethe connectorio workmoreslitwty ratherthah notwork at itlpage3 of 7 Technicat Position leePwater Horizon, Paper, EDS4MS DisconnectPh/osophv, (Cont'gl -

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It can therefore concluded be that maxirnum redundancy ensureunlockinq the con,,rector be achieyedbv to of can usingboththe primaryand second?ry unlockcircuits,elch beingsupplied sources. In addition, fiom independent to accountfor connector wear, hydraulicfrictional losses, actuaibrring creep, etc. the unlockpressureshould b6 greaterlhan the lock pressure. The recommendation 1,500-psilocli pressureand 3.000-psiirnlockpressurefor is boththe EDSand DMSsequences.Thiswill sive approximateli 2-1lZtimesadditionalunlockforce thariforce used to locktheconnector.This higherunlockpressurehis two priniarybenefits; 1. lt should allowthe connedtor openmoreouicklv to 2. lt accounts mechanical for lossesas describ'ed above. ln^add.ition, 300-500psishould be maintained the lock circuitduringoperations on after lockingthe connector. A POCVwill not be used. lt is felt that this createsa singlepoint fiiluie mechanism, whicli could preventthe connector fromopening. Both.the lock,and prirylary secondary q!d. unlockcircuitsshouldbe testedas a regularpart of the stack tests while the stackis on the surface. This shouldensurethe integrity the pipingsystemsSuppllingpressureas well as the of internal sealson the connector.

DeePwater Horizon, Technical Paper,EDSDMS Drsconnecf Position (Cont'd) Philosoph%

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Horiz I RB FafconDeepwater Position Paper Technical

(Attachment -ABS, I -MMS) REGULATORY ISSUES 7 1 v I The trable and disconnect belcw summarizesthe basic regulatoryrequirementsrelative to BOP, accumulator, requirements.
Ceilllicatlon of DrillingSystems 1990 (CDS+N rcfersto DNVlegg issuedin 1981and hasdisclalmer para.3) 8.1.

30cFR 250.406 1 June ,1998

2 - Piperamsw/locks CDS+N
nwutrruEll YlJtutttE-

2 -Pipe ramsw/locks

(frcr Surtsce subsea stack)

1,5x volumerequired close ram to and annularpreventers close and chokelines 8.12) CDS+N (Appendy o Refers NPDsections to 2.6.3.3 and 2.6.4

NOTE: Although ,48S, CDS (+N) ls not required for Vastar Resources, ceftlficatlon for approval in ! Nonileglan waters may lnclude signlficant additions andlor changes to the above requirements. This ls due to the fact that more recent NPD regulatlons exlst than are mentloned ln ABS Ceftlflcatlon of Drilling Sysfems, 19W. RB Falcon should coisultwith ABSfor specifying the exact requirements, (Attachment ) SUBSEAACCUMULATOR 1 QUANITIIES Sizingfor subseaaccumulators of shouldtdke into accountadiabaticexpansion nitrogenat ambientvs. seabed temperatures addition any regulatory in to requirements.

OD""p-"t"r x"rir"",L*

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Attachments: ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I Description EDSand DMSsystem of FlowChart, EDS - DrillMode FlowChart,EDS- CasingMode,SBR'scloseW rigidconduitsupply FlowChart.EDS- Gasin! Mode,SBR'scloseMA-uto-Shear Circuif FlowChart,DMS Cameron Type'HC' Connector Regulatory iiequirements ABS,Certification Drilling of Systems,1990 Regulatory RequirementsMMS,30 CFR250

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DisconnecfPhilosopfiv.(Contd) OeePwater Horizon,TechnicatPositbn Papgr,EDSzDMS

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RB Falcon DeepwaterHorii ,l TechnicalPositionP l

PreparedBy: Name M. Byrd ReviewedBy: Name KevinWink DonWeisinger Discipline Deepwater Horizon, Rig Manager Vastar,Project Manager Discipline Vastar, Subsea Consultant

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Technical Position Paper,EDSzDMS Drsconnecf (Contd) Pfirlosophy, Oeepwater Horizon, page Z of 7

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