2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Beyond Security Towards Peace

MEDIA INFORMATION

Preparatory Secretariat 2012.03

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Part I. The Nuclear Security Summit
A.Overview of the Nuclear Security Summit B.Development of Discussions on Nuclear Security C.Outcomes of the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit

Part II. Significance of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit

D.Importance of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit E. Expected Outcomes F. Information of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit G.Preparation for the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit

Part III. Glossary Part IV. Contacts

I. The Nuclear Security Summit

A. Overview of the Nuclear Security Summit
A world free from nuclear and radiological terrorism
The Nuclear Security Summit is a premiere international forum that aims to stop and prevent nuclear terrorism which has emerged as a serious threat and challenge to global security in the 21st century. As a premiere forum, more than fifty heads of state and four representatives of major international organizations participate in the Nuclear Security Summit to discuss ways to promote international cooperation and enhance protective measures for nuclear materials and facilities from being exploited by terrorists. Currently, it is estimated that 1,600 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 500 tons of plutonium, which is enough nuclear material to make approximately 126,500 nuclear weapons, are scattered around the world. If terrorists detonated just a single nuclear weapon in the middle of a highly popularized city, it will take the lives of tens or hundreds of thousands of people and also cause a catastrophe at the global level by paralyzing the interconnected global society and financial network in an instant. Political, social, and environmental consequences will be massive, too. Since nuclear terrorism is a universal issue of the international community, the Nuclear Security Summit carries an important meaning in that world leaders gather to share a common perception on the threat of nuclear terrorism and discuss concrete actions to counter the threat. The Nuclear Security Summit represents the joint effort of the global community to elicit shared understanding and practical measures to bolster nuclear security. Nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy could be sustained. Moreover, nuclear security may constitute an important base over those three pillars of the NPT in realizing a world without nuclear weapons. The first Nuclear Security Summit, which was inaugurated and held in Washington D.C. in April 2010, is to be followed by the second Summit which will be held in Seoul in March 2012. Fifty eight heads of state and representatives of international organizations (signifying 90% of global GDP and 80% of the worlds population) will gather at the Seoul summit under the shared goal of strengthening cooperation to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism. The focus of discussions will be on how to translate the agreements reached at the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit into concrete actions. Furthermore, in the context of strengthening nuclear security, nuclear safetya major issue raised in the international community following the Fukushima accident in 2011 will be discussed, focusing its nexus with nuclear security.

B. Development of Discussions on Nuclear Security

Active discussions regarding nuclear security began in the 1960s
In the late 1960s, cross-border transfers of nuclear materials increased with the rise of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In order to ensure stable nuclear fuel supply and prevent illegal interception of nuclear materials in transit, discussions on nuclear security emerged. With the Cold War ending in early 1990s, the dismantlement, reduction and protection of nuclear materials and facilities within former Soviet Union territories arose as new nuclear security challenges.

Nuclear terrorism, a serious threat to the world

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 demonstrated that of devastating terrorism using WMD is no longer just an imagination, but a real, viable threat. Especially, the danger of nuclear terrorism is so immense that one person terrorist with one nuclear bomb could unleash widespread devastation and destruction which could dwarf all past terrorist acts. Nuclear terrorism has a high appeal to organized terrorist groups. The 9/11 Commission reported on Al-Qaidas past attempts to acquire nuclear materials and it has been known that other terrorist groups such as Aum Shinrikyo tried to obtain radioactive materials in the past. As a matter of fact, according to the Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), around 2,000 cases of illegal trafficking, theft or loss of nuclear and radiological materials have been reported around the world since 1993, and of those about 60 percent have not been recovered. The most basic nuclear weapon or warhead can be produced with a mere 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or 8 kilograms of plutonium (Pu). While it is very difficult to manufacture sophisticated nuclear weapons, it is not too difficult to produce a basic weapon or explosive device using nuclear materials. Nuclear terrorism is considered as one of the most serious and challenging threats posed to international security in the post-Cold War era. According to a survey of 85 national security experts which was conducted by Foreign Policy and the Center for American Progress in 2005, 60% of the respondents projected the odds of terrorist attack involving nuclear materials within 10 years at between 10% and 50%. The U.S. governments Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), published in 2008, ranked nuclear attack by terrorists as the most serious threat the United States is facing. Mohamed ElBaradei, former Director-General of IAEA, pointed out that there are clear signs of terrorists trying to acquire nuclear materials through criminal networks. In light of these circumstances, it is wise to take preventive actions against nuclear or radiological terrorism, even if there is a 0.01% probability of its occurrence.

Nuclear security calls for international cooperation

Since the act of terrorism is typically undertaken by non-state actors targeting unspecified persons, the impact of such terrorism cannot be confined within the borders of a single nation. Nuclear-equipped terrorist groups carry out cross-border activities with impunity, ranging from the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials to production of improvised nuclear devices. It is extremely difficult for any single nation to effectively contain or counteract such malevolent activities. International cooperation is therefore critical in implementing effective and comprehensive actions to deter nuclear terrorism. Given the

extensive damage that an act of nuclear terrorism might cause, no nation is safe from impact of such an attack. In this heavily inter-dependent world, nuclear security is undoubtedly a global concern for the international community. As such, the Nuclear Security Summit carries great significance in providing for world leaders to set practical vision and concrete measures to strengthen nuclear security. Against this backdrop, the Nuclear Security Summit was inaugurated with aims to strengthen existing regimes and generate political impetus at the highest level. While it is loose institutionally, the highly charged engagement at the summit level certainly was able to extract a number of national commitments at the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, including among others the repatriation of highly enriched uranium.

IAEA Working Definition on Nuclear Security

The Prevention and detection of and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities.

C. Outcomes of the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit

A world without nuclear weapons
When U.S. President Barack Obama stated his vision for a world without nuclear weapons in Prague in 2009, he pointed out that nuclear terrorism is the most immediate and extreme threat to international security and called for a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. Subsequently, President Barack Obama called for the Nuclear Security Summit which was held in Washington, D.C., in April 2010 to bring a focus on nuclear security, previously considered a rather unfamiliar and technical area. The first Nuclear Security Summit demonstrated the highest political impetus through the first summit-level meetings on nuclear security, bringing together forty seven countries and three representatives of international organizations (UN, IAEA and EU).

Evolution of international cooperation

Nuclear security, along with nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, is becoming one of the key tasks to post-Cold War international security environment. The discussion on nuclear security has evolved from bilateral cooperation between the United States and Russia to a summit within the G8 framework and fully into a nuclear security summit comprising more than 50 heads of state.

1. BILATERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND RUSSIA

Prior to the first Nuclear Security Summit, nuclear security was discussed through bilateral cooperation between the United States and Russia, focusing on activities to recover HEU supplied to other countries during the Cold War.

2. G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
Nuclear security discussions then expanded to the G8 Global Partnership to regulate the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and fissile materials. The Partnership was established to raise 20 billion US dollars over 10 years between 2002 and 2012 to fund the dismantling of WMDs in former Soviet republics, including nuclear weapons and materials.

Washington Communiqu, Work Plan, Voluntary Commitments 1. WASHINGTON COMMUNIQU

The Washington Communiqu is a political document adopted by the leaders of 47 nations, laying down their commitments on strengthening nuclear security and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism. Through the Washington Communiqu, participating countries and international organizations have reached an agreement that nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security, and strong nuclear security measures are the most effective means to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials.

2. WORK PLAN
In order to bring the vision of the Communiqu into reality, participants of the summit agreed on the accompanying Work Plan which specified 50 cooperative nuclear security measures in 11 areas. Through this plan, participants reaffirmed their commitment to protect nuclear materials and prevent illicit trafficking by enacting relevant laws and policies. Moreover, the participants recognized the importance of international cooperation, as well as effective utilization and enhanced collaboration of multilateral nuclear security mechanisms such as the UN, IAEA, G8 Global Partnership, and GICNT.

3. VOLUNTARY PLEDGES AND COMMITMENTS

The announcement of voluntary national commitments (or house gifts) by participating countries in support of nuclear security is another outcome of note. Specific commitments were made to enhance global nuclear security, including the minimization of HEU, ratification of nuclear security-related conventions, increased contribution to the IAEAs Nuclear Security Fund, accession to the GICNT and the establishment of Centers of Excellence for education.

4. KEY COMMITMENTS OF THE WASHINGTON COMMUNIQU

Through the Communiqu, participating countries committed to:

Minimize the use of HEU Take legislative action and join international agreements regarding nuclear security

Share information and expertise and best practices Cooperate at the bilateral level to prevent nuclear terrorism Cooperate multilaterally through the GICNT and the G-8 Global Partnership Cooperate through international organizations such as the UN and IAEA

II. Significance of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit

D. Importance of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit
Characteristics of Seoul Summit
With fifty eight world leaders gathering in Seoul to engage in discussions on key nuclear issues, the Seoul Summit can be characterized as formulating a practical vision for implementation. Second Summit will play a pivotal role for the attainment of President Obamas goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years. To this end, the Seoul Summit will serve as a stepping stone to translate the political will generated at the Washington Summit into action, while laying a cornerstone for attaining key nuclear security goals in mid and long term.

From declaration to action

The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit will be attended by more states than the previous Washington summit. Such heightened interest shows that there is significant global awareness and understanding on the gravity of nuclear terrorism. As a premier security forum, the Seoul summit provides the groundwork to move from commitments to specific actions, and to chart the future course for advancing nuclear security goals. The Seoul Summit will also explore new agenda items, clarify core prioritized tasks of nuclear security and present concrete measures to achieve those objectives.

Enhancing dynamism of nuclear security discussion

While leading in-depth discussions on the three basic nuclear security concerns nuclear threat response, nuclear materials and facilities protection, and illicit nuclear trafficking preventionthe Seoul Summit will expand the discussion to issues such as the nexus of nuclear safety and security within the context of reinforcing nuclear security, and radioactive materials security. As seen in the Fukushima nuclear accident of March 2011, public fear of radiation exposure causes a significant and lasting social and cultural concern. Similar impact could be seen if terrorists attack a nuclear facility. This is why the study on the nexus or interface between nuclear safety and security is needed and countermeasures should be developed in tandem. Another important issue will be the threat of radiological terrorism which utilizes more primitive yet sufficiently devastating dirty bombs or radiological dispersion devices (RDD). Like nuclear terror, terrorist acts using a dirty bomb should be seen as a serious threat. Even though the scale of damage may be not be such a level of a full-scale nuclear attack, it is widely used and easily accessible with more vulnerable protection system. According to the IAEA Database on Illicit Trafficking (ITDB), of the total theft or loss of nuclear or radioactive materials since 1993, two-thirds involved radioactive materials. An effective implementation of methods and technology in this area, including research into nuclear forensics and sensitive information security, will also be discussed.

E. Expected Outcomes
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Adoption of the Seoul Communiqu

The vision and implementation measures of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit will be embodied in Seoul Communiqu, a final document of the Seoul Summit. In preparation for this, several rounds of Sherpa and Sous-Sherpa meetings have been conucted to coordinate views and positions of participating countries. Participating countries have reached consensus that the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit should present practical visions and concrete goals. Participating countries are endeavoring to include concrete and practical measures in the Seoul Communiqu, including, among others, the early entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM, strengthening education and training through a Center of Excellence, and possible conversion of nuclear reactors from running on highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU).

F. Information of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit

Date & Venue
Date: March 26-27, 2012 Venue: Coex Convention and Exhibition Center, Seoul, Republic of Korea

Participants
47 heads of state and government who attended the Washington Summit and representatives of the UN, IAEA, and EU will attend the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. In addition, six more heads of state and governmentDenmark, Azerbaijan, Lithuania, Romania, Hungary, Gabonand the Secretary-General of INTERPOL as well as President of the EU Commission will be invited as new participating states and international organizations.

<Table 1> Participating countries and international organizations (as of February 2012)

Asia (14)

Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, India, Indonesia, Japan, Peoples Republic of China, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Pakistan, Philippines, New Zealand, Australia Canada , United States, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Brazil Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Russia, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Armenia, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Italy, Georgia, Czech Republic, Turkey, Poland, France, Finland, Denmark, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Romania, Hungary Morocco, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Jordan, Israel, Egypt Nigeria, South Africa, Gabon

The Americas (6) Europe (23)

Middle East (7) Africa (3)

International organizations (5)

United Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency, European Union(2), Interpol

Paralleled events
<Table 2> Two paralleled events on the occasion of the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit

Date Venue Organiz ers

Nuclear Industry Summit March 23- 24, 2012 Grand Intercontinental Hotel The Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Corporation (KHNP) and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) Approx. 150 leaders, CEOs and representatives in the international nuclear power industry and related organizations March 23: Keynote speech, panel presentations and discussions on the role of the industries in strengthening nuclear security and safety March 24: Technical tour

Participa nts

Nuclear Security Symposium March 23, 2012 Grand Hilton Hotel Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) and the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) Approx. 200 nuclear security experts and NGO representatives Keynote speech and presentations on the status of nuclear security since the inaugural Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 and discussions on global nuclear security governance

Program

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G. Preparations for the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit

1. NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT PREPARATORY COMMITTEE AND SECRETARIAT
In October 2010, by presidential decree, the government of the Republic of Korea established the Nuclear Security Summit Preparatory Committee chaired by the Prime Minister, and vice-chaired by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade. In March 2011, the Nuclear Security Summit Preparatory Secretariat with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade as head, was formed to prepare the logistics, protocols and public information activities for the summit. <Table 3> Nuclear Security Summit Preparatory Committee

Chairperson Vice Chairperson Members

Prime Minister Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister of Strategy and Finance Minister of Education, Science and Technology Minister of Unification Minister of Justice Minister of Public Administration and Security Minister of Culture, Sports, and Tourism Minister of Knowledge Economy Director of the National Intelligence Service Presidential Chief of Staff Minister of the Prime Ministers Office Chair of the Korea Communications Commission Head of the Presidential Council on National Branding Chief of the Presidential Security Service President of the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute President of the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety President of the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control President of the Korea Electric Power Corporation President of the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Corporation Heads of municipal governments and related organizations and private experts deemed necessary by the committee chair

2. SHERPA AND SOUS-SHERPA MEETINGS

Participating countries have been conducting negotiations through designated Sherpa and Sous-Sherpa to consult on the agenda outcome document and proceedings. Four Sherpa meetings were and will be held in preparation for the Seoul Summit, with SousSherpa meetings held as necessary. <Table 4> Sherpa & Sous-Sherpa Meetings

Date Nov. 2010 11

First Sherpa Meeting (Buenos Aires)

Mar. 2011 Jun. 2011 Oct. 2011 Jan. 2012 Mar. 2012

First Sous-Sherpa Meeting (Vienna) Second Sous-Sherpa Meeting (Seoul) Second Sherpa Meeting (Helsinki) Third Sherpa Meeting (India) Final Sherpa Meeting prior to the Summit (Seoul)

III. Glossary
A. NUCLEAR SECURITY
Nuclear Security

A comprehensive approach to prevent non-state actors (such as terrorist groups) from illicit acquisition and trafficking of nuclear materials and/or inflicting terror on nuclear facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines nuclear security as the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities.

Nuclear Safety

Actions to prevent nuclear or radiological accidents caused by natural disaster or technical failure and to limit the consequences of such occurrences

Safeguards

A series of activities to audit and account for nuclear materials, equipment and facilities in order to prevent its diversion for nuclear weapon production

Nuclear Disarmament

Act of reducing nuclear weapons by nuclear states

Nuclear Non-proliferation

Actions to limit the development of nuclear weapons to the 5 nuclear weapon states recognized by Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and Peoples Republic of China)

Radiological Terrorism

Radiological terrorism utilizes more primitive yet sufficiently devastating dirty bombs. Terrorist acts using a dirty bomb can be a bigger threat, as there is a higher chance of their occurrence. Even though the scale of damage may be smaller than that of a full-scale nuclear attack, it is easier to obtain required materials and produce such a weapon.

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Furthermore, radiation exposure to humans and environment can cause lasting damages on a broad scale. Radiological Dispersion Devices (RDD) Any device, including any weapon or equipment, other than a nuclear explosive device, specifically designed to employ radioactive material by disseminating it to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material (also called dirty bomb) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Weapons of mass destruction can kill or bring about significant harm to a large population within a short period of time. WMDs can comprise of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and mid-/long- range missiles. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Signed in 1968, the Treaty on the NPT is the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. NPT was initially 25-years treaty, but was extended indefinitely in 1995. The three pillars of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclearweapon states will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) A device that uses a simple, untested design to attempt to create a nuclear explosion Uranium Conversion After the Mixed Uranium Oxides (U3O8, commonly referred as yellowcakes) are produced at the mill, the next step involves conversion into pure uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas at the Uranium conversion facility. Uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas is suitable for use in enrichment operations. Downblending Refers to the process of blending down HEU to LEU

This is done by mixing HEU and the blendstock (of natural, depleted, or slightly enriched uranium) in either liquid or gas form.

Physical Protection

Measures for the protection of nuclear material or authorized facilities, designed to prevent unauthorized access or removal of fissile material or sabotage

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Sabotage Any deliberate act directed against a nuclear facility or nuclear material in use, storage or transport which could directly or indirectly endanger the health and safety of personnel, the public or the environment by exposure to radiation or release of radioactive substances Nuclear Forensics Scientific techniques to investigate incidents and accidents involving nuclear materials

Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) HEU is concentrated natural uranium which contains 20% or more of U235. Uranium with less than 20% of U235 is categorized as LEU (Low Enriched Uranium). HEU is used to produce nuclear fuel or weapons Plutonium (Pu)

A radioactive element similar to uranium. It is also a main component of nuclear fuel or weapons. Plutonium-239 is the primary fissile isotope used for the production of nuclear weapons, although uranium-235 has also been used and is currently the secondary isotope. Plutonium-239 is also one of the three main isotopes demonstrated usable as fuel in nuclear reactors, along with uranium-235 and uranium-233.

Radioactive Sources

Radioactive material that is permanently sealed in a capsule or closely bonded and in a solid form and which is not exempt from regulatory control. This also includes any radioactive material released if the radioactive source is leaking or broken, but does not include material encapsulated for disposal, or nuclear material within the nuclear fuel cycles of research and power reactors.

State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC)

Organizational arrangements at the national level which may have both a national objective to account for and control nuclear material in the State and an international objective to provide the basis for the application of IAEA safeguards under an agreement between the State and the IAEA. Under a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the State is required to establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of nuclear material subject to safeguards under the agreement.

Design Basis Accident (DBA)

A postulated accident that a nuclear facility must be designed and built to withstand without loss to the systems, structures, and components necessary to ensure public health and safety.

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Design Basis Threat (DBT) The attributes and characteristics of potential insider and/or external adversaries, who might attempt unauthorized removal of nuclear material or sabotage, against which a physical protection system is designed and evaluated. Center of Excellence Centre of Excellence is the national nuclear security support centers that aim at acting as a resource base and providing or facilitating national training in a systematic manner, providing specific technical support required for effective use and maintenance of nuclear security technical systems, as well as providing scientific support during and after a nuclear security event. All three components are equally important and national nuclear security support centers will ultimately contribute to the improvement of global and national nuclear security and will assist States to meet and implement their obligations under the international nuclear security relevant legal instruments. Information Security Information Security is a series of actions to control access to sensitive information, as a vital part of the security function. Accordingly, the organization must implement classification and control measures for protecting sensitive information. Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) The ITDB was established in 1995 in IAEA to facilitate exchange of authoritative information related to illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials.

The ITDB also provides material for analysis of patterns and trends and to help identify potential security threats and vulnerabilities. As of September 30 2010, the ITDB membership stood at 111 Member States.

Nuclear Security Fund(NSF)

The NSF is a voluntary funding mechanism among the IAEA member states. NSF was established in 2002 to support, amongst others things, the implementation of nuclear security activities to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear terrorism. In September 2009, the IAEA Board of Governors approved a new Nuclear Security Plan, which approves the continuation of voluntary funding to the NSF for 2010 2013.

Magaports Initiative

The Megaports Initiative aims to protect the world's shipping network from dangerous cargo and nuclear materials by scanning as much container traffic as possible (including imports, exports, and transshipped containers) regardless of destination and with minimal impact to port operations. It works with foreign customs, port authorities, port operators, and/or other relevant entities in partner countries to systematically enhance detection capabilities for special nuclear and other radioactive materials in containerized cargo transiting the

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global maritime shipping network. Since the start of the Megaports Initiative in 2003, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the United States has completed installations at 27 ports and implementation is underway at 16 ports around the world. INFCIRC 225/ rev.5 INFCIRC 225/rev.5 is an IAEA publication (latest version) which is intended to assist its Member states in implementing a comprehensive physical protection regime, including any obligations and commitments they might have with respect to international instruments on nuclear security. Defense-in-depth The Combination of multiple layers of systems and measures that have to be overcome or circumvented before physical protection is compromised. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) The GICNT was initiated by Russia and the United States in July 2006 in order to prevent the illegal trade of nuclear materials, as well as to strengthen nuclear terrorism prevention measures and response capabilities. GICNT members develop safety measures for nuclear materials and facilities, and organize international training programs to share best practices and recommendations. Members consist of 82 nations and 4 official observers (International Atomic Energy Agency, United Nations, Interpol, United Nations Office on Drug and Crime) G8 Global Partnership The Global Partnership was launched in June 2002 in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, as a G8 initiative to counteract the spread of weapons of mass destruction in former Soviet republics. The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction support cooperative efforts to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Priority concerns include destruction of chemical weapons, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists. Republic of Korea joined the partnership in June 2004. UN Security Council Resolution 1540

The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 was adopted in April of 2004 to enforce effective measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. The resolution requires states to implement domestic legislation to prevent non-state actors from manufacturing, acquiring or transporting NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) weapons within or from their territory. All States are required to present a first report to the 1540 Committee, no later than six month from the adoption of the resolution 1540 (2004) on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement the resolution.

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International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International organization dedicated to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

A UN International Conference adopted its charter in 1955, and the agency was established in 1957. The agency aims to: - Promote research and development of peaceful nuclear technologies and to provide supplies needed for its implementation; - Promote the exchange of scientific techniques; - Devise safeguards against the use of fissile materials for military purposes

Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)

CPPNM requires each nation to take appropriate measures for the physical protection of nuclear materials under its jurisdiction and safeguard them against theft or embezzlement by law. This includes designating acts such as illegal transportation of nuclear materials as criminal offenses under the domestic law. The original CPPNM was adopted in 1987 and a amended version was adopted in July 2005. Specifically, the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM added protection measures for nuclear facilities, while the original CPPNM forced on physical protection for nuclear materials in transportation.

International Convention Suppressing Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)

The convention defines the following acts as criminal offenses and makes them punishable via domestic penal law: the manufacture, possession and/or use of nuclear or radioactive materials with intent to cause physical injury, death or substantial damage to human, property and environment. ICSANT was implemented in July 2007. As of September 2 2011, 115 nations have signed and 77 nations have ratified or joined the Convention.

B. NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

Communiqu An official statement issued following important bilateral or multilateral meetings. Sherpa

In literal sense, the term Sherpa means people from the East and refers to an ethnic group in eastern Nepal, who are typically employed as experienced guides and porters for mountaineering expeditions. In recent years, the term is applied by analogy to personal representatives for the heads of state and government who attends international summits.

Sherpa/Sous-Sherpa Meeting

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A meeting of nationally delegated Sherpas and Sous-Sherpas, for the purpose of preparing for the summit by discussing the summit agenda.

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. Contacts
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