The Exceptical Case

to the many who have given me their time and their advice in order to make the chapters that
follow as accurate and as well informed as possible, but I alone am responsible for the errors that remain. It is imporrant to remember finally that none of these chapters constitutes a comprehensive account of the religious situation in that place. They are highly selective, they are different from each other and each has been written with the intention of illustraring a particular poinr (or points) of contrest with Europe. There is, however, an underlying theme: that is to expose the 'boundedness' of both the European case itself and the sociological theories that have arisen from this. Such limitations are revealed bit by bit in the course of the case
studies; they are brought together in the more theoretical account offered in the final chapter.
rING THE SCENE: PARAMETERS OF FAITH
ODERN EUROPE
of this chapter is to sharpen the reader's awareness of a that is so miliar that it tends to be taken for granted. to look critically at the parameters of faith in our own the world before we can (l|gore. these with o*ther iqns and (b) make sense of the long-term future. In
the ori .,'.,"",@r%
on the theme that exist in
olusp,; and the ird w-ill inupdgssboth thp

for their lg--&I-gy, with some way of working. With the exception of a few paragraphs, ion in the initid sections will deal with the mainstream (Europe's historic churches), rather than the important minorities that form part of most European societies. the growing significance of iths other than Christian European context, it is the dominant trends that need
selection and
justification
ins in the first instance.
xtr
Introduction
THE THEME For a British audience or readership, a preliminary point is crucial: the parameters of faith in modern Britain ere very similar to our European partners. Despite marked differences in lanBuage, in denomination (there are, for example, very few Anglicans or Methodists in continental Europe), and in the very diverse legal arrangements between Church and State, there is a conlmon thread which binds together almost all European societies in terms of their religious behaviour. How, then, can these patte'n s o-f f.e, ligfgg;-g.q"!iy_r__ry__bs.=d!sgq{119ji There are two ways of doing this: ojg hblgqs3l il}futr_._ sg:g-smgset. The historica!_pgspJglry9. _ffssffisJfogfu ative ctors or themes that come tggetheq".in"the,6reaJion-.aqd l\.-. *", '+ qffij-.-l.j]{-ths-s"rg*lbi;o*{ EsIgP e' these are Judaeo.
in their history' Gltd.t already have (some peaceably, some a{ter Gontention), and no doubt others will - including,
plticular
and frequently pivotal point
our own. The historical legacy is, however, harder not least the cultural assumptions that go with these $rociations. This, for example, will be one of the Sontrasts between Europe and the United States that in the following chapter. The point to be made in that constitutional connection between Church and prrt of Europe's history whether they are retained or rpplauded or critiqued. Such is not necessarily the case
I
of material concerns erqpjrigaldata
that
is
Christian monotheism, Greek rationalism and Roman organisation (O'Connell r99r). These factors shift and -qcp!-v._9,"a.'y-gtJiree, way of li! "tha1.w,9.l:,:_". q-"..-i)a.pS"ir9 a-s European. Th; religious strand within such combinations is self-evident, but so too are the that have dominated so much of European history. These shared legacies go back as far as Constantine; they are deeply embedded in the European psyche, though the particular forms that they have taken in later centuries vary very considerably (a point to which we shall return). Some form of cy.J/s-!3-!Ls*rr.1e.gj9n is, however, historically present in every European sociery quite epart from the crucial, if not always harmonious, relationships berween pope and emperor in the centuries preceding the emergence of the nation state as the dominant form of political organisation in this part of the world. Nor can such connections be altered at will in terms of their long-term effects. It is, of course, possible, for individual European societies to disconnect the links berween Church and
b"llbe,r-sg*.hr,*agnnr,gan_-.ber!ii ff"gan4re-fo*rminga
natigns. One example can be taken as representative: V{.r1es lgdy2 It, like so many others of its kind,3 led soial science methodology (including careful techniques) to establish patterns and connections
across Europe, relating these to a range of and socid indic-aIls. It has generated very considerand will continue to do so. Any serious commentator ttligious situation in modern Europe must pay close, but
different kinds of variables
in this
case
to map social
time critical, attention to its findings. VS is concerned with two undering themes: Qlfittt p lhe gghsraggg -qf.carltemgo&r." Eur"BeT Y*es and th*e fariicula., to w*j5!g.t tb.y arq*olgre rs; what extent takes a Both themes inevitablY involve a element, either directly or indirectly. The first of these (the substance and the similariry of European value is widely accepted. The empirical data from the EVS the notion that the value systems of modern Europe Britain, whatever our misgivings in this respect) have
Europe: The Exceptional Case

the Scene
in common ' e fact most easily explained that +:Jqd?:ol, ,'tt "t.a rehgious ht'it'gt' No3q-e d:iWlltt E"y--Lt maly-e-lJ Present il dl f"ttt 9f Christian tradition values' beit foi*'tio" of iu'opean i'
a considerable amount
.
;;;";;.;;;r.'o'
't" variables' t" ."..,ton with a greet many other
d;;;;T;r*,
Arr-aen*+slf ,-gJ.dr..*l9l-t4"u-th"'g"5*e'-+saged'however'the times contentious' on u'ti .'"d'o*pio uotr' the institutionai'hurches the one hand, the ';;il;; oi them is systematica\ decreasing and the creeds ttt't ot'dt'pin t"; seriously doubts this' On the other' as the decades pass' N; is emerging to replace it is diflicult to discern what, if anything, As the EVS writers have themthese social and cultural forms' et al., tggz:7), the church has indeed selves pointed out (Barker arch of European culture' but lost its role as tht kty'to"e in the to take its place' Hence a no identifiable institution is emerging to the future of European whole series of questions with respect on the value system' It is religion and its continued influence substance of the sqclll3lggn these guestions that form the answers will be developed debate; they and some possible In rcrms of the book as a through the course of this chapter' rs immediately presents itself: whole, however, " ft"tt'"' point *Y),lI of the w3rld^land tf this siuation,,"iq'" to this part :1, of the lies the fil conducteur can it be found eLJ""?'H""it Sarum Theological Lectures' 7 . t:-* ^ the principal O-"U::T d The first trrk, ho*i"t', t' t" indicate for.a variery tt:]i?l::: the r98r, r99o and 1999 EVS surveys very direct on my Prevlous irrdi.rtorr.o Here the material draws to which the reader is work (especially Davie 2oooa: 5-4)' cenual point to grasp' dir".t.d for a foller discussion' The of variables that need to be however, lies in tf't rntlttipticiry of the religious situadon taken into account in any "'""*t" be found within the of modern Europe' Five of these can allegiance' reported church EVS data: they are denominational the Church' indicators of religious attendance, attitudes towards of subjective religious disposition' belief and some measurement
moreover, considerable flexibiliry the more l0dern techniques of data analysis: the variables can both with each other and with a wide range of ic data. Hence the complexiry of the emergent thc need to bear in mind more than one dimension lndividual's (or indeed a nation's) religious life in
,!!rmit,
':
llncrges in practice, however, is the situation that I elsewhere as 'believing without belonging' (Davie I phrnse that has become popular in pastoral as well as e clrcles, and which undoubtedly captures the clustering of variable: on the one hand, those concerned with , rxpeti.r.. and the more numinous religious belie{i; other, those which measure religious orthodoxy, ritual and institutional attachment. A second observation Itom this. It is only the latter (i.e. the more orthodox of religious attachment) which display an undeniable tccularisation throughout Western Europe. In contrast, (the less institutional indicators) demonstrate conpersistence (see below). The essentials of this Tbles t.r and r'2, 1 information are presented in from the EVG data. These tables can be used in two to indicate the overall picture of the continent or some of the marked national differences that can within Europe as a whole. In this section the emphasis on the former; the differences form the background to
clear, first of all, that the data are complex'
lny
conclusions.
With this in use of the term I'am hesitant about the unqualified ion even in the European context. Indeed it seems to more eccurate to suggest that West Europeans by and large, unchurched populations rather than simply
For a marked falling-off in religious attendance in the Protestant North) has not resulted, yet, in a
abdication of religious belief
in a broad definition of
Europe: The ExcePtional Case
the
Scene
Table
1.1
Frequency of church attendance in West Europe 1999/2000
of rcligious belief in West Europe i999l2000 (some
(some examples) %
Once a week
European average CATHOLIC COUNTRIES
20.5
Onee
Special
occasions
Cod
Life after
death
a month
10.8
38.8
77.4
s3.3
46.3
33.9
62.1
Belgium
France
19.0
9.0
4.3 10.5
13.1
25.3 27.8 22.8 32.5 33.5 32.5
46.6 60.4 9.7 13.9 15.2
71.4 61.5 95.5 93.5 96.4 86.7
45.6 44.7
33.5
7.6
56.9
31.2 85.3 58.7 60.0 50.8
Ireland
79.2 72.8 47.3

49.9
Italy
Portugal
Spain
40.5 36.4
25.5
14.9 10.5
31.5
t9.3 19.6 53.4 49.0 37.8 32.9 3s.3 20.1 13.8 73.9 9.5 31.4 17.5 9.4
52.6
44.1
39.8 85.7 73.2 71.2

51.2
MIXED COUNTRIES
Great Britain Germany Netherlands
14.4 13.6 14.5 4.5 16.5
1,1.2
25.3
41.2 28.1
55.8
28.8
46.1
7t.6
67.8
61.1
s8.3 38.8
50.1 75.1
55.8 30.9 37.4 86.6
66.9
4t.3
39.7
Northern Ireland
LUTHERAN COUNTRIES
48.5
14.9
t6.9
19.8
COUNTRIES
93.2
90.4
Denmark Finland
Iceland
Sweden
2.7 5.3
9.2
8.8 8.8 5.5
45.4
42.7 26.2 32.3 0.2

COUNTRIES
68.9
38.3
56.7
18.4 61.4 58.7 31.2
20.6 67.1 64.3 25.7
59.8 55.6 90.5
82.5 84.4 53.4
3.2 3.8
78.2
46.O
ORTHODOX COUNTRIES
Greece'
22.3
20.9
53.9
93.8
59.2
59.1
83.3
Data supplied by the European Values Study, University of Tilburg
by European Values Srudy, Universiry of Tilburg
lhe
Scene
the guiding theme of these lectures; all four, in addition, considered with reference to the case studies that follow. Until moderately recently, the secularisation thesis was c()Rsidered axiomatic. Herein lay the explanation for religioul decline not only in Europe but, in the fullness of time, in th rest of the modernised world. Such predictions derive from the central assumptions of the thesis itself; namely that therc it a necessery connection between the onset of economic and social modernisation and the decline of religion as a significant feature in public (if not always in private) life. In setting out these connections, secularisation theorists draw both from the sociological classics and from the thinking of American social scientists, notably Tlcott Parsons and Peter Berger at least in hin early work (Berger 1967).In Britain the principal exponenrs of the theory have been Bryan Wilson (1982) and Steve Bruce
(rgS6). We can take the latter as a representative case. ln From Cathedrals to Cults: Religion in the Modern World (rSg6), Bruce sets out the elements of the thesis with admirable clarity. The core of the argument lies in the changes that took place in Europe at the time of the Reformation when, for the first time, the authoriry of the medieval Church was seriously questioned. The challenge came in two ways - from a growing sense of
individualism as the individual believer was freed from the mediation of the church in terms of his or her relationship with God, and from increasing rationality as innovative ways of thinking began to penetrate the European mind. For Bruce the two movements are necesserily related; both moreover are corrosive of religion in its traditional forms: '[I]ndividualism threatened the communal basis of religious belief and behaviour, while rationaliry removed many of the purposes of religion and rendered many of its beliefi implausible' (1996: z3o). The first threads were pulled in the sacred canopy, which over time would unravel further and further - to the point, finally, of total disintegration. Not everything happened at once, however. Indeed for the
Eltlluries, religion remained a (if not the) central of European politics as nation fought nation Go control souls as well as bodies' Gradually, vivcndi emerged which allowed Europeans of persuasions to live alongside each other, both netions. Following the argument of the duorists, however, growing toleration simply poses gf dlfticulties - both for the religiously committed btuving sociologist. These can be summarised as lr possible to tolerate a variery of religious vtews lgclcty, can any of these views be considered an of truth? In other words, once more than one all religions necessarily lose their plausibiliry, their capacities to discipline the faithful. Or do ut marked differences of opinion in this respect' It moreover, that lead to one of the central sociological debate: whet precisely is the benveen increasing religious pluralism (an essential living) and religious vitalitY? lperking, there are rwo possible anwers: one held by Ichoice theorists (see Chapter Two for a full discussion ) and one by the defenders of secularisation Bruce himself (ISSS). The argument turns on ,Stsel connections betvveen the two variables are inAdvocates of secularisation maintain that growing pluralism (historically associated with greater religious I necessatily undermines the plausibiliry of all forms belief - thereby encouraging a greater degree of manifested in indifference just as much as hostiliry' this view, religion becomes increasingly a question of lifc-styles and preferences, to the point that it loses its raison d'tre. Piational choice theorists, however, the reverse: religious pluralism enables the needs of increasingly diverse populations to be more met - thereby encouraging rather than discouraging
r5
t+
lhe Scene
job to do - it preserved the
of a nation in face of extertll aggression, symbolic or real. A similar point will resonate i[ relation to South Korea (Chapter Five). Northern Ireland il, thankfully, a case apart; it will not form part of the followirrg
sense
discussion.
Secondly, there are marked differences befween European nations in terms of the variety of church-state relationships which have come into being in different places, mostly for particular historical reasons (Robbers 1996 offers a useful summary). We have dready made the point that the conrmon thread withirt West Europe lies in the existence of constitutional connectionl per se; the contrasts lie in the specificities of these relationships, Once again there is a broad contrast between Protestant and Catholic in this respect. In the Protestant parts of the continent
(including Britain), ecclesiastical arrangements very often take the form of a state Church which embodies, in a benign form, national as well as religious identiry. In these nations the indicators of religious activity tend, on the whole, to be low, but there is little evidence of hostility between Church and people, themselves largely of one mind. Indeed very positive relationships towards the state churches continue to exist - for example, in the Nordic countries, where residual membership of such churches remains astonishingly high (at least from the point of view of a British observer), despite the fact that attendance and assent to credal statements are some of the lowest in Europe. In Catholic Europe, a rather different evolution has taken place. The extreme case is the French one. Here a strong and markedly clerical Church has for more than rwo centuries been involved in a series of confrontations with its alter ego, an equally developed and at times impatiently secular State, consciously embodying an alternative ideology.e Up to a point the same confrontations can be found in the Iberian peninsula and in ltaly, but in both cases a rather different historical evolution has had a noticeable effect on the outcome. Spain and Portugal, for example, experienced dictatorship at a relatively late stage in
which both compromised the Catholic dm permitted a certain distancing in subsequent lhurch. for instance, played a positive role in the f prnish democracy. The legacy of the past remains &id, ho*"l.r, and especially for the young who, trc not attracted to institutional forms of religion' plcsence of the Holy See aPpears to have made a r the capacities of the Church to maintain its inldcntiry (not least, until very recently, as a bulwark Communist presence in ltalian sociery). cese, finally, is unique. Greece is the only eountry within the European (Jnion, a fact explicable of post-war history. Greek identiry moreover, lndistinguishable from Greek Orthodoxy, rendering of religious minorities in Greek society extremely This is even more the case for Christian or paraMuslim minoriry in Thrace'ro Sroups than for the
fact
-t
OGICAL EXPLANATIONS
now, to turn to the level of explanation' How is it to account for the religious situation that pertains rn rt the beginning of the twenry-first century? A variery hes will be offered. The first is substantially a reof the secularisation thesis in its classic form and is primarily on the work of Steve Bruce' The second' [in.a Uy David Martin, includes a much greater emphasis ional factors - secularisation undoubtedly exists but place in different ways in different places (both within and beyond). The final pair of explanations set out two approaches to the situation in modern Europe (they my own and that of Callum Brown - a social historian than a sociologist)' In one way or another, all four introduce the notion of 'European exceptionalism',
r3
the
Scene
the most visible, though Britain also houses considerable numbers of Sikhs and Hindus. Islam is, howeveq the largcst other-ith population in Europe, conservative estimates suggesting a figure of six million.T More specifically, Muslims makc up approximately 3 per cent of most West European populations (Lewis and Schnapper rgg4, Nielsen 1995, Vertovec and Peaclt tggil.The precise petterns derive very largely from colonial
(ilolt
notably the French) in coming to terms with
il!
CTTt
THE THEME
connections. The links between France and North Africa, for example, account for the very sizeable French Muslim communiry (3-4 million); Britaint equivalent comes from the Indian subcontinent (r.z million). Germany, on the other hand, has absorbed large numbers of migrant workers from the fringes of South-east Europe, and from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia in particular. In the r99os, the Muslim population has spread northwards - notably, for example, to Sweden (a country generously hospitable to political refugees from the Middle East). Finding ways to accommodate the growing Muslim presence in this part of the world is, in my view, one of the principal
challenges facing rwenty-first-century Europeans (and at all levels
of institutional existence). The presence of new religious movements in all European societies should finally be taken into account, not so much for the numbers that are involved (which remain minute), but for the issues that such minorities provoke. New religious movements disturb the European mind - whether this mind be secular, religious or sociological. For secular Europeans, new religious movements challenge ssumptions of rationality; fo. the traditionally religious, they throw up disconcerting alternatives to Christian teaching; and for the sociologically inclined, they offer not only ample material for case studies, but more importandy, insights into the nature of European sociery itself - notably its capacities to tolerate difference. A glance, for example, at the website established by CESNUR (an Italian centre for the study of new religions8) will indicate the degree of controversy that such movements provoke and the difficulties faced by European
to their religious identifications. The Republic is, in fact' to Poland - both are cases where religion has become (in Ireland Ofcultural deGnce against external domination lhe British and in Poland against, in turn, Lutheran Lutheran Germans and Orthodox - or aggressively Russians). This is the principal reason why the statisticel of lreland and Poland are out of line with the rest of in both places 'religion' had (until recently) an additional
the commonalities of European religion within Eritith will, I hope, recognise themselves alongside ptrtners. But what of the differences? These can ad in a variery of ways' There are, first, the broad beween the Protestant North and the Catholic Surope, with a variery of mixed types in berween llrlrnds, Germany and Switzerland)' By and large the of rcligious activity have fallen faster in Protestant in the South, though there are some suggestions them conclusive) that the Catholics will follow suit a or so later. In terms of religious activiry Britain falls within the Protestant North, despite the particular Anglicanism (it is both Catholic and Reformed) and Catholic minoriry in mainland Britain' important to remember, however, that certain limply fail to fit the pattern: Catholic lreland, for mey be part of the North from a geographical point but trish people are quite clearly very difGrent from neighbours in terms both of denominational two parts of Ea rnd of religious behaviour. Indeed the lhould in many respects be considere d sui generis with
the
Scene
to connect with Europeans have clased term. In short, many the have not in any ecdve sense' but they their religious institutis aspirations religious either their deep-seated abandoned, so far,
a latent sense
to the Latin American material. The correlation

respect to religious lfther than a manifestation of the normal life-cycle? f,ndings indicate that this might be so. The precise luch changes remains extremely difficult to predict, thc more so given the conclusions of the previous
of belonging' *"'1 f;;;; in fact' one belief and practice raises' This mismatttt Ut*t"" is' moreover'al' of the EVG material' It of the crucial quesdons a varrety to**t"tators (themselves from the one topic which divides'nt use of these data' on of disciplines), who ;;;;;t will follow practlcc assume that belief hand, there are those'who the rwo variables rate' In other words' but at a downwards, 'l;;**tU move in the same direction' albeit are direct\ related
,t generational shift with
G0tltrat, prompts one of the most searching quesBuropean Values Study: is West Europe experrencrng
"" at different'pttd'"- "
'J::#to *n"both religious practice and strictly Christian "nsiderbelief
*t ":'::'
'itt, finally, shifts occurring throughout Western Europe of the changing nature of the religious populagion' ctnnot be found in the EVG, or indeed in any
turvey, given that the sample sizes for each country
,Ut.. An evident fall in *: i*':io either to a parallel as beliefs in the ,"*-*" ;;;; the reverse is often true in religious '""'ntf (indeed loss or to the freedom to exoeriment)' individuals sense a greater point should alternadves &ttt tht widespread adoption "i'"t'f"' Henie a rarher different be made .r.n *or.- .*prr"ti."uy). rather rh,.n d i r e ctly relarc d t''ly u I ;;'':' I c onclusio n : "";as the institutional disciplines "tidot"to belonging' r" o'iJ'^*"'a'' but becomes increasingly perpt"i"'' decline, belief ""' o'i' among young i"gt"tous and particular Values study sonal, demched and European oeople. The data *#;:;:'"tt'"-; t;r ttt:"*' reinforce *:-'-"lY,a a number other ,'t"gr, :"'-^',::^--^-r'r-. note a n,,mber of other Ir999tzooo1 -Irt ' th. meantime, it is important to -not are data' Significant here that emerge'nt il" EVG patterns and a range Oo-"en religious indices the correlations that "i"t" of *f itt' confirm the exist;"t'il of socio-economic 'U boundaries' patterning across national ence of socio-religious the correlations with both striking ti The most 'nt "o"t"i" West EuroPe' The disproportionate gender and age kind of religious acuvlty 'tt'o'ghot" of *o*""-almost every presence the p"J-tl" t" fact be'found throughout belief detail ftoth "'a *t"tt' we shall return in some Christian'West, a rt;;;:
Case Europe: The ExcePtional
independent varr"'Y-^'llr:::TiJJTt '1:*
Fnrll to provide any meaningful information
about
minorities. They are, none the less, of crucial importgur understanding of Europe's religious environment' necessery emphasis in this chapter on the historic it would, I think, be unwise to ignore the minorities
of these, the Jews, has been present in Europe for though not continuously so, a fact in itself indicative
of European history both more and less recent' dcmonstrates the inapplicabiliry of the term Judaeoto much of Europe's past. The term (more related to political correctness than historical accuracy) should with considerable caution. Estimates of numbers are difticult, but there ere, et present, around one million West Europe, the largest communities being the French
)and the British (3oo,ooo). FrenchJudaism has in the post-war period by the immigration of numbers of Sephardim from North Aftica;6 it forms exception within the overall pattern of declining (V'asserstein 1996: viii). of more recent immigrations (largely brought about
mic reasons), the Islamic communities are undoubtedly
the Scene
will resonate in the following chapters, notably the next. Quite apart fir this, they immediately engage the issue of European ceptionalism, in so far as the outcomes appear to be di (markedly so) in different parts of the modern world. Before developing this point in more detail, it is important remember that Bruce is confining his argument to 'Western democracies - he is not including the religious mot. ments sweeping ecross parts of the Islamic world or the serioul disputes on the ult lines of the various faith communities thtt exist in the Neaq Middle and Far East. But even in the moderq West, there is surely, not only considerable diversiry in thr
greater religious vitaliry. These questions
UiUmcnt moves in Ewo stages' The first stage Stlon of 'American exceptionalism'' In other prrticular reasons for the religious vitaliry of which require careful analysis - a subject that fiom different disciplines for much of the Mrrtin among them. Bit by bit, however, begun to swing in a different direction, encourby Martint recent attention to the Latin fnd the emergence of Pentecostalism as a signifilnovement both here and elsewhere (Chapter the religious developments of the modern gf which have caught the sociological community Mrrtin - together with Peter Berger Ggsz) - have convinced not only that the modern world ta.tiot t of the modern West) is 'as furiously lvir', but that it is Europe that should be considered case rather than the United States. Berger has, full circle, from an advocacy of secularisation tnnchant critique of this position' as , does this leave the question of European American * forms of religion? They must be seen' rtrand among many which make up what it means n, European religion is not a model for export; it distinct, peculiar to the European corner of the then has been the nature of this strand in the latter twentieth century and what will it be like in subdccades? It is precisely these issues which have my recent writing on the religious situation rn
religious situations on offer, but seriously conflicting trajectoriol in terms of their iikely development. Such contrasts lead naturally to the second set of explanatory theories, approaches associated above all with the work of David Martin (rSZ8). In his seminll
text A Ceneral Theory of Secularization, Martin lays considerably greater stress than Wilson or Bruce on the empirically observablc differences between a wide variery of comparative cases, and the need to explain how the particular religious situation in each of these came about. It is clear, moreover, that advanced secularisation is more likely to develop in some circumstances than in others. It follows that there is nothing inevitable about the secularisation process - it may or may not take place, at different speeds, in different ways and with differenr effects. The conrrasts befween Europe (itself internally diverse) and the United States are central to this discussion. The difference berween the Ewo cases lies essentially in two very different religious histories, enabling in the American example a striking combination of economic modernisation and religious vitalitl,, itself associated with a developed religious pluralism (a point discussed in detail in the following chapter). How, then, did the secularisation theorists (largely of European origin) accommodate the markedly different American case? It is at this point that the notion of exceptionalism begins
ln Modern Europe: a Memory Mutates (Davie zoooa) this thinking; it is concerned with the specificities
b religious life and its relationship to European history
order to make these essentially Durkheimian is conceptualised as a form of collective memory' idea derives from the work of a leading French
. In
r6
lhe Scene
t7
sociologist of religion, Danile Hervieu-L6ger, whose of departure (Hervieu-L6ger zooo) lies in trying to identify to refine the conceptual tools necessary for the understal of religion in the modern world. An answer gradually in the definition of religion as a specific mode of believing. 't crucial points to grasp in this analysis are (a) the chain wli makes the individual believer a member of a community : communiry which gathers past, present and future memberr and (b) the tradition (or collective memory) which becomes th! basis of that community's existence. Hervieu-L6ger goes furthef than this: she argues that modern societies (and especially modern European societies) are not less religious because tlrey are increasingly rational but because they are less and less capablt of maintaining the memory which lies at the heart of theit religious existence. They are, to use her own term, amnesie societies. Through what mechanisms, then, can modern Eurupean societies overcome their amnesia and stay in touch with the forms of religion that are necessary ro sustain their identity? That seems to me the challenge set by Hervieu-L6ger's analysis, Religion in Modern Europe was largely a response to that challenge; the following paragraphs offer a brief summary of the argument. It must start, inevitably, with the churches themselves, Europe's churches have undergone a metamorphosis in the course of the last century.ll No longer do they supply a sacred canopy embracing every citizen within the nation in question (in this respect I entirely agree with Steve Bruce), but nor have they disappeared altogether. They have become de cto, if not always de jure, influential voluntary organisations, capable of operating in a whole variety of ways - traditional as well as innovative. Placing the churches in the sphere of the voluntary sector or civil society is, in fact, the crucial point. In this sector of sociery the churches are key players; they are central to the structures of a modern democracy and attrect more members than almost all their organisational equivalents. Churches, moreover, imply churchgoers (the social actors who carry and
Who these people are in modern Europe Itf plreed in the nexus of social relations - an frh question - is central to the understanding fad in-formal patterns of religion in Europe and dntr from an earlier section of this chapter lntwer in terms of the European situation: these well educated, often professionals, older on lhl population as a whole and disproportionately
.
to emerge from these analyses: that illlgton. Could it be that Europeans are not so world' nlout than populations in other parts of the ilmpty - Jiff.t .rtly so? For particular historical Itv the historic connections between Church and numbers of Europeans are content to let both
begins
up r thcir collective lives. The almost universal take most obvious Ercmonies at the time of a death is the of this tendency; so, too, the prominence of the crisis or' more Erches in particular at times of national of national celebration. Think, for example' of the of European churches and church buildings after of the Baltic ferry Estonia, aftet the death of Princess ffter the terrifying events of rr September 2oor' but nd of argument works well for the European case' jthcwhere - a further ergument in favour of excepHere the inapplicability of the concept of vicariousness parts of the world (and especially to the United States) from ucial point to grasP, a limitation easily illustrated every experience. I have travelled and lectured in almost of West Europe, frequently introducing the theme of religion. Despite the differences in language' rt rs this rare that Europeans fail to grasp what I mean by
!o draw on the capital at crucial times in their
(the churchgoers enact a memory on their behalf of vicarious), more than half aware that they
r8
the
Scene
t9
term and to respond accordingly, more often than not me with innovative examples from their own experience. ln United States the situation is entirely different. Here there it problem with language, but a far greater one in terms of sensitivities. Quite simply, Americans understand neither concept (vicariousness) itself nor irs implications. Why shr they given the entirely different evolurion of their reli
institutions?
s carriers
of the
discourse that
is of
with reference to Europe ivc cases that follow (a remark that will with reference to the chapter on Latin ofihe world where the role of women is again to
tis book, both
outcome very differenQ' So much is helpful' la my opinion, is the stress on the role of women
The final approach to the place of religion in modern E is more circumscribed still. It concerns the recent work of I social historian and concentrates entirely on the British cam, Callum Brownt The Death of Christian Britain (zoor) atrempts t explain the demise of Christianiry in Britain in terms of ; collapse of a shared discourse. In this respect the argument ll similar to that of Hervieu-L6ger despite a difference in vocabulary (memory and discourse are not interchangeable, but thcy undoubtedly overlap). Brown, however, goes further than Hervieu-L6ger in that he identifies first the disproportionate significance of women as carriers of this discourse through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (exempli$zing the argument from a wide variety of historical sources), but also the dramatic change that took place in the r96os associated with the revolution in the roles of women more generally. No longer were women (and more particularly younger women) prepared to be the carriers of piety on behalf of the nation as a whole. The effects of this shift, according to Brown, have been devastating both for the churches and for the cukure that they represent. (Jnsurprisingly (given both its title and its theme), the book has caught the amention of the wider public as well as the academic world. In articulating his approach, Brown is distancing himself from Bruce and the classic secularisation theorists - secularisation in Britain, following Brown, did not really bire until rhe sixties, a controversial position that he underpins with extensive statistical data. It is, however, the historically central, but currently dimin-
ItL to ihe exclusion of all other factors'
Even
of Britain, for example, he fails to explain
must be rccular) ptr.r, in fact, a question that in religious thore interested in the recent decline h the latter exclusively a symPtom of secularisation in part, an indicator of underlying economic and
male-dominated institutions of secular society political parties and the trades unions) collapsed .utu"rrl".l, than the churches and at precisely the 'ihi, *ia.tpread shift in social behaviour (both
lt
move ileed, however' to be kept in mind as we from European case and begin to set the material global context' Ections of this chapter into its
question and some answers were addressed in some developed hefigion in Modern Europe; they cannot be
ISTIN G CASES
a range be done in two ways - either by considering in locial movements which are essentially religious following n or by using a geographical frame' In the Before I shall be using the latter as a organising scheme' be helpful to say on this enterprise, however, it might approaches s about the former way of working' Both for a theory that and geographical) have implications the ty E,i.op."r, in origin and both can be found in
the
Scene
between State and Church through certuries of European history became increasingly diflicult to susrain (Casanova zoor), At this point Catholicism metamorphosed into a transnational
useful collection of essays on The De-seatlarization of the Moderfl World edrted by Berger (rSSq). The three global movements that need to be taken into account are global Catholicism, popular Pentecostalism and the possibly overlapping caregory of fundamentalism (encompassing a variery of world faiths). All involve hugenumbers of people they are popular movements in every sense, but not in Europe, It is true that elements of each exist withinthe European context (both within and outside rhe mainstream churches) but none ol' them attract large numbers of people. Indeed, in the case of Catholicism, the global movemenr took off precisely at the moment when European expressions of Catholicism began to retreat almost to the point of no return -i,e. as the convergence
religious movement, and as such has grown steadily since r87o (the low point of the European Catholic Church). Most visible of all within this whole scenario is the person of the pope himself, without doubt a figure of global media proportions. The Pope goes nowhere without planeloads of the world's media accompanying him, his health is the subject of constant and minute speculation in the international press; his global influence whether approved or otherwise - is indisputable. Global Pentecostalism is rather different in that its immediate impact is considerably less visible. Its effect on huge and probably growing numbers of individuals is, however, increasingly recog-
by $tablish effective global communications, not least dcctronic technologies. Freston concentrates on the ions of evangelical Christianiry an asPect which difiicult to discern given the fragmented, fissiparous rpolitical (at least in a conventional sense) nature of tent. Martin, in contrast, is concerned first and forethe cultural aspects of Pentecostalism, and more with cultural change. His book, like Frestonh, is wide in Covcring the diaspora populations of the Far East to North America, Latin America and parts of Africa; is become an important resource in later chapters' It that Martin (in a developed theoretical chapter) attention to the absence of Pentecostalism as a and popular movement in Europe' The notion of ism appears, once again, to be reinforced' ism(s) - whether in the singular or in the plural the most controversial concepts in academic discussion' of this debate concerns the largely unresolved issue a term that was used initially to describe currents of Protestantism popular in the ear\ rwentieth century of the United States can be helpfully transposed to a or trends visible in a variery of world faiths some sixty years later. The fact that the terminology is diflicult [ot, however, detract from the evidence that these trends
led taking place
nised, a phenomenon which is attracting the attention of growing numbers of scholars and in a variery of disciplines. The literature, as a result, is expanding fast (see, for example, the material broughr rogerher in Corten 1997). Coleman (zoor), Freston (zoor) and Martin (zoora) ofler state-of-the-art accounts of this phenomenon, each concentrating on a different dimension. Coleman, for example, is primarily concerned with 'Health and Wealth' Christians and
decreasing levels of global religiosiry as the twentieth lv drew to a close, but that such religion as continued to manifest increasingly'reasonable' tendencies' 'What has hap: did not happen, at least not universally' - in different places and in different world faiths - has emergence of a range of reactive, conservative religious
reversing in many ways the expectations Western (often European) observer, who assumed not
rts, resisting, in some cases, the modernising trends within the major faiths (modern biblical criticism, for or, in others, the incursions of modernisation (very
23
the
Scene
often associated with secularisation or westernisation) from thc outside. Once again the scholarly literature is immense. A huge, and to some extent representative set of volumes (though not everyone would agree with its findings) can be found in the Fundamentalism Project, published rhrough the early rggos by the (Jniversity of Chicago Press (Marry and Appleby 1995). For our purposes, one thread in particular can be extracted from thit vest accumulation of scholarship: the range and location of thc case studies which form the heart of the empirical project. These case studies are taken from all the major world faiths and from almost all parts of the globe. 'What, however, is striking is - once again - the relative absence of examples from Europe. The three potentiel candidates are rhe following: traditional 'Lefebvre rype' Catholicism, lJlster Protestantism and the ltalianbased youth movement - Communione e Liberazione. In terms of the ideal-rype of fundamentalism established in the project, however, none of the three fit the criteria completely or convinc* ingly. The first is closer to traditionalism than a reactive fundamentalist movement, the second is more of a ethnic nationalism than a social movement and the last has been described by Italian commentarors (Pace and Guolo 1998) as a 'fondamentalismo ben temperato'; it is, in other words, a partial illustration of fundamentalism, displaying some of the 'family resemblances', but lacking, in particular, any sustained reference to a sacred text. So much for an approach based on three global religious movements, which could have provided the basis of three (at least) fascinating lectures. I have chosen instead to base my case studies on four global regions, with the specific aim of using each to highlight a particular especr of European religion (or perhaps the lack of it). One reason for working geographically is to emphasise the fact that rhe 'rest of the world' is infinitely varied; it is not one place. Bearing rhis in mind, I have deliberately restricted the choice to Christian examples in an attempt to limit the number of variables that must be taken into account.
to learn more about our own situation, it is important $es with more rether than less in common with our
epert, the project is already sufliciently ambitious for of lectures.) The four regions have already been they are the United States (with some reference to Lrtin America, sub-Saharan Africa and three examples Far East - South Korea, the Philippines and (very Melanesia. They will, of course, cross-cut the movements ibed, notably in the case of Latin America (where
flccted to emphasise the Pentecostal presence). iley of working is essentially Weberian. It employs careful analysis in order to highlight the significance of Eriables. One question will constantly repeat itself what West European society that makes it distinctive from point oI vlew rr comPareo wrln mos[ of DUg Polnt of view if compared with most o the modern Eut a second follows on - inevitably, given the pervasive in the relevant sociological thinking. Not only are increasingly distinctive in terms of their religious they are visibly reluctant to admit this state of affairs. Eluctance has important theoretical consequences, the of which can be found in Martin (r9g6a): Europeans both the normaliry of their own situation and, which is tnore damaging, that the conceptual apparatus developed a specifically European phenomenon can be used ln other words there is one conceptual map tffi be taken on every journey; the ct that, figuratively this is a map of the Alps, which may not be all that to the Rockies or the Andes, does not always occur scholars. Taking the wrong map, moreover, is more ise - it is potentially very dangerous indeed. the need for a developed theoretical discussron rn ing chapter which returns to the idea of European nalism from a conceptual point of view. It is concerned two themes in particular. The first looks at Europe from ide, isolating the specificdly European characteristics that
24
the Scene
2S
account for the religious situation in this part of the world. Thit discussion will have practical as well as theoretical significance for the churches, in that policies are more likely to be effective if they are based on an accurate diagnosis of the problem. The second theme is more ambitious: it is concerned with the study of religion in the modern world per se and the need to develop an appropriate set of conceptual tools (or maps) to carry out this task. It is this section that has been developed most fully since
ICAN ACTIVITY:
BNANT RELIGIOUS MARKET
the completion of the Sarum Theological Lectures themselves,
rtaders of the previous chapter will have noticed that sections were, broadly speaking' divided berween described the parameters of religious activity in Europe which sought explanations for these findings' This will be developed further in this chapter. It derives iman's Tieatise on Social Theory (Runciman 1983/ 'Which splits the task of sociology into four distinct, but
the gathering of data ion - accounting sociologically for the data
in
(a)
the term is used in a specialised sense ically speaking) in order to describe how the 'feels' for the actors concerned - including the possibiliry of policy making is felt to be necessary or beneficial.
if
these categories
will be applied in turn to the American in order to establish a framework of comparison with
z6
1n
REPO RTAGE
lxvek of actiuity
For European observers, one fact stands out above all the othert in their observations of religion in the United Srates: rhat is the levels of religious activity. Approximately 4o per cenr of Americans, for example, declare that they attend church weekly and even more once a month, figures which have displayed remark*
able stabiliry over several decades. Similarly, well over go per cent of Americans aflirm that they believe in God, a markedly higher proportion than that found in most of Europe. Indeed, across a whole range of the EVS variables, Americans emerge att not only more religious but noticeably more orthodox (in thc sense of endorsing credal statements) than almost all European populations (Ester, Halman and de Moor rg94t 37-Sz). Attendance and orthodoxy become therefore mutually reinforcing, exactly the reverse of what is happening in Europe. A closer look at the attendance figures reveals, however, that not all Americans do what they say (Hadaway, Marler and Chaves r993, rg98). Iffigures ofreported attendance are ser against actual attendance, a discrepancy appears in the findings - indicating, it is reasonable to assume, a significant degree of over-reporting on the part of many Americans. (fust how large these overestimates are is a matter of sociological judgement and varies considerably berween researchers.r) Over-reporting, moreover, whether large or small, raises important questions with respect to the data and the conclusions that can be drawn from it; these statistics need to be treated with caution. But even before the numerical analyses begin, it is important to ask why such a tendency exists in the first place. The answer lies in the following: Americans, it seems, are anxious to be seen as churchgoers, even if many attend less frequently than they say. Europeans have fewer inhibitions. Indeed the reverse, to some extent, is true the over-zealous churchgoer may well run the risk of being called
in Europe, especially in working-class communities I)avie 1987) lpfrt from the over-reporting question, there are, of variations in the American pattern (ust as there ,Europe). Levels of attendance, for instance, vary from tegion in the United States: they are higher in the ccntre (in the Bible belt) and get progressively lower North and towards the coasts. The difference ln Lr betwee, men and women remains, however' a sigVrriable; women on both sides of the Atlantic are more religious than men, over a wide range of infnd in very different type of churches. The age ctor omplex. It is true that young Americans leave their just like young Europeans, and disproportionate of younger people appear in the 'non-religious' (Smith 1998; 8o), but significant numbers of these return to the churches later in life, complicating picture (Roof rgg3, 2ooo). Such variations are important and require careful and systematic ;ion, but the crucial point is the following: even if (or at least lower) figures are used with respect to in the United States, and even if the regional and Ylriations are taken into account, there is still a marked in levels of religious ctiviry between America and if not quite all, European countrles. difference berween the old world and the new in this is, in my view, qualitative; it is not simply a question of 'We have already noticed, moreover' that the reported are relatively stable (the actual figures rather less so), a certain amount of re-alignment between denomior 'switching' to use en American term. Such ent takes the form of a move away from the liberal mainstream towards more conservative forms of - notably varieties of evangelical faith (both black and
29
z8
white). The proportion of Catholics in the population remains solid, despite a decline in mass attendance in the r96os and r97os (now rather more settled) - with this in mind Catholic churches appear on both sides of the switching equation. But taking the picture as a whole, there is in the United States, at least to some extent, growth to compensate for decline in the historically dominant denominations. In Europe, such decline is only'too evident and in Catholic as well as Protestant constituencies, but there is no - or at least very little - compensating growth.2 A further point follows, more or less directly, from both the levels of activity and the growth in conservative Protestantism: that is the existence in America of the New Christian Right. Just like the estimates of religious attendance, the significance of this phenomenon has been disputed by American, and indeed British, scholars of religion (Bruce 1988, Bruce et al. r9g5, Lienesch rgg3), but the contrast between the United States and Europe remains, none the less, striking. In Europe there is nothing that can realistically be called a New Christian Right in the sense of a social movement of conservative Christians that has an effect on the political or electoral map of the nation in question, not least in the most recent Presidential election (Simpson zooo). It ls true that a relationship exists between religious allegiance and political predilections in much of 'Western Europe - by and large there is a correlation berween religious activiry (of all forms) and conservative political leanings (Berger 1982, Medhurst 2ooo), but in ways thar are very different from those that exist in America. It is also true that most European politicians would be wise not to offend too directly the religious sensitivities of both the minorities in their populations that do attend their churches with reasonable regulariry and the very much larger numbers of nominal members. But the capacities of religious activists to lobby their governments over matters of policy is not a matter of concern (or from another point of view of approval) in most parts of Europe, whether these be evangelical Protestants in the North or Catholic political
ln the South. Indeed in Catholic Europe the restructuring 'political scene in recent decades has largely reshlted in a Power on the part of the Christian Democrats. Why this fu a story in its own right (it does not pertain only to ion), but it does indicate the incapacities of more ive Christians to impose their will on the majoriry of in terms, most notably, of uniform moral codes.3 rrticle which demonstrates the utterly different ways of berween European and Americans in this respect can in the quintessentially American journal The National (Muller rggil.In this the author (President Emeritus of Hopkins Universiry) not only draws attention to the the New Christian Right does not exist in Europe, but that the European political scene is the poorer because Following Muller, religion survives in America as a force in politics, not least in the form of a conservative movement explicitly committed to traditional values and vigorously opposed to social and political (including, amongst other things, the promotion of through'big government'):
key difference bewveen Europe and the United States in regard is twofold: nothing comparable to the American
right is in evidence in Europe nowadays; and the orthodoxy is institutionalized far deeper in the strucof the welfare state - and even inside the churches - in than it is in America. This lay orthodoxy in under in America; in Europe, with the partial exception of
,
it really
is not.
(tSSl: lS)
Europeans,
course, are profoundly supportive of the in so far as it underpins social justice in the form of
of
comprehensive welfare system (the principal theme article); bearing this, and indeed many other reasons
the absence of a religious right is for them quite

Actiuity 3r
3o
clearly an advantage, not a disadvantage, something that many Americans (including Muller) find diflicult to understand. The place of televangelism is part and parcel of the same story. If the New Christian Right provides the political arm of
they ask, is watching this kind of thing? That person cxist in Europe.
particular forms of American religion, televangelism fulfils the same function in terms of the media. It is abundantly clear, for example, that televangelism resonetes with a particular kirid of Protestant Christianiry that flourishes in North America, though more in some places than in others; its sociological patterns havc been worked over by a variety of scholars employing a range of socio-political perspectives (Hadden r987, Hoover r988, Brucc rggo, Peck r993). Unsurprisingly, these scholars conclude differently concerning the scope and influence of televangelism in American life. Hadden, for example, considers televangelism a highly significant social movement with ongoing influence in American life; Bruce, on the other hand, stresses the limited influence of televangelists outside their immediate and already committed constituency (this is a classic case of preaching to the converted). Such differences of opinion are important and need to be taken into account in an overall assessment of the phenomenon in question. Of a totally different order, however, is the more or less complete failure of the televangelistic enterprise on this side of the Adantic, despite numerous efforts on the part of American evangelists to break into the European market (Elvy 1986, rggo, Schmied ry96). This 'failure' has been covered in some detail in Davie (zoooa). Essentially it revolves around the fact that the constituency with which the televangelists find a resonance in the United States does not exist in Europe and no amount of trying by means of increasingly deregulated radio and television nefworks can make good this ct. This is an area in which the power of the media has proved itself surprisingly limited, with the result that a European visitor to the United States, coasting the channels in any hotel room at almost any time ofthe day or night, is simply astonished when they discover the examples of televangelism on
lnsertion
of an overview of religion in the United States, a lt of issues concerns the manner in which religion $relf into American life - an area of enquiry in which
explanation become increasingly diflicult to disentangle to remember that these are indeed overlapping r). In this section - and in order to present this issue in terms of data - I have relied heavily on Nancy 's magisterial work on Congregation and Community rggT), a key text for anyone wishing to grasp the of American life, never mind American religion. The message of Ammerman's publication is not only the but the sheer resilience of religious congregations in life, despite the many vicissitudes which some of them is true that many of these congregations (perhaps the face decline, whether in the long or short term (rggz: cven the Contents page gives an impression of persistion, adaptation and innovation in combinations that bc hard to match in Europe. There is, in other words, a forward movement here than would be possible in the and in an astonishingly wide variety of communities. a British point of view, an interesting comparison with n's work can be found (at least in r.nicrocosm) in a completed doctoral thesis, which examines both the and decline of religious congregations in Swansea zooo). In this account, four case studies are selected different strategies of survival amongst different churches in a ciry undergoing a socio-economic metais as the port and industrial base retreet and new emerge. As in Ammerman's work, close attention is igious ecology (i.e. the economic, social, demographic
32
33
of each congregation) and the many in which religious groups are able to relate to the surrounding community. The case studies are supported by a
and cultural environment
ways
:'Atlantic, a debate provoked very largely by the work

Putnam (an American political scientist). speaking, social capital as a concept did not originate 's seminal article 'Bowling Alone' (Putnam r99j); it ,dready been used by a variety of authors to describe the ties that bind people together. Be that as it may, the notion definitely caught the attention of both politicians and in the mid r99os - Putnam's subsequent book of the same (Putnam zooo) has had huge media coverage. In this, both documents (dramatically so) and expresses concern the relentless reduction in the membership of voluntary in American life, organisations epitomised by the club.s The churches, or to be more precise certain kinds are seen as part of the same trend. The downturn statistics (both religious and secular) in the later post-war was both sharp and unexpected and has become the of considerable public concern. Hence a burgeoning and consistent literature on the nature and forms of social and the precise place of religious groups in this. argument in terms of religion is complex even in 's own work. In his earlier, more historical, work on (Putnam et al. ryg3: ro7-g), Putnam seems to imply that is little connection befween religion and social capital if anything the institutional churches (and notably the Catholic Church) generate negative rather than positive in this respect. In his analysis of America, in contrast, variables appear not only to be related to each other, firo generative of positive consequences. Hence Putnamb about religious decline in the United States, the more Eo far as faith communities are arguably 'the single most repository of social capital in America' (zooo: 66). religious groups, moreover, that do continue to flourish exhibit inward- rather than outward-looking tendi.e. they are less effective carriers of social capital than that are disappearing.
framework of statistics in a part of the United Kingdom where religious diversity has been more developed than in England; non-conformiry has been an essential feature of Welsh com-
munity life for generations. The crucial point to grasp in Chambers' study is the radical diminution in religious activity in the city taken as a whole, despite the examples of growth as well as decline in the congregations that form the principal focus of the thesis. The immediate past needs, however, to be set into a longer-term perspective. As the city of Swansea grew in the nineteenth century religious congregations (especially non-conformist ones) established themselves in order to cater for the rapidly growing communities, alongside their secular equivalents - notably branches of the trade union movement and the associated political parties. Any analysis of the Welsh data must, moreover, acknowledge the fact that the ctors that account for the decline of the traditional Free Churches on the East side of Swansea - the collapse of the close-knit working-class communiry centred on the docks - are precisely the same as those which account for the collapse of the trade union movement at the same time and in the same area. Both the organisations concerned with religion and those concerned with labour have lost their raison d'tre - i.e. a community to serve whose corunon interests (whether religious or work-based) required institutional articulation.a The striking thing about Ammerman's book and the American data more generally is that rnany religious congregations in the United States seem to have found creative ways out of these changing economic and social circumstances, unlike their European equivalents. This point is crucial. It should, moreover, be seen in relation to the wider, and politically urgent discussions of social cepital that are currently taking place on both sides of
34
35
the generation of effective social capital - is likely to be contingent: in other words they are differently related in different social contexts. The context, moreover, includes the nature of the Church in question; the Catholic Church in southern ltaly is very different from American denominationalism. But.quite apart from this distinction, it is clear that certain kinds of religious organisations in the United States have been able to maintain their levels of activiry despite the general trend downwards. Whether or not these forms of religion are, or are not, the most effective in terms of social capital is, I think, a somewhat different question to which different commentators will give different answers; it depends a good deal on how some aspects of American evangelicalism are interpreted (Noll zooo). For the time being it is sufticient to note that in Europe many forms of voluntary associations, both secular and religious, are finding themselves in the same, rather parlous situation. Cameron (zooz) offers an interesting analysis of the British case'u Why are the situations in Europe and the United States so different? The question leads immediately to the apparent advntages of a system based on uoluntarism (the very essence of the congregations that Ammerman describes) compared with a relatively immobile state Church (the common feature of Europeb religious heritage), seeing in the principle of voluntarism the fundamental reason for the continuing vitaliry of religion in American civic life. The arguments surrounding this question will form a principal theme of the following section. At this stage it is sufiicient to note that the independence of all religious groups from any kind of state support is, once again, one of the most striking features of American life as this is observed from across the Atlantic. Not only does this situation exist, it is, quite clearly, central to the self-understanding of Americans; it is an ttitude that colours a whole series of subsequent issues, which relate not only to the constitutional issues
Largely in agreement with Putnam, I would maintain that the connection between the two variables - religious activiry and
Church and State, bur to rhe manner in which religion as enters the public square. One illustration of the latter can be found in the notion of religion, a concept famously developed by Bellah in the context (Bellah r97o), but wirh roots in European discourse (notably in the work of Jean-Jacques u). Bellah seeks above all to identify the features thar Americans together. These include allusions to a shared istian heritage (and here the connection of the two is crucial), emphasising in each cse commonaliry rather difference. Despite the formal separation of Church and phrases such as 'One nation under God' or 'ln God we continue to resonate throughout the nation. Such phrases used judiciously by American politicians who wish ro unite than divide their constituencies. They are, moreover, compatible with organisational independence, in that no Church or denomination is privileged above others. Attempts to return the concept of civil religion to the Eurocontext have been made from time to time, in order. for , to identify a civil religion of Britain or France.T The - closely connected in this case to both established and royal famlly - is now under considerable scrutiny, in view of the vicissitudes of both Church and royal but more importantly given the developing emphasis on ution in the United Kingdom. A further (and not question at the beginning of the new century lies in existence or otherwise of a European (as opposed to British, or German) civil religion. What, moreover, might be nt elements in an increasingly diverse (religiously ing) continent (Bastian and Collange 1999)? The logic of rrgument leads however to further, somewhat disturbing if the answer to the initial enquiry were negative, does that the idea of Europe or of a European Union in any understanding of the word, simply ceases to exist? Or the same point in a different way - do the diversities of
Actiuity
36
37
modern Europe continue, despite everytring, to ouweigh the commonalities? The age-old sociologica. question concerning the relationship between economic factors (inevitably convergent if monetary union is to be taken seriousll) and cultural forces is central to this evidently unfinished debate.
Increasing diuersity
Europe representatives of religious communities from diverse pre-colonial) parts of the world, whose religious lives far more tightly controlled, at least in the short term, than
is at this point that questions relating to immigration and the increasing diversiry of religious life both in the United States and in Europe need to be integrated more fully into the discussion' In terms of the American case, new and significant data have emerged (indeed still are emerging) from a series of recent
It
investigations in the field, notably the New Ethnic Immigrant Congregations Project (W'arner and'VTittner r998) and the Public Religion and Urban Tiansformation work based in Chicago (Livesey zooo). Listening to recent presentations of this material by a wide range of American scholars, I have had the impression
of an extending religious diversiry - certainly not without its difficulties for many of the congregations concerned - but
without the frequently present, and often oppressive, European factor of previous imperial connections. In some ways the questions are similar: how does a culture dominated for the majoriry of its history by Judaeo-Christian understandings come to terms with minorities whose values are rooted in an entirely different politico-cultural environment? But it does, I think, make a difference if that history is measured in centuries rather than millennia and in a country whose past (at least since the arrival of the first European settlers) has been dominated by successive waves of immigration from different parts of the world.s The post-war shifts in the religious population of Europe, described briefly in Chapter One, raise questions of a different order. It is ironic that at precisely the moment when the historic religions in Europe are losing control of both the belief systems and life-sryles of many modern Europeans, there should arrive
European. Religious pluralism, in this nding of the term, is a crucial aspect of European life; is largely dominated by the existence within Europe of ly six million Muslims. In the final decade of the century the episodes which revealed most clearly failure to get to grips with the underlying issues that this situation presents were (a) the controversy surrounding the ication of The Satanic Verses in Britain and ft) rhe ffiire du in France. Both are discussed in some detail in Davie and both, to a large extent, remain unresolved. Hence, inevitably, the re-emergence of the underlying problems the diflicult circumstances following the attack on the'World Centre in September 2oor. pluralism has, however, at entirely different (in both popular and sociological discourse); it refers increasing fragmentation of belief-systems as a result of a point made in Chapter One - i.e. the loss of control on part ofEurope's historic churches. Clearly this loss of control developed in some parts of Europe than in others (i.e. in the Protestant North than the Catholic South), but it all over the continent - a more or less direct result of decline in churchgoing. As we have seen, such decline has resulted by and large (and for the immediately foreseeable in large numbers of conversions to secular rationalism. It however, resulted in a growing diversiry of religious beliee disciplines associated with regular ettendance diminish and ;frarket in spiritual goods continues to increase with the ing mobiliry of European populations. The New Age, itself rily diverse, is but one of the new spiritualities on
of the average
is interesting that recent work in the United States reveals spiritual seeking (Roof rggg, 2ooo, Wuthnow rg99),
Actiuity
39
38
relatively high levels of churchgoing. The context is different, however. For example, the links with organised religion re very much stronger in the United States, where seeking takes place within the churches as well as outside thenr and where specific forms of religious institutions emerge to rrlect thc needs of the questing population. Once again the market is responding to demand and with considerable success.e I)espitc such differences, 'spiritualiry' as opposed to 'religion' bccornes a catcgory to be scrutinised by sociologists on both sides of thc Atlantic, carefully distinguishing this understanding of religious pluralism (arrd the issues that it raises) from that despite
or
alongside
each have their own centres of worship and community
which relatcs to competing, and relatively
well-organised
religious orgniffitions. The confusion between these areas of study hes led to persistent and damaging misunderstandings, not least atttottgst Eroups whose religious commitments form the vcry r:ore of their existence and for whom a pick-and-mix, liveand-let-live kind of attitude simply will not do (Davie zooob).
IiXPt,ANA'I'ION
So tnue h firr e markcdly different state of affairs on each side of the Atlentle ln ternu of reportage. How, then, can we explain
thee
fint t of qucrtions pick up a point already made both in the prevlottt tetlon rnd in the previous chapter: they concern the urenner ln whleh religion inserts itself into the wider society anel hew thh nlrte to aecularisation, a central and crucially ittrpereuC thrnr ln the work of David Martin (rqz8). Broadly tpeekln5, Arnrrlera reliEion cuts vertically into American society r rch ErtlF ef nlw rrivrls brings with it its own religious pek5r :nd mdntrlnl or rdapts this way of working as the gene!dcnt Pala, Sluce rcund a4y American ciry for example, indlertrt I hup lwulty both within and between denomitltlnr! Irllh Iellra rnd Polilh Catholics (to name but the most
4o Europe: The Exceptional Case
-l'he
eontrfftrl
now joined by increasing numbers of Latino congregations, Protestants (given their fissiparous nature) are even more An essentially similar pattern is, moreover, continued as t interest groups (in addition ro narional communities) and sustain forms of religion suited to their own particular - a central theme of Ammerman's book.lo In Europe, in contrast, the insertion tends to be horizontal, a which derives ultimately from rhe collusions of religion power over many centuries, a direct legacy of the 'ofiicial' of Christianiry as a state religion. As European populations some more radically than others, to reject the political inations of the past, they discarded some, if not all, of the s connotations that went with these. The result, however, complex, a point well illustrated in the contrasts berween of religious practice and those of religious belief in most Wbstern Europe. These contrests formed a dominant theme the previous chapter, in which it became clear that an unto attend a religious institution on a regular basis (all closely associated with rhe State in some places) does not necessarily a parallel abdication in religious belief- though alter very profoundly the context in which that belief (or not) to exist. key sociological explanations for the contrast berween The United States and Europe can be found, however, in the g debate between the advocates of secularisation theory those who support the rational choice approach to religious enon. The former was discussed in some detail in One, an account which stressed very strongly the relaclose fit between theory and data in the European case; trcuble arose in exporting the theory indiscriminately, not to the United States. It is now time to outline the American
Actiuity
I
to America what secularisation it has been described by some American' (Sirapson r99o). It is a urlth the names of Stark and Baincontributions coming in (oftcn in collaboration with Stark) concerning RCT (including a has dominated the Journalfor ln the t99os. A further very useful in Young Oggil. that the derrand for religion in Being religious is part of the inabiliw of individuals in deepest needs (not least the to them after death). Hence ', which are substitutes rre provided, very largely, by organisations offer to individuals etc.) whilst exacting from orts (participation, conformitY their religions by weighing uP - f,or example - the degree of lbr weighed against the costs liberal forms of religion will ones, but at a lower cost. of choice; it is, moreover, notion of religious choice the eunply illustrated in Previous contrast to the marketrcpeatedly stressed by the RC (historically speaking) state the lack of choice has rcligion in any active sense.
is
relative persistence of religious belief in modern Europe is by the RC theorists as additional evidence in favour ir theory.) Hence, on the one hand, the advocates of RCT lue, sometimes very severely, the concept of a state Churchl2 on the other, they throw down a challenge. If a free market religion were allowed to emerge, there is no reason the religious institutions in this part of the world should fourish in the same way as their Ameriian counterparts. isation in Europe is caused by deficiency in religious not in demand. 'l,Jnsurprisingly RCT has proved highly controversial. More there are supporters on both sides of the Atlantic, not those in Europe - for example certain sections of the ofEngland * who wish to break the ties berween Church State (see below). There are others, however, who are
ntly opposed and on two (overlapping) grounds. Firstly are those, led by Steve Bruce (rgSS), who not only stress tincreasingly secular nature of Europe and the failure of the theorists to come to terms with the realities of the European but - as we have already seen - attack the RCT protagonists at the heart of their project. For the RCT supporters, and religious vitaliry are positively related; for Bruce
tlverse is true. This was the point underlined in Chapter A second group of critics are primarily persuaded by the ial limits of RCT; it is too American to be all that helpful ining patterns of religion beyond the borders of that whether in Europe or anywhere else, a point reinforced (tgg3, rqqZ). RCT may well be the new paradigm ng religious activity in the United States; its ion elsewhere is noticeably more problematic. own position lies somewhere berween the acceptors and I am not entirely persuaded by RCT if this is set in market terms but I can see some merit in the . The crucial point to grasp is that Europeans, by and regard their churches as public utilities rather than
*a
43
competing firms; this is the real legacy of a state church history and inextricably related to the concept ofvicariousness developed in Chapter One. As a result Europeans bring to those institutioru an entirely different repertoire of responses from their American counterparts. Most Europeans look at their churches with benign benevolence - they are useful social institutions, which the great majoriry in the population are likely ro need er one time or another in their lives (not least ar the time of a death). It simply does not occur to most of them that the churches will or might cease to exist but for their active participation. It is this atrirude of mind which is both central to the understanding of European religion and extremely difiicult to eradicate. In my view it, rather than the absence of a market, accounts for a great deal of the data on the European side of the Atlantic. It is not that the market isn't there (it quite obviously is in most parts of Europe, if not quite in all); it is simply that the marker doesnt work given the prevailing attitudes of large numbers in the population. What I am trying to say, continuing a metaphor introduced in the previous chapter, is that a map of the Rockies (i.e. more
prrticularly in Southern Europe - Tuscan examples come to minJ). Currently, however, the relationship is It least much weaker, though it is interesting to discover Europerns are willing to invest in their religious at the turn of the millennium, even amongst Nordic where ;hurchgoing is notoriously low (Bckstrm
r995).
PTION
weys, this section of the enquiry (how does it feel to ipant?) provokes the most pertinent questions of all
ist trying to understand the nature of religion in parts of thc world. It is also the area of enquiry which tnost difticufu to research and (b) most open to mis-
rigorous versions of rational choice theory) has ro be adapted for use in Europe - just like the map of rhe Alps (secularisation theory) for those who venture in the reverse direction. Such a map cen, however, open up new and pertinent questions if used judiciously. I would, for example, be interested in its cultural as well as organisational applications, not least with respect to televangelism, Why is it that rhe European market ils to operate with respect to this particular form of religion? Or to pur the point even more directly, why has it not been possible to create a narket for this particular product? Is it simply the lack of a suitable audience (as suggested in the previous section) or is sonlcthing more subtle ar srake?l3 It might, in addition, be intcrelting to exrmine in more depth, and over a longish historicrl period, the relationship berween capital and religion in Europe, In difrerent historical periods this has been exrremely strcng (hence, for example, the wealth of religious art and archi-
point of departure lies in an essay title that I set my class in the sociology of religion: 'ls churchgoing behaviour in modern Britain (ot indeed modern Most students are eapable of setting out the British/ statistics and of deciding that churchgoing is indeed deviant - it is essentially a minority activity - but more deviant for some people than others. In pursuing it
point, students become aware of the patterns of religion Britain/Europe and conclude that churchgoing is dcviant (and so differently constructed) for men than for for the youog rather than the old and for working-class rather than the better educated. If they are dealing ive data, they could go on to make comparisons different parts of the United Kingdom (noting the case of Northern lreland), between different European and, up to a point, berween the different regions of (or France) - the latter variations (and the French is an especially good one) reflect contrasts established
44
Actiuity
45
over centuries, but still visible to the discerning eye. The persirt. ence of local patterns of religious life forms an important piltt
of this material, in that the meanings attached to actions csn vary markedly from place to place. But the key question lies elsewhere: that is in the interpretatio6 of the word'deviance'. I am repeatedly astonished by the sophil. tication of some students - few of whom ere churchgoers - who scrutinise this term carefully and come to the conclusion thilt 'deviant' is an inappropriate word to use in this case. Churchgoing does not fly in the face of the values systems of European societies; in many ways it upholds them. And for the most partr Europeans are grateful to rather than resentful of the churchgoert who articulate in an active sense what many in the European population assent to passively (the precise meaning of vicariout
religion). Quite what they are assenting to is not always easy to it has, I think, more to do with moral codes than with Christian theology. Be that as it may, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that Europeans are not entirely complacent about the reduction in churchgoing in most parts of the continent in recent decades. Such an awareness revolves precisely round the realisation indicated in the previous chapter, i.e. that Europe is in the process of removing the 'keystone' in the arch of its value-system, without being altogether clear about what should be put in its place. Two very different pieces of (British) evidence lead me to this conclusion. The first is an opinion poll carried out on behalf of the BBC in connection with a series of programmes on 'The Soul of Britain' ftroadcast in the summer of zooo). For the most part the poll indicated a marked and unequivocal drop in the indicators of institutional attachment and credal statements compared with previous findings. So much was anticipated; rather less so was the fact that a significant proportion of respondents were not entirely hrppy about what was happening. To be more precise, 45 per cent regretted the decline in traditional religion, feeling that this makes Britain a 'worse' country. A very different
say:
(enkins 1999) makes a similar, though not identiThis is an anthropological eccount of religion in the lives of English people. Despite radical changes in the English still make a link berween religion iliw'. It follows that one source of respectabiliry ions (direct or indirect) with churches or chapels rt all clear what might replace these as generators of (to use Putnam's term) should the need arise' llow time to turn the question the other way round' of answers would American students give if the same were transposed to the American classroom? It seems of all, that the statistics would lead some, if not all of r different conclusion concerning statistical deviance' In numbers of communities, it is clear that churchgoing the norm rather than the exception and not to go to would be considered more unusual (or deviant) than In which communities/parts of the country this is so, is central to the whole analysis' So too ere the aspects guestion that relate to different kinds of people - men , for example, or different age or ethnic groups ich it should be possible to build a demographic profile ,churchgoing population on both sides of the Atlantic (a comParative exercise) and the changes taking place in each
in the United States, as in Europe, the real questions lie - in the meaning of these actions for different groups of What does it 'mean' for representative Americans to church on a regular basis and how should we interpret lctions? Are the answers to these questions significantly from those that emerge in Europe and how are we to this difference? One way into this intriguing field of might be to examine in more detail the seeming proofAmericans to inflate their levels of churchgoing as these 'Why do they do this? At the very in opinion polls. are answering similar questions in a different way from
46
Actiuity
+7
their European counterparts, who are, apparently, rather happier to declare their absence from the pews Sunday by Sunday. The enquiry could, moreover, continue for a whole range of social actors present in the field. For example, given the very different religious situation in the United States, how does it 'feel' to be:
. . . . . . I
rcligiously active a religious professional a politician with an eye to the electord process a rnenrber of a religious minority - whether newly arrived or rclatively well settled a journalist in the field a sociokrgist of religion?
would likc to take the fifth of these as a more developed illustration, drawing on Hoover's empirical study of religious journelirnr in the United States (Hoover 1998). Paradoxically, the striking thing about this case study is the sirnilarity wirh
Eurclpeln cxperience, despite the differences in levels of churchgoing between the two cultures. It is still, it seems, the case that nrort religiour journalists in the United States feel marginal to the centrll enterprisc of the paper in question. Or, as Hoover putr it, thare cxilts a major mismatch between the worlds of journalirnr and rcligion in the United States just as there is
Europe, cpitonritcd by the markedly areligious culture of nuinstrsgrR journrlirts, if not always of the religious correspondentl thomlclver, Also similar is the contrast between local rnd nrdsnd FrPeri (rcmembering, of course, the very different weyt in whlch the prom is structured in North America compared with tomr, lf not rll European societies). There is, I have to adrnit, no eolRPiltble empirical study of the religious correspondant in Eurcpc, but the more anecdotal accounts of Longley (tggt)' Bundq (tggO), rnd Defois and Tincq Ggsil are, in the mdn, tupFordw of Hoovep's findings. Their role is surprisingly limllil to chah Ancriern counterperts, more particularly in the
in
4ll
tion that even the most gifted religious journalists will ilatively limited in their impact if they do not have the of the senior management of the Paper'
wonder, though, whether there might be larger differences reen Europe and the United States in the response groups defined by Hoover): i'e. amonpt the recipients rather than of the religious news. This is less likely to be the case respect to the religiously committed respondents, but might be so in terms of the wider - and in Europe significantly - public. But here there is no data concerning the situation; it is, and must remain, simply a possibiliry'
l
i
ALUATION AND POLICY-MAKING

hesitant to make eualuations ebout a society other than my but I have certainly heard Americans imply that, in the States, there is too much of the wrong sort of religion' (zooo) certainly hints at this with respect to American icalism. Unsurprisingly, Europeans rarely say the same except sometimes with reference to Muslim and other
ties. Apart from a relatively small (though vociferous) of secular rationalists, most Europeans' as we have already ri regard their churches benevolently - i'e' as a necessary and The the whole useful part of society. There are exceptions' the most nds being (or rapidly becoming) one of where increasing sections of the population live outside ttalm of the churches altogether, but they are relatively few' important to remember, however, that the exact nature of
ttitudes displayed towards the churches varies across different
socieiies; such differences were discussed in some detail r One. following remarks regarding polky'making are necessarily they are simply indicative of the kind of thing that is given the data and their interpretation already set out
Activity
in this chapter. One example relates to the constit of the Church of England. Amongst a number
Anglicans
11
With this in mind, the English
and
with the
going figures at home. Such an ergument, of coursc, fitt
that cutting the connections befween church arrrr England might encourage a similar renaissance in the
understandings
- disproportionately but not exclusively nrr group - covetous eyes are cat acros the Atlantic whCE going levels are high. The lack of a relationship bctweE and State is also noted, leading in some quarters to tlre r
rrl
of the rational
(Interestingly it is a position also supported by thc lil albeit for very different reasons.)
choice
VUiow hI wedish citizen (Backstrom rggg)' the Ctut in terms of policy-making concerns which in modern Europe and the level at at a European Eflrrte: should this be enforced In
rnitrely comparable' The Swedish term - the Eating to observe in the longer ll the*focus of an empirically based and of ttd research project which has the aim stages in the process and their
example
ii tt ,t.
compensation.
My own view is that the situation is altogether more than these suggestions imply. There is, indeed, an i debate to be had in England about disest"ffrn-*t, lruiii this one. And if it is one thing to cut the ties betwecrr (i and State, it is entirely another to eradicate the cor history that lie behind this, not to mention the accurrrl of culture rhat go with it. I have already argued that the pr reason for the limitations of a religious market in Europe not in the lack of choice per se, but in the attitudes of Eunrn towards the decision-making process itself. .\X/ith this in the cutting of the ties berween church and state in Er might simply end in a double negarive: you lose the advar of establishment (which remain significant, if pn understood), bur you gain nothing, o; at least *r.ry iittl*,
responsibiliry of the nation State? in recent years Of the most interesting debates racial cetegorrs:cpt of 'religious'as opposed to
tl'n: ,1ot.rrr, a discussion with-new les:nance attack on rtmorph"r" that has followed the
on the incitement I Eritish law an offence based *tt., racial hatred is a case in point' IJnderstandMuslims' who iwm of prrricular concern to British gi iif.nti are unable to claim any kind of protection relations legislation' Such 3;ill"g.i under the race things it indicates a lack ll rcvealing; amongst other policyrg i., ,om. sections of both public and Jf *ni.f, have difiiculry comprehending that to be considered as Muslims, not es (multiple)
nal minorities. increasingly irrg tfr"t the Muslim minoriry has-been in t.itiig the issue of a specifically religious identity a 'religious' question a, *.11, notably with respect to census (Fane 1999). The result was vvr/ volunlary' arru ,uL very satisfacnise: rn romise: in 2oor a voluntary and not
to t. Th; attempt, in the autumn of zoor'
One ongoing, and partially similar case study in this res can be found in the Church of Sweden, which in zooo did the formal connections befween the Church and the Swe State. It is important to remember, however, that the connecti in Sweden were more developed than those in England rrra thtl the motivation for change was different. It is also important tO grasp the relative wealth of the Swedish Church (given th: church tax system); this was felt ro be unjust in an inJreasingly,
Jo Europe: The Exceptional
ii
in
a typically
represents none populations of Britain, such a question

I
n was included in the
census'15
For the non-
in the right direction' study of religion flnal point returns to the sociological
step
Case
Actiuity
5r
and concerns the outmoded nature of our measuring techni
played a far larger part
in Canadian history than her
Very largely we continue to use static categories to increasingly fluid phenomene. We continue, for examplcr divide our populations into churchgoers and non-chu as if this black and white distinction reflected current For this reason, I am very attracted by Hervieu-L6ger's work (Hervieu-L6ger 1999) which introduces the much n mobile concepts of 'convert' and 'pilgrim': concepts w capture the mood of contemporary religious actors as they and search throughout their lives - with the intention of find the particular religious package that suits them best. This, it clear, is as true in the States as it is in Europe, but the fram is different. Europeans seek and search within the framework their historic churches, more often than not returning 'hornll when they die (Princess Diana being but the most celeb example). Americans seek and search on a much more open market - a significant different enterprise.
tnore Protestant neighbour, an important reason for understandings of Church and State. in Canada has been a declining establishin the Anglican and United Churches), an increase rtion of Catholics in the population, alongside rrtes of prectice, and some movement towards the churches - a pattern in some ways similar to States, but on an entirely different scale. There is, , no equivalent to the American New Christian zooo). What emerges overall looks increasingly despite Canadat new world status. Canada displays of religious identification (for the most part with churches), low (and declining) levels of religious , a limited rather than excessive pluralism and an fragmentation of belief (O'Toole 1996, Bibby zooo)' Canadians, like many Europeans, believe without (Lyon and Van Die zooo).
A NOTE ON CANADA _ A HYBRID The United

States
CASE16
society,
is not the only North American
Why, then, has Canada moved increasingly towards the European rather than the American model in the configurations of itt religious liG? Canada, like Australia and New Zealand, representl a mid-point in a continuum of state or elite control versui voluntarism. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Protestant colnmunities of English-speaking Canada were not so very different from their counterparts in the United States; the possibilities for voluntarism were, and in some senses still are, real. Such tend-
encies were, however, counterbalanced by the hegemonic Catholic identity of French-speaking Qu6bec, a sub-culture which persisted until the r96os when it collapsed dramatically secularisation may have come late, but it came fast to Frenchspeaking Canada. Notwithstanding such shifts, Catholicism in
52
53
3k:I::"..
LATIN AMERICA: AN EXAMPLE OF GLOBAL
PENTECOSTALISM
from several points of view, both quantitative and and provide the take-off point for a whole variety of
main such debates are concerned with an explanation is happening: how can we account for the dramatic religious behaviour in Latin America and where else in are these happening? The question is easily asked, but difficult to answer. An initial explanation has collapsed: ingly clear that changes in the religious scene in iAmerica do not depend on policies formulated or money elsewhere - more particularly in the United States. tetives, howeveE are more diflicult to come by in a field ised by ideological disagreement. Europeans, moreunaccustomed to rapid church growth - are particularly . Or to put the same point in a different way, here, as anywhere, are the inadequacies, or 'boundedness', of ways of thinking exposed. How then cen we ) grasp the significance of Pentecostalism as a wideand popular global movement? final, but inevitable question follows from this discussion: the same thing - i.e. rapidly growing and popular Pente- not occurring in'Western Europe? It is this issue that the chapter full circle, returning once again to the printheme of these lectures: the exqeptional nature of the
case.
The previous chapter ended with a note on Canada indicating that the Canadians were becoming less American and mort European in their patterns of religious behaviour as the wventieth century drew to a close. In Latin America, paradoxically, thO reverse seems to be the case. A religious pattern which in many ways mirrored that in Latin Europe for several centuries now appears to be moving, at least partially, towards the voluntarism of the United States. Why this should be so will form an important part of the following discussion, notably in the sectionr that offer explanations for the very dramatic changes that have taken place in religious life south of the Rio Grande. With this in mind, this chapter will, at least in part, follow the distinctions in the sociological task that are already becoming miliar. It will start with a presentation of the data. There is a common agreement amongst those who are working in or commenting upon the religious field in Latin America that a profound transformation is taking place, namely the extraordinarily rapid expansion of Pentecostal forms of Protestantism, Strong terms are used: 'transformation', 'explosion', 'inexorable growth', etc., leading to 'overt, intense, and widespread competition berween churches' in a continent once confidently assumed to be uniformly Catholic (Levine 1995: r55). These shifts will
TS AND FIGURES: THE CHANGING RELIGIOUS NE IN LATIN AMERICA

ways, it is difficult to comprehend the scale of the taking place. Latin America is a huge and diverse contiwith a population of almost 5oo million people.' To say that ro per cent of this population is now Protestant (a which is still growing) ils to convey either the size
54
America
i5
of the shift or the significance of wtrat is happening.

comparative data may be helpful. In Latin America as a wl there are now about 45 million Protesrtants (the great major of whom are Pentecostals). Between a tlhird and half of thesc lts Brazilian - i.e. some eighteen million. Compare this with chure allegiance in Britain, where less than ro per cent (five to rl* million) of the population are seriousl'y active in any religiortl denomination and you begin to grasp the numbers involved i4 these shifts, remembering thet most Prortestants in Latin Ameriel are indeed active in their church alleg;iance (far more so thtfl the great majority of Catholics). The same point can be put ti follows: the Assemblies of God in Brazill, a single denominationl will easily outnumber the entire chuLrchgoing population in Great Britain (Freston ry96).What is rnore these churches co[. tinue to grow; as the Brazilian demographic curve peaks artd then lls (from the I96os on), the proportion of Protestants gol on climbing.2 There are other, more local ways of conveying both size and significance. In Rio de Janeiro, for :instance, berween IggC and tg9z, a new church was registered every weekday, as a result of which '[i]n one Catholic diocese there were over rwice u many Protestant places of worship as Catholic, and in the poorclt districts the ratio was seven to one . . . The needier the district, the more Protestants: 20 percent in the poorest areas versus 6 percent in the rich South Zone' (Freston r998a: 338). The attraction of certain forms of Protestantism to particular sectiunl of the population appears almost limitless.3 Miguez (r998) offc'ru a similar account of Protestant expansion in a poor suburb of Buenos Aires. In Argentina the overall figures are smaller, but there is a similar process at work - all the more remarkable if compared with the evident reluctance of most local people to participate in more conventional forms of neighbourhood ectivities. Miguez puts this as follows: 'people were not eager to takc part in political parties or corrmunity organisations. Contrastingly, the local Pentecostal churches were generating the more
and dynamic forms of organisation and partici,(Miguez I998: r). Hence Miguez'decision to undertake ic research in this area. His title - Spiritual Bonfire in - evokes the nature of the changes taking place; we way from fanning the embers of latent (some would nd) Christianiry in contemporary Europe. clearly something very significant is happening in a which had been pretty uniformly Catholic for four It is important not to forget this background, not least that 9o per cent of the population remain nominally to their historic churches. There is also a need for rcgarding the statistics as a whole. This is a Part of the i$rhere plural practice has been widespread, not least
popular forms of Catholicism and a variery of possession otably Candombl6 and Umbanda, movements with more close connections to African religions. Faced with this
one of the most innovative aspects of Pentecostalism IB attempts to break with what are seen as negative forms ism, creating instead a genuine pluralism with mutually choices (see below). But old habits die hard. Religious is r from static in Latin America; large numbers of move out of as well as into the Protestant churches, accurate estimates of membership all the more difficult. have, in addition, been crucially important shifts within Church itself, including both the emergence of theology and, more recently, increasing charismatic The relative concentration within this chapter on ism needs to be seen against a background of more change, exemplified in growing diversiry within as well the different denominations. regional variations within Latin America must also be account, just as in both Europe and the United States. that one variation on the European theme (the Latin with its hegemonic Catholic Church) became the pattern to Latin America, it is equally plain that the model
56
Europe: The Exceptional
Case
America
57
implanted differently in different parts of the continent, a fact with continued significance for the spread of Pentecostalism, This has been'easier'in some parts of the region than in otherti the most propitious combination being a sustained latent religl= osity alongside relatively low levels of Catholic control' Ot, following Martin, 'the optimum conditions for Protestant expanr sion exist where the church has been seriously weakened but the culture not secularized, as in Brazil, Guatamala and Chilel (Martin rygo: z4). In Brazil it is the absolute number just rl much as the percentage of Pentecostals that is so striking' Secuhf Venezuela and Uruguay are considerably more resistantl though Venezuela is now beginning to change' The initirl chapter of Martin's overview Tongues of Fire maps, both geo' graphically and sociologically, these very different, but highly
signifi cant trajectories.
looks as though it is becoming rather more like the market described in Chapter Two and rather less like model exported from Europe some four centuries ago' a shift is conceptualised depends a good deal on how about the alternatives in question. For some observers, patterns of American-style religion (whether these are from outside or freely chosen) are seen as a particularly form of cultural imperialism; for others, this is a way not only the market but the individual, now able choices with hugely important implications for lifewonder the controversies that follow are heated as well
finally, to consider what is happening in terms civilisations' (Martin r99o). Following Martin, Latin
Time as well as place is important. Frorn an historical point of view the take-off point can be located in the mid-sixtielt paradoxically at precisely the moment when the secularisation thesis peaked among'Western sociologists. With this in mind, it was hardly surprising that Western scholars were slow to ca what was happening elsewhere in the world, not least in Latin America; quite simply they were looking in the wrong directiort for the wrong kind of evidence (Martin ryg6e). South of thl Rio Grande, however, two things were occurring more or lerl simultaneously in this pivotal decade. The size of the Protestant communiry began to expand exponentially and the nature of the Protestant churches altered; they ceased to be small, missionary based and in some senses liberal (in terms, for example, of their economic and social critique) and becam instead much more like a mass movement' increasingly indigenous and increasingly dominated by Pentecostd (somewhat apolitical) tendencies. In assessing this shift, tho influence of the United States in the form of American mission'
aries and American money became, inevitably, a crucially debated point. It will be discussed in more detail in the following section,
example
Itvey of conveying both the complexity and the nature of American Pentecostalism is to look in more detail at one case. Rowan Ireland's Kingdoms Come: Religion and
in Brazil (rSgI) offers an excellent example' In
this,
covers the entire religious scene of a small town on the of greater Recife in North-east Brazil; in other words not only the Pentecostals (the crentes) but the Afrospiritists and the Catholics as well. But in each case, introductions are to a range of individuals, in a series of interviews, who demonstrate the differences as well as ities of the various religious movements covered book. So we meet Severino, Teresa and 26, then Valdo each of whom demonstrates something different Pentecostalism. Only then are the rituals of church and and, eventually, the particular impact that these have on the local political scene. Theories about religion ics (drawing on a series of comparative studies) come to some extent least.
Europe: The Exceptional Casl
America
59
As the bigger picture gradually emerges, we are able appreciate the subtleties within Pentecostalism and the da
of generalisation. There is, for example, the distinction church-centred crentes and more sectarian crentes, in their diverse attitudes both towards political culture in general towards the political liG of the communiry (r99r: %-il. this in mind, Ireland is able to make better sense of the a guities and conflicts within the literature on Pentecostalislu Brazil (and indeed elsewhere). His informants inrerrogate emergent theories in a series of imaginary dialogues (r9g roz-8), a constant reminder that theories which fail to individuals into account are unlikely to be fully satisctory. plea that Pentecostals should nor be stereoryped (conversely they are diverse and real) should be born in mind th this chapter, not least in the following section.
and economic, but also social, cultural, ethnic and ctors; not only the macro level (which social characfavour conversion) but also the micro level (why only
people with those characteristics convert); not only the of Pentecostalism to men but also (especially) to ; not only the demand side (why people are ready tlonvert) but the supply side (what Pentecostals do to maxitheir potential public). And it must ask not only why ostalism grows so much, but why does it not grow and why some types grow more than others. (Freston
: 347-8)
ing paragraphs will seek to do justice to some of despite the obvious limitations of space. trsy to see, first of all, how several strands in the debate cntangled. For example, from the point of view of the Church, and especially those who have invested whole
confronting the appalling economic and social conditions urbanisation, it is important to find a reason for the predilection of substantial numbers of poorer people congregations rather than their Catholic equivathe base communities of liberation theology. That reason found, et leest in part, in the notion of an external ion of the religious scene, in which American mission'(unwittingly or not) become the agents of American , opposed not only to the leftist leanings of liberation but to its supposed collusion with suspect regimes. It paradigm, howeveg that can no longer be sustained in fails to offer a convincing explanation of what is obviously reasingly an indigenous movement of Latin American
more self-critical, but none the less Catholic variation theme can be found in a discourse which locates the explanation for what has happened in the immobilism of c Church itself- a heavily institutionalised, top-down
EMERGENT DEBATES
Why did it happen?
The first of these debates is the most difficult (for the reasonl set out in the introduction to this chapter) and centres on why such a significant shift has occurred at all. Bearing in mind tho
unavoidably ideological narure of this discussion, it is wise to recall at the outser the sheer scale and variety of the religiout field in Latin America and, following Ireland, of penrecosralism itself. Civen such potential, it is most unlikely that one reasoRl or even several reasons (grouped into neat and tidy themes), will emerge to account for something so diverse. Freston (fouowinS
Droogers 1998) is undoubtedly right to draw attenrion ro thh point:
to be a single grand reason for its success. An eclecticism based on the ambivalence of religion must take into account not only
60
Pentecostalism is flexible and rhere is unlikely
America
clerical structure which, despite basismo (the base communit cannot adapt fast enough to the changes taking place orr ground (Levine rggJ). Yet another strand (this time f indirect, if not direct American influence) stresses the indigett ation of Latin American Pentecostalism - congregations takc when missionaries leave, not the other way round - but in that require submission to a leadership, which in style (il' other way) are reminiscent of American evangelists, a pr reinforced by media replications of American televangelism. A very similar set of nerretives can be presented soci rather than pastorally, in terms, for example, of the struct changes taking place in Latin America, the conservatism of Catholic Church, the seductions of American culture the vulnerabilities of the population to external influence. either way (i.e. whether the discourse be sociological or pastorul) a debate emerges which not only pays insufficient attention t the mukiplici{ of causes already pointed out by Freston, but also = and crucially - to the freely made decisions of ordinary peopler Conditions are invoked which explain why large numbers people have moved from one set of allegiances to another, bsl which fail in many cases to take into account (a) the motives the people themselves and (b) why significant sections of thl population do not make the same choices. Martint analyses (r9go, zoora) overcome some of thela difliculties - notably the tension berween external pressure and internal choices. American contacts, American culture, indecd Americanism itself, are ettrective in so r as they are outwatd looking, English-speaking and corrosive of the organic unio6 berween ith and community whether at national or at tribrl level (Martin r99o: ro7). They are representative of modernity, global connections and economic prosperiry. In this sense Pente. costalism looks up and out and becomes part of a globll transformation. But it also provides a saG-haven, freely joincd but firmly directed (hence. the leadership sryle) in which dis. advantaged people, if they so choose, can find both mutuel
as well as as members of a redeemed community. Significant in life-style occur in consequence. In order to 'work', lhlt Pentecostalism needs at one and the same time to linked and firmly bounded; features which appear be mutually exclusive turn out, on closer inspection,
supportlve. on the individual believer is important. Mariz (r99o, example, compares Pentecostalism, Catholic base com-
ffid a sense of self-worth (individually
rnd Afro-Brazrlitn spiritism in Brazil paying particular to the effects that these movements have on people in poverty. Pentecostalism has, she argues, a particular the poorest of all, providing psycho-social and cultural rvoid the mentally damaging consequences of extreme - in other words, it provides a bulwark against the activity that aggravate destitution (alcoholism, domestic and economic fecklessness). The consequence of conis partial if not dramatic improvement in economic reversing the likelihood of a downward spiral. A
order (sanctioned at times by divine intervention) begins the chaos of everyday life, leading to constructive than destructive behaviour, a point that will emerge again with reference to both economic and family life. kind of discussion edges towards a second and equally set of issues: those concerned with an appraisal or of Pentecostalism (in the sense that these terms were in Chapter Two). It is at this point, moreover, that the perspectives of the various commentators are at their a For example, if it is clear, on the one hand, that
all observers link the growth in Pentecostalism to the of modernisation, and especially to the dislocations of
isation that have characterised recent Latin American there is markedly less unanimify when it comes to the
outcomes
of this situation. Bastian (rg9z, 1994), for
supports the argument first outlined by Lalive d'Epinay
6z
America
63
(1969, rgli. Both authors stress the at best neutral, but worst more negative effects of Pentecostalism vis--vis consciousness or political intervention. Reform is hin rather than helped by communities that are not so very di de facto, from traditional forms of Latin American reliqi (which embody above all stultifying methods of social and subordination). Indeed Bastian goes so r as to ask Latin American Pentecostalism is really 'Protestant' at all; its aflinities lie, he argues, in Latin political culture rather than the democratic ideals of historic, presumably Calvinistic, of Protestantism.s Martin, in contrast, is more inclined to follow Willems (r 1964, 1967); in this case both wrirers ere more optimistic terms of the future. In Martint analysis, for example, lism offers a form of religion quintessentially suited ro the modernising society - and not only in Latin America (hencc success). More than this, Pentecostal communities offer trai in democratic values, just as the earlier waves of Protesta did in both Europe and Norrh America (in other words, are generative of positive social capital). For Martin the of Pentecostalism is of paramount importance; for him, it the natural successor - in a lineage of 'voluntary, fissile participatory' forms of religion (r99o: 5) - of Puriranism I) and then Methodism (Mark z). The importance ofPen lism (Mark 3) lies in the fact that this is the firsr time Protestantism, or Protestants, cross the Rio Grande in signifi numbers. An additional point follows from this; once a form of religion (or to use Weber's term a religious ethic) a conduit, or series of conduits; through which to pass, the
of the missionary very largely becomes obsolete. The relati
conservative American churches is no longer necessary Pentecostal expansion (that takes place with a momenrum of i own), but - as we have noted - remains highty significant as I
with
symbol of American culture seen as a whole. Freston (zoor), finally, repeatedly insists on the sheer diversity
64
Europe: The Exceptional Cast
in Latin America, and indeed elsewhere. With more than one thing (positive and/or negative) can at once - a point that will resonate even more with reference to the economic and p.olitical impliof the changes that are taking place. New forms of lifc will emerge, moreover, which are specific to the n case; they will not (and cannot) be replicas of found elsewhere * in Europe or the United States, for Hence, surely, an even greater need for innovative models to understand fully what is happening in large the developing world.
with liberation
theology
to liberation theology has already been made. Mariz, for example, it tends to attract groups ofpeople
some education and whose economic situations are hss criticd than many Pentecostals. Despite such distinc; it is clear that the base communities of liberation and the ever-growing number of Pentecostal churches much the same scial space - a situation bound tension. It is now rime to expand this complex and
relationship.
's work is particular significant in this respect 1996). As a scholar of Latin America for some thirty Lehmann failed initially to take the religious factor into at all. The first step towards remedy led to a study of theology and base communities with respect to both ic and political (democratic) development (Lehmann
By the time, however, that the author came to do detailed in Brazil in the early r99os, it was clear that the of Protestantism demanded equal attention in terms of investigation. What emerges, in consequence, is a analysis of the religious field in Latin America, enas an arena in which contending forces 'struggle for the
America
65
spirit'
(hence the title of the 1996 book). Macro questions come to the fore:
as
well
as
questions are very big: do the people fecl faithfully represented by, or identified vith, the revoluti priests and nuns in their jeans and sandals, promising a period in the wilderness travelling towarJs an uncertain I ised Land, and offering a diet of agor.ized self-questiot 6rf seminars and consciousness-raising combined with r projects, to sustain the People of God on their journey? grill they be drawn towards the pastors, uniformly respc('t in their suits, white shirts and black ries, as they Proc she tangible happiness that will follov from a fulmi conversion experience, a herculean effort to get their livel their families under control, and the firancial discipline oF sreekly contribution to church funds? (Lehmann 1996: 3*1)
fhe big
The
follow operalionalise these 66ng14sting the 'option for the poor' articulated by theologians with the 'options of the poor' in the form of dividual choices in favour of Pentecostalisrn. Each posibility
f,eseerch questions that
ghs rnembership of a base community or Pentecostd
is set out in terms of its relationship to the history culture lnsjiftrtions of Latin America in general and of Brazil rr particularly. Theme and counter-theme are repeatedly set againtl qn6 a.nother: one modaliry for example, seeks insertion in the highly valued culture of the people (the Catholic mode inculturation); the other continually confronts what are con: sffued as the evils of local behaviour (i.e. the feasts, celebratio[lg rituals and rhythms to follow Lehmann's own list), offering thl convert a new and 'better' way. The stakes, quite clearly, rrl very high indeed, a metter - no less - of life and death.
second attempt to 'compare and contrast' these huo powerful movements can be found in the final volume of tht University of Chicago's Fundamentalist Project.6 In this accoutlt; there is a stronger emphasis on the commonalities of liberationitt
end Pentecostal Protestantism, in so r as both and share an agenda 'built around literacy, small on personal ps, flexible organization, and emphasis Both' community responsibiliry' (Levine 1995: 16z)' social context' are working in the same economic and Core reach out to particular demographic categories' these reside in remain none the less; for Levine contrasts between Catholicism and Protestantism' has a freedom to innovate denied to the Catholic not least the freedom to create new and autonomous Proas the need arises. The fissiparous nature of though problematic at times, necessarily engenders a valuable quality in times of rapid social change' more analytical rccond part of Levine's essay raises rather loncerning the applicabiliry of the term'fundamentalism' taking place in Latin America' A significant step rt turns on the epparent similarities between the Pentecostal churches of South and Central America ive Protestant groups in the United States (an reinforced by the supposed influence of American lnd manpower in Latin America)' On closer inspection' r. such similarities turn out to be spurious' prompting' and reconsideration of the concept 'fundamentalism' forms of :ability to the Pentecostal case' Pentecostal life south of the Rio Grande do not on the whole fundathe 'family resemblances' or common features of promptlng as these are set out in the Chicago Project, If itable and considerably more searching question' what terms and concepts do not enable us to see clearly other) rning in the religious field in this (and indeed about regio-ns (see note 6), we need to think carefully chapter of this dvls - a major theme in the concluding
be questions conclude this short section' Both should *ltt in the framework of European exceptionalism' 67
=a
Europe: The Exceptional Catl
America
Why is it that liberation theology and irs associated base munities are frequently viewed with sympathy in intellectual circles, whereas Pentecostalism is not? And doet distinction tell us more about the commentators than aborrt phenomena that they are supposed to be observing?
that characterize masculine behavior
in
Colombia,
rs smoking, gambling and visiting prostitutes. (Brusco
t47)
one household - the consequence of marital fideliry is considerably more economical than keeping two
transformation in gender roles
Most accounts of Pentecostalism in Latin American both sct the statistics of extremely rapid growth and urge caution in interpretation. On one point, however, all the commen agree: this is a movement disproportionately attractive to despite the presence of men in leadership roles. Why should be? To a certin extent the same paradox confronts the of European forms of religion (Francis rggT,Walter and I 1998). In this respect Europe is, it seems, similar to rather different from other global regions. The explanations ( women behave differently from men), however, are different each case;7 so too are the outcomes - markedly so. Brusco's pioneering work in Colombia provides a starting point for the Latin American material. Brusco rei the relatively simplistic norion that significant numbers ofwonr are attracted to Pentecostal churches to compensate for the of fulfilment in secular life. Her analysis probes at a much level in that it emphasises the transformarion of gender roles (i of both men and women) brought about by conversion.
effects are tangible: data on Colombian evangelical households supports thl conclusion reached by other analysts of Latin American pe costalism: that conversion of both a woman and her improves the material circumstances of the household. simply, no longer is zo to 40 percenr of the household budget consumed by the husband
of Brusco's account resides, therefore, in the effect conversion on both male and female behaviour, a results in a redrawing of the boundaries of both vate and male/female roles. Most notabty, the men from the street and assume, alongside their wives, ilities in both the church and the home (in other words ivate realm). With the new roles in place, the relative of Pentecostal teaching leads to modest upward
(or at the very least a more secure economic existence) y, to education for the children - itself a decisive in inter-generational mobiliry. The household becomes ive corporate group. The ct that this analysis does not criteria of Western feminists in terms of 'liberation' is ial. It works in practice, an undeniable attraction for the
concerned.
My
in the form of alcohol.
AscetiG
codes block many of the other extrahousehold forms of coR.
concentrates on conversion. The of this experience given by women are primarily conwith physical and psychological illness, whilst those of on social and moral ilings. The need to escape latter is peramount for men. Once escape is achieved, the crucial formula is in place: in Brazil as much as in , bringing the husband under control is synonymous ing the family. The fact that the women describe this as bringing the men under control and the men describe is, once again, of little importance; either way route is discovered, which frees men from the classic nean or Latin stereotype (a circulation berween parta series of unstable relationships). In other words, Brusco's
n (lSS6) also
68
CasQ
America
69
findings are reinforced by Lehmann: following conversion,
isla behaviour diminishes and the nuclear (rather than extended) mily becomes the effective unit of organisatiott,
Maldonado, finally, comes to the same conclusion. Pentec(
lism provides 'a theologically informed domestic conserva (rgg:' 234), which both counters traditional male behaviour offers, in consequence, security to women and children means of increasing affection, responsibiliry and leadership, last of these is important: the man remains squarely heatl the household (hence the dilemma for Western feminist$, concentrating their efforts at this level, Pentecostal churches however, met an evident need, the consequences of which over into other aspects of life, not least the economic sphcre,
Economic and political implications
life. Martin himself discusses the same possibiliry very firmly the complex nature of the original fact this is no one-to-one causal relationship (Hal6vy in t as Weber). Martin remains, however, cautiously at least at the level of potential: an attitude of selfbe realised economically as well as spiritually' Others ture. Freston (r998a, zoor), for example, reviews what be described as ambiguous evidence, stressing the fact if the work ethic is indeed reinforced by Pentecostal the economic and social conditions are so markedly from those in ear modern Europe that the outcome (rggl)' be anything but uncertain. For Levine and Stoll as true for the nply too soon to say, a fact which is consequences of liberation theology as it is for
,
The transformation in family life already described is the key economic change. Add to this the fact that groups of familiel form networks of reciprociry ffust and communiry valuer = essentilly economic virtues - and it is not diflicult to understlnd the cumulative effects of Pentecostal conversion. This is not, lt is important to recognise, a question of hard-headed capitfl accumulation; nor is it a direct application of the Weber thelhr It is a considerably more modest enterprise. But given the pre= cariousness of the economic context more generally, the very basic qualities of honesry thrift, self-discipline and organisationd skills stand out. In consequence, as people move from thl countryside into the city looking for better jobs and educatiortl opportunities (especially for their children), Pentecostal com. munities become 'havens and way stations in the journey up thl socio-economic ladder' (Maldonado r9g3t 4il. The long-term effects of what is happening remain uncertaifli Berger, in his introduction to Martin (r99o), is optimistic, feelirtS that all the elements of the 'Protestant ethic' are now in plac! and it is only a question of time before they exert their influenca
rather different point should be noted in conclusion encroachment of a prosperiry gospel as Pentecosta-
up the economic scale. This is an attractive option the reiatively well-off, but one which necessarily disrupts and of upward social mobility. You cannot at one time affirm material comfort (in the sense of wellrnd appeal to a sense of anguish (regarding salvation) as
lual source of economic motivation. The prosperiry gospel rver, a bad press rightly so in many ways, perticularly
on its head to condemn the less successful or less said this' es necessarily faithless or unbelieving' Having
between betterment and prosperiry is a very fine one: the (almost universally applauded) is almost bound, if taken to lead to the latter.8
similar tensions can be found in the literature conthe political outcomes of Pentecostalism' The question controversial - unsurprisingly given the nature of Latin politics, a part of the world where the experience i, both limited and short-term' The supposed ".r, tion with liberation theology is a further complicating
7r
7o
Europe: The Exceptional Can
America
factor; so too the assumption that withdrawal from the pr 6eld is necessarily an endorsement of the status quo - the r so if this is reinforced by a theologircally inspired respect firr currently ordained powers, themselves mirrored in pattentt
church life. It is difficult, finally, to escape entirely frrrrr stories of corruption and scandal that from time to time Pentecostal (ust like any other) dealiLngs with the world ( r998b: $-4. All of this, it might seem, adds up to a rather than positive portrayal of Pentecostal political leaningt, What can be said on the other side? There is at least posibility (indeed the probabiliry following Martin), that creation of a free, or at least freer space for particular forrru religious life will have a similar - and democratising * effcct the political field. The process takes place as follows. In so flr Pentecostals reject the status of a minority and syncretic reli under the general protection of the Catholic Church (in nra contrast, for example, to the attitude of the possession c they demand a new rype of religious pluralism in the fornr equal rights for all religions before the State. Or to put same point more analytically, the breaking of the monopoly corporate union between Church and State mey turn out to of crucial political significance, despite or perhaps preci because of the exclusive, at times apolitical and seemingly tolerant claims of the Pentecostal sector. In this respect it crucially important to distinguish between the short and term, a point that will re-emerge in the discussion of Pentecottlr lism in Africa. The seeming intolerance of Pentecostals may be effective other, more immediate ways, an attribute exemplified lE antipathy towards various forms of social evil - notably urban violence. Such evils demand confrontation and at all of sociery (Birman and Pereira Leite zooo: 274); qtite they are corrosive of healthy social life, not to say of itself. This, in fact, is one reason for the attraction of the poot to Pentecostalism, in that the poorer neighbourhoods are thl
by urban unrest. Resistance to the perpetrators of (in particular that associated with the drug culture) however, considerable courage. In effecting their resisapped to a superior spiritual power becomes for a crucial and effective weapon, displayed amongst in the ritual of exorclsm. nccessary, findly, to take into account the cumulative numerous changed liv'es, in so r as these are generative ar well as (modest) economic capital. In terms of civil therefore, the positive effects of Pentecostal behaviour be clearer than at the level of State * the latter being for the greater number, if by no means all, Pentecostals. it, however, cautious at this point: '[c]ivil sociery can uncivil' (zoor: 298), i.e. generative of negative rather consequences. The balance betr,veen voluntarism on the one hand and repressive internal organcorporate interests and triumphalism on the other is (the scales can slip in either direction). A negative moreover, end in scandal on a large scale, not least in
with the media.

further pointi it is once again to recall the hugely varied political situations Latin America, and within this the different alliances (or these) of Church and State that have emerged in different the continent. The delicate counterpoint befween Prot'(including Pentecostals) and Catholic has to be worked Iy in different places. The particular niches which themselves for Pentecostal action may, in consequence, one place to one solution and in another to something different (think of Peru, Chile, Brazil and Guatemala). these the differences observed by Ireland at the micro the sheer complexity of the data becomes increasingly Patterns do indeed emerge from these accumulations ip (it is the task of sociology to discern them), but
's meticulous analyses underline a
'America
Europe: The Exceptional Cail
73
few universally applicable generalisations. The latter,

tempting, should be resisted.
THE SOCIOLOGICAL RESPONSE

Bearing such detail in mind, it is hardly surprising that sociological commentators are far from unanimous. One howeveq is abundantly clear: despite an initial lack of an enormous amount of work is now being done in the with the effect that academic bibliographies are growing as fast as the Pentecostal churches.e Such work, however, is confined to Pentecostalism but covers the whole range religious activity in the region, not least the possession cultl spiritism, up to now mentioned only in passing. It is i however, to note this aspect of Latin American and especially Brazilian life, in that the expressions of Afroreligion provide a significant link with a principal theme of following chapter - that is the capaciry of African religions export themselves to different Parts of the world, and not to Latin America and the Caribbean. Candombl6 is the example of this tendency, with its origins in Nigerian religion; Umbanda draws from a similar tradition but has roots in Rio de Janeiro in the early twentieth century than in Africa itself.lo The major theme of this section, however, lies elsewhere. aim is to look again at the theoretical approaches (both E and American) outlined in previous chaPters in order 'measure' each of them against the material presented in one. How well, in other words, can they cope with the that is emerging from a different part of the world? Chapter One set out a number of variations on the ation thesis. Bruce, following Wilson, was the principal of the most rigorous of these approaches. Interestingly, in developed parenthesis within Religion in the Modern World,
to the Latin American material, using the data to rather than critique, the secularisation thesis (1996: His argument draws directly from Martin's Tongues oJ ,that it reinforces the connections berween Methodism Latin American Pentecostals, like British some two hundred years earlier, are experiencing change, not least the movement of large numbers of &om rural areas to the cities - a translation which brings a profound sense of rootlessness. It is in precisely this tituation that new forms of religion can gain a purchase,
for populations already accepting of the supernatural' , in other words, has a specific (entirely understandable)
so
do for particular kinds of people
in conditions of
social change. that the secularisation theory remains intact despite development of Pentecostalism in Latin America' The thesis itsele according to Bruce, would only previously secular populations were ettracted in signifi-
to the
to a religious revival. In a very narrow sense, and the parameters of the secularisation thesis firmly in place it applies only to modern democratic societies), this plausible. Rather more problematic, however, is the that it was precisely an over-preoccupation with secuconceptualised in these terms that blinded sociologists was happening in Latin America: quite simply they did and would not accept what theory forbade. Martin puts
follows: power of the ruling paradigms came home to me most on a bus full of \n'estern academics in Guatamala' told that 66 percent of the population was Catholic asked no questions about where the rest might be, even gh the answer shouted at them from texts on huts in El Pet6n, storehouse churches called 'Prince of Peace,' buses announcing'Jesus is coming'' (Martin zootb: z7)
74
Cul
America
75
that I advanced this in Religion in Modern Europe - looks even more out of place in this chapter than it did with reference t the United States. Latin American Pentecostalists are not lookinS for institutions to carry a memory on their behalf. Quite thl contrary, in fact: they are consciously and explicitly making I new start in churches that are essentially participatory, a poirtt that will resonate even more strongly with reGrence to an African case study described in Chapter Four (Meyer 1998). The non. exportabiliry of the vicariousness thesis can, however, be quali. fied a little. Given the European origins of the Catholic Church in Latin America, there is at least the possibiliry that vicariousne$ might work in a Catholic (with its large number of nomind believers) as opposed to a Pentecostal context, Ironically, it il precisely in this situation - that of unchurched and primarily Catholic religiosity - that Pentecostalism is gaining ground tlt
fastest.
It is this kind of attitude that explains at least in part the heavily ideological critique of Tongues of Fire when it was first publisherl, Martin himself has constructed a rather different version of the secularisation theory one that permits, indeed encourallel the possibility of different outcomes in different places (in Europe and in the United States for example). Tongues of Fire (tggol simply extends this process in that it maps the Latin AmericitE case in the terms set out in Martint earlier General Theory qt' Secularization (rg78), the former becoming in many ways the missing chapter in the latter. More specifically it creates a hybrid case bringing together both Anglo-Saxon and Latin variants, synthesis which emphasises amongst other things the continuing posibiliry of religious change.ll In the more nuanced sense of secularisation offered by Martin, there is therefore a much more convincing fit befween theory and data. The notion of vicariousness, in contrast - in the senm
There are, finally, clear echoes of Callum Brown's thesis con. cerning the crucial role of women as carriers of religious culturiS so much is common to both European and Latin Americrn
76
Europe: The Exceptional Ca*
. There is little sign, however, that this role is either or altering radically in Latin America as Brown to be the case in modern Britain. Entirely the opposite as Latin American women find solutions to their in the mutual support of the Pentecostal communiry even more profoundly, in its transformative effect on the ional behaviour of men, who maintain none the less hip roles. Such ambiguiry profoundly disconcerts the feminist. Bernice Martin (zoor) takes the argument still: feminist perspectives (rather like the traditional of secularisation) were not only mistaken, they were part of the problem in so far as they blinded many n academics, though not the observers sur place ists and missiologists), to much of what was ing in Pentecostal communities. More specifically, the preoccupation with the oppression within both religion the family effectively blanked out the crucial and continuing of women in both spheres, through which a form of ion was indeed achieved but in ways undervalued by the
observer.
much for the different versions of secularisation theory, of which 'do better' than others. Chapter Two introduced ican alternative: rational choice theory. Can this help a better understanding of the Latin American material? is, first of all, constant reference in the literature to the ng evidence of religious 'competition' in Latin America 1995). Such competition is more apparent in the cities in rural areas, but exists in most, if not all, parts of the Pentecostal congregations are not only springing up in thousands, but are recruiting actively, not to say aggressively, :mbers. This, surely, is evidence of a religious market - a that is used with increasing frequency - with all the
ions that follow.
this situation it is surprising that the rational choice have come somewhat late, if at all, to the Latin
America
American field.l2 A notable exception can be found, h in the work of Anthony Gill, who draws on RCT in his of Catholic policy-making in Latin America (Gill 1998, r More specifically, Gill uses RCT to explain the decisiont some Catholic churches in the region in vour of an ' for the poor', despite their 'traditional' stance as the ally economic and political elites. The argument can be sum as follows. RCT concentrates on the balance berween i and costs. Using this Gill sets out the combination of that in his view will provide sufiicient incentives for the Clr to opt in favour of the poor, thus overcoming the costt abandoning an alternative, and familiar policy. More specifi in those places where the Catholic Church faces competition the recruitment of believers - and especially from socialist Protestant alternatives - the Catholic authorities will authoritarian regimes in order to maintain credibility with poor. It is clear that the presence of emergent Pentecostal ments becomes a crucial (if by no means the only) variable this process as the Catholic Church looks for supporr among poor. Gill exemplifies his theory with reference to rhe different stances of the Catholic Church in Chile and Arsenti In the former case where there is a noticeable presence of socialist and evangelical movements, the Pinochet regime been heavily criticised. In the latter, where the alternatives far less developed, the traditional accommodation Church and State to a large extent continues. The approach offers an unusual (in the sense that it is conr cerned with the choices made by churches rather than thl choices made by believers) application of rational choice theory to the understanding of Latin American religion. The materirl, however, is extensive; together with a series of comments and criticisms, it is usefully gathered together on a website by Pm. fessor Gill himself.l3 Interestingly, in their more recent work; Finke and Stark (forthcoming) are beginning to draw on Gilll analyses as they review the possible applications of RCT outsidt
States.
The question of time-lag is crucial to their
in Latin Annerica (as indeed was the case in the United growtlh follows deregulation but not immediately, with obvious resonance as we return once again to the
NS FOR EUROPE then, are the lessons for Europe? The first, surely, is that tn and do ch.ange and often in very unexpected direcsecond point follows from this. Will they, giuen lime, chrnge rin modern Europe and will they change in direction? And if not, why not? Such quetions must tpart from the associated value judgements, though the Undoubtedly exist. There are bound to be those that and indeed pray for, revival in Europe almost exactly lh. [t.t that ic has occurred in Latin America' There are no doubt, who feel that a certain growth in levels of acdviry may well be desirable in Europe, but not quite Way that has attracted so meny Latin Americans in recent It is preciselly these questions that will be engaged in the meantime, one thing is pretty certain: so far it hasn't There are, of course, examples of both evangelical growth in Europe, both inside and outside the churches. Tn'ris is arL aree of church life that, relatively flourishes in a part of the world where the overall are low. There are, moreover, interesting illustrations growt[r on the fringes of the continent - where tional Church is at its weakest. Cucchiari's study of a communiry in Sicily provides an excellent illustration the more interesting given the evident abiliry of Sicilian ism to confront the traditional, seemingly implacable of Sicilian family life (Cucchiari 1988, r99r)' The
Six.
78
Europe: The Exceptional Cata
America
79
afliniry befween Pentecostalism and the gypsy populatiotu south, central and east Europe has also caught the of researchers, a phenomenon also discovered in Swedcrr
zoor). Sweden, finally, is the rather surprising home of
a cl
Birman and Pereira Leite, for example, consider

inn Catholic Church in these terms - using an argucan be constructed both positively and negatively' On side, the Catholic Church is seen as tolerant and drawing into itself the varied currents of Brazilian least the possession cults that came, directly or indirectly, . Cordialiry moreover, is a valued characteristic cndorses the claim of the Catholic Church to be the Church of Brazil. The downside, however, is relatively doctrinal control, manifested in the myriad forms of religion (a whole pantheon of saints and demons) that r to exist inside as well as outside the oflicial Church' maintenance, dogmatic or otherwise, is well-nigh (Birman and Pereira Leite zooo: 27r-il. however, is only half the story. The other half can be in the failure of the secular elite, just as much as the ilic hierarchy, to exert an equivalent discipline on significant of the population. Secularism undoubtedly exists but it the preserve of the elite, iling to Penetrate the mass of lation (Martin zoor). In consequence, the division over the question of religion as such (epitomised in case) simply did not occur in Brazrl - or indeed of Latin America, with the partial exception of EuroUruguay. Either way, it is the resistant popular religiosiry mass of the population which becomes the key explanation one the very different scenario. Such religiosiry becomes, at for Pentecostalism and the same time, a highly fertile seedbed effective limit to hierarchical control. final question remains: might the same thing happen in At , if not immediately, then at least in the longer term? chapter rejoins that presented in foint the argument in this previous one - i.e. the case study of the United States' In chapter, I argued strongly against the artificial adoption of American answers to European questions. In my view, tt possible to create the kind of market found in the United
8r
kind of
Pentecosral communiry:
the Livets Ord mega-clr
in
Union) not, explkitly not, in the historic depositl

Scandinavian Lutheranism (Coleman zooo).la
Uppsala. Livets Ord (Word of Life) embodies a firrrn Pentecostalism that appeals to a relatively affiuent section or' Swedish population. Its reference points lie in the So United States and its mission further East (not least the St
By and large, however, we must conclude that the prir question facing us at this point is to explain why the significant growth in Pentecostalism that can be seen in America has not for the most part occurred in Latin Europc indeed anywhere else in the continent). In other words, ther nothing in Europe that could be described as a widespread popular Pentecostal movement, involving significant sectionli the population with a corresponding change in life-sryle.
not?
One way of tackling rhis quesrion is to think comparativel$ i.e. to identify spaces for Pentecostalism in Latin America th* are not, or not yet, present in Europe. We have already sc.6 that Latin American patrerns of religion derive historically frogl the Latin varianr in Europe. On this side of the Atlantic, tlill took the form of a relatively well-disciplined Catholic monopoly on one side, confronted (at times aggressively) by an anti-clericd secularism on the other. Each encouraged the other and in sonr parts ofEurope, notably nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Francen the clash between Catholic Church and secular Stat became the defining fearure of political life. It is equally clear, however, that a similar conflict despite significant attempts never quite took hold in Latin America. We need to appreciate why, Material (both historical and currenr) from the Latin American context indicates a marked lack of conrrol on both sides of thc
EO
America
foolish try. Other scenarios might, however, be possible. For examphl
States
within the European context and probably
European 'spaces', previously occupied by hegemonic nationd

churches (not to mention their secular alter-egos), could gradUr ally open up to permit new forms of religion. We have alrerdy seen that this is happening round the edges of the contincntl whether these be defined geographically (in Sicily, for exemphl or socially (the gypsy populations). Could the process becoml more widespread? Precisely this point has already been made by Martin. I finl used the following quotation in a chapter in Religion in Modafil Europe (in other words looking at Europe from the insi Looked at from the outside (and in the first instance from Latin America), it seems even more apposite:
all over the West, to the dismay at times of the churches. This reversal of the 'normal' flows will become theme in subsequent chapters - most immediately trlference to the African case.
Initially, about a quarter of a century ago, I asked myself whf the voluntary denominations of Anglo-American culture hld not taken offin Latin America as they had in the U.S.A., and concluded that Latin America must be too similar to Latln Europe for that to happen. But now I am inclined to reverfl the question and ask why the burgeoning denominations Latin America have not taken off in Latin Europe . . . Therl are new spaces being cleared in which a competitive denonrl= national culture can flourish. (1996: 4r; citation taken fn:t1 the English original)
The essence of Martin's approach lies in the observation that thl factors that encouraged European secularisation in the first place = a fortress Catholicism, buttressed by political power, and opposed by militant secularity - are themselves beginning to erode. Thcra is no reason, therefore, why the voluntary denominationalism the New'lVorld should not find a place in the Old, alongsidl if not replacing a weakened Catholic Church. And if that true in Latin Europe, how much more spectacular are thl spaces in much of the former communist world, which, quitl clearly, are attracting sustained attention from the evangelicd
8z
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Chapter Four
AFRICAN INITIATIVES: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW GTOBAL RELIGION
OF
ion: its apparent reversal is correspondingly disturbing. J for example, underlines the self-understanding of Ghanair ities in The Netherlands, arguably one of the m,t s countries of 'Western Europe. They see themselves ies in a secular continent. Drawing on the Old Tes image of 'dry bones', members of these churches .o.rrrr,' as a spiritual desert to which they are called as evangelii' that is not always appreciated by the host society. The reversal of responsibilities implied in this attitude drasl cally overturns the traditional relations between Af.icarrs aJ Europeans. It is in sharp contrast with the conventional vitv of existing north-south relations, often equared with blac white relations, and hardly conforms to the marginal positi,l of the majority of Africans in Europe. On the European sic' this reversal of roles appears difiicult to appreciate as it dcs not comply with the srereorypes often attached to Afri<l Africans are traditionally represented as on the receiving e{ and Europe on the giving end of a relationship characteris,' by unequal transfer. (Ter Haar r998a: 168)
this is to anticipate the conclusion of the chapter too soo'' t fder to appreciate the impact of this kind of role reversal, essary to put in place the various layers of African religi{ which such 'missionaries' come and the crucial ,ol. 't peans in Africa's Christianisation process. One way of tacl-
Given the size and diversiry of modern Africa, this chapter mult be even more selective than the others. Chapter Three took at
its principal theme the dramatic growth of Pentecostalism in many parts of Latin America and attempted to explain why the same phenomenon had not (so far at least) occurred in Europo, Exactly the same could be done for sub-Saharan Africa, a fact which illustrates the truly global nature of Pentecostalism at th start of the rwenry-first century. For the African chapter, I have,
however, chosen a different emphasis - namely the capaciry of African people to export their religious life to many parts of tht modern world, and not least in recent years to Europe. The two chapters overlap in so far as the churches of the newly-arrivcd
African congregations are very often, though not always, Pente. costal in nature, but the point of departure is differently
conceived.
this question is, at least in part, to follow the them's in the Journal of Religion in Africa as these a.. ,.t olt
retrospective reflections, both chronological and themati' retiring editor (Hastings 2ooo). Such reflections operare's
The impact of African forms of religion in various parts of Europe is a relatively new field of enquiry; it is, however, on that fits the theme of these lectures very precisely. Quite apart from this, it is a subject which many Europeans find provocativ in so far as it questions many of their most deep-seated assump. tions. Or to put the same point more sharply, the relationship berween Europe and Africa is assumed to operate in a particulr!
through the complexities that are inevitable I the shortest summary of the religious field in this ..ro.-o,'t diverse continent. They, like African religion itself, a1e t 1 rr , I I . . , n layered. Not only do they furnish a set of themes by whii' n ise the material, they provide in addition comment o iated literature.
conducteur
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Initiatiues
Before embarking on this venture, two preliminary points l! important. The first is to stress that the chapter concentrute! almost entirely on sub-Saharan Africa, i.e. on the parts of Afi'icl influenced by Christianity rather than Islam. The latter, of course, is of vital importance in order to understand the contl= nent as a whole, but not everything can be included here. With this in mind the emphasis will inevitably 11 on Anglophon rather than Francophone Africa and will leave on one sidE the issue of Christian-Islamic relations despite their growittg importance in geo-political debate. The second point is rather different and emerges directly from the fact that both the reserch for this chapter and its preliminary draft were undertaken in thc Universiry of Uppsala, Sweden, the home base of the schol$ and pastor Bengt Sundkler whose career as an Africanist lastcd more than half a century. His first major book Bantu Prophets ltl South Africa was published in 1948, the last volume (well ove! rooo pages) was published posthumously (with the help ofChril= topher Steed) in zooo. An obvious consequence of Sundklcrt work is the admirable collection of material on African religittR in the libraries of his home universiry something for which was extremely grateful, if at times rather overwhelmed by thf sheer volume of what was available. This seems an appropriatt place to acknowledge the unique contribution of Sundkler t the field of African studies.
J
to move elsewhere in the world, including Europe. At :point, however, e rather different consideration requires : that is the effects of economic uncertainry on African ip itself, a fact widely recognised by those working in field. Hastings, for example, emphasises the seriousness of tconomic situation for the study of African Christianity in the later post-war decades:
That brings us to the r98os, the nadir of our history. What ' cxactly happened? The first and most decisive cause was, unquestionably, the rundown of African universities north of lhe Zernbezi: the erosion of salaries, the book famine, the disappearance of periodicals . . . University decline was, of course, within a context of wider political unrest and ecohomic stagnation, all greatly inhibiting the work of research. In the r96os one took it for granted that the generation of Ajayi and Ayadele would be followed and excelled by a burgeoning academic army all across Africa. It never
happened. (Hastings zooo: 37)
THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

TWo somewhat contradictory features of modern Africa need underlining at the outset. The first concerns the demographi shift in world Christianiry the second the economic collapse in most, if not quite in all, of the African continent. A developed discussion of the latter is, quite clearly, beyond the remit of tha present chapter, though its.influence will resonate at a numblt of places in the text - not least as a push factor in encouraginj
Europe: The Exceptional Cau
has been a marked recovery in the sub-discipline in but the difliculties of African universities north of the I remaln acute. need for African Christian studies has, however, never greater. Walls (1996) emphasises two aspects of this work: the continuing need to document the specifically African but second to realise that the African narrative has become ingly a pivotal chapter in the history of Christianiry itself. te this point, Walls used his introductory paper at a ce of Christianiry in Africa in the rggosl to compare of affairs in Africa in the r99os with that evoked at an 'World Missionary Conconference in Edinburgh: the
of r9ro.2 The latter divided the world into the 'misand the 'non-missionised' areas. The fully missionised Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealtnd. 'not yet fully missionised' was essentially everyone else, not
86
Initiatiues
87
least the whole
of Africa (apart from a small section of
SoutF
Africa). Interestingly nothing at all was said about Latin Ameriel (in order it seems to avoid dividing the conference delegatel)i Asia, m<lreover, was the prime focus of missionary attentionl rather than Africa. Since rgro the demography of world Christianiry has altcrgC dramatically. Active Christianiry in'fully-missionised' Wc* Europe has manifestly receded, whereas large sections of the 'nrlt fully missionised' globe have become centres of Christian vitality - those largely which are covered by the case studies descrihed in these chapters. And none more so than Africa itself wherl the indices of both practice and belief (never mind the absolutE numbers) are some of the highest in the world (Barrett I glilt Barrett et al. zoor). Hence the crucial importance of the Afrieffi story to the evolution of Christianity as a whole. An obvioutl rather more domestic illustration of the same metamorphosis cnE be seen in the shifting nature of the Lambeth Conference (thl decennial meeting of Bishops of the Anglican Communion cotl. vened by the Archbishop of Canterbury). From somethin dominated by the English (and English ways of doing thing$,lt has become increasingly global in its reach and includes a crucld African presence. The emergence of markedly different and rt times conflicting agendas are part and parcel of the same procclli Undoubtedly diflicult to manage from the point of view of tht conference organisers, such agendas caused in t998 even greatl consternation amongst the secular journalists.
That is to be found in Africa itself, first in the presence Christian Church considerably before it existed in most Europe and second in the traditional religions of Africa. apecifically, in the early centuries of the Christian era, there iimportant Christian deposits both in the Mediterranean (and their hinterlands) and in the Horn of Africa. the emergence of Europe as a Christian entiry (that in Chapter One) comes later and, as a process, is e from the spread of Islam in the seventh and eighth With the advance of Islam, the uniry of the Mediterworld was shattered once and for all, out of which
three distinct civilisations (indeed three calendars): that Byzantium and Islam, latter overran the great majoriry of the Christian churches
Africa with the exception of the Coptic Church in a presence which then spread southward up the Nile into the land of Nubia, leading in 7ro to a Nubian state. Christianiry survived in Nubia until the fifteenth when it too succumbed to persistent Islamification. In ia, in contrast, Christianiry not only came earlier (the century) but survived. Ethiopian Christianiry moreover, unique features, not least an identiry which linked the background of the early Church with specifically African
acquired, in consequence, considerable symbolic distinctively African Church with its own faith own traditions - Gatures which were to resonate strongly nce
as a
. It
LAYERS OF AFRICAN RELIGION

The beginnings
The long-term movement ofboth people and ideas from Europl to all parts of the African continent is of crucial significance ltt understanding the multipliciry of religious layers that exilt in modern Africa. Such movement is not, however, the starti
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Many African movements have adopted the name Ethiopian to signify n Christianiry independent from Western domination. the exponential growth of Christianiry (as indeed of in the lwentieth century what has happened to the religions of Africa that existed before the coming of to most parts of the continent? Walls (lSS6) rgues such religions continue within Christianiry itself - the nature of African Christianiry cannot in fact be
88
Europe: The Exceptional Cafi
Initiatiues
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understood without reference to what has gone before. There '\Xi'alls, are, following more continuities than discontinuities, it1 the fact, for example, that the Christian God in Africa has I vernacular name and in the application of the Christian tradition to already existing maps of the universe. The latter point it crucial:
unwavering devotion' (Maxwell zoor: 8). In terms

lies with African women, in, for example, the role celibate nun - an entirely new idea.
influences
of of
, the most dramatic disjuncture of all, following
we shall see, that the relationships berween tltE components of those maps - God, local divinities, ancestoill objects ofpower - have changed, and changed radically, al I result of the Christian impact; but as components in undet= standing the world and sociery they remain in one guise ol another. In order to have an effect in Africa, the Christinn tradition has thus had to be applied to these pre-existing components; it has been placed on the available maps of th! universe, and interpreted within existing categories. (Witlll rqq6: S)
is true,
as
It
the missionary centuries
thing is abundantly clear: the influence of Europe and has been decisive for the evolution of Christianiry in In Sundkler's and Steedt massive overview, for example, fotty pages describe the first r joo years (pages which in addition to set out a range of seminal themes); the ing rooo deal with the colonial story end its aftermath. first to arrive (in the late fifteenth century) were the
significant for a number of reasons. First Portuguese (newly enthused by the Reconquista at home) helped the ians to repulse a fierce Muslim attack in the r54os, a event in the survival of the Ethiopian Church. Further , coastal communities emerged in Angola and Mozambique result of setdement, trade and intermarriage. More ing and more profoundly Christian, however, was the elecmonarchy of Mbanza Kongo (at the mouth of the Congo) in the early sixteenth century, an impressive venture undermined by the insensitivities of the Europeans, the genuine ettempts by the Africans to incorporate ian culture. Finally it is important to note the role of in the emergent slave trade on both sides of the (North and South), the beginnings of African to the new world. the dominance of the Portuguese gradually diminished, place was taken in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ern Europq's Protestant states - notably the Dutch (in Africa) and the British, the latter heavily involved in both trade itself and in the struggles to bring this to an end. founding of the free cplonies of Sierra Leone and Liberia
The argument about continuities should not, of course, be takon too r. Many changes have occurred - the world view has becB re-ordered and new elements have been introduced - but fot some commentators the persistence of the older componenf, remains paremount, prompting the specificiry of Africut theology as well as African religion.3'Walls, for example, suggcttl that much of the distinctiveness of African theology lies in thl manner in which it formalises the syntheses produced by the lival of countless African Christians es they afiirm, deny, suppre$, redirect and reinterpret the traditional forms of African religion in light of Christian teaching (r996: I4). Others are less sure. Indeed the debate regarding continuity and discontinuity becomes a pervasive theme in the literature il a whole and will resonate repeatedly. With respect to the cominS of Christianiry Maxwell, for instance, stresses rupture as much il continuity in both theology and behaviour: 'Christianiry brought many new and powerful ideas: sin and hell, judgement attd redemption. It introduced Africans to Christ and Mary who . , ,
9o
Initiatives
9r
are central to this history themselves embodying a new conccptl
the notion of an African Christian civilisation free from slaverX led by Africans, but modelled first and foremost on the Protcstnflt
west.
Sundkler follows the same 'route', moving from the
to the West, to the South and then the East.
Cross-
was, however, in the 'long nineteenth century' that th missionary enterprise became the dominant theme. The story ll
It
the regions (with important exceptions and variations), r, are the key social categories: the kings and chie6, the
men, and the slaves and other socially marginalised groups. with his stress on the second of the fwo 'maps' above, Sundkler argues that the first to join the new
complex and multi-layered, unsurprisingly given the size and diversity of the African continent. It can, moreover, be told fnrm different points of view. Sundkler, for example, indicates tw quite different 'maps' that can be drawn to describe and tg explain the Christianisation process that took place in nilre= teenth-century Africa. The first is the 'ofticial' missionary nltpl locating the centres (or chains of centres) of a well-definod missionary programme. The materials required to furnish thlt history are to be found in the histories of the missionary socictiel and their mission fields and in the biographies (sometinr$ hagiographies) of the missionaries themselves. Beneath such schemes, however, can be found a different, and in some w{{ more penetrating map: one that concentrates on the movemen and migrations of the African populations rhemselves and thel: own role in spreading the gospel. It is to this map that Sundkh! (and indeed others) give precedence. 'In the following pa$tr the reader will meet an emphasis on vast and dramatic changetl in and through the adversities and opportunities, with uproote{ refugee - groups and individuds - in "the spreading chaos the interior plains", prepared to face and join the new religionl (Sundkler and Steed zooo: 8z). The refugee motif becomes lE fact a primary theme of the book as a whole.a The crucid moments arrive, howeveq at the points of intersection befwe|l the two maps, when a major transition (or conversion) taket place from traditiond ways of living to the new ith. Sundkler's following chapters tell this rich and varied story, itl which distinctive patterns emerge - both regional and socid, The regional pattern, first of all, emphasises the contrastinl characteristics of the different parts of Africa - in each timl
Europe: The Exceptional Cdtp
were, very often, the aliens, the foreigners and the The African Church in the nineteenth century was very largely a youth movement. It was the young men had least to lose and most to gain as they struck out; herein core of mobility and movement, characteristic of both sociery and African religion.s even within the broad periodisation of Sundkier's as a whole - the long nineteenth century Q787-rgr9), Colonial experience Qgzo-5g) and independent Africa ) - there are important shifts in emphasis. It is, for in the last quarter of the nineteenth century that the tEuropean scramble' for power and empire takes place; politook geo-political shape after the Congress of Berlin in as Europe's leading statesmen carved the African continent pieces largely for their own consumption, a crucial moment as well as African history. Christian missions were an essential part of this process (deGnding or claiming r territories) and critical of it (soundly condemning, for the worst excesses of economic exploitation in the Congo). The European scrambles were, moreover, embodying economic and political as well as transformations. They were part, in fact, of an immense 1s in the life of Africa, as the conrinent gradually its place in the global capitalist economy. The role of ity (and indeed of Islam) as catalysts in this globalising became the focus of a much discussed article published r (Horton ry7r).6In this, Horton argues that Christianity Islam) has particular resonance as a world ith, stimulating
92
Initiatiues
93
and accelerating shifts that were in the air anyway; offering, in other words, the intellectual and conceptual resources to coPC with the immensities of change, as the microcosm gradullly turned into the macrocosm and Africa became part of the emergent world order.
ns. Such critiques have been led by the secular-liberal a group already critical of Christianity in its European
.
Exactly the same personnel seem paradoxically unaware, that in many ways they are themselves participating in enterprise: effectively they are'exporting' secularisation,
Horton's analysis remains controversial. Peel, for example, rthe crucial role of both the missionaries and their message and the specificities of the context, including the assocl= ated power structures, in which the missionary encounters tah place (Peel zooo: 4). But either wey the European occupatiotl of Africa, including its religious dimensions, was decisive. ltl effects were multiple and irreversible as old authorities (politicrl and religious) either disappeared altogether or were vastly reduced. This was the moment when Europeans imposed on Africans, either directly or indirectly, their languages, thelf systems of education and administration, their political traditionlt a European literary culture, modern forms of trensport and most decisive of all - a system of tax (Hastings 1994: 4o3). Atl immediate effect of the latter and its implications for econouil liG (as indeed of the European influence as a whole) was thl manifest need for literacy, and hence education. This in tur stimulated a huge demand for schools, including mission schoolt, The need for education and the contrasting policies of thl British and the French in this field, becomes, in consequenccr an increasingly important aspect of the story as the nineteenih century gives way to the twentieth. [t cannot be covered ln detail in this chapter, but resonates strongly in both Sundklerl and Hasting's accounts of the later period. One final remark concludes this section; it relates very immediately to the broader theme of these lectures and conceril the retrospective views of many Europeans with respect to thl missionary enterprise (both in Africa and elsewhere). In the posl. war decades (most notably in the r96os), such enterprise has hrd a bad press in Europe; it has been seen primarily as a form of cultural oppression profoundly damaging to 'native' beliefs and
emphasises
rs their forebears exported Christianity. But with one dif. For this group, the export of secularisation remains unquestioned in so far as many Europeans assume that as world modernised, it would necessarily secularise. In conthe earlier product, Christian mission, was (and still is)
censured.
recipients (a moment of deciding berween old ways and . Bearing these complexities in mind, Peel's Religious and the Making of the Yoruba (zooo) should become reading for all those interested in mission.
Independent Churches
are, of course, tvyo sides to the debate about mission. ways the secular liberals are right - African beliefi and were indeed disturbed if not destroyed altogether. Such , however, frequently underestimate both the sheer cost of in terms of the individuals involved,T and - rather differ- the significance of the religious encounter in the lives of
time now to turn to a rather different strand in the history ican Christianiry: the multiplicity of churches founded by African for black African' and 'devoted to the well-being, ion and liberation of African people' (Daneel rg98: zz). how different this strand is, however, raises once again the of continuiry and discontinuity: the line berween mission and African Independent Churches (AIC, is not always as is sometimes imagined. Quite clearly the success of ,lmission churches depended to a large extent on labour refugees, African evangelists and catechists (a point established); AICs in their turn are fed more than some
94
Initidtives
9i
commentators appreciete by currents from outside Africa (ne[ least by the descendants of the slave population in the United States). The system is by no means closed. The emphasis, however, rs different. Precedents for indepen= dency can be found in the eighteenth century, but the majorlry of AICs date from the early rwentieth century as a sense of plnAfricanism emerged as a significant force, and particularly l South Africa. They vary in size from the very small to movements embracing millions of adherents. Most, it is importlnC
to remember,
are distinctively Christian and form part
of tht
mainstream of Christian activity in Africa; these are by no nrernl marginal or sectarian movements. Among the larger groups ctn be found the following: the amaNazareta of Isaiah Shembe artd the Zion Christian Church of Engenas Lekganyane, both ltl
South Africa; Samuel Mutendit Zion Christian Church and Johane Maranket African Apostolic Church in Zimbabwe; Alief Lenshina's Lumpa Church in Zarnbia; Simon Kimbangul Church of Jesus Christ in Zaire (the largest of all); and finally the Cherubim and Seraphim Church and the Church of thl Lord (Aladura) in Nigeria. Continuing to follow Daneel (rSg8), three broad rypes can be distinguished in the literature. The first includes the Ethiopinn type or non-prophetic church movements which emerge ar ! reaction to the white-led mission churches, though in othCF respects are very like them. It is these churches, moreover, thlt embody an 'Ethiopian' or distinctively African ideology - i,t, one that is free from European influence. The second or spirit. type place much greater emphasis on the work of the Holy Spirit, displayed in charismatic forms of worship and prophcti gifts including healing and various forms of exorcism. Dancll includes in this category all Zionists and a wide range of Apoi* tolic churches. Finally there are the Messianic churches (a morl controversial category), in which the founder-leader of tht church or movement becomes much more central (as a mirach worker or resistance figure, for example), displacing in soml
the centraliry of Christ. The controversy surrounds the to which the leader obscures the salvific work of Christ. inp, however, mitigates these distinctions, feeling that rre easily overstated (Hastings rgg4i 5or, j33). He prefers to reGr to an Ethiopian end and a prophetic end to the each of which appealed to rather different people whole the former to a new elite of clergy and lairy (irritated control) and the letter to the very poor (opting out white-dominated secular world and into a more religious Such distinctions form part of a wider discussion of the and motivations of independency. This was first of all a movement, part in fact of the naturally fissiparous Protestantism, much of which had become by this of a somewhat cerebral form of ith out of touch with the context (of healing and miracles etc.). With this in mind, more specific factors should also be taken into account. first derives from the colonial and racial nature not only of but of the Church itself, which consistently marginalised ican in favour of even the most recendy arrived European. $econd ctor picks up a point made earlier, that is rhe ing influence of traditional African religion and culture Christianity itself, a fact which resonated strongly with a tradition: hence a 'sort of biblical-African alliance against more rationalist, but also simply more rigidly denomiist, missionary' fi994: 529), sufiicient in many places ate the prophetic side of the independent churches. and healing were central to the latter movement, reacting 'Western medical practice on the one hand and aspects medicine (the fear of spiritual powers and lifeexorcism) on the other, a point strongly reinforced
(zooo:
6ll-g).
final ctor in explaining the growth of AICs lies in the expansion of the Christian scene. In the early twentieth the mission churches could hardly keep up with what happening, a situation in which the prophet emerged to
96
Europe: The Exceptional Ca$
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97
take on the missionary's task (precisely because of its According to Hastings, the process was more one of
than of secession. In baptism, for example, it is indeed continuiry in experience rather than any discontinuiry mission and independency which requires recognition' (r{rq*l 53r). The difference lies more in the modes of preparatioql Missionaries insisted on the thoroughness of this; independenef in contrast came close to responding to the demand for in baptism by generating prophetic baptisers. 'Whatever the case, th! years berween rgro and r94o saw a proliferation of converrisfl movements in many parts ofAfrica, partly driven by the rigiditla of the missionary churches ot conversely, by their abseneft Different patterns emerged in different places, but in signifi parts of Africa (notably the South), independency becanro crucially important part of the growing Church. Not only did the AICs expand, so too did the related to this topic. Sundkler, for example, notes the number studies devoted to such movements, many of which are together in Turner's magisterial bibliography (Turner ry7i!r,1 Rather more serious, however, is Sundklert subsequent indiek ment: '[T]here is undeniably a certain tendency to romanticilQ in some of this literary activity. If Africa was to be "the Christir Continent" at all it must be so, not in any recognizable Westel form, but preferably dressed in as surpris ing a garment as possibhl (zooo: ro33). Hasting's reflections regarding theJournal of ReliXloS in Africa are rather similar. Emphasising first the evident 'fltl berween the prevalent mood of the r96os and r97os (i.e. thl early years of the journd) and the search for African initiatirrul including AICs, Hastings was at times less happy about thC quality. This varied from the truly excellent - work that rv[ properly contextualised and historically/theologically informed = to studies which clearly displayed some of the 'romanticilml already pointed out by Sundkier. The 'industry' finally ran out steam in the r98os, an additional reason for the downturn of thl fortunes of the journal in this decade (see above). Gradually, in I
Eurcpe: The Exceptional
welcomed by Hastings, it was counter-balanced by a ing ofscholarly attention on the mission-founded churches In order for both to be properly understood, the two of African religion should be seen as complementary of a single whole, not simply in terms of schism.
Pentecostalism
of scholarship, Pentecostalism in Africa is differently Compared on the one hand with the study of AICs in and on the other with the very extensive work devoted
ism in Latin America, relatiuely little has been done increasingly significant field. There are, however, beginnings - for example, the collection of case studies together in New Dimensions in Aftican Chrktianity
rgg2)."
his introductory essay to this volume, Gifford pursues a of questions: i.e. questions about numbers, about pro(from which churches do the new Pentecostals come?), typologies (to what extent are the traditional rypologies icable?), about 'Africanness', about politics and fi"rlly the connection be&veen Pentecostal movements and 's economic collapse. Within this rather daunting list, it is pausing for a moment on 'Africanness' in that it raises matic distinction berween new forms of Pentecostalism traditional forms of independency, parts of which have rightly been described as Pentecostal.
[n what way are these new churches a flowering of African

Christianiry? What attitude do these new pentecostal churches edopt towards African Culture? To what extent is this new 'African Christianiry underpinned by an African metaphysic? ,'What is the Western factor in this phenomenon? To what 'Western missionaries involved? What role do ,degree
are
Western literature, technology, media play? To what degree
98
Cul
Initiatives
99
is the theology of these new movements Western? (Gitlird tggz: 5)

Beneath such questions, the issue of continuity reappears otle again and in a particularly complicated form. Harvey Cox (r996),
for example, regards AICs as the African expression ofworldwidl Pentecostalism. In a later vlume, Gifford (1998: ::) feels that tlth is a serious category mistake, underlining instead the markcrlly different nature of modern forms of Pentecostalism. Peel (zorn)t thirdly, offers a both/and rather than either/or solution for thg Nigerian case. There are indeed striking differences betwcil the two groups in 'sryle, idiom and emphasis', notably the Pettt= costal stress on new beginnings and their anxiery to look oBt rather than back (emphasising above all their membership of I fast-growing and worldwide movement). 'Yet basically the bor[agains and the Aladura share the same worldview, with its decp Yoruba (or Nigerian, or African) roots', an outlook which h{ both positive and negative features (zooo: 3r4-j). Martin (zoora) offers further clarification. Pentecostals, h! argues, inhabit a niche between the AICs and the historl churches, rejecting both the Africanisation of the former and the political critique and commitment to inculturation of thl latter. Pentecostals, in contrast, are essentiely forward lookin5, shedding the ties that hold them back in their search for mobilitl freedom and advancement. Their familial, economic arrd political attitudes follow from this, but take different forms lE different places. An important aspect of Martin's synthesis echoelg however, a point made earlier: that is the continaim3 migratioq and mobilities of African sociery but this time to the meg= cities of late moderniry in which the Pentecostal commu offers rootedness (in a voluntary community) to those for the ties of nation or ethnicity no longer resonate. Martint analysis is based on an overview of recent case studiI; almost all of which date from the rggos. Four of these have begn brought together in a special issue of the Journal of Religion
Europe: The Exceptional CaE
t0 Maxwell's editorial underlines the by now familiar the dramatic growth of African Pentecostalism in the last of the twentieth century its vitality and the complexiry effects on the traditional alignments of African Christianiry. this framework, rwo of the studies pay particular attento the mass media and their role in the life of Pentecostd nities.ll For Hackett (1998) this is the major theme of r, but her argument also includes a strong emphasis on ionalism and the flows of information across international ies. For Marshall-Fratani (1998) it is almost the other tound: transnarionalism is the starting point, an idea that resonance for Pentecostals as they seek identities the nation state. With this in mind the connections the global and the local (in this case Nigeria) become to Marshali's argument, within which the media pay a
facilitating the circulation of images and narratives. people are, however, equally mobile. Nigerian evanfor example, preach at international conGrences alongside and Brazilians, whilst international ministries are mainin different parts of an ever-growing Nigerian diaspora ing, interestingly, Manchester and London). The capaciry ism to operate across borders becomes a pivotal (see below). work on Ghana, together with Maxwell's own on bwe, focuses on the relationship between Pentecostalism modernity itself. Using material from a detailed ethnostudy of the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God, Africa A), Maxwe[ (rgq8, 1999) addresses two interrelated the prosperity gospel itself and its links to the American
role
belt. Both ere controversial. Maxwell concludes that there contact between Zimbabwe and the United States in of theological justification for the accumulation of wealth, that Southern African sources and local concerns are parafor the members of ZAOGA, not least the need to ways of surviving in conditions of rapid economic
lnitiatiues
In so far as it succeeds in this aim, Pentecostalisrrt it1 Africa fiust as in Latin America) fits well with both the valttel
change.
and the institutions of modernity. Meyer (1998, 1999) engages moderniry in a different wu14 examining the tension between 'making a complete break with the past' (so often characteristic of Pentecostalism) and the cttl.
S-CUTTING THEMES
back once again to Hasting's article, the fil conducteur of chapter, a new set of themes emerge in the Journal in I99os. In addition to Pentecostalism itself, Hastings lists the Church-State relationships, Christian-Islamic a renewed emphasis on missionary history and the diaspora. It will be the last of these (indeed the African more generally) that preoccupies us in the following but before engaging this particularly pertinent theme, t few words should be said about the other three. Giffordt contribution to the understanding of Church tate has been crucial (Gifford 1995, 1998). ln The Christian
and the Demooatisation of Africa Qg95), Giffcrd brings
tural policies encouraged by the Ghanaian State.
Morc
specifically Pentecostals oppose the re-assertions of tradition artd
culture voured by the post-colonial State,'2 preferring the glo* balised and forward-looking character of Pentecostal religittn (exemplifring both Peelt and Martint point very precisely). 'I'lre process, however, is complex: Meyer demonstrates, for exanrple, 'how pentecostalism seeks a rupture from a "tradition" or "pa$ttl which it has previously helped to construct, thereby engagitt5
and forgetting' (1998: 3rB), forget what they first 'construct' as the prtti Believers can only the forgetting is achieved through deliverance. Meyer's analytll goes further still. She demonstrates how believers cannot in flet make a complete break with the past and turn once and for l[ into'free' and modern individuals. The success of Pentecostalitm resides precisely in its capacity to address this ambiguiry. It is interesting to reflect on Meyer's work in connection with that of Hervieu-L6ger introduced in Chapter One. For both tltt idea of memory is central, i.e. that which links an individual tg a chain of generations and (in the African case) to a web qf kinship relationships. For Hervieu-L6ger, religion is seen as ptlt and parcel of this process - indeed linking a believer to a speciflE chain of memory becomes the defining feature of religion. Fof Meyer, almost the reverse is true: for Ghanaian Pentecostals thl identiry of the born again Christian resides not in memory il such 'but in the rejection of all the links revealed by it' (rgpt 339-40). The power of the past needs to be broken, not pcir petuated, a rupture which requires a powerful ritual explanatory discourse (supplied in this case by the distincti of Pentecostal worship and teaching).
in a dialectics of remembering
r the papers from a prestigious conference held at the iry of Leeds two years earlier. In this, he highlighrs role of the churches in the democratisation process the Catholic Church in the French-speaking parts of
;ontinent), a role which surprised many Western observers (as ever) they were not prepared for it. Why not is the that follows. Once again the dearth in African scholarbecomes a significant factor, but the predorninantly secular tions of Europeans is, as ever, another. Nor should it be that the churches necessarily act unanimously in the sphere. Gifford distinguishes carefully berween the ine churches which for the most part challenge Africa's and the newer evangelical or Pentecostal churches
often provide support. The latter remark is, however, qualified - endorsing a point already made in conwith Latin America. Paradoxically, evangelical or churches 'may in the long run do more for political than the mainline churches and any "liberation " ' (1995, 5), in that simply by existing the new churches
Europe: The Exceptional Co'll
Initiatiues
r03
are creating freer social space (an essential element
tE
The impact on both the sending and receiving societies
autonomous action), not least at the level of civil sociery.13 Africa, however, is a continent of change and in re-assessitlg the public role of Christianiry in 1998, Gifford is forccd t acknowledge the cataclysmic nature of events in both (Protestrfl$ Liberia and (Catholic) Rwanda. It is hard to be comfortabll about Christianityt role in either of these cases. Gifford's reactict is to use these profoundly negative experiences constructivelyl that is to scrutinise ever more closely the adequacy of th: churches' (plural) response to the higtrly problematic situatiotl in which they find themselves. One way of doing this is to follow Hastings' advice and t return once again to the careful essessment of the missiorrary churches as a keystone of African religion. The geo-politicd circumstances of the r99os, both inside and outside Africa, atl however very different from those prior to 196o, when the shlft towards AICs (quite rightly) rypified the mood. One inescapabh feature of the later decades of the twentieth century has, fu! example, been the resurgence of Islam on a global scale, I transformation that has crucial resonance for both the relationr ships berween Christian and Muslims in Africa and the acadernl study of these. Undoubtedly a major theme for Africanists ii the twenty-first century (as indeed for scholars of religiotl in Europe), this - regrettably - can be signalled only in passingr
lable as an economic, social and religious trenstook place. The manner of embedding was, however, different in the different parts of the New World, contrasts reflect very immediately the themes developed in the two
chapters.
New World
America, for example, African forms of religion rapidly part of the hugely diverse religious market described in
r Two. Newly arrived slaves were forbidden to
pracfise
THE AFRICAN DIASPORA The immediate task is to look in more detail at the Africrtl diaspora, with particular attention to its growing presence ln
Europe. The dispersal of Africans across the globe has been onl of the largest and most brutal movements of people that hll taken place in modern times - a fact almost entirely explainad by the slave trade, which displaced huge numbers of black peoplt
to Latin America (notably Brazil), the Caribbean and North

own religion and were introduced instead to Protestantism, ithe intention that this would legitimise their enslaved confrom which they would escape only into eternal life. controls were only partially successful: Protestant Christoffered the hope of freedom in this world too, becoming seme time an important vehicle for the expression of (notably in worship). The influence of distinctive of black Protestantism on American life was, in conse, immense. Evangelical rather than liberal in its ions, it provided none the less crucial motivations for icivil rights movement (not least for Martin Luther King . Half a century later African-American Christians a major component in the religious life of the United For the most part they are to be found in distinctive groups: roughly divided between Baptists (the largest , Methodists and Pentecostals. Latin America (more especialiy in Brazil) something rather has happened. Here the influence of traditional African can still be seen alongside more orthodox forms of ianity (an argument in favour of continuity). Significant of Brazilians of African descent belong, for example, Afro-Brazilian movements already referred to in Chapter notably Candombl6 and [Jmbanda - movements in
Initiatiues
which the question of syncretism
(always an ambiguous tcnn)
for African religious movements, outside as well

the continent.
Europe
as
inevitably arises, Syncretism becomes
Peter Clarke's extensive 1998). Clarke has gathered together a series of empirical studil which highlight the ways in which African and African-derived religions manifest themselves in the contemporary world, undet= lining for special attention 'their continued dynamism and thcll relationship with other religions, often labeled syncretism' (lglgl
in fact a major themc itl collection of work in this area (Clark!
of Afro-Caribbean religions now have a

in Britain
as
significant
viii). There is, following Clarke, no
alternative
to
careful
empirical study in order to mep, over the long term, the relation. ship berween movements such as Candombl6 and Umbanda and the host society (including its religious dimensions). A crucid
element in this evolution turns out, once again, to be thl growing presence of Pentecostalism in Latin America. As Pentr costals have demanded a discrete space for themselves in Brazilirn society, other religious groups have followed suit, a trend notic. able in the religious selGascriptions (including those to AfipBrazilian movements) that can be found in the Brazilian censul,ll Clarket case studies include Latin America, the Caribbern, the United States and finally Europe - the new field of enquiry, The experience ofAfricans in the Caribbean provides a steppinl stone in this process. In terms, initially, of the new world, thl Caribbean case lies somewhere berween that of the United SBttl and that of Latin America; outcomes vary depending on whethcf the dominant religion in the receiving sociery wes Protestant Of Catholic. The delicate interaction between host culture and incoming groups becomes in fact the key to understanding thl evolution of both Christian and non-Christian groups in thll area, where different islands had different policies in terms Of conversion. Hence the presence of significant Christian groupl in Jamaica and Barbados (with a growing Pentecostal elemotl! within them) contrasted with religions that derive more direcdy from African sources: for example, Santeria, Voodoo and, molt important of all, Rastafagianism. The Ethiopian symbolilt! within the latter picks up once again the crucial significance
well as in the West Indies, unsurprisingly the importance of the Afro-Caribbean population to the economy in the early post-war decades. This significant ion, from new world to old, becomes moreover the route ich this chapter returns to its starting point: that is to an is on the growing number of Africans in Europe, the nature of their religious life, and the disturbing effect this is beginning to have on the assumed relationship African and European. In the following paragraphs, r attention will be paid to the British (moderately longand Dutch (very recent) examples. ibbean and African immigrations into Britain are relatively documented; so too the vibrant church life of these comities in many of Britaint larger cities. There are two sides story: first the kind of Christianity that immigrant groups with them, but second - and crucially - the initial of the migrant Christians by the established denomiin Britain (for the most part in England). The nal growth of black-led churches was the direct con* of the latter (Gerlotr rygz) - congregations which first by immigration, then for demographic reasons, but by receiving 'converts' from the historic churches. Such hes become, moreover, an indispensable focus for the cul* identity of their communities, the more so given the very t economic and social conditions in which these popuare obliged to live. inationally, however, they ere extremely diverse. (rggz), for example, identifies eleven different traditions, the largest being the Pentecostals, themselves divided
r07
r06
Cul
Initiatiues
into three families (with sub-groups). The remainder
includ
Methodists, Baptists, Sabbatarians, the Holiness Movement$, a significant group of AICs (notably from Nigeria and Ghana) rnd lastly the British Rastafarian movement. The material nted!, finally, to be amplified by data from the mainstream churches in which significant numbers of Africans continue to work despitc everything, some in positions ofleadership - quite possibly, giveB the parochial (in the sense of territorial) nature of these churclretl in closer contact with the wider population than their countsrparts in the black-led churches. If the experience in Britain (and more especially England) hru been longer than most, that in The Netherlands is recent. T'hl study of African immigrant corrununities in a number of Duteh cities has become, however, the focus of Ter Haar's work on th African diaspora in Europe, with which we started this chaptetr The main focus of this account lies in a developed study of tht Ghanaian communiry in the Bijlmer, a suburb of Amsterdanr,l which becomes de facto an illustration of the wider experienc! of Africans in Europe. In understanding this process, an initirl remark is crucial: that is the centraliry of religion to this experl. ence, a characteristic often overlooked by the Western enquiret,
In marked contrest to the Africans

'scholars
themselves,
for
examphl
writing on immigrant communities often define thell in terms of ethnicity and ethnic adherenel (Ter Haar I998b: iii). The primary aim of Ter Haart work becomes, therefore, the study of recently arrived African imnll. grant communities in light of their religious affiliations, seein5 these not as something exotic or alien but as an increasin$y
almost exclusively
important feature of European society itself. The Dutch experience fiust like the British) needs to be placod in the historical context outlined above: that is the considerabll involvement of Dutch entrepreneurs in the trans-Atlantic slaVl trade, legitimated at times by the selective application of Calvinitt theology - activities which exemplifii par excellence the role Europeans as senders. The point to grasp some three
later is the movement of people in a different direction, Iarge numbers from West Africa (and more parricularly Ghana) to many parts of Europe previously unaffected by ion from the South. For the African, this is part of an process: West Africans have travelled to find work for ions, but not until now to Europe. It is, moreover, these migrants who are largely responsible for the flourishing Christian congregations in The Netherlands (and indeed ere) at the start of the rlventy-first century. however, is only half the story. The other half lies in rather than economic motivations. For many African migration to Europe is not simply an economic ity; it is seen in addition as a God-given opporruniry to ilise - more precisely to reinvigorate the religious lives of who brought the gospel to Africa in the first place, but have subsequently gone astray (Ter Haar rggga r67). Hence notion :f 'reversed mission', an aspiration eloquently capin an organisation such as GTE, that is the Gospel Africa to Europe (an acronym which can also be used to symbolise a pathway to new life). paradoxes that follow are considerable, not least the very difliculties that such churches have in finding accomion, in a part of Amsterdam built in the r96os with only ichurch building to house the mainstream denominations of attee.16 Burgeoning African congregations, in contrast, find space for their Sunday worship (Ter Haar r998a: Their churches provide, moreover, a crucial social ner'work ican migrants, offering once again an excellent illustration effectiveness of Pentecostal churches (for such they mostly in conditions of extreme economic uncertainty. Just as in , they are able to provide the religious beliefi, spiritual and social contacts that are necessary not only to in a hostile environment, but in some cases to begin the climb towards respectability within it. If in so doing tightly-bounded, seemingly undemocratic nature of these
ro8
Inrtiatives
r09
churches offends the egalitarian sensibilities of the hott population, then so be it. Ter Haar offers a useful shorthand to draw the threads not only of her own work, but of this chapter together. The 'l' in AICs gradually mutates through the course of time - frorf, 'independent', through'indigenous', through African'institutedl or 'initiated' churches to, finally, 'international'. Each shift denotes a different perspective. The current appellation (already seen in the Nigerian case study above) reflects once again thl essentially international distribution of Pentecostalism at the strt of the fwenty-first century not least in its African forml, Acknowledging that these churches are international just rl much as they are African (and so effectively marginalised from the European mainstream) requires, however, from the Europeafl a certain reciprociry. It requires, in fact, a willingness to ro. construct the relationships outlined in the introductory pages Of this chapter. The implications are immense: 'mission in rever$i - if taken seriously - would turn the traditional relationship between African-European, not to mention the responslbilitiet that go with it, on its head. It hasn't happened yet. Documenting the arrival of increasing numbers of Africrnt into Europe is an incipient field in the study of African religion, It can be found, for instance, in a series of recendy held Europcnn conferences on the significance of the African Christian diasporl in Europe - in Leeds and Vsters (Sweden) in 1997, Ghy (France) and Hamburg in 1998 and in Cambridge in rqgg. Thl papers from the latter have been brought together in a recefll volume of the lnternational Review of MissiontT guest edited by Roswith Gerloff. As Gerloff insists, 'South has come Northrl reversing the demographic trend and bringing new religiout ideas into Europe. Such ideas disturb the European mind weddcd amongst other things to linear structures and the need to distin* guish berween the spiritual and the material. African missiotlll on the other hand:
travel along pre-existing social relations such as mily, friend-
or island communiry and trade and work They rest on charismatic leadership, communicomradeship. cate in songs and signals, and understand the human person in his or her relationship to corlmunity. Therefore ith becomes the light, reliable and comforting baggage in the process of migration and crisis. (Gerloff zooo: 277)
ship, village
well aware that such accounts can be romanticised, just like of the AICs in Africa in the mid post-war decades. Despite the presence of African churches in Europe needs to be very seriously. In terms of the religious life of Europe, congregations have a very particular position. Almost ; they exhibit a dual nature: in terms of their Christianiry are part of the mainstream, but in terms of their vitaliry distinctive styles of worship and their capacities to disconthey exemplify the features of an immigrant communiry 2oooa: r49). Hence their undoubted significance in the ing evolution of Christianiry in this part of the world.
Cul
Initiatives
Chapter Fiue
are the only predominandy Christian society in SouthAsia, collectively Christianised (like Latin America) in the
DIASPORA POPULATIONS: CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN THE FAR EAST
Up to now the emphasis in this book
excellent example. The accommodation of such minoritiel within an historically Christian culture presents crucially important issues, already touched on in earlier chapters. Tho fragmentation within Christianiry itself has provided a parallel theme. In Latin America, for example, a solidly Catholic culturf has begun to dissolve, the catalyst in this instance being rapidly expanding Pentecostalism; in Africa (South of the Sahara) tlrcrl were several layers of Christian evolution to bear in mind lf the present was to be properly understood. Still sticking to thl principal theme of systematic comparison with the Europettl case, it is now time to turn to an entirely different religioul environment - to a part of the world, that is, where Christirru have been a minoriry rather than a majoriry a situation whieh provokes e very different set of sociological questions. The three societies in question are, moreover, very differcnt from each other. The Philippines (a developing rather th$ developed nation) are in many ways similar to Latin Americl'
has been, on majoriry Christian populations, some of which are beginning to disphy increasing religious pluralism as significant other-faith commurities arrive in their midst - European societies are themselves tn
enth century at the time of the Spanish circumnavigation the world. Some four and a half centuries later, the Spanish their claim to the Americans enabling an increased Pro(as opposed to Catholic) influence * an element which to grow exponentially in the eighties and nineties, a by familiar theme though the timing is a little different in each An important Muslim minority exists main-ly in the south ,the Philippines, provoking from rime ro rime a desire for political autonomy, a factor which was nor present in Latin American case. The Muslim minority is all the more given the much larger, and at times aggressive Muslim
in South-east
Asia.
entirely different evolution. Here the dramatic growth in ianiry has been relatively recent (i.e. post-war), though the innings of Christian influence go back two cenruries or The important poinr to grasp is that the coming of Christnotably in its Protestant forms, has accompanied nisation (not least extremely rapid urbanisation) rather opposed this, a ct which prompts renewed reflection with to the presumed connections between religion (more ially Christianity) and moderniry. Are rhese necessarily ible? In Korea it appears otherwise, though a series of ical factors should also be taken into account. In Korea, forms of Christianity have undoubtedly formed a bulwark
'againstJapanese imperialism and later against the communist
- or to be more precise South Korea - has experienced
ion which
Religion and politics become increasingly entangled in represented (and in some respects still does the front line in the confrontation of the West with
final, very much briefer illustration comes from Melanesia.
Populations
II3
offers a particular colourful example of reversed roles, tht reinforcing the argument of the African case study. It forntr I bridge to e re-consideration of the European case in the uro6 theoretical concluding chapter.
It
r987
989
Buenos Aires, Brazil Santiago de Compostella,

Czestochowa,
qoo,ooo
Spain
[99r
1993
I995
THE PHILIPPINES _ VARIATIONS ON THE LATIN

THEME
r997
I
2000
Poland Denver, United States Manila, The Philippines Paris, France Rome, Italy
4oo,ooo r,600,000
6oo,ooo
4,ooo,ooo r,ooo,ooo 2,ooo,ooo
to find up-to-date information the religious situation in the Philippines than about the about other case studies covered in this book, thought quite why thl: should be so is more difficult to say. The statisticd framework ll none the less available (Barrett et al. zoor) and offtrs e useful starting point before turning to more qualitative mterial. AboUC 85 per cent of the Philippino population are members of tht Catholic Church - the largest proportion of Catholics of any country in Asia. This has been the case since the conversion of the Philippines en masse by the Spanish in the sixteenth century, Equally (perhaps more) significant, however, is the nature of the Catholicism found there: its dramatic and demonstrativt character, especially noticeable in Holy Week and often embodying folk as well as Christian belie{b, has become th focus ofjournalistic as well as scholarly accounts. Some examplet
has been considerably harder
It
more convincing, however, are the eye-witness accounts Philippino meeting. The following statement, for example, some idea of what it was like to be in a crowd of four
people:
was an invited guest
to the find
mass
of the World Youth
will be given
below.
Before doing so, a second numerical indicator of the con. tinuing pervasiveness of Catholicism, and especially among young people, can be found in the comparative statistics availablc for the biennial meeting of the Catholic World Youth Dayl, These meetings, at which the Pope himself is present, art intended for young Catholics worldwide; they are held every two years (more or less), each time in a different venue. Th following figures (normally taken at the final mass) are instructiv!
Day in the Philippines in 1995, in my capacity as General Secretary of the NCC (National Council of Churches) Philippines. The crowd was so thick, the thickest that I have ever seen or experienced, including sporting events, that I could not walk through the crowd to reach the stage. The Pope could not be driven to the stage, he was helicoptered in. I do not think I will ever see as large a crowd as that one. Four million is a fair estimate. Where in the world can you ever see a crowd as large, and this was five o'clock in the morning! This phenomenon simply convinced me of the incredible drawing power that the Church has, and continuds to have in the country - something that no other institution has. (Cariflo zoor, private communication)
drawing power of the Catholic Church becomes in ct a ing theme throughout this section; it is an important key understanding the religious situation in the Philippines. addition to the official Catholic Church, however, there a variery of indigenous movements. Two of these - the Iglesia Independiente (IFI) and the Iglesia ni Kristo (InK) - are
in
themselves:1
icularly influential. The former flourished at the turn of twentieth century when anti-colonialism was at its height.
II4
Populations
II5
Therea{ter the numbers stagnated as the tide of nationalirrn receded and, more specifically, after 19o6 when the Supren.t Court ordered the return of all Catholic properties appropriated by the Independent Church. In the late r93os, however, a new Declaration of Faith and Articles of Religion were preparerl, which resulted in closer links berween the IFI and the (Anglicrrr) Philippine Episcopal Church, not least the murual recognitiull of their 'holy orders' - a highly significant move which enabled the IFI to use Episcopal seminaries for the training of thelf clergy. The rwo churches, though still fully independenr, entered into communion with one another in 196r. After a long period of relative decline (given the increase in the population es 1 whole), the Independent Church is once again experiencirrg growth - its membership in zooo was berween four and fivf million. The second of these churches - the Iglesia ni Kristo - is vcrf different. It was established in r9r4 by a former Catholic whc felt called to revive the original Christian Church, outsidc of which there is no salvation; it is an aggressively nationalisti movement with an all-Philippino leadership but with cotl. gregations overseas as well as ar home. Currently this highly visible (architecturally amongst other things) Church has 8,40 congregations made up mainly of poor people. Freston (2oogl 7r) characterises it as 'neither Catholic nor Protestant b[! "evangelical"'; he notes in addition the recent influence qf the Iglesia ni Kristo in Philippino politics (pa.th through thl mechanism of bloc voring). Mainstream Protestant missionaries from outside and from 1 wide variety of denominations began to arrive around r9og1 encouraged by American colonial rule. Both the number of thl missionaries and the denominational mix have grown rapidly since the Second World War resulting in a marked expansion Protestantism in the same period. This expansion became explosion in the r98os and. r99os as Pentecostal and charismrli! movements spread rapidly both inside and outside the establishgd
Number of non-Catholic religious groups registered in the
Metro Manila
1980 1980 111 836 947
Outside Metro Manila
Nationwiile 228 1448

1676
117
612
729
numbers ofactual Protestant church congregations were r97o: jooo, rggo: 94oo, taken 6om Dam Research Report rygr
. This is, undoubtedly, the fastest growing sector of the religious economy as it is in Latin America, though less has been written about it. One sympatheric corlmen(Miranda-Feliciano r99r) speaks, however, of exponential
growth, a movement that embraces both evangelical and charismatic Catholics. Impressive statistics this statement both at a micro and macro level (see Table
far then, the story is similar to rhat described in Chapter in terms both of the Catholic cukure of the society as a and the phenomenal growth of new churches (notably ) in recent decades. different is the significant Muslim presence in the ines (about j per cenr of the total population), a conwhich is concentrated in the southern islands, in some places a majoriry in the local population. It is to remember that a Muslim presence in the area the arrival of Christianity by more than a cenrury it is not indigenous. From the mid-fourteenth century had been spreading northwards from Indonesia (largely as of trading links) and was well established in the south
Ir6
C&
Populations
of the Philippines by the time that the Spaniards arrived. Despite attempts at Christianisation (similar to those in Spain herself), the Muslims maintained themselves on the island of Mindanoo and in the Sulu archipelago,2 a resistance which continued under the American occupation. Since independence the situation hlt remained tense leading to armed revolt on Mindaneo in the tg7os. Policies of Christian settlement leading to declinirrg control by Philippino Muslims have been balanced by increasing support from neighbouring (and not so close) Muslim countrict, a process which has both strengthened Muslim consciousness itl the area and encouraged the idea of regional autonomy for thr southern islands. In the late r98os, following the restoration of democracy, the Moro National Liberation Front entered into negotiations with the Aquino and Ramos governments; tha smaller Muslim movements have, however, been more resistant t0 compromise, still anxious to maintain the ided ofan independent Muslim state. So much for the statistical outline, which can now be fleshcd out by more qualitetive accounts. With respect to Catholicisttt, these are written from different points of view. One source eA be found in the work of missiologists whose primary concern lies in understanding the Philippino mentality with a view tB sympathetic evangelism. Maggay (rSq8) offers an interesting example. She describes what Philippinos call 'fold Christianityr, 'a product ofpre-Hispanic religious imagination and Catholicirm of the Iberian variety, a branch of Christianity untouched by th: upheavals of the Reformation and unscrutinized by the radierl doubt of the Age of Reason' (1998: 362). One result of this liu in the huge cultural gap berween the Philippino consciousn0tl and the more cerebral, word-centred forms of Protestantilt brought by some missionaries. In contrast charismatic movlr ments @oth Catholic and Protestant) find it considerable easi$ to engage with local people for whom a religion of power h{ particular resonance. A more detailed and primarily anthropological account 6f
Catholicism can be found in a special issue on the of the Reaiew of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs.The of this arricle is a well-known but hitherto poorly studied practice - the Morion festival which takes place on the of Marinduque during Holy Week (Adachi 1994).3 The id is one of many religious dramas enacted at this time, a in the year permeated by the atmosphere of the passion asurrection of Christ when the preoccupations of everyday 4c put on one side. It differs, however, from other exarnples the festival is not (or not fully) sanctioned by the Catholic . For the islanders, on the other hand, the Church's position is relatively unimportant. Despite (or maybe of) their participation in the Morion festival, they confully Christian. It is this amalgam of Christran blk elemenrs which scinates Adachi. Morion Gstival is based on a biblical story, the piercing of 's side by a Roman solder (|ohn r9:r9-34). The associated maintains that a drop of blood from the crucified Christ into the eyes of Longinius, a Roman soldier, miracucuring him from blindness and thereby converting him to ianiry. Adachi describes the events of Holy Week which te this episode in some detail. From Holy Monday, roam the town dressed (and masked) as Roman centurThey are obliged to keep moving despite the intensiry of $filmer heat - a way of giving thanks to God for their iul through illness or misfortune. On Holy Wednesday and Friday, Morions perticipate in two processions organised ttre Catholic Church, the route of which symbolically conthe different districts of the town. Central to Good Friday, r, is the practice of the antipo, a demanding form of selG ion (now frowned upon by the hierarchy), into which and other penitents are drawn, symbolising a further of thanks or atonement for past sins.a The week's erv'ents to a climax on Easter morning when the capture and of Longinius are ebulliently re-enacted. Before he
rr8
Europe: The Exceptional Caf
Populations
II9
dies, Longinius refuses to deny his faith and recounts how blood of the Saviour restored sight to his blind eye; his finally, is borne in a funeral procession around the town *" cycle of death and resurrection is once more complete. The long-term evolution of this festival is interesting in i lt dates from the r87os and initially represented an attempt by Catholic Church (more especially the Augustinian Recollectr) encourage participation in Catholic ritual. The more aspects came later, during the Americen occupation. argues (tgg+: 26) thet this shift was only partly a introduced by the Church; it also incorporated peasant ceptions of suffering, some of which drew from traditional cults rather than, or in addition to, Christianiry. Whatever reasons, the event grew in populariry during this period established the format of the current festival. The evolution the festival since independence (it was suppressed during Japanese occupation) is equally revealing. Two rather di things happened et once: firstly the Church attempted to di itself, particularly from the excesses of the penitential (one result of this has been the moving of the festival away the square beside the church); and secondly - especially in sixties and seventies - the festival received a considerable as a tourist attraction in a part of the Philippines where represents an important sector of the economy. The reaction the Church to the latter phenomenon has been mixed: on one hand it is understandably critical of increasing commerci ation but at the same time cannot ignore the prominence of the festival in local affairs. The emphasis is on transformation rather than proscription. Obviously different interest groups approach this event diflerent motives; it remains a site of contention. One thing clear, however, there is absolutely no evidence here of ation. Philippinos are and remain a deeply religious populati Forms of religion may mqtate over time and acquire di meanings, but they do not disappear. An equally
of evidence resistant to the notion of secularisation can, , be seen in the emergence of Pentecostalism, indeed charismatic movement in general, in the last decades of
ieth century. da-Feliciano's article is useful in this respect; its descripmd examples cross the denominational divide, but 'we are ing here of traditional Christian religiosiry or rituals' 64). The emphasis rather is on small Bible-based groups : and without pastors), in which healing and exorcism play part, and where prayers are answered, miracles expected deliverance experienced. It is these phenomena that lie at t of the unprecedented church growth evident in the from the r98os onwards and which, it seems, appeal Philippino population rather more readily than proProtestantism. There is also (as in both Latin America ica) the attrectiveness of the tightly-bound and supportive in precarious economic conditions, including extremely
as well as answers in the ensuing ions (as there were in the Latin American chapter), not from those who have had a longstanding commitment ro of society and social structures (Philippino forms of theology), and from those who have particular reason suspicious of American influence (in a part of the world the United States has played a major role). There is also, ing both Miranda-Feliciano (rgqr) and Maggay (rSS8), of (a) 'health and wealth' preaching and @) too grear asis on feelings. And with particular reference ro rhe perceptive Philippino commentators wonder about the ial nature of many conversions. What, they ask, will to the rapidly multiplying new churches in the longer (Interestingly, exactly the same question will arise in the relating to Korea.) So far, however, the indicators in ppmes contrnue to rrse. relationship between the political sphere and different
urbanisation. Course there are questions
Populations
forms of religious life in the Philippines is particularly con* troversial, just as it is in Latin America; there can be no doubt about that. The crucial point to grasp, however - over and aboW the frequently disputed detail (Freston 2oor: 74-5) - is thl continuing significance of the religious factor in the publk lf well as private lives of Philippinos, despite the fact that Chureh and State are oflicially separate and have been since the cornin! of American rule at the end of the nineteenth century.s Thl
separation of Church and State is one thing; the ongoing politied
scale that they did). Their scale, moreover, was a principal for their effectiveness.
life of the country quite another, a point strongly confirmecl Cariflo in a personal communication. For the purposes of thlt chapter, the latter point can be clearly illustrated with referene: to two defining moments in the evolution of Philippino politiet in the final decades of the fwentieth century: those that hlQ become known as EDSA LJno and EDSA Dos.6 Churches anC church-people were heavily involved in both. EDSA (Jno occurred in 1986, bringing onto the streets tE those many and varied sections of the population who oppolcd the dictatorship ofPresident Marcos. The Catholics, spearheadoC by Cardinal Sin, were a crucial element in this process - mott; specifically, the Cardinal called on the ithful to join with 'oU! friends' (including significant representation of the police rnC the military) to put an end to a'reign of evil'(Cariflo 2ooo: l)r They were supported in this enterprise by most mainstrct& Protestants, grouped around the National Council of Churchfl of the Philippines. The growing numbers of evangelicals weE; however, more divided and whatever the distaste they felt fot Marcos himseli the assertion that the victory of the peopll against Marcos was a Marian event was seen as provocative lE groups for whom anti-Catholicism is a significant element (Roll 1996: 34). The latter sentiments are undoubtedly importarth Even more crucial, however, is the need to realise that wi the pulling power of the Catholic Church, such gatherings not, very probably, have taken place at all (and certainly not ofr
Dos is much more recent (zoor), focusing this time on need to remove President Estrada from office.7 Once again groups that took part represented many aspecrs of Philippino including the churches. But this time the divisions were more marked, in so r as significant numbers of evangeli(though by no means all) and indeed some Catholics saw in the protector of the poor and were ready to offer support than opposition to the beleaguered president. Indeed ing Rose (1996: 339), it is probably more accurare to see lines of political demarcation at the turn of the century in-
ingly running through the denominations rather
than
them. You cannot, in other words, simply read off ical allegiance from confessional attachment. Religioconnections are considerably more complex than that, field which requires ongoing and careful scrutiny given its importance to Philippino life. (zooo) makes a further perceptive comment regarding ities of political movements. Between EDSA (Jno and Dos, the technology of protest shifted from the radio ro ;rnobile phone. In this respect Philippino political organising reflects and makes use of developed global technology. religious groups are as much part of this evolution else, offering yet another illustration of the evident ibiliry in the Philippino context, between the modernprocess (albeit a very uneven one) and the continued ificance of religion at every level of sociery. With this in it seems that the discourse of secularisation must, once be put firmly on one side.
Europe: The Exceptional Catl
Populations
SOUTH KOREA _ A RELIGIOUS METAMORPHOSIS

South Korea constitutes an entirely different and better documented case (and infinitely more so for those able to use Korean sources). It is, and always has been, a multi*religious nation u layer upon layer of religious life form and reform over millennia
rather than centuries. The oldest religious traditions can bt found in ancestor worship and shamanism, elements of which became incorporated in both Buddhism (dominant in Korca from the fourth to the fourteenth centuries) and in Confucianism which supplanted Buddhism as the national religion in the four. teenth century and continued as such until the JapanetO occupation in r9ro. Christianiry entered the field relatively late Catholic congregations date back to the late eighteenth centuryr Protestant missionaries arrived some hundred years later. Thl early beginnings of Protestant Christianity still resonate, in, fof example, the influence of missionary establishments on the education system. The really dramatic growth of Protestantism (and up to a point of Catholicism) comes, howeveq at the end of the wventieth century. It is not an exaggeretion to say that thC religious landscape of South Korea has been transformed as I
result.s
The bare bones ofthis transformation, the focus ofthis sectiotll
are indicated in Tble 5.2.e A word of caution is necessrrS however, before jumping to conclusions about these figurcli Statistics for Christian and non*Christian religious groups ill Korea are not directly comparable in that terms such as membet ship are understood differently in the different faith grouplr Information that believers provide about themselves, example, differs markedly from the numbers reported by religious communities (Yoon rygT,Daiber zooo). This mi is not quite the same as that encountered in the American where respondents (unlike their European counterparts)
724
Ilble 5.2 Religious change in South Korea 1962-94

Protestanlisfi Catholickm growth rate
(%o)
Buddhism
growth rate (%o)
growth rate (o/o) 687,000
1962
1970 1985 1991 1994
736,000
590,000
3,192,000 333.7 6,48e,000 103.3 8,037,000 23.e
779,000
1,865,000
32.0
139.4
2,476,000
32.8
6.6
4,943,000 619.s 8,059,000 63.0 11,729,000 45.5

10,921,000
8,146,000
1.4
2,640,000
6.9
Korean
hble reproduced from Kim (2002). Original figures taken frcm The Yea$ook of
hllgion (19931 for the years 1962 and 1970, and from Social
Indkatore
in
Korea (1999)
for
Itr prrs 1985, l99l and
1994.
lrudous to give the impression that they are regular churchgoers
frrcn if they are not. In Korea, it is the categories themselves fhrt are inappropriate in a population that thinks very differently
pout religion. Following Daiber, the
system works relatively for Buddhism and Christianiry but very much less so for ftcll ponfucianism. The significance of shamanism disappears ahoin a statistical table, in that it is not considered a 'religion' uch; conversely the number of Koreans who appear to have
religion at all is exaggerated. These are important issues and should be kept in mind rhrough following discussion. The recent and dramatic growth in the istian sector of Korean society cannot, however, be denied. tequires close scrutiny - once again at the level of data (the that are available to us) and explanation (why did this very ic change take place?). The growth, for a stert, is uneven. real take-offin the Protestant churcheslo occurs in the r96os r97os; thereafter it slows to the point of sragnarion in the The growth in Catholicism, in contrast, starts later but Ionger, albeit at a slower rate than in earlier decades.
Populations
It
is important, finally, not to forget the parallel growth in
Buddhism over the same period; this is equdly dramatic (indeed more so) in the r96os but tails offro rhe point of decline as the century comes to a close.ll All these figures, moreover, need to be seen against the background of equally impressive economic growth. South Korea is an Asian tiger par excellence, notwithstanding the recent difliculties in the economic development of the region. 'W'e are, therefore, confronted with a situation in which rapid growth in major sections of the religious sphere accompaniei rapid modernisation. Exactly how the rwo variables are related to each other is, however, a much more diflicult question. Add to this the specificities of the political situarion in this part of the world and the complexiry ofthe issues begins to become apparent, In order to understand these better, Kim (zooz) takes tho period (196o-zooo) more or less a decade ar a time and within
ential success rates. The situational factors, both economic and political, can taken first. It is true that the economic indicators soared in
this looks'first at the Catholic case and rhen ar rhe different strands within Protestantism. There are two ways into the argu. ment. The first concerns rhe background variables that art corunon to all faith communities. Extremely rapid economic growth is the first and mosr obvious of these; from the r96ot on, South Korea climbs higher and higher in the inrernariond economic tables (whether of GNP or GNI and in terms of both gross and per capita indices). In addition, there are significant political changes over the period as Korea moves from a military regime in the r96os and r97os to a gradual but decisive demo, cratisation in the r98os. The second part of Kimt artick concentrates on the responses of the different Christian denomi. nations (together with the different theological tendencies within these) to this shifting economic and political contexr; that are associated with - or possibly are the reason for -
tz6
period (nobody denies this); but so too did the social in terms, first of all, of an extremely rapid movement of from the country to the cities. The result was an ing imbdance between rural and urban populations.
ities mushroomed containing populations cut loose from tmditional values of the rural community. (In this respect, the situation is no different from the many others that we dready described.) Related to this was a more generalised between traditional and emergent values, with a strong is on what Kim calls a'me-ism'or'we-ism', rather than understanding of individualism with a sense of as well as of rights. Such tensions were exacerbated dramatic but uneven rise in per capita income, leading, an overdl increase in affiuence, to growing economic
ities.
moreover, took place in a situation of political uncertainty, dominated by an authoritarian which by its very nature inhibited the growth of civil
All this,
the r98os on, however, the atmosphere begins to change Korea became increasingly exposed to cultural as well as ic influences from outside, a situation which encouraged only greater democratisation in the political process, but 'a of what might be called post-modern characteristics' (Kim These include greater class differentiation, an increasing ity of identities, a growing generation gap, and the emergence of civil sociery. Such changes are ied, finally, by a greater emphasis on consumption, a of pleasure-seeking, and an invasion of mass culture. A moreover, which appears to coincide with a rapid slowin church growth, to the point, finally, of stagnation.
sort of answer will emerge as we look at the responses different Christian communities to the changes in Korean over the past four decades. The Catholic case is instruc-
in so far as the post-conciliar Catholic Church in

Populations
Korea
t27
emphasised far more than the Protestant denominations both lE ewareness of and a readiness to value indigenous Korean culturEr
in fact, that mirrors the changes taking place in Korean itself. 'IVith this in mind, Baker concludes:
There have been some remarkable changes in Korea over the last four decades. A poverty-stricken nation has become a force to be reckoned with in world markets. A succession of governments that executes political dissidents has been succeeded by one led by a former prodemocracy activist. And a Roman Catholic Church that once survived on the periphery
In the sixties and ear seventies, however, such attributes alieB= ated rather than attracted the Korean people inrent Bn maximising Western gains. Catholic growth rates in the mld post-war decades were, in consequence, markedly lower tht those in the r95os. Bit by bit, however, the cultural mood shifted to a greater appreciation of what Catholicism had to offer: rtgt
only an endorsement of traditional culture but a greater emphrdl on welfare and social justice. Hence an increased growth Httl beginning in the late r97os but increasing rapidly in the rgtotl a decade in which the Korean Catholic Church doubled in dlEi As part of the same process, significant numbers of Catholil became involved in the democratisation movement. CardiRd Soo-Hwan Kim, for example, repeatedly underlined thl importance of democratisation - as a result Myungl)on! Cathedral became a centre of political activity (Kang zooo)r Catholics, for example, were among those who opposed thl governmentt 4.r3 Constitution protection plan, put together i order to consolidate the military regime.l2 Baker (rSSil complements this account with a longer-tcrfl and more detailed history of the Catholic Church in Korelr Notable in this evolution is the gradual Koreanisation of thl Church, a process that finally comes to fruition in the 196flg just as the policies of the Second Vatican Council were beginnin! to make an impact. At the same time (indeed as part of the srml process), there is an increasing willingness to intervene in secul* affairs, first in terms of the regime itself (thought in the sixti to be dangerously Protestant), but later - in the r97os rnd r98os - involving a direct confrontation with poverty alongi& a commitment to human rights, social justice and indeed t democracy itself. Such views were encouraged by a shift lE the Catholic population. Pardy because of its political stancft Catholicism becomes increasingly attractive to urban intelCr tuals, helping the Church to shed its rural and backward image -
of sociery
has
joined the mainstream. (Baker ry97: 164)
is no mean achievement, though frequendy eclipsed by the in Protestantism over the same period, ing Kim, Protestants - and more especially conservative
in the r96os and r97os conservetive Protestant grew nearly as fast as the economy itself (see Table , Among them were the mega-churches of the mega-cities, ised by the Yoido Full Gospel Church, reputedly the congregation in the world (see below). Part of the attracundoubtedly lay in the attitude of these churches rowards military regime; refraining from criticism, they implicitly the status quo, appealing to a population that was more (unsurprisingly at the height of the Cold War) with ion from the communist North than with democratisation . Policies which endorsed supposedly left-wing ideas of justice (espoused amongst others by liberal Protestantsl3)
even less popular. balance began to shift
ts (see note ro) - were the great gainers in the rg6os, their policies at least in part by means of mass evangelrallies, themselves underpinned by a theology of church which, quite clearly, caught the mood of the moment. rallies emphasised individual rather than social salvarion legitimised, indeed encouraged, marerial blessing; in so they came to represent a form of religion entirely competwith Western-sryle modernisation. The combination was
in the r98os, precisely the decade

r29
tzB
Populations
is no longer growing. Nor, it is important tg remember, is Buddhism, despite an equivalent (perhaps evon war period
that had seen the advance of Catholicisrn in Korean society Korean people continued to be wary of the liberal oprion but became increasingly dissatisfied with the almost total lack sf social awareness in conservative Protestant theology. It was lE this point, moreover, that a greater appreciation of traditiond Korean values gradually re-emerged; 'Western materialism nB longer had all the answers - more than this, it was increasingly perceived as the creator just as much as the solver of socieryt problems. Nor, moreove! wes it possible any longer to resitt the democratisation process, a movement that had gained ln unstoppable momentum in Korean sociery by the mid r98os. A theology, finally, that was based on a combination of the prc. modern (authoritarianism and verrical human relationships) and the modern (rigidiry and uniformiry) looked increasingly out of place in the much more flexible climate that was emerging tt the century came to an end. Bearing such factors in mind, it becomes easier to understlnd why the emaziny successful package put together by the con. servative Protestants no longer attracted the numbers that it dld in previous decades. The problem, moreover, was exacerbated by an increasing tendency to schism. Not only were conservatiw Protestants opposed to liberals, they increasingly succumbed t division amongst themselves. The Catholic Church on the othc! hand gained in credibiliry relatively speaking. By the end of th: decade, however, the Christian presence (whether Catholic of Protestant), though undeniably a permanent feature of Koreri sociery - and on a scale unimaginable in the immediate pol!.
have reflected on the shifts in fortune of conservative ism from the inside. One such comes from an assistant of the Yoido Full Gospel Church (Hong zooo). Reviewing
stagnation and decline after decades of the author underlines two internal reasons for the slump statistics (in addition that is ro rhe shifts in Korean society The first of these concerns an increasing lack of social ility - largely associated, according to Hong, with corrupand scandals in private and public life. The second lies in phenomenon of nominalism. Those leaving the conservative churches often cease to practise any religion at all, a somewhat superficial artachment to the faith in the place. Both ctors, following Hong, are indicative of too an emphasis on quantity rather than quality in church a stress which leads in turn to the uncritical adoption particular strategies (size became the only criterion of ) - in many ways a direct reflection of the economic life over the same period. e Yoido Full Gospel Church remains none the less a hugely undertaking, so much so that it merits a place in Cuinness Boole of Records as the fastest-growing church in the
. From humble beginnings as a tenr church in 1958, it has systematically to Too,ooo plus in the r99os. The al growth dates from the r97os. Luca (zooo) offers detail on the creation and management of this immense congregation (if such is the right word for e comof this size). The story is remarkable, first of all, in ical and architectural terms. In the ry7os (after repeated ions) the Full Gospel Church became the first conion to build on the Island of Yoido (also the home of the parliament); architecturally similar, the fwo buildings each other, a reward perhaps for repeatedly endorsing
possibility
of
more dramatic) increase over the same period. Bearing the col-
lective downturn
engender caution
in mind, the situation should, perhapls, in face of the wilder claims about religioul
growth at the turn of the millennium whether in Latin Americq Africa or the Pacific Rim..It is indeed impressive, but may not continue ad infinitum. OnIy time will tell.
istic policies. State-of-the-arr technology permits the running ofservice after service as tens ofthousands are in and out of the building on a Sunday morning. Other
Populations
r30
I3I
developments have grown alongside the church - for example, and very selectively, educational facilities (including a televisiotl studio); welfare initiatives (for the unemployed and the elderly)1 a centre for international mission (itself incorporating 'Church
Growth International'); and a whole series of local missiont (organised by different sectors - defined by profession, social" economic category or cultural interests). The latter represeni impressive networks, counteracting many of the negative effeett of rapid modernisation. At the same time they are evidence of
an emergent second generation, markedly more prosperous thln the disadvantaged groups initially attracted to the church.ra
indirect, that Protestants and Protestant missions had on the of which it had become part. It was in this context that contribution to the educational system had such a decisive Protestantism found itself, moreover, in the happy posiof representing modernity but not representing a colonialist (Freston zoot: 63) - quite clearly the threat lay elsewhere, aggression of the Japanese. This combination of factors, argues, is unique in this part of the world, unlikely to
repeated elsewhere.
Something of the initial character of the venture (the tcrrl church) is, however, maintained in the 'Prayer Mountain' soruE thirty kilometres from Seoul, where individuals or groups can retreat for a period of intensive prayer in rather simpler cou* ditions. Even this, however, can accommodate ro,ooo peoplc in either Korean or 'Western facilities (many visitors come fnlm overseas). lJnsurprisingly the Prayer Mountain in itself requir! considerable levels of practical as well as spiritual organisatitlu, not least the shuttle buses that run to and fro from the city
centre.
One 'frequendy asked question' concerns the explosion of Christian activity in South Korea, compared with the relati6 inactivity in this respect of Korea's Asian neighbours - especially Japan.ls Are there, in other words, particular features of Korcltl sociery which explain the predilection of the Korean populatiofl for new and, in the case of Christianiry Western forms ef religion in the twentieth century? The answer lies at least in prlt in the political evolution of the region. In the early twentieth century, Christianity grew in populariry under the Japanell occupation of Korea. taditional Confucian values had failed tg withstand the foreign invasion, itself a great humiliation, iB the ce of which Protestant values were seen as a means of
transformation. Yong-Shin Park (zooo) documents this episodt in some detail, also explaining the profound effects, both direcC
ing like it was, however, repeated in the post:war , and more particularly after the Korean war. As Korea between the South (supported by the West, notably the ited States) and the North (supported by the communist , the Protestant churches became a crucial ctor in the polarisation - for good or ill. There was, first of all, a iderable relocation of Christians to the South; there was ,rddition material support from the Americans, encouraging other thinp the proliferation of denominations and a to schism; there was, finally, a marked effect on the icd life of the country as a whole and the role of Protestants in this. The military regime was endorsed by many, though no means all Protestants, as the bulwark against communism, lte its own anti-democratic tendencies.16 some respects, therefore, though considerable ceution is in such comparisons, Christianity - and more particularly tism - comes to play a role in South Korea which is similar to that of the Catholic Church in Ireland and in (see Chapter One). In all three case, there is 'extra' work the churches to do, quite apart from their role as the carrier particular theology; they come to represent the identiry of nation in face of external opposition. Two questions follow this. One has already been mentioned: that is the uniqueof the Korean case amongst the societies of the Pacific Rim in consequence, the need to be careful ebout generalising this. The second concerns the future: what will happen
r32
Populations
r33
next, as the threat from the North recedeg| Both park (toO$
and Freston (zoor) raise this point at the er1d of their respectlU! accounts of Korean Protestantism. Already eXperiencing setbre after t quite extraordinary period ofnumeriqal growth, will thefl churches and their leaders find within themselves the resourc$ face an entirely different future? One further point should be mentioned in conclusion - th! presence of Korean missionaries all over the world. An emphrff
churches leading once again to the inescapable conIn South Korea, just as in the Philippines, there is no ibility between the modernising process and vibrant of religious life. The reverse is, if anything, the case.
LANESIAN MISSIONARIES
abeyance, however, between rgoo and t97 (unsurprisingly given the poverry of the Kqrean Church), onlf to re-emerge with the shift in fortunes of Pr:testantism in Koftl itself. From this point on, the number of fissionaries increuEl fast, from 94 in ry6g, to 3z7z in rg94, to ah esrimated 6goo ii 2ooo (Park rggT: 33o, using figures frqm official churth handbooks). Destinarions (in descending order of numbertf include Asia, Eurasia (including Russia), Latin America, Europq the Pacific, the Middle East, the Caribbean and North Ameriear Some missionaries work with Korean c>ngregations livin! abroad (in the US, frr example, where the :nurn[s1 of Korecni is very large), but others with indigenous people. A rather more analytical account of the same phenomeng can be found in Clark GSgil who documents the various wa6! of Korean missionary activity in recent decades, noting in pf!. ticular (a) the phenomenal growth in the rggos, brought aboUt very largely by the lifting of restrictions rqfuglsg ro currenef exchange (sending bodies could now keep rnissionaries in thi field for longer periods) and (b) the particular conrribution 0f the Yoido Full Gospel Church to the missioqxry end.eavour il I whole. clark also stresses an alternative strategy which dates bleh to the rg7os, i.e. in the creation of trainiqg organisations ltl Korea to which aspiring Christians from rhe third world wefl invited. Either way, internarionalisation and globalisatiOtl (essential features of modernity) are readily embraced by thl
134
fell into
is, in fact, nothing nw in Korean lrrc* testantism; it dates from the late nineteenth century. The practltl
overseas mission
on
final example in this chaprer is very much briefer but the concluding theme of the previous section. It derives the connections berween Exeter (a monocultural, sometraditional English ciry) and the Anglican Church in ia. In the sumner of zooo, this city received a visit from
ofMelanesian Anglicans, to be more precise
men from the Melanesian Brotherhood
a
group
notably absent from the active participants in the of England. The Melanesian Brotherhood was founded 925; its main purpose was evangelistic (taking the gospel to rcmote islands and villages of the Solomon Islands). In order ieve this goal, its members lived (and continue to live) as ' to the people, respecting their traditions and customs helping with everyday activities - such as fishing, haring and house-building. The Brothers rake vows of poverry and obedience for a period of five years, after which vows can be renewed.rT The group came to Exeter at the of the Bishop, but in part to pay homage to Bishop n, one of the founders ofAnglicanism in Melanesia, who his tide in Alfington, a small village in the Diocese of . Bishop Patterson was eventually martyred on the island (in r87r), a moment captured in a ftieze on the nave in Exeter Cathedral. in the Diocese of Melanesia, it should be rememremain active rather than nominal members of their quite unlike the current state of their fons et origo (a European establishment where relatively small
Populations
a demographic
Cul
numbers maintain the structures on behalf of the nonr believers). In the South Pacific, in contrest, Christi (including Anglicanism) retains the kind of vibrancy alrcldf described in this and previous chapters, though in particular to the region. In the course of their visit to Exeteq the Melanesian tlf took part in the scheduled Sunday morning worship in tht cathedral, a liturgy which included a dramatic presentatiorr the gospel. 'Fifteen of the Melanesian Brothers, in traditionC South Pacific dress, performed liturgical dances, and providld music on pan pipes and other instruments, probably never hend before in the Cathedral, as part of the Eucharist' (Cathedral Nottgl September zooo). Still dressed for this part of the service, thc[ leader then preached from the cathedral pulpit - looking esronr tially like the 'savage' characteristic of a children's book of tht immediate post-war period and right above the frieze which depicted the martyrdom of the Bishop at the hands of a natiV* At the end of the service the Melanesians 'danced' the conr gregation and its dignitaries out of the cathedral. This, if eW! there was one, was a reversal of roles, a visual example, perhrpll of future possibilities. It is interesting to note that the whql! episode was well received by a normally conservative cathedral con. gregation and reported favourably in the local press. Thl relationship, moreover, is ongoing: rwo Melanesian Brothers wl[ spend the year zoor-z year in the Diocese ofExeter, contributing to the life of the local churches. The theoretical implications of these shifting roles, as Korelfll send missionaries to Asia and beyond and as Anglican MelaneshE brothers preach the gospel in English cathedrals, will providc I prominent theme in a final, more analytical chapter.
NCEPTUAL MAPS
of this book have been arranged geographically. of them has focused on a different part of the world, wfth aim of extracting from the discussion the specific ways in both the Christian churches and the Christian populations ,that global region behave, concentrating on the differences Latin Americans, say, and Europeans. It is now time to up some of these themes with the intention of (a) estabthe case for European exceptionalism, ft) asking wlry the of religious behaviour in this part of the world are and (c) whether and in what direction they are likely to . This is the goal of the first part of the chapter; its
chapters
re reflects the different sociological tasks that have already
more substantive material (most notably in

r Two). second and crucidly important point follows from this. If ere to argue that patterns of religion in Europe are indeed exceptional case, ii is important to ask what they are exto? Is there e norm elsewhere? And if so where and what does this norm consist? The same point can be put in t way: Europe may indeed be exceptional in terrns of comparative seculariry but the rest of the world (or more other parts of the Christian world) demonstrate not but many examples of religious vitaliry which are - and this crucial point - as different from each other as each of is from West Europe. It is this question that'ilrill be tackled second part ofthe chapter.
q6
Europe: The Exceptioni,al Cail
r37
The argument at this stage will be rather more abstract in t far as it concentrates on the sociological tools that are necessery to understand the emergent patterns of religion across the world, If it is not possible simply to take the theoretical frames thnC have developed in Europe or the United States and apply thell to all cases, what resources are available to the sociologist ln order to understand what is happening? Crucial Questionr = theoretical and methodological - begin to formulate. An attenrpt will be made both to articulate these questions more sharply rnd to set out, at least tentatively, some of the possible answers. Thl notion of 'conceptual maps' has been deliberately chosen t describe this task, given its geographical as well as sociologictt
resonance.
to a competitive firm. In other words, they will be there

the population has need of them, but do not require overt in the meantime. This was the centrd theme of
One and Two and carried with it the warning that of religion which flourish in the United Stares cannot be transferred to Europe at will. Europeans who are with their churches do not, on the whole, seek new (as they might in a market); they remain, very largely, passive members of their majoriry churches - reactivating their itment at pivotal momenrs in their individual or collecive
In terms of the material on Latin America, we discover that and more especially West Europe, is not a part of the
where Pentecostalism exists as a widespread and popular nt. That is not ro say thar it doesn'r exisr at all; it is in one of the few parts of the European Church that is growing. the movement, whether inside or outside the mainstream remains relatively restricted; there is nothing comto the dramatic increase in Pentecostalism that we saw l,atin America (or indeed in Africa or rhe Pacific Rim). Why was crucial to the argument of Chapter Three. 'The Africa chapter posed a similar if not identical question. introduced the notion of 'reversed mission', an idea that ies a considerable degree of self-questioning wirh respect the relationship between Europe or European churches and ir African counterparts. Just which ones are to be senders which the receivers in the twenty-first century? There can litde doubt that the religious traffic now moves in both So far, however, the in-comers to Europe have, for pert, established their churches 'on the edge'. Europeans most these as African churches for African people. A major quesmark lies over their ability ro penetrate further into Europe in a geographical and cultural sense). The debate overlaps presented in the Latin American chapter in so r as the in question are frequently Pentecostal in nature.
THE CASE FOR EUROPEAN EXCEPTIONALISM

Reportage
the evidence
The first chapter of this book set out the parameters of faith ln modern Europe, indicating the principal forms of religion thr! exist in the different parts of the continent. These were presenttd
renge ofvariations on a discernible theme - namely relatively low levels of religious practice and credal essent, alonpide highrf
as a
of both residual attachment and nominal belief. In th! initial paragraphs of this section the same question will be tackled from a different perspective, i.e. one that looks at Europe fronl the outside rather than from within. The subject matter h similarly reversed: instead of setting out what the patterns of European religion ere, ei attempt will be made to underlina what they ere not, taking each of the preceding case studies m I particular point of reference. Such patterns do not, first of all, constitute a religious marht in the sense that this exists in the United States. Indeed, if tha economic analogy be extended, the historic churches in Europl are considerably closer to the notion of public utility than thrf
levels
r38 Europe: The Exceptional Cu/.
r39
The forms of religion discovered in the Philippines offcr
different contrast. Here both the particular nature of CatholiciltA and the recent Pentecostal growth, not to mention the importnnt role played by the churches in recent political crises, indicatet I degree and intensiry in religious life rarely experienced in Europl and at all levels of sociery. This holds up despite indicators B modernisation, albeit of a very uneven nature. In South Korelg finally, it is almost as if the assumed European trajectory ll turned on its head. Here unbelievably rapid modernisation ll accompanied b.r an equally extraordinary surge in the nationl religious life. Both Christianiry and Buddhism grew exponcn. tially from the r96os on. It is only at the turn of the millennium that the indicators falter, provoking yet another set of sociologicC
questions.
the reasons why
the materid presented in the preceding chapters it is hardly
Two points are immediately apparent from this overview. Firlt the European observer (whether he or she is a member of onl of Europe's churches or simply a spectator) is forced to adrnlt that the familiar is not necessarily the norm in global terms. T'hl assumption that this might be so has been radically shaken by the materid presented in the case studies (a principal aim of thlt book). A second point is, however, equally important - thet l: to avoid jumpipg to conclusions in terms of value judgemcntl, It may indeed be the case that patterns of religion in Europe afl different from those discovered elsewhere in the Christian worldl but it does not follow that they are either better or worse; th, are simply different. Indeed opinions will vary enormously ln this respect. For some Europeans, what we experience in thll part of the world is reassuringly familiar (there is no real ncQd for change); for others, such changes should be positively resistcC (European petterns are to be preserved at all costs); and for I third group, both attitudes are a source of great frustration (thcH is longing for change and an impatience with those who relltt this). All three groups, however, are faced with essentially thl same question: how do wq explain the differences that we hrVl
established?
ible to argue that religion, and more specifically Christian , is incompatible with moderniry even in its advanced . Both in the United States and in South Korea - if not cvery case that we have covered - the economic indicators some of the highest in the world, yet the religious indices are 'What impressive. is it, then, about the European case leads to a different outcome? The specificities of European history economic, political and , provide the starting point. In most of Western Europe, example, what has become known as the modernisation took place both relatively early and relatively slowly. there are huge variations across the continent (from the days of industriaiisation in eighteenth-century Britain to artificially held back and far more rapid changes in Spain Portugal following the collapse of the dictatorships), but and large - the process has moved through a discernible ce, i.e. from incipient industrialism, through the domiof heavy industries and their associated cities to the forms sociery known as late or post-moderniry (associated with a industrial economy). All three stages are important if the nt situation is to be proper understood. the final chapter of Religion in Modern Britain (rgg+), I in some detail at each phase in this complex evolution with their implications for religious people and religious isations. A major aim of the chapter was to point out that shift offers advantages and disadvantages for the churches, that certain types of church organisation will have more than others in coming to terms with particular stages the process. Crucial in this respect is the manner in which institution in question is embedded in its host sociery 's historic churches offer an obvious illustration. They easily (one could almost say seamlessly) into the patterns
r40
Europe: The Exceptional Catt
r41
of pre-industrial society, a hierarchical model which embodiod at almost every level the collusions of religion and power derivttive of Europe 's ecclesiastical history (a pattern that was centuriel old). It was hardly surprising, rherefore, that these territorially based institutions had a particularly hard time adapting to the major movements of population rhat took place as Europeln societies not only industrialised, but urbanised. A major dir location took place at this time from which the historic churchca have never fully recovered, in the sense of regaining a significanG element of social control over rhe populations of which thry were part.r Secularisation theorists have focused a great deal sf their argument on this issue, and rightly so. Alternative ideologies emerged, moreover, to take the plrer of church teaching - ways of thinking associated both directly and indirectly with the European enlightenment. No longcr were the certainties of Christian theology taken for granted. T'hl manner in which they were challenged varied, however, ln different parts of the continent. In the Protestant North, (and more particularly in Scandinavia), a model emerged in which the state Church remained prominenr, indeed influential, amidlt a largely secularised population. In many respecs the habiE characteristic of Lutheranism simply transferred themselves tO the secular sphere in the forms of a social welfare economy. ln Latin Europe, in contrast, the confrontation between the Cath. olic Church and the advocates of the enlightenment becam: heavily politicised, a conflict which lasted for several generatioru, One result in this part of Europe was rhe emergence of a parelhl 'church' in the form of the apparatus of a secular state - i,t, an institution equivalenr ro rhe Catholic Church, which both transmitted and embodied the alternative, enlightenmcnt
ideology.
just as this happened in Europe (Detroit is an excellent ). Totally different, however, were the capacities of the es (in the plural) ro move with the industrial process than t,o resist this. New and adaptable forms of church : became irr ct part and parcel of the changes taking place, wave after wave of immigrants to nineteenth- and rwentiethAmerica brought with them diverse forms of religion uprooted from their European (sometimes parochial) ins. It was these innovative forms of religion that embedded i/es vertically rather than horizontally into American (see Chapter Two), permitting far greater flexibility as
economy developed.z In America, furthermore, there is an entirelv different relation_ with enlightenment ideas. The assumed confronrations of ,pean sociery (particularly in its Latin forms) are very largely
behind. Indeed Bouretz (forthcoming) argues that the
(French) models. In the United Smtes orft the positive e of religion and rhe freedom to believe (or indeed not are defended. The separation of Church and State ensures, ; that these aflirmations do not become confused with I political sphere. Hence an enrirely different configuration the new world: narion building and economic development e associated with religious vitality within which appro_ elements of the enlightenment rhinking are encouraged than resisted - a virtuous circle is brought into being, different from the dislocations and downward spirals
erican version of the enlightenment in many ways embodies best of both Protestanr (more specifically German) and Cath-
in Europe.
The specificities of the American
In terms of the argument so far, the United States is both similar and different. It is similar in the sense thar the economy moves through the stages already described. At the industrialisin; stage, for instance, American cities grew around perticular inE
r42
Europe: The Exceptional Ca$
case, not least of the ican enlighrenmenr, could be developed at considerable drawing from a substantial scholarly literature.3 At this howeveq a second set of comparisons needs to be estabconcentrating rhis time on rhe chaprers which describe ing rather than the developed economies. South Korea
has been the most successful of these; here a dramatic and lastln
transformation has been wrought, a pre-modern sociery hr! become an Asian tiger. The Latin American examples are sornewhat different but have a good deal in common with th: Philippino case: in both economic development has indced occurred but has been extremely uneve;n, leading to dranutl differences in prosperiry both within as well as berween popu= lations. In both places, moreover (as indeed in Korea), the growth of the mega-ciry has outstripped anything experienced at the time of the industrial revolution in Europe (or indeed iB the United States). It is almost as if these economies have leapt from a pre-industrial phase to a post*industrial one, vritly increasing the tensions that accompany more gradual econotnl and social change. The African case is different again. As nr6 have seen, with the exception of South Africa, the econontl situation in this continent gives continuing cause for concern l that many of the indicators fall rather than rise, exposing hup numbers of people to at best a marginal existence. The ravagel of AIDS in large parts of Africa have made a desperate situatioa
even worse. It is in these situations that Pentecostalism seems to gain I purchase. The many and different forms of Pentecostal religion
that can be found in the developing world have a common feature in this respect; they create havens in which both indl. viduals and groups find the strength to cope with the vicissitudel of both economic and political uncertainry.a Pentecosralisnr hrt succeeded in this respect, when so many other attempts haW failed (various forms of community action, for example). Sueh success demands attention; at its best it is deeply impresive. Thl very success of Pentecostalism in the developing world mr1 however, offer a clue to why it does less well in Europe (ln addition that is to the reasons addressed in Chapter Three). Quilt
simply, the spaces that Pentecostalism inhabits so effectively on a global canvas do not exist in Europe (at least not to tha same extent), unsurprisingly given the very different economi
same trajectory that accounts for the greater development of secular tives in Europe - both cultural and institutional. The preceding account is skeletal.s It has been offered in order reveal the multiplicity of factors (economic, political, cultural ecclesiological) that must be taken into account in undering not only the particular nature of European religion, but dangers that will arise if this case is used as the basis of ralisation. Nor, more importantly, is it possible to generalise sociologicd approaches (i.e. strong versions of secularisation ), which to a large extent are part and parcel of the same not least in their connections with European forms of enlightenment. How then should the sociologist proceed in nding the huge variery of cases that exist in the modern ? That is the question to be tackled in the second section this chapter. Before doing so, however, fwo more immediate require attention: the first relates to the remaining categories the Runciman scheme; the second concerns the changes that ight be possible within the specificities of the European case. say that European patterns of religion are exceptional in terms is not the seme as seying that they are immutable. Runciman elaborated four distinct sociological tasks (see ter Two). So r in this chapter, we have dealt with two of - reportage and explanation. It is important to grasp that two that remain - description (in the sense of what it 'feels' to be part of a particular situation) and evaluation or policy- also resonate within the framework of European ionalism. In terms of the former, for example, it is clear European reactions to being religious are, like everything peculiarly European. Europeans who are actively religious used to being a minority. They are prone, in conse:, to consider themselves outside the mainstream of their ive societies * a tendency reciprocated, to a considerable , by the mainstream itself (a milieu in which the chattering and the media are disproportionately present). Hence
in this part of the world. It is the
r44
Europe: The Exceptional Cate
r45
two interrelated characteristics: not only do believing Europernt become somewhat defensive in their reacrions, they frequently attempt in everyday life to conceal the labels that the acrivcly religious in other parts of the world claim with pride (a very noticeable difference in religious behaviour once it is pointod
out).6
The realities that lie beneath rhe veneer are considerably complex. They reflect, in fact, a point underlined in
namely that Europeans may indeed of the arch of European values is mbling, but they are not altogether complacent about this ion. Probing these complexities further requires innovative techniques, not least those that are associated with as well as objective attributes. It is a way of thinking eware that the 'keystone'
chapters (pp. +, 46)
On a superficial level, this is undoubtedly rrue of Europern society. At a deeper level, however, something rather morE
complex may be going on, an ambiguis nicely illustrated by the following episode. In zooo (the millennid year) the Nationrl Gallery in London mounted an exhibition enritled 'seeing Srl. vation'. The exhibition was not large but contained a carefully selected set of European paintings and sculpture depicting tht story of the passion. (In itself it was a powerful indicator of Europe's religious past in cultural as well as religious terms.) Thr theme was unashamedly Christian. To the surprise of everyon, including the staff of the gallery the exhibition was exrraordl-
narily popular and drew unprecedented numbers. It rhc provoked a considerable correspondence addressed to thr Director of the gallery a correspondence that I have been privl. leged to read.7 'With reference to the argument of this section, two contnr dictory themes emerge from these letters. The first endorses thl marginaliry of religion ro the mainsrream of British life in so frf as numerous writers congratulate the Director on his couragc lA mounting an explicidy Christian exhibition in order to celebmfl the millennium. ft is here that we find evidence in vour of tha secularisation of the British mainstream - why else would the Director require courage to act in this way? Conversely, thl sheer pleasure that the exhibition gave to so many people (agrin a dominant theme in the correspondence), alongside the vcty large numbers ofpeople who attended, conveys a rarher differcnt story: namely that the supposed secularisation, or even secu. larism, of British sociery might nor be as deeply roored as it finf
r46
further in Religion in Modern Europe (Davie zoooa). Contextually insensirive policy-making, finally, is unlikely to effective, a point made forcibly in Chapter Two. With this in attempts to 'copy' situations or solutions that work well other parts of the world should be resisted unless there is a good reason to do otherwise; rhey are likely to have un(quite possibly negative) consequences in the Eurocontext. Rather more creative is an approach that takes account the possibility that European patterns of religion themselves be undergoing change. European ways of doing may well be distinct but they continue to evolve, and in doing they are responding to external as well as internal i. It is at this point, moreove! that the preceding case begin to resonate.
obligation to consumption: the changing ndture of European
the start of the rwentieth century a whole set of interrelated
are occurring in the religious life of Europe. First the ic churches - despite their continuing presence - are systically losing their capaciry to discipline the religious ing of large sections of the population, especially amongst
young. That is abundantly clear. The larter respond, however, complex ways * they are just as ready to experiment with forms of belief as they are ro reject the norion of belief , a tendency that is (or appears to be) inversely related
Cq|
to the capacities of the churches to exert control (see Chapte! One). At the same time, the range of choice is becoming widef
as innovative forms of religion come into Europe from outside, largely as the result of the movement of people (a major thenl of the preceding chapters). Populations that have arrived ln Europe primarily for economic reasons bring with them differenC ways of being religious, some Christian and some not. And quit: apart from the incoming movements, European people travel the world, experiencing amongst other things considerable religioul diversiry. In this sense a genuine religious market is emerging itt most parts of the continent. The crucial question lies, however, not in the existence of the market in itself but in the capacities of Europeans to make urc of this, the major point of contrast with the United Statcl, Having underlined this difference many times, I am not about t change my mind. I ara, however, beginning ro wonder whether I significant and this time authentically European muration migh! be taking place, both inside and outside the historic churchel, The mutation in question takes the form of a gradual shift awry from an understanding of religion as an obligation and towldl an increasing emphasis on consumption. In other words, wh&t until moderately recendy was simply imposed (with all the neg&,
tive connotations of this word), or inherited (a rather mort positive spin) becomes instead a matter of personal choice. I gO
to church (or to another religious organisation) because I want tog maybe for a short period or maybe for longer, to fulfil a particultf rather than a general need in my liG and where I will continut my attachment so long as it provides what I want, but I have ng obligation either to attend in the first place or to conrinue if I
don't want to. If (and the question must remain tentative) such a shift il indeed taking place, what might be the implications for thf patterns of religion in modern Europe? The first point to gralpr paradoxically, is that the emergent pattern is not only entirely compatible with vicariousness but to a large extent depen&
it: the churches need to be there in order that individuals attend them if they so choose. The chemistry however, alters, a shift which is discernible in both practice and not to mention the connections between them. An , illustration of this process can be found in the patterns confirmation in the Church of England. It is rrue that the ll numbers of confirmations have dropped dramatically in post-war period, evidence once again of institutional decline. England, though not yet in the Nordic countries, conion is no longer a teenage rite of passage (imposed by the ion), but a relatively rare event undertaken as a matter of choice by people of all ages. Hence the marked rise in proportion of adult confirmations amongst the candidates rall - up to 40 per cent by the mid r99os (by no means , however, to offset the fall among teenagers). Confirmation becomes, therefore, a very significant event for individuals who choose this option, an attitude that is to affect the rite itself - which now includes the space a public declaration offaith. It becomes in fact an opportuniry make public what has often been en entirely private activity below). It is increasingly common, moreoveq to baptise an candidate immediately before the confirmation, a gesrure ich is evidence in itself of the fall in infant baptism some to thirty years earlier. Tken together, these events ina marked change in the nature of membership in the ic churches which become, in some senses, much more their non-established counterparts. Voluntarism (in some a market) is beginning to establish itself de facto, regardless the constitutional position of the institution in question. Or continue the chemical analogy a little further, a whole set of reactions are set off which in the longer term (the stress is tant) may have a profound effect on the nature of European
n.
One final remark concludes this section. It concerns the public
r48
r49
of 'choosing' religion. Claulg (not least Bruce 1996, rggg) of secularisation theory carry with them the notion that chosen religion is necessrrlly privatised religion. It is an indication that the sacred canopy thtt used to embrace the totaliry of believers is no longer operatiwf religion has become instead simply a matter of life*sryle rnd personal preference. Prompted by discussions with sociologitE in the Nordic countries,e I am no longer convinced that thil ll so. Those who opt seriously for religion in European socictiel will want to make their views heard in public as well as privlll debate. It is at this point, moreover, that the forms of religion @oth Christian and non-Christian) that have arrived msE recendy within Europe begin to make an effective impact: thoy offer positive ("t times inspirational) models to the holt community - the learning process is running in both directiont,
as
well
as the private implications
versions
THEORETICAL RESOURCES
case has been made for European exceptionalism, indicatinS at least some of the implications that this might have for tht ongoing life of Europe's churches, which themselves continut to evolve. Looking at Europe from the outside proved to be t useful exercise in this respect: patterns of religion in Europe mry well be distinct from those in the rest of the world, but they ln by no means immune from them - unsurprisingly given that th! possibilities for exchange (both of people and approaches) rttl increasing all the time. But what, exactly, is Europe distinct from (is it one thing or many) and can such differences bl conceptualised in theoretical as well as empirical (i.e. case study) terms? It is these questions and the tools that are required fot their understanding that are central to the following discussion, A number of theoretical approaches have already been alludod to. In Chapter One, for example, the emphasis lay on secularlF ation theory stressing the essentially European origins of thlt
re-emerged in the earlier part of chapter. Chapter Two contained an outline of what might called the American equivalent, rational choice theory, once in a mode of theorising which has emerged from a specific . In both cases the somewhat bounded nature of these became apparent, especially in their stronger, more tic forms. In terms of the Latin American material, for :, it was only the more flexible versions of secularisation that permitted the insights necessery for understanding emergence of Pentecostalism - those in other words that paid ntion to contingent variables and the likelihood that different rns will emerge in different parts of the world. The need for sensitivity in this respect has been illustrated reference to geographical rather than conceptual maps. In ical terms, the point is immediately obvious: maps of Alps cannot simply be transferred to the Rockies or the (or vice versa) without serious consequences. The corolto underline at this point is that using the wrong conceptual p is just as misleading (dangerous even) as using the wrong hical map, and in more than one respect. Not only do maps indicate inappropriate routes, they are equally likely distract the researcher from the features that do require attenThe inabiliry of numerous scholars even to acknowledge presence of Pentecostalism (in its early days), never mind to the phenomenon seriously, is a case in point. All analogies are dangerous if they are pushed too far. It might the less be helpful to consider a rather different sort of in terms of the understanding of religion (in this case istianiry) in the modern world. Such maps would start from different perspective. Instead of looking at the European or American'case, and trying to decide which if any was typical, conversely exceptional, the emphasis would lie in creating an ific map of 'mountains' that can be adapted to each and ry case.ro Are there, in other words, sufficient features in for the different patterns or trajectories of Christianiry
h, a theme that
r50
Cul
IJI
to be placed on one map (albeit with significant variations), rr must we begin afresh each time? The understandings of both modernity and the process of modernisation can be considered in these terms. They revolve around the notion that a core concept or process can be identi. fied, applicable - with a certain number of adaptations - to the multipliciry of examples that are to be found in the real world, The literature in this field is immense and goes back to thc founding fathers of sociology - not least to Marx himself, whore insights into the nature and consequences of industrialism remain required reading even if his more specific prophecies wcr seriously mistaken. In this chapter, the discussion will be fnt more modest: it will concentrete primarily on the relationship berween modernisation and secularisation. Are the two necc. sarily connected and in what ways? Or to put the same question in terms of the 'map' analogy: is the decrease of religion, or more modestly of certain forms of religion, a necessary featur of modern landscape (i.e. intrinsic to the modernisation procerr) or simply a contingent one (i.e. extrinsic, in the sense that lt will be there in some cases but not in others)? Two studies (or groups of studies) offer contrasting routes into the discussion. The first concerns the empirical testing of som! aspects of the modernisation theory using data from the World Values Survey of which the European material employed in Chapter One formed the first part - bringing the argument of the book as a whole nicely full circle. The principal sourcG of material for the World Surveys lies in the work of Rondd Ingelhart and his team in the LJniversity of Michigan.tl Thl second approach is primarily theoretical; it is directed by Shmuel Eisenstadt from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, but drawt from a wide range of comparative cases embracing, once again, examples from almost all global regions (and indeed almost dl world faith$. Eisenstadt's thinking embodies an innovativ! concept - that of 'multiple modernities'. In other words lt moves sharply away from a single or core understanding of
r52
moderniry or the modernisation process. The case studies er with the comparative frame have been published in dedicated issues of Daedalus (the journal of the American of Arts and Sciences).12
le*ing modernisation theory

theory evokes strong reactions and has become, inore o{ten than not, heavily ideological. In the immediate postrvar period, for example, there were those who considered it both necessary and appropriate to bring'modern' ways of doing to the developing societies of the world. Such policies on attitudes, often well intentioned, which assumed that values necessarily prevent the proper course of tion (i.e. effective and inevitable capitalist develophltent); it was right therefore that they be replaced. Such views tvere vehemently opposed, two decades later, by those (mostly dependency theorists) who saw the lack of modernisation of parts of the world in an entirely different light. It had ing to do with the value systems of local populations and ng to do with the greed of advanced capitalist societies. inequalities of the global economy were the outcomes not the
of 'backward' values but of capitalist exploitation. LJnsurprisingly, this too has been criticised by those who perceive advantages as well as disadvantages in capitalist investment on a global scale end not solely for the elite. Embedded in critique and counter-critique are different nderstandings of the modernisation process. On the one hand are those who maintain 'that economic development is with coherent and, to some extent, predictable changes culture and social and political life' (Inglehart and Baker zooo: r).13 On the other are scholars (mostly dependency theorists and
relativists) who reject such a possibiliry - the relationship the two sets of variables is essentially random. Data the World Values Survey (the focus of this section) are
Europe: The Exceptional Calo
Conceptual Maps
r53
strongly supportive of the former vie'.v, but with importrnt modifications to earlier versions of the theory (Inglehart r997, Ingelhart and Baker zooo). There are, first of all, two steges to bear in mind in the ongoing process ofmodernisation: the first occurs when societiet move from a pre-industrial to industrial economy and the secolrd as the economy begins to mutate once again - this time to n service-based, post-industrial mode of organisation. At each stge, moreover, there is an associated shift in the value-systenu espoused by the populations in question but not always in thc direction anticipated by the early theorists of modernisation, lt becomes increasingly clear, for example, that it is no longer possible to assume a linear evolution in the development of modern societies, i.e. towards an increasingly technical, mechan.
ical, rationalised, bureaucratic, and indeed secular environment iR which the values associated with economic and physical security become paramount. Something very different was taking placa in many parts of theworld. More precisely: as economies moved from the industrial to the post-industrial phase, the populationl in question began to place far more stress on posr-materialilt values, not least an increasing emphasis on well-being and the qualiry of life - i.e. somerhing rather more subtle than simplo survival.
return once again to the questions (i.e. the long-term evolution of industrial economies) rhar preoccupied me in the last chapter of Religion in Modern Britain.In the earlier sectionr of the present discussion (p. r+r-z) the stress lay on the shift
from pre-industrial to industrial societies and the different effectt that this had in Europe and the new world. At this point, it it the movement away from industrial society and into new forml
'We
by growing rather than declining evidence of spiritual concern (indeed of religious belief), though not, it is clear, of institutional commitment. Hefe, moreover, is further support for the possibility that European patterns of religion $ust like any orhers) will continue to develop: West Europe may be distinctive but it is by no msxn5 5htic. So much for rhe longitudinal sequence. Ingelhart eggfl and Inglehart and Baker (zooo) then introduce a second but equally important dimension in the argument, namely the diversity befween nations, Or groups of nafions. Drawing from the huge data sets of the World values Survey, it becomes increasingly clear that different societies follow different trajectories even when they are subject to the same forces of economic developmenr. This is a borh/and situation. On the one hand the rise of industrial society arrd its subsequent mutation into post-industrial forms are associated with coherent and empirically discernible cultural shifts. On the otheq rhe sysrems which emerge ar each stage in this evolurion are parh dependent: more precisely they feflect Protestant, Catholic, Islamic or Confucian backgrounds, ,each of which display distinctive value systems. The associated ',differences, shaped very largely by the cultural (and more specifically religious) heritage in quesrion, persist even afrer controlling for the effects of economic developmenr. Hence rhe following conclusion:
, .
Economic development tends to push societies in a common direction, but rather than converging, they seem to move on parallel traject<rries, shaped by their cultural heritages. We doubt that the forces of modernization will produce a homogenized world culture in the foreseeable future. (Inglehart and
Baker zooo: 49)
of economic and social life that resonates most strongly. Thl data from the World Values Survey firmly endorse the lattct
shift: across a wide variery of socieries, West Europe included, t rether different configuratipn emerges as industrial economil mutate into post-industrial ones, i.e. into societies characterised
lfn terms of the case studies described in this book, the patterns maps that emerge ere satisfying if not quite 'perfect' (Inglehart 9gT: ni. There is evidence, first of all, ofEurope's comparative Both parts of West Europe (North and South), for
r54
Europe: The Exceptional Cac
:Conceptual Maps
r55
example, score noticeably higher on the secular-rational scale than the United States, the Latin American countries, the Philippines and the African examples. (The South Korean case is rather more ambiguous, though the movement of South Korea in ternu of economic development between r98r and r99o can be clearly seen.) Cutting across these axes, however, lies a second set of contrasts: those befween primarily Catholic and primarily Protestant cultures. It is at this point, moreover, that the afiinitict between Northern Europe and North America reveal thenrselves, with Canada edging closer to the European pattern rll the time. Latin America (including the Philippine$ links itself to Latin Europe. There is, finally, a hint that the 'lead' societict in the modern world are more likely to be those of Northern Europe than the United States, a crucial but contentious point that will be immediately challenged in the following section.ra
all modernizing and modern societies; with the expansion of modernity, they would prevail throughout the world.
(Eisenstadt zooo: r)
Right from the start, therefore, Eisenstadt challenges both
rhe
essumption that modernising societies are convergent, and the fiotion of Europe (or indeed anywhere else) as the lead society in the modernising process. How then does the multiple modernities approach develop
Muhiple modernities
The work on multiple modernities embodies a rather different in that it confronts the notion of global convergencc in theoretical rather than empirical terms. The negative ageuda is unequivocally set in the following paragraph:
approach,
The notion of 'multiple modernities' denotes a certain vicw of the contemporary world - indeed of the history and characteristics of the modern era - that goes against the views long prevalent in scholarly and general discourse. It goes against the view of the 'classical' theories of modernization and of the convergence ofindustrid societies prevalent in the r95ol, and indeed against the classical sociological analyses of Marx, Durkheim, and (to a large extent) even of Weber, at least in one reading of his work. They all assumed, even only implicidy, that the cultural program of moderniry as it developed in modern Europe and the basic institutional con. stellations that emerged there would ultimately take over i
from a positive point of view? In the introductory esay to th; set of comparative cases, Eisenstadt suggests thet the best way to understand the modern world (in other words to grasp the history and nature of modernity) is to see this as ,a story of continual constiturion and reconstirution of a multiplicity of cultural programs' (zooo: z). A second point follows from this. These ongoing reconstitutions do not drop from the sky; they emerge as the result of endless encounters on the part of both individuals and groups, all of whom engage in the creation (and recreation) of both culturd and institutional formations, but within dfferent economic and cultural contexts. Once this way of thinking is firmly in place it becomes easier ro appreciate one of the fundamental paradoxes of Eisenstadt,s writing: namely that to engege with the Western understanding of moderniry or even to oppose it, is as indisputably modern as to embrace it. r' 'What then is the authentic core of modernity? The question in fact, very difiicult to answer in that modernity is more of an attitude (a distinctive epistemology) than a set of "haracteristics. In its early forms, it embodied above all a notion bf the future which was realisable by means of human agency. As soon as the process was set in motion, however, even the of moderniry was beset by internal contradictions. 'Were societies to be totalising or pluralistic, for example? Or what degree of control/eutonomy was considered desirable? Hence, to ive an institutional illustration, the very diflerent formulations of the nation state (an essential feature of modernity) that
TJ6
Europe: The Exceptional Can
emerged even in different parts of Europe - hegemonic in France and the Nordic countries (though difGrendy so in each case) al opposed to the rather more pluralistic pattern adopted in Britairt
or The Netherlands. Should we be surprised therefore at the

even greater transformations that took place (both culturally and institutionally) when the idea of modernity transferred itself to the new world, and then, bit by bit, out of the west altogether? Following Eisenstadt, diversiry is simply assumed within thc modernising process; it becomes in fact part of moderniry itself.rr In the World Values Study, the initial emphasis lay on the
longitudinal shifts in the modernisation process with the emphasis on diversity following from this. In Eisenstadt's essay, it is almost the other way round in so r es the two can bc separated at all. The shifting neture of the moderniry (or more accurately modernities) is none the less crucial to Eisenstadtb thinking - a point nicely illustrated in his continuing analysis of the State, this time in late as opposed to early modern societies. Globalisation (in all its diverse forms) has changed dramatically the 'institutional, symbolic, and ideological contours of the modern, national and revolutionary states' (zooo: 16). No longer, for example, can these institutions adequately control much of modern living, whether in economic, political or cultural term. Despite technologically developed means of restraint, the flows and counter-flows of modern living increasingly transcend political boundaries. The construction of multiple modernities continues none the less (that is its nature), but in constantly
changing circumstances. Central to this process in recent decades is the appearance of new actors and new entities, emong them a whole range of social movements, who assume responsibility for the emergent problems of the modern world. Feminist or ecological organisations (often transnational in nature) provide excellent examples, but so too do religious movements - even those commoniy known as fundamentalist. It is true that the latter are vehemendy opposed to the west and to the ideologies embodied therein. Fundamen-
talist movements are, however, quintessentially modern in the msnner in which they set their goals and in the means that they adopt to achieve them: their outlooks, for example, are truly global and their technologies highly developed' Just like their secular counterparts, they are redefining and reconsrituting the concept of modernity, but in their own terms.r6 With respect to this chapter as a whole, the crucial point to emerge from Eisenstadt's work is the continued space for religion and for religious movements within the unfolding interpretations of moderniry. The forms of religion, moreover' may be as diverse as the forms of moderniry. Indeed the examples that follow in the special issue of Dae dalus offer Christian, Muslim, Hindu and Confucian illustrations, but regrettably no discussion of Pentecostalism. The author of one of these, Nilufer Gle, concludes that the essential core of moderniry resides in its potential for self-correction, a capaciry that by definition must be ongoing given that the problems that preoccuPy us at the start of the twenty-first century could not even be imagined in the early stages of modernisation. Thus religion (in Gle's essay this is innovative forms of Islam) becomes one resource among many in the process of continual self-correction. More precisely, 'modernity is not simply rejected or readopted but critically and creatively re-appropriated by new religious discursive and social practices in non-'Western contexts' (Gle 2ooo: 93). Two points bring this discussion to a close. First, to underline once again that European versions of modernity xe indeed distinct (most notably in their comparative secularity), a possibility underpinned by theoretical as well as empirical considerations. But, second, they are not distinct from a single undifferentiated other. They are simply one moderniry among many in the modern world and, like all the others, in the process of continual reconstruction'
r58
Conceptual Maps
r59
CONCLUDING REMARKS
How then should the European respond? What lessons if any can be learnt from these pages? In answering these questions, I will simply speak for myself. For me the writing of this book has been an exercise in humiliry. If Europe is not the global
protorype, both Europe and Europeans have everything to learn from cases other than their own. Not least among such lessons is the importance of taking the religious factor seriously, and in public as well as private life. Tirking religion seriously, moreover, is greatly facilitated by the assumption that you expect it to be there, as an integral, normalpart of modern as well as modernising
societies.
everything that comes in from outside will be appropriate (or indeed welcorne) in the European context. Deciding what to accept and wh.at to reject will be a demanding process, requiring sensitive as well as informed decision-makirg in the secular as well as the reliigious sphere. Finally writing this book has become for me an exercise in what it meens to be modern. I conclude that it is as modern to draw from the resources of religion in order to critique the secular as it is to draw from the secular in order to critique the religious. Only in Europe has the equation become seriously imbalanced. or to put the same point in rather more abstract terms, secularisation is essentially a European phenomenon and is extrinsic rather than intrinsic to the modernising process per se.
of the cataclysmic events of just how far short Europeans ll from r r September 2oor reveals achieving this god. Since the attack on the Twin Towers, for example, the debate about religion has veered too often from vilification to trivialisation, indicating not only the difiiculty of accepting the normality of the concept, but (even morc importantly) the lack of a shared vocabulary with which to discuss the emergent issues - a point that could be repeated with reference to a host of further, if thankfully less catastrophic, examples. One will suflice. Lynas (zoor) provides a fascinating insider account of the attempts to include a religious or spiritual component in the ill-fated Millennium Dome. Whilst it is clear that almost everyone thought this was a good idea in principle (though disagreed sharply about its contents), very few possessed the conceptual understanding necessary to put such ideas into
respects, the aftermath
In many
practice.
One way of initiating the learning process is, surely, to spend time with those who are arriving in Europe almost on a daily basis. In this respect, listening is the first priority (an exercise in welcome in itself). In terms of policy-making, in contrast, a considerable degree of discernment will be necessary for not
r6o
Europe: The Exceptional Cass
Conceptual Maps
impossible to translate into English. Stricdy speaking it refers to the absence of religion from the public sphere. At times, however, the connotations have been considerably more negative.
NOTES
ro. A number of
rr.
Chapter
r: sETTING THE scENE: THE PARAMETER
MODERN EUROPE
rz.
Note, however, the case of the English-speaking Dominions who, initially at least, modelled their arrangements on Europe. z. The European Values Study is a major cross-netional survey of human values' first carried out in Europe in r98r and then extended to other countriel worldwide. It was designed by the European Vdues Systems Study Group (EVSSG). Analyses of the r98r material can be found in Harding and Phillips, with Fogarry (1986) and in Stoetzel (rg8f). A restudy took place in r99o. Published material from this can be found in Timms (1992), Ashford and Timms (r9gz), Barker, Hdman and Vloet (1992) and Ester, Halman and de Moor (1994). Barker er al. includes a useful bibliography of the wholc enterprise up to 1992. A further restudy took place in tggg/2ooo, ftom which the initid results are now available (Halman zoor). Up-to-date information ebout the survey and the data that have emerged from it can be found on the following website: http://evs.kub.nl' The longitudinal aspectl
r.
cases concerning intolerance of minorities in Greece have been brought, successfully, to the European courts. An excellent source of information on the detail of these cases can be found on the CESNUR website (see note 8). Exacdy when and why these changes were initiated is subject to debate emongst historians; starting dates vary considerably from place to place. Precisely the same point has been made by Robert Putnam with reGrence to his work on voluntary organisations in the United States (Putnam zooo). See Chapter Two for a fuller discussion of this.
Chapter 2:
AMERIcAN
AcrrvlTy: A vtBRANT RELrcrous
MnKET
r.
The 1998 Hadaway, Marler and Chaves'article forms part of a'Symposium on Church Attendance' in the United States published by the American Sociologkal Review The controversy was sparked by their 1993 article. The accuracy of these figures (notably the degree to which atrendance is
of the study enhance the data considerably. 3. See, for example, the parallel study on Religion and Moral Pluralism, directed by Wolfgang Jagodzinski from the Institute for Applied Socirl Research in the Universiry of Cologne. 4. For a fuller picture of these data - essential for any detailed work - scc Stoetzel (1983), Harding, Phillips with Fogarty (rg86), Barker, Halman and Vloet (1992), Ester, Halman and de Moor (1994), and Halman and Riil (1999), together with the individual analyses for each European country involved in the survey. 5. Most striking of all are the growing numbers of young people (especially in Northern Europe) who believe both in life after death and in a'God within' * i.e. in an immanent rather than transcendent God. 6. Information (including statistics) about the Jewish communities in Welt
Europe can be found
in
Wasserstein (1996) and Webber (1994).
7. Estimates of the size of Europet Muslim population are, inevitably, relatcd to questions about immigration. Statistics relating to illegal immigration art particularly problematic. See Nielsen (tg95: r7o-t) for a discussion of thr
statistical question and related difliculties.
overestimated) remains an ongoing controversy in American sociology, with opinions quite sharply divided. 2. It is true that in Europe, as well as in the United States, growrh is found in the more conservative, often evangelical groups, both within the mainstream denominations and outside them. Such growth, however, is insufticient to compensate for the losses sustained in more liberal groups. 3. A partial exception can perhaps be found in Poland, where the traditional disciplines still operate at least in rurd areas (much less so in the cities). 4. Interestingly in Sweden, both the formal, or nominal, membership of the churches and that ofthe trade unions has remained high (they are, moreover, spoken of in very similar ways). Active membership of either is, of course, a very different matter. 5. The crucial point is the following: Americans still go bowling but no longer . do this in organised leagues. Social capital is generated by the interaction between team members, not by the activity of bowling itself. 6. It is important to remember that the applicabiliry of the Putnam thesis to the British case is not universally accepted. Hall (1999), for example, fails to find support for Putnam in the British data. 7. Davie (1994), especially Chapter Five, discusses the British case in some detail.
8. For some faith communities, voluntarism presents particular difliculties. Muslims, for example, think and act entirely differently - for them the
notion of a state Church is rather easier than the American model.
8. The full tide is the Centro Studi sulle Nuove Religioni. Information about CESNUR is most easily accessed via www.cesnur.org, an impressive, very up to date end multilingual website.
9. ro.
in Europe have, of course, responded to this phenomenon; Holy Trinity Brompton is an excellent example.
Some churches Edgell Becker (1999) offers another good example, describing in considerable
9. The competing ideology
is known
in
France as laiZit, a word that is almort
r62
r63
that detail congregations
;G
i; ry
specific
'Ppt'l needs'
family' each of them to particular kinds of

,rsial;
9. ro.
See,
(1997)' or-the wobillte for example, the bibliograp cgmqilef b1 Corten ^f"'t the Latin American Studicc Progrrnt of C'l maintained by Antnony
it
has been dropped
P-rid.... io[.g" ,ot.
"i{:.Ti{:;i;::l"xt;}Jff
,,
ffi:i"lxl',i: l': .,"rr.
p,or.rri""'a
:""'':;:'*ubsidv,pa*orwhich
u:ff
_,
;;ri'i
:'l:J:
:ffi;;;', ;'"
sav rary
(www' providence' edu /las/ index'htm)' African slaves; it mixes African and Romtln Candombl6 c"me to Bra'il remriinr a synthesis in which contect with the decersed Catholic belie6, is more effiuent and better organisred U-U"nda is also syncretic, but and Catholic features' but than Cendombte. It co"tai"ts African' Amerindian
iith
r.,r. e that
" ]J:,i:"tlJ3rll.'.;;; became a major preo l"''rtr"i", r"t tx"mplt' it

.u","
is established Church
t
a": l,.,: iilil"rir,,.Jlr":flif J, gi"" th"' i"'"'l'1s^..,,r;,io, in parliamentarv

Europe
originated in Brazil rather than in Africa itself'
respect' "r. Maitin adds an interesting note in this of ientecosralism in mind"the decline
'-:T'.ili::;f i*,:","jj,*.;::*:f 'f Lffi ;,:;;;*,.t*,,r,i,n

r
i"i.r. 1{ 3J,I:ii,i ll;. :: :::*nffj,l ::f
i:fil;
its growth (zoorb: z8)' (1999)'-with colction of articles in Smith and Prokopy rz. --' Note, however, the collection are in turn critiqured thai the RCT articles within this
as
;.p"d, with this of ,irn. be as fast
Modern change is increasingly could in the fullnress
ifr.
by LwY (zoot). r3. See note 9 for details of this website'
f-"ir"
''(.
or
"
consider and corrucr-- :--1.',1-rl a more detailed ano Scottish census included " lnterestingly' the zoor turv more effective'1ilt'lil*u, published collection of papers" se c tron' the argument or this
not'
t4.
ih. lit"oto."
*t:t-lP
"uo". "u, cultural museum.
shourld, of Livets ord is interesting in this resPect' Wonhip to date and relevant; in other words the very opposite of a be up
:J'^lt'r' "* -a' il: "'::.'li,:tt : l,H i:
vIEw oF GLoBAt' Chapter4: AFRTcAN INITIATIvEs: AN ALTERNATIvE

RELI GION
PENTEcosrALrsM AN ExAMPLE oF GLoBAL Chaptetr: LATIN AMERIcA:
'IT:T:::;:ff ::"'.:T:[ixii+1!:fl ;if reach however' to have been

,. *"'o
1,';"ffi
;*:,
,lli:rj*:*j*x;':-;cf
(Chapter Five) bv the South Korea case
'ooears'
i#[i:":::r]T;'r,',i *1;r:;i;tJ (Cf'"p"' r*o); -x,"ll**:'*::';x,'i:,i;::'JJ1'"";ffi l:J::r'::rni;';;

as
May r99z'-It was was held at New college in Edinburgh in jointty by the Centre of A&iian Studies and the Centre for the ;t;;ng.d -Ch.isii"niry in the Non-western World' itody"of is recogaised as the high water mark of the missionary z. This conference movement from the west to the rest of the world' by Sundkler (zooo: 9r-6); hence.the 3. Exactly the same point is discused '' p."aitJ"tio, ofthe author for the term.transition' rather than'convers:ion'
r. The conference -
mod'l' are helptul "r*"'ii'p*r ,ii"-I","p"'l:::{::,lTf :'H'.'l'";;';smthat""p"'ding our attemPts to th. di"tr"io"
in
are rather more ambigu^ot others the outcomes
becomes'::i"i:r'}il:t
people to Christiarrity' the initial, often corporate, movement of Aftican it does in th"ory. Bt't as Ranger (zooo) points out' it doesn't quite 4. At l"rrt deliver in Practice. for exarnple' decisive role of women comes a little later' See'
tr
5. Interesdngiy, the -
6.
7.
Sundklerlzooo: 68r) and Ward (t999: zz54)' Af"*' 45' rg75i ztg-35 md See also 'On the rationality of conversion"
theevelopingworld? ' '-^d in chapter one' why this was -'i:ol::;*..' I.o p'ur''atic in that .. ;-?;;mentalist Project " or
il;;i
.i;;;;;i'.,-*H.i:*,'"1:B,ffi;d, *i,t ,r,. noti1n neither liberauon ';?';""''t'1uiiffi ji:Xt"*'*X*l ntalism

tundame in particular' U*".".:;i:'";;; resPect to Pentecostalism to its the
373-99' any first-hand ih. los of life, especially in th,e early days' was enormous asreaction in the Precisely this point produced a notable account will rereal. was based on the personal- cost Sarum Lecture on 'African Initiatires'; lt
O"rg.
"'ffi
itself and both to the anomaly
say ideological
""a indirectlY, to the

8. Turner
uses
canno'l be #?oo*"' i'l The latter' emPowerment' l. X,:*::'*:*J.il?:[T'il' tt tt" io*t' tnd *::;;;
implicadons.
right both
,_-^rr--r ?p(rrrce on this point.
q.
The at the terms 'New Religious Movements' or 'NERMS" attention given to these movements in many ways times disproportionate (NRMs) in Western prt U"f, the attraction of New Riligious Movements of religion at about the same dme' lociery fo, sociologists t"tou'"ge African scholars to address Africa's of this vJume *"
small) born by numerous missionary families audience'
known' directly or
'to
it.
,'irn
'I
iftaken"'ioo"v'iiu-it"a*iUy-ttiuytothelatter'
r65
NoIes
changing religious scene; the aim, however, was only partially achieved in
view once again, of the economic difliculties of many African

r
scholars.
ro. Journal of Religion in Africa, XXVIII/3, 1998. r. Hackett makes an interesting methodological point in this connection: scholars of religion in Africa rarely engage the media and scholars of the medir seem blind to the significance of religion. Both, therefore, miss this crucial intersection between the public and the private in African life. 12. In this respect, Pentecostals are in many ways imitating the earlier exhortations of Protestant missionaries to avoid back-sliding; the notion of rupture is however even more clear-cut for Pentecostds than it was for thcir
with Martint analysis of the Latin American case are obvious (Chapter Three). The relationship with Martint ideas becomes, however, rther more equivocal in Gifford's later writing (Gifford tgqS). 14. This information was given to me by Maria Jose Fontdes Rosada Nunes. No longer do the vast majority of Brazilians call themselves Catholic - the r3. Here the
pattern has become much more varied. acquired global notoriety after a plane crashed onto an apartment building inhabited largely by immigrants. 16. The r96os saw the onset of relatively late but very rapid secularisation in
predecesson. parallels
rJ. This area ofAmsterdam

The Netherlands.
17. International Reuiew of Mksion, LXXXIX/354, July zooo. Ar r o N s : c H R r s rr
?:yr:^:;",
r.
^s
N c oMM u N rrr E s r N r
Such statistics can, of course, be read in a number of ways. Not only does the meeting in the Philippines stand out as the largest (the point to be made in this chapter), in terms of the argument of this book taken as whole, thc relatiue stccess of the European meetings is also important. One-off gatherings in Europe still drew large numbers of young people, despite the sharp ll-offin regular attendance (Davie zoooa). z. In contrast, the inhabitants of Luzon and Vasaya, Muslim at the time of the Spanish occupation, were systematically Christianised. 3. See also Ileto (rgzg) which sets festivals such as this one into a wider sociopolitical context. 4. Such practices, which become amongst other things a form of initiation ceremony for the Morions, derive initially from the penitential exercises of the colonial priests. They are increasingly condemned by the Church becausc oftheir dleged brutality and barbarism, but are currently (and paradoxically) on the increase. It is this kind ofpractice, moreover, that catches the attention
7, Joseph (Erap) Estrada, a former film star, became president in r99g; his sixyear term came to a premature end in April zoor. 8. The transformation is visual as well as cultural. The thousands of christian churches in the major cities of Korea call artention ro their presence by placing neon red crosses on their roofs. 9. I_ am grateful to sungHo Kim for indicating rhese sources which are reproduced in his own article, as indeed for his help in understanding the Koiean situation as a whole (Kim zooz). ro. Korean Protestantism is internally divided. Figures from the Korean Torch 1993 suggesr the following: 6z% presbyterian (in several denominations), r r% Methodist, ro% Penrecostal, 8% Holiness and 7% Baptist. presbyterianism is, however, coruiderably Pentecostalised. rr. The dramatic change in the Buddhist as well as the christian presence in post-war Korean sociery merits a study of its own. A useful source can be found in a special issue of the KoreaJournal, Autumn ry9j, vol. 33/3. rz. This was the plan for an indirect presidential election as a means of consolidating the regime, ignoring the Korean peoplet hope for direct election. 13. Such-ideas are brought together under the heading Minjung theology, a specifi cally Korean understanding of liberarion theology. Koreans, ho*!r.r, would be wary of rhe term 'liberation' in their anxiety to avoid Marxist connotations of any kind. 14' some idea of the scale of this undertaking can be gleaned from the multiIingual website maintained by the church itself (www.english.fgtv.com). The site also ofers an outline history on the church, from its beginnings as a tent mission (working amongst the disadvantaged) to its extraordinary rapid growth in recent decades. The account of course is written by the thuich itself; it does not consritute a critical analysis. r5. The chinese case remains extremely difficult to predict; there are signs, however, of considerable religious growrh &orh christian and Buddhist) in recent decades. See Tir Weiming (1996). 16' Freston (zoor:65-9) indicates the complexiry of this story in which there are many vested interests. Quite clearly there is a need to avoid simple
dichotomies.
17. During the recent ethnic troubles in the region, the Melanesian Brothers have provided a saG refuge for those forced out of their homes and their work on the island of Guadalcanal. The Brothers are amongst the Gw trusted by all sides in the conflict.
Chapter 6:
cor.rcspru^L
MAps
of the W'estern press. Despite the separation 5.
r.
6.
new constitution includes an invocation imploring the aid of Divine Providence, EDSA is a shortened form of Epinio de los Santos Avenue, a major
of Church and State, the
preamble
to the
z. similar and
Most commentators agree that this is a good thing. Exceptions still exist, however - for example in parts of poland where a high percentage of priests can still exert an effective pastoral discipline on rhe rural population.
thoroughfare in Metro Manila.
equally innovative forms of religion do, of course, exist in Europe. Their emergence and continuing significance form an essential part
r66
r67
of the historical account. They remain, however, a secondary rather than dominant motif in the European picture taken as a whole. 3. The contrast between Europe and the United States has caught the eyc of commentators since de Tocqueville onwards; so too the possibility of Americen exceptionalism, reformulated, for example, by Lipset (t996). 4. It is here, moreover, that the historical affinities with Methodism and Puritanism are most clearly displayed. J. It can - indeed should - be supplemented by the developed theoretical account of these issues offered in Martin (zoora). 6. A small but reveding example can be found in American theatre prograrnmes, in which large numbers of the cast unselfconsciously thank God, alongside their families, both for their talents and for the success that they are enjoying. 7. This correspondence was lent to me by the Director. It consists in some 45o letters relating partly to the 'Seeing Salvation' exhibition in the National Gallery and pardy to the television prograrnme of the same title. As a response to the television programmes, the number of letters was in linc
to an exhibition, it was exceptional. 8. A more detailed version of the argument in this section can be found in Davie (forthcorning). 9. My Nordic (more specifically Danish) colleagues are parricularly concerned with the influence of Islam in the European context. Privatised Islam makes no sense and the struggle to find appropriate models for Islam in Europe will afect the host society as much as the in-coming conrmunities - a point
LIST OF REFERENCES
Abrams, M., Gerard, D. and Timms, Basingstoke, Macmillan.
N. (1985)
Values
and Social Change in Britain,
Adachi, T. (tSq+) 'The Morion as srranger', in Reuiew of Indonesian and Malaysion Afairs, z8/r: 13-34. Ahern, G. and Davie, G. (1987) Inner City God: the Naturc oJ BelieJ in the Inner Ciry, London, Hodder and Stoughton.
Ammerman,
N.
with previous experience;
(ICSZ) Congregation anil Community, New Brunswick, NJ,
as a response
ro.
that echoes a major theme in these lectures. Such an approach reflects the notion of ideal-type'first developed by Weber; that is a 'pure' type against which the multiple examples of reality can be
measured.
Rutgers Universiry Press. Ashford, S. and Timms, N. (1992) What Europe Thinlu: a Study oJ West European Values, Ndershot, Dartmourh. Bckstrdm, A. (ISCS) FrBn staukyrlea till fri folkkyrka (From State Church to Free Folk Church), Stockholm, Verbum Publisher. Bckstriim, A. and Bromander, J. (1995) I(yrkobyggnaden och det ffintliga rumnet, Uppsda, Svenska Kyrkans Utredningar (contains an English summary). Baker, D. (1997)'From pottery to politics: the rransformation of Korean Catholicism', in L. Lancaster and R. Payne (eds.), Religion and Society in Contemporary Korea, Berkeley, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of
rr.
rz.
The University of Michigan is the centre of a worldwide network in this respect, which can be accessed through the World Values Survey website wvs.isr.umich.edu.
California, :,z748.
'Early Modernities', Daedalus, tz7/3, svmmer r998; 'Multiple Modernities',
Daedalus, rz9lr, winter zooo. 13. A second set of questions follows from this position: those that relate to the causd sequence. Do economic changes engender cultural change (the Marxist position) or do cultural values themselves encourage/influence economic endeavour (the Weberian position)? This ongoing debate lies at the heart of social scientific discussion.
Barker, D., Halman, L. and Vloet, A. (1992) The Ewopean Values Stuily 1961-1990: Summary Reporr (published by the Gordon Cook Foundation on behalf of the European Values Group). Barrett, D. (1982) World Chistian Encyclopedia: a Comparatiue Study oJ Churches and Religions in the Modern World AD lgoo-2ooo, Oxford, Oxford Universiry
Press.
Barrett, D., Kurian, G. and Johnson, T. (zoor) World Chrktian Encyclopedia:

Comparatiue Study Bastian,
of
Churches
anil
Religions
in
the Modern World (second
It is also worth pointing out the position ofJapan in the World Values framework; in WVS terms this is a further example of a society which is both highly modern and highly secular. 15. The intrinsic nature of diversiry in the modernisation process emerges es much ftom the volume on 'Ear Modernities' as it does from the one on 'Multiple Modernities'. 16. Eisenstadt (1999) offers a fuller discussion of the nature of fundamentalism in the modern world.
14.
edition), Oxford, Oxford Universiry Press. J.-P (1992) 'Les protestantismes latino-am6ricains: un objet interroger et construire', Social Compass,3g/3i 327-54. (rgSd It Prctestdntisme en Amrique latine: une approehe socio-historique, Geneva,
Labor et Fides.
Bastian, J.-P and Collange, J.-F (ISSC) (eds.) L'Europe la recherche ile son me, Geneva, Labor et Fides. Bellah, R. $g7o) fuyond Belief Essays on Religion in a post Tiaditional World, New York, Harper and Row. Berger, P (196) The Sacreil Canopy. Elements oJ a Soeiologieal Theory oJ Religion, New York, Doubleday. (rggz) A Far Clory: the Quest for Faith in an Age oJ Creilaljry, New york, Free
Press.
r68
Nofer
t69
For my Swedish friends who made it all possible.
,.,C
i,
ONTENTS
vl ix
ETTING THE SCENE: THE PARAMETERS OF FAITH IN MODERN EUROPE ,MERICAN ACTIVITY: A VIBRANT RELIGIOUS MARKET
27
LATIN AMERICA: AN EXMPLE OF GLOBAL PENTECOSTALISM

First published in zooz by Darton, Longnan andTodd Ltd
54
Spencer Court
4;.;
AFRICAN TNTTIATIVES: AN ,TILTERNATIVE vIEw oF GLoBAL

I
RELIGIoN
84
r4o- r4z Wandsworth High Street
London swrS
.DISPORA POPULATIONS
Reprinted 2oo7, 2oog, zoto

@
CHNISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN THE FAR EAST

ONCEPTUAL MAPS
II2
r37
zoo: Grace Davie
The right of Grace Davie to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordange with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Agl 1933'
of References
ISBN ro: o-z3z-S24zS-4 ISBN r3: 978-0- 232- 525425'
3
r62 r69 r78
A catalogue recond for this book is available from the British Libr11y.
qf
Thbles
of church attendance in West Europe rggg/2ooo

Designed by Sandie Boccacci Phototypeset in rr{/I4pt Bimbo by Inrype Libra Ltd, London Printed and bound in Grcat Britain by Intype Libra Ltd, London
of religious belief in West Europe rggg/zooo of non-Catholic groups registered in the

change
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in South Rorea 196z-94
r25
ARUM THEOLOGICAL LECTURES
UROPE: IHE EXCEPTIONAL CASE

of Faith in the Modern World

The Exceptical Case

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to the many who have given me their time and their advice in order to make the chapters that

rING THE SCENE: PARAMETERS OF FAITH

the ori .,'.,"",@r%

on the theme that exist in

olusp,; and the ird w-ill inupdgssboth thp

ins in the first instance.

and frequently pivotal point

of material concerns erqpjrigaldata

different kinds of variables

Europe: The Exceptional Case

't" variables' t" ."..,ton with a greet many other

abdication of religious belief

Europe: The ExcePtional Case

Frequency of church attendance in West Europe 1999/2000

of rcligious belief in West Europe i999l2000 (some

25.3 27.8 22.8 32.5 33.5 32.5

46.6 60.4 9.7 13.9 15.2

71.4 61.5 95.5 93.5 96.4 86.7

31.2 85.3 58.7 60.0 50.8

79.2 72.8 47.3

39.8 85.7 73.2 71.2

55.8 30.9 37.4 86.6

42.7 26.2 32.3 0.2

18.4 61.4 58.7 31.2

20.6 67.1 64.3 25.7

59.8 55.6 90.5

82.5 84.4 53.4

Data supplied by the European Values Study, University of Tilburg

by European Values Srudy, Universiry of Tilburg

Europe: The Exceptional Case

Europe: The Exceptional Case

job to do - it preserved the

Europe: The Exceptional Case

notably the French) in coming to terms with

Europe: The Exceptional Case

to the Latin American material. The correlation

,t generational shift with

"" at different'pttd'"- "

'J::#to *n"both religious practice and strictly Christian "nsiderbelief

independent varr"'Y-^'llr:::TiJJTt '1:*

Fnrll to provide any meaningful information

Europe: The Exceptional Case

!o draw on the capital at crucial times in their

Europe: The Exceptional Case

ItL to ihe exclusion of all other factors'

of Britain, for example, he fails to explain

Europe: The Exceptional Case

Europe: The Exceptional Case

Europe: The Exceptional Case

the completion of the Sarum Theological Lectures themselves,

the gathering of data ion - accounting sociologically for the data

Europe: The Exceptional Case

Europe: The Exceptional Case

the absence of a religious right is for them quite

Europe: The Exceptional Case

Europe: The Exceptional Case

:'Atlantic, a debate provoked very largely by the work

Europe: The Exceptional Case

Europe: The Exceptional Case

each have their own centres of worship and community

which relatcs to competing, and relatively

Europe: The Exceptional Case

Europe: The Exceptional Case