Democracy in The Caribbean

DEMOCRACY IN THE CARIBBEAN
A CAUSE FOR CONCERN

Douglas Payne
April 7, 1995
Policy Papers on the Americas
Democracy in the Caribbean

A Cause for Concern
Douglas W. Payne
Policy Papers on the Americas Volume VI Study 3
April 7, 1995
CSIS Americas Program
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), founded in 1962, is an independent, tax-exempt, public policy research institution based in Washington, DC. The mission of CSIS is to advance the understanding of emerging world issues in the areas of international economics, politics, security, and business. It does so by providing a strategic perspective to decision makers that is integrative in nature, international in scope, anticipatory in timing, and bipartisan in approach. The Center's commitment is to serve the common interests and values of the United States and other countries around the world that support representative government and the rule of law.
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CSIS, as a public policy research institution, does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this report should be understood to be solely those of the authors.
8 1995 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. This study was prepared under the aegis of the CSIS Policy Papers on the Americas series. Comments are welcome and should be directed to: Joyce Hoebing CSIS Americas Program 1800 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 Phone: (202) 775-3180 Fax: (202) 775-3199
Contents
Preface ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. i Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Free .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 Partly Free..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 21 Not Free ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 28 About the Author......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 29
Preface
The Caribbean, in part because of its proximity to the United States, is inherently linked to this country. U.S. policy attention, however, has historically only been intermittently focused on the Caribbean, and then generally in times of crises. In the post-cold war period, there is a danger that the region will fade from policy attention precisely at the moment when it must adjust to global economic trends, strengthen its democratic traditions, and cope with a myriad of potential stresses such as drug trafficking and environmental pressures. The Center's interest in the Caribbean CSIS dates back to 1965, when it issued a report on the Dominican crisis. Since then, the Center has focused attention on the U.S.-Caribbean relationship, particularly in the areas of the regional trade agenda, governance, and security issues. In this Policy Paper on the Americas, Douglas Payne takes a close look at each of the countries in the region and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of their democratic systems. This report will be joined by several companion pieces, including U.S.-Caribbean Relations into the 21st Century: Policy Considerations and Democracy in Latin America: An Assessment of U.S. Elections Policy, and a CSIS Report, Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy. Special thanks are due to the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, whose support helps make our work on the Caribbean possible.
Georges A. Fauriol Director and Senior Fellow CSIS Americas Program
Democracy in the Caribbean: A Cause for Concern
Introduction
The Caribbean offers a mixed panorama. The sixteen countries addressed in this study include some of the world's most democratic states, one of its least democratic states, and a handful of states in between. To provide a coherent structure, the individual assessments of each country that follow are grouped into three sections based on the country's ranking free, partly free, or not free in Freedom House's annual Comparative Survey of Freedom in the World. In the Freedom House Survey, "free," "partly free," and "not free" are the broad categories that countries fall into following a detailed evaluation and numerical rating of political rights and civil liberties. There is a great deal of differentiation between countries within each category. Moreover, Freedom House does not view democracy as a static concept, and the Survey recognizes that a country with a formal democratic system does not necessarily place in the "free" category. For example, fifteen of the sixteen Caribbean countries have formal democratic systems. However, of the fifteen, only eleven placed in the "free" category in the most recent Survey. The other four, with a lower combined rating for political rights and civil liberties, placed in the "partly free" category, a broad indication that democratic institutions and the rule of law in those countries are weak. Based on the 1994-1995 Freedom House Survey, which covers the year 1994, the sixteen Caribbean countries addressed in this study are grouped as follows:
Free
Bahamas Barbados Belize Dominica Grenada Guyana Jamaica St. Kitts-Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent and the Grenadines Trinidad and Tobago
Partly Free
Antigua and Barbuda Dominican Republic Haiti Suriname
Not Free
Cuba This study does not address the thirteen U.S. and European dependencies in the Caribbean.1 However, all are
French Guiana (France), Guadeloupe (France), Martinique (France), Aruba (Netherlands), Netherland Antilles (Netherlands), Anguilla (UK), Bermuda (UK), British Virgin Islands (UK), Cayman Islands (UK), Montserrat (UK), Turks and Caicos (UK), Puerto Rico (U.S.),
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internally self-governing to one degree or another and all placed in the "free" category in the 1994-1995 Freedom House Survey. It should also be noted that until recently it was expected that many of these small-island dependencies would follow the path of their brethren toward complete autonomy. But while independence advocates remain active, almost everywhere their cause has become politically unpopular. The shift in attitude toward independence is directly related to the severity of the problems that the Caribbean's small-nation democracies have been confronting. Opinion polls and election results in the dependencies indicate that most residents, recognizing the difficulties, threats, and uncertainties that afflict the region in the post-cold war era, now view maintaining close relations with the colonial power as a safeguard against political instability and economic decline. A review of the annual Freedom House Survey for the last two decades shows that democracy in the twelve nations of the English-speaking Caribbean has proved to be more effective and durable than in any other subregion in the developing world.2 The exceptions have been Guyana, where in 1992 fair elections were held for the first time in over two decades; Grenada, which endured nearly five years of Marxist rule before returning to democratic rule in 1984; and Antigua and Barbuda, which has been dominated by the Bird family for over four decades. However, the parliamentary systems of the English-speaking Caribbean, having survived the cold war mostly intact, are now buffeted by the demands of an unforgiving global economy, the drug and money-laundering networks that flourish within it, population pressures, and an increasing lack of confidence among citizens in the abilities of the political class to address these problems. The result has been mounting stress on democratic systems and the weakening of the institutions upon which they rest. To compete in the global economy, governments in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have been compelled to restructure statist economies. The same goes for the former Dutch colony of Suriname which recently was admitted as a full member of CARICOM. Every Caribbean nation is whipsawed between large trading blocs, and every political party that wins an election finds itself caught between the demands of foreign creditors and uncertain revenues due to the vagaries of tourism and traditional commodity markets. Whatever their ideological appeal or the campaign promises they have made, economic survival means parties in power today must cut budgets and trim public sectors. The political and social costs are evident throughout the region. Political parties have weakened because they have so little room to maneuver once in office, and because their ability to dispense patronage is increasingly limited. Parties may alternate in power through elections, but if the results are the same declines in services and living standards and rising unemployment and crime citizens begin to lose confidence in politics in general. In many countries that has been evident in declining voter turnout rates and increasing levels of emigration and unrest. Although patronage abuse is not uncommon in the English-speaking Caribbean, it has nonetheless been a means of maintaining strong political parties. It has also provided a stepping stone to a political career for the young and talented. But now, with the prospects dimmed by public sector cutbacks, and with the problems of governing looking
U.S. Virgin Islands (U.S.). The twelve nations of the English-speaking Caribbean and the years in which they achieved independence are: Jamaica (1962), Trinidad and Tobago (1962), Barbados (1966), Guyana (1966), Bahamas (1973), Grenada (1974), Dominica (1978), St. Lucia (1979), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (1979), Belize (1981), Antigua and Barbuda (1981), St. Kitts-Nevis (1983).
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intractable, many of the best and brightest are not only foregoing politics, they are leaving the region altogether in a debilitating brain drain. At a time when a number of the older political leaders are passing from the scene, the pool of potential new leaders is shrinking. At the same time, economic and social pressures have exacerbated racial tensions in those countries with multiethnic societies, and have left the region as a whole vulnerable to powerful drug-trafficking and money-laundering cartels that have already begun to corrupt governments, judicial systems, and law enforcement agencies in the region. Venezuela, with a 750-mile Caribbean coastline, has become a principal drug-transshipment point and South American cartels have entrenched subsidiaries in the corruption-plagued Dominican Republic. Traffickers are increasingly laundering money in casinos, resorts, real estate, and offshore banks in the region. Drug-related scandals of varying magnitude have hit throughout the Caribbean in recent years, raising the specter of small island nations coming under the sway of international criminal networks. Every country in the region is grappling with increases in violent, drug-related crime, particularly among youth. The English-speaking Caribbean has been known for high-quality public education. But education systems in many countries are beginning to suffer because of the budget axe. More ominous, however, is that youth, who in most countries could once count on a decent job if they worked hard and made it through school, now confront double-digit unemployment throughout the region, with rates as high as 30 to 40 percent in some countries. Many of those that cannot manage to emigrate to the burgeoning Caribbean communities in the United States and Europe are succumbing to crime and addiction, which in turn is taking a toll on the region's traditionally strong family structures. Finally, at a time when Caribbean democracies are increasingly at risk, the attention of their allies in North America and Europe is drawn more to Haiti, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic, whose combined populations are about four times that of the rest of the nations in the region. Moreover, most Caribbean nations will be affected if upheaval or military intervention causes a drop in the tourist trade or produces a surge of immigrants that leads to a further tightening of U.S. and European immigration policies. The populations of many of the small island states have or will soon reach the saturation point and emigration will remain an important safety valve as CARICOM nations grapple with economic adjustment. This introduction provides only a brief overview of the difficulties that democracy in the Caribbean is confronting. The following survey examines more closely the specific situations and trends in each country. Although democratic institutions are holding up better in some countries than in others, the survey indicates that the survival of even the strongest democracies in the Caribbean cannot be taken for granted.
Free
Bahamas
In the 20 August 1992 election Lyndon O. Pindling and the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) were swept from power after dominating Bahamas politics for a quarter century. Hubert Ingraham, the new prime minister, vowed to bring honesty, efficiency, and accountability to government. Significant steps have been taken. But the Pindling legacy of corruption and nepotism still weighs heavily on the nation's institutions, and the influx of illegal Haitian immigrants remains a source of societal tension and a burden on government facilities. Bahamas is a member of the British Commonwealth. The British monarchy is represented by a governor-general. The bicameral parliament consists of a 49-member House of Assembly elected for five years (subject to dissolution) from single-member constituencies and an appointed Senate. The judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court and a Court of
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Appeal, with the right of appeal under certain circumstances to the Privy Council in London. During the Pindling years the judiciary was compromised by the drug trade and government corruption, and its effectiveness remains in question. Pindling wrested power from the white-minority elite "Bay Street Boys" in 1967 and then led the nation to independence in 1973. He constructed a dynasty based on strong appeals to black nationalism, a buoyant tourism-based economy, and the PLP's vast patronage machine. By the mid-1980s Bahamas had become engulfed in drug-linked corruption as the 700-island nation became a principal transshipment point for South American traffickers. In 1984 a government-appointed commission found that dozens of police and public officials, including some of Pindling's close friends and political associates, received payoffs from drug smugglers. But with the economy prospering, Pindling handily won reelection in 1987. Ingraham, a lawyer in his forties and one-time protege of Pindling, was expelled from the PLP in 1986 for his outspoken criticism of drug-connected corruption in the government. He joined the center-right Free National Movement (FNM) and became party leader in 1990. In 1992 he campaigned against corruption and blamed Pindling's oldstyle politics for a demoralized civil service and an economy that had contracted 20 percent between 1987 and 1991. Pindling fell back on his image as father of independence. But that meant little to younger voters hard hit by a 20percent unemployment rate. Many other voters evidently decided the Pindling government had become ineffectual and unresponsive. With 90 percent of the electorate voting, the FMN's slate of relatively youthful candidates won 32 seats in the House against 17 for the PLP. Pindling retained his seat and became opposition leader in the House. Unlike previous balloting, the vote was relatively free of irregularities and allegations of fraud. In his first two years in office Ingraham made some headway toward reducing a gaping budget deficit and turning the economy around. His government has been far more open to public scrutiny than Pindling's, and it has passed legislation allowing private ownership of media broadcasting outlets. In 1994 Ingraham announced that the 150-year-old libel laws would be overhauled, to free up the press and eliminate the self-censorship that had been prevalent under Pindling. However, cleaning out the government bureaucracy and overturning the culture of corruption posed a more difficult challenge. In 1993 Ingraham established a commission to investigate allegations of misuse of public funds in the former government. By 1994, however, the inquiry remained stalled by PLP court challenges to the legality of the commission. At the same time, Ingraham angrily admitted that the "dehumanizing patronage system" established by Pindling was still operative, as the PLP continued to use political victimization in an attempt to retain control of the civil service. Another matter of concern was the continuing influx of illegal Haitian immigrants. The Haitian community in the Bahamas may now be as high as 50,000, nearly 20 percent of the population. The tide of impoverished refugees has put severe strain on health, welfare, and education facilities and aroused resentment among Bahamians. Following through on a campaign pledge, the Ingraham government has instituted tough new immigration policies. But police round-ups and deportations of hundreds of Haitians have been criticized by rights groups and are unlikely to resolve the problem as long as Haiti remains in turmoil.
Barbados
Over time Barbados has proven to be one of the strongest, most stable democracies in the Caribbean. However, its institutions are under stress owing to a prolonged economic slump, rising drug-related crime, youth disaffection, and questionable leadership. These are some of the challenges now confronting Owen Arthur, who became prime minister in September 1994 following the return to power of the Barbados Labour Party (BLP).
Barbados, a member of the British Commonwealth, gained independence in 1966. The British monarchy is represented by a governor-general. The bicameral parliament consists of a 28-member House of Assembly elected for five years (subject to dissolution) from single-member constituencies and an appointed Senate. The prime minister is the leader of the party commanding a majority in the House. The judicial system, encompassing a High Court and a Court of Appeal, is independent and functions well. The media are vibrant, varied, and among the most professional in the Caribbean. Since independence in 1966, power has alternated between two centrist parties, the BLP and the somewhat more liberal Democratic Labour Party (DLP). Both lost strong, personalistic leaders with the deaths of the BLP's Tom Adams in 1985 and the DLP's Earl "Skipper" Barrow in 1987. Barrow, who had been prime minister at the time, was replaced by his deputy, Erskine Sandiford. In 1989 the DLP suffered a split as four parliamentarians, led by finance minister Richie Haynes, broke off to form the, new more economically conservative New Democratic Party (NDP). Economic issues dominated the January 1991 election campaign. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had declined in 1990 for the first time in seven years, because of decreasing revenues from tourism, sugar, and manufacturing and rising interest on the large foreign debt incurred in the mid-1980s. Sandiford and the DLP retained power, winning 18 seats to the BLP's 10. The NDP, hindered by the first-past-the-post system, failed to win any seats. Sandiford felt compelled to implement an IMF-sponsored austerity program, including an eight percent public sector pay cut. That led in late 1991 to a two-day general strike backed by the BLP, and mass demonstrations, a level of turbulence not seen in Barbados in decades. Sandiford made a slight comeback in 1993 when he secured a wage and price control agreement with labor and the private sector. But unemployment had climbed to unprecedented levels 27 percent according to the government, more than 30 percent according to the unions and real GDP growth was to edge up a mere one percent in 1993 after three straight years of steep decline. Moreover, high unemployment among youth and a rising poverty rate was fueling unmatched levels of drug trafficking, addiction, and crime. Population pressure added further stress as Barbados, with 264,000 people, has one of the highest population densities in the world. Sandiford confronted a mutiny within the DLP. Labor leader Leroy Trotman left the party in 1993 to sit in parliament as an independent. Then, four officials resigned from the cabinet, complaining of Sandiford's increasingly "high-handed" style of rule, a charge echoed in the media. There were indications that within the DLP there was pressure on Sandiford to step down. Under the new leadership of 44-year-old economist Owen Arthur, the BLP stepped up attacks against Sandiford, accusing him of "genuflecting at the altar of the IMF." In May 1994 the BLP tabled a no-confidence motion. Trotman and the four former DLP cabinet officials voted in favor. Fifteen votes, half plus one, were required to pass the motion, which would have required Sandiford to leave office or call an election. However, with BLP MP Delisle Bradshow absent, the tally was only 14-12 in favor of the motion. Sandiford technically had hung on, but he resigned as head of the DLP and called for new elections to be held in September.
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Economic issues and anti-Sandiford sentiments defined the campaign for the September 1994 elections. David Thompson, who had replaced Sandiford as the head of the DLP, claimed that the economy had turned the corner. Arthur and the BLP promised to provide a more dynamic economy, more jobs, and improved investor confidence. The BLP won 19 seats to the DLP's eight, with the NDP winning one. Disturbingly, voter participation dropped to an all-time low of 60.6 percent, down from 62 percent in 1991 and 76 percent in 1986, underscoring the increasing disillusionment with politics, particularly among youth. Both the BLP and DLP confront a duel challenge: tackling long-range economic and social problems that have no easy answers, and restoring confidence among a population increasingly unsure of the capability of the political class to address those problems.
Belize
George Price, who headed governments in Belize for all but five of the last forty years, left office after his centerleft People's United Party (PUP) narrowly lost elections to the center-right United Democratic Party (UDP) on 30 June 1993. Manuel Esquivel, who had ruled in 1984-89, returned as prime minister. The free-market, pro-business policies of both parties have led to economic growth. But Belize's relatively sturdy democratic institutions are under increasing stress as a result of a major influx of immigrants from neighboring Guatemala and El Salvador, government corruption, and rising drug-related crime and gang conflict. Belize also faces a security threat because of renewed saberrattling in Guatemala at the same time Britain is closing its military garrison. Belize, a member of the British Commonwealth, achieved independence in 1981. The British monarchy is represented by a governor-general. The political system is a parliamentary democracy. The bicameral National Assembly consists of a 29-member House of Representatives elected for a five-year term from single-member constituencies (subject to dissolution) and an appointed Senate. The rule of law is strengthened by an independent, nondiscriminatory judiciary. After leading Belize to independence, Price was swept from office by the UDP in the 1984 elections, but returned when the PUP narrowly won in 1989. In May 1993 he called snap elections, apparently compelled to renew his mandate after Britain suddenly announced it would withdraw its Harrier jets and most of its 1,500 troops. Britain established the garrison in the 1970s to protect the former colony from Guatemala, which maintains a 135-year-old claim over Belize. After Guatemala formally recognized Belize in 1992, London believed Belize was secure enough to withdraw its forces. Although the UDP had been hammering Price for a series of corruption scandals, Price was confident of a win because of an upswing in the economy based on sugar and tourism. But widespread concern over the British withdrawal turned to panic when political upheaval struck Guatemala during an attempted coup a month before the vote. Esquivel blamed Price for not being forceful enough in convincing the British to stay.
Unrest in Guatemala also lent resonance to the UDP's anti-immigrant platform. Racial balance in Belize's historically multi-ethnic society is a touchy issue. Tens of thousands of Belizeans, principally English-speaking black Creoles, have emigrated, many to New York and Los Angeles. At the same time, about 40,000 Spanish-speaking Central American immigrants, mostly Guatemalans and Salvadorans, fled to Belize in the 1980s, a huge influx in a country of 205,000. The most recent census showed that English-speakers had fallen from 40 percent of the population in 1980 to 30 percent in 1991, while Spanish-speakers rose from 33 percent to 43 percent. English remains Belize's official language and the societal transformation has been relatively free of turmoil. However, there is latent resentment and the UDP apparently tapped into it by accusing the PUP of manipulating the voter list by registering illegal immigrants. The UDP also scored with allegations that the PUP had lined its pockets through a program that grants citizenship to Asian investors. The two parties fought a fierce campaign, on the stump and in Belize's vibrant, independent media. The UDP narrowly won the election, taking 16 seats to 13 for the PUP. The PUP actually won the popular vote with 51.2 percent. In August 1994, Said Musa, the former foreign minister in the Price government and the heir apparent to Price, and a number of PUP associates, were cleared of charges that they had attempted to bribe two UDP members of the House to cross the floor and bring down the Esquivel government. Despite Esquivel's pleas, London completed the withdrawal of its forces in 1994, but did commit to joint training with the 900-member Belizean Defense Force. At the same time, the Guatemalan government of President Ramiro de Leon Carpio reaffirmed to the United Nations its territorial claim to Belize, although it did not break diplomatic relations. The lightly armed Belizean Defense Force braced itself as the Guatemalan military embarked on a series of provocations along the mostly unmarked border between the two countries. The Esquivel government estimated the British withdrawal would cost Belize $30 million per year, about 5 percent of GDP, and 3,000 jobs. As the government tightened its belt, it confronted a public workers strike in April 1994, the first since 1981, and mounting anger over its failure to curb drug and gang-related violence. Gang violence escalated in the early 1990s when the U.S. deported a number of Belizeans who were involved in Los Angeles gangs. Some 2,000 Belizean teens now belong to gangs modeled after the Crips and the Bloods.
Dominica
Eugenia Charles, the first woman prime minister in the Caribbean, announced in late 1992 that she would not seek a fourth consecutive term in 1995. First elected in 1980, she brought a significant degree of economic and political stability to Dominica following the initial upheaval in the first years after independence in 1978. Her blunt, nononsense style and conservative politics invited comparisons to former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and earned Charles the sobriquet the "Iron Lady of the Caribbean," particularly among her detractors. However, as Charles, now 75-years-old, approaches the end of her career, her political influence has waned, the banana-dependent economy is in difficult straits, and social unrest has again become a threat. Dominica is a member of the British commonwealth. By virtue of the 1978 constitution, it is a "sovereign democratic republic." The head of state is a president elected for five years by the parliament. Parliament consists of the president, a 21-member House of Assembly elected for five years (subject to dissolution) from single-member constituencies and an appointed Senate. The president appoints as prime minister the elected member who commands a majority in the House. An independent judiciary embraces the West Indies Supreme Court (based in St. Lucia). In 1979 Dominica nearly collapsed in chaos and corruption under Prime Minister Patrick John of the leftist Dominica Labour Party (DLP). After his government fell amid massive street protests, Charles, a lawyer, led the Dominica Freedom Party (DFP) to a 17-seat victory in the 1980 elections. She survived two coup attempts in 1981, one in
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which John was implicated. John was convicted on conspiracy charges, imprisoned, and released in 1990. The DLP was taken over by brothers Michael and Rosie Douglas. Rosie has led the party since Michael's death in 1992, and remains an outspoken supporter of Libya, which gave aid to the DLP government following Hurricane David in 1979. Charles restored a semblance of order to the country cutting inflation, improving infrastructure, attracting foreign aid and investment and the DFP won fifteen seats against the DLP in the 1985 elections. In 1990 she confronted a new contender, the United Workers Party (UWP), founded in 1988 by the then 44-year-old Edison James, a former director of Dominica Banana Marketing Corporation, and a group of "Young Turk" businessmen. The UWP said Charles was too old to continue and charged that the DFP was too close to the mulatto establishment, to the economic detriment of the rest of the population. The UWP charged that unemployment was as high as 30 percent, nearly three times what the government claimed. The DFP narrowly won the 1990 elections, taking eleven seats to six for the UWP and four for the DLP. The UWP drew heavy support among banana farmers. Bananas account for 70 percent of exports and over half the population depends directly or indirectly on the industry. The bitter campaign was marked by numerous instances of violence, and voter turnout 65 percent was the lowest since independence. Local analysts believed the elections indicated increasing disaffection with the DFP, the DLP, and politics in general, particularly among youth. In 1991 Charles barely overturned a no-confidence motion by 11-10 in the House. In December 1993 the UWP increased its seats to seven, ousting the incumbent DLP in a by-election in the Carib constituency of Salybia. In mid-1993 foreign minister Brian Alleyne won internal DFP elections to become the new party leader. A number of political observers urged Charles to step down, but she said she would stay on as prime minister until the elections due by September 1995. Meanwhile, the government found itself increasingly cash-strapped, primarily as a result of lower banana earnings due to increased competition from Latin America and the devaluation of the British pound. Dominica remains one of the poorest countries in the Caribbean. The DFP was roundly criticized for enticing Far Eastern investors to Dominica, particularly from Taiwan, with the offer of citizenship. In late April 1994 the government doubled the annual fees for vehicle license plates. The measure sparked a bus driver strike and two days of violent clashes in the capital of Roseau between more than a thousand mostly young, pro-DLP demonstrators and police, a level of upheaval not seen since 1979. Riot police used tear gas to disperse demonstrators who were pelting government headquarters with rocks. The government instituted a state of emergency, with a dusk to dawn curfew, that lasted until May 6. A tense calm was restored after the government scaled back the fee increases. A number of local observers urged Charles not to wait until 1995 to hold elections, but she remained unmoved.
Grenada
Eleven years after a failed revolutionary experiment and the restoration of democratic governance, Grenada is suffering amid political and economic stagnation. Prime Minister Nicholas Braithwaite created a semblance of fiscal stability. But his popularity plummeted because of internal squabbling in his government and high unemployment. He retired from active politics and was replaced as prime minister in February 1995 by Agricultural Minister George Brizan. With elections due in 1995, the political landscape is littered with more than a dozen political parties, mostly one-man operations, and the population appears increasingly disillusioned with their performance. Grenada, a three-island nation that includes Carriacou and Petit Martinique, gained independence in 1974 and is a member of the British Commonwealth. The British monarchy is represented by a governor-general. After the joint U.S.Caribbean intervention in 1983, parliamentary democracy was restored as provided for in the 1974 constitution. The bicameral parliament consists of a 15-member House of Assembly elected for five years (subject to dissolution) from single-member constituencies and an appointed Senate. The judiciary is independent and in 1991 was reinserted into the
West Indies court system (based in St. Lucia) which includes a High Court and Court of Appeals, with right of appeal under certain circumstances to the Privy Council in London. Grenada's political party system remains fragmented and weak. In 1984 Tom Adams, then prime minister of Barbados, and other Eastern Caribbean leaders, had to intervene to forge a coalition among feuding centrist parties to avert the return of Eric Gairy, the former prime minister whose authoritarian rule had paved the way for Maurice Bishop's initially popular armed takeover in 1979. The three-party coalition, the New National Party (NNP), handily defeated Gairy's Grenada United Labour Party (GULP) in the 1984 elections. Within four years the coalition had unraveled, leaving Prime Minister Herbert Blaize with the support of just six representatives in the House at the time of his death in 1989. Five parties contested the 1990 elections. The centrist National Democratic Congress (NDC), led by Braithwaite, former head of the 1983-84 interim government, won seven seats. The GULP won four, the NNP and The National Party (TNP), an NNP splinter, two each. The GULP, NNP, and TNP failed to form a coalition and the governor-general swore in Braithwaite as head of a minority government. The NDC eventually achieved a shaky 10-5 majority with the addition of two defectors from the GULP and one from the NP. Braithwaite, confronting a huge foreign debt, cutbacks in U.S. aid, and declining agricultural revenues, was compelled to initiate a structural adjustment program. In early 1994 a joint World Bank-IMF mission concluded that Grenada had produced a major turn-around in its fiscal position. But the program led to infighting within the government, which nearly fell in 1993, and three cabinet overhauls. It also incurred the wrath of public sector unions and produced widespread discontent as economic growth remained flat, with banana and nutmeg exports taking a price battering, and unemployment nearing 30 percent. Most disturbing has been the deterioration of the education system, the extent to which drugs and guns have permeated the society, and the ensuing toll on increasingly disaffected youth. By mid-1994 the government seemed merely to be going through the motions. In August Braithwaite retired as NDC chief. Agricultural minister George Brizan narrowly won the NDC leadership over attorney general Francis Alexis. Opinion polls in the independent print and broadcast media indicated that none of the seven parties had substantial support and that up to 40 percent of the electorate remained undecided. Underscoring the difficulties encountered by successive democratically elected governments has been the political resiliency of Gairy who, now in his seventies and nearly blind, still commands the support of about 20 percent of the electorate. At the same time, a virtual cult has grown up around the legend of Bishop, particularly among young people. It has not translated into significant political support for the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement, which has failed to surpass five percent of the vote in the last two elections. But the residual strength of the Bishop myth and the staying power of Gairy indicate a longing for the days of the "big man" and are a sign that for many, confidence in democracy is waning.
Guyana
The elections held on 5 October 1992 brought an end to nearly three decades of authoritarian rule under the People's National Congress (PNC). Since then, under President Cheddi Jagan of the still nominally Marxist People's Progressive Party (PPP), Guyana has made some headway toward consolidating democratic rule. Local elections were held in August 1994, the first since 1976. However, the legacies of PNC rule racial animosity, a battered economy, weak democratic institutions, and an undemocratic constitution weigh heavily against the country's prospects. A member of the British Commonwealth, Guyana was ruled from independence in 1966 until 1992 by the black-based PNC. Under President Forbes Burnham, Guyana was redesignated a socialist "cooperative republic" and the PNC retained power through fraudulent elections and repression. In 1980 Burnham installed a constitution that provides for a 65seat National Assembly, but grants overwhelming power to the president. Burnham died in 1985 and was replaced by
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Desmond Hoyte. With the statist economy in shambles, Hoyte began restructuring and turned to the West for assistance. Washington, Canada, and Great Britain tied economic aid to political reform, and Hoyte finally conceded to internationally monitored elections. Jagan moderated his Marxist rhetoric after the collapse of communism. In 1992 the East Indian-based PPP ran as democrats with a group of Indo-Guyanese business people in an alliance called PPP-Civic. In the end, race was a key factor. Since the first elections under internal self-rule in the 1950s, the PNC and the PPP leaned on apan jhaat, a Hindi expression meaning "vote your race." With Indo-Guyanese outnumbering Afro-Guyanese by more than 15 percent, the PPP won every election until 1964, when Burnham won with the covert assistance of Washington and London. The social democratic Working People's Alliance (WPA), the only mixed race party in the country, campaigned for multiracial cooperation. But the campaign was marked by racial polarization and violent flare-ups. As expected, the Indo-Guyanese majority turned out for Jagan. Some in the PNC orchestrated violent attacks against Indo-Guyanese businesses, apparently to establish a pretext to annul the vote. But overseen by observers from the Commonwealth and the Carter Center, the process was completed. Jagan was elected with 52 percent of the vote against 41 percent for Hoyte, percentages that mirror the country's racial composition. WPA candidate Clive Thomas won less than 2 percent of the vote. The PPP won a narrow majority of seats in the Assembly. Jagan promised the PPP would not seek revenge against the PNC. And indeed, Jagan governed during his first year in a generally evenhanded manner. The climate of fear that prevailed under PNC rule had ended. The state-run media was opened to a significant extent and an anti-corruption program was initiated. However, Jagan broke his promise to form a broad-based government by excluding the WPA and independent blacks from his appointments. Moreover, he seemed to back off his commitment to overhaul the 1980 constitution. Some amendments were made regarding electoral procedure in preparation for local elections in August 1994. But in May 1994 Ralph Ramkarran, one of Jagan's top legal advisors, stunned a public forum on constitutional reform by stating that the 1980 document was not as bad as people believed, and that the excessive powers granted to the president should not be feared under the current government. An increasing number of local observers questioned the commitment of Jagan to strengthening democratic rule. Jagan also sent mixed signals on economic policy. Although he did not reverse Hoyte's market reforms, he did slow the pace of privatization. But whatever the thrust of his economic and social policy becomes, the challenge is enormous. Guyana is one of the poorest countries and has one of the highest per capita foreign debts in the hemisphere. The country is resource rich, but the infrastructure, limited to begin with, is shot. The judicial system, once under the thumb of the PNC, is weak and inefficient. In May 1994 the country was paralyzed by a ten-day public sector strike in demand of better wages. Jagan was caught between workers and an IMF requirement to keep salaries low. The strike raised racial tensions as a majority of public sector workers are black, a legacy of the PNC era. The PNC, however, weakened by internal feuding since 1992, was unable to take political advantage. Nonetheless, whatever honeymoon Jagan may have enjoyed appeared to be over. What is troubling in the longer term is the absence of a successor generation that in the end will determine whether democracy succeeds. Jagan is now 77-years-old and Hoyte is in poor health. Both are products of the Burnham era and neither of their parties are internally democratic. Moreover, the brain drain of professionals and teachers continues unabated, the education system is in ruins, and youth are disaffected and drawn to ever more available drugs.
Jamaica
Over the last decade, and amid wrenching attempts at economic restructuring, there has been a steady erosion of Jamaica's democratic institutions. The latest economic restructuring has been applauded by the international financial community. Opinion polls, increasing voter abstention, and large-scale emigration, however, indicate that many
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Jamaicans have little confidence in either of the two main political parties to reverse declining living standards, tackle government corruption, or reduce rising levels of violence rooted in drug activity and gang conflict. Jamaica, a member of the British Commonwealth, achieved independence in 1962. It is a parliamentary democracy, with the British monarchy represented by a governor-general. The bicameral parliament consists of a 60-member House of Representatives elected for five years (subject to dissolution) and an appointed Senate. Executive authority is invested in the prime minister, who is the leader of the majority party in the House. The judicial system is independent, but it is slow, inefficient and frequently unfair, and now appears to be buckling amid mounting crime and increasing allegations of police brutality. Since independence, power has alternated between the social democratic People's National Party (PNP) and the conservative Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). The PNP's Michael Manley was prime minister from 1972 to 1980, and again from 1989 until 1992, when for health reasons he gave way to his deputy, P.J. Patterson, the current prime minister. JLP leader Edward Seaga was prime minister from 1980 to 1989. Beyond the ideological differences, both parties are steeped in the clientelist tradition of Jamaican politics. Each maintains connections with important elements of the local private sector, each has well organized labor union affiliates, and each is supported in urban ghettos by violent, turf-based political gangs, particularly during fiercely fought electoral campaigns. Since the late 1970s both the PNP and the JLP, when in power, have found themselves caught between the patronage and subsidy demands of their political support groups and the need to overhaul a statist economy to compete in the global marketplace. Economic reality won out as Seaga began a restructuring program that Manley, to the surprise of many, and Patterson continued. But the social and political costs, to the parties and to the general population, have been high. When Patterson became PNP leader it marked the end of an era of intense personalistic competition between the towering, light-skinned figures of Manley and Seaga. Patterson and the PNP handily defeated Seaga and the JLP in the 1993 elections, taking 52 seats. The parties differed little on economic policy. Patterson seemed to appeal because he is black (in a country with a 75 percent black majority) and because of his low-key technocratic style that seemed reassuring after years of economic difficulties and fractious politics. But the March 1993 election was marred by thuggery on both sides, police intimidation, large-scale confusion, scattered fraud, and a turnout of 59 percent, the lowest since independence. The JLP boycotted parliament for four months and then refused to participate in two by-elections because of an ongoing dispute with the PNP over electoral reform. Little progress had been made on electoral reform by the end of 1994. A year after his election, Patterson's ratings in the respected Stone poll had plummeted to 26 percent. Labor unrest and militancy among state employees was growing as inflation and the weakening of the local currency continued to cut into purchasing power. Violent crime, including the murders of two priests in the first months of 1994, had reached record-high levels. The PNP's pronouncements about a balanced budget seemed to ring hollow. The JLP did not fare much better in the Stone poll, garnering but 29 percent. Seaga's image has been hurt by his heavy-handedness in throttling dissent within the JLP. On 30 March 1994, the one-year anniversary of the 1993 vote, Seaga asked Jamaicans to stay at home to mark what he called a "day of shame." Except in one JLP stronghold in Kingston, the call was largely ignored. Independent Jamaican analysts underscored the 45 percent "undecided" in the Stone poll, interpreting it as evidence of a lack of confidence in either party. Subsequent polls indicated some shifts in PNP and JLP support, but the large number of undecideds remained constant. A number of analysts continued to warn that the combination of lost trust in politics, continued hard times, citizen insecurity, and mounting population pressure was a recipe for social upheaval.
Douglas W. Payne
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St. Kitts-Nevis
St. Kitts-Nevis, the hemisphere's newest and smallest nation, was rocked by violent clashes following disputed elections held on 29 November 1993. Prime Minister Kennedy Simmonds, who guided the country to independence in 1983 and presided over a growing tourism-driven economy, now heads a minority government that the opposition St. Kitts Labour Party (SKLP) refuses to recognize. The government was further weakened by a stunning drug-and-murder scandal in late 1994, and Simmonds agreed to call new elections no later than 15 November 1995. The continuing political crisis, coupled with the threat to the country's institutions by the regional drug-trafficking and money laundering trade, has put democracy in this two-island nation at risk. St. Kitts-Nevis is a member of the British Commonwealth. The British monarchy is represented by a governorgeneral. The constitution provides for a unicameral National Assembly, with members elected for five years (subject to dissolution) from single-member constituencies, eight on St. Kitts and three on Nevis. The prime minister is the leader of the party or coalition with the most seats in the House. The judiciary is independent and embraces the West Indies Supreme Court (based in St. Lucia), which includes a High Court and a Court of Appeal. There is a right of appeal under certain circumstances to the Privy Council in London. Simmonds and the center-right People's Action Movement (PAM) came to power in the 1980 elections with the support of the Nevis Reformation Party (NRP). After independence, the PAM-NRP coalition won majorities in the 1984 and 1989 elections over a weak and divided SKLP. Simmonds expanded the tourist sector and brought about one of the highest economic growth rates in the region. The social democratic SKLP began a comeback when Denzil Douglas took over the party leadership after the 1989 vote. Douglas, like Simmonds, is a physician. But unlike the mild-mannered 58-year-old prime minister, Douglas is young and fiery. His allegations that Simmonds was paying more attention to the interests of foreign investors than to the interests of the people, and his unproven charges of government corruption, appeared to resonate, particularly among youth. Despite steady economic growth, unemployment remains high possibly 20 percent although the government claims less and the younger segment of the population has been hit the hardest. Meanwhile, the PAM was weakened by a drawn-out power struggle that culminated with Simmonds throwing PAM deputy leader Michael Powell out of the party. On the defensive, the government increasingly limited SKLP access to the state-run broadcast media. The 1993 election campaign was fiercely contested and marked by sporadic violence and mutual allegations about benefiting from "drug money." In the end the SKLP actually won the popular vote on St. Kitts by more than twelve percent. But in the first-past-the-post system, the PAM and the SKLP each won four seats. On Nevis the Concerned Citizens Movement (CCM) won two seats against one for the NRP. The
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CCM, founded in 1992, is led by businessman Vance Amory, another young political newcomer. After the CCM declined to join either the PAM or the SKLP in forming a majority, Governor-General Clement Arrindell asked Simmonds, who had retained his own seat by only 32 votes, to head a minority PAM-NRP government. Douglas denounced the action, noting that the SKLP's percentage of the vote exceeded that of the PAM and the NRP combined. After Simmonds was sworn in on 1 December 1993, Douglas demanded new elections and outraged SKLP supporters initiated three days of violent protests in Basseterre, the capital, that left stores looted and nearly two dozen injured. On 2 December Arrindell declared a 21-day state of emergency and a tense calm was eventually restored. Hundreds of hotel reservations and cruise-line stopovers were canceled. A number of leading Caribbean constitutional experts, including Karl Hudson-Phillips, concluded that Arrindell had no choice but to swear in the minority government after the CCM opted to say neutral. Hudson-Phillips said the SKLP should advocate a change in the electoral system rather than new elections. By mid-1994 Douglas had not backed off his demand for a fresh vote and was supported by two leading church groups on St. Kitts and the Barbados-based Caribbean Rights group. More violent clashes between SKLP demonstrators and police occurred during the opening of parliament, boycotted by the SKLP, in January 1994, and again in February during the government's presentation of the budget. In May Douglas and the other three SKLP MPs took their seats, but just long enough to take the oath of office. Douglas stated the SKLP had forestalled a government plan to declare the seats vacant and hold by-elections. He reiterated his demand for a new vote and his contention that the PAM-NRP government was "unconstitutional and illegal." Some observers noted that the impasse could be resolved if the SKLP and the CCM were to unite behind a noconfidence vote. But others believed that was unlikely since Nevis has traditionally been an anti-SKLP enclave owing to the antagonistic posture of the party toward the island during its years in power before independence. The government received a brutal shock in the fall of 1994. In October, a police official, who had been investigating the murder of one of Deputy Prime Minister Sydney Morris's sons, was killed. In November, two of Morris's sons were arrested on drugs and firearms charges, and were also implicated in the murder of their brother. Morris was forced to resign. That same month a "forum for national unity" was held, chaired by the Chamber of Commerce and attended by the main political parties, church organizations, and the bar association. All agreed to a political cooling-off period at least through the end of 1994, and the Simmonds government agreed to hold new elections by 15 November 1995.
Douglas W. Payne
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St. Lucia
Prime Minister John Compton won a third straight five-year term as the conservative United Workers Party (UWP) easily defeated the social democratic St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP) in the April 1992 elections. Compton was rewarded in large part for his steerage of a growing economy. But St. Lucia has since been buffeted by upheaval and violent clashes in the crucial banana industry, allegations of government corruption, increasing crime, disaffection among youth, and penetration by the regional drug trade. St. Lucia's democracy is not necessarily in immediate peril. But the UWP under Compton, now 70-years-old, has been a oneman show, as has the SLP under the leadership of volatile businessman Julian Hunte. The question is whether St. Lucia can produce a new generation of politicians capable of addressing the country's ever more pressing problems. St. Lucia is a member of the British Commonwealth. The British monarchy is represented by a governor-general. The bicameral parliament consists of a 17-member House of Assembly elected for five years (subject to dissolution) from single-member constituencies and an appointed Senate. The prime minister is the leader of the majority party in the House. The judicial system is independent and includes a High Court under the West Indies Supreme Court (based in St. Lucia), with ultimate appeal under certain circumstances to the Privy Council in London. Soon after leading the nation to independence in 1979, the UWP lost elections to the SLP. SLP rule was marked by internal disputes and government paralysis, which led to the return of Compton and the UWP in the 1982 elections. A radical-left faction of the SLP broke away and formed the Progressive Labour Party (PLP), which has not won a seat in any subsequent election. In the 1987 elections the UWP won a narrow 9-8 victory over the SLP, which had been resuscitated under the new leadership of Hunte. Compton, desiring a stronger mandate, asked for new elections, but the UWP again won by 9-8. In his second term, Compton's skilled management of the economy paid off, as 1989 marked the first of four years of growth. The 1992 election campaign was bitterly fought, with some incidents of violence and an exchange of personal accusations, including one by The Star, an anti-Compton weekly, that accused him of conducting an affair with a teenaged student. The fiery Hunte charged that Compton was running a "benevolent dictatorship" based on clientelism and abuse of the constitution. Compton ran on his economic record, dismissing allegations by the SLP that social services had deteriorated under his rule. Compton was aided by the increasingly unpredictable behavior of Hunte, who faced criminal charges for a scuffle during an electoral boundaries commission meeting. The UWP prevailed, taking eleven seats to the SLP's six. Compton soon encountered serious problems. By fall 1993 claims of corruption in the civil service were rampant in the media. The attorney general described the increase in crime, particularly among youth, as "staggering." The police commissioner stated that the island had become a focal point for illegal drug transshipments. Civic leaders were warning that the regional drug trade endangered the social and economic well-being of the nation. Then, banana farmers went on strike for three days in October 1993 to protest low earnings caused by increased competition from Latin America and the devaluation of the British pound. During clashes with police two farmers were shot dead. In January 1994, the agency that provides price support for banana farmers went into receivership. In April, a major banana boxing plant was destroyed by a fire that police believed was the result of arson. The government stated that St. Lucians could expect a steep tax hike to make up for high losses. The banana industry employs 30 percent of the labor force and accounts for 55 percent of foreign currency earnings. Since his reelection Compton has hinted he might step down before the end of his term. But after dominating the UWP for nearly three decades, he appeared to have done little to groom a successor generation. In turn, the SLP did not seem to strike St. Lucians as an attractive alternative, especially after Hunte drummed deputy SLP leader Peter Josie out of the party after Josie challenged him for the SLP leadership. Meanwhile, continuing reports in the media
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of government corruption led to widespread demands for a formal investigation.
Prime Minister James F. Mitchell, leader of the center-right New Democratic Party (NDP), won a third term in elections held on 21 February 1994. A united center-left opposition won only three seats in parliament, but that was three more than in 1989 when the NDP swept all fifteen seats. The nation's parliamentary democracy does not appear to be in any immediate jeopardy, but there is stress on democratic institutions after five years of government without a formal opposition. St. Vincent and the Grenadines, a member of the British Commonwealth, achieved independence in 1979. The British monarchy is represented by a governor-general. The bicameral parliament consists of a 15-member House of Assembly with members elected for five years from single-member constituencies (subject to dissolution) and an appointed Senate. The prime minister is the leader of the party or coalition commanding a majority in the House. The judiciary is relatively independent but often inefficient. The highest court apart from a right of appeal in certain circumstances to the Privy Council in London is the West Indies Supreme Court (based on St. Lucia), which includes a Court of Appeal and a High Court, one of whose judges is resident on St. Vincent. Mitchell became prime minister in 1984 when the NDP, which he founded in 1975, defeated the incumbent, moderately socialist St. Vincent Labour Party (SVLP). Mitchell instituted a relatively successful market reform and economic development program. The NDP's more conservative tilt was underscored by its joining the International Democratic Union.
Douglas W. Payne
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After the NDP swept the 1989 elections, Mitchell was accused by some of running a "parliamentary dictatorship." On more than a few occasions parliament skipped its regular sittings and policies were announced without public discussion. It did not appear, however, that Mitchell abused his overwhelming mandate in any significant way. Nonetheless, Mitchell's rule has been very much a one-man show. His younger cabinet ministers have been reluctant to challenge him or risk offering new ideas, an arrangement Mitchell has continued to cultivate. Prior to the 1994 elections the SVLP formed an electoral alliance with the leftist Movement for National Unity (MNU). The MNU is led by Ralph Gonsalves, a leading Marxist theoretician in the Caribbean who in the 1980s adopted a more social democratic line. Gonsalves and SVLP leader Stanley John agreed that former SVLP leader Vincent Beache would lead the alliance. The campaign was hotly contested in the media and on the stump. Radio is state-run and biased toward the NDP, but the opposition is allotted equal time during electoral campaigns. Issues included the mounting crime and drug problems and the rate of unemployment, which the government claims is 19 percent but may actually be more than 40 percent. The SVLP-MNU also campaigned for political reform. It advocated reducing the powers of the prime minister, creating the post of ombudsman and reorganizing the civil service to ensure against political victimization by the ruling party. Campaigns have traditionally been marked by sporadic violence and 1994 was no exception. The night before the vote a rock-throwing clash between NDP and SVLP-MNU supporters left one dead and dozens injured. The vote took place in a generally peaceful and orderly manner. Beache, Gonsalves, and SVLP newcomer Louis Straker won 3 seats for the SVLP-MNU, with Mitchell and the NDP taking the other twelve. There were no allegations of significant irregularities. Three weeks later, however, the SVLP-MNU disputed the outcome by filing petitions and a constitutional motion before the High Court. The grounds dealt with elements of the process that preceded the vote, e.g. voter registration. Some Vincentian analysts believed the SVLP-MNU was motivated more by politics than a genuine belief that the electoral process was flawed. The case, with appeals, was expected to continue into 1995. Adding to the rancor between Mitchell and the SVLP-MNU was a procedural row that led the SVLP-MNU to walk out of the first parliamentary session after the election. The high level of distrust after five years of government without a formal opposition raises the question of the efficacy of the first-past-the-post system in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, as well as other small-island parliamentary democracies. In 1989, 33.5 percent of the electorate in St. Vincent and the Grenadines voted for the opposition and ended up with no representation in parliament. Also cause for concern is the decline in voter participation from 89 percent in 1984, to 72 percent in 1989, to 65.6 percent in 1994. The strength of democracy in St. Vincent and the Grenadines will therefore depend upon responsible behavior from its political class, including a willingness to pay greater attention to civic education.
Trinidad and Tobago

The promise of new young leadership under Prime Minister Patrick Manning of the People's National Movement (PNM) has been dampened by severe economic and social problems that are putting one of the Caribbean's strongest democracies to the test. Trinidad and Tobago's institutions withstood one body blow the bloody coup attempt by a small group of Muslim extremists in 1991 that sent tremors along the fault lines of an ethnically divided society. Now, the oildependent economy remains in a prolonged slump, the foreign debt remains high, political polarization is sharpening, and institutions are being eroded by drug-related crime and corruption. The two-island nation, a member of the British Commonwealth, achieved independence in 1962. Under the 1976 constitution the nation became a republic with a president, elected by a majority of both houses in parliament, replacing the former governor-general. Executive authority is invested in the prime minister. The bicameral parliament
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consists of a 36-member House of Representatives elected for five years and an appointed Senate. The prime minister is the leader of the party or coalition commanding a majority in the House. Tobago, which accounts for about 5 percent of the nation's area and population, has internal self-government. An independent judiciary is headed by a Supreme Court, which consists of a High Court and a Court of Appeal, with right of ultimate appeal to the Privy Council in London. The black-based PNM was founded in 1956 by Dr. Eric Williams and controlled the government without interruption for thirty years. After his death in 1981 Williams was succeeded by George Chambers. In the 1986 elections the PNM was swept from office by the newly formed National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR), an unprecedented coalition of black and East Indian elements led by A.N.R. Robinson. Robinson inherited a bloated state bureaucracy and an economy in decline since the end of the oil boom in the early 1980s. An austerity and restructuring program caused Robinson's popularity to plummet. That exacerbated divisions between blacks and East Indians in the ruling coalition, which culminated in the expulsion of Basdeo Panday, who then formed the East-Indian based United National Congress (UNC). In July 1991, the radical Jamaat-al-Muslimeen seized and held the nation's parliament for five days before surrendering when the government promised an amnesty. The incident sparked rampant looting, set back tourism, heightened tension between the roughly equal black (43 percent) and East-Indian (40 percent) populations, and left the Robinson government gasping. Five months later the PNM returned to power under the new leadership of Manning, taking 21 of 36 parliamentary seats. The UNC came second with 13 seats, followed by the discredited NAR with two. Manning, a bright 46-year-old pragmatist, put together a cabinet of mostly young technocrats and promised structural adjustment "with a human face." By early 1994, however, finance minister Wendell Mottley admitted the country's finances remained a "major nightmare," the result of having to service a $2,416 per capita foreign debt with reduced income from oil, which accounts for 70 percent of the economy. Meanwhile, privatization efforts had angered the country's powerful labor unions who were threatening a general strike, and two years of economic decline had pushed unemployment up to at least 25 percent, higher among youth. Opinion polls indicated an increasingly anxious population concerned about a steep rise in drug abuse and drugrelated violent crime. The nation sits off the coast of Venezuela along a prime drug transshipment route and has been vulnerable to heavily armed drug gangs and money-launderers. In the wake of police corruption scandals and an upswing in charges of police brutality, the government in 1994 assigned 300 armed soldiers from the Defense Force to patrol high crime areas. Crime threatens the government's promotion of foreign investment, which is crucial in easing the loss of public sector jobs due to privatization. By spring 1994, with the strident Panday hammering at the government over alleged corruption, and with ethnic tensions simmering amid the social deterioration, polls showed that the UNC had overtaken the PNM in popularity. Complicating matters was the announcement by Jamaat-al-Muslimeen leader Yasin Abu Bakr that he had founded the New National Vision Party to contest the elections due by the end of 1996. Charges of treason and murder against Bakr and more than a hundred followers were dismissed when the Court of Appeal ruled that the amnesty given to them during the 1990 insurrection was valid. Bakr was seeking support from the poor, especially in urban areas, who now make up close to 25 percent of the population. The stagnant economy, rising crime, and continued charges of corruption have damaged the Manning government, which seemed ready to call elections in 1995, a year before they are required.
Partly Free
Antigua and Barbuda
Douglas W. Payne
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Vere Cornwall Bird, now 85-years-old, and his two eldest sons, Vere Jr. and Lester, have dominated politics in Antigua and Barbuda for decades. Lester replaced his father as prime minister after winning tainted elections on 8 March 1994. Lester promised "modernization," but the prospects appeared more for business as usual. Under Vere Sr., who founded the Antigua Labour Party (ALP) in the 1960s, rule has been based more on power and the abuse of authority than on law. The constitution that established a parliamentary democracy at independence in 1981 and the nominally independent judiciary have consistently been disregarded. A series of government corruption scandals beginning in the 1970s led a commission of inquiry headed by prominent British jurist Louis Blom-Cooper to conclude in 1990 that Antigua and Barbuda faced being "engulfed in corruption" and had fallen victim to "persons who use political power as a passport to private profit."
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Antigua and Barbuda is a member of the British Commonwealth. The British monarchy is represented by a governorgeneral. The bicameral parliament consists of a 17-member House of Representatives elected for five years (subject to dissolution) from single-member constituencies and an appointed Senate. The prime minister is the leader of the party or coalition commanding a majority in the House. In the 1984 and 1989 elections, the ALP machine steamrolled a weak and divided opposition amid credible allegations of serious electoral irregularities and police intimidation. In 1992, however, the exposure of a scheme in which Vere Sr. siphoned public funds into his personal account spurred the opposition to unite behind a successful general strike and the largest protests ever against Bird rule. The center-left United National Democratic Party (UNDP) and the leftist Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement (ACLM) then merged to form the United Progressive Party (UPP). The UPP also includes remnants of the Progressive Labour Movement (PLM), which had held power in 1971-76, the only period the Birds have not ruled Antigua and Barbuda since the advent of internal self-government in the late 1950s. UNDP chief Baldwin Spencer, a labor leader who had won the only opposition seat in 1989 aside from Hilbourne Frank of the Barbuda People's Movement (BPM), became UPP leader. Tim Hector, head of the ACLM and editor of the outspoken weekly Outlet that has been at the forefront in exposing government corruption, became deputy leader. Following the general strike, Vere Sr. announced he would not run in the elections due in 1994. Lester became ALP leader in September 1993 after cutting a deal with Vere Jr. In exchange for the backing of convention delegates controlled by Vere Jr., Lester helped his brother obtain the ALP chairmanship. Lester also promised Vere Jr. a ministry in his government, despite the recommendation by Blom-Cooper that Vere Jr. "should not hold any public office again" because of his central role in an international arms smuggling scandal in 1990. During the 1994 election campaign, Lester portrayed himself as an agent of change and modernization. But the conduct of the elections indicated otherwise. The elections were neither free or fair because (1) the balloting system did not guarantee a secret vote, (2) the ALP dominates the nation's broadcast media, (3) the voter registration system is deficient, (4) the voter registry was inflated by up to 30 percent by names of people who had died or emigrated, and (5) the electoral law allows the ruling party to abuse the power of incumbency patronage and state spending with impunity and without limit. Moreover, Lester schemed to make it appear that the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Carter Center had somehow sanctioned the elections when in fact they had not. If Lester intends to conduct business as usual, it will not be as easy as in the past. Unlike his father, he now confronts a galvanized, united apposition. The UPP, despite an enormous disadvantage, won five seats in parliament against the ALP's eleven. In a free and fair vote, the UPP very conceivably could have won a majority. It nonetheless accepted the outcome because it believed, with reason, that political momentum was now on its side. Lester made many enemies in the ALP during the succession battle and has since riled Vere Jr., who won reelection in his constituency yet again, by breaking his promise to give him a cabinet post. In addition, Antigua and Barbuda faces a looming economic crisis. With revenues declining amid mounting debt obligations, Lester will be hard pressed to keep the ALP patronage machine fueled. Meanwhile, in 1994 there were fresh allegations by U.S. Drug Enforcement Agencies that public officials were participating in, or were acquiescent to, drug-related activities.
Dominican Republic
Two consecutive disputed elections, combined with endemic official corruption and a deeply rooted tradition of conspiratorial, authoritarian politics, have made the Dominican Republic's already frail democracy increasingly unsteady. The bitter, racially charged 1994 election campaign left this impoverished nation polarized and on the verge of severe unrest.
Douglas W. Payne
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Since achieving independence from Spain in 1821, and following the occupation by Haiti (1821-44), the Dominican Republic has endured recurrent domestic conflict. The assassination of General Rafael Trujillo in 1961 ended thirty years of dictatorial rule but led to renewed turmoil. The military overthrow of the leftist Juan Bosch in 1963 led to civil war and U.S. military intervention in 1965. In 1966, under a new constitution, civilian rule was restored with the election of the right-wing Joaqun Balaguer, formerly a puppet president under Trujillo. The constitution provides for a president directly elected for four years and a congress consisting of a 120member Chamber of Deputies and a 30-member Senate, also elected for four years. The president is endowed with enormous powers, while the legislative and judicial branches are weak and, under Balaguer, have been generally subservient to the executive branch. Despite the structures of formal democracy, rule in the Dominican Republic is based more on power and influence than on law. Balaguer, supported by the military and old-line economic elites, has been in power for all but eight years since 1966. Without the firm intervention of President Jimmy Carter, the winner of the 1978 election, Antonio Guzman of the social democratic Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), would not have been allowed to take office. The PRD, while in power from 1978 to 1986, was hamstrung economically by the collapse of the sugar market and politically by constant pressure from the military and Balaguer's allies in the business community. But the PRD also fell into the clientilism and corruption that are the lifeblood of Dominican politics, tarnishing its once promising reformist image. Balaguer returned to power in the 1986 elections as his Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC), more an elite-backed, personalistic vehicle than a party, defeated the PRD. Juan Bosch, who had broken away from the PRD in the 1970s to form the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), placed third.
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The 1990 election took place amid an economic slump and mounting social unrest. Bosch made a strong run at the increasingly centralized rule of his fellow octogenarian, Balaguer. But Balaguer was declared the winner following a tight vote marred by serious irregularities and a two-month, suspect recount by the government-influenced electoral authorities. Balaguer, despite blindness and poor health, continues to skillfully practice a soft brand of authoritarian rule within the framework of formal democracy. But social tensions have risen as the gap between rich and poor has widened and unemployment has climbed toward 25 percent. Moreover, the emergence of an array of civic organizations and a vibrant media now provide channels of expression for many in the middle and lower classes who have grown increasingly dissatisfied with Balaguerism. In 1994, PRD presidential candidate Jos Francisco Pea Gomez tapped into that dissatisfaction, adding to his already strong base among the poor, and led in the polls as the elections approached. On the defensive, the Balaguer machine unleashed a campaign of race-based attacks that branded Pea Gomez, who is black, a Haitian and virtually accused him of secretly planning to unite the two neighboring countries. Although 85 percent of Dominicans are at least partially black, many harbor a strong antipathy toward Haiti because of the Haitian 1821-44 occupation of the Dominican Republic and fear of the present turmoil in Haiti. The attacks against Pea Gomez, ugly even by Dominican standards, were effective and narrowed the gap in the polls between him and Balaguer to a few points. The PRD and international observers concluded that a significant number of voters, particularly in PRD strongholds, were left off the official registration list and had been unable to vote. The PRD claimed the figure was around 200,000 and the international community put the number between 50,000 and 100,000. That certainly could have affected the outcome given that Balaguer was winning by less than 30,000 votes when the electoral commission stopped issuing results with 96 percent of votes counted. As in 1990, Balaguer claimed victory and the electoral commission announced it had begun a recount. The commission's neutrality is questionable because the executive branch controls its budget and resources. Pea Gomez argued that a recount was meaningless because fraud had been perpetrated through manipulation of the voter lists. Amid rising tensions, he demanded a public accounting and investigation of the lists. Balaguer at first adopted the same strategy as in 1990 wait for international eyes to focus elsewhere, then have the electoral commission declare him the winner. In 1990 that led to protests by Bosch supporters and violent crackdowns by security forces. But in 1994, street protests and international pressure particularly from the United States compelled Balaguer to negotiate. With the OAS mediating, Balaguer and Pea Gomez agreed that Balaguer's term in office would be shortened to 18 months (as opposed to four years), with elections to be held in November 1995. Balaguer also agreed not to run for reelection. The new Congress, however, lengthened Balaguer's term to two years and set a new election date of May 1996, prompting the PRD to boycott Balaguer's inauguration.
Haiti
Democratically-elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide was restored to Haiti's presidency in October 1994. Haiti's economy was devastated by the three years of military rule, and its democratic institutions are fragile if not dysfunctional. Tremendous hurdles remain for Aristide, the United States, and the UN as they attempt to rebuild the country. Haiti has a long history of instability and dictatorship. The Duvalier family's 29 years of rule was ended in 1986 by a military coup, but the army ruled the country for the next five years. The international community pressured the military to allow the election of a constituent assembly, which drafted the 1987 constitution. The constitution calls for a five year, elected presidency, an elected parliament consisting of a 27-member Senate and an 83-member House of Representatives, and a prime minister appointed by the president.
Douglas W. Payne
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Aristide, a charismatic left-wing priest, was elected in the internationally-monitored December 1990 elections, winning with 67 percent of the vote. Aristide's government, formed of loyal but inexperienced supporters, took steps to strengthen the judicial system and to place the military under civilian rule. Political violence was reduced, although Aristide occasionally exceeded his constitutional authority by calling for violence to defend his government. Haiti's elites and the military were threatened economically by Aristide's changes. In September 1991, there were indications that the military was preparing a coup. Aristide suggested in a speech that his followers support him by "necklacing" burning tires around the necks of government opponents. Aristide was overthrown on 30 September 1991. Over the next three years, General Raoul Cdras, General Philippe Biamby, and Lieutenant Colonel Michel Franois, ruled the country, at times through puppet civilian presidents. The three-year crisis was marked by severe repression by the military and continually tightened international economic sanctions. In the summer of 1993 the military and Aristide signed the Governors Island Agreement, which called for the resignation of Cdras and the reinstatement of Aristide by October 1993. The military reneged on the agreement and created an armed front group, the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), headed by Duvalierists. The Clinton administration, in response to pressures from U.S.-based Aristide supporters and threats of a continued refugee crisis, prepared for an invasion. Cdras and Biamby, in last-minute negotiations with a U.S. team led by former president Jimmy Carter, agreed to step down by 15 October 1994 and allow a U.S. military presence during Aristide's restoration. Franois resigned on 4 October and left for the Dominican Republic. Cdras and Biamby left for Panama on 10 October. Aristide returned to Haiti on 15 October, and called for reconciliation. He named Smarck Michel, a proponent of free-market economics and a member of the business community, as prime minister. He also underscored his commitment to reconciliation by appointing a more broadly-based cabinet. Presidential elections will be held in December 1995, with Aristide's successor to take office in February 1996. In the interim, Aristide must contend with virtually nonexistent political institutions and an economy that has been decimated. His conciliation efforts appear to have disappointed many of his supporters. Perhaps most important, there is a security vacuum. Aristide has disbanded the military and ordered the dismantling of the network of rural section chiefs. The UN force, which took over from the United States on 31 March 1995, is faced with a hastily-trained Haitian police force and thousands of former FRAPH members and disgruntled former soldiers who remain armed. After the 1991 coup the judiciary system essentially served as an arm of the military. The task of overhauling the system and establishing legitimate legal authority is enormous. The civil society that had been suppressed under military rule has started to reorganize, but resources are severely limited and security uncertain, at best. Haiti's future is dependent on Aristide's ability to make significant inroads in strengthening democratic institutions and rebuilding the economy. But with the approach of parliamentary elections scheduled for 4 June 1995, the great expectations created by his return were turning into frustration over the slow pace of economic development and fear of mounting crime and political violence.
Suriname
Suriname returned to elected civilian rule for the second time in 1991. But it is experiencing severe difficulties in overcoming years of military dictatorship that infected a multi-ethnic society rooted in the gentler traditions of the Caribbean with the fear and political violence common to Latin countries. In 1994 the government of President Ronald Venetiaan appeared stymied by a collapsing economy, renewed social unrest, and political violence. With former military ruler Desi Bouterse looking to press the advantage, the question was whether the country's weak democratic
23
institutions could withstand the stress. Suriname has a presidential-parliamentary system based on the constitution implemented in 1987. A 51-member National Assembly is elected for a five-year term and selects the nation's president. The judiciary, nominally independent, is weak and ineffective, particularly in addressing government corruption and human rights cases. The media is relatively free, but subject to anonymous threats that cause a degree of self-censorship. The 1991 elections were won by the New Front (NF). It is basically the same coalition of Hindustani, Creole, and Javanese parties that won in 1987 and was ousted in 1990 in the second military coup since independence from the Netherlands in 1975. The NF won thirty seats and Bouterse's National Democratic Party (NDP) twelve. Nine seats were won by Democratic Alternative 91 (DA 91), an ethnically mixed coalition led by young professionals who campaigned against corruption. The NF's candidate, Venetiaan, an educator and leader of a Creole-based party, became president. In 1992, Venetiaan, backed by the OAS, the Netherlands, and the United States, faced down Bouterse, who resigned from the military after the Assembly approved constitutional reforms that removed the military's right to intervene in politics. Venetiaan also concluded a peace accord with two guerrilla groups, the Bush Negro-based Jungle Commando and the Amerindian Tucuyana Amazonas. In 1993 the Netherlands announced it was halting balance-of-payment subsidies to the debt-strapped economy until it conformed to IMF restructuring guidelines. Venetiaan subsequently survived a no-confidence vote in the Assembly, but the ruling coalition remained caught between the need to cut back spending and widespread discontent over rapidly declining living conditions and rising inflation (105 percent in 1993). The DA 91 boycotted the last legislative session in 1993 and demanded that Venetiaan resign, a demand echoed by Bouterse who led a demonstration of 5,000 in the capital of Paramaribo, a city of less than 70,000. Amid strikes by the country's well-organized unions and anonymous threats against government figures, the homes of National Assembly chairman Jaggernath Lachmon and a prominent businessman were attacked with grenades and molotov cocktails. Venetiaan and Lachmon blamed Bouterse. Tensions rose further in April 1994 when a previously unknown Bush-Negro group, the Suriname Liberation Front, took 30 hostages at a hydroelectric dam south of Paramaribo. The guerrillas, citing the government's harsh austerity measures, threatened to blow up the dam unless Venetiaan resigned. Stanley Rensch, a Bush Negro who is the country's most respected human rights advocate, attempted to mediate. Bouterse held a rally to state that the NDP was ready to assume leadership of the government. An army commando finally recaptured the dam but no rebels were captured. Rensch accused Bouterse of surreptitiously encouraging the rebels. Bouterse continues to cast a long, dark shadow over Suriname. Even though he no longer commands the army, Surinamers know he is unpredictable and violent. Memories of the most brutal period of his rule (1980-87) he traumatized the country by executing fifteen prominent political opponents in 1982 have not faded, and he has never been held accountable for myriad human rights violations by the military. By mid-1994, polls showed that the goal of a majority of Surinamers, especially youth and professionals, was to leave the country for the Netherlands. The economy was in tatters and unemployment among those under thirty was close to 75 percent. Suriname enjoyed South America's highest per capita income when it gained independence from the Netherlands in 1975. But in the first half of 1994, Paramaribo hospitals reported nearly a hundred cases of children suffering from malnutrition, while reports from the interior indicated that conditions there were far worse. Anxiety heightened in late 1994 amid violent protests against the government's economic restructuring program and renewed coup rumors.
Douglas W. Payne
24
Not Free
Cuba
Cuba remains a one-party, communist state dominated by Fidel Castro. But with the fall of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Castro is now caught between the need to reform an economy in danger of collapse and his fear of unleashing forces that could undermine his control of Cuban society. Communist structures were institutionalized by the 1975 constitution at the first congress of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC). The constitution provides for a National Assembly which, in theory, designates a Council of State which, in turn, appoints a Council of Ministers in consultation with its president who serves as head of state and chief of government. In reality, Castro is responsible for every appointment. As president of the Council of Ministers, chairman of the Council of State, commander in chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and the first secretary of the PCC, Castro controls every lever of power in Cuba. The PCC is the only authorized political party and it controls all government entities from the national to the municipal level. The elections for the National Assembly held in 1993 were totally controlled by the state, with only candidates that supported the regime allowed to participate. All political activity outside the PCC is illegal. Political dissent, spoken or written, is a punishable offense. The educational system, the judicial system, labor unions, professional organizations, and all media are controlled by the state. Outside of the Catholic church, whose scope remains limited by the government, there is little semblance of independent civil society. Between 1990 and 1993 the Cuban economy contracted by an estimated 50 percent. Since mid-1993, with Cuba seemingly on the verge of devolving into a pre-industrial society, Castro has made a series of economic reforms legalization of the U.S. dollar, limited self-employment, the opening of farm markets, and the opening of more state-run industries to foreign investment. The aim is to increase hard currency flows. But the measures have heightened social tensions, as those with access to dollars from abroad have emerged as a new monied class, and resulted in a boom in the black market. In April 1994 Castro, fearing the anything-goes atmosphere created by the black market and the potential for unleashing uncontrollable forces in Cuba society, cracked down on illegal economic activities in an operation called "Giron '94." The crackdown came in the wake of stepped-up harassment, repression, and imprisonment the government's daily and endemic weapons against dissidents and human rights activists that began in late 1993. In a report released in February 1995, the OAS's Inter-American Human Rights Commission concluded that in 1994 "the human rights situation in general has continued to worsen." That, combined with grave economic conditions, has produced "a situation that could generate a social explosion." In August 1994, Castro announced that the government would no longer stop Cubans from departing the island. The announcement sparked a wave of over 35,000 boat people, most of whom were picked up at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard and sent to U.S. camps in Panama and Guantanamo Bay. Ultimately, the United States agreed to accept at least 20,000 Cuban immigrants each year, and Cuba stopped the flow of boat people. The United States agreed to continue talks on immigration, but refused to discuss the matter of the embargo. It is difficult to determine how long the Cuban people will tolerate a diet of deprivation and repression. Numerous scenarios have been offered for how political change might come about in Cuba. But it seems that the prospects for a more open system will require at least Castro's passing from the scene. Knowing that he won't last forever, Castro appears intent on making the challenge of rebuilding and democratizing Cuba as difficult as he possibly can. If and when the opportunity for democratization arise, it will mean starting from scratch. Cuba has almost no tradition of democratic governance, and few Cubans remember the brief periods of elected government that occurred prior to the 1950s. Most difficult will be overturning the widespread disaffection of Cuban youth, who have known
25
nothing but tropical Stalinism and its pathetic expiration. The depth of the desperation among some youth was indicated by reports from Cuba in 1994 that dozens, possibly hundreds, of Cuban youths had intentionally injected themselves with the HIV virus to gain admittance to relatively comfortable government-run sanitariums.
About the Author

Douglas W. Payne has been the director of hemispheric studies at Freedom House since 1987. He has traveled extensively and observed elections throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. He has testified on regional issues before the U.S. Congress, written numerous monographs and Freedom House Special Reports, and is the coauthor of Latin America: U.S. Policy After the Cold War. Mr. Payne is also the author of CSIS Latin American Election Study Series reports on the 1994 St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda, elections.

Democracy in The Caribbean

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DEMOCRACY IN THE CARIBBEAN

A CAUSE FOR CONCERN

Policy Papers on the Americas

Democracy in the Caribbean

Policy Papers on the Americas Volume VI Study 3

CSIS Americas Program

Georges A. Fauriol Director and Senior Fellow CSIS Americas Program

Democracy in the Caribbean: A Cause for Concern

Democracy in the Caribbean: A Cause for Concern

Democracy in the Caribbean: A Cause for Concern

Democracy in the Caribbean: A Cause for Concern

Democracy in the Caribbean: A Cause for Concern

Democracy in the Caribbean: A Cause for Concern

Democracy in the Caribbean: A Cause for Concern

Democracy in the Caribbean: A Cause for Concern

of government corruption led to widespread demands for a formal investigation.

Trinidad and Tobago

Democracy in the Caribbean: A Cause for Concern

Democracy in the Caribbean: A Cause for Concern

Democracy in the Caribbean: A Cause for Concern

Democracy in the Caribbean: A Cause for Concern

Democracy in the Caribbean: A Cause for Concern

About the Author

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