BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.

1,2004

HISTORYIN FOREIGNAFFAIRS,19652000
MiloJones* Foreignpolicydecisionmakersareinfluencedbyprevailingpolicyideas,manyofwhich aregeneratedwithrecoursetoHistoryandreferencestothepast,andthendisseminated throughpolicy publications. One of the most influential of thesepublications is the US CouncilforForeignRelations'journal,ForeignAffairs.Thisarticlefirstmakesthecase that this journal is a key informal input to US foreign policymakers' decisions and thereforetoUSforeignpolicyitthendiscussestheauthor'sdetailedexaminationofthe historicalreferences(intermsoftheirscope,depthandtemporalorigin)inthisjournal between 1965 and 2000. Based on this analysis and the criteria for the "good" use of Historyestablishedindebatesbetweenhistoriansandpoliticalscientists,theauthorfinds that historical references in Foreign Affairs can be criticized as largely decorative, repetitious, epistemologically naive, andpossibly even Orientalist (pace Edward Said). Given the standing of Foreign Affairs, acorresponding negative impact on US foreign policycanbeinferred.Furthermore,theway inwhichhistoricalreferencesareused in this journalsupportswiderreachinginsight intothe wayin whichHistoryandthepast are poorly used to justify, support and even predict events in current policy debates. Finally,thedatageneratedinthisresearchleadstheauthortoproposethata"Gravity model" should supplant the Generational model when trying to predict the impact, durability and perceived relevance of historical events and individuals on the policy debate.

Acknowledgements I wouldlike to acknowledge and thank the staff of BSIS as a whole, especially Dr.JarrodWienerforhishelpinconstructingthisandotherargumentsDr.Christopher Daase, for stressing the need to make sure research is important as well as interesting Dr. Mike Palo, for introducing me tothe epistemologicaldebatebetween historians and political scientists (and for pointing me towards some great sources) Ignacio Corrochano for his timely reminder of the Gravity Model in Economics and RachaelAtkinson,forherassistancewithlogisticsandproofreading. INTRODUCTION:THECOUNCILONFOREIGNRELATIONS TheCouncilonForeignRelations(CFR)haslongbeenrecognisedasoneofthe 1 most influential modern American institutions. Like the discipline of International

* Milo Jones holds a BA in Art History from Northwestern University, an MBA from the University of
Kent.HeiscurrentlypursuingaPhDinInternationalRelationsattheUniversityofKentsBrusselsSchool ofInternationalStudies. 1 InderjeetParmar, "TheIssueofStatePower: The Council onForeignRelations asa CaseStudy,"The JournalofAmericanStudies 29,no.1(1995).p.71.

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2 Relations(IR), theCFRtracesitsrootsbacktotheFirstWorldWar,intheCFRscase specifically back to The Inquiry. The Inquiry was a working fellowship of distinguishedscholarsassembledinNewYorkCityinthewinterof191718,taskedto briefWoodrowWilsonaboutoptionsforthepostwarworldoncetheKaiserandimperial 3 Germany [weredefeated]. Historians differ about how seriously President Wilson took The Inquirys 4 efforts butwhatiscertainisthatin1921,AmericanswhohadparticipatedintheParis 5 6 Peace Conference of 1919, disappointed at being ignored and underutilised during 7 the Conference, established the CFR in New York, on July 29, 1921. The Councils intentwassimple:tobeacontinuousconferenceoninternationalquestionsaffectingthe 8 UnitedStates. Though nonpartisan, the CFR has long been recognised as the voice of 9 AmericasEstablishment. AsParmarwrylynotes,theCFRsfounderstriedtoavoid the taintof politicalpartisanshipby deliberatelyappointingone wellknown millionaire 10 Wall Street lawyer from each of the Democratic and Republican parties. Today, Council members are expected to be responsible and informed individuals with 11 reasonablypredictableviews,temperamentsandassociates. TheheydayoftheCFRscloutwasduringandsoonaftertheSecondWorldWar, 12 when it enjoyed a semiofficial status, close to government but distinct from it . In 1947, as part of the CFRs Committee for the Marshall Plan, member Arthur W. Page 13 wrote our ideas will control the world. With the benefit of hindsight, Parmar could write in 1995: If isolationism was largely overcome in the 1940s, it was not purely throughtheeducativeforceofevents:organisationsthatwereostensiblyprivate,likethe CFR, were a vital part of the process of both elaborating the new consensus and 14 disseminatingitscentralprinciples. And ever since its foundation, the primary way the CFR has reached a wider publicwithitsviewshasbeenthroughitsjournalForeignAffairs(FA),whichhasbeen publishedcontinuouslysince1922. THECONTEMPORARYINFLUENCEOFFOREIGNAFFAIRS 2 3

ChrisBrown, UnderstandingInternationalRelations(London:Palgrave,1997).pp.216 PeterGrose, Continuing theInquiry:TheCouncilon ForeignRelationsfrom1921to1996 (NewYork: CouncilonForeignRelations,1996).p.1. 4 Ibid.,p.1. 5 AccordingtoParmar,specifically,thekeymemberswereWhitneyHartShepardson,ThomasLamontand IsaiahBowman. 6 Parmar,"TheIssueofStatePower."p.78. 7 DavidC.Hendrickson,"ReviewEssayInquiringMinds:TheStoryoftheCouncilonForeignRelations," ForeignAffairs 76,no.1(1997).p.159. 8 Grose,ContinuingtheInquiry.p.9. 9 Hendrickson,"ReviewEssayInquiringMinds."p.160. 10 Parmar,"TheIssueofStatePower."p.79. 11 Robert D. Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1984).p.248. 12 Hendrickson,"ReviewEssayInquiringMinds."p.161. 13 Michael Wala,The CouncilonForeignRelationsandAmericanForeignPolicyin theEarlyColdWar (Providence:BerghahnBooks, 1994).p.171. 14 Parmar,"TheIssueofStatePower."p.75.

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ItisclearthatinanydiscussionoftheCFRanditsimportancetoday,influenceis 15 problematic both as a concept and as a phenomenon for measurement and that no 16 adequate social scientific tools exist that objectively measure influence. Some observers maintain, for example, that Council officials and friends have often 17 exaggeratedthebodysimportance..., whileothersfeelthat...failuretobeaskedtobe a member of the Council has been regarded for a generation as a presumption of 18 unsuitabilityforhighofficeinthenationalsecuritybureaucracy. Whatever the role of the CFR, most media observers agree with Columbia Journalism Reviews opinion that FA is an immensely influential journal in American 19 foreign policy circles. Since 1922, FA has frequently set the limits of respectable 20 21 debate and helped form the climate of opinion in which US foreign policy is debatedandmade. AnecdotalevidenceconfirmingFAsimportanceisabundant.Considerthewords of Japanese Governor Shintaro Ishihara: How to influence American policy toward 22 Japan: Make a speech at Stanford and write an article for Foreign Affairs. 22 Time magazinecalledFAThemostinfluentialperiodicalinprintandNewsweekreferredtoit asThepreeminentjournalofitskind. But to characterise FAs influence anecdotally is not to identify the social mechanism by which influence is exercised or to confirm its actual impact. 23 Understanding the social mechanism, or transmission belt, by which FA influences US foreign policy requires two steps. The first is to establish that according to several schoolsofthoughtwithinIRtheory,ideas,anddecisionmakersbehaviourarisingoutof theseideas,mattertoforeignpolicyformationandtostateconduct.Thesecondstepisto provethatFAreadersaresuchdecisionmakers.Totakethesestepsseriatim: 24 Oneapproach toexplainingforeignpolicyconduct isthestatecentricview. In this view,domesticorforeignorganisations likethe CFR,not tomentionajournal like

15 16

Ibid.,p.86. Ibid.,p.86. 17 Schulzinger,TheWiseMenofForeignAffairs.p.xi. 18 Ibid.,p.248. 19 CamilleFinefrock,"PlayersOnly:WhereMediaandForeignPolicyElitesTalkGeopolitics,"Columbia JournalismReview(2001).p.42. 20 Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on ForeignRelations and UnitedStatesForeignPolicy (NewYork:MonthlyReviewPress,1977).p.6. 21 Ibid.,p.6. 22 Anonymous, "Foreign AffairsMedia Kit," (New York,NY:The Councilon Foreign Relations, 2002). Availablehttp://www.foreignaffairs.org/advertising/. 23 For a discussion of the importance of mechanisms and an exploration of the transmission belt metaphor, see Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, "Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay," in SocialMechanisms:AnAnalyticalApproachtoSocialTheory,PeterHedstromandRichardSwedbergeds. (Cambridge:CUP,1998. 24 SeeforexamplePeterB.Evans,DietrichRueschemeyer,andThedaSkocpol,BringingtheStateBackIn (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1985).

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25 FA, are notimportant inforeign affairs. Againstthis highly debatable view, however, thefollowingargumentcanbeadvanced:

Foreign policy has to be understood as being made in certain domestic and international contexts by...state institutions that mobilize domestic groups and individuals for the achievement of statedetermined policy objectives. The democratic features of the political system and the diversity of attitudes and interests in a continentalsized nation, however, ensure that the state cannot lead without national mobilisation and cannot mobilise without taking due regard for themajor social, economicandpolitical interests withinthe United 26 States. (Emphasisadded). Alexander Wendt makes a broader, but equally compelling case for the importanceofideas(andthereforethetransmittersofideas,likeFA)ininternationallife: thekeyistoreclaimpowerandinterestfrommaterialismbyshowinghowtheircontent and meaning are constituted by ideas and culture. In other words, it makes sense to begin our theorizing about international politics with the distribution of ideas...in the 27 system,andthenbringinmaterialforces,ratherthantheotherwayaround. Moreover, asLevysays,Mostresearchinsocialpsychologyconcludesthatinterpretationofreality 28 tends tobe moretheorydriven than datadriven, andDeborahLarsons classic study 29 theOriginsofContainment:APsychologicalExplanation demonstratesthevalidityof such conclusions. Hermann, Hermann and Hagans work has been even more specific, and has exhaustively documented how human decisionmaking processes and ideas influence the foreign policy behaviour of individuals, single groups, and multiple 30 groups. ButwhatabouttheargumentthatFAisanessentiallyscholarlyjournal,andthat scholarly IR theory can be divorced from foreign policy? Despite FAs selfappointed mandatedescribedabove,acriticcouldmaintainthatFAisperceivedtobeascholarly, not policy, publication. (EBSCO, the academic data retrieval system, specifically 31 categorisesitasa "Scholarly [PeerReviewed] Journal).KennethWaltz, forexample, 32 insistsonasharpdistinctionbetweenforeignpolicyand IR theory, saying that asking neorealisttheorytoexplainspecificpoliciesofstatesislikeaskingthelawofgravityto
25

Fortheclassicexplorationofthetangleofgoalsthatcanexplainormotivateforeignpolicybehavior,see GrahamT.AllisonandPhilipZelikow,EssenceofDecision:ExplainingtheCubanMissileCrisis,Second ed.(NewYork:HarperCollins,1999). passim. 26 Parmar,"TheIssueofStatePower."p.76. 27 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, ed. Steve Smith, Cambridge Studies in InternationalRelations (Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999).p.371. 28 J. S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," International Organization48(1994a).Footnote12. 29 Deborah W. Larson, The Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress,1985). passim. 30 Margaret Hermann, Charles Hermann, and Joe Hagan, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behaviour," inNewDirections inthe StudyofForeign Policy, ed.CharlesHermann, Jr.Charles Kegley, andJamesRosenau(London:HarperCollins,1987).pp.31318. 31 Thoughthisisamistake:FAisnotpeerreviewed. 32 Kenneth.N.Waltz,"InternationalPoliticsIsNotForeignPolicy," SecurityStudies 6(1996). passim.

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BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.1,2004
33 forecastthewaywardpathofafallingleaf. Allison,however(supportedindepthby 34 Fearon ), asserts that such a claim of separation is untenable: only by perverse definitioncantheclaimthatthese[IRandforeignpolicy]aresharplydistinctdomainsbe 35 made. Ultimately,ImaintainthatSmithmakesanobviousbutcompellingpointwhenhe says: thepath to understanding foreignpolicymaking almost certainly travels through 36 the mindsof foreignpolicymakers (emphasisadded). Any other approachto foreign policy and state behaviour rests on a narrow conceptionof what it means to explain 37 something. 37 In short, ideas matter, and FAs possible position as a scholarly journal does not impede, and may indeed enhance, its ability to influence US foreign policy. The second step in understanding the transmission belt of FAs influence on foreignpolicyistoexamineitsreadership.AsInotedabove,onehastoprovenotonly thatideasinfluencestatebehaviorandforeignpolicygenerally,butthatFAreadersare thepeople whoseideas matter,i.e.,that thepeople making(oratleasthavingabearing on) policy decisions and the people reading FA are one and the same. Without this linkage,thereisnosocialmechanism. 38 Toestablishthislinkage,considerthefollowing.FAhas185,000readers, witha medianageoffifty,eightytwopercentofwhomaremale.Ifwedrillalittledeeper,we findthat FA readers are educated: ninety percent arecollegegraduates,andsixtyone percent have a postgraduate degree. We also discover that FA readers are wealthy: eightypercentareprofessional/managerial(splitseventypercentintheprivatesectorand thirtypercentingovernment/education/other)twentythreepercentaremembersofa BoardofDirectorstheirmeanhouseholdincomeis$200,100,theirmeanhouseholdnet worthis$1,296,000,andtwentysixpercenthaveahouseholdnetworthover$1million. Andfinally,welearnthat FAreadersareinternational:97%tookaforeigntripinthe last3 years, fifteenpercentofthe readersoftheEnglisheditionof the magazinereside outside the United States, and FAs Japanese, Spanish, and Russian language editions 39 reachacombinedaudienceof31,000readers. 33 34

Kenneth.N.Waltz, TheoryofInternationalPolitics(NewYork:RandomHouse,1979).p.121. James D. Fearon, "Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations,"Annual ReviewofPoliticalScience1(1998). passim. 35 AllisonandZelikow, EssenceofDecision.p.405. 36 ThomasW.Smith,HistoryandInternational Relations,RoutledgeAdvances inInternationalRelations andPolitics09(London:Routledge,1999).p.188.Notethisisnotthesameassayingthatonecanjudgea situation accurately by the public utterances and the rhetorical references of foreign policymakers. See Paul A Anderson, "Justifications and Precedents as Constraints in Foreign Policy DecisionMaking," AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience25(1981).p.740. 37 Matthew G.BonhamandMichaelJ. Shapiro, "ThoughtandActioninForeign Policy," in Thoughtand ActioninForeignPolicy,ed.MatthewG.BonhamandMichaelJ.Shapiro(Stamford:CentreforAdvanced StudiesintheBehavioralSciences,1977).p. 2. Seealso Ole R Holsti,"Foreign PolicyDecisionMakers ViewedPsychologically:"CognitiveProcess"Approaches," in ThoughtandAction inForeign Policy,ed. Matthew G. Bonham and Michael J. Shapiro (Stamford: Centre for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences,1977). 38 MorethanWorldPolicyJournal,ForeignPolicy,andTheNationalInterest,seeFinefrock,"Players Only." 39 AllreadershipstatisticsabovetakenfromtheMRIMay2001SubscriberStudycitedinAnonymous, "MediaKit."pp115.

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BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.1,2004 A lot ofpolicyinfluence mightbe inferred from the evidence above, butdo FA readers documented education, wealth and internationalism, and its international distribution,reallytranslateintopolicyinfluence?AccordingtodataderivedfromErdos &MorganOpinionLeaders1998 1999and20002001,theydo,andquitepowerfully: Foreign Affairs is read by more individuals who directly affect legislative/governmentalpolicyissuesthantheNationalJournal,Congressional Quarterly, Aviation Week, or Janes Defense Weekly...A reader of Foreign Affairsisalmostthreetimesmorelikelytoinfluencealegislative/governmental issue than a reader of Business Week...Foreign Affairs is read by more individualswhodirectly influence military anddefensespending than Aviation Week,JanesDefenseWeekly,TheNationalJournal,RollCallorCongressional Quarterly...A reader of Foreign Affairs is five times more likely to influence defensespendingthanareaderofBusinessWeek,Forbes,orFortune...Areader of Foreign Affairs is more likely to influence business issues than a reader of TheEconomistorHarvardBusinessReview...AreaderofForeignAffairsisfour times more likely to influence trade issues than a reader of Business Week or Fortune.[FAreaders]academicachievementhasalsomadethemextraordinarily active in public life. Compared to the national average, they are almost eight timesas likelyto have writtensomethingforpublication, almostnine times as likely to have addressed a public gathering, and over seven times as likely to 40 haveworkedactivelyforapoliticalpartyorcandidate. 40 In short, ideas matter, and through its circulation among the major social, economicandpoliticalinterestsof Americaand abroad,FA reaches educated,wealthy and international individuals directly involved in government policy and legislation, defencespending,business,andtrade.Italsoreachesthousandsofeducatorsandstudents in Political Science and History. If there were ever a publicly circulated journal that influencesUSforeignpolicy,FAisit. FOREIGNPOLICYANDHISTORY SofarIhaveassertedthattheexpressionofideasoftenthroughjournalslikeFA matters in foreign policy, and also proved that the FA readership matters in the formationandtheconductofUSforeignpolicy.Butwhatabouthistoricalinformation?Is it possible to isolate historical information as a subset of these ideas that matter in policy formation? I believe that it is, and before exploring the demonstrable historical contentof FA,Iwillexplainwhy.
41 In1973, May arguedthat Meninpoweroftenmakedecisionsonthebasisof theirimpressionsofthepast,thattheseimpressionsareoftenmistaken,andthatamore

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AlldataderivedfromErdos&MorganOpinionLeaders19981999and20002001,andcitedinthe 2002ForeignAffairsReadersProfile. 41 ErnestR.May,"Lessons"ofthePast:TheUseandMisuseofHistoryinAmericanForeignPolicy (New York,:OxfordUniversityPress,1973). passim.

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BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.1,2004
42 critical andsystematicuseof historywould improve theirdecisions. Whilehistorical 43 knowledges influence relative to other factors is difficult to gauge accurately (and some argue, Occasionally a lack of historical memory may be a positive benefit in 44 making policy decisions), it is difficult to dispute the assertion that historical 45 knowledgeisacentralpartofeverypolicyproblem. Thisassertioncanbesustainedon manylevels,asweshallnowexplore. Jervis maintains in his classic Perception and Misperception in International 46 Politics thatat the very least, thelessons [of history]are perceptualpredispositions. Fryismorespecific,sayingthatforthepolicymakerhistoricalknowledgeprovidesthe basis for their casual opinions, general attitudes, predispositions, perceptions, images, beliefs, convictions and axioms and for their values, preferences and expectations...[it] providestheirgoverningconcepts,propositionsandseeminglypowerfultheoriesofhow 47 theworldworks,ithelpsstatesmenconstructtheirmentalmaps. Vertzbergerismore explicit still, saying that in policy information processing and decisionmaking, historicalknowledgeplaysfourroles:1)definingthesituation,2)circumscribingtherole 48 oftheactors3)determiningstrategy,and4)justifyingthestrategy. JeffreyRecordhasclearlyillustratedtheimportanceoftheuseofhistoryinthese rolesinarecentstudyof AmericanPresidentialdecisionstouse(ornottouse)forcein foreign affairs. In this study, he details the use of historical knowledge in the policy formation of Truman in Korea, Eisenhower in Indochina, Kennedy and Johnson in Vietnam and the Caribbean, Nixon and Kissinger in Vietnam, Reagan in Lebanon, Grenada, Central America and Afghanistan, Bush in Panama, the Persian Gulf and 49 Somalia,andClintoninHaitiandtheBalkans.

Thisimpressivelistraisesthequestionofwhy historicalknowledgeisemployed (whenitisconsciouslyrecognizedassuch),inpolicy.Fryarguesthatpolicymakersfind 50 in history certainty where uncertainty reigns, and statesmen often find in the
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ArthurM.Jr.Schlesinger,"Reviewof"'Lessons'ofthePast",byErnestMay,"TheJournalofAmerican History 61(1974).p.443.AlongwithNeustadt,in1986Maydeliveredaseriesofspecificframeworksfor decisionmakerstobackuphissuggestionandtohelpthemmakebetteruseofthepast.See:RichardE. NeustadtandErnestR.May,ThinkinginTime:TheUsesofHistoryforDecisionMakers (NewYork:Free PressCollierMacmillan,1986). passim. 43 JeffreyRecord,MakingWar,ThinkingHistory:Munich,Vietnam,andPresidentialUsesofForcefrom KoreatoKosovo(AnnapolisMD:NavalInstitutePress,2002).p.60,andreinforcedonp.165. 44 A.N.Gilbert,"InternationalRelationsandtheRelevanceofHistory,"InternationalStudiesQuarterly12 (1968).p.351. 45 MichaelG.Fry,"Introduction,"inHistory,theWhiteHouseandtheKremlin:StatesmenasHistorians (London:PinterPublishers,1991).p.3. 46 RobertJervis,PerceptionandMisperceptioninInternationalPolitics(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press,1976).pp.22225. 47 Fry,"Introduction."p.2. 48 Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, "Foreign Policy Decisionmakers as PracticalIntuitive Historians: Applied HistoryandItsShortcomings," InternationalStudiesQuarterly30(1986).p.225. 49 Record, MakingWar,ThinkingHistory.passim.ForotherexamplesseealsoMaciejBartkowski,"The ImpactofAnalogiesontheForeignPoliciesoftheUnitedStatesandGreatBritain:TheCaseof InterventioninBosniaandHerzegovina," Rubikon:EJournal (2002). 50 Fry,"Introduction."p.13.

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51 historical record a particular form of evidence that they regard as authoritative. In particular, current events dominated by a single leader tend to lead policymakers to 52 retrievehistoricalfiguresagainstwhichtocomparehim. Anothercommonareawhere 53 historicalinformationisusedisduringsurprisingevents andmilitarycrises.FAreaders, for example, might draw upon what they know of history under these circumstances 54 becauseofthehighlevelofdrama,stakesandtimepressures, ortofillintheblanks 55 wheninformationisscarce. Certainly decisionmakers also use historical knowledge in policy formation purely rhetorically. Historical references are trigger words that help decisionmakers achieve what scholars in the field of political communication call interpretive dominancethat is, the widespread acceptance of ones own characterization of a 56 particularissue. AsLakoffobserves,thepeoplewhogettoimposetheirmetaphorson 57 [a]culturegettodefinewhatweconsidertobetrueabsolutelyandobjectivelytrue. Asaresult,somearguethathistoricalreferencesandanalogiesareoftenmademerelyto 58 justifypreviouslymadepolicychoices. Before leaving this discussion of the use of history in policymaking, a special categoryoftheuseofhistoricalreferenceshastobeexplained:historicalanalogies.This is because the use of historical analogy, or precedent based reasoning, has been 59 advanced as a key cognitive mechanism in the analysis of international politics. It maybehyperboletomaintainthattheUnitedStateswenttowar[inthePersianGulfin 60 1991] over an [historical] analogy, but it is also difficult to dismiss the notion that 61 Withouthistoricalanalogies,everyforeignpolicycrisiswouldbeunique. Moreover, research confirms that both individuals and groups use historical analogies in policy 62 formation. In Analogies at War, Khong explores historical analogies and decision 51 52

Ibid.p.11 ScotMacdonald,RollingtheIronDice:HistoricalAnalogiesandtheDecisionstoUseMilitaryForcein RegionalContingencies(Westport:GreenwoodPress,2000).p.199. 53 ScotMacdonald,"Hitler'sShadow:HistoricalAnalogiesandtheIraqiInvasionofKuwait," Diplomacy& Statecraft 13,no.4(2002).p.44. 54 Macdonald, Rolling the Iron Dice. p. 18. For other examples of this phenomenon, see David Patrick Houghton, "The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel ForeignPolicy Situations," British Journal of PoliticalScience 26(1996). 55 Philip E. Tetlock, "TheoryDriven Reasoning About Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics: Are We Prisoners of Our Preconceptions?," American Journal of Political Science 43, no. 2 (1999).p.338. 56 RolandParis,"KosovoandtheMetaphorWar,"PoliticalScienceQuarterly 117,no.3(2002).p.425. 57 MarkJohnsonGeorgeLakoff, MetaphorsWeLiveBy(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1980).p. 160. 58 AndrewJTaylorandJohnT.Rourke,"HistoricalAnalogiesintheCongressionalForeignPolicy Process,"TheJournalofPolitics7,no.2(1995). 59 Philip A. Schrodt, "Pattern Recognition of International Crises Using Hidden Markov Models," in Political Complexity: Nonlinear Models of Politics, ed. Diana Richards (Ann Arbor, MI: University of MichiganPress,2000).p.296 . 60 BarbaraA.SpellmanandKeithJ.Holyoak,"IfSaddamIsHitlerThenWhoIsGeorgeBush?Analogical MappingbetweenSystemsofSocialRoles,"JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology 62,no.6 (1992).p.913. 61 Macdonald,RollingtheIronDice.p.ix. 62 Ibid.,p.5.

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BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.1,2004 makingindepth.Hearguesthathistoricalanalogiesassistpolicymakersbyperforming three diagnostic tasks 1) help define the nature of the situation confronting the policy maker, 2) help assess the stakes, and 3) provide prescriptions. In addition, they help policymakers evaluate alternative optionsby 1) predicting their chances of success,2) evaluating their moral rightness, 3) warning about the dangers associated with the 63 options. AsarefinementofKhong,MacDonaldintroducestheideaofmasteranalogies, i.e.clustersofanalogiesbasedoneventswhichareusedbecausetheyarepresumedto 64 be widely understood by policymakers and the public An example of an analogy cluster or master analogy might be Hitler /Munich /Appeasement/ Chamberlain/ outbreak of WWII. Many master analogies apparently overlap with or mirror the mythsofIRdescribedinthesectionabove. But when asked How well are [historical] analogiesused? Khong withothers 65 concludesNotverywell. Amongotherreasons,thisisbecauseAvailabilityisakey factor in determining which historical analogy will be chosen a person estimates the 66 probabilityofaneventbytheeasewithwhichsimilarinstancescanberecalled justas 67 important,theimpactofreadilyavailableinformationisoftennotconscious. Likethe drunkwholookedforhiskeysnotwherehedroppedthem,butunderthelamppostwhere the light was better, people often seek inadequate information that is readily 68 available... Humansarecognitivemisers whoseeksimple, easyheuristics(suchas 69 70 historicalanalogies)tosolveproblems thisleadstocommonerrorsandbias. Someof theseerrorswillformthebasisformyargumentbelowthatFAfallsshortinitsserviceto policymakers. The final refinement in this short review of how and why decisionmakers use historical information istonotetheexistenceoftheGenerationalModel.MacDonald 71 andothersargue(followingMannheim) thatthereisaGenerationalmodelatworkin the use of history, in which the common experiences of a cohort or generation when they are between the ages of 17 and 25 in elite groups have an impact on policy 72 formationabouttwodecadeslater. Jervisappearstobeinqualifiedagreementwiththis 73 theory, and at least one scholar goes so far as to argue that these generationally
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YuenFoongKhong,AnalogiesatWar:Korea,Munich,DienBienPhu,andtheVietnamDecisionsof 1965(Princeton,N.J:PrincetonUniversityPress,1992).P.10. 64 Macdonald,"Hitler'sShadow."p.43 65 Khong, AnalogiesatWar.p.9. 66 Ibid.,p.212,quotingDanielKahnemanandAmosTversky,"Availability:AHeuristicforJudging FrequencyandProbability,"inJudgementunderUncertainty,ed.DanielKahneman,PaulSlovic,and AmosTversky(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982). 67 RobertJervis,"TheDrunkard'sSearch,"inExplorationsinPoliticalPsychology,ed.ShantoIyengarand WilliamJamesMcGuire(DurhamNC:DukeUniversityPress,1993).p.345. 68 Ibid.,p.339. 69 Macdonald, RollingtheIronDice.p.207. 70 Many of which are catalogued in Jervis, Perception and Misperception, and Richard Heuer, The PsychologyofIntelligenceAnalysis (WashingtonDC:CenterforStudyofIntelligence,CIA,1999). 71 HowardSchumanandCherylRieger,"HistoricalAnalogies,GenerationalEffects,andAttitudestoward War," AmericanSociologicalReview 57,no.June(1992).p.315. 72 Macdonald, RollingtheIronDice.p. 9andMacdonald,"Hitler'sShadow."p.42. 73 Jervis,PerceptionandMisperception.p.25371.

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BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.1,2004 significant events from decisionmakers youth form the primary paradigm for the 74 foreign policy decisions taken when they are adults. As I will argue below, however, based on the evidence of historical references in FA, I think that a different model providesabetterexplanationforthepatternsatwork. CATALOGUINGTHEHISTORICALREFERENCESINFA Having established the influence of FA, and the importance of historical informationintheforeignpolicyprocess,wecannowturntotheanalysisofthejournals historical content. Using a combination of physical and electronic searches of the contents of the journal, I devised a method to establish the identity and frequency of historical figures, events and epochs referenced in FA from 1965 to 2000. My methodologyispredicatedontheideathatonecandrawconclusionsabouthowwellFA useshistory through a largescale analysisof what historical references areused in the journalandhowfrequently(thenumberofhitsperreference). I will begin by briefly describing the process of textual analysis that I devised. Therewereelevensteps: 1. IselectedtheonlinesearchserviceEBSCOhostBSPanditstextsearchcapability 75 toreviewissuesinmychosentimeperiod. 76 2. I selected issues of FA from 1965 (the first full year available) to 2000 as the populationforanalysis(172Issues). 77 78 79 3. I selected a random sample of twenty percent (thirtyfour issues) of the total issue population for closer examination. (NB: thoughsome years were skipped in 80 therandomsample,Ireliedonthelawoflargenumbers topickupmostcommon historical references over the entire period, because thirtyfour is a statistically significant sample of a population of 172, and the text search described below wouldsearchallissuesinthepopulation.)
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MichaelRoskin,"FromPearlHarbortoVietnam:ShiftingGenerationalParadigmsandForeignPolicy," Political ScienceQuarterly89, no.Fall(1974). At leastonelarge scalesurvey contradicts this finding. It arguesthatintermsofpredictingforeignpolicypredilections,generationprovedtobeamuchlesspotent explanationthanoccupation.SeeOleR. Holsti andJames N.Rosenau, "DoesWhereYouStandDepend on When You Were Born? The Impact of Generation on PostVietnam Foreign Policy Beliefs," Public OpinionQuarterly10,no.Spring(1980).(1997),76:6(1997),77:1(1998),77:4(1998),77:6(1998),and 79:6(2000). 75 Accessedviahttp://library.kent.ac.uk/library/online/journals/ 76 Anadmittedlyarbitrarycutoffpoint,butonewhich.generatedenoughissuesformeaningfulanalysisof FAcontent. 77 Generatedbyhttp://www.random.org/sform.html. 78 Emil G. Milewski, The Essentials of Statistics (Piscataway, NJ: Research and Education Association, 1989).p.106. 79 Thesethirtyfour Foreign Affairs issues were: 44:1(1965),45:3(1966),46:1(1967),47:2 (1968),49:2 (1970), 49:3 (1970), 51:2 (1972), 52:2 (1973), 52:3 (1973), 52:4 (1973), 53:2 (1974),55:1 (1976), 56:3 (1977),57:2 (1978),57:4 (1978), 58:1 (1979), 59:1 (1980), 60:5 (1981),62:1 (1983), 63:2 (1984), 67:1 (1988), 68:4 (1989), 71:2 (1992), 73:1 (1994), 75:4 (1996), 75:5 (1996), 76:1 (1997), 76:2 (1997), 76:3(1997),76:6(1997),77:1(1998),77:4(1998),77:6(1998),and79:6(2000). 80 i.e.: the sample mean approachesthe populationmean as the sample size increases See Anonymous, "Laws of Large Numbers," in A Dictionary of Statistics, ed. Graham Upton and Ian Cook (Oxford UniversityPress,2002).

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BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.1,2004
81 The entire contents, minus advertising, of each issue in the sample (using the physicalcopyof thejournalin the ULBLibrary) were reviewedforall references to: historical events, historical epochs, historical figures or significant 82 contemporaryfigures. 5. I recorded these references, and screened them for repeats, alternative 83 nomenclaturesetc. ,whichgavemealistof564historicalreferences. 6. UsingEBSCO,IperformedatextsearchforallofthereferencesIcollectedinstep five,above.Thenumberoftimesthateachreferenceoccurredwasalsorecordedin the same spreadsheet. For example: a search for Allende generated sixtythree hits. 7. I determined the nature of the section where the reference was found, that is, whether it occurred in a book review, letter to the editor, etc., rather than in an actual policy article, and recorded the numbers of hits according to their source section.Forexample,ofthesixtythreereferencestoAllende,above,twentytwo occurred in Recent Books on International Relations, letters to the Editor, or somethingsimilar. 8. Totesttheeffectoftimepassingoncontemporary(i.e.,1965to2000)references,a fiveyear exclusion period was assigned to these references. This was done by notingthe end date of the active political life of a figure, or theoccurrence of an 84 event, andthenaddingfiveyears.Forexample:SalvadorAllende,above,diedin 1973. Therefore, he was assigned a contemporary reference exclusion year of 1978. 9. Thefulltextreferencesearchwasthenrerunonthesereferencestoseehowmany mentions were madeof each figureor eventfromtheexclusion year onwards.To continue the Allende example, an EBSCO search of FA was run for the period 1978 2000, which generated thirtytwo hits, of which ten were found to be in bookreviews,etc,ratherthanarticles. 10. When this process was complete, and two particular patterns (described below), werenoticed,anadditionaleightytworeferencetermswereaddedandsearchesrun to help confirm some biases apparently detected in the first cut of the data (in particular,theadditionsincludedanyUSPresidentsorSecretariesofStatemissing th fromtheoriginallist,plusadditionalprominentWesternpre20 centurypeople, 85 epochsandevents ),forafinaltotalof646termssearched. 11. Finally, itbecame clear during the course of the analysis that there wereproblem areas with a small number of references which could impact the results. These

4.

81 82

Thisrequiredabout40minutesperissue,orabout23reviewinghoursintoto . Contemporary at the time of the issue what/who was significant was an admittedly subjective judgement. 83 Unfortunately,theyalsohadtobescreenedfornounsusedtorefertohistoricalepochswhencapitalized (e.g.TheReformation,TheRenaissance,ThePlagueetc.)because the fulltextsearchcapabilityof EBSCO cannot be setuptobe sensitive tocapitalization. For the possible problems this factcreates, see AppendixI. 84 ThisonewasdonebyconsultingPeterTeed,ed.,ADictionaryofTwentiethCenturyHistory:19141992 (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1992).,http://www.infoplease.com/,and http://politicalgraveyard.com/index.html. 85 SelectedfortheirgeneralfamiliarityatWorldHistorysectionof http://www.infoplease.com.

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BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.1,2004 areas, and the decisions taken as to how to deal with them, have been set out in AppendixI. RESULTSANDANALYSIS Asdescribedabove,IsearchedthirtyfiveyearsofFA(172issues)forthepresence of 646 historical reference terms in policy articles. What were the results? In terms of size,theresultsofthissearchcanbesummarizedasfollows: Therewere16,461rawreferences(hits)overall When contemporary (as defined above) hits are excluded from these, there were 12,151hits Of these, however, twentyfour percent (2,947) were in book reviews and letters to theeditor,notpolicyarticles When both these factors are accounted for, the total number of historical reference hitsin FApolicyarticlesfrom1965to2000is9,204,oranaverageoffiftyfourper issue. Atfirstglancethisseemsanimpressiveamountofhistoryinthepolicydiscussionsin FA.Acloserlookatthedata,however,revealsthatthisisnotthecase: Of the 9,204 hits on 646 references, a staggering fiftysix percent (4,007) are accountedforbyonlytwentyfivepeopleorevents,withthetopfiveaccountingfor twentypercent(1,831)ofthetotal.Inotherwords,thescopeofhistoricalreferences inFAisextremelyrestricted Even extending the list of reference terms (e.g. by adding to the reference list, and testing,thecompletelistofallUSPresidentsandSecretariesofState,asopposedto only those found in the issues sampled see point 10, above) did not broaden the scope. Rather, I determined that in thirtyfive years of policy articles, nine US presidents and eighteen Secretaries of State are never mentioned in FA at all an additionaleightandfourteenofthem,respectively,arementionedonlyonceortwice. In other words, FA policy articles have a severe case of historical amnesia with respecttoAmericanforeignpolicyleadership. Thetemporalscaleofthehistoricalreferencesreflectsthesamehistoricalamnesia: Only thirteen percent (1,226) of the total hits referred to events or people that th th occurred prior to the 20 century. Again, these pre20 Century references were narrow, with only twentyfive people and events accounting for fortynine percent (618)ofthetotal,andwithfivereferencesaccountingforsixteenpercent(194)ofthe totalnumberofhits.
th In20 Centuryreferences, FAsnarrownesscontinued: Fiftyeight percent (5,329)of the total hits wereto people andeventscirca1900 to 1965 of these, sixtyfive percent (3,442) are accounted for by only twentyfive references,andjustfiveaccountedforthirtytwopercent(1,718)ofthetotalofhits. Theremainingtwentyninepercent(2,649)ofhitsareonpeopleoreventsfrom1965 to2000(excludingcontemporarymentions)of thesesixty fivepercent (1,741) are

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BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.1,2004 accounted for by the top twentyfive references, and five account for thirty percent (786)ofthetotal. Intermsof theeffectoftimepassingoncontemporary references,itwas foundto cuthitsby anaverageof fortysix percent.In otherwords,thoughvery few (only four) significantcontemporaryeventsandpeopledisappearedcompletely fromreferenceafter fiveyears, theirhistoricalpresence,especiallyinpolicyarticles,decaysquiterapidly. TheMayaguez Incident,forexample, is referredtofour timeswithin fiveyearsofits occurrencein1975.After1980,however,itdropsoutofpolicyarticlesentirely,despite the fact that the US attempted another hostage rescue in that very year (in Iran). This patternhasinterestingimplicationsfortheGravitymodelIdescribebelow. And finally, when one examines the FA data closely, another trend becomes th evident:adisproportionaterelianceonpre20 centurypeopleandeventswhenreferring to Asia. While only four percent (373) of the total hitsonhistorical people and events 86 th mentioned are exclusively Asian, when the field of study is restricted to pre20 Centuryreferencesthispercentagerisestotwelvepercentandfurthermore,exclusively th Asianreferencesmakeupsixteenpercent(four)ofthetwentyfivemostcommonpre20 centuryreferencesinpolicyarticles. GiventheapparenttrendinthenatureoftheAsianreferences,afurthertestwasin order. Therefore, additional Western references deemed to be of a similar type were addedto the referencesearchlist(aswith USPresidentsandSecretariesofState, these werenotobtainedfromthephysicalexaminationoftheFAcopies,butwereaddedinto thesearch).Because,forexample,policyarticlesinFAmentiontheChin,Han,Manchu, Ming, Qing, Sung, and Tang Dynasties in China, the Meiji period in Japan, and the MogulEmpireinIndia,searcheswererunonWesternproxytermsandpeoplesuchas Feudalism, Middle ages, Celts, Roman Empire, Jacobite and Louis XIV. Nevertheless,thelackofequivalence(300percent) between Asianhitsoverall andpre th 20 CenturyAsianhitspersisted,asthenumbersabovereflect. FASUNCONSCIOUSDISDAINFORHISTORY Basedontheevidenceabove,IwouldarguethatFA useshistoricalreferencesina largelyunexaminedanduncriticalmanner.Suchusagemayevenreflect,inSchroeders 87 words,anunconsciousdisdain forhistory.Thisconclusioncanbejustifiedinseveral ways. First,thisconclusionissupportedbythefactthatthatalmostaquarter(twentyfour percent) of the total historical references in the journal are made outside of policy articles,cominginsteadlargelyfromthesectionofthejournalentitled"RecentBookson International Relations" (emphasis added). The fact of this large percentage is easy to explain thatsectionofFA, despite its name,actually reviews large numbersofbooks abouthistorybyhistorians.Butthisfactispartoftheproblem,notammunitionin FAs defence,becausefailuretodistinguishaworkofhistoryfromaworkofpoliticalscience istoinvitethesortofunscientificcherrypickingofhistorythathistoriansabhorand
86

ByexclusivelyAsian,ImeanhavingnoWesternhandintheirexistence.i.e.,MaoZedongortheHan DynastyareexclusivelyAsian,whiletheKoreanandVietnamWarsarenotbecauseAmericaparticipated inthem. 87 P.W.Schroeder,"HistoricalRealityVs.NeoRealistTheory,"InternationalSecurity19(1994).p.148.

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BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.1,2004 responsiblesocialscientistscondemn.Asonecriticargues,theworkofhistoriansisnot understood by historians to be, and cannot legitimately be treated by others as, an unproblematicbackgroundnarrativefromwhichtheoreticallyneutraldatacanbeelicited 88 for framingproblems andtestingtheories, but FAs lumpingofhistoryin withother worksinvitesdecisionmakersto doexactly that. TheAmericanjournalsshortcomings inthisregardareespeciallyegregiouswhenoneconsiderstheexampleof International Affairs,thejournalpublishedbythesisterorganisationoftheCFRintheUK,TheRoyal Instituteof InternationalAffairsthisjournalverycarefullydistinguishesbetweenbooks under review that are about IR and books under review that are about history. Such a distinctionwouldnotsolveeveryproblemwithFAsuseofhistory,butitisanimportant firststep. Second,thepitifulbreadthofthehistoricalreferencesinFApolicyarticlesrevealed allowsonetoinferalackofreflectionattheCFRabouthistoricalreferencesasawhole. When it was founded, FA noted that technical articles will be left to more special 89 magazines, but FA appears to have drifted too far from a thoughtful approach for a policymagazine(atleastinsofarashistoriographyandmodernissuesofepistemologyare concerned).In1984,forexample,onecriticofFAnotedthatinasingleissuetwoofthe articles lead withquotesfromWinstonChurchill,thesavioroftheunimaginative after 90 dinner speaker. When only twentyfive references out of 646 account for fiftysix percentofallhitsoverthirtyfiveyears(Churchillamongthem,atnumberfifteen!),one canrepeatthechargefortheentireperiodofanalysis.Thislackofbreadthalsomakesit likely that no account is taken in policy articles of the subtlety required when making referencetohistoricalfiguresandevents,eventhoughresponsibletechniquesforusing historical sources are available, but they require understanding the extent to which patterns within historiography rather than History, must be the direct focus of 91 investigation and explanation. In short, it seems likely that historical references are 92 being used in FA more as dignified background than to put ideas, theories and recommendationsthroughanysortofrigorousscreenforevidence.Illustratingoneofthe historians charges of the worst abuse of history by IR, in FA references to Napoleon, Munich, Stalin, or Pearl Harbor (all in the top twentyfive) may merely salt articles withtheappearanceofdepthandprofundity. 93 Thesamecanbesaidofthethetyrannyofrecenthistory thatisclearlyatwork inFA(asevidencedbythefactthateightysevenpercentofallhistoricalreferenceshits were to events and people in the twentieth century). One IR scholar notes that the academiccomparativeadvantage,whichappliestoInternationalRelationsnolessthanto

88

I.S.Lustick,"History,HistoriographyandPoliticalScience:MultipleHistoricalRecordsandthe ProblemofSelectionBias," AmericanPoliticalScienceReview90(1996).p.605. 89 ArchibaldCaryCoolidge,"EditorialStatement,"ForeignAffairs 1,no.1(1922).p.1. 90 Schulzinger,TheWiseMenofForeignAffairs.p.251 . 91 Lustick,"History,HistoriographyandPoliticalScience."p.605. 92 TheexpressionisusedinNevilJohnson,TheLimitsofPoliticalScience(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1989).Chapter2, passim. 93 TheexpressionisusedinNevilJohnson,TheLimitsofPoliticalScience(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1989).Chapter2, passim.

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BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.1,2004
94 any other subject, is a long time perspective, but FA has obviously disposed of this advantageinfavourofwhatSmithreferredtoinhiscatalogueoftheabuseofhistoryin 95 IRaspresentism. In fact, the lack of historical breadth and depth in FA makes it highly likely that many historical references are not really references to history at all, but instead are 96 97 referencestotheClichsofmemory, ormyth. BymythImean,asynonymfor arepresentationorastory,simplifiedorillusory,whichdealswithapasteventbutwhich hasanexplanatorypowerinthepresentday.Itisillusoryorsimplified,becauseamyth, althoughalwayshavinganobjectivefoundation,differsfrom[history]qualitativelyby 98 exaggeratingorotherwisetransformingthefacts. Munich,forexample,isthemost 99 powerful and influential political myth of the second half of the twentieth century 100 101 (though there have been numerous attempts to explode it, including in FA itself. ) 102 103 Among othercommonhistorical mythsemployed in policy are Prussia, Yalta, 104 105 the Special Relationship, The Spanish Civil War, and Din Bin Phu. This matters for a policy journal not least because what these myths are said to have in 106 common is their reliance on a stark monocausality. Instead of illuminating the real conduct or consequence of foreign policy, historical myths have the same function as

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ChristopherHill,"AcademicInternationalRelations:TheSirenSongofPolicyRelevance,"inTwo WorldsofInternationalRelations:Academics,PractitionersandtheTradeinIdeas,ed.PamelaBeshoff andChristopherHill(NewYork:Routledge,1994).p.20. 95 ThetermisusedinSmith, HistoryandInternationalRelations.passim. 96 TheexpressionseemstohavebeenfirstusedinMarcellinHodeir,"ClichsofOurMemory,"inHaunted by History: Myths in International Relations, ed. Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser (Providence, RI: BerghahnBooks,1998). 97 CyrilBuffetandBeatriceHeuser,"Introduction:OfMyths andMen," in HauntedbyHistory:Mythsin InternationalRelations, ed.BeatriceHeuser(Providence,RI:BerghahnBooks,,1998).p.viii. 98 AlineAngoustures, "TheSpanishCivilWar:"Betrayal"by theBourgeoisDemocracies,"inHauntedby History:MythsinInternationalRelations,ed.CyrilBuffetandBeatriceHeuser(Providence,RI:Berghahn Books,,1998).p.54. 99 David Chuter, "Munich, or the Blood of Others," in Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations,ed.CyrilBuffetandBeatriceHeuser(Providence,RI:BerghahnBooks,,1998).p.65. 100 Seeamongothers:RobertJ.Beck,"Munich'sLessonsReconsidered," InternationalSecurity14(1989). Chuter, "The Blood of Others." Spellman and Holyoak, "If Saddam Is Hitler." Macdonald, "Hitler's Shadow." May, "Lessons"ofthe Past.and Arno J.Mayer,"Greece IsNotMunich,"The Nation,March 25,1968. 101 GerhardWeinberg,"MunichafterFiftyYears,"ForeignAffairs 67(1988). 102 Robert Cooper, "The Myth ofPrussia," in Hauntedby History: Myths in InternationalRelations, ed. CyrilBuffetandBeatriceHeuser(Providence,RI:BerghahnBooks,,1998). 103 Reiner Marcowitz, "Yalta, the Myth of the Divisionof the World," in Hauntedby History: Myths in InternationalRelations, ed.BeatriceHeuser(Providence,RI:BerghahnBooks,1998). 104 JohnBaylis,"The'SpecialRelationship':ADivertingBritishMyth?,"inHauntedbyHistory:Mythsin InternationalRelations, ed.CyrilBuffetandBeatriceHeuser(Providence,RI:BerghahnBooks,1998). 105 Hodeir,"ClichesofOurMemory."p.104. 106 Cyril Buffet and Beatrice Heuser, "Conclusions: Historical Myths and the Denial of Change," in HauntedbyHistory:Mythsin InternationalRelations, ed.CyrilBuffetandBeatriceHeuser(Providence, RI:BerghahnBooks,,1998).p.263.

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BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.1,2004 classical myths, with a moral dimension that assigns a value system of guilt and 107 punishment,orofredemptionthroughsacrifice... onthepastandonpolicy. InFAsdefenceonemaysaythathistoricalanalogies,atleast,havetobefamiliar 108 to fulfil theirsimplifying role. Historical references as a whole, however, shouldbe considerablymorerich,andmoredetailedforFAsuseofhistorytostanduptoscrutiny (NB: though my research did not check the detail offered by each reference in each article,thelackofdiversityinthereferencedistributionasawholemakemecomfortable with this conclusion). Thucydides backed up his conclusions with proper historical analysis,currentexamples,andobservationsofpoliticalactorsbothinsideandoutsideof 109 the state in question. The heavy reliance on a few references, and the speed with which most references to the past decay in FA, make it unlikely that its articles are doingthesame. th Andfinally,FAs incrediblebias infavourof pre20 century references toAsian people and events in policy articles supports the charge of an unreflective and unselfconscious use of history. My analysis revealed that the Wars of the Roses, the MerovingianandCapetianKings,theConquistadorsofSouthandCentralAmerica,and theMasonDixonLinehavenotonceinthirtyfiveyearsbeensummonedtomakeapoint in FAs policy articles in contrast, the Tokugawa Shogunate, the Mongols, the Meiji Restoration and Chinese dynasties stretching back literally thousands of years are relativelycommonlyemployedintheirpolicyarticles. Whileitisoutsidethescopeofthisarticletoexplorewhythisbiasmightbepresent in FA beyond the unreflectiveuse of history and historical references generally, it is at leastpossiblethat what my analysis reveals isaclassiccaseof Orientalism, inwhich certainpartsoftheglobearetoWesterneyesafact,whichifitdevelops,changesor otherwise transforms itself in the way that civilizations frequently do, nevertheless is 110 fundamentally, even ontologically, stable. In other words, while FA is unlikely to explainSpainsforeignpolicyintermsoftheMoors,ortheUKsintermsoftheNorman Conquest, historically distant events are more likely to be summoned to frame policy arguments aboutChina andJapan. Even ifnoneof theotherargumentsabovecouldbe made in terms of the unexamined and uncritical use of history by FA, this Asian bias alonewouldsustainthecharges.

MASTERANALOGIESAGENERATIONALORAGRAVITYMODEL?

107 108

Ibid.p.269. Macdonald,RollingtheIronDice.p.196. 109 L. M. Bagby, "The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations," International Organization48(1994).p.148. 110 Edward W. Said,Orientalism: Western Conceptionsof the Orient (London:Penguin Books, 1995). p. 32.

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BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.1,2004 My analysis alsocast intodoubt a theory about theuse of historical references in 111 policyformation.Asdescribed above, MacDonald, Jervis, etal,argue thattheremay be a generational model at work in the use of history in policymaking, in which the common experiences of a cohort or generation when they are between the ages of 17 and 25 in elite groups become master analogies and have an impact on policy 112 formationabouttwodecadeslater. My research does not support this thesis as a single explanation for thechoiceof references. Ifthis were thecase,onewouldnotexpect tofind theFirst World War and theSecondWorldWar(andvariationsthereof,likeNazis)overwhelminglyinthetop five historical references in FA for 1965 to 2000, and nor would one expect to findso manyrelatedreferences(orcomponentsofmasteranalogies)tothesetwoconflictsin thetoptwentyfivereferences(seetheTopTwentyFivelistsinAppendixI).Onewould expect rather to see someequality of numbers of hits between the Second World War, Koreaand Vietnam infact,weseecloseparitybetween thelattertwo,butamassively largernumberofSecondWorldWarhits.Similarly,wefindNapoleoninthetoptwenty five references, where the Generational model cannot be responsible for his 113 appearance. Though the manner in which master analogies from history form and are 114 sustained remains a mystery (indeed remains virgin territory for research ), I would arguethatamodeloriginallyborrowedfromNewtonianPhysicsandsinceappliedwidely 115 inEconomics fitsthedatabetter:aGravityModel.Agravitymodelpredictsthatthe influenceofanobjectorthepullofgravityfromitispositivelyrelatedtothesizeof theobject,andinverselyrelatedtothedistancebetweenobjectsthus,inmostmodels,[it] 116 increases with size and decreases with distance. Identification of gravitationally significant people or events, and assessment of their relative sizes/effects, could be achieved by high volume textual analysis of the type demonstrated in this article with regardto FA.The Gravity modelcould thenbeapplied topredicttheirlongevity and ongoing influence. One might thereby uncover, for example, a tendancy for policy articles toremember(i.e. cite) events moreonthebasisoftheirseeming gravityor shock value (e.g.the assassination of a president,amajor terrorist attack, etc.)rather thanonthebasisoftheiraptnesswithcontemporarypolicyquestions,orthegenerational experiencesofcontemporarypolicymakers.Thismodelseemstoexplainbetterthanthe generational model the refusal of events such as Versaille, Munich, and Peal Harbor to leave the stage of historical references two and even three generations of policymakersaftertheiroccurance.Itwouldfurtherpredictthatashockingeventsuchas theterroristattacksinAmericaofSeptember11,2001willbereferedtonotonlyinthe
111 112

Jervis, PerceptionandMisperception.p.25371. Macdonald,RollingtheIronDice.P.9andMacdonald,"Hitler'sShadow."p.42. 113 Ifthe argument is made that there hasbeenmore time for the SecondWorldWar tobeabsorbed and referencedthanfortheothertwoexamples,thenthegenerationalmodelisimmediatelybeingbroughtinto question. 114 Macdonald,RollingtheIronDice.p.215. 115 Anonymous, "Gravity Model," in A Dictionary of Economics, ed. John Black (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress,2002). 116 Anonymous,"GravityModel,"inDictionaryoftheSocialSciences,ed.CraigCalhoun(Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,2002).

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BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.1,2004 policy debates of 2021, but also those of 2051 a prediction which seems safe, even banal,butwhichtheGenerationalmodelofMacDonald,Jervisetaldoesnotsupport. In short, while my research sheds no light on how the larger planets of master analogiesform,itopensapathtoreconsideringandexpandingtheGenerationalmodel and its prediction of dominant opinionforming events or people. The Gravity model can be used to identify the presence and persistence of reference points in the policy debate. WHAT IS TOBE DONE? CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FA FAs website boasts Inevitably, articles published in Foreign Affairs shape the 117 politicaldialogueformonthsandyearstocome. Thisistrue,butFAsuseofhistory alsomakesthisfactproblematic.AsIargueabove,Meninpoweroftenmakedecisions on thebasis of their impressions of the past, that these impressions areoften mistaken, 118 andthatamorecriticalandsystematicuseofhistorywouldimprovetheirdecisions. Therefore,IarguethatatleastthreechangesinFAarerequiredtoensureamorecritical andsystematicuseofhistoryinthejournal. First,theeditorsofFA (whocommissionmanyofitsarticlesratherthanreceiving 119 submissions ) should insist that insteadof relying on a few historical references from the recent past, its authors expand and enrich the historical content of their articles. Should these authorsbeunableor unwillingtodoso,FA shouldconsiderwhetherthey deserveavoiceinajournalofitsinfluenceandambitions.ToborrowSchroederswords, ThesignIamtryingtopostonhistoricalterrain...isnotKeepOffPrivateProperty 120 (which wouldbeabsurd) but ratherThin Ice. Aparticular pointfortheeditorsto addressinthiscontextistheensuringofaconsistentandreasonablebalanceofhistorical referenceswithrespecttoAsiaversustherestoftheworld. Second, as well asexpanding the breadth anddepth of historical references in its articles,FAshouldalsobemorerigorousinitsuseofhistorytoavoidthinice:itshould ensurethateacharticlemakesclearthatthehistoricalfactsbehindapolicyarticlefrom whichits authorsorganize andstylizefortheirownpurposesarehistoriansselections andconstructs.Thisisbecausemisfitleadingtomisuseorabuseoccurswhen[people] fail to understand or keep sufficiently in mind that the historical facts...are pieces of sculpture,anddonot work well asbuildingblocks. 121 Thismightbe most effectively donebyabriefreviewofthehistoriographyofthetopicinafootnoteorappendixtoeach article. Third, it would be a simple matter for FA to differentiate in its book reviews between IR books and History books as International Affairs does, and to increase the numberofhistoriansonitsBookReviewPanel.Currently,FAsunconsciousdisdainis
117 118

Seehttp://www.foreignaffairs.org/advertising/. Schlesinger,"Reviewof"'Lessons'ofthePast"."p.443.AlongwithNeustadt,in1986Maydelivereda seriesofspecificframeworksfordecisionmakerstobackuphissuggestionandtohelpthemmakebetter useofthepast.See:NeustadtandMay,ThinkinginTime.passim. 119 Finefrock,"PlayersOnly." 120 P. W. Schroeder, "History and International Relations Theory:NotUse or Abuse, butFit or Misfit," InternationalSecurity 22(1997).pp.713. 121 Ibid.,pages713.

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BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.1,2004 alltooevidentfromthefactthattheirBookReviewPanelhasfivepoliticalscientists,one War Studies specialist, a Law professor, two economists, and a single historian (a specialist on the Middle East) reviewing works of History under the rubric Recent BooksonInternationalRelations. IrecommendthesechangesinFAforthefollowingfourreasons. First, I demonstrated above that FA readers are decisionmakers in US foreign policy.AsJervissays,Adecisionmakerwhoseconceptualframeworkisdominatedby a few categories willfit events intothem quickly andonthebasisof little information. On the other hand, those who are familiar with multiple possibilities will be less 122 influencedbyanysinglehistoricalcase. Therefore,richerandbetteruseofhistoryin FA will make its readers less likely to be taken in by a single dominant (and perhaps mythic) version of history. To say this is simply to acknowledge that FA readers as decisionmakersareonlyhuman,whowilluseasmuch(oraslittle)historyasFAoffers them:Peoplelookforinformationwherethelightisbrightest...thedatathatanalystsand decisionmakersusearemoreoftendistinguishedbytheirreadyavailabilitythanbytheir 123 relationtothequestionsbeingasked. Second, as noted above, historical analogies are drawn upon most frequently and most poorly in crisis situations. Currently, FAs narrowness restricts The range and scope of a policymakers knowledge of history, and this knowledge therefore may well be limited to inappropriate analogies which will nevertheless constitute the sole 124 reservoirofintellectualcapitalhehastodrawupon. Third,whenmakingpolicy,bothtointerpretothersbehaviourandtodesignones ownsothatotherswillrespondasonewouldwish,onemustexaminetheworldthrough 125 avarietyofdifferentperspectives. Jervisalsowarnsthatitisparticularlydangerousto take important questions for granted and to have a limited understanding of the 126 workingsofothers arguments. And fourth, accordingtohistorians, history properly conceivedandusedexpandstherangesofexperiencefordecisionmakers,bothdirectly 127 andvicariously. Italsohonestheironicsensibilities,sothatonebecomesawarethat [history]isfilledwiththeunexpected,andthataninfinitevarietyofobscurerelationships arewovenintothepast... [italsoshows]howmeninteractwitheventsoverwhichthey 128 have limited control. Without thissensibility,FA readersnatural inclination willbe to draw upon what they think they know about that past, and pay more attention to what happened than to why it has happened...[making their learning from history] 129 superficial,overgeneralized,andbasedonposthocergopropterhocreasoning.

122 123

Jervis, PerceptionandMisperception.p.270. Jervis,"TheDrunkard'sSearch."p.358. 124 Vertzberger,"AppliedHistoryandItsShortcomings."p.241. 125 Jervis, PerceptionandMisperception.p.409. 126 Ibid.,p.410. 127 JohnLewisGaddis,"InDefenseofParticularGeneralization:RewritingColdWarHistory,Rethinking InternationalRelationsTheory,"inBridgesandBoundaries:Historians,PoliticalScientists,andtheStudy ofInternationalRelations(BcsiaStudiesinInternationalSecurity),ed.ColinElmanandMiriamFendius Elman(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,2001).p.326. 128 Gilbert,"InternationalRelationsandtheRelevanceofHistory."p.353. 129 Jervis, PerceptionandMisperception.p.294.

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BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.1,2004 AsJervissays,helpingdecisionmakersbemorethoughtfulwillnotsolveallour 130 problems,butneitherisitatrivialgoal. IfFA takesitsmissiontonotonlyinform 131 132 but also to guide US public opinion and policymakers, it should address the shortcomingsinitsuseofhistoryinpolicyarticleswhichmyresearchhasrevealed.For an organisation as conscious of its heritage as the CFR, its journal should be more consciousof History. Basedon my analysisofFAs historical references from 1965to 2000,ithasalongwaytogo. APPENDIXI:NOTESONMETHODOLOGYANDSEARCHRESULTS Introduction: ThisAppendixprovidesbothbackgroundanddetailconcerningtheresearchcarried out as described in this article. Section one of the Appendix covers the problems identifiedwithcertainsearchtermsandthechoicesmadeinordertoachievemeaningful results:SectiontwooftheAppendixholdstheresultsoftheresearch.TheTopTwenty th fiveresultsoverall,theTopTwentyfiveresultsforpre20 century references,theTop Twentyfive results for Asian references, and the Master historical reference list, are attached. Sectionone: In undertaking research across the selected population of FA issues (that is, 172 issues)anumberofproblemswereidentifiedwiththereferenceswhichwereculledfrom the initial review of thirtyfour issues. Decisions had to be made in order to achieve results that would be recreatable, justifiable and meaningful. This section sets out the problemsencountered andthedecisions takentoaddresstheproblems. I wasguidedin 133 generaltermsinthisprocessbytheadviceinTheoryandMethodsinPoliticalScience. 1. Proper names individuals: clearly, in research of this type proper names of individualsformagreatpartofthebodyoftermssearchedfor.Therearetwoclasses ofproblemassociatedwithpropernamesofindividuals:firstly,thenamesthemselves canrefertomorethanoneindividual.ReferencestoFordcanrefertoHenryorto Gerald.Insuchcases,searcheswerecarriedoutontheformofanindividualsname that was deemed to be most specific to him/her, e.g. Gerald Ford. Secondly, some individualsareroutinelyreferredtobyanyofanumberofcommonalternatives,e.g. President Kennedy, John F. Kennedy or JFK. Where these alternatives were all deemed to be specific enough that only the intended individual would be so designated,alltermsweresearchedon.

130 131

Holsti,"CognitiveProcessApproaches."p.184. Hendrickson,"ReviewEssayInquiringMinds."p.159. 132 Parmar,"TheIssueofStatePower."p.79. 133 MelvynReadandDavidMarsh,"CombiningQualitativeandQuantitativeMethods,"inTheoryand MethodsinPoliticalScience,ed.DavidMarshandGerryStoker(NewYork:PalgraveMacMillan,2002).

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BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.1,2004 2. Proper names individuals intheir ownright,versusplaces,prizes, etc named aftertheindividual:TocontinuewiththeKennedyexample,JFKcanreferbothto thepresidentandtotheairport.Insuchcasesaviewwastakenastowhether,inthe opinionofareasonableindividual,theterminquestionwasmorelikelytobeused,in this journal, to refer to the reference which was sought or to the accidental homonym, andthetermwaseitherused inordropped from thesearch accordingto thatlikelihood. 3. Propernamesplaces:Placenamesthatexistnowaswellasinthehistoricalpast werenotincludedinthesearchunlesstheirsignificancewasdeemedtobeprimarily historical. For example, determining whether London, Athens or Germany werebeingusedtorefertotheirhistoricalpastortotheirpresentwasimpossible,and suchplacenameswerenotincludedinthesearch.Munich,however,wasdeemed inthisjournaltobemorelikelytobeusedinreferencetotheeventsof1938thanto thepresentdaycity,andthetermwassearchedfor. 4. Continuous activity of an individual: in a few cases, figures of historical importance during the period investigated have continued to operate up until the present day, either in the same role throughout (e.g. Fidel Castro) or in different guises (e.g. Henry Kissinger Secretary of State author). References to such individuals were not sought, due to the difficulty of ascribing the reference to historicalorcontemporaryactivity.Theonlyexceptionto this wasPresident Carter, who was searched for only under this title. Poets, writers, philosophers, and economists were also removed from the list, because of the difficulty of knowing whetherareferencewasactuallyhistoricalortotheirworkandideas. 5. Longterm activity of an individual: as was explained above, a contemporary exclusion zone of five years was set from the date that an individual disappeared from the activepoliticalscene.Thisexclusionmay have meant thatsomebonafide historical references to individuals who had been active in different roles for some yearswerenotincluded.Forexample,areferencetoEisenhowersgeneralship,made within five years of the endof his presidency, would automatically be excludedby the terms of this research. Itwas deemed thatsuch exclusionswouldbe minimal in overallimpact. 6. Historical epochs: terms such as Reformation, Confederacy, or Terror could notbesearched for.Capitallettersasadistinguishingmarkindicatingthattheword in question referred to the historical epoch rather than an abstract noun were not recognisedbythesearchengine.NB:Thismayaccountforsomeoftheapparentbias th in thepre20 centuryreferences,whereinadisproportionatepercentageofOriental referenceswerefound(e.g.Han,Ming,Meiji)itispossiblethat,ifsuchcommonly used Western epoch names such as those above could have been searched on, the th percentage of Asian pre20 century references would be found to be as th (extraordinarily)lowasinthe20 Centuryreferences.

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BSISJournalofInternationalStudiesVol.1,2004 7. Commonlyusedwordsasnamesforparticularhistoricalpeople/events:Itproved impossibletosearchforsomehistoricalreferenceswithanycertaintythattheresults wouldrefertothatreferenceonly.Forexample:Enigma,Assassins. 8. Figuresofspeech/stylisticphrasing:authorswillsometimesuseRussianEmpire inaSovietcontext,orSungDynastytorefertothecurrentKoreanregime.Where confusionofthistypewasidentifiedadecisionwastakenonacasebycasebasisto droporincludetheresults,basedonthelikelihoodofoneortheothermeaningbeing ascribedtothewords. 9. ClassificationwithinFA:inninetysixpercentofcases,thesearchwillclearlyshow whetherareferenceoccurswithinanarticle,abookreview,orcorrespondence.Ina minority ofcasesthe issue inquestiondidnotmake thedistinction in itselectronic summary ofcontents, andall suchunclassified references were thereforedeemedto befromarticlesratherthanothersources. SectionTwo Belowisaselectionofsomeofthedataabouttheuseofhistoricalreferencesin FA 19652000thatmyresearchgenerated,fromwhichIdrawmyconclusions.

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