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TERMINAL OPERATION DEPARTMENT Terminal Engineering Division Juaymah Terminal Engineering Unit
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On Tuesday August 9th, 2011 at approximately 21:00 hours, informed by port control center senior pilot reported the SPM 34 hoses observed bending and need to be check. At 2130 hours BERRI # 5 with RIMTHAN II coordinator inspected SPM 34 and observed two of the port surface hoses P-28 and P-27 before breakaway coupling squeezed and bending. The hose P-28 was observed squeezed about more than one meter and the hose P-27 was observed bending more than 45degrees. Two surface full float hoses at SPM-34 were observed collapsed completely while in service. Next day, third hose was discovered suffering from the same collapse effect. An investigation committee was formed to determine the root cause of such premature failure and to prevent reoccurrence in future. The failed hoses are located near the breakaway coupling in a sequence ( #26, 27 and #28).The failed hoses are manufactured by Parker ITR (formerly known as Treg Pirelli) and had failed while in service for only 383 days. This type of hose is supposed to stay in service for around 2190 days (i.e. 17% only of the required service life). It is worth mentioning that this type of failure has happened before two times already in May 2010 and April 2011. An on-going investigation and analysis is being conducted right now by the vendor and a third party office to determine the cause of this type of failure. Several tests have been conducted on the failed hoses and other analysis and recommendation will be issued in this investigation report. Fortunately, there was no product leak or spill associated with this failure. Moreover, this report represents the analysis leading to the hose failure, defines the causes and suggests recommendations to prevent similar failures. In addition, the report addresses the following important points: The root causes of the failure and the action plan to avoid reoccurrence of such incident. The adequacy and quality of the hose manufacturer providing this type of hoses.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
INTRODUCTION DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURE FINDINGS & ANALYSIS DETAILED DISCUSSION RECOMMENDATIONS ATTACHMENTS INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBERS
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1.0 INTRODUCTION:
This report presents the analysis leading to the hose failure, identifies root causes and suggests recommendations to prevent reoccurrences. The investigation was based on the following standards, manuals and publications: o Saudi Aramco Material Specifications; 22-SAMSS-004 Oil Hose for Offshore Tanker Loading o General Instruction manual; GI 86.001 Handling, Storage, Inspection and Testing of SPM Hoses o Terminal Instruction Manual; TIM 934601 Hose Evacuation and Backfill System o Terminal Instruction Manual; TIM 934201 Loading Hoses Inspection and Testing o Oil Companies International Marine Forum OCIMF; Single Point Mooring Maintenance and Operations Guide, 2nd Edition 1995 o OCIMF; Guidelines for the Handling, Storage, Inspection and Testing of Hoses in the Field, 2nd Edition 1995 o OCIMF; Guide to Manufacturing and Purchasing Hoses for Offshore Moorings (GMPHOM 2009), 5th Edition 2009
12:00 06:30
collapse effect. Crew replaced defective hoses and SPM-34 back in service. Started new loading operation via SPM-34
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START
IMMEDIATE CAUSES Poor Internal Design of Parker ITR Full Floating Hoses Excessive Vacuum Duration imposed on Hoses
1. All failed hoses manufactured between March-May 2009 2. Inadequate adhesion between the Liner and main body components of the hose. 3. Not withstand vacuum under design tolerances.
1. No inspection. 2. No PM on joints. 3. Seizing of swivel screwed pin and bushings. 4. No clearance between pins and bushings.
5. No greasing nipples installed by FMC. 6. Not included in the pre-arrival check list.
Causal Factor Chart Consequently, the contributed immediate causes of this failure are attributed to the followings: 3.4.1 The bolts that secure the outboard cylinder maneuvering axis to the sheave sleeve bearing flange were loosen and not well tighten in place as a result of frequent use of the loading arm. Consequently, these bolts could not carry the load of the 8 tons counterweight causing them to shear off during the movement of the outboard arm. As a result of lack of lubricant, some of the sheared bolts were found corroded and eroded which did not help in carrying the shearing force on the axis.
3.4.2
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o Abnormal noise from the adjacent loading arm (L/A-5C) outboard cylinder securing bracket during simulation was an indication of possible mechanical failure that might occurred to loading arm (L/A-4C) before the incident occurred.
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Hose Brand BS- Bridgestone DU- Dunlop KL- Kleber (Trelleborg) TP- Parker ITR (Treg Pirelli) YK- Yokohama Total
Total In Service
33 76 32 260 112 6.4% 14.8% 6.3% 51% 21.8% 513
Total in Warehouse
39 343 30 77 22 511 7.6% 67% 5.9% 15% 4.3%
Total
Table1:HoseBrandDistributionforJuaymahSPMs
Total In Service
14 73 60 67 47 260
Table2:InServiceTPHosesDistributionsamongfiveSPMs
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The CSD Structural Engineer evaluated the incident and indicated that there could be three reasons for the failure. The friction between the cylinder (where the bolts are fastened to) and the housing is very high notice the grease nipples and grease lines may not be doing their job in getting enough grease to lubricate the cylinder. If the cylinder is frozen (or nearly frozen), then the torque exerted will be resisted by the frozen cylinder and bolts will shear off. The loading arm is forced to turn while it is in the locked position (with a locking mechanism). The bolts will resist the arm movement and the applied torque eventually overcame the strength of the bolts and sheared them off. Some bolts are shown in the pictures are loose. If this was the case, then the load sharing between bolts would have been different, putting more load on some bolts that are tight, shearing them off, transferring the load to the remaining bolts that could not handle it and also sheared off. Loose bolts also weakens the connection making the cross-sectional area of the bolts as the only resisting mechanism, while if they are torqued correctly, additional contact area (metal on metal) will be resisting the applied forces. Furthermore, FMC highlighted by e-mail that the screwed bolts for the manoeuvring assembly should be periodically checked for tightness, as they can become loose due to vibrations after some time of frequent loading arm operations. Also when one or two screws got loose, the probability of all screws getting loose and shearing is very high. On the other hand, Ras Tannura Terminal reviewed Berth 64 L/A-4C incident and they suspected possible multiple problems if the following assumptions derived from the pictures of the incident are correct. First, the bolts in the outboard drive assembly broke due to them being loose. Judging from the pictures of the bolts being bent and broken at different lengths and the smearing of the bolt-hole metal, other arms bolts should be checked for looseness at the bracket in question. Second, if the other outboard cylinder brackets are being deformed/bent as it appears to be in the pictures, something else much more serious could be happening and the arm where hydraulic systems and operating envelopes should be checked very closely. This could be an indicator of very excessive overloading or misalignments. In addition, Ras Tanura Terminal indicated that they have typical type of FMC loading arms at their loading jetties but fortunately they did not encounter similar incident since they increased the PM program on the securing parts by modifying the outboard cylinder manoeuvring axis assembly and installing grease nipples on the screwed pins. The investigation team members discussed the requirements of conducting PM on the critical moving components and the securing parts of the loading arm such as the maneuvering axis assembly, hydraulic cylinders and counterweights securing mechanisms. The PM should consist of cleaning, greasing, and checking the looseness of the securing parts. Sent: Sunday, March 13, 2011 10:55 AM Thank you for your follow up and please be noted that the ITR-Parker proposal is not Page 12 of 25
acceptable as submitted due to the following reasons: Based on the information we have, the failure mode of ITR-Parker hoses cannot be associated with positions or operational conditions as failures had occurred in different location of the same string. Additionally, failure type has been only occurring on ITR-Parker hoses and not to any of the other marine hose brands which are installed in the same string and position and have been exposed to similar condition. The root cause of the collapsed hose failure has not been identified yet. Saudi Aramco still have large number from the marine hoses Inferior Roma Design which are either installed or in the warehouse. Until a genuine evaluation of the actual cause of failure is concluded, it would be risky to use these hose design without close monitoring and evaluation as a mass failure may occur in the future similar to what had happened to those two hoses. It should also be highlighted that Saudi Aramco still have an outstanding failure issue with ITR-Parker hoses that have failed in Jazan in 1994 and so far had not been resolved as ITR-Parker were reluctant to pursue this issue or even admit it. For this reason, we would like to ensure that this will not happen again and therefore this failure issue will be tackled at the beginning rather than waiting until it gets bigger to a point that ITR-Parker unable to resolve. To avoid any unexpected mass failure of the remaining hoses and to ensure full responsibility of ITR-Parker to the performances of their marine hoses at Saudi Aramco facilities, the hose strings with suspected inferior design will all be removed from service next year and then subjected to rigorous testing and inspection. Based on the result, a decision can then be made and ITR-Parker will be notified accordingly.
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5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS:
The investigation team derived the following recommendations for immediate action plan and avoidance of future reoccurrence of such incident. Item # 1 Description Recommended By Action by JTEU
Determine the maximum duration of vacuum that the hoses Team Members should be applied to without subjected to failure Team Members
Ensure that
RU
Perform immediate Inspection for all TP Full Floating Hoses to ensure their integrity and to establish the baseline Team Members for future inspection. The berth operator who usually operates the loading arms should be more attention for any abnormal noise that Team Members indicates possible failure of the moving component and he should report it for immediate action for maintenance. Include the PM requirements for the loading arm critical components in the Instruction Manual (including the rules Team Members and responsibilities of all parties). Test the pressure relieve valve in the hydraulic circuit to check if excessive force was exerted on the cylinder bracket and caused the bolts to shear off. Check other arms bolts for looseness at the bracket. Hydraulic systems and operating envelopes should be checked very closely. This could be an indicator of very excessive overloading or misalignments. Provide greasing nipples on the swivel joint screwed pins for the outboard cylinder securing bracket. RT Terminal (e-mail) RT Terminal (e-mail) RT Terminal (e-mail) COS Maint. (Innovation Idea)
COS Maint. COS Operatio n COS OME COS OME COS OME COS OME COS OME
6 7
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10
12
The set of screws for the manoeuvring assembly axis should be periodically checked for tightness, as they can become loose due to vibrations after some time of loading arms operation. And when one or two screws loose, the probability of all screws getting loose and shearing is very high. On monthly basis, inspect the condition of all moving components for general operating condition and security. Area OME will provide scaffoldings for inaccessible locations. Replace or repair parts that indicate possible malfunction. On six months basis, inspect all components for damage or safety, fix all loose nuts and bolts, cracks, bent parts, etc.
FMC (e-mail)
COS OME
COS OME
13
RU
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6.0 ATTACHMENTS
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 5. 6. 7. 9. 10. Investigation Team Members Sign Sheet SPM-34 Loading Historical Trend Other SPMs Loading Trends SPM Hose Change Out Schedule Failed Hoses Data Sheet Inspection Failure Hose Report 2010 Inspection Failure Hose Report 2011 Manufacturer Hose Inspection and Test Certificate of the Failed Hoses Parker ITR e-mail response FMC Maintenance Manual and Loading Arm Drawing
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ATTACHMENT#1
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ATTACHMENT#2
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ATTACHMENT#3
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ATTACHMENT#4
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ATTACHMENT#5
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ATTACHMENT#6
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ATTACHMENT#7
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ATTACHMENT#8
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