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From: To: Subject: Date: Attachments:

RST01 Hoc
Trapp, James; Ulses, Anthony; Kolb, Timothy FYI Info an Zirc fires Tuesday, March 15, 2011 12:52:19 AM mitioation.docx

FYI

From: Mensah, Tanya Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2011 12:45 AM

To: Brown, Eva

Cc: RST01 Hoc

Subject: mitigation.wpd

Eva, Here you go. Hoping the references in the table help you out. This file was created in 1999 and was used as input to develop the SFP Decommissioning Report that Diane Jackson had the lead for. I don't believe it was incorporated in her report because of the scope/focus of the report. I will try to find the report and forward to you via a separate email. Thanks, Tanya

I'

Zirconium Fire Mitiaation Methods Available Extinguishing Methods Portable Fire Extinguishers Pros Cons Recommendations or Cost Benefit Results Additional investigations into this alternative are not considered to be technically viable, due to large quantities necessary to cool the pool and personnel limitations.

(1) Fire extinguishers or extinguishing agents with Class 1 D ratings can be provided for zirconium fires.

(1) Require personnel to remain in vicinity while fighting fire. (2) Fire extinguishers are designed for incipient fires (flame production limited and restricted to small areas which are accessible). (3) Limited amount of extinguishing agent. (4) Limited range of the discharge agent. (1) No available water sources outside of fire department for seismic. (2) High-expansion foam's principal application is for fighting Class A fires. (3) Turbulent air or uprising combustion gases can divert foam from burning area. (4) Manning concerns. (1) Carbon dioxide will not extinguish reactive metal fires due to the active involvement of these materials in the combustion process.

High-Expansion Foam

(1) Cuts off oxygen supply to burning area by covering/coating the fuel surface.

Additional investigations into this alternative are not technically viable, based on concerns associated with implementation of a portable high-expansion foam system and heat transfer.

Total-flooding Carbon Dioxide

(1) Extinguishes a fire by dilution of air. (2) Readily available,

Additional investigations into this alternative are not considered to be technically viable.

Class A Fires: Fires in ordinary combustible materials such as wood, paper, rubber and many plastics. Agents: Water, loaded stream, medium/high expansion foam. Class B Fires: Fires in flammable liquids/gases, combustible liquids, tars, oils, paints, solvents. Agents: Carbon dioxide, dry chemicals, AFFF (use on hydrocarbon fuel surfaces). Class C Fires: Fires that involve energized electrical equipment. Agents: Carbon dioxide, dry chemicals. Class D Fires: Fires in combustible metals, such as magnesium, titanium, zirconium, sodium, lithium, and potassium. Agents: Dry Powder

Available Extinguishing Methods

Pros

Cons

Recommendations or Cost Benefit Results

(2) Beyond design basis seismic event will crack SFP liner and allow fresh air to enter into the pool from below. Halon (1) Extinguishes a fire by chemically interrupting the combustion process. (1) Inhibits or breaks the combustion chain process by smothering the flame. Dry chem. must be applied to the heat source. (2) Dry Chemicals that are effective on Class D fires include Met-L-X and Pyromet. Inert Gas - Argon (1) "Gas blanketing," effectively controls zirconium fires if all air can be excluded from area of application, (1) Pool spray decontaminates the radiological release. (2) Reduction in offsite consequences. (1) Halon is no longer available due to ozone layer issues/ban. (1) Only UL approved for use with manually operated hose lines, (2) Some dry chem. are slightly corrosive to surfaces. (3) Large amounts of dry chem., which are costly, would be required to completely fill the SFP. (1) Beyond design basis seismic event will crack SFP liner and allow fresh air to enter into the pool from below, (1) Oxidation could be aggravated by slow spray actuation. Considered beyond the scope of report. Additional investigations into this alternative are not considered to be technically viable. Additional investigations into this alternative are not considered to be technically viable.

Total-Flooding Dry Chemical Agent for Metal Fires

(1) Additional investigations into this alternative are not considered to be technically viable. (1) Hardware: 1.2 million/per SFP 1988 (2) Best estimate value/impact ratio:
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Install Seismic Cat. 1 Safety Grade Water Spray System (NUREG -5281 2 and 1353 3)
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Jo,

J.H., et. Al., "Value/Impact Analyses of Accident Preventative and Mitigative

Options for Spent Fuel Pools", NUREG/CR-5281 (BNL-NUREG-5281), March 1989. Throm, E.D., "Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Generic Issue 82, "Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools", NUREG-1353, April 1989.
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NUREG 1353, Page 5-17, "Costs of Installing Spray Systems": Category I tank of 200,000 capacity, a spray system, pumps, spray nozzles, and associated hardware. NRC review of effort per pool and TS development/approval costs at an additional 100,000 per staff-year. (1988 dollars)
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Available Extinguishing Methods

Pros

Cons

Recommendations or Cost Benefit Results $3,340 per averted / person-rem (exceeds limit)

(3) Lower consequences of a spent fuel accident,

(2) System would not withstand a beyond design basis seismic event. (3) Require new equipment or modify existing safety system for SFP. (4) No available water source for seismic. (1) Transportation of materials in time to reduce radiological pool releases is highly unlikely. (Based on ad hoc measures) (2) Materials would not be stored onsite. (1) SF building ventilation could not cope with a beyond design basis earthquake. The same earthquake that cracks the SFP would destroy the system.

Cover Spent Fuel'

(1) Reduces radiological

(1) Cost not explicitly quantified. (2) A generic -contingency plan was not cost-effective for an operating plant, but could be considered for a decommissioned plant with no or reduced EP. (1) Cost not explicitly quantified. (2)Additional investigations into this alternative are not considered to be technically viable.

releases from SFP, Debriswith Solid Material - Sand, clay, (2) Covers debris if zirc dolomite, boron compouInds, lead, etc... ~fireprogressed to melting, relocation, and (NUREG - 1353) rubble bed.

Ventilation Gas Treatment System (NUREG - 1353)

(1) Ventilation & filter system capable of reducing airborne radioactivity concentration before discharge.

Staff Recommendations: 100000 (1) Do nothing initially for mitigative actions. In line with our staff recommendations, increasing preventative measures for heavy loads and seismic. just focus on

(2) For those plants that are identified as being vulnerable due to heavy load concerns or seismic concerns, perhaps look further into: (A) The development of a generic contingency plan.that would allow these plants to state that if an unrecoverable SFP draindown occurred, they have a plan which would ship in materials to cover the SFP in a reasonable amount of time before radiation release or before oxidation occurs. The plan could include storage of the materials, the transportation and time it takes to transport materials to the affected site, costs, etc..

(B) The other option would be to have them modify an existing SR train for SFP use. However, this system would not be guaranteed to survive a beyond design basis earthquake and then you have problems again with guaranteeing a water source is available.