Dual Track Financing (DTF) Lessons Learned in appointing an indigenous Civil Society Principal Recipient (PR).

. The Case of Burundi

Eastern Africa National Networks of AIDS Service Organizations

Acknowledgements

In recognition of the growing work emanating out of Global Fund (GF) programmes in Eastern Africa, EANNASO has taken a keen interest in supporting its members with information that seek to capture civil society experiences of engaging in GF processes in the region. Therefore, in documenting the selection of the Civil Society Principal Recipient experience
in Burundi, as per Dual Track Financing (DTF) requirements, EANNASO secretariat we would like

to acknowledge and express profound gratitude to the following:

(i)

ABS board, staff and management for organising the field work and engaging fully with the research team from EANNASO.

(ii)

The EANNASO Team Leader for Information, Communication & Research, Roman Mukendi, for leading the research process both in terms of data collection, analysis and writing.

(iii)

The EANNASO Team Leader for Networking Development & Support, Titus Twesige, for supporting in data collection and review of draft field reports.

A special thank you goes to all key informants and CSOs who participated in the focus group discussions and interviews. Last but not least, the EANNASO Executive Director, Lucy Nganga, for strategic direction and leadership in ensuring the documentation took place.

Acronyms ABS Alliance Burundaise contre le SIDA (Alliance against AIDS in Burundi) ANNS Association Nationale de Soutien aux Seropositifs et Sideens ASOs AIDS Service Organisations CCM- Country Coordinating Mechanisms CNLS Conseil Nationale de Lutte contre le SIDA (Council for the Fight against AIDS) CSOs Civil Society Organisations DTF Dual Track Financing EANNASO Eastern African National Networks of AIDS Service Organisations IHAA International HIV and AIDS Alliance PHAs People Living with HIV and AIDS PR Principal Recipient RBP+ - Reseau Burundais des personnes Vivant avec le VIH/SIDA (National Network of People Living with HIV and AIDS) SR Sub-Recipient TSF Technical Support Facility UNAIDS Joint United Nations Proggramme on HIV and AIDS WHO World Health Organisation

Table of Contents Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................2 Acronyms .....................................................................................................................3 Table of Contents .......................................................................................................4 1.0 Introduction .....................................................................................................5 1.1 Dual-Track Financing - What does it mean?............................................6 1.2 Objectives of Documenting DTF experience in Burundi.......................6 1.3 Methodology ....................................................................................................7 2.0 The Journey to Dual Track Financing in Burundi ....................................7 3.0 Selecting the Civil Society PR ....................................................................11 4.0 Country Proposal Development Process .................................................13 5.0 Lessons Learned and Recommendations ................................................16 6.0 Appendices .....................................................................................................18 Appendix I: Focus Group Participants held on 3rd March 2010, Bujumbura18 Appendix II: Focus Group participants (ABS Staff) held on 2nd March 2010, Bujumbura .................................................................................................................18 Appendix III: Key Informants ...............................................................................18 Appendix III: Interview Guide ..............................................................................19

1.0 Introduction The first AIDS case in Burundi was diagnosed in 1983. Since then the epidemic has grown rapidly, making HIV and AIDS one of the major causes of mortality in the country. The socio-political crisis of the 1990s, poverty and large-scale displacement of populations have contributed to the rapid spread of the epidemic which is generalised1.

The continued political conflict in Burundi was exacerbated by the assassination of the countrys first president in 1993 and his successor in 1994 which plunged the country into civil war2. During the time of war it was civil society organisations like the Society of Women and AIDS in Africa (SWAA), Association Nationale de Soutien aux Seropositifs et Sideens (ANSS) etc which were supporting community initiatives on HIV and AIDS related activities.

Although civil society organisations continued to shoulder most of the AIDS work, the war crisis persisted in hindering the fight against HIV and AIDS. In 2002, the government established the Council for the Fight against AIDS (CNLS) to coordinate and guarantee a multi-sectoral coordination of HIV and AIDS work now under the Ministry of HIV and AIDS. CNLS was established to manage the World Bank project - the Muti-Country HIV and AIDS Programme (MAP) which promoted a multi-sectoral response to HIV and AIDS aimed at engaging both local communities and the private sector.

By the end of 2005, the Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) under the Global Fund (GF) funding mechanism appointed CNLS as the government sector Principal Recipient (PR) for Round Two (2) and Five (5) based on its experience and competencies in grant management and implementation of the MAP project. The CCM is a multi-stakeholder partnership established under the auspices of the Global Fund to develop and submit country proposals as well as oversee grant implementation if approved. They comprise of representatives from the public and private sectors, non-governmental organisations and academic institutions3. The CCM in Burundi comprises of ten (10) representatives from the public sector, eight (8) from the NGO sector, five (5) from the bilateral/multilateral donor sector and one (1) representative from the academic sector.

1 2

Burundi, World Health Organisation, Epidemiological Fact Sheets, 2005. IRIN News Humanitarian Country Profile, February, 2007 3 Global Fund website, 20 April, 2010

1.1

Dual-Track Financing - What does it mean?

Civil society has not just been an advocate for the Global Fund (GF); it has also played an essential role in the oversight and implementation of Global Fund grants. Following the introduction of the Dual-Track Financing (DTF) concept in Round 8, the GF demanded for proposals to be implemented by Principal Recipients (PRs) from both the government and the non-government sector. The emphasis on this dual approach of grant implementation and management was intended to help countries yield the following results:

To ensure that multiple sectors are involved in implementing GF grants To ensure that key affected populations are reached, especially in situations where they are not included in government programmes. To accelerate efforts to build capacity and scale up responses to AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. To contribute to sustainability of programmatic interventions over the longer term, through the increased capacity that comes from a broader range of implementing partners.

Burundi is a good example of a country whose proposal factored DTF to include non-government sector PRs and they were successful. The Global Funds recommendation on dual track financing applies separately for each disease4 (HIV, TB and Malaria) hence the focus of this documentation exercise on the HIV Civil Society Principal Recipient (PR) only.

1.2

Objectives of Documenting DTF experience in Burundi

The purpose of documenting the DTF experience in Burundi was to capture the Civil Society experience in becoming a PR as well as to draw lessons learned and good practices to be shared in the region. The following were the three key objectives of documenting Civil Society (CS) GF experience around DTF in Burundi:

(i) (ii) (iii)

To assess the process of selecting non-government sector PRs on HIV and AIDS To capture key milestones in Burundi adoption of DTF To obtain bottom-line data around country proposal development processes, implementation and oversight of grants at country level

GF Fact Sheet DTF 2008

1.3

Methodology

The qualitative research methodology was deployed to guide the entire documentation process. A case study approach was used to offer a stand-alone Burundi GF experience on DTF. Data collection methods included: two focus group discussions (one with staff members of ABS and the other with various key stakeholders see appendix I and II) and In-depth face-to-face interviews with key informants (see appendix III). The use of a variety of methods in this study was important so as to enable the documentalists to generate as much information as possible and to make more meaningful comparisons of different view points. Worth mentioning is that most documents accessed were written in French and due to both human and financial constraints and limitations in the French language it was quite difficult to aptly sruitinize all documents made available to the documenting team. In addition, the research team also found it extremely difficult to undertake a validation exercise owing to limitations in language and financial resources. 2.0 The Journey to Dual Track Financing in Burundi

This section describes in detail the key processes that Burundi followed in deciding to adopt Dual Track Financing (DTF) for the country proposal for Round 8 of Global Fund. It highlights events which ignited country interest in DTF as well as consultative participatory processes which later culminated into the development and submission of the country proposal to the Global Fund (GF).

a) Regional and International Meetings on DTF and other GF related Issues

During the year 2008 when the DTF concept for Round 8 was introduced, a number of both regional and international meetings were organised to unbundle the DTF concept as well as other GF related issues such as Community Systems Strengthening (CSS), Health Systems Strengthening (HSS) etc.

In February 2008, Population Service International (PSI), International HIV and AIDS Alliance (IHAA), International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), Global Alliance and the Global Fund Friends of Africa organised a regional workshop in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to sensitise key players across Africa the importance of mainstreaming DTF, reproductive health and Most-At-RiskPopulations (MARPS) in country proposals to the Global Fund. From Burundi the workshop was attended by representatives from the CNLS, Ministry of Health, and CSOs. At this meeting the concept DTF was unpacked as articulated in Round Eight (8) guidelines of the Global Fund. Discussions from these meetings armed the Burundi team with firsthand information which helped them to advocate for DTF in their country. The advocacy process included submitting the workshop report to the CCM with specific recommendations on DTF as well as CNLS officials and technical

experts from Global Fund Friends of Africa taking turns to explain to the Burundi CCM the importance of DTF and its associated benefits to the country.

In March 2008, another meeting on Round Eight (8) was organised for Francophone countries by UNAIDS and WHO in Cotonou targeting government officials. The meeting provided further insights into the DTF processes. Another workshop on emerging opportunities in GF was organised by EANNASO in Nairobi, April 2008, for CSOs in the region regarding R8 at which ABS and RBP+ attended. Another meeting was also organised by the International HIV/AIDS Alliance in Brighton, United Kingdom, on the same subject, both ABS and RBP+ attended.

(b) Civil Society (CS) First Consultative Meeting

After attending and participating in some of the meetings highlighted above coupled with an in-depth familiarisation of DTF concepts, Round Eight (8) guidelines and other GF related issues, ABS and RBP+ organised a consultative and information sharing meeting with 14 CSOs who served as SubRecipients (SRs)5 for Round Two (2) and Five (5) at country-level. ABS, which is a national network of AIDS Service Organisations (ASOs), and RBP+, which is the national network of people living with HIV and AIDS are the two major umbrella civil society organisations in Burundi. They play a key role of both mobilising and advocating on behalf of the broader civil society fraternity working on HIV and AIDS.

The rationale advanced for choosing SRs for the first consultative meeting organised by the two organisations (ABS and RBP+) was that SRs had prior knowledge and experience of the workings of GF. They had envisaged an easier understanding and immediate grasping of the concepts for CSOs which had interacted with the Global Fund. At this meeting CSOs present pledged to take advantage of DTF as a window of opportunity for CSOs but did not propose any name of a civil society organisation to be appointed civil society Principal Recipient (PR)6. The meeting further resolved to intensify advocacy for DTF among CSOs and other key structures such as the CCM, CNLS, relevant ministries and development partners.

SRsare recipients of grant funds which perform programme activities that would otherwise be expected to be undertaken by the Principal Recipient (PR) 6 PRs are appointed or nominated by CCMs to be legally responsible for the GF grant but usually disburses part of the grant to SRs or SSRs for effective implementation of activities (AIDSPAN Guide, 2007).

(c) CCM adoption of DTF

The DTF discussions among CSOs, government officials and development partners stimulated by advocacy work, prompted the CCM to meet and decide whether to adopt DTF or not, the outcome of which DTF was adopted for Round Eight (8). In choosing the non-government sector PR, CCM set-up the selection criteria and requested CSOs to undertake consultations among themselves and submit the proposed name of the potential PR. For the first time, the CCM apparently just tasked the CSOs to go and agree on which organisation was suitable to be PR and report back. After CSOs failed to reach consensus on which CSO was to be appointed PR, the CCM then set up a technical committee to receive the applications afresh and select the non-government sector PR. The next sections detail the process which led to the lack of consensus among CSOs and how the final decision to select the nongovernment sector PR was made.

(d) Civil Society (CS) Second Consultative Meeting

As intimated earlier, the two major national civil society umbrella organisations on HIV and AIDS (ABS and RPB+) took the lead in organising civil society consultations after the CCM adopted DTF and instructed civil society to consult on the potential PR. Interestingly, the two organisations despite having vested interest in being nominated for PRship agreed among themselves to co-chair consultation meetings, to jointly handle logistics of organising consultations and facilitate civil society participation in the consultations. Important to note, however, is that both organisations were already lead agencies of the GF grants in Round (2) and Five (5) with CNLS as the Principal Recipient (PR). ABS was sub-granting to its members including giving funds to RBP+, while RBP+ had received GF funds as an implementer for its Institutional capacity strengthening. Both organisations were also represented on the CCM with express interest in applying for the non-government sector PRship.

RBP+ developed its organisational capacity after receiving funds from the PR for institutional strengthening and were an SSR implementing R5 grants focusing on IGAs Patience

The second civil society consultative meeting was still limited to the 14 SRs under Round Two (2) and Five (5). The discussions during this meeting were now confined to deciding on the nongovernment PR. Amazingly, apart from a CCM representative being present during the consultations, there was no external facilitator or observer invited to attend the meeting.

During discussions, participants agreed to request all CSOs keen to be appointed as PRs to express their interest and seek to undertake a self-assessment exercise which would highlight their competencies and technical abilities. The two organisations (ABS and RBP+) emerged as the only 9

two organisations capable of being appointed as PRs and as such were tasked to undertake the selfassessments and present the findings to the members present at the next consultation. The nomination of the two organisations did not come as a surprise because even prior to CSO consultations, informal discussions with relevant bodies like CNLS, Ministry of Health and development partners insinuated for the nomination of the two organisations. Worth noting as well is that most organisations present during the consultations were new to the DTF process.

We got a lot of support from many people and organisations citing that ABS has the structure, experience and coordination arrangements but has limitations in its capacity to deliver as PR Patience

(e) Civil Society (CS) Third Consultative Meeting

At the second CSO consultative meeting, ABS presented its self-assessment report prepared by an external consultant to the meeting. RBP+ had not yet conducted its assessment although this was later done and presented during the next consultation. Even if the assessments were made, there was no uniform assessment template which was used by both organisations; and while ABS was assisted by an external consultant to conduct the assessment, RBP+ did not receive any technical support for the same exercise. Therefore a number of questions regarding the integrity of the process can be raised around standard templates (especially GF competence guidelines) for use by both organisations, quality of the assessments and independence of professional thought in undertaking self-assessment exercises.

However, discussions on the assessment reports ignited more deliberations and invited questions from participants during consultations. For example, CSOs wanted to know how RBP+ as an implementing organisation and as a network of PHAs would serve as PR because taking on this role has the potential to divert the organisation from its core mandate. In response, RBP+ explained that taking on the role of PR would actually strengthen the organisation and their strategy is to set-up a granting unit to ensure that their work is not disrupted and that they had developed full capacity after implementing Round 5 grant. They also highlighted their comparative advantage of working with the grass-root and having linkages with structures like the hospitals in various parts of the country.

We are not implementers, we build capacity and undertake advocacy for our member networks in the various regions of the country RBP+.

Questions directed at ABS lingered around how the organisation intends to address capacity gaps (low human resource and logistical capacity) identified in the self assessment report. ABS responded by 10

indicating that they had forged strong partnerships with organisations such as EANNASO, IHAA, GF Friends of Africa and UNAIDS to provide them with technical and human resource support. They also noted that support for capacity enhancement of the PR was covered in the country proposal itself.

3.0

Selecting the Civil Society PR

This section encapsulates the process taken by civil society organisations to arrive at their nomination of the PR and the associated challenges experienced by contesting parties in accepting decisional outcomes made by both the civil society organisations and the CCM. It unravels the process which the CCM undertook to arrive at the final decision of choosing the non-government sector PR.

(a) Voting process to nominate PR

The 14 CSOs present during the consultation process described above moved a motion to vote for the civil society PR after a careful review of the self-assessment reports presented by both ABS and RBP+. The meeting proposed two options/motions upon which they based there voting. The two options were:

(i)

That one organisation from among CSOs should be decided upon and chosen as PR by CSOs and be presented to the CCM.

(ii)

That two organisations be named, ranked in order of prioritisation and be submitted to CCM and allow CCM to choose one PR.

Majority (11) of the participants present voted for option One, two (2) voted for option Two and one voted for none of the options by noting that they would prefer two organisations to be named and submitted, but not ranked in order of prioritisation. The majority vote prevailed and participants present moved into casting of votes for one civil society PR. The voting process was presided over by one of the CSO called ANSS and the results were as follows:

(i)

11 votes in favour of ABS

(ii)

1 vote in favour of RBP+

(iii)

1 vote (by RBP+) abstained

11

After the results were declared, CSOs agreed to present the name of the winning organisation to CCM for endorsement and approval. Upon submission of the nominated organisation by CSOs, RBP+ officially protested to the CCM and refused the results of the civil society consultation on the following grounds:

(i) (ii) (iii)

That participants present were all members of ABS That the process was highly politicised by ABS That ABS undertook a lobbying exercise to influence the process

RBP+ insisted that most CSOs present refused to go by the self-assessment criterion by critically looking at the strengths and weaknesses of each organisation but rather preferred to go the voting way.

Overall, looking at the process taken by CSOs to nominate their PR it can be inferred that problematic elements of mistrust were inherent. For example, the contesting organisations were organisers of the electoral process, they were presenters of the election outcome to CCM themselves without any independent external support necessary to warrant credibility to the entire process.

Most CSOs are members of ABS and they were pushing for ABS nomination without taking capacity requirements into account RBP+

This protest was viewed by CCM as indicative of grave differences, disharmony and a lack of unified position by CSOs CCM

(b) Final Selection of PR by CCM

The protest by RBP+ over the election results from the civil society consultation was viewed by CCM as indicative of grave differences, disharmony and a lack of unified position by CSOs on the selection of a non-government sector PR.

To address the situation, the CCM decided to set-up a technical committee to receive self-assessment documents and to review competencies of the two contesting organisations (ABS and RBP+). The technical committee comprised of four CCM appointed members (1 former Coordinator of GF Round 5, 1 former Coordinator of GF Round 4 malaria component, 1 representative from a CSO dealing with malaria and 1 representative from an FBO). The technical committee at its sittings recommended 12

RBP+ as the civil society or non-government sector PR, citing it strong capacities in the area of human resource, experience in Global Fund work and technical management capabilities. The decision of the technical committee was upheld by consensus within CCM. Apparently, CCM decision-making processes during its sittings are usually by consensus, voting is normally encouraged if there are differing views.

Naturally, ABS and other CSOs who supported ABS nomination protested and registered their grievances officially to the CCM on the following grounds: a) That the technical committee did not visit, or show any sign of re-assessing the capacity of ABS. b) That the technical committee did not take into account the civil society consultations that had already been conducted. c) That the General-Secretary of RBP+ sits on the CCM and was present when the decision to appoint his organisation was taken thus a conflict of interest.

Upon receipt of the official complaints from ABS+ regarding the appointment of RBP+ as civil society PR, the CCM still maintained its decision based on technical findings as presented by the technical committee.

4.0

Country Proposal Development Process

This section describes the process followed by Burundi in developing the country proposal which was eventually submitted to Global Fund for Round 8. More information is provided around the mediation which took place among CSOs who had contested for PRship, proposal submission, the work of the Local Funding Agency (LFA) and grant disbursements. Its worth mentioning here that the process of agreeing on the non-government sector or civil society PR for Burundi occurred alongside the development of the country proposal.

(a) Proposal Development

The following steps provide a systematic account of how Burundi as a country managed in a consultative and participatory way to develop the country proposal to Global Fund for R8:

The CCM met and made a decision to submit a country proposal for Round 8. Therefore, a three man committee made up of one representative from CNLS, CCM and civil society was constituted by the CCM to coordinate the proposal development process.

13

A central committee (made up of 60-100 people) consisting of all sectors (FBOs, CSOs, academics, research institutions, private sector, government etc) was set up to provide input into the country proposal.

From among members of the central committee, thematic teams in various areas such as Prevention, Treatment, Capacity Building, Care & Support, etc were constituted to provide technical input in those specific areas.

A small committee of experts (6-8 people) was selected from among central committee members to give technical input in the drafting process and to produce draft zero of the country proposal. The draft zero was then presented to the central committee for further discussion and validation.

The final proposal was then presented to the CCM by the central committee for clearance, approval and submission.

Both the central committee and the committee of technical experts were supported by a team of international consultants led by Dr. Khenan Sharabeen (UNAIDS- TSF). The consultants rendered technical support especially in the area of editing, proof reading and ensuring adherence to Global Fund guidelines.

We believe as UNAIDS its our responsibility to give to the country the right capacity building support in order to develop a sound country proposal UNAIDS Country Coordinator

(b) Mediation between ABS and RBP+ before Proposal Submission

Before submitting the proposal to the Global Fund, a country must demonstrate thorough participatory consultations and mutual agreement in the proposal development process. In Burundi, owing to the persistent deep seated divisions and disagreements between the two major network organisations, ABS and RBP+, emanating from the decision by CCM to select RBP+ as PR, it was difficult for the country to move forward in submitting the proposal without armicably resolving the impasse. Therefore, a two-man mediation team volunteered to carry out the mediation process between the two parties. The team was made up of the International Lead Consultant Dr. Khenan Sharabeen and the Executive Secretary of GLIA Dr. Joseph Wakana. The Terms of References (ToRs) for the mediation team were broadly to broker a peaceful settlement between the two parties which would allow the country to move forward in submitting the proposal to Global Fund. 14

In view of the fact that the divisions among CSOs were mainly caused by the way the PR was finally chosen by the CCM, the mediation team presented the two parties (ABS and RBP+) with the following two options for consideration during the mediation process:

(i)

That either both ABS and RBP+ be factored in the country proposal and jointly manage funds when made available or

(ii)

That RBP+ remains as PR and ABS be factored in the proposal as lead SR supporting emerging Community Based Organisations (CBOs).

After much deliberation, option two prevailed and ABS accepted to serve as lead SR. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two parties was jointly developed and signed to that effect. The MoU has continued to serve as a peaceful reference point and binding agreement among both parties.

Evidently, it is clear that even after signing the MoU there still exits some misunderstandings in the interpretation of the key features of the MoU and aspects of the country proposal. For example, ABS still questions what the provision supporting emerging Community Based Organisations in the MoU entails. ABS also asserts that although both organisations (ABS and RBP+) are mentioned in the implementation logical framework of the country proposal, RBP+ is seeking to change the stated roles in the logical framework after receiving the first disbursement of funds from the Global Fund. At the time of documenting this process, ABS was planning to call for a meeting of key CSOs to raise issues around the implementation of the GF project and clarify issues with RBP+.

Proposal Submission to GF

As noted above, following the signing of the MoU between ABS and RBP+, the country proposal was submitted to Global Fund and it was successful.

(c) LFA assessment visit

An LFA assessment of the non-government sector PR (RBP+) was conducted in July/August 2008 followed by an assessment of the lead SR (ABS) in July/August 2009. The lead SR was also assessed in order to determine its capacity to manage large amounts of funds since it was predetermined in the country proposal. By implication, other SRs will be implementing GF grants while ABS as the lead SR will be sub-granting to CBOs.

(d) Disbursement of grants 15

Upon fulfilling all Global Fund requirements around grant negotiations, the first phase of funding was disbursed to the non-government sector or civil society PR and disbursement had since commenced. Since receiving funds from GF in January 2010, the civil society PR had signed 30 agreements with SRs at the time of conducting this study and government PR had not started disbursing. The lead SR on the other hand expressed concern that the funds were transferred to the civil society PR in January 2010 and by March 2010 no funds were yet disbursed to implementers. The GF inspection team was expected to visit the country in June, so there was fear that there will be delay in implementation. 5.0 Lessons Learned and Recommendations

The following section outlines lessons learned as expressed by respondents and experienced by CSOs in general:

(i)

In view of the fact that the Burundi CCM from the onset did not carve out a clear roadmap which spells out the criterion and conflict management procedures for Civil Society consultations, the aggrieved CSOs who supported ABS nomination for PRship still view the appointment of RBP+ as government led without civil society involvement. It is thus strongly recommended for CCMs to take a proactive role in providing basic standard guidelines that seek to support civil society consultations and engagement on GF related issues at country level.

(ii)

The dual role of organising civil society consultations and contesting for the non-government sector PRship by both ABS and RBP+ interfered with the integrity of the process and offered challenges of leadership in managing the entire consultative process. Seeing that Civil Society in general is a vague concept for most developing countries like Burundi, it is incumbent upon all civil society actors to seek to invest time in exploring ways that would facilitate leadership, value addition and render credibility to processes of consultation regardless of vested interests.

(iii)

During the civil society consultations, it was vividly clear that each contesting organisation had to carry out its self- assessment without a standard template, tools, guidelines or even external support around the evaluations. In the absence of all these, it can be safely concluded that the quality of the assessments were questionable, the degree of independence and objectivity in carrying out the assessments was questionable as well. The two organisations that hitherto had good relationships are now more divided and conflicting because of the questionable quality of the process. This could be attributed to less ample time which was

16

given to CSOs to prepare for the consultation process. However, for a multi-stakeholder consultative process of this magnitude, it is recommended that quality assurance arrangements and resources are deployed to effectively facilitate sound professional judgement, understanding and acceptability of the process.

(iv)

Overall, civil society organisations in Burundi enjoy a cordial and good relationship with government. They appreciate efforts by government and the CCM to have accorded them the opportunity to participate in the selection of the non-government sector PR and in the development of the country proposal to Global Fund. They envision decentralisation of services due to DTF with some challenges to scale-up due to anticipated national elections in May 2010 which may affect the government PR in implementing the grant. The gesture of complimentarity and goodwill on both the part of government and civil society organisations in Burundi should be emulated as key in achieving progress for the common good of all citizens.

(v)

The initiative on the part of government and civil society organisations to participate, attend and learn in regional and international meetings on Global Fund Round 8 discussions and later seek to share with the general civil society fraternity in Burundi is commendable. It is true for most African countries that when such critical discussions happen at such forums very few key stakeholders in-country are privy to such information for decision making and further action.

(vi)

What can be learned from the consultative process in Burundi is that management of conflict through mediation by neutral parties is essential in resolving any impasse among CSOs. It is thus recommended that in developing a roadmap for civil society consultations or engagement in a national process, aspects of conflict management should be taken into account to address areas of disagreement as they emerge.

(vii)

One other observation which did not emerge clearly is whether the two contesting organisations (ABS and RBP+) had grasped the implications of being appointed PR. By implication being appointed PR poses a conflicting role of sitting on the CCM and forfeits their role of representing civil society on this key structure. As a lesson, civil society umbrella organisations must endeavour to balance their representative interest vis--vis their financial resource interests as they seek to serve as PRs.

17

6.0

Appendices Appendix I: Focus Group Participants held on 3rd March 2010, Bujumbura

Name of Participants 1. Simbashira J. Paul 2. Ndayisaba Baselisse 3. Niyonkuku Josephine 4. Dr. Ngendakumana Fabien 5. Christine Bizimana 6. Ndizeye Janvien 7. Kandava Jacqueline 8. Patience Kubwumuremi 9. Felix Nininaizwe 10. Hakizimana Frederic

Organisation RENASES-SIMBIMANGA SWAA, Burundi PlateForme ROMUA ANSS RBP+ RENASES Tubabarane ABS ABS CNLS

Appendix II: Focus Group participants (ABS Staff) held on 2nd March 2010, Bujumbura Name of Participants 1. Patience Kubwumuremi 2. Felix Nininaizwe 3. Jose Nkurikiye 4. Dennis Ndikunasaeo 5. Glorias Ndayisenja Designation National Coordinator Programme Manager Finance Manager Secretary- General Regional Coordinator Organisation ABS ABS ABS ABS ABS

Appendix III: Key Informants

Name of Participants 1. Emmanuel Kararimbanya 2. Benjamin Nicayenzi 3. Rosemeire Munhoz

Designation Executive Secretary National Coordinator Country Coordinator

Organisation CCM -Burundi RBP+ UNAIDS - Burundi

18

Appendix III: Interview Guide Key Questions: 1. Please describe Burundis journey to DTF by highlighting the history and steps followed 2. How was the selection of the non-government or civil society PR conducted? 3. Please highlight how the country proposal was developed and submitted to Global Fund. 4. In view of conflicts arising from civil society consultations in nominating a nongovernment sector or civil society PR, how were these conflicts mediated or resolved? 5. Please highlight the assessments by the Local Fund Agency (LFA) and the status of grant disbursement 6. What would say are the key lessons learned for Burundi around the DTF process?

19