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G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989 Marcos, petitioner VS.

Manglapus, respondent (Part 1) Facts: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent people power revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events: 1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders 2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists 3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar 4. Honasans failed coup 5. Communist insurgency movements 6. secessionist movements in Mindanao 7. devastated economy because of 1. accumulated foreign debt 2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquinos decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquinos power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction. According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order. Issue: 1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. 2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return. Decision: No to both issues. Petition dismissed. Ratio: Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State. The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Theyre flexible depending on the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied. For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution. Fernan, Concurring 1. The presidents power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the imperatives of events and not on abstract theories of law. We are undergoing a critical time and the current problem can only be answerable by the President. 2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present danger. Thus, its the executives responsibility & obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety from arising. 3. We cant sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political & economic gains to give in to Marcos wish to die in the country. Compassion must give way to the other state interests. Cruz, Dissenting 1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos right to return, live & die in his own country. It is a right guaranteed by the Consti to all individuals, whether patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.

2. Military representatives failed to show that Marcos return would pose a threat to national security. Fears were mere conjectures. 3. Residual powers but the executives powers were outlined to limit her powers & not expand. Paras, Dissenting 1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair Marcos right to return to the Philippines. . 2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies, he/she should be buried w/in 10 days. 3. Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute & state is powerless to restrict it. Its w/in police power of the state to restrict this right if national security, public safety/health demands that such be restricted. It cant be absolute & unlimited all the time. It cant be arbitrary & irrational. 4. No proof that Marcos return would endanger national security or public safety. Fears are speculative & military admits that its under control. Filipinos would know how to handle Marcos return. Padilla, Dissenting Sarmiento, Dissenting 1. Presidents determination that Marcos return would threaten national security should be agreed upon by the court. Such threat must be clear & present.

Facts: In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and order of the state and society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines. A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following arguments: 1. Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their country of birth and all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos. 2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily. 3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Issue: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippines be granted. Decision: No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied because of lack of merit. Ratio: 1. Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration. 2. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino illegal claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal president. 3. President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power. Enumerations are merely for specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power, interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can exercise power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with implied powers. 4. It is within Aquinos power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound to comply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily

G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989 Marcos, petitioner VS. Manglapus, respondent (Part 2)

Valmonte vs Belmonte

G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989 FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo Valmonte wrote a letter to Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, GSIS General Manager, requesting that he be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan. Belmonte replied through the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS whose opinion is that is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts. ISSUE: Whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information HELD: The information sought by petitioners is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. The public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. The Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. However, although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL L. MORATO (in his capacity as Chairman of the MTCRB) and the MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, respondents. G.R. No. 92541. November 13, 1991) Petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), requested that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. Her request was denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions partake the nature of conscience votes and are private and personal. A board resolution was also issued declaring as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members. The Court found the respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine the records of MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as well as the individual voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to public records. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties Gonzales vs. Narvasa G.R. No. 140835, August 14, 2000 Facts: Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen andtaxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of thepositions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the manner of implementing them. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case Held: In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be addressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers andassistants. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised. In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, payers action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by Congressof its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of EO 43 as amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Officeof the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As to the creation of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants, the petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest in this particular issue.