SQUO

Contention one is Inherency: Lack of a global transparent maritime information network is collapsing maritime domain awareness recent satellite launches set the stage for effective integration but no plans have been made. Earles 10 (Marion Rick, Owner of E&A; Executive Director for CANEUS US at Earles & Associates and CANEUS US, CANEUS USA, International
Collaborative Aerospace Development Micro-Nano-Technologies: From Concepts to Systems, CANEUS International is a unique non-profit organization of professionals involving public/private partnership, serving primarily the needs of aeronautics, space and defense communities by fostering the coordinated, international development of MNT (Micro-Nano- Technologies) for aerospace and defense applications. CANEUS Shared Small Satellites CSSP Workshop Committee, International Space-Based AIS and Data Extraction Backbone High Level Requirements, http://www.caneus.org/sharedsmallsats/downloads/International_Space-Based_AIS_and_Data_Extraction_Backbone-High_Level_Requirements.pdf, azp)

With greater emphasis being placed on global situational awareness, global asset monitoring, and environmental monitoring, maritime and terrestrial sensor and data acquisition systems are critical enabling capabilities that are becoming more ubiquitous. The need is driven by global security and safety initiatives responsive to the new face of conflict, which involves every sector of society and knows no geographic boundaries. Because much of the Earths surface is unwired and governed loosely, if at all, and because illicit activity seems to flourish where transparency is lacking, there may be important gains in collecting data and monitoring activity in just such places: the open seas, jungles, deserts, and the polar regions. We feel that moving data out of these areas, which are not supported by electrical or communications grids, suggests the need for a global space-based data collection and distribution backbone.. Furthermore, we feel that creating such a system should be undertaken as an international collaborative effort, with no significant barriers to entry. A number of national space agencies, consortia, and commercial interests have been active in deploying AIS receivers and data extraction capabilities on satellites; however, there currently exists no global partnership to coordinate and organize all the disparate efforts especially one that ensures the availability of these capabilities to otherwise underserved countries. To further develop the concept of an internationally shared data collection and distribution backbone in space, CANEUS is organizing a workshop to explore technical, policy, and financial issues, and to frame an implementation plan. The eventual goal is to establish a public/private partnership that would create a low-cost, internationally shared data collection and distribution backbone in space with exceptionally low barriers to entry for participating nations. The plan: The United States federal government should deploy a constellation of satellites equipped with synthetic aperture radar and integrated into automatic identification system networks.

ADV 1
Contention two is Port Security: Ports in Southeast Asia are vulnerable lack of awareness makes maritime terrorism likely and impossible to respond to. Raj 09 (Andrin Raj, visting research fellow, The Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) Stratad Asia Pacific Research Center, 2009, Japans
initiatives in security cooperation in the straits of Malacca on maritime security and in southeast asia: piracy and maritime terrorism,http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/fellow_report/090331-Andrin_Raj.pdf, azp)

Hence, the same objectives can be driven together in a more profound way in using maritime terrorism to shape its core ideological goals. Evidence gathered from Jemaah Islamiyah and supported by Al Qaeda shows prove that the militant religious extremist group in this region is indeed set out to make the Southeast Asia region an Islamic hegemony based on extremeness ideological beliefs.xxiv In keeping with its ideological beliefs, JI will continue to act on all approaches in respect to the call for Jihadism towards the West and nations that are allied to the West in particular to the United States. Singapore authorities uncovered plans of an attack on US naval vessels transiting the Johore Straits in 2001. Seized documents included maps; operational planning and video footage had been made for a maritime suicide attack on US naval ships.xxv Information gathered from intelligence sources, as reported in the media, states that such possible maritime attacks are possible than initially imagined. The Director of Indonesias State Intelligence Agency in 2004 confirmed that such attacks on shipping in the Straits of Malacca had been planned by captured JI operatives in detention who had admitted to it.xxvi US intelligence also reported the same time that they had intercepted JIs communication activities revealing a plot to seize a vessel using local pirates. The possibility of using the vessel and arming it with explosives to either direct it towards another vessel or just sinking it in the busy sea route of the Straits is something not to be overlooked.xxvii This clearly determines a clear interest for these militant groups operating in the Southeast Asia region to pursue maritime targets with pirates operating in the Straits of Malacca or even around the SEA region. In light of Singapores view on the nexus of piracy and terrorism, it is convinced by its intelligence report that piracy and terrorist have joined forces to target the island republics port and shipping facilities and hence in December of 2003 warned that an attack in the Straits is real and imminent. In the same statement it concluded that due to the number of pirate attacks at the southern end of the Straits made it extremely difficult to distinguish criminal acts of piracy from potential acts of terrorism and that no distinction should therefore be made between piracy and terrorism.xxviii The discourse from Singapore did not warrant a course of concern to either Malaysia or Indonesia, which viewed the issues as not a worrisome threat. In 2000 the ASG landed on the island of Sipadan and kidnapped twenty-one Malaysian and foreign tourist from the resort island and took them hostage. The incident was a watershed for Malaysia, has it seemed incapable of safeguarding its sovereign territory from foreign intrusions. Prior to the press release on the above kidnappings and hostage takings, the authorities reported that it was pure act of piracy and it should not be considered as a terrorist operation. Further to this, what was seen as a pirate attack, turned out to be a terrorist modus-operandi in full fledge camouflage outfits when they literally landed on the island, equipped with semi and automatic weapons. The fact also remained that they did not take food and other essentials was something to be concerned about, as usually pirates will take whatever they can get their hands on. The reality of these attacks can very well justify the means of terrorist groups operating within the Southeast Asia region to be of a major threat to maritime operations and attacks along the coastal waterways of Southeast Asian waters on the Sea-Lines of Communication (SLOC). There are two impacts: First, pirates will target LNG tankers. Raj 09 (Andrin Raj, visting research fellow, The Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) Stratad Asia Pacific Research Center, 2009, Japans
initiatives in security cooperation in the straits of Malacca on maritime security and in southeast asia: piracy and maritime terrorism,http://www2.jiia.or.jp/pdf/fellow_report/090331-Andrin_Raj.pdf, azp)

In addition to the high number of pirate attacks in the region, a number of which have involved the hijacking of more high-risk vessels, such as LNG, crude oil or other such inflammable chemical containers has led to worry that terrorist could use copycat methods to takeover a vessel for more sinister reasons. They could also higher local pirates to accomplish these attacks. A visit by Vice Admiral Terry Cross of the U.S. Coast Guard to Malaysia in 2005 told the media that the ease with which pirate attacks were taking place in the

Straits of Malacca could alert terrorist to the opportunities for seizing oil tankers and that these could be used as floating bombs. xxix Similar remarks have been made by IMO on the hijacking of the MT Tri Samudra by pirates in the Straits of Malacca on its cargo of inflammable petrochemical products in 2005.xxx LNG tankers and their potential role in a scenario of this kind have probably received the most attention from security experts. In its liquid state, natural gas is not explosive, and it is in is in this form that it is shipped in large quantities via refrigerated tankers. Once in the open air, LNG quickly evaporates and forms a highly combustible visible cloud. It has been reported that if ignited the resulting fire could be hot enough to melt steel at a distance of 1.200 feet, and could result in second-degree burns on exposed skin a mile away.xxxi A fire of this magnitude would be impossible to extinguish and contrary to the littoral states of preparedness, they would not be able to handle the claustrophobic burning of the LNG. The fire will burn until all fuel is absorbed. The impact of such an attack in a port like Singapore would be devastating. There would be loss of life and severe structural damage in the immediate area. The most likely way a terrorist group would carry out such a major attack is using an LNG tanker rather than any other cargo, whereby to create an explosion onboard the vessel as it is rammed into the target. Although crude oil can be devastating, in my opinion is not of particular interest to terrorist groups to mount an attack using crude oil containers. That outweighs nuclear war. Lovins and Lovins 01 (Brittle Power, Amory Bloch Lovins (born November 13, 1947)[3] is an American environmental scientist and writer,
Chairman and Chief Scientist of the Rocky Mountain Institute. He has worked in the field of energy policy and related areas for four decades. Harvard University-educated, he was named by Time magazine one of the World's 100 most influential people in 2009., L. Hunter Lovins (ne Sheldon, born 1950) is an author and a promoter of sustainable development for over 30 years, is president of Natural Capitalism Solutions, a 501(c)3 non-profit in Longmont, Colorado and the Chief Insurgent of the Madrone Project, azp)

LNG is less than half as dense as water, so a cubic meter of LNG (the usual unit of measure) weighs just over half a ton.1 LNG contains about thirty percent less energy per cubic meter than oil, but is potentially far more hazardous.2 Burning oil cannot spread very far on land or water, but a cubic meter of spilled LNG rapidly boils into about six hundred twenty cubic meters of pure natural gas, which in turn mixes with surrounding air. Mixtures of between about five and fourteen percent natural gas in air are flammable. Thus a single cubic meter of spilled LNG can make up to twelve thousand four hundred cubic meters of flammable gas-air mixture. A single modern LNG tanker typically holds one hundred twenty-five thousand cubic meters of LNG, equivalent to twenty-seven hundred million cubic feet of natural gas. That gas can form between about twenty and fifty billion cubic feet of flammable gas-air mixtureseveral hundred times the volume of the Great Pyramid of Cheops. About nine percent of such a tankerload of LNG will probably, if spilled onto water, boil to gas in about five minutes.3 (It does not matter how cold the water is; it will be at least two hundred twentyeight Fahrenheit degrees hotter than the LNG, which it will therefore cause to boil violently.) The resulting gas, however, will be so cold that it will still be denser than air. It will therefore flow in a cloud or plume along the surface until it reaches an ignition source. Such a plume might extend at least three miles downwind from a large tanker spill within ten to twenty minutes.4 It might ultimately reach much fartherperhaps six to twelve miles.5 If not ignited, the gas is asphyxiating. If ignited, it will burn to completion with a turbulent diffusion flame reminiscent of the 1937 Hindenberg disaster but about a hundred times as big. Such a fireball would burn everything within it, and by its radiant heat would cause third-degree burns and start fires a mile or two away.6 An LNG fireball can blow through a city, creating a very large number of ignitions and explosions across a wide area. No present or foreseeable equipment can put out a very large [LNG]... fire.7 The energy content of a single standard LNG tanker (one hundred twenty-five thousand cubic meters) is equivalent to seven-tenths of a megaton of TNT, or about fifty-five Hiroshima bombs. Second, port terror collapses the global economy the timeframe is three weeks. Flynn 03 (Stephen, Natl Sec Studies, The Fragile state of container security, testimony before the senate, March 20
http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=573, azp)

A year later I joined with former senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart in preparing our report, America: Still UnpreparedStill In Danger. We observed that nineteen men wielding box-cutters forced the United States to do to itself what no adversary could ever accomplish: a successful blockade of the U.S. economy. If a surprise terrorist attack were to happen tomorrow involving the sea, rail, or truck transportation systems that carry millions of tons of trade to the United States each day, the response would likely be the samea selfimposed global embargo. Based on that analysis, we identified as second of the six critical mandates that deserve the nations immediate attention: Make trade security a global priority; the system for moving goods affordably and reliably around the world is ripe for exploitation and vulnerable to mass disruption by

terrorists. This is why the topic of todays hearing is so important. The stakes are enormous. U.S. prosperity and much of its powerrelies on its ready access to global markets. Both the scale and pace at which goods move between markets has exploded in recent years thanks in no small part to the invention and proliferation of the intermodal container. These ubiquitous boxesmost come in the 40x8x8 sizehave transformed the transfer of cargo from a truck, train, and ship into the transportation equivalent of connecting Lego blocks. The result has been to increasingly diminish the role of distance for a supplier or a consumer as a constraint in the world marketplace. Ninety percent of the worlds freight now moves in a container. Companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors move up to 30 tons of merchandise or parts across the vast Pacific Ocean from Asia to the West Coast for about $1600. The transatlantic trip runs just over a $1000which makes the postage stamp seem a bit overpriced. But the system that underpins the incredibly efficient, reliable, and affordable movement of global freight has one glaring shortcoming in the post-9-11 worldit was built without credible safeguards to prevent it from being exploited or targeted by terrorists and criminals. Prior to September 11, 2001, virtually anyone in the world could arrange with an international shipper or carrier to have an empty intermodal container delivered to their home or workplace. They then could load it with tons of material, declare in only the most general terms what the contents were, seal it with a 50-cent lead tag, and send it on its way to any city and town in the United States. The job of transportation providers was to move the box as expeditiously as possible. Exercising any care to ensure that the integrity of a containers contents was not compromised may have been a commercial practice, but it was not a requirement. The responsibility for making sure that goods loaded in a box were legitimate and authorized was shouldered almost exclusively by the importing jurisdiction. But as the volume of containerized cargo grew exponentially, the number of agents assigned to police that cargo stayed flat or even declined among most trading nations. The rule of thumb in the inspection business is that it takes five agents three hours to conduct a thorough physical examination of a single full intermodal container. Last year nearly 20 million containers washed across Americas borders via a ship, train, and truck. Frontline agencies had only enough inspectors and equipment to examine between 1-2 percent of that cargo. Thus, for would-be terrorists, the global intermodal container system that is responsible for moving the overwhelming majority of the worlds freight satisfies the age-old criteria of opportunity and motive. Opportunity flows from (1) the almost complete absence of any security oversight in the loading and transporting of a box from its point of origin to its final destination, and (2) the fact that growing volume and velocity at which containers move around the planet create a daunting needle-in-thehaystack problem for inspectors. Motive is derived from the role that the container now plays in underpinning global supply chains and the likely response by the U.S. government to an attack involving a container. Based on statements by the key officials at U.S. Customs, the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Transportation, should a container be used as a poor mans missile, the shipment of all containerized cargo into our ports and across our borders would be halted. As a consequence, a modest investment by a terrorist could yield billions of dollars in losses to the U.S. economy by shutting downeven temporarilythe system that moves just-in-time shipments of parts and goods. Given the current state of container security, it is hard to imagine how a post-event lock-down on container shipments could be either prevented or short-lived. One thing we should have learned from the 9-11 attacks involving passenger airliners, the follow-on anthrax attacks, and even last fall Washington sniper spree is that terrorist incidents pose a special challenge for public officials. In the case of most disasters, the reaction by the general public is almost always to assume the event is an isolated one. Even if the post-mortem provides evidence of a systemic vulnerability, it often takes a good deal of effort to mobilize a public policy response to redress it. But just the opposite happens in the event of a terrorist attackespecially one involving catastrophic consequences. When these attacks take place, the assumption by the general public is almost always to presume a general vulnerability unless there is proof to the contrary. Government officials have to confront head-on this loss of public confidence by marshalling evidence that they have a credible means to manage the risk highlighted by the terrorist incident. In the interim as recent events have shown, people will refuse to fly, open their mail, or even leave their homes. If a terrorist were to use a container as a weapon-delivery devise, the easiest choice would be high-explosives such as those used in the attack on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Some form of chemical weapon, perhaps even involving hazardous materials, is another likely scenario. A bio-weapon is a less attractive choice for a terrorist because of the challenge of dispersing the agent in a sufficiently concentrated form beyond the area where the explosive devise goes off. A dirty bomb is the more likely threat vs. a nuclear weapon, but all these scenarios are conceivable since the choice of a weapon would not be constrained by any security measures currently in place in our seaports or within the intermodal transportation industry. This is why a terrorist attack involving a cargo container could cause such profound economic disruption. An incident triggered by even a conventional weapon going off in a box could result in a substantial loss of life. In the immediate aftermath, the general public will want reassurance that one of the

many other thousands of containers arriving on any given day will not pose a similar risk. The President of the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other keys officials responsible for the security of the nation would have to stand before a traumatized and likely skeptical American people and outline the measures they have in place to prevent another such attack. In the absence of a convincing security framework to manage the risk of another incident, the public would likely insist that all containerized cargo be stopped until adequate safeguards are in place. Even with the most focused effort, constructing that framework from scratch could take monthseven years. Yet, within three weeks, the entire worldwide intermodal transportation industry would effectively be brought to its kneesas would much of the freight movements that make up international trade. The impact is global war. Royal 10 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction U.S. Department of Defense, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the
Problem of Economic Crises, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

Even if the attack fails perceived vulnerability creates irreversible bottlenecks and leads to protectionism. Nazery 08 (Nazery, Senior Research Fellow at Maritime Institute of Malaysias (MIMA), a think-tank that conducts maritime policy research for the
Malaysian Government and the industry. The thrust of his centers research is in the field of maritime economics, with a focus on ports, shipping, multimodal transport, freight logistics, offshore oil and gas, maritime supply chain, and maritime trade issues, In ports We trust: the Economic consequence of Attacks on ports Asian Energy Security: Regional Cooperation In The Malacca Strait, 2008, pg 8892,http://www.navy.gov.au/w/images/PIAMA23.pdf, azp)

Although it is a matter of debate whether ports present legitimate, high-value targets for terrorists, the occurrence of various scenarios at ports could adversely affect the smooth flow of seaborne trade and therefore global trade. The toppling of structures like super post-Panamax cranes due to sabotage could halt quay operations and cause berthing delays for ships and processing delays for cargo. The discovery of a shipment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) materials such as uranium for the purpose of mounting terrorist attacks and even terrorist personnel inside container boxes can trigger the kind of panic and frantic response that can paralyse the global maritime supply chain.2 A suicide attack on a chemical tanker or crude oil tanker at the entrance channel of a busy port could result in its closure and disrupt shipping traffic and cargo delivery. All these could lead to bottlenecks forming along the maritime supply chain whose efficiency depends on the efficient running of its various sub-chains and components along it. A breakdown anywhere along the chain as can arise from a single incident or a combination of several incidents could disrupt the flow of the goods. Economic interdependence solves all war protectionism creates conflicts, our evidence is reverse causal. Boudreux 6 (Donald J. Boudreux, Chairman of the economics department at George Mason University, 11/20/06, Want world peace? Support free
trade, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1120/p09s02-coop.html, azp)

Back in 1748, Baron de Montesquieu observed that ". Peace is the natural effect of trade Two nations who differ with each other become reciprocally dependent; for if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling; and thus their union is founded on their mutual necessities." If Mr. Montesquieu is correct that trade promotes peace, then protectionism a retreat from open trade raises the chances of war. Plenty of empirical evidence confirms the wisdom of Montesquieu's insight: Trade does indeed promote peace. During the past 30 years, Solomon Polachek, an economist at the State University of New York at Binghamton, has researched the relationship between trade and peace. In his most recent paper on the topic, he and coauthor Carlos Seiglie of Rutgers University review the massive amount of research on trade, war, and peace. They find that "the overwhelming evidence indicates that trade reduces conflict." Likewise for foreign investment. The greater the amounts that foreigners invest in the United States, or the more that Americans invest abroad, the lower is the likelihood of war between America and those countries with which it has investment relationships. Professors Polachek and Seiglie conclude that, "The policy implication of our finding is that further international cooperation in reducing barriers to both trade and capital flows can promote a more peaceful world." Columbia University political scientist Erik Gartzke reaches a similar but more general conclusion: Peace is fostered by economic freedom. Economic freedom certainly includes, but is broader than, the freedom of ordinary people to trade internationally. It includes also low and transparent rates of taxation, the easy ability of entrepreneurs to start new businesses, the lightness of regulations on labor, product, and credit markets, ready access to sound money, and other factors that encourage the allocation of resources by markets rather than by government officials. Professor Gartzke ranks countries on an economicfreedom index from 1 to 10, with 1 being very unfree and 10 being very free. He then examines military conflicts from 1816 through 2000. His findings are powerful: Countries that rank lowest on an economic-freedom index with scores of 2 or less are 14 times more likely to be involved in military conflicts than are countries whose people enjoy significant economic freedom (that is, countries with scores of 8 or higher). Also important, the findings of Polachek and Gartzke improve our understanding of the long-recognized reluctance of democratic nations to wage war against one another. These scholars argue that the so-called democratic peace is really the capitalist peace. Democratic institutions are heavily concentrated in countries that also have strong protections for private property rights, openness to foreign commerce, and other features broadly consistent with capitalism. That's why the observation that any two democracies are quite unlikely to go to war against each other might reflect the consequences of capitalism more than democracy. And that's just what the data show. Polachek and Seiglie find that openness to trade is much more effective at encouraging peace than is democracy per se. Similarly, Gartzke discovered that, "When measures of both economic freedom and democracy are included in a statistical study, economic freedom is about 50 times more effective than democracy in diminishing violent conflict." These findings make sense. By promoting prosperity, economic freedom gives ordinary people a large stake in peace. This prosperity is threatened during wartime. War almost

always gives government more control over resources and imposes the burdens of higher taxes, higher inflation, and other disruptions of the everyday commercial relationships that support prosperity. When commerce reaches across political borders, the peace-promoting effects of economic freedom intensify. Why? It's bad for the bottom line to shoot your customers or your suppliers, so the more you trade with foreigners the less likely you are to seek, or even to tolerate, harm to these foreigners.

Contention three is Offshore Partnering:

ADV 2

Tensions in the South China Sea are high absent a shift in maritime strategy even small disputes can ignite huge conflicts. Ross 10/25/11 (Robert S., professor of political science at Boston College and an associate at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at
Harvard University, Chinese Nationalism and Its Discontents, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/chinese-nationalism-itsdiscontents-6038, azp)

THE TRUTH is China is neither particularly militarily strong nor particularly domestically stable. Beijings combative diplomacy was not spurred by American economic weakness in the wake of the recession, and it was far from an indicator of growing Chinese confidence. On the contrary, in recent years Beijing has not deployed and operationalized significant new advanced naval capabilities, and its domestic economic environment is worse today than at any time since the onset of the post-Mao economic reforms in 1978. Beyond its coastal waters, Chinas naval capability remains dependent on its advanced diesel submarines, which were first deployed in the mid-1990s. By 2000, Chinas submarine force had already begun to pose a formidable challenge to U.S. naval operations in the western Pacific Ocean. But since then it has not deployed any additional naval capabilities that pose consequential new challenges to the U.S. Navy or to Americas defense of its security partners. China still cannot independently manufacture advanced military aircraft, and it has yet to deploy a single Chinese-designed advanced aircraft. The J-15 and J-20 fighter planes are still in development. It has finally launched its first aircraft carrier, but it does not have aircraft for the carrier. Its antipiracy naval operations off the coast of Somalia are basic. Its protection of its claims in the South China Sea depends on coast-guard ships. China is developing potentially effective advanced-technology maritime access-denial capabilities, including an improved missile capability, but none of it has yet been adequately tested, much less deployed. Its antiship ballistic-missile program is not operational. Chinas space program is making great progress, but the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) hasnt developed the capacity to significantly challenge U.S. space-based communication capabilities or hasnt built its own space-based war-fighting capability. The PLA is developing drones and air-based radar systems, but again these and other such defense projects remain relatively primitive or experimental. China will continue to modernize its military capabilities, and it will eventually deploy advanced systems that may challenge U.S. security and regional stability, but Beijings new diplomacy cannot be explained by thirty years of defense spending and military modernization. Nor does the strident diplomacy reflect Chinese economic confidence. At the height of the global financial crisis, the Chinese economy continued to grow at approximately 10 percent per year. But beneath this facade of prosperity, Chinas economy was weakening significantly. In October 2008, as the global recession deepened, Chinese leaders unleashed a massive but dysfunctional stimulus program. Not only did it fail to resolve most of the deep-seated problems in the system, it also managed to foster many new ones. Despite the stimulus, unemployment in China remains high in rural areas and among urban college graduates. In 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao estimated that there were 200 million unemployed Chinese. Moreover, during the past two years, inequalityby international standardshas become extremely high. As a result of the stimulus, inflation has soared, affecting the price of food, housing and transportation. By last year, Chinas property bubble had significantly worsened, the condition of national banks had deteriorated more than at any time in the past ten years and local government debt had skyrocketed. Economic growth has increasingly relied on governmentstimulated investment, not on consumptionwhich fuels even-greater inflation. More worrying still, the stateowned sector is expanding at the expense of the private sector, thus undermining innovation while politicizing economic policy making. These are all protracted problems which together suggest that social instability in China will grow and that the Chinese Communist Partys economic-based legitimacy will significantly erode. Beijings problems are only exacerbated by the fact that the tools of Chinese repression are deteriorating. In the past five years, the number of spontaneous small- and large-scale demonstrations has mushroomed. More recently, the Internet has undermined the governments ability to control informationand to minimize nationwide hostility toward the party. It has become an effective device for people to communicate their ire over unemployment and inflation, as well as over political and economic corruption, police brutality, criminal cover-ups, environmental degradation and property seizures. In addition, peer-to-peer microblogging (via Twitter and its Chinese equivalents) can facilitate large-scale, independent and impromptu mass protests. China made its first arrest for a microblog post back in September 2010 during the rallies against Japans detention of the Chinese fisherman. Economic instability and the erosion of the Communist Partys control over society are occurring simultaneously. This domestic weakness has forced the government to rely more and more on nationalism for regime legitimacyand it explains Beijings diplomatic blundering.

As the Chinese people witness their relative position in the world increasing (particularly in light of the decline of Japan), the United States is seen as the obstacle to Chinas international acceptance as a great power, so that Washington is gradually replacing Tokyo as the focus of nationalist resentment. With its influence waning, the party is now more vulnerable to growing strident nationalist opposition. Since January 2010, on the web and in newspapers, nationalists have demanded Chinese international assertiveness before the government can even consider a policy, putting Chinese leaders on the defensive. Indeed, in recent years nationalism has become more widespread in urban areas, infecting not just the military and disaffected youth but also workers, intellectuals, civilian leaders and businesspeople. Moreover, Internet communication technologies enable Chinese nationalists to interact with each other and can facilitate popular protests against Chinese foreign policy, thus magnifying the importance of nationalism and the danger it poses to regime stability. Chinas insecure rulers, preoccupied with domestic stability, are thus compelled to pay evermore attention to nationalist triumphalism as they formulate foreign policy. For the first time since the death of Mao Tse-tung, Chinese leaders have had to choose between using nationalism and strident diplomacy to accommodate their domestic audience and using Chinas peaceful-rise strategy to accommodate the international community. Until recently, China opted for the latter. But since 2009 the partys effort to appease Chinas nationalists has resulted in a bumbling foreign policy that has aroused global animosity and undermined Chinas security. THIS NATIONALIST diplomacy bred considerable anxiety among Americas allies in East Asia. Did Washington have the will to sustain its strategic presence and balance Chinas rise? A robust U.S. diplomatic response was in order. But the United States went too far, challenging Chinas security on its continental periphery , creating the potential for protracted great-power security conflict and heightened regional instability. Following the North Korean sinking of the South Korean naval ship Cheonan in March 2010 and Chinas failure to publicly condemn Pyongyang for the attack, the United States developed a series of effective initiatives in maritime East Asia designed to reaffirm its resolve to contend with the rise of China. Many of these initiatives were necessary and constructive. In late June, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, three U.S. nuclear-powered submarines surfaced simultaneously in Asian ports. In July 2010, during former secretary of defense Robert Gatess visit to Jakarta, the United States agreed to expand military cooperation with Indonesia. In November, during Secretary of State Hillary Clintons trip to New Zealand, the United States agreed to reestablish full military cooperation with the Pacific island nation, despite New Zealands ban on visits by nuclear-powered ships to its ports. The United States expanded military relations with the Philippines and strengthened its commitment to the protection of Japan. During Sino-Japanese tension over the fishing-boat-captain incident, Hillary Clinton stated that the U.S.-Japan defense treaty covered military contingencies involving the disputed Senkaku Islands administered by Japan but also claimed by China. Subsequent to the release of the captain, Washington and Tokyo carried out their largest-ever joint naval exercise. Here then was a strong America reassuring its alliesthis may have encroached on Chinas grand ambitions, but it was an expected and appropriate response. But then there was the overly assertive Washington that launched, in Hillary Clintons formulation, its forward-deployed diplomacy. It was a volte-face of years of American policy, and it was seen as a growingand very different sort ofchallenge by Beijing. During the George W. Bush administration, the United States reduced its troops in South Korea by 40 percent, removed its forces deployed between the demilitarized zone and Seoul, dramatically reduced the size of the annual U.S.-South Korean joint military exercises and stated in the Department of Defenses Quadrennial Defense Review that in 2012 the United States would transfer to Seoul operational command (OPCOM) of South Korean forces. These steps, regardless of the administrations intentions, created a China that was more secure on its periphery. Now, the Obama administration has reversed course. The transfer of OPCOM to South Korea has been deferred for at least three years. Throughout 2010 the United States conducted a series of high-profile, large-scale military exercises with Seoul, including maritime drills in waters west of South Korea. Later in the year, the United States and South Korea signed the new Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation, which called for enhanced combined exercises and interoperability between the two armed forces. These developments all suggested a determined U.S. interest in reestablishing a significant conventional military presence on the peninsula. The U.S. security initiative with South Korea has eroded Beijings confidence over its strategic relationship with Seoul; China is now increasingly dependent on North Korea as its only reliable ally on the peninsula, and it has become more resistant to Korean unification for fear that it could lead to an expanded U.S. military presence closer to Chinas border. Chinese leaders now place ever-greater value on stability in North Korea. Rather than use its economic leverage on Pyongyang in cooperation with U.S. nonproliferation objectives, Beijing has increased its support of North Korean economic and political stability. And in July 2010, as a U.S.-South Korean naval exercise took place in the Yellow Sea, Hillary Clinton launched a new U.S. strategic initiative for Southeast Asia at an Asian regional-security meeting in Hanoi. After Washington held extensive consultations and planning with all of the claimants of the Spratly Islands except China, Secretary Clinton announced Americas support for a

collaborative diplomatic process to resolve the dispute. The move constituted a sharp rebuke to Beijing, which has long claimed sovereignty over the territory, and suggested U.S. intervention in support of the other claimants, which have advocated multilateral negotiations. In addition, the United States had previously expressed support for stability in the South China Sea, but only in Washington, DC, at the assistant-secretary level, and never through prior discussion with any of the involved nations. The administrations forwarddeployed diplomacy also includes strategic cooperation with Vietnam. For over twenty years Washington parried Vietnamese overtures, understanding that Indochina is not a vital interest. Yet, in August, after Clintons support in Hanoi for Vietnamese resistance to Chinese maritime claims, the U.S. Navy, including the aircraft carrier USS George Washington, held a joint training exercise with the Vietnamese navy for the first time. In October, Secretary Gates visited Hanoi, where he proclaimed the potential for expanded U.S.Vietnamese defense cooperation and his hope that Vietnam would continue to participate in military exercises with the United States. Later that month, Clinton returned to Hanoi and declared U.S. interest in developing a strategic partnership with Vietnam and in cooperating with the country on maritime security. She then visited Phnom Penh and urged Cambodia to establish greater foreign-policy independence from China. In addition, for the first time the United States expressed support for the Indochinese countries efforts to constrain Chinese use of the headwaters of the Mekong River. Beijing is now intent on punishing Vietnam for its hubris in cooperating with the United States. It wants to compel Hanoi to accommodate Chinese power . In 2011 it escalated the frequency and scale of its armed harassment of Vietnamese fishing ships operating in disputed waters, causing increased bilateral tension and damage to the Vietnamese fishing industry. China also stepped up its naval harassment of Philippine economic activities in disputed waters. But in response, the United States has only reinforced its commitment to the Southeast Asian countries. In July 2011 it held another military exercise with Vietnam. Then it again sent an aircraft carrier to visit the country, and the Pentagon reached its first military agreement with the Vietnamese military. The Pentagon is also assisting the Philippines maritime intelligence capabilities in the South China Sea. Chinas deputy foreign minister Cui Tiankai recently warned that some Southeast Asian countries were playing with fire and expressed his hope that the fire will not be drawn to the United States. Washington is thus engaged in an increasingly polarized conflict in Southeast Asia. But more important, independent of the course of the South China Sea maritime disputes, U.S. collaboration with Vietnams effort to use America to oppose China is not only costly but also foolish. Vietnams common land border with China, its maritime vulnerability to the Chinese navy and its economic dependency on Beijing ensure that the United States will not be able to develop meaningful defense cooperation with Vietnam. But having engaged China in this regional diplomatic tussle, any U.S. effort to disengage from the island conflict by encouraging moderation on the part of its Southeast Asian partners would risk being viewed as a strategic retreat. The Obama administrations greater security cooperation with countries on the mainlands perimeter is a disproportionate reaction to Chinese nationalism. It is not reflective of any recent improvements in Chinese naval capabilities that could challenge U.S. maritime dominance. Nor does it reflect an increased strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula or Indochina for U.S. security. Since 1997, the United States deployed increasing quantities of its most advanced weaponry to East Asia and consolidated security cooperation with its maritime security partners, all the while maintaining significant U.S.-China cooperation. That was a productive policy. But now Chinese leaders are reevaluating U.S. intentions. They have concluded that the United States is developing a forward-leaning policy of encirclement and containment. Regardless of Washingtons intent, recent American actions have provided ample evidence to support Chinas claims. BEIJINGS NATIONALIST diplomacy is dangerous. Americas illconceived response makes it even more so. China is militarily vulnerable to the United States, and the regime is vulnerable to internal instability. At this point, Washington is embroiled in territorial disputes over worthless islands in the South China Sea and is expanding its strategic presence on Chinas periphery. And in an era when Chinese cooperation is increasingly important, Washington is needlessly challenging Chinese security. Just as America expects China to restrain its security partners in the Middle East and Asia from exacerbating conflict with the United States, America has the responsibility to rein in its security partners as well. The balance of power in East Asia is a vital national-security interest, and the United States must reassure its strategic partners that it will provide for their security, despite the rise of China. The United States military must continue to focus its weapons acquisitions and deployments on maintaining U.S. security in the region. The task at hand for American policy is to realize these objectives while maintaining U.S.-China cooperation. Chinese nationalism will continue to challenge U.S. foreign policy for a long time to come. This will require the administration to acknowledge both Americas maritime superiority and Chinas domestic and international vulnerabilities, and thus exercise confident restraint and resist overreaction to Beijings insecure leadership.

Waterways are a hair-trigger for escalation lack of regional cooperation in South East Asia makes conflict inevitable. SPC-A 08 (SPC-A, Sea Power Center Australia, Official division of Royal Australian Navy, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs, no. 23, Asian
Energy Security: Regional Cooperation in the Malacca Strait, Collection of Articles by qualified maritime security experts, Asian Energy Security: Regional Cooperation in the Malacca Strait, azp)

Fifth, Asias growing energy demand is increasing the pressure on the sea lines of communication. Nearly 50 mbpd of oil is shipped by tanker. The growing number of oil tankers and LNG carriers coming from the Arabian Gulf will increase pressure on already congested strategic chokepoints; specifically the Strait of Hormuz, the Indian Ove rview of Globa l and Asian Energy Trends 9 Ocean, the Malacca Strait, and the South China Sea. The Malacca Strait, in particular, is a crucial chokepoint for the dangerously high number of energyrelated tankers transiting it. It is projected that tanker traffic will at least double from 10 mbpd in 2004 to over 20 mbpd in 2020. To ease pressure on the Malacca Strait, future tanker traffic could be partially routed through the Sunda or Lombok straits; or to avoid a destabilised Indonesia, they can be bypassed by sailing around Australia. However, natural gas transport cannot avoid the Indonesian archipelago, as the majority of LNG resources being exploited are centred in or around Indonesia, and the LNG carriers must also pass through the archipelago to reach the gas consumers: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and, in the future, China. Sixth, given Asias voracious demand for energy, countries will be faced with multiple energy fronts, as opposed to the one or two they faced in the past few years. For example, in a decade India could import gas from three or four directions - from the Middle East, Central Asia, Bangladesh, and Southeast Asia. Or in the case of China, its energy is already coming from all directions - the Middle East, Central Asia, the Russian Far East, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Seventh, these multiple energy fronts will engender significant security vulnerabilities that present a wide range of military challenges. The growing dependence on longhaul sea lanes and offshore energy resources will ensure that energy strategies increasingly have a defensive military component, particularly with a naval focus. A growing pressure to protect energy transport routes will intensify if Indonesia destabilises or if incidents of maritime terrorism in the region increase , which is also a growing concerns among the Asian states. Plans for ambitious pipelines projects, which are viewed as an alternative to dependence on the sea lanes, also present security challenges. The proposed pipelines are projected to cross rugged terrain, harsh climates, and politically unstable or remote areas. Pipelines linking the Russian Far East to China or Japan; Central Asia to China; the Caspian and Iran to India; or a complex gas pipeline network criss-crossing Southeast Asia could be targets for terrorist attacks or military competitors. This infrastructure will require protection and contingency plans for responding to disruptions. Even more vulnerable will be the expanding energy infrastructure across the region, such as refineries, LNG terminals, and sophisticated offshore exploration and production facilities throughout Southeast Asia, the South and East China seas, and the Bay of Bengal. These facilities cost millions, even billions of dollars, and in some cases, are located in remote locations, making them difficult to protect. American energy analysts argue that an attack on an LNG terminal, refinery, or offshore installation could take months to repair and bring back online and could cause severe environmental damage. In this context, most regional militaries in Asia will face a growing energy security component to their missions. Such missions might include monitoring and protecting sea lanes from enhanced naval and missile threats as well as non-traditional threats, and defending energy infrastructures as a way to forestall threats or blackmail. If competition for energy resources increases , states may begin to develop an offensive component to their energy strategies, with the intent of targeting anothers energy security. War over the South China Sea escalates and causes extinction cooperation solves. Wittner 11/30/11 (Lawrence, Professor of History emeritus at SUNY/Albany, Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?, Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/nuclear-war-china_b_1116556.html, azp)

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries international conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China's growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China's claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was "asserting our own position as a Pacific power." But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during their conflict over the future of China's offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight

Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would "be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else." Of course, China didn't have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven't been very many -- at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan's foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use "any weapon" in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don't nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn't feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO's strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing "Star Wars" and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive -- and probably unworkable -- military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over 5,000 nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly 300. Moreover, only about 40 of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would "win" any nuclear war with China. But what would that "victory" entail? An attack with these Chinese nuclear weapons would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a "nuclear winter" around the globe -- destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars "modernizing" its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies. US satellite capabilities are uniquely key to diffusing conflict in the South China Sea. Arthur et al 2007 (Stanley R., Retired admiral, written with the Lexington Institutes Naval Strike forum which included many PhDs and retired high ranking naval officials, Securing the Seas: The Logic of Maritime Domain Awareness, Lexington Institute, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/the-logic-of-maritime-domainawareness.pdf) One region where arrangements for enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness have progressed rapidly in recent years is Southeast Asia. The vast archipelago of islands stretching from Indochina to Australia reflects both the promise and the peril of economic globalization. A third of the worlds sea-borne commerce and half of its oil moves through the Strait of Malacca and the Singapore Strait each year, making those passages critical chokepoints in the global economy. As Singapores defense minister Teo Chee Hean observed at a recent regional security conference, a consumer product in transit through his countrys ports might be made of raw materials from Indonesia, components manufactured in Vietnam, and software coded in India, that is destined for final assembly in China using Japanese production equipment financed with American capital. Because this intricate supply network depends on the timely movement of container ships and tankers traversing lightly policed sea lanes, it is highly vulnerable to disruption. Unfortunately, the region has more than its share of problems that might lead to such disruptions, including territorial disputes, separatist insurgencies, religiously- inspired terrorism, piracy and smuggling of everything from weapons to illegal migrants. Some analysts have also suggested that as Islamic terrorists currently operating in Southwest Asia are gradually

defeated, they may shift their operations to Indonesia, the worlds most populous Muslim state. Recognizing the numerous local threats to transit and trade, the countries of Southeast Asia have begun cooperating more closely to monitor maritime developments in their area. In 2004, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore bolstered existing bilateral security agreements by agreeing to coordinate the use of their navies in patrolling the Strait of Malacca. The following year, they added joint air patrols to their maritime surveillance activities. More broadly, they have participated in a series of regional security initiatives such as the Five Power Defense Arrangements and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium aimed at building trust and cooperation among regional military forces. During 2005, nineteen navies from countries participating in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium took part in a joint military exercise that illuminated ways of improving information sharing and interoperability. These efforts demonstrate how the shared economic and security concerns of nations can support initiatives such as the thousandship navy concept advanced by the U.S. Navy. But there is much more that can be done in places like Southeast Asia to improve Maritime Domain Awareness, and some of the most challenging needs can only be met with U.S. assistance. For example, the United States is the only country with a constellation of satellites for tracking maritime traffic, and its submarines far surpass the intelligence-gathering capacity of any other countrys undersea fleet. Furthermore, it is the only country operating large numbers of carrier-based surveillance planes and building a robust global communications grid for the rapid transmission of military information. It thus has the opportunity to be a key player in developing Southeast Asian maritime awareness capabilities, possibly participating in the creation of a comprehensive surveillance regime that can be gradually extended outward to encompass much of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Improved MDA shores up global maritime cooperation, establishes interdependencies, and makes relations resilient. Truver 11 (Dr. Scott C. Truver is Director, National Security Programs, Gryphon Technologies, Greenbelt, Maryland. In addition to his support to
national security and defence organisations in government and industry, he supports the US Navys MDA programmes in research , analysis and engagement efforts. Edward Feege of Gryphons National Security group assisted in the research for this overview. On the Other Side of the Hill? Global Partnerships for Maritime Domain AwarenessThe View from the United States, by NMCO on NOVEMBER 9, 2011, http://www.mda.gov/2011/11/09/on-the-other-side-of-the-hill/, Accessed 11/23/11, azp)

A GLOBAL FOCUS IS NEEDED, TOO From the US perspective, relationships that have worked domestically also must be applied internationally. As former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead repeatedly emphasised: Personal trust is indispensible to partnerships at home and abroad trust cannot be surged. The US MDA community of interests is based on tile understanding that a global perspective based on trust is needed to ensure that we can detect and deal with threats that originate in or take advantage of the vastness of the oceans. Only through collaboration and cooperation will we be able to ensure that these global threats and challenges can be dealt with as far from our shores as possible. To deal with these threats and challenges, world Navies and Coast Guards require accurate and timely information on what is occurring in their maritime areas of operations. In regional and global perspectives, a shared awareness of activities within the maritime domain is key to mutual success. MDA thus is critical for success against all threats in maritime regions, anywhere. Information sharing is thus a key focus of the USNs efforts to build trust and strengthen MDA partnerships. There are two aspects of these MDA partnerships, Titley said. First, we need partnerships to enable access and build on local knowledge of the maritime environment, to know whats going on in coastal states EEZ and territorial seas, in ports and harbours, and in ships and cargoes. The MDA supply chain has greater reach than the coastal/littoral environment and extends to internal waters and even landlocked states, where threats to our security, which use the seas as means of conveyance, can originate. Second, he noted, these MDA partnerships serve as an entry point for broader relationships that can enhance security across the board. We have common interests and we confront common threats and challenges. We can expand and improve shared capacity and capabilities to defeat common threats and challenges and safeguard common interests. Acquiring and sharing information and intelligence with a broad array of global maritime partners sustains cooperation and builds the trust required to ensure the safety, security and economic vitality of all who hold membership within global maritime community of interest, he said. The trust is not built over night, but through sustained collaboration and security cooperation measures and processes, such as the Maritime Safety and Security Information System [MSSIS]. MSSIS is a freely shared, unclassified, near real-time data collection and distribution network. Its member countries share data from Automatic Identification Systems CAIS), coastal radar, and other maritime-related systems. MSSIS promotes multilateral collaboration and data sharing among international participants, with a primary goal of increasing maritime security and safety (see figure 3). International efforts [also] include participation in exercises like TRIDENT WARRIOR II, Titley added. We partnered with the United Kingdom and France to

successfully share maritime information using internationally agreed upon National Information Exchange Model-Maritime [NIEM-M] common data standards and models. NIEM is a joint Department of Justice/Department of Homeland Security programme started in 2005, created to promote standardisation of information exchange for cross-jurisdictional inforn1ation sharing. NIEM provides the tools used across DRS for enabling interoperability at the data layer within and across systems supporting information sharing, while preserving investments in current technology and optimising new technology development. Another example is the Global Maritime Partnership Game held in October 2010 at the US Naval War College. Senior-level representatives from more than 40 nations attended, mostly from Navies and Coast Guards. But, other representatives were from agencies that are considered key contributors to MDA, e.g., customs and border security, port authorities, fisheries enforcement, and search and rescue organisations. In fact, Titley underscored, every nation with a coastline and a willingness to share information can play important roles in local, regional and global maritime security. Every coastal state comes to the table with assets that can make important contributions to security. These dont have to be aircraft carrier strike groups. The issue of classified or sensitive data continues to be a concern. Within constraints, however, the USN intends to share as widely as possible accurate and timely information to shape our and our partners ability to protect important interests in the maritime domain. Most countries, including the United States, require additional assets to increase and sustain presence for maritime security. Increasingly, this means active and energetic engagement in regional and global partnerships. Partnerships reduce requirements spread responsibilities, and give small nations equal status. MDA is an organising principle for world Navies and coast guards. It brings us all to a common table. And, there appears to be a growing need to link these and other partnerships together into regional and global systems, as illustrated figure 4. Effective MDA will be the keystone of cooperative US and international efforts to counter maritime threats through regional and global partnerships, according to Titley. Because certain risks and interests are common, facilitation of regional maritime partnerships occurs with full recognition and acceptance that our allies and partner nations may not share all of our goals, but well find common purpose in countering transnational threats and securing peaceful use of the maritime commons. US retrenchment is inevitable MDA is key to making the transition to offshore partnering which leads to naval drawdown and collaborative restructuring. Hoffman 08 (November 2008, From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century, Frank Hoffman is a retired
Marine officer with 30 years of experience in policy development, strategy and force analysis, and consulting)

Our maritime forces have to be designed to support an overall grand strategy . Americas Cold War grand strategy of containment was no longer needed after 1989, and a strategy best described as preponderance evolved during the Bush administration. The logic of preponderance required American policy makers to amass military power in order to dissuade other great powers from emerging or even contemplating arming themselves to contest U.S. primacy. 4 9 This strategy has focused largely on military power, and the unilateral application of force to maximize U.S. strategic freedom of action. Arguably, Americas primacy has been a source of stability that many have benefited from. But in a world in which power is distributed more widely, with new players on the global scene, where Americas preeminence is challenged in myriad ways, preserving or extending preponderance as an operative framework will be increasingly difficult. The world, in the words of Robert Kagan, is becoming normal again. 50 As the tragedy of 9/11 showed, our traditional military might can be contested by new modes of warfare that bypass the Pentagons tanks, aircraft carriers, and stealth bombers. Chinese and Russian assertiveness on the global stage and the spiraling risks of nuclear proliferation from North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan indicate that nations can and will find ways of contesting American influence. Additionally, Americas strategic position, based upon its economic competitiveness and human and physical infrastructure, is eroding relative to others . 51 However, the need for leadership (and indeed a reluctant sheriff) is readily apparent. 52 Some strategists have argued that America should stop trying to preserve the unipolar moment and embrace an alternative grand strategy. Strategies of restraint and offshore balancing are offered. 53 These approaches focus on ensuring that America avoids entanglement in the internal or regional affairs of others. Instead of risking overstretch by the extensive costs of posturing military forces around the globe, offshore balancing focuses first on our own narrowly defined interests in our region. Other regions would be expected to provide for their own national and regional security commensurate with their interests. The major regional powers would police themselves. Advocates of this approach would withdraw from most, if not all, of Americas treaties and security obligations, and limit forward-based forces, which would permit a sizable reduction in U.S. military forces. The problem with the strategies of restraint and balancing is that they overlook current geostrategic circumstances. Todays challenges and the integrated

globalized economy do not support the detached posture and cold calculations suggested by either approach. Since 9/11 we have learned that small events and under-governed areas have big consequences. We have learned that geography and our oceans no longer protect us the way they once did. Due to the interdependent networks of financial, energy, and information systems, American interests in many areas are not trivial or secondary, but crucial. Finally, history suggests that regions do not police themselves and that we cannot stand idly by while other regional powers satisfy their ambitions at our expense. As noted in a United Nations report, in todays world, a threat to one is a threat to all. Every State requires international cooperation to make it secure. 54 Balancing from a great distance does not generate international cooperation or develop the necessary capacity to maintain the sinews of international economic activity. We need to recognize that Americas interests and future prosperity are interdependently tied to others. So many of todays challenges are transnational in nature and cannot be met without the cooperation and efforts of others. Furthermore, so much of our success and security is tied to reliable access to the global markets, commercial networks, trade routes, and cyber communications that constitute todays global commons. 55 We need not act as if we own or dominate these commons, but we must actively ensure that access to them is reliably secure for everyone. Thus more collective frameworks, which reflect shared interests and cooperative approaches, appear warranted today. Adapting the Maritime strategy and Naval Forces for an Interdependent World Our maritime forces should be adapted to support this more cooperative approach. Rather than balance from afar, we can help others help themselves and bind them to an international system and a set of rules that benefit all. Partners need not commit to one hegemon over another, but they should be able to commit to a rule set that maintains global order and a mutually prosperous system of trade and commerce. Rather than standing back as free riders, a larger regional community of interest can be motivated to collaborate in the day-to-day maintenance of the basic commons. With respect to maritime forces this means seeking multilateral combinations to deal with maritime security, commerce, smuggling in narcotics and humans, criminal activity, and counterproliferation. Hopefully, when either natural or state-based challenges to the commons arise, the habits of cooperative support, coupled with a sense of common interest, will engender a greater collective response to threats to stability. Such an approach emphasizes cooperative concerts and flexible arrangements built around maritime partners to support mutual interests in maintaining order. Partners are not asked to support American hegemony as a transactional payment, but the international economic and maritime security system itself. This indirect approach, which I call Off Shore Partnering, requires forward engagement and regular, interactive dialogue and cooperation with all possible partners. Off Shore Partnering requires earlier and proactive involvement at local levels, not detachment or reactive responses. It requires working with and through others over the direct or unilateral application of U.S. power. Local approaches to local and global problems are sought, not merely transplanting U.S. templates to various regions. Furthermore, it does not assume U.S. operational leadership in day-to-day activities. Finally, Off Shore Partnering provides for an inherently flexible posture while minimizing our political or military footprint. 56 Over time our force posture must be retooled to maximize flexibility and adaptability. 57 We will accrue numerous benefits from this shift in posture. Maintaining a flexible approach over fixed commitments avoids the counterbalancing so evident today, builds more positive relationships over intrusive obligations, and reduces the costs of fixed military presence to both our hosts and the American taxpayer. The adoption of a more indirect approach will increase our reliance on maritime assets as well as the Special Operations community. It will also allow us to adapt how we use our forces. This military posture and presence should be used more as a positive tool for proactive engagement over static positioning or belated crisis response. 58 A more expansive view of our posture is needed to secure long-term goals of sustained stability, access to markets and resources, and secure access to the global commons to connect the two. 59 Thus, the United States will be more secure, and global stability better sustained, if America shifts its maritime forces consistent with Off Shore Partnering on behalf of a sustainable grand strategy. This strategy relies upon the global reach and capability of our maritime services to work with others to preserve and extend security via multilateral approaches. On balance, the Cooperative Seapower Strategy is very consistent with Off Shore Partnering. The new maritime strategy is long on globalizations fragility, and the role of maritime forces in securing the seas from disorder and disruption. The benefits that the global community gains from our persistent forward maritime presence are manifestly clear, as is the shared responsibility to maintain the global commons. The only distinction between the new maritime strategy and Off Shore Partnering would be in the priorities of the missions required and the Rather than balance from afar, we can help others help themselves and bind them to an international system and a set of rules that benefit all.

Contention four is Solvency:

SOLVENCY

The plan reinvigorates overall maritime domain awareness. Earles 10 (Marion Rick, Owner of E&A; Executive Director for CANEUS US at Earles & Associates and CANEUS US, CANEUS USA, International
Collaborative Aerospace Development Micro-Nano-Technologies: From Concepts to Systems, CANEUS International is a unique non-profit organization of professionals involving public/private partnership, serving primarily the needs of aeronautics, space and defense communities by fostering the coordinated, international development of MNT (Micro-Nano- Technologies) for aerospace and defense applications. CANEUS Shared Small Satellites CSSP Workshop Committee, International Space-Based AIS and Data Extraction Backbone High Level Requirements, http://www.caneus.org/sharedsmallsats/downloads/International_Space-Based_AIS_and_Data_Extraction_Backbone-High_Level_Requirements.pdf, azp)

The potential for international collaboration in space to materially improve maritime security was recently articulated by Guy Thomas, Science and Technology Advisor for the US Coast Guard: The maritime entities of the world, military, civil, and private alike looked at their situation in the new reality (after 9/11/2001) and quickly understood their vulnerabilities and the potential consequences. Since that terrible day a number of national and international organizations have addressed how to protect their maritime assets, both individually, and in growing numbers, collectively. Most saw increased maritime domain awareness (MDA) as of first importance to the smooth functioning of commerce on the worlds oceans, the crucial supporting frame of the worlds economy, and crucial to their national interests. The potential unique contributions of current and planned space systems, owned by a wide range of nations and available to many others, to international global maritime awareness is a subject of growing interest to many. 1Knowing where ships are located is a necessary element of Maritime Domain Awareness, though not sufficient in itself to achieve an effective understanding 2 of maritime activity and its impact on safety, security, the environment and the economy. Current practice relies on a diverse set of sensors to garner the positions of ships; a fundamental contribution to the art and practice of ship tracking can be credited to the International Maritime Organization, which in 2004 mandated the use of an Automatic Ship Identification System (AIS) for many commercially important ships. AIS is a self-reporting system that broadcasts each participating ships identity and position (among many data fields) over VHF channels; the original intent was to provide collision-avoidance information to nearby ships and shore stations. 3 Shortly after the IMO carriage requirements became effective, the US Navy in the Mediterranean began to collaborate with European and African governments to establish a network of shore stations, all of which contributed the AIS signals they received locally to a consolidated data stream, which was then shared among participating nations. This Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) has since grown into a network of over 100 AIS base stations in over 60 participating nations around the world, providing current positions for over 15,000 ships. The major strengths of this innovative collaboration are the trust and interdependence it generates, and of course, an unprecedented picture of maritime activity. The major shortcomings are the limited set of ships broadcasting AIS, and the limited reception range for VHF signals; no data is received from non-cooperative vessels, or from the open oceans or areas near nonparticipating nations. Herein lies the key point made by Guy Thomas: the entire planet is visible from space, and many of the sensors (including AIS receivers) needed for a much more complete picture of maritime activity are already on orbit or planned. That space will be the key enabler for truly global situational awareness is suggested by the exceptional composite image of the earth at night (Figure 1). Lights which are clearly visible from space define the wired world, served by grid electricity and more recently, internet connectivity. This leaves the oceans, the polar regions, deserts and jungles unwired and often undergoverned. Moving data out of these areas, which comprise roughly 84% of the Earths surface, is important: a key strategic principle in warfare is to deny the enemy sanctuary , and for illicit activities ranging from illegal trafficking to training terrorists, sanctuary is found in the unwired world. Quite separate from the challenge of moving data out of unwired areas is the related question of generating that data in remote regions; this will be addressed with a review of the State of the Art in unattended sensors in the context of the business case for small satellite systems. This article will focus on the bent pipe link that can connect the unwired and wired regions of the world via satellite, using AIS data as a convenient example of interesting data that is routinely generated by ships that are only in the wired world when they are pier-side or close to a shorebased AIS receiver. This will allow us to develop a concept for collaboration in space with a concrete use-case, that being to extend the current AIS picture from regional near-shore areas to the entire world. Additional utility can be had if the data collection and transport backbone in space, which handles AIS data, would also handle data signals from maritime and terrestrial sensors that transmit short bursts of data.

The technology exists but fails because it isnt space based synthesis of automatic identification systems with synthetic radar imagery solves. Singh 10 (Jaswinder Singh, Naval School Postgraduate, Countering Small Boat Terrorism in Territorial Sea 12/2010, Online azp) AIS signals can easily be detected from space by a standard AIS receiver for altitudes up to 1000 km. However, an AIS sensor in space would cover a much larger area on the ground than the AIS system was originally designed for. With many ships within the field of view, interference problems will occur and AIS messages from some of the ships may not be detected. Detailed analyses of the ship detection probability have been performed. Important parameters for the ship detection probability were found to be; the reporting interval T, the observation time Tobs, and the number of ships within the field of view. A single satellite at 1000 km altitude (Tobs=15 min) would be able to handle up to 900 ships within the field of view with a ship detection probability of better than 99%, with a ship reporting interval of T=6 s.75 Depending on traffic density, the capability of the AIS-based satellite constellation to handle a larger number of ships can be increased by increasing the number of satellites, lowering the height of the satellite, increasing the reporting interval and / or increasing the observation time. Aerial based AIS is capable of providing ship detection capability of more than 99% at 1000 km, if the number of ships does not exceed its maximum capacity of target handling. Therefore, a constellation of 18 LEO satellites would be able to provide an update of every ship across the globe every 15 minutes, but would still not be able to provide continuous identification capability in time domain for establishing MST. However, if the same LEO satellites are fitted with both SAR and AIS, then these satellites can definitely provide near-real MST. Satellite AIS solves problems that exist with MSSIS now creates a globally accessible data extraction backbone. Earles 10 (Marion Rick, Owner of E&A; Executive Director for CANEUS US at Earles & Associates and CANEUS US, CANEUS USA, International
Collaborative Aerospace Development Micro-Nano-Technologies: From Concepts to Systems, CANEUS International is a unique non-profit organization of professionals involving public/private partnership, serving primarily the needs of aeronautics, space and defense communities by fostering the coordinated, international development of MNT (Micro-Nano- Technologies) for aerospace and defense applications. CANEUS Shared Small Satellites CSSP Workshop Committee, International Space-Based AIS and Data Extraction Backbone High Level Requirements, http://www.caneus.org/sharedsmallsats/downloads/International_Space-Based_AIS_and_Data_Extraction_Backbone-High_Level_Requirements.pdf, azp)

The Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) is a freely-shared, unclassified, near real-time data collection and distribution network. Its member countries share AIS data, with no filtering, analysis, or other value added operations; this preserves the all-important freely-shared character of the network, making it appropriate for all countries, regardless of their technological sophistication or financial condition. MSSIS is intended to promote multilateral collaboration and data-sharing among international participants, with a primary goal of increasing maritime security and safety. Data sources may range from a single sensor to an entire national vessel tracking network. Because the data distributed by MSSIS maintains its original, internationally recognized format and is delivered to users in near real time, member organizations are able to utilize the feed to meet their specific mission requirements. Members joining the MSSIS network can immediately begin to leverage its capabilities. Transview (TV32), the client software for MSSIS which is distributed free of charge, serves as a common system interface and vessel tracking display for its users. It offers a variety of standalone display features and also functions as a gateway for users to access and contribute to the aggregated global data stream. With frequent enhancements to the systems capabilities and a continuously growing MSSIS community, government organizations can capitalize on the services of MSSIS to improve and maintain Maritime Domain Awareness. MSSIS was developed by the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center at the US Department of Transportations Research and Innovative Technology Administration and is available to nations worldwide to improve and maintain Maritime Domain Awareness. The system is currently used by over 60 nations worldwide. A major enhancement that is currently in testing for this system is the addition of AIS data collected by satellites. Technical issues being addressed include the latency of data delivered only periodically (as satellites pass over downlink stations) and the problem of data collisions when more than one vessel transmits in a given time slot. Preliminary data collections show tremendous potential, however, as seen in Figure 2. No disads the Coast Guard deployed S-AIS last year but the satellites failed in orbit. Selding 11 (Peter Selding, Staff Writer for Defense News, Tracking Ships From Space 4/10, Online, azp) With International Maritime Organization regulations now mandating that ships weighing more than 300 metric tons carry on-board terminals to beam ship identity, cargo, speed and heading data to the coast,

satellite-based AIS requires no special technology added to ship fleets. Instead, it extends what coastal radars now do, permitting coastal authorities to review data on all ships in their region even when the vessels are in mid-ocean. The U.S. Coast Guard gave Orbcomm an initial contract to test the Orbcomm AIS service, a contract that ended in late 2010 when the last of six AIS-equipped satellites failed in orbit.