Journal of Strategic Studies

Bayonets on Musa Dagh: Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations - 1915

Edward J. Erickson

To cite this Article Erickson, Edward J.(2005) 'Bayonets on Musa Dagh: Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations - 1915',

Journal of Strategic Studies, 28: 3, 529 548

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The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 28, No. 3, 529 548, June 2005

Bayonets on Musa Dagh: Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations 1915

EDWARD J. ERICKSON
Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army (retired) ABSTRACT This article examines the Ottoman militarys escalatory response to violence and frames the Armenian insurrection of 1915 in the historical context of contemporary early twentieth-century counterinsurgency campaigns. A case study is presented, from a military historians perspective, of counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Ottoman Armys 41st Infantry Division against Armenian insurgents on Musa Dag (Musa Dagh) in an operational area south of Iskenderun (Alexandretta). In this particular operational area, it appears that the modern label which most closely approximates what happened there is ethnic cleansing. Finally, the article concludes with an objective assessment of the effectiveness of the Ottoman Armys counterinsurgency operations.

Introduction The most controversial issue in the history of the Ottoman war effort in the First World War is the events surrounding the massacre and deportation of the Armenian population of eastern Anatolia in 1915. Interpretations of what happened range from a total genocide to the simple movement of displaced persons.1 The modern Republic of Turkey stands accused of genocide denial while Armenian writers stand accused as Armenian Falsiers.2 There is almost no middle ground between these extreme positions and the emotional nature of the controversy makes objective dialogue and inquiry very difcult. This article examines the Ottoman militarys escalatory response to violence and frames the Armenian insurrection of 1915 in the historical context of contemporary early twentieth-century counterinsurgency
Correspondence Address: Edward Erickson, 133 North Broad St, Norwich, NY, 13815, USA. E-mail: eerick@norwich.net
ISSN 0140-2390 Print/ISSN 1743-937X Online/05/030529-20 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd DOI: 10.1080/01402390500137465

530 Edward J. Erickson campaigns. A case study is presented, from a military historians perspective, of counterinsurgency operations conducted by the Ottoman Armys 41st Infantry Division against Armenian insurgents on Musa Dag (Musa Dagh) in an operational area south of Iskenderun (Alexandretta). In this particular operational area, it appears that the modern label which most closely approximates what happened is ethnic cleansing. Finally, the article concludes with an objective assessment of the effectiveness of the Ottoman Armys counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgency and the Ottoman Army At the beginning of the twentieth century, de facto counterinsurgency doctrines were beginning to emerge based on the British Armys conduct of the Boer War, the German suppression of the Herero and the American occupation of the Philippines. The Ottoman Army itself had a long and difcult history of counterinsurgency in such widely separated theatres as Albania, Arabia, Armenia, Caucasia, Libya, Macedonia, Mesopotamia and Yemen. The American example was brutal in the extreme and, most famously, included the devastation of the island of Samar in 1901. On Samar, General Jacob H. Smith was in charge of a pacication campaign that included deportation, the burning of villages, the killing of captives and children, and the destruction of property, homes, crops and livestock.3 Smith operated under the aegis of General Arthur MacArthurs General Orders No. 100, which dated from the Civil War, and allowed commanders to treat partisans and guerrillas with summary imprisonment, deportation and execution.4 On Luzon and Mindanao, the pacication programs were less aggressive and were limited to actual anti-guerrilla operations as well as a civic improvements program. However, by late 1902, America had pacied the Philippines. The German experience in South-West Africa was, likewise, brutal in the extreme against the Herero people. The German colonial forces, the Schutztruppen, employed both genocide and famine in a ferocious campaign of suppression between 1904 and 1906.5 However, it was the British who established the modern principles (as they were in 1914) for the successful conduct of counterinsurgency operations. This stemmed from their successful operations in the Boer War after the defeat of the Boer conventional forces. As the Boer commandos began to conduct successful guerrilla operations, Field Marshal Lord Roberts turned to non-traditional tactics that revolved around separating the guerrillas from their source of supply, the Boer civilian population.6 In November 1901, Roberts army began to build a giant web of blockhouses connected by barbed wire to cordon off the

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations 1915 531 guerrillas. This forced the commandos into ever-smaller areas. Simultaneously, the Boer civilian population was deported from their homes to the worlds rst concentration camps to further isolate the Boer commandos and many of the homes, crops and livestock were destroyed as well. As an unfortunate, although unintended, consequence of the incarceration, thousands of Boer civilians died in captivity of disease and neglect. Finally, the British Army was organised into highly mobile columns, which conducted relentless search and destroy operations to hunt down the Boer commandos. Within a year, this multi-dimensional strategy forced the collapse of the Boer commandos. The Ottoman Army also waged very effective anti-guerrilla campaigns in its empire from the mid-1870s through 1912.7 The Ottoman Army tended to ruthlessly suppress rebellion within the empire; the Bulgarian Horror of 1876 and the Adana Massacre of 1909 were the most famous examples of this policy.8 In 1914, the Ottoman State was engaged in a counterinsurgency campaign in Yemen that had been active since 1911.9 The weak condition of Ottoman forces assigned there allowed the army to do little more than to hold the key cities and control the railway to the north.10 Occasionally, the army did assassinate insurgents and conduct search and destroy operations in Yemen, but it lacked the strength to bring operations there to a successful conclusion. To what extent these operations inuenced the Ottoman Armys counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics is problematic at the present time. However, it is a fact that the Ottoman Army used contemporary German manuals and publications in its training programs. It is also a fact that many Ottoman General Staff ofcers maintained an active interest in contemporary military affairs.11 Perhaps the most compelling evidence that the Ottomans maintained an interest in counterinsurgency may be found in the connection between German General Colmar von der Goltz and Ottoman Colonel Pertev.12 Pertev was a prote of von der Goltz and maintained an active corresponge dence with him after the Boer War in which they discussed operations and lessons learned.13 This ongoing relationship is described also in Pertevs biography of von der Goltz and reected the continuing interest that von der Goltz maintained in the Ottoman Army. Pertev was an ardent admirer of von der Goltz and was instrumental in assisting him to introduce many ideas concerning organisation and training into the Ottoman Army.14 It was through Pertev that many of von der Goltzs ideas about recent operations made their way into the minds of the Ottoman Armys ofcer corps.15 As far as is known today, the Ottoman War Academy did not include a distinct block of instruction on counterinsurgency operations in its

532 Edward J. Erickson curriculum.16 However, it is known from the memoirs of several ofcers that at least one instructor at the War Academy covertly lectured about counterinsurgency operations. Mustafa Kemal and his classmates wrote that Lieutenant Colonel Nuri Bey secretly gave a lecture about guerrilla warfare.17 Since many of the professional ofcers in the Ottoman Army served on active operations in the suppression of insurrections, both prior to and after their tours at the Ottoman War Academy, it is logical to believe that it was a topic of discussion in their studies there. In any case, by 1914 there was a considerable body of practical applications available concerning the suppression of insurgency. Moreover, the Western powers had set precedents in the use of extremely brutal operational methods, which included a variety of methods aimed at the civilian population. These methods included deportation, starvation, imprisonment and the destruction of property and livestock. The Ottoman Army was certainly aware of these precedents and had used many of them previously in its own counterinsurgency operations. Armenian Activities and the Ottoman Response Difculties with the Armenian population began in 1877 during the Russo-Turkish War and continued intermittently into 1914. Encouraged by the successful insurrections and independence of the Serbs, Bulgars and Greeks, dissident Armenian elements in the Ottoman Empire began to form revolutionary committees, both in secret and in public, a formula that had worked especially well for the Christian peoples in the Balkans. There were several outbreaks of Armenian violence before the First World War.18 These were the Sason Rebellion in 189496, the Ottoman Bank incident in Constantinople in 1895 and the Second Rebellion in 1908. These failed, but Albanian and Macedonian rebellions in 191112 encouraged further outbreaks of Armenian violence. Furthermore, continued oppression and the PanTurkic philosophies of Zia Gokalp further worried and inamed Armenian opinion. The author acknowledges that there is a much wider political and social context to the problem of Ottoman-Armenian relations; however, a fuller description of these perspectives is outside the scope of this article. In July 1914, the Ottoman Consulate in Kars intercepted a telegram outlining the smuggling of 400 ries into the Eliskirt valley.19 Other intercepted letters sent by the Dasnak Committee (predominant among the numerous Armenian nationalist committees of the time) requested weapons from the Russians. Also during the summer of 1914, the Armenian Committees conducted the important Erzurum Congress

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations 1915 533 under the leadership of the Dasnaks. Armenian representatives from every major eastern Anatolian city were present. Ostensibly conducted to peacefully advance Armenian concerns through legitimate means, the Ottomans regarded the Congress as the seedbed for later insurrection. It was here, the Ottomans were convinced, that strong Armenian-Russian links solidied into detailed plans and agreements aimed at the detachment of Armenia from the Ottoman Empire. By September the commander of the Erzurum Fortress received a report that the Armenian regiments in the Russian Army were mobilised and were conducting war-training exercises.20 Indicators of potential violent intent accumulated as Ottoman authorities found bombs and weapons hidden in Armenian homes. For example, the 4th Reserve Cavalry Regiment, patrolling from its lines in Koprukoy, discovered Russian ries cached in Armenian homes in Hasankale on 20 October, which were conscated.21 The tempo of army operations against Armenian dissidents accelerated. In early October 1914 (prior to the commencement of hostilities), the Ottoman Third Army was receiving reports of Armenians who were exRussian soldiers returning to Turkey with maps and money.22 There were reports from infantry battalions concerning Armenian meetings at which large numbers of aggressively nationalist people were gathering.23 In late October 1914, the Third Army staff informed the Ottoman General Staff that large numbers of Armenians with weapons were moving into Mus, Bitlis, Van and Erivan.24 Additionally disturbing to the military staffs at all levels was an increasing recognition that thousands of Armenian citizens were deliberately leaving their homes in Ottoman territory and travelling into Russianheld territory with most of their earthly possessions. Although Turkey was still ofcially at peace with Russia, many Ottoman ofcers were by now convinced that Russia was actively conspiring to foment an Armenian revolt. The situation went from bad to worse as Russia declared war on Turkey in November 1914. Throughout November, December and into January 1915, many similar reports to the Ottoman General Staff outlined the danger posed by armed Armenians in the Third and in the Fourth Army areas. Incidents of terrorism increased, particularly bombings25 and assassinations of civilians and local Ottoman ofcials.26 On 25 February 1915, a ciphered cable went from the Operations Division of the Ottoman General Staff to the First, Second, Third and Fourth Armies; the Irak Command; I, II, III, IV, V Army Corps; and to the Jandarma Command. The cable contained the chief of the Operations Divisions newly-issued Directive 8682 titled Increased Security Precautions.27 This directive noted increased dissident Armenian activity in Bitlis, Aleppo, Dortyol and Kayseri,

534 Edward J. Erickson and furthermore identied Russian and French inuence and activities in these areas. The Operations Division directed that the Third and the Fourth Armies increase surveillance and security measures. All recipients of the cable were instructed to increase coordination among themselves. Finally, the cable specically directed that any ethnic Armenian soldiers should be removed from Ottoman headquarters staffs and taken out of important Ottoman command centres. The nal measure contained in Directive 8682 was probably taken in response to a report from the Ministry of the Interiors Intelligence Division to the Ottoman General Staffs director of intelligence.28 In this report it was noted that the Armenian Patriarchate in Constantinople was transmitting military secrets and dispositions to the Russians. By mid-March 1915, the tactical situation in the Dogubeyazt-Van region had considerably worsened. Cevdet Bey, the governor of Van, reported numerous massacres of isolated Muslim villagers by armed groups of Armenian guerrillas.29 At this time, the staff of the Third Army was sufciently concerned over the possibility of armed insurrection that it began to shift Jandarma (Gendarmarie: a paramilitary internal security force) and army units into the area to meet the threat. By 25 March, the Van Jandarma Depot Battalion (augmented with artillery), the 17th and 28th Reserve Cavalry Regiments, and the 44th Infantry Regiment (a unit of the 1st Expeditionary Force) had been deployed into the Van region.30 The Armenian Rebellion It is difcult to pinpoint exactly when and where the rebellions broke out rst. Many Western writers and historians have concluded that the Ottomans themselves deliberately instigated the revolts by enforcing intolerable conditions on the Armenians.31 These acts included murder, rape and lesser humiliations, which served to provoke an Armenian reaction. The Turks dispute this and today claim that it was the Armenians, encouraged by the Russians and French in the aftermath of Sarikamis, who rst rose in revolt. Whether resistance or revolt, modern Turkish military histories claim that the real ghting began in the village of Satak (modern Catak, about 20 kilometres southeast of the city of Van), which by 15 April 1915 was completely cut off from the outside.32 In fact, armed revolts by the Armenians soon broke out in many areas of southeastern Anatolia. There is no question that the Russians supported the Armenians with money, weapons and encouragement.33 Four Druzhiny, or regiments of the Armenian National Council, were formed from enthusiastic volunteers, who were eager to invade the Ottoman Empire.34 The Ararat Unit was composed of the 2nd, 3rd

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations 1915 535 and 4th Druzhiny regiments and was assigned to capture the lakeside city of Van. The event most associated with the beginning of the rebellion occurred when insurgents seized most of Van in a erce attack on 14 April 1915.35 Venezuelan soldier of fortune Rafael De Nogales observed the battle for Van, which went on for two weeks, while ghting for the Ottomans as a mercenary in April 1915. De Nogales noted, Deputy to the Assembly from Erzerum, Garo Pasdermichan, passed over with almost all the Armenian troops and ofcers of the Third Army to the Russians, to return soon after, burning villages and mercilessly putting to the knife all of the peaceful Mussulman villagers that fell into their hands.36 He continued, the Armenians of the Vilayet of Van rose en masse. De Nogales was present for the siege of the city of Van itself and noted that the Armenians were heavily armed and fought with courage and determination.37 In late May 1915, Ambassador Morgenthau sent a condential report to Washington specically identifying additional areas in eastern Anatolia that contained armed Armenians (see Map 1).38 He noted that, Apart from the mountainous region in eastern Armenia, and the Zeitoun district, North of Alexandretta, the

MAP 1 AREAS OF INSURGENCY IDENTIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU, 25 MAY 1915

536 Edward J. Erickson Armenians no more than other dissatised communities, possess the means or determination to give expression to their wishes.39 Morgenthau went on to elaborate on the nature and the large scale of the insurrection: . . .it would seem as if an Armenian insurrection to help the Russians had broken out at Van. Thus a former deputy here, one Pastormadjian who had assisted our proposed railway concessions some years ago, is now supposed to be ghting with the Turks with a legion of Armenian volunteers. These insurgents are said to be in possession of a part of Van and to be conducting guerrilla warfare in a country where regular military operations are extremely difcult. To what extent they are organised or what successes they have gained it is impossible for me to say; their numbers have been variously estimated but none puts them at less than ten thousand and twenty-ve thousand is probably closer to the truth.40 Cumulatively, the Ottomans, the Russians, an independent Venezuelan observer and the American Ambassador in Constantinople indicated that a large number of Armenians, who possessed large numbers of weapons, revolted in the eastern provinces of Anatolia in support of a Russian offensive.41 This point is often overlooked in examinations of what happened to the Armenians in 1915. In any case, the Ottomans were unprepared for violence on this scale and did not have adequate forces in position to deal with the problem. In spite of months of tension the Ottoman Army was largely unprepared for outbreaks of violence on the scale of the Van rebellion. There were pitched battles between the insurgents and the Jandarma, the Ottoman Armys paramilitary irregular units and the few regular army units in the area. Beginning in mid-April, the Ottoman General Staff began to shift reinforcements into the region. In order to suppress the insurgents at Van, for example, the Ottoman General Staff was forced to divert the First Expeditionary Force (a full army division equivalent) from the front where it was needed against the Russians.42 The ghting spread largely southwest and northwest from the epicentre at Van. Donald Bloxham has characterised the Ottoman states political response in this period as genocidal and moving from regional measures to general policy.43 Likewise, the development of the Ottoman General Staffs military policy toward the Armenian rebellion can be characterised as moving from a localised response to a general counterinsurgency campaign. Over a three-month period, MayJuly 1915, the Ottomans deployed substantial forces into the region to conduct a sustained counterinsurgency campaign. The

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations 1915 537 operations of the Ottoman Armys 41st Infantry Division near Alexandretta provide a case study of how the army transitioned from a condition of unreadiness to participation in a full-blown counterinsurgency campaign. Early Operations 41st Infantry Division On 4 August 1914, the Ottoman General Staff ordered the organisation of the Halep Jandarma division as a part of the ongoing military mobilisation of the armed forces in Halep (Aleppo).44 This divisions 1st, 2nd and 3rd Provisional Regiments were composed of battalions of the professional eld gendarmarie (seyyar jandarma). The men were trained to military standards and were armed and equipped like the active Ottoman Army. On 16 October, the jandarma division was deactivated and its regiments transferred elsewhere. However, a provisional infantry division was maintained in its place and it was assigned the depot battalions of the 72nd, 76th and 78th Infantry Regiments. In this reduced role it continued to conduct military training for new conscripts that included marching, marksmanship and manoeuvres.45 In effect, from mid-October 1914 through mid-April 1915, there were no Ottoman Army combat units (of battalion-size or larger) in northern Syria and the Alexandretta area (modern Iskenderun), capable of either coastal defence or counterinsurgency operations. On 9 April 1915, the provisional division was reorganised and was activated as the regular Ottoman Armys 41st Infantry Division, composed of the 131st, 132nd and 133rd Infantry Regiments.46 These three regiments were built around the nucleus of the depot battalions and were made up of reservists and recruits. The new infantry division was assigned a tactical area (named the Iskenderun Bolgesi or the Alexandretta Area) within the Ottoman Fourth Armys area of operations. Cemal Pasa commanded the Fourth Army and was responsible for road, area and coastal security operations, as well as the operational front along the Suez Canal.47 Lieutenant Colonel Huseyin Husnu Abdullah commanded the division, which was given the mission of coastal and area defence for Iskenderun and the coast, and road security against bandits and insurgent Armenians.48 Colonel Huseyin assigned the 131st and 132nd Infantry Regiments to internal security duties in Zeytin (Zeitoun) and Urfa (Sanliurfa) and the 133rd Infantry Regiment to coastal defence duties near Iskenderun (Alexandretta). The activation of the 41st Infantry Division was taken in reaction to a pattern of dissident Armenian and allied naval activity in the Iskenderun area. As early as October 1914, the British consul at Aleppo

538 Edward J. Erickson noted that all the Christians sympathise with England and France and would welcome with joy a swift British or even French occupation.49 Armenian groups of the region were in contact with the allies in November 1914 and had volunteered to support a possible disembarkation at Alexandretta, Mersina or Adana and, moreover, promised valuable assistance could also be provided by the Armenians of mountainous districts, who, if supplied with arms and ammunition, would rise against Turkey.50 In December 1914, there was also an increase in allied naval activity and British landing parties were gleefully greeted by Armenians.51 Numerous naval bombardments also contributed to the overall picture of impending intervention and insurgency.52 In particular, the city of Dortyol was of particular concern to the Ottoman Army General Staff, which sent out warning messages outlining insurgent activity and subversive coordination with the allies in Dortyol, Bitlis and Halep.53 Despite the threat and importance of its ongoing missions, the 41st Infantry Division was ordered to send two infantry battalions (of nine in the division) to assist in training the newly formed 53rd Infantry Division. Moreover, the Ottoman General Staff ordered the division to send the 2nd Battalion, 131st Infantry Regiment and the 3rd Battalion, 132nd Infantry Regiment to Iraq to reinforce the faltering military situation there.54 These battalions never returned to their parent division and the 41st Infantry Division was forced to activate two provisional infantry battalions of poorly-trained recruits and reservists to replace them. The division also had a small eld artillery force assigned to support its infantry, which was composed of a battery from the 22nd Mountain Artillery Regiment and a battery from the 35th Artillery Regiment.55 Finally, the Ottoman General Staff assigned an irregular volunteer cavalry troop to the division for reconnaissance and security operations (Humus Gonullu Suvari Bolugu).56 In comparison with other Ottoman Army infantry divisions, the 41st Infantry Division was under-equipped with artillery, engineers and medical support. Moreover its infantry battalions were 20 per cent under strength and contained numbers of older reservists.57 This reected the overall low priority given to the Ottoman Fourth Army by the General Staff. As the Armenian insurgency increased in scale and spread southward, the 41st Infantry Division found itself being drawn into the conict. Within the divisions tactical area, Armenian insurrections broke out in the mountainous areas near Maras and Urfa in June and July of 1915. Cemals Fourth Army staff believed that the Urfa insurgency was instigated and supported by the French.58 To better accommodate this expanding mission, Cemal modied the tactical areas of his army by tailoring them to better t the reported threats of insurgency.59 The 41st Infantry Division was assigned a revised tactical

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations 1915 539 area known as the IInci Bolge (Second Area) and a new commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mehmet Emin.60 The new tactical area was smaller than the Iskenderun Bolgesi and coincided very closely with the areas identied by Ambassador Morgenthau in May (see Map 2).61 On 29 July 1915, the 1st Battalion, 133rd Infantry Regiment was sent to Antep (Gaziantep) to ght insurgents.62 The 132nd Infantry Regiment (composed of three infantry battalions) was ordered, likewise, to suppress ve hundred Armenian guerrillas (cete) near Zeytin.63 The town of Zeytin itself was a hotbed of insurgent activity and in the words of American consul and missionary Reverend J.E. Merrill, it is said that there were thirty-seven previous attempts at rebellion and this time the place was provisioned for it.64 Merrill continued and conrmed guerrilla activity by noting that a real danger of attacks by Armenian outlaws on Mohammadan refugees who have replaced Armenian villagers in Zeitoun existed in the region. The ght to subdue Zeytin was costly and was only resolved by a direct assault on the town.65 On 30 July 1915, the 3rd Battalion, 131st Infantry Regiment was sent to Antakya (Antioch) where it went into action against 500600 insurgents.66 The Ottoman battalion went into action against

MAP 2 SECOND OPERATIONAL AREA 41ST INFANTRY DIVISION, JULY 1915

540 Edward J. Erickson insurgents who had constructed a well-built trench system. The Armenian fortications were so strong that they fell only to a direct bayonet assault, in which the battalion lost four killed and 18 wounded. Contemporary Ottoman observers also noted that the only way to rout out the rebels was at the point of a bayonet.67 These operations in Antep, Zeytin and Antakya were characterised by direct assaults on known points of Armenian resistance. Operations on Musa Dag One of the most famous engagements of the Armenian Rebellion occurred southwest of Antioch on Musa Dag (or Musa Dagh), a mountain in modern Hatay province.68 In military terms, the Musa Dag engagements provide a detailed exposition of the Ottoman Armys application of counterinsurgency warfare. The battle was immortalised in Franz Werfels novel titled The Forty Days of Musa Dagh.69 Although a work of historical ction, Werfel based his book on interviews with survivors and much of his contextual information is very specic and therefore probably accurate. Using information from Werfels book and Ottoman sources it is possible to examine the Ottoman military response on Musa Dag at the tactical level. The Armenians on Musa Dag lived in six villages and numbered about 5,500 inhabitants, of whom 1,556 were males over 14 years of age.70 According to Werfel, they had initially 50 Mauser ries and 250 Greek military ries, which were carefully buried and hidden in graves until they were needed.71 The Armenians on Musa Dag organised themselves into three main divisions; a ghting-formation; a big reserve, and a cohort of youth.72 The ghting men numbered 860 t Armenian males, the reserve was composed of 1,100 older or unt men, and there were 300 boys, who were used as scouts.73 Werfel noted that every ghting man had either a military rie (of which there were 300) or a hunting rie. Sixty Armenian deserters from the Ottoman Army soon joined the insurgents. They and the men of the area, many of whom had served in the army (some were combat veterans of the Balkan Wars), trained the Armenian villagers in ghting methods. The Armenians used their time well as the Ottomans began to move their thinly stretched combat forces into the area. By mid-July, the Armenians were hard at work fortifying their villages and the entire population was put to work in this endeavour.74 This involved the digging of trenches, the clearing of elds of re, and the emplacement of obstacles including thorny scrub. Positions were also prepared in the high mountains into which the villagers could retreat. Sentries were posted along the likely avenues of approach to alert the defenders to the approach of the Ottomans.75

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations 1915 541 On 7 August 1915, the 41st Infantry Division began its counterinsurgency operations against the Armenian villages on the mountain of Musa Dag. The daily war diary of the 41st Infantry Division on that day reported that many Armenian children had joined in the ghting as had numbers of Armenian deserters from the Ottoman Army.76 There was sporadic ghting for several days as the Ottomans marshalled their forces and attempted to locate and x the points of resistance. Werfel described the rst encounter at the village of Bitias in which 400 Ottoman soldiers conducted a poorly-coordinated frontal attack on the well-camouaged and well-entrenched Armenians (also numbering 400 in two trench lines).77 The over-condent Ottomans were routed and the Armenians captured numbers of Ottoman ries, which were left on the eld. However, once the Ottomans were alerted to the strength of defences and the determination of defenders they immediately changed their tactics. The Ottomans soon identied the location of the Armenian defences and manoeuvred around the village, making the position untenable for its defenders.78 The Armenians were pushed southeast and 1st and 2nd Battalions, 131st Infantry Regiment (altogether about 870 trained infantrymen) began a large operation against insurgent Armenians in the village of Haccbl Koyu on 9 August.79 In the village were some 1,5001,800 Armenians, heavily armed and determined to resist.80 This time, the two Ottoman battalions conducted better reconnaissance and carefully encircled the village. The regimental commander then brought up his artillery. After a brief bombardment, the Ottomans assaulted and carried the village with a bayonet attack. More than 1,000 weapons of various types were found in the village (while this number of weapons seems unusually large it conforms to Werfels descriptions). The survivors and their families were rounded up and sent into temporary camps for movement out of the area. The regiment received congratulations from the corps commander for its victory.81 On 13 August 1915, the 41st Infantry Division received orders to take several villages in the sector and to disarm the remaining Armenian villagers who lived there. Preparation and movement for these operations went on for several days and by 15 August, the division had encircled the village of Ermeni Koyu.82 The villagers refused to disarm themselves and the division was forced to assault the village. Ermeni Koyu was taken on the next day and also produced large numbers of captured weapons. This battle was described in Werfel as occurring on 14 August at the North and South Bastions and, moreover, he noted that the Ottoman force again split into two divisions of equal strength supported by artillery.83 Clearly, the Ottomans learned quickly to respect their enemy and adjusted their tactics accordingly. In these operations, the 131st Infantry Regiment

542 Edward J. Erickson lost six men killed, 26 men wounded and had 25 men missing in action.84 The regiment reported the expenditure of 20,353 rie bullets, 30 shrapnel shells, 47 high explosive shells, and also reported the loss of eight ries and three pistols.85 These operations illustrate that the 41st Infantry Division understood the importance of isolating and sealing the insurgents inside their villages. Five days later, the local Armenians ed their villages, which had become death traps, and moved into the high mountains. In two more days of search and destroy operations (1819 August), nine insurgents were killed. On 20 August 1915, the division reported that no Armenians remained in nearby Antakya.86 After an operational pause, the 41st Infantry Division began pursuit operations and again went into action against the Canakkale Armenians (Canaklk Ermeniler) near the summit of Musa Dag on 31 August.87 Fighting was heavy and resulted in the fall of the mountain. Pursuit operations were renewed against the eeing survivors. The division war diary for August 1915 noted that the Armenians had paid bandit gangs (of actual criminals) to ght against the army.88 Furthermore, the diary noted that many older Armenians were responsible for the coordination of joint guerrilla operations between the Armenian villages. In the minds of the Ottomans, when combined with the active participation of children as ghters, this appeared as evidence of an insurgency that was widely supported by the Armenian population. In spite of these volatile issues, the Fourth Army continued to coordinate the evacuation the surviving Armenians from the area of operations.89 There were reports of atrocities committed against the Armenians, which were received and investigated by the 41st Infantry Division. Reports reached the division on 13 August 1915 that severe unprovoked massacres of Armenians had occurred near Musa Dag.90 The division also received a report on 15 August of a massacre of over 30 Armenians in Alaaddn Koyu. A detachment was sent there to investigate and conrmed that the village was burnt.91 Moreover, the detachment found seven burnt bodies as well and made a complete report to the XII Corps headquarters. These reports, as well as others from throughout Anatolia, resulted in a three-member commission being dispatched in the fall of 1915 to investigate reports of atrocities and abuses against the Armenians.92 Operations continued against insurgent Armenians in September 1915. On 7 September, the division reported its concern about French agents who were in contact with the insurgent groups. The agents had come ashore from French naval vessels, which included the French battleship Victor Hugo.93 The division staff of the 41st Infantry Division was very concerned about the possibility of the Armenians

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations 1915 543 insurgents supporting a French amphibious landing in the Gulf of Iskenderun.94 However, the anticipated landing never occurred, although a number of French naval demonstrations were staged in the gulf, including the evacuation of some of the survivors of Musa Dag by the French cruisers Guichen and Jeanne d Arc.95 Mid-September saw an increase in the tempo of operations against Armenians in the Urfa area as the Fourth Army was forced to send in reinforcements to assist the 41st Infantry Division. The 3rd Battalion, 130th Infantry Regiment was dispatched from the 23rd Infantry Division in Syria, arriving in Urfa on 30 September 1915.96 In its largest battle against the insurgents on 18 October, this battalion suffered 13 men killed and 31 ofcers and men wounded.97 A second battalion from the 23rd Infantry Division joined the counterinsurgency campaign on 28 October and was deployed to ght guerrillas around the city of Tarsus. By late fall 1915, the 41st Infantry Division gained the upper hand on the insurgency in its sector of responsibility and combat operations drew down by November 1915.98 The 41st Infantry Division remained on coastal and internal security duties in the Iskenderun vicinity for the remainder of the war. The division survived the war to become a part of the postwar Ottoman Army and it later fought in the National War of Liberation. Conclusions In the 41st Infantry Divisions tactical area in 1915, the Ottoman Army fought a very successful counterinsurgency campaign against Armenian guerrillas and insurgents. It appears from the records examined in this study that the division was ordered to eliminate rebellious activity in its assigned operational area. There is no indication that the division received orders for the general killing of the Armenian population. Nevertheless, the 41st Infantry Division eradicated the insurgency in its sector by killing or displacing the majority of the local Armenian population and, as a matter of historical fact, by 1916 literally no Armenians remained in the 41st Infantry Divisions tactical area. A modern label associated with operations of this severity and magnitude is ethnic cleansing. At the operational level, the Fourth Army assigned the division a tactical area that clearly dened its mission and its responsibilities. Although the division was under strength in infantry and artillery, it aggressively executed its assignment by bringing the ght to its enemy. The division employed contemporary counterinsurgency tactics that included the encirclement and destruction of insurgents in villages, search and destroy missions to isolate and destroy guerrillas in

544 Edward J. Erickson mountainous terrain, and weapons searches and conscation. Often these tactics resulted in the destruction of Armenian villages and were accompanied by large numbers of insurgent casualties. Objectively, however, these tactics seem to have resulted from the necessity to clear nests of resistance with the bayonet. It must be noted that, when incidents of the deliberate massacre of Armenians were reported, the division investigated the circumstances and submitted reports to the Fourth Army. Within six months, the 41st Infantry Division completed its mission and restored stability and civil order to its assigned area. Other Ottoman Army infantry divisions participated in counterinsurgency operations against the Armenians in tactical areas to the north (the 36th Infantry Division) and the northwest (the 44th Infantry Division) of the 41st Infantry Division. These divisions produced similar successful results.99 In terms of how the armies of the day dealt with counterinsurgency, the Ottoman Army employed a very conventional approach that reected contemporary Western de facto doctrines. Although overshadowed by the horror of the Armenian massacres and deportations, the Ottoman Army was arguably very effective in its counterinsurgency campaign against the Armenian insurgency in 1915. NOTES
1 The most widely accepted view outside Turkey is that the insurgency was a purely defensive, and spontaneous, resistance to Ottoman oppression and deportation. 2 There is an entire genre of literature presenting extreme viewpoints associated with this subject. Recent examples of books that present extreme cases are: Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris, The Armenian Genocide and Americas Response (NY: HarperCollins 2003) and Turkkaya Ataov (ed.), The Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period (Ankara: The Turkish Historical Society Printing House 2001). 3 Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defence, A Military History of the United States of America (NY: The Free Press 1984) p.295. Smiths nickname was Hell roarin Jake. 4 Ibid. 5 Hew Strachan, The First World War, Volume I: To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001) p.496. Genocide as a term had not come into usage so the use of the term by this scholar may be ahistorical. 6 Thomas Packenham, The Boer War (NY: Random House 1979) pp.56683. 7 Edward J. Erickson, Defeat in Detail, The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 19121913 (Westport, CT: Praeger 2003) pp.211, 3744, 515. 8 Ibid. 9 T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlg, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Turk Harbi, VInc Cilt, Hicaz, Asir, Yemen Cepheleri ve Libya Harekat 19141918 (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basmevi 1978) pp.41316. 10 Ibid. pp.12544.

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations 1915 545

11 See Erickson, Defeat in Detail (note 7) pp.1115, 589, for discussions of German inuence and training. 12 Pertev (later Pertev Demirhan) was a graduate of the War Academy and an Ottoman General Staff Ofcer. During the Balkan Wars, Pertev served as the Chief of Operations of the Ottoman General Staff. 13 Feroz Yasamee, Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the Boer War, in Keith Wilson (ed.), The International Impact of the Boer War (London: Acumen 2001) pp.193210. Later during the Russo-Japanese War of 190405, Pertev served as a military observer and sent combat reports directly to von der Goltz. 14 Erickson, Defeat in Detail (note 7) pp.2433. 15 Pertev Demirhan, Generalfeldmarschall Colmar von der Goltz: Das Lebensbild eines grossen Soldaten (Gottingen: Gottinger Verlagsanstalt 1960) pp.7491. 16 Authors correspondence with Dr Mesut Uyar (Captain, Turkish Army), Director of Archives, Turkish Military Academy, Ankara, Turkey, 24 Sept. 2004. Dr Uyar attributes this to the fact that all news of counterinsurgency operations was suppressed during the reign of Abdulhamid. 17 Yavuz Abadan, Mustafa Kemal ve Cetecilik (Istanbul: Varlk Kitabevi 1972) pp.247; Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Snf Arkadasm Ataturk (Istanbul: Kanaat 1996) pp.536; Asm Gunduz, Hatralarm (Istanbul: Kervan Kitapclk 1973) pp.1922. Mustafa Kemal attended the Ottoman War Academy from 190205. 18 T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlg, Turk Silahl Kuvvetleri Tarihi, IIIncu Cilt, 5nci Ksm (1793 1908), (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basmevi 1978) pp.597606. 19 Muammer Demirel, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Erzurum ve Cevresinde Ermeni Hareketleri (19141918) (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basmevi, 1996) p.17. 20 Ibid. Even though Russia was already at war with the Central Powers, the Ottomans were very disturbed by the mobilisation of Armenians on the Russian side of the frontier. 21 Ibid. pp.1718. 22 Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etut, Ankara, Turkey (ATASE), Headquarters, Third Army, Report on Criminal Activity, 8 Oct. 1914, Archive 2818, Record 59, File 225. 23 ATASE, Report from Hudut Battalion to Headquarters, IX Corps, 22 Oct. 1914, Archive 2818, Record 59, File 239. 24 ATASE, Headquarters, Third Army Report to Acting Commander-in-Chief, 23 Oct. 1914, Archive 2818, Record 59, File 141, 142. 25 Kamuran Gurun, Ermeni Dosyasi (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basmevi 1983). Included in this book are numerous reports sent to the Ottoman General Staff and the Ministry of Defence from the Third and Fourth Army commanders. 26 ATASE, Headquarters, V Corps Report, 25 Feb. 1915, on the bombing incident in Ankara, Archive 2287, Record 32, File 8. 27 ATASE, First Division, Ottoman General Staff cable, 25 Feb. 1915, Archive 2287, Record 32, File 9. 28 ATASE, Special ciphered correspondence No. 2086, Chief, Second Division, Ministry of the Interior to Chief, Second Division, Ottoman General Staff, 31 Jan. 1915, Archive 2029, File 2. 29 T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlg, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Turk Harbi Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekat Cilt I (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basmevi 1993) pp.5878. 30 Ibid. p.588. 31 For varied commentary see Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis (NY: Charles Scribners Sons 1931); Vahakn N. Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conict (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers 1999); Richard G. Hovannisian (ed.), Remembrance and Denial (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press 1998); Alan Moorehead,

546 Edward J. Erickson

Gallipoli (NY: Harper & Row 1956); and Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthaus Story (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Press 1918). Genelkurmay Baskanlg, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekat (note 29) p.591. W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battleelds, A History of the Wars on the TurcoCaucasian Border, 18281921 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1953) pp.242, 299 301. Michael A. Reynolds, The Ottoman-Russian Struggle for Eastern Anatolia and the Caucasus, 19081918: Identity, Ideology and the Geopolitics of World Order, unpublished PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2003, p.206. Genelkurmay Baskanlg, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekat (note 29) p.591. Rafael De Nogales, Four Years Beneath the Crescent (NY: Charles Scribners Sons 1926) p.45. Ibid. pp.7397. Although the Ottoman Army employed De Nogales, as a Christian, he was much in sympathy with the Armenians. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland, Morgenthau to the Secretary of State, 25 May 1915, RG 353 (Internal Affairs, Turkey), Roll 41. Ibid. p.2. Ibid. p.3. The author recognises that some scholars question De Nogales and Morgenthau as reliable sources. However, in this context, their information reinforces Ottoman and Russian reports. Genelkurmay Baskanlg, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncu Ordu Harekat (note 29) pp.5917. Donald Bloxham, The Armenian Genocide of 19151916: Cumulative Radicalisation and the Development of a Destruction Policy, Past and Present 181 (2003) pp.14191. ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarhcesi, 3, (unpublished staff study) Stk Atamer, 1969, ATASE Record 26344. Ibid. p.3. Ibid. p.4. T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlg, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Turk Harbi, IVncu Cilt nci Ksm, Sina-Filistin Cephesi, Harbin Baslangncndan Ikinci Gazze Muharebeleri Sonuna Kadar (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basmevi 1979) p.288. The four other tactical areas in Cemals Fourth Army were the Birinci, Ikinci, Cebelilubnan Kylar and the Akka-Hayfa-Yafa (First, Second, Lebanon Mountain and Haifa-Jaffa). Fahri Belen, Birinci Cihan Harbinde, Turk Harbi, 1918 Yl Hareketleri, Vnci Cilt (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basmevi 1967) p.248. The National Archives (TNA), Kew, Mallet to Edward Grey, 14 Oct. 1914, FO 438/3, 59458. TNA, Cheetham to Edward Grey, 12 Nov. 1914. Boghos Nubar, an inuential Armenian leader, presented this idea in Cairo to the British. FO 438/4, 70404. Bloxham, The Armenian Genocide of 19151916 (note 43) pp.1746. Professor Bloxham also noted that a British landing party blew up a strategically important railway bridge on 18 Dec. 1914. _ _ T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlg, Harp Mntakalar, Sehir ve Kasabalarn Isgal, Istirdat ve Bombardman Tarihleri (Ankara: Genelkurmay Matbaas 1937) p.54. Between 12 Feb. and 19 Aug. 1915, Iskenderun was bombarded four times, Mersin twice, and Dortyol, Tarsus and Adana once each. ATASE, Directive 8682, Chief, Operations Division, OGS to armies, 25 Feb. 1915, Archive 2287, Record 32, File 9. ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarhcesi, p.4. Genelkurmay Baskanlg, Sina-Filistin Cephesi, Harbin Baslangncndan Ikinci Gazze Muharebeleri Sonuna Kadar (note 47) p.282.

32 33

34

35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

48 49 50 51

52

53 54 55

Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations 1915 547

56 Ibid. 57 T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlg, Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri Tarihi Osmanli Devri Birinci Dunya Harbi Idari Faaliyetler ve Lojistik, Xncu Cilt (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basmevi 1985) pp.213 14. 58 T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlg, Sina-Filistin Cephesi, Harbin Baslangncndan Ikinci Gazze Muharebeleri Sonuna Kadar (note 47) p.332. Thus to the Ottomans, the Armenian rebellion appeared to be an Entente orchestrated affair with the Russians supporting Armenian insurgents in northeast Anatolia and the French supporting Armenian insurgents in southeast Anatolia. 59 Ibid., Kroki (Overlay) 17. _ _ 60 Ismet Gorgulu, On Yllk Harbin Kadrosu 19121922, Balkan-Birinci Dunya-Istiklal Harbi, (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurum Basmevi 1993) p.141. Mehmet Emins chief-of-staff was Major Mumtaz. 61 The city of Adana and 200 kilometres of coastline were transferred to the newly-activated 44th Infantry Division. 62 ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarhcesi, p.5. 63 Ibid. Depending upon the context, cete may be translated as guerrilla, bandit or insurgent. 64 NARA, Letter from American Consul, Aleppo to Morgenthau, 14 June 1915, RG 353 (Internal Affairs, Turkey), Roll 41. 65 Ali Fuat Erden, Suriye Hatralar (Istanbul: Kultar Yaynlar 2003) pp.1445. 66 ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarhcesi, p.5. 67 Erden (note 65) p.146. 68 The Musa Dag mountain is in actuality a rugged extended area covering over 250 square kilometres. 69 Franz Werfel, The Forty Days of Musa Dagh, trans. Geoffrey Dunlop (NY: Viking Press 1934). 70 Ibid. p.166. 71 Ibid. p.225. 72 Ibid. p.239. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. pp.2424. 75 Ibid. 76 ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarhcesi, 6. This corroborates Werfels information. 77 Werfel (note 69) pp.32430. Werfel describes this battle as occurring on 4 Aug., but Turkish sources place it on 7 Aug. 78 Ibid. 79 ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarhcesi, p.6. The two Ottoman infantry battalions were authorised almost 2,000 men on paper. However, at this time the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 131st Infantry Regiment were operating at less than half of their authorised strength or 44% of their required personnel. This reected the low priority of units operating in this theatre of operations. 80 Ibid. p.6 81 The division was then assigned to the Ottoman XII Corps, which was commanded by Fahri Pasa. 82 Ibid. p.7. 83 Werfel (note 69) pp.36575. 84 ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarhcesi, p.8. 85 Ibid.

548 Edward J. Erickson

86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. p.9. Evidently, this particular group of Armenians originated from the Gallipoli peninsula. 88 Ibid. 89 T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlg, Birinci Dunya Harbinde Turk Harbi, Sina-Filistin Cephesi, IV Cilt, 2nci Kisim, Ikinci Gazze Muharebesi Sonundan Mondros Mutarekesine Kadar Yapilan Harekat, 21 Nisan 191730 Ekim 1918, (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basmevi 1986) pp.698704. See Logistics and Support, Armenian Problems. 90 ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarhcesi, p.7. 91 Ibid. 92 ATASE, Jandarma Headquarters to the Ministry of War, 26 Sept. 1915, Archive 2287, Record 13, File 3. 93 ATASE, 41nci Piyade Tumen Tarhcesi, p.9. 94 Ibid. 95 Werfel (note 69) pp.77590. 96 ATASE, 23ncu Piyade Tumen Tarhcesi, p.24, (unpublished staff study) Sek Mete, undated, ATASE Record 26412. 97 Ibid. p.25. 98 T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanlg, Sina-Filistin Cephesi, Kroki (Overlay) (note 58) p.55. 99 Ibid. p.282.

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