ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondents G.R. No.

116668 July 28, 1997 CASE SUMMARY Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 when he took private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as a wife. A few months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlina's only child, Herminia Palang. During the entire duration of his year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother, not in Pangasinan with his wife and child. The trial court found evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. 1 When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with private respondents, but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan Then in 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in their names A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased by Erlinda with TCT covered under her name. 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang. Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina's complaint. Two years later Miguel died Carlina Palang and her daughter, instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court and sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.

lower court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint after declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel Palang On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE 1. Whether or not the two deeds of absolute sale covering the riceland and the house and lot in favor of Miguel Palang and Erlinda Agapay and the other in favor of Erlinda Agapay alone are valid 2. Whether or not, Kristopher A. Palang as Miguel Palang's illegitimate son is entitled to inherit from Miguel's estate.

LAWS APPLICABLE 1. The sale of the Riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. 2. Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. 3. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage settlements 4. The house and lot bought under the name of Erlinda alone partakes the nature of a donation by Miguel to her which under par. 1 of Art. 739 shall be void for the reason that it is made between persons who were guilty of adultery and concubinage at the time of donation

DECISION 1. In the case at bar, Erlinda failed to establish and persuade that she actually contributed money to buy the subject Riceland. Petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness

2. Supreme court find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the rice land so it must revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang 3. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought under her name. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation 4. The issue concerning Kristopher Palang's status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel's estate. Inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession 5. The instant petition is DENIED

DR. BIENVENIDO B. GESMUNDO, VEDASTO B. GESMUNDO, OLIVER B. GESMUNDO, LIGAYA G. LUALHATI, AMOR G. CARLOS and BELEN G. ROXAS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 13th Division, JUDGE ZORAYDA H. SALCEDO, RTCBr. 31, San Pablo City, MAXIMINA BRIZ, (LEANDRO and ELPIDIO REYES both defaulted), and RODRIGO, LOPE and CASIMIRA, all surnamed BRION, respondents
G.R. No. 119870 December 23, 1999

CASE SUMMARY Petitioner herein, filed on 4 March 1983 a complaint against the spouses Maximina Briz and Santiago Reyes and the City Assessor of San Pablo City before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City for annulment of certain falsified affidavits and tax declarations over a ] parcel of cocal land located at Brgy. Dolores, San Pablo City Petitioners alleged that the aforementioned property was originally declared in the name of their father Anastacio Gesmundo who died on 20 June 1974 and submitted in evidence Tax Declarations. To substantiate their claim of ownership, they further claimed that Crispin Briz, uncle of respondent Maximina Briz, was the administrator of their father, whereas Lucio Brion, cousin of respondents Brion, was subsequently designated caretaker thereon. Still further, they asserted that on account of a series of record tampering in the City Assessor's Office, Tax Declaration No. 11296 was cancelled. Respondent Maximina Briz presented the same Tax Declaration number but declared in the name of her grandmother Anastacia Gesmundo who died on 21 September 1909 leaving five (5) children. Her uncle Crispin Briz, who died in 1949, was the administrator of the property. She inherited one-fifth (1/5) portion thereof from her father in 1940 and subsequently acquired the rest by way of sale transactions. She paid the real estate taxes thereon from 1945 to 1991 Respondents Brion asserted that their property is in the name of their grandfather Esteban Maranan, and when their grandfather died, the property was transferred in the name of their mother Francisca Maranan who paid real estate taxes thereon from 1972 to 1984 and upon the death of their mother and of their father Gervacio Brion, respondents Brion possessed the property. as to who of them possessed the subject property and gathering the fruits therefrom, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the premises. As it turned out, the land being claimed by petitioners was located outside of the property, on the west thereof, being claimed and possessed by respondent Briz and with visible natural boundaries separating the properties. the trial court rendered judgment declaring that respondent Maximina Briz are the lawful owners of the property with an area of 7,091 square meters and

respondents Rodrigo, Lope and Casimira Brion the lawful owners of the property with an area of 11,094 square meters. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. ISSUE Who owns the property by presentation of evidence of tax declarations, Deed of sale, and prescription. LAWS APPLICABLE 1. Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten (10) years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty (30) years without need of title or of good faith While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual possession become strong evidences of ownership. Proof of ownership together with identity of the land is the basic rule.

2.

3.

4.

DECISION 1. the testimonial and documentary evidence of respondent Briz adequately establish that the 7,091-square meter property formerly belonged to Anastacia Gesmundo, thereafter transferred to her children by inheritance until ownership thereof was consolidated in respondent Maximina Briz both as a consequence of inheritance and by sale 2. The name "Anastacio" in several tax declarations appears to be a typographical error by the City Assessor's Office, and find plausible the explanation of respondent Briz that she understood "Anastacio" in subsequent tax declarations to be Anastacia because she did not know Anastacio Gesmundo 3. Respondent Briz has been in possession of the 7,091-square meter property since 1956 through Crispulo Exconde as caretaker. Her possession was in the concept of owner. Her acts of harvesting coconuts therefrom were manifest and visible to all. She possessed

the property peacefully as she was never ousted therefrom nor prevented from enjoying the fruits thereof. Her possession was uninterrupted and in good faith 4. There is failure on petitioners to prove their ownership of the 7,091square meter property, and they were uncertain as to the identity thereof. A person who claims ownership of real property is duty bound to clearly identify the land being claimed in accordance with the document on which he anchors his right of ownership 5. Supreme court did not sustain the ownership of respondents Brion since it relied merely on the tax declarations and tax receipts in the name of their predecessors-in-interest. They were only able to prove their own possession which began in 1984 up to the time respondent Casimira testified on 25 May 1992, which is less than the requisite period of 10 years. They failed to establish the possession of their predecessors-in-interest.

BELEN UY TAYAG and JESUS B. TAYAG, petitioners, vs. ROSARIO YUSECO, JOAQUIN C. YUSECO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. L-8139 October 24, 1955

CASE SUMMARY In and prior to the year 1930 Atty. Joaquin C. Yuseco had been rendering professional services to Maria Lim, owner of lots 11-A and 11-B, block 2251 of the Government Subdivision known as Hacienda de San Lazaro. To show her appreciation of the service rendered to her Maria offered the two lots to Atty. Yuseco and his wife Rosario Yuseco for them to build on, and accepting the offer, the Yusecos built a house and an annex for servants quarters on the two lots which improvements. Although Atty. Yuseco claims that the two lots were donated to him, he could exhibit no evidence of said donation and the certificates of title already mentioned remained in the name of Maria. There is reason to believe that at least during her lifetime and while she remained owner of the two lots, it was her desire to have the Yusecos occupy the land free. there was executed a lease contract to the effect that the lease was to run for a period of five years, with a rental of P120 a year; that the owner of the lots was to pay all land taxes, and that failure to pay the rent when due would be sufficient cause for the recission of the contract. This agreement was noted on the certificates of title. A few days before her death, Maria sold the two lots to her daughter Belen Uy married to Jesus B. Tayag for and in consideration of the sum of P4,000. The new owners in 1946 asked the Yusecos to remove their houses from the land because Belen and her husband planned to build their own house on the two lots, or else pay a monthly rent of P120. Because of the failure of the Yusecos to comply with the demand, Belen assisted by her husband filed an action of ejectment in the Municipal Court of Manila which later rendered judgment for the plaintiffs and against the defendants. On appeal by the defendants to the Court of First Instance of Manila, the latter rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the two parcels of land upon payment by her to the defendants of the sum of P50,000, which is the value of the two houses they had built thereon On appeal by the plaintiffs to the Court of Appeals said court found that the Yusecos were builders in good faith under article 448 of the new Civil Code; and that as such builders in good faith, they cannot be required to remove their house and the annex unless they were paid the value thereof ISSUE WHETHER OR NOT petitioners shall be entitled to the possession of the land described in the complaint upon payment for the value of the improvements and respondents shall be entitled to purchase the land in question in the event that they are not in a position to pay said amount within 90 days Whether or not it is an ejectment case and therefore the applicable law is Rule 72, section 6 of Rules of Court and not the provision of 448 of the new Civil Code.

LAW APPLICABLE 1. In speaking of ordinary ejectment cases, if the lessee or occupant has not built anything on the premises, payment of rent would be a valid and satisfactory solution of the problem; but where the occupant has built on the land a building which is substantial and valuable, the courts even in ejectment cases are bound to take cognizance of said fact and when they find that the construction or planting had been effected in good faith,

2.

The construction in good faith was effected in 1930 and that good faith of the builders may be considered as ended in 1946 when the demand for rent was made. It is, therefore, clear that Art. 361 of the old Civil Code instead of article 448 of the new Civil Code is applicable for the reason that the new Civil Code did not go into effect until 1950 Art. 361. The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted in good faith, shall be entitled to appropriate the things so built, sown or planted, upon paying the compensation mentioned in Article 453 and 454, or to compel the person who has built or planted to pay him the value of the land, and the person who sowed thereon to pay the proper rent therefor. DECISION

Affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in so far as it finds and declares respondents to be possessors in good faith. giving an opportunity to plaintiffs-petitioners to exercise their choice and option: Whether to refund or pay by the petitioners should they choose to appropriate the buildings; "the value of the land" under article 361 of the same Code, or to be paid by the defendants-respondents in case plaintiffspetitioner elect to compel them to buy the land.

ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and BENEDICTO HORCA, SR., respondents G.R. No. 76225 March 31, 1992 CASE SUMMARY 1985, a complaint for payment of disturbance compensation with damages was filed by petitioner Espiridion Tanpingco against respondent Benedicto Horca, Sr. with the Regional Trial Court. It is alleged in the complaint that the petitioner is the tenant-lessee in the respondent's parcel of agricultural Riceland under a leasehold contract entered into sometime in April, 1976; The respondent through his representative informed him to desist from working on the subject land, having already donated the agricultural land and ordered the petitioner to vacate the landholding. Respondents defense thru motion that he is not the real party-in-interest having already donated the subject land to the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports, Region VIII, as a school site of the Buenavista Barangay High School; And that the donation not having in anyway benefited the respondent, no disturbance compensation is due the petitioner since under Section 36 (1) of the Agrarian Reform Code as amended, disturbance compensation holds true only in cases wherein the lessor-owner derives financial benefits from the conversion of the agricultural land into non-agricultural purposes. The trial court granted the respondent's Motion and Intermediate Appellate Court rendered the decision finding no merit in the instant appeal filed by petitioner. ISSUES 1. May a tenanted parcel of land be donated by the landowner so that it can be the site of a public high school without securing the consent of the tenant-lessee? 2. Who bears the responsibility of paying disturbance compensation? 3. Is respondent a real party in interest considering he donated the land already with the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports, Who stands now as a donee?

LAWS APPLICABLE 1. The claim of being a real party in interest is bolstered from the provision of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) which provides that: . . . In the case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligation of the agricultural lessor 2. . A donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee and once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.

3. Under Article 428 of the New Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law. As an incident of ownership therefore, there is nothing to prevent a landowner from donating his naked title to the land. However, the new owner must respect the rights of the tenant.

4. Under Sec. 7 0f R.A. No. 3844, It gives the agricultural lessee the right to work on the landholding once the leasehold relationship is established. It also entitles him to security of tenure on his landholding. He can only be ejected by the court for cause

5. Court has guaranteed the continuity and security of tenure of a tenant even in cases of a mere transfer of legal possession. Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood.

6. Under Section 10 of R.A. No. 3844, the law explicitly provides that the leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. The only instances when the agricultural leasehold relationship is extinguished are found in Section 8, 28 and 36 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines. The donation of the land did not terminate the tenancy relationship. However, the donation itself is valid

DECISION 1. The petitioner should have impleaded the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the party-defendant. The Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, as donee, became the new lessor of the agricultural lessee by operation of law and is therefore the real party-in-interest against whom the claim for disturbance compensation should be directed. 2. Considering that the tenant in the case at bar is willing to accept payment of disturbance compensation in exchange for his right to cultivate the landholding in question. The Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the new owner cannot oust the petitioner from the subject riceland and build a public high school thereon until after there is payment of the disturbance compensation in accordance with Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended. 3. trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for payment of disturbance compensation because the private respondent is not the real party-in-interest. 4. . The remedy then of the petitioner is to claim his disturbance compensation from the new owner or whatever agency, local or national, is in a position to pay for 5. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

ELIAS GALLAR, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HERMENEGILDA HUSAIN, ET AL., defendants. BONIFACIO HUSAIN, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-20954 May 24, 1967

CASE SUMMARY On January 9, 1919, Teodoro Husain, the owner, sold this land to Serapio Chichirita for P30, reserving for himself the right to repurchase it within six years. The deed of sale is contained in a private instrument. Teodoro Husain did not redeem the land, although shortly after the execution of the deed of sale the vendee a retro, Chichirita, transferred his right to Graciana Husain, sister of the vendor a retro, in what purports to be a resale of the land Graciana Husain subsequently transferred her rights to the land to appellee Elias Gallar in exchange for one cow Possession of the land, together with the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title of Teodoro Husain, was delivered on the same occasion to appellee who since then has been in possession of the land. He then asked the Cadastral Court for the issuance to him of a transfer certificate of title but the court dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction He, therefore, filed this suit in the Court of Instance of Iloilo on October 10, 1960 to compel Hermenegilda and Bonifacio Husain, as heirs of Teodoro Husain, to execute a deed of conveyance in his favor so that he could get a transfer certificate of title. He also asked for damages The trial court ordered the appellants to execute a deed of conveyance of the land in favor of the appellee. Bonifacio Husain brought this appeal to this Court.

ISSUE LAWS APPLICABLE 1. to quiet title is to remove the cloud cast on one's ownership as a result of refusal to recognize the sale made by the predecessor 2. successive sales in a private instrument, are valid just the same

3. action to quiet title is an action for recovery of real property which must be brought within the statutory period of limitation and thus prescribed if the claimants were not in possession thereto. Otherwise, the same is imprescriptible. DECISION 1. Teodoro Husain failed to redeem the land within the stipulated period, thus its ownership became consolidated in the appellee and by the delivery of possession of the land , the sale was consummated and title was transferred to the appellee 2. as plaintiff-appellee is in possession of the land, the action is imprescriptible