Cardiff University

France: Corruption as Resentment Author(s): Vincenzo Ruggiero Reviewed work(s): Source: Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 23, No. 1, The Corruption of Politics and the Politics of Corruption (Mar., 1996), pp. 113-131 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Cardiff University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1410470 . Accessed: 02/03/2012 04:12
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Blackwell Publishing and Cardiff University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Law and Society.

http://www.jstor.org

OF JOURNAL LAWANDSOCIETY 1996 VOLUME NUMBER MARCH 1, 23,

ISSN: 0263-323X,pp. 113-131

as France:Corruption Resentment
VINCENZO RUGGIERO* Corruption will be defined here as occurring when one or more actors involved in, or witnessing corrupt exchange have reasons for resentment and therefore permit corruption to come to light. This thesis will be elaborated and critiqued with respect to recent episodes of political, administrative, and economic corruption occurring in France. The adoption of this framework

of analysisis not a short-cutwhichsparesthe authorthe customary'review on of the literature' the subjectmatter.Rather, it is an implicitrefutation of some of the views includedin that literature,in particularthose which and suchas economicunderdevelopment with variables associatecorruption as The social backwardness.1 choice of the formula'corruption resentment' permitsthe explorationof how corruptexchangealso takes place in highly In a previousarticle,wherethe authorcouldnot escapethe painfulexercise of a review of the literature,corruptionwas analysedwith a view to uncoveringsome aspectsof victimizationcaused by it.2 It was arguedthat a numberof actors, endowedwith varyingdegreesof resourcesand power, optical illuparticipatein corruptexchange,and that only a deeply-rooted sion enablesus to see these exchangesas victimless.Withoutanalysingwhy corruptionoccurs,in that articlethe attemptwas madeto show why, when, and for whom it is harmful.In a similarvein, this articledoes not propose an aetiologicalview:here, the existenceof corruptionis treatedas a given, how it is perceived.In otherwords,an while questionsare posed regarding ratherthan of its 'true' explanationis attemptedof its publicmanifestation, prevalence,of its very definitionas corruption,ratherthan of its causes. This avenuehas also been taken by other authors:'scandal,like treason, This is to say that abuseof power, only existswhensomethinggoes wrong'.3 governmentalmalpractice,and incompetenceonly emerge when they are
* Reader, Faculty of Social Science, Middlesex University, Queensway, Enfield EN3 4SF, England
This articleis based on researchconductedin Francein 1995. The research consistedof a and numberof interviews collectivediscussionscarriedout withjudges and journalists.For I and the information contactsprovidedduringthe courseof the research, am indebtedto the
Syndicat de la Magistrature and to Laurent Joffrin of Le Nouvel Observateur.

developed and advanced social contexts.

113
? Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 238 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA

exposed. However, when this avenue has been explored, the emergence of corruption and its concealment have mainly been associated with, respectively, the efficacy or lack of scrutiny of political and economic power. This perspective appears to entail that there would be less corruption if some actors - usually the judiciary, the media, and the public - exerted stricter control over others - usually politicians and entrepreneurs.4In the following pages, the emphasis will be placed on the interactions between these actors and, crucially, on the resentment that corrupt behaviour produces in some of them, a resentment which translates into the exposure of that behaviour and its definition as corrupt. A related assumption to this approach is that corrupt activities, albeit unorthodox or even illegal, may be tolerated when they appear to generate benefits for all those participating in or witnessing them. Resentment, and therefore corruption, emerge when these activities are no longer perceived as generating acceptable benefits for everyone; or when the previous role division, and the related expectations, are no longer accepted. In some cases, which will be mentioned later, some of the actors involved may find the 'diseconomies' of corrupt exchange too heavy to endure, and begin to perceive that exchange as tantamount to extortion. In the present article politicians, entrepreneurs, judges, and the media are identified as the main actors contributing to the definition of certain behaviours as corrupt. It is in the light of the interactions taking place between these actors, which periodically oscillate between mutual acceptance and competition, that corrupt exchange in France is examined. In the first part of this article, some characteristics of the French political apparatus are sketched which may help locate corrupt exchange in the national context. The actors of corrupt exchange and their interactions are the focus of the second part of the article, while the emergence of resentment among some of them forms the third part. The institutional responses to this resentment form the last section, while a brief conclusion tries to clarify the reasons for the exclusion of 'public opinion' from the dynamics described.

MONTESQUIEU VERSUS ROBESPIERRE? French republicanism, and indeed the 'corruption of the Republic', are often examined against the analytical framework provided by one of the most celebrated fathers of political philosophy.5 The emphasis on Montesquieu's view that the republic is based on virtue leads some commentators to claim that contemporary France, where many of its political representatives are deemed far from virtuous, is no longer a republic. However, the resort to the political philosophy of Montesquieu appears to rest on a one-sided interpretation of his thought. In fact, his association of virtue with the republican form of government can also be interpreted as a proposition aimed at undermining the legitimacy of republicanism itself. Montesquieu made no secret 114
? Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996

of his preference for monarchy, a form of government that he associated with 'honour', allegedly more tangible and definite a value to pursue than unrealistic and vague 'virtue'.6 Montesquieu's theory of the division of powers within the republic is also constantly invoked. However, it is unclear whether the enthusiasm caused by this theory is the result of misunderstanding or of support of even its more disputable aspects. In Montesquieu, the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers are not as rigorously separate as republicans would advocate, as the pre-eminence of the executive surfaces throughout his argument. For decades, the myth of the separation of powers in Montesquieu has been the object of critical discussion.7 This discussion has centred on the fact that his 'power diagram' entails the existence of a strong executive which is entitled to scrutinize, veto, influence, and in other ways hamper both the legislative and the judiciary powers. An interesting aspect for the purpose of this article regards Montesquieu's view that state dignitaries should not stand trial in ordinary tribunals, for 'their dignity must be safeguarded from any contact with the prejudices of ordinaryjudges'.8 In other words, the morality of state representatives should only be judged by those who possess a similar notion of morality, namely their peers, who stand outside the domain of ordinary justice. Montesquieu's judiciary is as invisible as it is null. The judge is a glance and a voice, in the sense that he or she only reads and pronounces the words of the law, like a talking code. Crimes committed by the aristocracy and other members of the ruling class must be judged by the rulers themselves. Indeed, the power of judges is null, because they are deprived of the political impact that their action would be expected to produce. Hence the criticism attracted by Montesquieu well-known definition of political regimes.
It is all right to claim that despotism is a regime where one person governs without rules or laws [ ... ]; there are regimes in which despotism reigns within the very existing laws.9

It should be noted that the predominance of the executive over the other constitutional powers also features in the Republican Constitution of 1793, allegedly the most revolutionary brain-child of Robespierre:
The new Constitution was a trap; it re-created a monstrous executive power, independent of the Assemble, a colossal power inimical to freedom, which restored a new type of royalty.'0

The predominance of the executive power is among the legacies characterizing contemporary France, a background against which corrupt exchange should be analysed. POLITICIANS AND ENTREPRENEURS The pendulum-like movement between concentration of power and its distribution has remained one of traits of the French Republic: 115
? Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996

Sincethe Revolution,all authoritarian regimeshave triedto put powerin the handsof one person:the dictator,the emperor,the head of stateat centrallevel, the prefectand havetried,sometimes democratic themayorsat thelocallevel.Conversely, going regimes too far, to fragment power."

Duringthe Thirdand Fourth Republics,for instance,the centralpower of the executivewas weakened,while the local executiveswere strengthened. for mainlylocatedwithinthe Opportunities corruptexchangeweretherefore domain of the legislative power, where economic decisions were made. memberswas among the activitiesof powerfulentreLobbyingparliament influenceof Paris. who weredeemedthe victimsof the corrupting preneurs, this The Panamascandalexemplifies type of corruptexchange.It beganwith Americain order a projectto builda channelthroughthe isthmusof Central to join the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Difficulties and incompetence the repeatedlyinterrupted work, while the budget grew disproportionately than the expensesinitiallyenvisaged.The companyneededconstant higher until a final parliamentary vote was requiredto authorizea re-financing, loan. More than a hundreddeputies were accused of having taken large which they knew bribes in exchangefor a 'yes' vote over an undertaking was bound to fail.12 During the Fourth Republic,however,the involvementof politiciansin Politiciansowed their corruptexchangewas also tracedin local clientelism. in Parliament the financialsupportof local notables, to with whom presence had ties of mutual interests:once elected, they would exchange the they We supportreceivedfor favouritismin the concessionof local contracts.'3 shall see how the evolutionof these national-localdynamicsplays a crucial of role in the emergence corruptexchangein contemporary France. TheFifthRepublic inherited strongexecutive the advocated Montesquieu by with in and Robespierre, powerbeingconcentrated thepresidency. However, along with the national,regionaland city authoritiesalso took on unprecedenteddecision-making model',with the executive powers.This 'monarchic resultedin the power being strongboth at the centreand at the periphery, multiplicationof corruptopportunities.A notorious example of national du executiveinvolvementin corruptionwas the 'Carrefour Developpement' affair.The Carrefour an association,foundedin 1983,officiallycharged was with the development commerciallinks with and productiveactivitiesin of of Africa.14 Funded the Ministry Co-operation theMinistry Economy and of by and Finances,this associationwas found to have wastedresourcesby both indulging in personal expenses, including the purchase of a castle, and It divertingmoney to financethe electoralcampaignof its members.'5 is a convictionthat the 'Carrefour Developpement' du affairis only widely-shared the most visibleepisodeamonga chain of similaraffairstakingplacebehind
the friendly links of 'la grandefamille franco-aJricaine'.6

for Opportunities corrupt exchangeto takeplaceat the locallevelincreased with the legislation in 1982which accordedrelativeautonomy-status passed to region executivesand mayors. Since 1982, the decentralization process 116
? Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996

endowedlocalauthorities withsuchcrucialprerogatives local politicians that The to areoftenreferred as 'feudalseigneurs'.17 powerof mayors,forexample, with regardto all aspectsof urbandevelopment, includedfull responsibility town planning, property and planning permission, health (with mayors sitting on executiveboards of public hospitals), social welfare,education, Decisionstakenin thesefieldswerenot subjectto a priori and environment. scrutinyby national bodies, but only to a posterioricontrol on the part of regionalauthorities.These would forwardthe relevantinformationto the of at prefects,the representatives the government local level, only afterthe commitmentwith local contractorshad been taken.18 should be added It of that most members the FrenchParliament held,and to a degreestill hold, local office in their constituencies,and that about three quartersof them are mayors:
To combinethe role of deputeand mayor gives much greatercontrol over the local politicalsub-system,gives one more influencewhen it comes to obtaininggrants or subsidiesfrom centralgovernment, gives one, as a notable,a betterchance of being elected.19

Frenchmembersof Parliament,therefore,may devote more time to their local concernsthan to their parliamentary as responsibilities controllersof the executive.On the other hand, they may be part of the executiveitself, albeit at the local level, thus acting as both controllersand controlled. Local public executivesare said to act and feel as pure businesspeople, in moreinterested the profitstheygenerate thanin the orthodoxyof practices and methodsutilized.20 However,beneaththe officialimageof effectiveness, of they may rewardassociatesand supporters irrespective businessprofitaof Nevertheless,at the origin of centralization power is the rhetoric bility. of effectiveness, which favoursthe accumulation mandatesand the conof concentration resources. of Under the impulseof Gaston Defferre, sequent both mayor of Marseilleand Ministerof the Interior,the socialistgovernment played a centralrole in devisingthe 1982 legislationon decentralization. Inspiredby the apparentdesire to realizeforms of local democracy, and to bringcitizenscloserto decision-making bodies,this legislationin fact favouredthe largeentrepreneurial which surrounded supported and groups localpoliticians.Virtualmonopolieswereestablished, with someloyal entrecontractsfrom local authorities. preneursattractingthe most remunerative It should be added that in France,over the last fifteenyears, the majority of public contracts,consistingof majorurban works, were issued by local authorities,with funds being releasedby mayors:'In Francethreequarters of civil investments undertaken territorial are which act as communities, by
maitres d'ouvrage.'21

This circumstance entrepreneurs focus theiractivityon municipaliled to ties and regions,wherefunds weremore easily available.The 'local choice' was also prompted by the rule whereby those winning contracts were to the and required pre-finance worksor servicesundertaken acceptdelayed reimbursement. This considerably reducedthe numberof firmswhich were 117
? Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996

in a positionto bid, and only groupsalreadystrongnationally,namelythose and endowedwith nationalcredentials collateral,had a realisticprospectof at contracts.In theircase, credibility the nationallevel turnedinto winning at the local one. opportunities In this respectit may be of interestto highlightthe followingcomparative in note. Unlikein the Italiancontext,corruption Francedoes not necessarily rely on mediatorswho act as informalcontact personsfor politiciansand In entrepreneurs. Italy, these mediatorsare non-electedfigureswhose characteristicsare hybridin nature,stridingas they do betweenthe public and itselfirrespective electoraloutof the private.This 'caste',whichreproduces comes, presentsus with the followingtypology. There are 'entrepreneurial meddlers',who mediatebetweenfirmsand a numberof public administrawho one and tors;'political bag-carriers', mediatebetween politician a number and who of privateentrepreneurs; 'self-employed wheeler-dealers', offertheir In betweenthe politicaland servicesto all.22 France,instead,relationships worlds seem to be more direct,with mayors,deputies,and entrepreneurial ministersin a position to relate to entrepreneurs a more independent in fashion.This wouldsuggestthatcorruptexchangein Franceis characterized by a lower degreeof dispersion,and that corruptincome is concentrated among limited elites. As its proceeds are less 'socialized',corruptionin Franceappearsto entail lower connivancecosts. The dynamicsdescribedso far may lead one to over-emphasize role the in of local authorities the buildingof a corruptsystemand,morespecifically, the role of the politicalright,whichcontrolsthe majorityof local administrations. Did the right take advantageof a piece of legislation,namely a well-intentioned decentralization power,designed the left?Thisassumpof by tion is challengedby facts. The Pechiney-Triangle affairshows how corruption in ministerialcircles can proceed simultaneouslywith locally-based corruption.The state-ownedPechineygroup acquiredthe United States of companyTrianglein 1988,underthe encouragement Ministryof Finance officials.23 after the government had securedthe go ahead for Immediately the takeover,a businessman closely linkedwith the SocialistParty bought 32,000 Triangleshares, while a close friend of the Presidentpurchaseda further20,000. The profits were launderedthrough businessesset up in to Panamaand returned France,allegedlyto the SocialistParty.24 Urba The affair,whichwill be discussedlater,is anothernotoriousexampleof socialist involvement in corrupt practices, and, most importantly,of the local/ nationalco-ordinationof corruptexchange. It has been suggestedthat corruptionin Franceis to be analysedagainst a crucialcharacteristic the politicalapparatus. of This is thatpoliticalparties are financiallyand socially weak. Numerous and undisciplined(with the notable exceptionof the CommunistParty), they have never achievedthe featuresof hierarchically machinesset in motion by the efforts structured of branches, andmembers.25 representatives, Lackingin humanandfinancial resort to informal donations and opaque resources,parties traditionally 118
? Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996

contributions given in exchange for 'influence'. The example of Urba is illuminating. In President Mitterrand's ambition, the Socialist Party was to evolve into a modern party of the Left, though it was unable to gain the support of active members and generous entrepreneurs. The establishment of a network of societes d'etudes, which would attract funds officially earmarked for research and cultural development, was thought to serve the purpose. These societes d'etudes had to 'ensure an intermediary function between those who controlled the resources (the firms) and their beneficiary (the Socialist Party), thus making obligatory a movement of funds which had never been spontaneous.'26 Not completely new, this system reached organizational perfection with the socialist government, with percentages on the contracts granted being paid to commissioning politicians and their parties.27 However, the weakness of political parties may only explain the causes of specific episodes in the French context, and should not be regarded as a universal causation of corrupt activities. For example, in the face of the Italian case, one might endorse a completely opposite aetiology, the country being characterized by extremely powerful political parties. In this respect, the 'Republic of Parties' is a commonly shared definition, one which retains derogatory as well as aetiological significance when applied to Italy. But to attribute to the weakness or to the power of political parties the causes of corruption is to overlook the interactions of political parties themselves with other actors who contribute to the definition of some activities as corrupt. The next section is devoted to such actors, in particular to the judiciary and the media, and to the way in which they have long been unable to perceive corrupt activities as being corrupt, or have been prevented from expressing their resentment over them.

PRIVILEGE OF JURISDICTION A number of articles included in the code of penal procedure allow the executive to deprive judges who conduct delicate investigations of their investigative power.28For example, legislation passed in 1974, and in place until 1993, established that public prosecutors could not investigate offences committed by mayors within the sphere of their public mandate, but had to hand such cases to the Court of Cassation, where an appropriate investigative judge would be designated.29 The designated investigator had to be one of the high judges sitting in the Supreme Court (Haut Courtde Justice). This prerogative is inscribed in the procedural code, according to which the Court of Cassation can suspend the validity of decisions taken by lower courts and tribunals, and is required to ensure that legal proceedings adhere to the existing legislation.30The 1974 legislation also implied that whenever in investigative documents the names of public administrators were mentioned, examining judges were required to hand the investigation over to the higher ranks of 119
' Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996

If the judicialhierarchy.31 they failedto do so, the Court of Cassation,after seizing the investigation,could annul all the previousproceduralacts and the findings,before transferring proceedingsto the SupremeCourt. However, only cases not dismissedby the formercourt would be handedto the latter. The immunityenjoyedby cabinetministersdates back to 1958,when the SupremeCourt was established.This Court, elected anew by each newly formedparliament,dealt with crimescommittedby governmentmembers in relation to the exerciseof their functions. But before legal proceeding could be initiated,permissionhad to be grantedby parliamentthrougha formal resolutionof mise en accusation.During the thirty-fiveyears of its Court(this 'archaicinstitutionformedof 12 senators existence,the Supreme and 12 deputies'32) heardtwo cases among those selectedby the Court only of Cassationand approvedfor examinationby parliament.33 du cameto an end not leastbecauseof its indirect, Thisprocedure privilege effect.Theprivilege jurisdiction appliedto police of also catastrophic judicial over drug trafficking officersand detectives.In a numberof investigations offences, some officerswere chargedwith malpracticeor even complicity with offenders.The transferral the investigation a higherjudge meant of to a delay whichresultedin allegeddrugtraffickers being grantedconditional bail. LITTLEAND BIG JUDGES According to Bancaud, those occupyingthe high ranks of the judiciary 'have neverchanged':they have been there before,duringand afterVichy, and allegedlythey all have verycorrectRepublicanviews.34 Vogelweithand Vaudanoterm the culturecharacterizing seniorjudges a 'subservient one', and see the intermediary low ranksof the judiciaryas more susceptible and to changeand more independent. The lowestpositionsin thejudiciary occupiedby thejugesd'instruction, are examiningjudges who are chargedwith the gatheringof informationand evidencerelatingto criminaloffences.35 Above them are the judges of the public prosecutionservice(also termedthe parquet),who are requiredto supervisethe legality of the examiningprocedure.The presidentsof the parquets,or public prosecutors,have the prerogativeto designatewhich with the investigation which of examining judge(petitjuge)will be entrusted case. They also have the power to appoint one or more examining judges undertheirsupervision the expertsin financialand administrative as crime. Data producedin 1994 indicatethat an elite of eleven investigative judges was dealingwith about 7,000 cases each year.36 This is obviouslya limiting factor! Although their action is dependenton decisions taken by their public prosecutors,it is common for examining judges to be accusedof wielding 120
:e Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996

too much power. In effect, once they receivepermissionto proceed, they become responsiblefor both the investigationand the treatmentof those investigated.For example,they can remandsuspectsin custody until they believe all evidencehas been examined.This, however,does not apply to in proceedings whichpublicpoliticalfiguresare involved,as these cases are dealt with accordingto the proceduredescribedabove. The careerof an examining judge offerslimitedpromotionopportunities:
Normally,he may only progressfrom the lower 'grade'to a higher'grade'and salary his and scaleby abandoning functionin 'instruction' by orienting careertowardsthe his or (as parquet a publicprosecutor) a siege (as a judge).37

This organizational make-uplends itself to potential abuse, as examining judges who intend to advancein their careerare requiredto act amicably in towardspublicprosecutors orderto eventually join the parquet.Thereis also scope for 'punitive'promotions, whereby 'stubborn'individualsare role and assigneda higherrank in a less removedfrom their investigative of the country. Finally, some judges may 'choose' to problematicregion abandontheir careeraltogetherwhen the feeling that their hands are tied becomestoo unpleasantto bear. The following is one such case. Jean-Pierre Thierrywas handlingthe Urba affair in the capacityofjuge He d'instruction. was gatheringevidenceconcerningthe illegal funding of his beganto suggestthat a part politicalparties.In particular, investigation of the fundsusedto financethe 1988electioncampaignof the SocialistParty had beenillegallyobtained.The fundshad beendivertedfroma construction and Urbanetwork ofsocietesd'etude, forwarded company, viatheintermediary to the SocialistParty,whichwas in government the timeof investigation.38 at Thierrywas accusedof havingtakenthe law into his own handsbecausehe had failed to reportback to the public prosecutorsabout his investigation, and had not receivedthe necessary permissionto continuehis investigation was of the case.Thierry immediately removedfromthe case by theprocureur decidedto aban(theheadof the publicprosecutionservice). general Thierry don his careeras a judge and becameinvolvedin politics. The head of the prosecutionserviceis directlyappointed(and disciplined or fired)by the Ministryof Justice,therefore, the partyin office.In order by to complete the descriptionof the Thierrycase, it should be noted that, when the examiningjudge was removedfrom the case, this Ministrywas headedby HenriNallet, formerly treasurer Mitterrand's the for 1988election campaign.39 While the independence thejuge de siege is rarelyquestioned,it is the of
juges d'instruction and the procureurs generaux who are usually the object

The of controversy. formerare deemedtoo young and inexperienced hold to a position whichentailstoo much power. However,we have seen how this power can be curtailedand bridled.The latter, as we have also seen, may with the executive,as theirvery be underattackfor theirclose relationship careerdependson the will of the Ministryof Justice.This is exemplified by 121
C

Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996

the fact that all criminal proceedings initiated by prosecutors must receive official approval by the Minister. Theoretically, prosecutors can advise the Minister 'that proceedings are being undertaken rather than they have intention of undertaking them'.40However, in practice, before sensitive proceedings are started, consultation with the Ministry is essential, in particular when cases are investigated which could cause distress for government and the public opinion. When prosecutors are instructed by the Minister in relation to sensitive affairs 'the problem is not to pursue a case or not (visa-vis the law), but to obey or disobey (vis-d-vis the instructions received)'.41 The only avenue available to public prosecutors, and for that matter to petitsjuges, to pursue a case entails the media enlarging upon the case being investigated. Once the media divulge information relating to an affair, it is more difficult for the Ministry to deny permission to proceed. But with this we are entering the role of the fourth actor involved in the definition of certain activities as corrupt.

THE MEDIA The French media have never been regarded as particularly effective in their watchdog role. This notoriety applies in particular to television, whose coverage of news was under direct government control during the de Gaulle and With Giscard d'Estaing, 'direct control was replaced Pompidou presidencies.42 by patronage: associates of the President were put in charge of television and radio organisations'.43 Before the scandals of the last decade were unearthed, the press also was noticeable for its investigative inefficiency in exposing abuses of power. The vigilance of papers such as Le Canard Enchatne, along with the work of a few independent journalists, were sufficient to bring abuses to light, but were incapable of following up inquiries or forcing the judiciary to act, let alone to sustain generalized public interest. In its turn, television, too timid to deal with the malpractice and offences of the elites, applied self-censorship as its rule. In choosing the items for 'evening news', for example, 'delicate' affairs and their critical discussion were relegated to the midnight programme, while pre-arranged interviews with politicians involved in those affairs were given prominence in the six-o'-clock programme.44 There exists a media network of trusted journalists who are omnipresent, on television and in the press. According to Halimi, they amount to no more than a dozen, and their presence and opinion can never be escaped.45 Connivance and uniformity of views are the consequence: they meet, exchange information, appreciate each other, and end up agreeing on everything. A leader in a weekly, an interview in a monthly, radio and television appearances, and the inevitable book every year. Controlled, like elsewhere, by financial groups and sustained by their advertisement money, newspapers and 'independent' television stations 122
:? Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996

were, and to a degree still are, under strict control. Financial groups do not hide their political sympathies nor do they conceal which newspaper they find most congenial, and therefore worthy of support. Newspapers sell advertisement pages to political parties and also to individual politicians engaged in their electoral campaigns. Moreover, political parties themselves own papers and magazines, and sometimes set up their own radio stations. See the example of Radio Nostalgie, whose programmes contained only indirect political propaganda for the Socialist Party, but was proved to act as a counduit to channel illegal funds to the party.46Ironically, the companies which were eventually to be exposed for their role in illegal party funding were the same which sustained papers such as Le Monde, L'Express, Le Point, and L'Expansion.47

RESENTMENT The exposure of political scandals and corruption was the result of the resentment of one or more of the actors described so far. Before briefly sketching the institutional reaction to the onslaught of accusations, let us see how this resentment found its expression. 1. Corruptcompanies The exchange of public contracts for bribes (whether for personal gain or illegal party funding) may not be a widely accepted practice among enterprises. This implies that only 'trustworthy' companies can be expected to participate in the exchange. For this reason politicians' choice as to the type of service or work to contract out may not depend on the actual need for that service or work, but on the potential that available enterprises offer for hidden money to move. Resentment may therefore be expressed by firms offering services which, though needed, are nevertheless never asked for. The example of service privatization offers an illuminating extension of this. Here it is not only the nature of the service privatized, but also the costs incurred by private providers which may cause resentment. Private firms contracted with service may apply higher costs than their competitors, because The resentment of competing firms they are, in a sense, assisted enterprises.48 arises, therefore, from the diseconomy caused by both the type of service contracted out and its costs. The former is in fact determined by the loyalty manifested by firms to politicians, the latter by the cost of this loyalty. Other sources of resentment may come to light when the relationships between small and large firms are analysed. The system of illegal party funding created a de facto corrupt monopoly which mostly benefited the large groups more closely associated with the executive, be this locally- or nationallybased. The organizational structureof these groups was decentralizedenough for them to gain contracts in different business arenas and geographical 123
e Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996

contexts. For example,a large firm could offer building work to a local authorityand furnishhospital equipmentto another.This strategyis part of whathasbeentermed'flexible a whichbecame accumulation', phenomenon apparentin many Westerncountriesthroughoutthe 1980s. The previous financialmovementto low-incomecountriespartly changed its direction, of with the predominant tendencybecomingthe re-centralization finances In in high-income countriesand regions.49 France,opportunities diversify to domesticinvestments werecreatedby publiccontracts,and receiveda boost the relatedprocessof decentralization describedabove. by Frenchfirmsseem to have stretchedthe conceptof flexibilityto embrace the politicalarena,with work and servicesbeingofferedto local authorities controlledboth by the right and the left. Finally, flexibilityalso informed the ethicalsphere,in the sensethat rulesand procedures would be stretched to tally with those adoptedby those grantingcontracts.This diversification allowedlargefirmsto be competitivein both nationaland local markets.In the lattermarketsthey encounteredthe resentmentof smallerfirmswhich were unableto achievesimilarorganizational complexity. One of the first large scandalsuncoveredin the 1980sinvolvedone such smallenterprise. scandalcameto lightby pure'judicial The accident',during the courseof investigations the deathof two workerson a buildingsite. into by Followingpressures the union, examining judgesfound that workconditions in the company involved were poor and safety regulationsignored. The marketfor publiccontractsin the regionwherethe accidenttook place was characterized a situationof oligopolysharedby largefirmsconnected by with local politicians.Smallerfirmscould only gain contractsby applying lowercosts, thus cuttingon safetyexpenses.The resentment of significantly the firm under investigationwas expressedthroughthe claim that it had incurredhigh costs for the 'privilege'of winningthe contract:
The accidentin the work place had occurredbecause the firm had had to pay a backhander politicians orderto win the tender,a circumstance to in whichhad deprived the firmof the financial meansnecessary the respectof safetyregulations.5 for

The investigation, uncovered widenetworkof enterprises a eventually, adoptthe sameprocedure: Urba affair was born. the ing It is worthnotingthatthe Italian'cleanhand'operation startedon a similar note. The whistlewas blownby a smallentrepreneur in operating Milanwho was contractedfor cleaningduties in a home for the elderly.He reported to the police the incessantrequestsby top administrators the home for of a percentage his profits.Becausethis percentage of was incessantlyincreascouldno longerguarantee the qualityof the service for ing, the entrepreneur he was providing.51 Resentment againstcompaniesengagedin corruptpracticesmay also be shareholders. Again, this may resultfrom 'accidents'such as expressedby financial returns shareholders eventhe suddenbankto or unexpectedly poor of a company.In France,this was the casewitha numberof allegedly ruptcy 124
? Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996

stablecompaniessuddenlygoing into receivership. Pressure shareholders by led examining to uncoverillegal transfersof finances,displacement judges of funds,false invoices,and so-called'taxicompanies',whose role consisted solely of delivering money to politicalparties. Finally,thereis a broaderpossibleexplanationof why corruptexchange of emerges.The internationalization the economyrenderscorruptexchange tantamountto unfair competition,with firmsunable to build up political in contactsbeingpenalized theiractivity.Corrupt companies generateresentment becausethey enjoy the privilegeof operatingin protectedmarkets,a circumstance whichis at odds with the freemarketrhetoricrecentlyprevailin Europe.In Italy,for example,only 0.1 percentof contractsaregranted ing to non-Italianfirms,52 the French authoritiesare equally ungenerous and withnon-national economicactors.Corruption reduces uncertainty giving by domesticcompaniesa competitiveedge. These companiesmay be resented who take the opening of European markets by foreign entrepreneurs seriously. leads businesscultures Accordingto some authors, internationalization towards greater homogeneityand the sharing of 'concerns for business of and ethics,greatertransparency markets,and the establishment preservation of acceptable international standards businessconduct'.53 of According to our interpretation, and instead,internationalization deregulation simply lead to more exposureof corruptpracticesas a resultof increased competition and resentment.Firms enjoyingpolitical protection,whose business is are reduced, resented firmsseekingbut unable uncertainty consequently by to achievesimilarforms of protectionism. is not their belief in the free It International market,but its opposite,whichtriggersresentment. deregulation bringsalong processesof 'informalization', that is, a proliferationof activitiesthat bypasslegal regulationthroughone kind income-generating or anotherof political,personalor familialentrepreneurialism.54 powerLess ful companiesmay not be capableof participating this process of inforin malization,hence their resentment.Even in an ideal situation, where all wouldbe givenequalopportunities of entrepreneurs irrespective the country in which they operate, it remainsto be seen whether corruptionwould become redundant,55 whethernew conditions conduciveto corruption or wouldemerge.In suchan idealsituationcorruptexchangemay well become internationalin scale, with a limited numberof companiesmonopolizing international contracts.
2. Thejudiciary-media alliance

The resentment the judiciarywent hand in hand with that of the media. of The bargainingpower of judges mainly stems from their ability to make investigation findingspublic.In this they may also be helpedby the defence of those underinvestigation, is the case with politiciansand their as lawyers counselcallingpressconferencesto revealthe 'absurdcharges'broughtby
125
? Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996

judges. For example,when the first large financial scandalsof the 1980s exploded,TF1 channellauncheda serialprogrammeof invectivesagainst the 'witch hunt' mountedby the judiciary.One of these scandalsinvolved the Alcatel group which, under investigationon corruptioncharges,preempted the judiciaryin makingthe content of the accusationspublic,preThis sumablyin the attemptto keep control of the informationrevealed.56 to move provedbeneficial the examining judge, who could rely on the support of the mediaand obtain permissionto carryon with the investigation
from the procureurgeneral.

In other cases publicitywas sought by investigative judges themselves, with the secrecy but in doing so they could be accusedof non-compliance the investigation This happenedin relationto process.57 principlegoverning the Henri Emmanuelli case, when the media revealedcorruptioncharges brought against this Socialist Party politician before he had receivedany officialnotificationby the examining judge. allianceignitedthe reactionof politiciansand entreThisjudiciary-media preneurs,who felt they were being treatedas guilty before their guilt had been proven. Judgeswere likened to some contemporary Saint-Justs,and and from the press.Obscureinvestigators convictionsweresaid to emanate as stars,in a spectacle journalistswereaccusedof pursuingfame, of acting circus'.58 which some commentators equatedto a 'judiciary-media INSTITUTIONALRESPONSES a Accordingto influentialwriterAlain Minc, France is experiencing misguided 'democraticinebriation'which prefiguresa new public individual: one who is obsessedby externalobserversand is thereforebound to lose The reflexivityand tolerance.59 new public individuals,namely the politicians, will be requiredto constantlyfight those who accuse them: a Holy Trinityformedby judges,publicopinion, and media. Francehas becomea of 'government judges',the damningphrasewith which the accusedmount their counterattack againstinvestigators. In July 1988, in the wake of the presidential election, along with a new the pieceof legislation establishing fundingof partiesby the state,an amnesty was given to all politicianschargedwith malpracticeand corruption.The amnestycoveredall offencescommittedin relationto electoralcampaigning and politicalparty funding.In that year big cases such as the Urba affair had not yet come to light. After they had, a secondamnestywas grantedin 1990for all those who had not benefitedfrom the previousone, but corrupt politicianswho had pursuedpersonalgains, ratherthan party funds, were excluded.This secondamnestywas presentedas an inevitablemeasurevisa-vis offencescommitted a phaseof judicialvoid, whenlegislation in regulating politicalparty fundingwas non-existentor vague. Therefore,with the the amnesty,new legislationregulating financialaspectsof politicalactivity 126
e Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996

was introduced. This reduced the amount of funds each campaigning candidate was allowed to spend, and decreed that private donations to parties be given a pre-established ceiling, be precisely recorded, and made public. This piece of legislation was regarded by critics as a de facto de-criminalization of formerly illegal practices. Currently, it is argued, if politicians still intend to pursue their personal gains, they may well continue in this practice by resorting to falsification and forgery, as they did before. If funds exceeding the legally set ceiling can still be channelled to parties by means of forged invoices, individual politicians may well 'forge the forged invoices' to pocket monies destined for their party. On the other hand, with the state funding system, improbable political parties and even 'unipersonal parties' are said to crop up with the sole purpose of attracting state finances.60 The 1990 legislation marked a shift in the legal perception of corruption. Amnesties granted in 1947 and 1953, for example, were not intended for politicians, who were deemed passive parties in corrupt exchange. Their behaviour was only regarded as one of complicity with corrupt individuals. Moreover, politicians using mediators in their corrupt practices could escape prosecution because they would be defined as 'accomplices of accomplices', a byzantine category devoid of juridical significance. Finally, 'attempts to corrupt' could not be prosecuted because 'attempting to become an accomplice in crime' was an even more byzantine juridical category.61 Changes introduced by the 1990 amnesty abolished these privileges. In 1993 the Bouchery report was published, which addressed three of what were believed to be the deep-seated problems of France: unemployment, street crime, and corruption.62 The report described corruption as a gangrene devouring society, but failed to identify new rules for its prevention. Too many rules regulating the relationships between politicians and enterprises, it was argued, would hamper competition and benefit companies from other European countries, unless all countries of the Union agreed to introduce similar rules. Organizational reform of the judiciary was one of the responses to assuage resentment. In 1993, a number of amendments to the code of procedure were passed. The privilege de jurisdiction was abolished, although members of parliament took a precaution: 'the procureurgeneral maintained the power to remove a judge from a case when this was in the best interest of the administration of justice'.63In 1992 a new piece of legislation made concessions on two important issues. First, it made the procedure related to the career of judges more transparent, with new powers being given to their national professional body. This body, elected by judges themselves, was made responsible for transferrals and promotions. Second, it issued a series of statutory guarantees aimed at reducing the influence of the executive on the judiciary. Concessions were also made to journalists. Their resentment had induced Mitterrand to create the 'High Authority for Audio-Visual Communications', allegedly independent of government, to supervise radio and television 127
C Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996

and to Abolishedby Chiracin programmes make appointments top jobs.64 1986, and replacedby his CNCL (National Commissionfor Communications and Liberties)the 'High Authority'did not 'free'the press:when Le Mondestartedcoveringthe Alcatelaffair,the advertisement contractof the with that companywas cut down. paper CONCLUSION It is difficult assessthe extentto whichthe institutional to responsessketched above will reduceresentmentand thus exposition of corruptactivities,let what conalone reducecorruptionitself.The actors involvedin identifying be stitutescorruption may temporarily satisfiedby the concessionsobtained, but may soon discovernew reasonsfor being dissatisfied. It should be noted that resentment alone does not explainthe successof resentment merelythe motivationfor is those exposingcases of corruption; of exposure.The multiplication cases of corruptionrevealedover the recent years,and the successof the mediaand the judiciary,are perhapsdue to the fact that all political partieswere accused, sooner or later. This may have of reducedthe embarrassment individual tempered parties,andconsequently their willingnessand capacityto stop the anti-corruption onslaught.It is that worthremembering the rightcameto powerthanks,amongotherthings, to theirexposureof corruptepisodesin which the SocialistPartyhad been involved.Whenthe right itself was chargedwith corruptpractices,it could not replicatethe responsesgiven by its socialistcounterparts. example, For it could not claim that there was a politicalconspiracyagainstit, nor that judges and journalistshad hidden agendas, because these were the same agencies that had indicted their predecessors.In a sense, the alternation betweenpoliticalpartiescreateda climatein whichit becameeasierto expose Similarly,afterthe initialreprisalby firmsagainstthe pressin corruption.65 the formof curtailment advertisement of to contracts, thingsreturned normal becausetoo many firms came under investigation.Soon the issue became that of how to imposelimitationson the press when individualsnot found New legislationunderdiscussionin the guiltyof an offencewerementioned. French parliamentconcerns 'the freedom of communicationwithin the of respectfor the presumption innocence'.66 This paperdoes not includepublicopinion among the actorsinvolvedin corruptexchangeand its exposure.It is time to explainwhy. It is a characteristic representative of democracies createan increasing to distancebetweenelectoraldecisionsand policy decisions.Electedpoliticians are the recipients powerconferred themby citizens.67 with banking of on As institutions,once they have receivedthis 'deposit'of power,politicianscan invest it in enterprises which are out of the control of depositors.Increasdecisionsaffectingall are made in places and times known only to a ingly, few. It is the awareness thisdistancebetweenthe 'public'and theirpolitical of 128
C Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996

which makes the role of the formerin exposingcorruption representatives a secondaryone. This distanceis perceivedas the cause of corruption,or even deemedcorruptionitself. To use Geertz's metaphor:as in the past crownsand coronations,now limousinesand conferences'markthe centre as centreand givewhat goes on thereits auraof beingnot merelyimportant but in some odd fashionconnectedwith the way the world is built'.68 Parathis distancedoes not shelterpoliticiansfrom 'public'scrutiny, doxically, becausethe behaviour politicianswill be assumedto be corruptevenwhen of it is not. The slogan'toutest pourri'was not coined to describethe scandals of the 1980s,but datesbackcenturies.But this slogan,appliedto all regimes and governments, makes it impossibleto establishthe limit within which can be accepted and beyond which it must be exposed. For corruption example, in recent opinion polls conducted in France, respondentswere askedto choosewhethertheyhad ratherbe governed corruptbuteffective by ones.69 politicians not expected As are politiciansor by honestand ineffective to haveboth attributes, beliefthat it is impossible get rid of the former the to led the 'public'to opt at least for the latter.In a poll conductedby L'Express morethan 70 per cent of respondents believedthat corruption International, was rifeamongmembers parliament entrepreneurs, of and about 55 per cent said that corruptexchangehad not increasedover the yearsbut that something had happenedwhichled the media to writemore about it, and 70 per cent felt that a degreeof corruptionis inevitablein modernsociety.70 But and to again, little attentionwas paid by both interviewers respofidents the limit beyondwhichcorruptexchangemust be halted. Thispaperhas triedto understand is why corruption exposed,ratherthan it occurs.Thefocus has beenon relatively why powerfulactorswhoseresentment against those deemedmore powerfulthan themselveshas led to the definitionof some activitiesas corrupt.'Publicopinion' has been excluded from this definitional process:the labellingof other people's behaviouras has not been analysedas the resultof a conflictinvolvingpowerless corrupt and powerfulactors,but of a conflictstagedby powerfulactorsagainstone another. NOTES AND REFERENCES
1 I am referring in particular to R. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (1968); D. Bailey, 'The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation' (1966) 19 Western Political Q. 719; S.P. Huntington, Modernization and Corruption(1968); J.Q. Wilson, 'Corruption: The Shame of the State' in Political Corruption:A Handbook., eds. A. Heidenheimer et al. (1990). 2 V. Ruggiero, 'Corruption in Italy: An Attempt to Identify the Victims' (1994) 33 Howard J. of CriminalJustice, 319. 3 J. Frears, 'Not Sex, the Abuse of Power: Political Scandal in France' (1988) 3 Corruption and Reform 307. 4 See, for example, P. Lascoumes, Les affaires ou l'art de l'ombre: les delinquances economiques etfinancieres et leur contr6le (1986).

129
C Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Montesquieu, L'esprit des Lois (10th ed., 1907). L. Althusser, Montesquieu, la politique et l'histoire (1964) S. Eisenmann, L'esprit des lois et la separation des pouvoirs (1933). L. Althusser, op. cit., n. 6. id., p. 96. J. Michelet, Storia della rivoluzionefrancese (1981) 361. Y. Meny, 'France: la fin de l'etique republicaine? in Democratie et corruption en Europe, eds. D. della Porta and Y. M6ny (1995) 23. 12 J.Y. Mollier, Le scandale de Panama (1991). See also M. Cornick, 'From the Sublime to the Ridiculous: Scandals in France' (1993) 3 Modern and ContemporaryFrance 301. 13 B. Jenkins and P. Morris, 'Political Scandal in France' (1993) 2 Modern and Contemporary France, 127. See, also, R. Bornstein, 'The Politics of Scandal' in P. Hall et al., Development in French Politics (1990). 14 A. Garrigour, 'Strategic Analysis of a Scandal: Carrefour du D6veloppement' (1989) 4 Corruptionand Reform 159. 15 G. Gaetner, L'argentfacile. Dictionnaire de la corruptionen France (1992). 16 J-F. M6dard, 'France-Afrique:des affaires de famille', in della Porta and Meny, op. cit., n. 11, p. 29. 17 A. Bercoff, La France des seigneurs (1989); 'Corruption: la decentralisation en accusation' Politis, 22 December 1994; P-A. Lorenzi, Corruptionet imposture (1995). 18 A. Etchegoyen, Le corrupteuret le corrompu(1995). 19 Frears, op. cit., n. 3, p. 308. 20 Y. Meny, La corruptionde la Republique(1992). 21 id., p. 134. 22 D. della Porta and A. Vannucci, Corruzionepolitica e amministrazionepubblica (1994). 23 M. Maclean, 'Dirty Dealing: Business and Scandal in Contemporary France' (1993) 2 Modern and ContemporaryFrance 161. 24 'Le dossier noir de la corruption', Le Nouvel Observateur,6-12 October 1994. 25 della Porta and Meny, op. cit., n. 11. 26 id., p. 20. 27 J-L. Uguen, Les elus et l'argent (1994); C. Leyrit, Les Partis politiques et l'argent (1995). 28 Y. Lemoine and F. Nguyen, Tristesjustices (1994); D. Conil, Notre justice (1995). 29 A. Vogelweith and M. Vaudano, Mains propres. Mains liees (1995). 30 H. Pinsseau, L'organisationjudiciaire de la France (1985); G. Camillieri and C. Lazerges, Atlas de la criminalite en France (1992). 31 A. Vogelweith and P. Jacquin, 'Des juges en liberte tres surveillee' (1994) 140 Justice 3. 32 Maclean, op. cit., n. 23, p. 163. 33 Volgelweith and Vaudano, op. cit., n. 29. 34 A. Bancaud, La haute magistraturejudiciaire entre politique et sacerdoce (1991). 35 H. Trouille, 'The Juge d'Instruction:A Figure under Threat or Supremely Untouchable?' (1994) 2 Modern and ContemporaryFrance 11. 36 'Ces juges au coeur des afJaires' Le Monde, 20 October 1994. 37 Trouille, op. cit., n. 35, p. 12. 38 id. 39 id. 40 Lorenzi, op. cit., n. 17, p. 242. 41 ,(id., p. 244. 42 Frears, op. cit., n. 3. 43 id., p. 308. 44 Vogelweith and Vaudano, op. cit., n. 29. 45 S. Halimi, 'Un journalisme de reverence' Le Monde Diplomatique, February 1995. 46 Gaetner, op. cit., n. 15. See, also, 'L'affaire de Radio Nostalgie' Le Monde, 22 November 1987. 47 Vogelweith and Vaudano, op. cit., n. 29.

130
g Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996

48

W. Tocci, 'Partiti, finanza e mattone' in L'economia della corruzione, eds. L. Barca and

S. Trento(1994) 119. Foundations?' 49 D. Gordon,'The Global Economy:New Edificeor Crumbling (1988) 168
New Left Rev. 24; G. Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century (1994).

and 50 Vogelweith Vaudano,op. cit., n. 29, p. 22. in 51 Ruggiero,op. cit., n. 2; F. Cazzola,'I costi dellacorruzione' Barcaand Trento,op. cit., n. 48, p. 109. 52 Barcaand S. Trento,id. 53 Maclean,op. cit., n. 23, p. 167. and InformalEconomies'(1990) 18 54 E. Feige, 'Definingand EstimatingUnderground of The World 989; Economy: SocialBasis Development A. Portes,'Paradoxes the Informal in eds. N.J. Smelser of Unregulated of Sociology, Entrepreneurship', Handbook Economic and R. Swedberg (1994).
55 G. Cazzaniga, 'Sulle cause morali della corruzione', in Barca and Trento, op. cit., n. 48,

p. 33. 56 Lorenzi,op. cit., n. 17.

57 58 59 60 62 'Les senateurs souhaitent renforcer le secret de l'instruction' Le Monde, 7 April 1995. D. Soulez Lariviere, Du cirque mediatico-judiciaireet des moyens d'en sortir (1993). A. Minc, L'ivresse democratique(1995). 'La dotation de l'Etat aux partis pour 1995 va leur etre versee' Le Monde, 24 March 1995. R. Bouchery, Prevention de la corruptionet transparencede la vie economique (1993). For a comment to the report, see M. Maclean, 'La moralisation de la vie Economiqueen France:

61 Etchegoyen, cit., n. 18. op. and and France GlobalImperatives Cultural (1995)3 Modern Contemporary Impediments' 71. 63 Vogelweith Vaudano,op. cit., n. 29, p. 59. and 64 Frears,op. cit., n. 3.
65 H. Imerglik, 'Corruzione in Francia: il ruolo della magistratura' (1994) XIII Questione Giustizia 646. 66 'La presse bouc emissaire', and 'Liberte de communication et respect de la presomption d'innocence' Le Monde 7 April 1995. 67 This parallel is suggested by T. Parsons, On Institutions and Social Evolution (1982).

here. However,fromthat parallelParsonsdoes not drawthe sameconclusionspresented

68 C. Geertz, Local Knowledge. Further Essays in InterpretiveAnthropology (1983) 124.

69 Etchegoyen, cit., n. 18. op.

70 'Le tour de France de la corruption'L'Express International, 8 December 1994.

131
? Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1996