Selemce & Education 7: 425-480, 1998. © 18S Kluwer Acadernic Pubishers. Printed in he Netherlands Limits of Constructivism: Kant, Piaget and Peirce M. OTTE Insite for Didakik dee Mashemank, Universitar Bielefeld, Pestface 100131, D-33501 Bielejetd. Germany (Presented atthe Centennial Conference of Piaget’ Rich: “The Growing Mind in Geneva Sepieriber 1996) ABSTRACT, The paradox of mathematical knowledge that mathematics cannot be con cived of as completely separated fon empiriea! experieace and yet eannot be explained by empiricist epistemology (for 2 slghiy diferent and more elaborate foxmutation ct Blackwell Companion fo Episiemology, 2), can Only be resowvea 1 OME ARLEpES Ina INE ‘causal interations berween Knower and environmeat have themselves generalizing tem sleney. a sort of cominusty, rather than consisting just of singular events. Kart sesolves the Schism hetwecn the continous and the distinc: in a constructivist manne. He assumes that allot knowledge extending cognitions are synthetic. This synthesis does note inthe macer ‘of experience but springs trom the function of cognizant consciousness, Piaget adhored t0 4 Kontanis where "she estegaries are not there atthe outset”. He conceives uf the subject ‘apprehension ofthe world and believes ina Kantanism sich emphases man's active being and potential for unlimited seltdevelopment. But he hes no use for the Kantian idea of space and time as forns of mathematica intuition antian thought is abo ceatra to Peitee’s philosophy and conception of mathematics. But Peizce emphusizes the sole of perception and analysis a sts prerequisites, Peitce’s and Piaget’ origins in Kantianism are exhibited when dork ty to replace the Aristotelian notion Peirce proposes that “hypostatic shwtactina” is the ebief explanation for the power of mathematical eascning and explains: “This operation is performed when something, that fone fzs thought about any subject, is itself muade s subject of though. Paget speaks of Feneeive tosriceion tial concen, musing f ony tins ot nhc knowiedges at separating it completely from empirical abstraction. L THE CONTINUITY PRINCIPLE AND THE REALITY OF IDEAL OBJECTS Reality is infinitely varied compared even with the subtlest workings of conceptual or theoretical thought. Reality is not a unique and homogene- ous thing. Reality strives for infinite graduation of being, of perspective, and of communication. Therefore, the principle of continuity was the most important methodological and epistemological device since the days of Newton and Leibniz, Lovejoy, in his important The Great Chain of Being, pursues its roots much farther back into Antiquity. Aristotle, although being foremost the great representative of classical logic which rests upon. the assumption of the possibility of clear divisions and rigorous classifica tion, had already made the observation that “*Nature refuses to conform to our cravings for clear lines of demarcation” and “*he first suggested the limitations and dangers of classification” (Lovejoy 1936, 56). Aristotle thereby became responsible for the introduction ot the principle ot conti-£26 M. OTTE hulty tino mira Bistory. “And the Very terms ane altustrations used by a hundred later writers down to Locke and Leibniz and beyond. show that they were but repeating Aritotle’s expressions of this idea” (Lovejoy 1936, 38). Eves since, hese wo sides of cognition, the Intuitive or ngurat- ive and the logical and operative, have remained opposed to one another: The first represents the rich but particular perspective of monadie beings, dre sceund ies «w Uvercoure chs particularity In an abstractive snd formal way. It is on such distinctions between the intuitive and the discursive processes of the mind, writes Peitve, “that the greater systems have been founded". Now dhe prineiple of cominulty way meant w give the generat and the particular their complementary roles. Lovejoy had thus to conclude that the continuity principle was transformed into a temporalized fom vr thet iy impertance disappeared ahogetter st Mle beginalny OF the 0th century and with the appearance of evolutionistic theories on the one hand, which had multiplied since the last quarter of the [8th century, and of wuustustive suuciutolisut on Mie Udier. Kaui is) pacvivula introduced a radical separation between the reality of things in themselves and of phenomena or appearances, limiting the principle of continuity to the lottsr, Kant hoa! leaeut Gone Thaiie that sclativis aie eatciisal, alte aliey represent nothing of the essence of the relata, Continuity we find. accord- ing ta Kant, only ia the realm of phenomena as they are synthezised by activity, Kant ainl Piaget wee eoseutially ulin, staadg fou uve beter that whatever connection, coherence or continuity there is, it is result of the subject’s constructive offorts. rather than a precondition of making these efforts meaningful In contrast to Kant’s views one should rather understand the continuity principle as stating that we understand something only on the basis of change and evolution, dat is rue ive conditions uf ts gonesin, libs Sunt fation, although beeing rather vague nevertheless runs counter the empi cist interpretation, for instance, John Stuart Mill’s interpretation in terms, of an auiumed “Uniformity of Nature from the narrowing of constructivism, which, while taking into account only the activity of the subject as such a condition of genesis, claims that in referring to these different interpretations of the continuity principle we may not only obtain a first idea of the differences between Peirce’s views fon the ono side and Piuget’s on the other, but are also led to ouspsel that the notions of space and of perception should provide major points of isagrecment for both positions The groatost fault of Kant’s epistemology, according to Peirce, was at the same time “the greatest merit of his doctrine: it lay in his sharp discrimination of the intuitive and the discursive processes of the mind. [cant] saw far moro cloarly then any predecessor had done the whole philosophical import of this distinction. This was what emaneipated him from Leibnizianism, and at the same time tumed him against sensational- fem. ... Buthe drow too hard a lino between the operations of observation, Aunt iC alsu listinguistyes ieselt understand what we ourselves have constructed, Tbelicve taatLIMITS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM aur ‘aud of 1atiuuiuation, He allows himself ty fall imw die Mabie UF Uriuing that the latter only begins after the former is complete: and wholly fails to sce that even the simplest syllogistic conclusion can only be drawn by ouserving ie setaiony UF IE Letiny in Uhe premises aud conclusive (Peirce. CP 1.35), Kant tried to free himsolf from Leitniz’ rationalism and in particular font Leibuiiz® asscitiow vat eaisieme Gaius wih 1apeLe Ww Ubjective reality can be established by conceptual reasoning (thus making all know!- edge essentially analytical or necessary, although perhaps only God's in- five sind ql tay peaveive Ulin), THis i9 what Peiuee Ia allel “Ue a valuable” proposition that the Critique of Pure Reason contains, Kant had seen that mathematics cannot be based on conceptual, discursive reasoning Ines Ievaune vauneptual ju or constructions do not imply the existence of the referents about whieh they speuk. This stands in contrast to Cantor's thesis that consisteney is alo sulfigiont fur caisienee ite satle constructive epistemology, which claims that mathematicat structures ean gel along without existence or mathematical objects, being themselves the ition Of fasts der clopussat According to both Kant and to Peitce, mathematics is synthetic or depending on ever now aets of synthesis. It deals with (ideal) objects (Kant uses the form “oehena’”), which have te be instantiated and presented in intuition, because, us Kant had shown, and Peirce as well as Wittgenstein have repeated after him, we cannot express the relationship between the seul world ond our linguistic descriptions in terms of longuage and conceptual thinking alone, Piaget, on the one hand shying away from empiricism, and not seeing the pomibilitics which semiotics has to offer on the other, retaina the constructive element while largely ignoring the intuitive or perceptual. Most importantly, Piaget wanted to get rid of empiricism. Piaget is so afraid of senaationaliam and 30 concerned with the ave sary character of structural development that he does not use his own insights with respect to the subject-object interaction in visual perception to conceive of the question of how the relation between the particular and the gonorul, us well ay development or evolution, which essentially consists in transforming some possibles into actual realities Why should synthesis not be facilitated by our pereoption of gonoral possibil From a constructivist point of view the possible has no meaning apart from the subject who considers something possible. But Piaget is con- comod with novescary knowledge and therefore tries to conneet the possi ble andl the necessary by attributing them to structures and to structural development. Piaget conceived of the possible, strictly as of what is coating ve prodoter mined by it and which is actualized by the subsequent structure, “Thus there exists psychologically a kind of causality of the possible, in the sense that, givon thir teastura, the ingui to a certain operative cteucture and therefore in ie divootod in torme of the porsiblitioe