C. No Strike Clause Panay Electric Co., Inc. v.

NLRC, 248 SCRA 688 (95) 248 SCRA 668 VITUG; October 4, 1995 NATURE Petiton for certiorari FACTS -On 30 October 1990, petitioner Panay Electric Company, Inc., posted a notice announcing the need for a "Report Clerk" who could assume the responsibility of gathering accounting and computer data at its power plant -When nobody applied for the position, the EDP/Personnel Manager recommended Enrique Huyan who was at the time an Administrative Personnel Assistant at the head office. Huyan was then also a Vice President of respondent union. The recommendation was approved by the company's President and General Manager. -Enrique Huyan informed petitioner that he was not interested in accepting the new position. -The EDP/Personnel Manager required Huyan to explain within 48 hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for gross insubordination and for failure to follow the General Manager's approved directive. -Eventually, on 03 December 1990, Huyan was given a "notice of dismissal" -An administrative investigation was conducted; thereafter, Huyan was ordered dismissed effective 10 December 1990. -On 22 January 1991, the respondent union went on strike. -Forthwith, the company filed a petition to declare the strike illegal as it was a serious breach of the "no strike, no lock out clause," of the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") -The NLRC found the strike conducted by the Union from January 22 to 25, 1991 to be illegal as the same was staged in violation of the no strike, no lock-out clause in the Collective Bargaining Agreement existing between the parties and also because the same disregarded the grievance procedure ISSUE WON the strike committed by the respondent union was illegal HELD Yes -The State guarantees the right of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations, as well as peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike, in accordance with law. -The right to strike, however, is not absolute. It has heretofore been held that a "no strike, no lock-out" provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") is a valid stipulation although the clause may be invoked by an employer only when the strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other concessions from the employer that are not mandated to be granted by the law itself. -It would be inapplicable to prevent a strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice. -In this situation, it is not essential that the unfair labor practice act has, in fact, been committed; it suffices that the striking workers are shown to have acted honestly on an impression that the company has committed such unfair labor practice and the surrounding circumstances could warrant such a belief in good faith. -In the instant case, the NLRC found Enrique Huyan and Prescilla Napiar, the "principal leaders" of the strike, not to have acted in good faith. The NLRC

said: It is bad enough that the Union struck despite the prohibition in the CBA. What is worse is that its principal leaders, Napiar and Huyan, cannot honestly claim that they were in good faith in their belief that the Company was committing unfair labor practice. The absence of good faith or the honest belief that the Company is committing Unfair Labor Practice, therefore, is what inclines us to rule that the strike conducted by the Union from January 22 to 25, 1991 is illegal for being in violation of the "no strike, no lock-out" proviso and the failure to bring the union's grievances under the grievance procedure in the CBA. It must be borne in mind that prior to the dismissal of Huyan, there was sufficient time to have the matter of Huyan's transfer subjected to the grievance procedure. That the Union considered the procedure an exercise in futility is not reason enough to disregard the same given the circumstances in this case. Whatever wrong the Union felt the Company committed cannot be remedied by another wrong on the part of the Union. Disposition Decision is affirmed (as regards the illegality of the stirke) Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Greenfield v. Ramos, 326 SCRA 428 326 SCRA 248 PURISIMA; February 28, 2000 NATURE Petition for Certiorari to annul the NLRC decision FACTS - Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield, Inc. (MSMG) (Local Union) is an affiliate of United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP) (Federation). - The CBA between MSMG and M. Greenfield, Inc. states that it is entered into by the corporation and MSMG / ULGWP. - The CBA includes a Union Security Clause requiring all employees who are covered by the CBA and presently members of the UNION to remain members of the UNION for the duration of the CBA as a condition precedent to continued employment. - Local union imposed a P50 fine on non-attending union members which became the subject of bitter disagreement between the Federation and the local union. MSMG then declared general autonomy from the ULGWP. In retaliation, the national federation asked respondent company to stop the remittance of the local union's share in the education funds. It also disauthorized incumbent union officers from representing the employees. - Petitioner union officers were expelled by the federation for allegedly committing acts of disloyalty and/or inimical to the interest of ULGWP and in violation of its Constitution and By-laws. The federation advised respondent company of the expulsion of the 30 union officers and demanded their separation from employment pursuant to the Union Security Clause in their CBA. - Upon demand of the federation, the company terminated the petitioners without conducting a separate and independent investigation. The expelled union officers assigned in the first shift were physically or bodily brought out of the company premises by the company's security guards. Those assigned to the second shift were not allowed to report for work. This provoked some of the members of the local union to demonstrate their protest for the dismissal of the said union officers. Some union

members left their work posts and walked out of the company premises. - Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissed union officers were validly and legally terminated because the dismissal was effected in compliance with the union security clause of the CBA which is the law between the parties. This was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. > On the ISSUE of STRIKE: - Labor Arbiter held that the strike was illegal for the following reasons: (1) it was based on an intra-union dispute which cannot properly be the subject of a strike, the right to strike being limited to cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practice (2) it was made in violation of the "no strike, no lock-out" clause in the CBA, and (3) it was attended with violence, force and intimidation upon the persons of the company officials, other employees reporting for work and third persons having legitimate business with the company, resulting to serious physical injuries to several employees and damage to company property. ISSUE/S * WON the union officers were validly terminated 1. WON the strike was illegal for being grounded on a non-strikeable issue (intra-union conflict between the federation and the local union) 2. WON the no strike, no lock-out clause in the CBA was violated 3. WON the strike was attended with violence force and intimidation HELD * NO Reasoning Although this Court has ruled that union security clauses embodied in the collective bargaining agreement may be validly enforced and that dismissals pursuant thereto may likewise With regard to the issue of the legality or illegality of the strike, the Labor Arbiter held that the strike was illegal for the following reasons: (1) it was based on an intra-union dispute which cannot properly be the subject of a strike, the right to strike being limited to cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practice (2) it was made in violation of the "no strike, no lock-out" clause in the CBA, and (3) it was attended with violence, force and intimidation upon the persons of the company officials, other employees reporting for work and third persons having legitimate business with the company, resulting to serious physical injuries to several employees and damage to company property. On the submission that the strike was illegal for being grounded on a non-strikeable issue, that is, the intra-union conflict between the federation and the local union, it bears reiterating that when respondent company dismissed the union officers, the issue was transformed into a termination dispute and brought respondent company into the picture. Petitioners believed in good faith that in dismissing them upon request by the federation, respondent company was guilty of unfair labor pratice in that it violated the petitioners right to self-organization. The strike was staged to protest respondent companys act of dismissing the union officers. Even if the allegations of unfair labor practice are subsequently found out to be untrue, the presumption of legality of the strike prevails. V. STRIKING LOCKOUT PARTY 263 (b), (c)

ART. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. - xxx (b) Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection. The right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected. However, no labor union may strike and no employer may declare a lockout on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes. (c) In case of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 day before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting, where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately. VI. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS A. Effort Bargain 264 (a); 250-252 ART. 264. Prohibited activities. - (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry. No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of any unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining: (a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice; (b) Should differences arise on the basis of such notice and reply, either party may request for a conference which shall begin not later than ten (10) calendar days from the date of request. (c) If the dispute is not settled, the Board shall intervene upon request of either or both parties or at

its own initiative and immediately call the parties to conciliation meetings. The Board shall have the power to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of the parties to such meetings. It shall be the duty of the parties to participate fully and promptly in the conciliation meetings the Board may call; (d) During the conciliation proceedings in the Board, the parties are prohibited from doing any act which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of the disputes; and (e) The Board shall exert all efforts to settle disputes amicably and encourage the parties to submit their case to a voluntary arbitrator. (As amended by Section 20, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989). ART. 251. Duty to bargain collectively in the absence of collective bargaining agreements. In the absence of an agreement or other voluntary arrangement providing for a more expeditious manner of collective bargaining, it shall be the duty of employer and the representatives of the employees to bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions of this Code. ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession. B. Filing of Notice of Intention 263 (c); (d); (e); 264 (a) C. Observance Cooling Off Period 263 (c); (e); 250 (c), (d), (e) ART. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. xxx(c) In case of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 day before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting, where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately. (As amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986). (e) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the Ministry to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement. Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may declare a lockout. ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:

(c) If the dispute is not settled, the Board shall intervene upon request of either or both parties or at its own initiative and immediately call the parties to conciliation meetings. The Board shall have the power to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of the parties to such meetings. It shall be the duty of the parties to participate fully and promptly in the conciliation meetings the Board may call; (d) During the conciliation proceedings in the Board, the parties are prohibited from doing any act which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of the disputes; and (e) The Board shall exert all efforts to settle disputes amicably and encourage the parties to submit their case to a voluntary arbitrator. (As amended by Section 20, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989). D. Vote, Conduct of; and Period of Validity 263 (f); 264 (a) ART. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. xxx(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided. ART. 264. Prohibited activities. - (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry. No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of any unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. National Union of Workers in Hotels, etc. v. CA, 570 SCRA 598 (08)

Luzon Marine Department Union v. Roldan, 86 P 507 (50) 86 PHIL 507 OZAETA; MAY 30, 1950 NATURE Petition for certiorari to review a resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations. FACTS - June 17, 1948: Petitioner Luzon Marine Union (UNION) presented to respondent Luzon Stevedoring Co. (LSC) a petition containing demands, including that it be granted of full recognition with the right to collective bargaining, closed-shop and check-off. The Union initiated the petition in the CIR praying that LSC be directed to comply immediately with the demands. - The Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (UOEF) a labor organization divided into units of which Universal Marine Union is a part, intervened on behalf of the Union because it alleged that the demand of the Union for recognition with the right to collective bargaining, closed-shop, etc. would violate an agreement entered into between LSC and UOEF, where the company recognized UOEF as the labor organization of the workers rendering services to LSC., with full right of collective bargaining. - UOEF moved for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground that the Union did not count with more than 30 members employed in the LSC. Judge Bautista issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. Before the receipt of the order, 65 alleged members of the Union initiated a strike without notice (July 19). It was only on July 21 that the LSC received the notice of strike. - July 20, 1948: Union filed with CIR a petition alleging that all its members (more than 300) went on strike on July 19 due to the refusal of LSC to grant their demands, and prayed for the issuance of a restraining order to prevent the respondent from employing strike breakers. - August 16, 1948: Judge Bautista issued an order directing the strikers to return to work, and the LSC to reinstate them in their previous positions. Acting on a motion for reconsideration, the court set said order aside on the ground that the strike was unjustified and illegal. - Judges Roldan and Castillo held that although Sec. 19 of Commonwealth Act 103 provides that pending award or decision by the CIR, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so enjoined by the Court, and although the Court had not enjoined the petitioner NOT TO STRIKE, it does not necessarily follow that the strike was legal and justified xxx Although the Act recognizes the laborers right to strike, it also creates all the means by which a resort thereto may be avoided, because a strike is a remedy essentially coercive in character and general in its disturbing effects upon the social order and the public interests. - The CIR found out that the reason the members went on strike was because the opposite party claims or asserts that they had no members inside the company, and because they were becoming impatient. From The court concluded that the purpose of the strike was to influence the decision and to compel the Court to decide promptly. The union insists that the strike was called for a lawful purpose: 1) to show they had more than 30 members; 2) to answer the challenge of Alejo

Villanueva that he will dismiss the members from the company. ISSUES WON the strike was called for a lawful purpose. HELD NO Ratio In cases not falling within the prohibition against strikes, the legality or illegality of a strike depends upon the 1) purpose for which it is maintained, and 2) upon the means employed in carrying it on. - The law does not look with favor upon strikes and lockouts because of their disturbing and pernicious effects upon the social order and the public interests. Reasoning The reasons presented by the Union do not justify the drastic measure of a strike, which necessarily entails pernicious consequences not only to the company but also to the laborers themselves and public. - If the purpose of a strike is trivial, unreasonable or unjust, or if violence was committed, the strike, although not prohibited by injunction, may be declared by the court illegal, with adverse consequences to the strikers. - If the laborers resort to a strike to enforce their demands (instead of exhausting legal processes first) they do so at their own risk, and should the court find the strike was unjustified, the strikers would suffer the adverse consequences. DISPOSITION The petition appealed from is affirmed Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Philippine Labor Organizations, Caltex Chapter, 93 P. 295 (53) Philippine Marine Officers Guild v. Compania Maritima, 22 SCRA 1113 (90) Acts of violence in this jurisdiction, when committed in carrying on a strike are not to be overlooked in determining its legality or illegality. To overlook these acts of violence would encourage abuses and terrorism and subvert the purpose of the law which provides for arbitration and peaceful settlement of disputes. If a strike is unjustified as when it is declared for trivial, unjust or unreasonable purpose, the employer may not be compelled to reinstate the strikers to their employment. More so, when the strike is carried on illegally. Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., 192 SCRA 396 (90) 192 SCRA 396 MEDIALDEA; December 19, 1990 NATURE This petition assails the decision of the NLRC, dated November 2, 1988 on the consolidated appeals of petitioners FACTS - UFE filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations against Filipro (now Nestle Philippines). - UFE filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) against Nestle and its officials for violation of the Labor Code (Art. 94) on Holiday Pay, nonimplementation of the CBA provisions (Labor Management Corporation scheme), Financial Assistance and other unfair labor practice. - Acting on Nestle's petition seeking assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute or its certification to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, then Minister of Labor and Employment Blas F. Ople assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and issued the following order enjoining any strike, lockout, or any other form

of concerted action such as slowdowns, sitdowns, noise barrages during office hours, which tend to disrupt company operations. - UFE filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order, with this Court assailing the assumption of jurisdiction by the Minister. Notwithstanding the automatic injunction against any concerted activity, and an absence of a restraining order, the union members, at the instigation of its leaders, and in clear defiance of Minister Ople's Order of December 11, 1986, staged a strike and continued to man picket lines at the Makati Administrative Office and all of Nestle's factories and warehouses at Alabang, Muntinlupa, Cabuyao, Laguna, and Cagayan de Oro City. Likewise, the union officers and members distributed leaflets to employees and passersby advocating a boycott of company products. - Nestle filed a petition to declare the strike illegal premised on violation of the CBA provisions on "no strike/no lockout" clause and the grievance machinery provisions on settlement of disputes. - Despite receipt of the second order dated January 30, 1986, and knowledge of a notice caused to be published by Nestle in the Bulletin on February 1, 1986, advising all workers to report to work not later than February 3, 1986, the officers and members of UFE continued with the strike. - Minister B. Ople denied their motion for reconsideration of the return-to-work order. - UFE defied the Minister and continued with their strike. Nestle filed criminal charges against those involved. ISSUE WON the strike is legal. HELD NO. UFE completely misses the underlying principle embodied in Art. 264(g) on the settlement of labor disputes and this is, that assumption and certification orders are executory in character and are to be strictly complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any petition questioning their validity. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests. - Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-towork orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company, to justify their actions. - The return to work order does not so much confer a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the worker's will. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest." - An assumption and/or certification order of the Secretary of Labor automatically results in a returnto-work of all striking workers, whether or not a corresponding order has been issued by the Secretary of Labor. Thus, the striking workers erred when they continued with their strike alleging

absence of a return-to-work order. Article 264(g) is clear. - Once an assumption/certification order is issued, strikes are enjoined, or if one has already taken place, all strikers shall immediately return to work. - A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended. The Union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act. - Thus, the NLRC correctly upheld the illegality of the strikes and the corresponding dismissal of the individual complainants because of their "brazen disregard of successive lawful orders of then Labor Ministers Blas F. Ople, Augusto Sanchez and Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon dated December 11, 1985, January 30, 1986 and February 4, 1986, respectively, and the cavalier treatment of the provisions of the Labor Code and the return-to-work orders of the Minister (now Secretary) of Labor and Employment, or Articles 264 and 265 (now renumbered Arts. 263 and 264). - No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency o f cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. Disposition ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED, and the decision of public respondent NLRC, dated November 2, 1988, and its Resolution, dated March 7, 1989, are both AFFIRMED in their entirety. No costs. Reliance Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 193 SCRA 365 (91) 193 SCRA 365 Sarmiento, J; 1991 NATURE Petition for Ceriorari to review NLRC decision FACTS - It appears that to avoid unnecessary loss of productive working time due to personal and nonwork-related conversations, personal telephone calls and non-work-connected visits by personnel to other departments, the respondent Reliance Surety Insurance Co., Inc. (company for short) on 21 November 1986, thru the manager (Mr.Celso Eleazar) of its underwriting department, effected a change in the seating arrangement of its personnel in said department. - Among those affected were members of the labor union who claimed that the change was done merely to harass them. In the ensuing discussions, the manager and the union members apparently had heated words and the union members hurled unprintable insults. Some employees refused to stay at their designated places. The company then asked the recalcitrants to explain within 48 hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against them. Due to the continuing hostility by the union members they were place under preventive suspension and finally dismissed. - Illegal dismissal complaints were filed. These were amended to include a charge of unfair labor practice. The members alleged that the seating arrangement was changed to pressure or intimidate labor union members. While the action was pending, the union

filed a notice of strike. Before a conciliation conference can be held, the union struck and picketed the company premises thus preventing officials and other employees from doing their usual duties. - Company filed a petition to declare the strike illegal since there was no strike vote and the required cooling off period was not followed. The Arbiter found the strike illegal. The finding was modified by the NLRC and ruled that the strike while illegal should not result in the termination of the employees involved since the members truly believed that the company was committing unfair labor practice in terminating the other employees. It ruled that the employees be reinstated but without backwages. - Hence this appeal to the SC. ISSUE/S WON strikers who have found to have staged an illegal strike may be reinstated to work HELD No. There is no question that the strike itself was prompted by no actual, existing unfair labor practice committed by the petitioner. In effecting a change in the seating arrangement in the office of the underwriting department, the petitioner merely exercised a reasonable prerogative employees could not validly question, much less assail as an act of unfair labor practice. The Court is indeed at a loss how rearranging furniture, as it were, can justify a four-month-long strike. As to the private respondent's charges of harassment, the Commission found none, and as a general rule, we are bound by its findings of fact. Amid this background, the Court must grant the petition. In staging the strike in question, a strike that was illegal in more ways than one, the reinstated union officers were clearly in bad faith, and to reinstate them without, indeed, loss of seniority rights, is to reward them for an act public policy does not sanction. - As a general rule, the sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not only because the Constitution imposes sympathy but because of the one-sided relation between labor and capital. The Court must take care, however, that in the contest between labor and capital, the results achieved are fair and in conformity with the rules. We will not accomplish that objective here by approving the act of the National Labor Relations Commission which we hold to constitute a grave abuse of discretion. Disposition Petition is granted. Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) v. NLRC, 198 SCRA 586 (91) 193 SCRA 365 Sarmiento, J; 1991 NATURE Petition for Ceriorari to review NLRC decision FACTS - It appears that to avoid unnecessary loss of productive working time due to personal and nonwork-related conversations, personal telephone calls and non-work-connected visits by personnel to other departments, the respondent Reliance Surety Insurance Co., Inc. (company for short) on 21 November 1986, thru the manager (Mr.Celso Eleazar) of its underwriting department, effected a change in the seating arrangement of its personnel in said department. - Among those affected were members of the labor union who claimed that the change was done merely to harass them. In the ensuing discussions, the

manager and the union members apparently had heated words and the union members hurled unprintable insults. Some employees refused to stay at their designated places. The company then asked the recalcitrants to explain within 48 hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against them. Due to the continuing hostility by the union members they were place under preventive suspension and finally dismissed. - Illegal dismissal complaints were filed. These were amended to include a charge of unfair labor practice. The members alleged that the seating arrangement was changed to pressure or intimidate labor union members. While the action was pending, the union filed a notice of strike. Before a conciliation conference can be held, the union struck and picketed the company premises thus preventing officials and other employees from doing their usual duties. - Company filed a petition to declare the strike illegal since there was no strike vote and the required cooling off period was not followed. The Arbiter found the strike illegal. The finding was modified by the NLRC and ruled that the strike while illegal should not result in the termination of the employees involved since the members truly believed that the company was committing unfair labor practice in terminating the other employees. It ruled that the employees be reinstated but without backwages. - Hence this appeal to the SC. ISSUE/S WON strikers who have found to have staged an illegal strike may be reinstated to work HELD No. There is no question that the strike itself was prompted by no actual, existing unfair labor practice committed by the petitioner. In effecting a change in the seating arrangement in the office of the underwriting department, the petitioner merely exercised a reasonable prerogative employees could not validly question, much less assail as an act of unfair labor practice. The Court is indeed at a loss how rearranging furniture, as it were, can justify a four-month-long strike. As to the private respondent's charges of harassment, the Commission found none, and as a general rule, we are bound by its findings of fact. Amid this background, the Court must grant the petition. In staging the strike in question, a strike that was illegal in more ways than one, the reinstated union officers were clearly in bad faith, and to reinstate them without, indeed, loss of seniority rights, is to reward them for an act public policy does not sanction. - As a general rule, the sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not only because the Constitution imposes sympathy but because of the one-sided relation between labor and capital. The Court must take care, however, that in the contest between labor and capital, the results achieved are fair and in conformity with the rules. We will not accomplish that objective here by approving the act of the National Labor Relations Commission which we hold to constitute a grave abuse of discretion. Disposition Petition is granted. San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 403 SCRA 418 (03) 403 SCRA 418 AZCUNA, June 10, 2003 NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition

FACTS -SMC and Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) executed a CBA wherein they agreed to submit all disputes to grievance and arbitration proceedings, aside from no-strike, no-lockout agreement. -IBM, through its VP and subsequently through its president (which was opposed by the VP), filed with NCMB a notice of strike against SMC for allegedly committing: (1) illegal dismissal of union members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting out of jobs being performed by union members, (5) labor-only contracting, (6) harassment of union officers and members, (7) non-recognition of duly-elected union officers, and (8) other acts of unfair labor practice. SMC filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the notices raised non-strikeable issues and that they affected 4 corporations. -NCMB: issues are non-strikeable, as only SMC was impleaded when 4 different companies were involved. Notices of strike converted into preventive mediation. -while separate preventive mediation conferences were ongoing, the Union through its VP filed a notice of holding a strike vote. SMC opposed, invoking PAL v. Drilon (no strike could be legally declared during the pendency of preventive mediation). NCMB reiterated conversion of notice of strike into preventive mediation and grounds raised were only intra-union conflict nonstrikeable (who between the 2 groups shall represent the workers for collective bargaining purposes, union leadership). -IBM President group filed 2nd notice of strike against SMC, NCMB found the additional grounds to be mere amplifications of issues alleged in the 1st notice of strike. Ordered consolidation of the 2nd notice of strike with 1st notice of strike. Group informed SMC of its plan to hold a strike. -VP group notified the NCMB that their strike vote favored the holding of a strike. NCMB issued a letter reminding the group of the PAL v Drilon. IBM went on strike. Strike paralyzed the operations of SMC, which caused millions of loses. -SMC filed with NLRC a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO, Free Ingress and Egress Order and Deputization Order, which was issued by NLRC, without prejudice to the unions right to peaceful picketing and continuous hearings on the injunction case. SMC also entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Union, calling for lifting of picket lines and resumption of work in exchange of good faith talks between the management and the labor management committees. The MOA also stated that cases filed in relation to their dispute will continue and will not be affected in any manner whatsoever by the agreement. Work was then resumed. -NLRC reconsidered the issuance of TRO, and sought to dismiss the injunction case. SMC opposed, submitted copies of flyers wherein IBM expressed their threat to revive the strike. NLRC issued decision denying the petition for injunction for lack of factual basis, there being no circumstance to constitute an actual or threatened commission of unlawful acts. MFR denied ISSUES WON the strike held by IBM was illegal (therefore, NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for injunction filed by SMC)

HELD YES a. Procedural aspect of the strike -For a strike to be valid, it must be pursued within legal bounds. One of the procedural requisites that A263 of the LC and its IRR prescribe is the filing of a valid notice of strike with the NCMB. Imposed for the purpose of encouraging the voluntary settlement of disputes, this requirement has been held to be mandatory, the lack of which shall render a strike illegal. -In accordance with the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, the conversion of the notice of strike to preventive mediation has the effect of dismissing the notices of strike filed by respondent. A case in point is PAL v. Drilon, where we declared a strike illegal for lack of a valid notice of strike, in view of the NCMBs conversion of the notice therein into a preventive mediation case. During the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings no strike could be legally declared. -therefore, since the notice of strike filed by the union was converted into preventive mediation proceedings, the union had lost the notices of strike required under A263. However, the union defiantly proceeded with the strike while mediation was ongoing. Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant violation of theImplementing Rules, which explicitly oblige the parties to bargain collectively in good faith and prohibit them from impeding or disrupting the proceedings. b. on ruling of NLRC that there was lack of factual basis (no circumstance to constitute an actual or threatened commission of unlawful acts) -at the time the injunction was being sought, there existed a threat to revive the unlawful strike as evidenced by the flyers then being circulated by the IBM, which were not denied by the respondent union. Moreover, a declaration of strike without first having filed the required notice is a prohibited activity (A264(a)), which may be prevented through an injunction in accordance with A254. c. on IBMs failure to observe the CBA provisions on grievance and arbitration - Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a collective bargaining agreement are illegal especially when they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be achieved. -We cannot sanction the respondent-unions brazen disregard of legal requirements imposed purposely to carry out the state policy of promoting voluntary modes of settling disputes. The states commitment to enforce mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace is affirmed by no less than our Constitution. Trade unionism and strikes are legitimate weapons of labor granted by our statutes. But misuse of these instruments can be the subject of judicial intervention to forestall grave injury to a business enterprise. Disposition. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the NLRC in Injunction Case No. 00468-94 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner and private respondent are hereby directed to submit the issues raised in the dismissed notices of strike to grievance procedure and proceed with arbitration proceedings as

prescribed in their CBA, if necessary. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Greenfield v. Ramos, 326 SCRA 428 (00) 326 SCRA 248 PURISIMA; February 28, 2000 NATURE Petition for Certiorari to annul the NLRC decision FACTS - Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield, Inc. (MSMG) (Local Union) is an affiliate of United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP) (Federation). - The CBA between MSMG and M. Greenfield, Inc. states that it is entered into by the corporation and MSMG / ULGWP. - The CBA includes a Union Security Clause requiring all employees who are covered by the CBA and presently members of the UNION to remain members of the UNION for the duration of the CBA as a condition precedent to continued employment. - Local union imposed a P50 fine on non-attending union members which became the subject of bitter disagreement between the Federation and the local union. MSMG then declared general autonomy from the ULGWP. In retaliation, the national federation asked respondent company to stop the remittance of the local union's share in the education funds. It also disauthorized incumbent union officers from representing the employees. - Petitioner union officers were expelled by the federation for allegedly committing acts of disloyalty and/or inimical to the interest of ULGWP and in violation of its Constitution and By-laws. The federation advised respondent company of the expulsion of the 30 union officers and demanded their separation from employment pursuant to the Union Security Clause in their CBA. - Upon demand of the federation, the company terminated the petitioners without conducting a separate and independent investigation. The expelled union officers assigned in the first shift were physically or bodily brought out of the company premises by the company's security guards. Those assigned to the second shift were not allowed to report for work. This provoked some of the members of the local union to demonstrate their protest for the dismissal of the said union officers. Some union members left their work posts and walked out of the company premises. - Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissed union officers were validly and legally terminated because the dismissal was effected in compliance with the union security clause of the CBA which is the law between the parties. This was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. > On the ISSUE of STRIKE: - Labor Arbiter held that the strike was illegal for the following reasons: (1) it was based on an intra-union dispute which cannot properly be the subject of a strike, the right to strike being limited to cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practice (2) it was made in violation of the "no strike, no lock-out" clause in the CBA, and (3) it was attended with violence, force and intimidation upon the persons of the company officials, other employees reporting for work and third persons having legitimate business with the company, resulting to serious physical

injuries to several employees and damage to company property. ISSUE/S * WON the union officers were validly terminated 1. WON the strike was illegal for being grounded on a non-strikeable issue (intra-union conflict between the federation and the local union) 2. WON the no strike, no lock-out clause in the CBA was violated 3. WON the strike was attended with violence force and intimidation HELD * NO Reasoning Although this Court has ruled that union security clauses embodied in the collective bargaining agreement may be validly enforced and that dismissals pursuant thereto may likewise be valid, this does not erode the fundamental requirement of due process. The reason behind the enforcement of union security clauses which is the sanctity and inviolability of contracts cannot override one's right to due process. 1. NO Reasoning When respondent company dismissed the union officers, the issue was transformed into a termination dispute and brought respondent company into the picture. Petitioners believed in good faith that in dismissing them upon request by the federation, respondent company was guilty of unfair labor practice in that it violated the petitioner's right to self-organization. The strike was staged to protest respondent company's act of dismissing the union officers. Even if the allegations of unfair labor practice are subsequently found out to be untrue, the presumption of legality of the strike prevails. 2. NO Reasoning A no strike, no lock out provision can only be invoked when the strike is economic in nature, i.e. to force wage or other concessions from the employer which he is not required by law to grant. Such a provision cannot be used to assail the legality of a strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice, as was the honest belief of herein petitioners. Again, whether or not there was indeed unfair labor practice does not affect the strike. 3. NO Reasoning The Labor Arbiter and the Commission found that "the parties are agreed that there were violent incidents resulting to injuries to both sides, the union and management." The evidence on record show that the violence cannot be attributed to the striking employees alone for the company itself employed hired men to pacify the strikers. With violence committed on both sides, the management and the employees, such violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike as illegal. Dispositive Petition is GRANTED; the NLRC decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; respondent company is ordered to immediately reinstate the petitioners to their respective positions. 2) Guidelines and Balancing of Interest Shell Oil Workers Union v. Shell Co. of the Philippines, 39 SCRA 276 (1971) 00 SCRA 000 FERNANDO; May 31, 1971 NATURE Petition for review order of ca FACTS - Shell Company decided to dissolve its security guard section from its Pandacan Installation, notwithstanding the tenure of the said section being embraced in and assured by an existing collective bargaining contract

- this resulted in a strike by the union (for unfair labor practice). During the strike, violent acts were committed by some of the members of the union - the CA declared the strike illegal, saying that there was no unfair labor practice for the dissolution was a a valid exercise of management prerogative and ordered the dismissal of the officers who participated in the strike) ISSUE WON the strike was illegal HELD NO Ratio The dissolution of the security guard section was in violation of the CBA, thus amounting to unfair labor practice. What was stipulated in an existing CBA certainly precluded Shell Company from carrying out what otherwise would have been within prerogative if to do so would be violative thereof. Reasoning there was specific inclusion of the category of the security guards in the CBA. Specific mention is made of the CBA covering rank and file personnel regularly employed by the Company, including the work area covered by the Pandacan Installation. There was likewise specific reference to such positions in the wage schedule as well as in the appendix of regular remuneration, premium pay and night compensation. Nonetheless, Shell Company was bent on doing away with the security guard section, to be replaced by an outside security agency. - Essentially, the freedom to manage the business remains with management. It still has plenty of elbow room for making its wishes prevail. In much the same way that labor unions may be expected to resist to the utmost what they consider to be an unwelcome intrusion into their exclusive domain, they cannot justly object to management equally being jealous of its prerogatives. Non-compliance With the CBA constitutes ULP - the ULP strike called by the Union did have the impress of validity. - the legality of the strike follows as a corollary to the finding of fact, made in the decision appealed from which is supported by substantial evidence to the effect that the strike had been triggered by the Company's failure to abide by the terms and conditions of its CBA - The assumption is that labor can be trusted to determine for itself when the right to strike may be availed of in order to attain a successful fruition in their disputes with management. It is true that there is a requirement in the Act that before the employees may do so, they must file with the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor a notice of their intention to strike. Such a requisite however does not have to be complied with in case of ULP strike, which certainly is entitled to greater judicial protection if the Industrial Peace Act is to be rendered meaningful. - Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by violent acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and not collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to

ends, it becomes illegal because of the means employed. - on balancing of interests: the violent acts made by some union members does not render the strike illegal. The right of the management to prevent strike cannot override the right of the workers against ULP Disposition Petition is granted. Order is modified (order against individual members who committed violent acts affirmed) Almira v. B.F. Goodrich, Philippines, Inc. 58 SCRA 120 (74) 58 SCRA 120 FERNANDO; July 25, 1974 Facts Due to the refusal of the management to consider petitioners' union as the exclusive bargaining representative, petitioners staged a strike and picketed the company's premises. In the course of the mass picketing, illegal and unlawful acts were committed by the petitioners. Respondent CIR declared petitioners to have committed an illegal strike and dismissed the petitioners. Held REASON FOR PENALTY LESS PUNITIVE THAN DISMISSAL.-Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. it is not only because of the law's concern for the workingman. There is, in addition, his family to consider, Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on the wage-earner. The misery and pain attendant on the loss of jobs then could be avoided if there be acceptance of the view that under all the circumstances of this case, petitioners should not be deprived of their means of livelihood. Nor is this to condone what had been done by them, For all this while, since private respondent considered them separated from the service, they had not been paid. From the strictly juridical standpoint, it cannot be too strongly stressed, to follow Davis in his masterly work, Discretionary Justice, that where a decision may be made to rest an informed judgment rather than rigid rules, all the equities of the case must be accorded their due weight. Finally, labor law determinations to quote from Bultmann, should be not only secundum rationem but also secundum caritatem. SECURITY OF TENURE FORTIFIES PROTECTION TO LABOR.-The conclusion that the dismissal of petitioners in view of their unlawful acts during the strike is uncalled for is fortified by the stress on the security of tenure that is a notable feature of the present Constitution as pointed out in a decision rendered only last month in Philippine Air Lines, Inc. vs. Philippine Air Lines Employees Association, L24626, June 28, 1974. ATTENDANT RESPONSIBILITY ON THE WORKING FORCE AND MANAGEMENT.-The basic doctrine underlying the provisions of the Constitution so solicitous of labor as well as the applicable statutory norms is that both the working force and management are necessary components of the economy. The rights of labor have been expanded. Concern is evident for its welfare. The advantages thus conferred, however, call for attendant responsibilities. The ways of the law are not to be ignored. Those who seek comfort from the shelter that it affords should be the last to engage in activities which negates the very concept of a legal

order as antithetical to force and coercion. What is equally important is that in the steps to be taken by it in the pursuit of what it believes to be its rights, the advice of those conversant with the requirements of legal norms should be sought and should not be ignored. It is even more important that reason and not violence should be its milieu. 3) Defenses Good Faith ULP Interwood Employees Association v. International Hardwood, 99 P 82 (56) 99 P 82 PADILLA; May 18 , 1956 FACTS Mr. Enrique Marcelo, president of the Interwood Employees Association, was originally employed by the petitioner since July 26, 1949, as shop helper with a daily compensation of P3. Desiring to move to a better position in the company, he tendered a letter of resignation from his current position to make himself available for another position. However, he later found out that the new position was not available. He then tried to go back to his original position but was refused by management on the ground that the old position had been abolished. The union declared a strike on his behalf. ISSUE 1. Whether or not Mr. Marcelo was illegally terminated 2. Whether or not the striking union members should be dismissed for fighting for the cause of Mr. Marcelo. HELD NO Mr. Marcelo also claims that his letter of resignation was misinterpreted by the management. From the contents of Exhibit "A" there could be no other meaning from the sentence "I am resigning from my present post as Supervisor effective March 7, 1953," except that as used in ordinary parlance, he is quitting or giving up his present position effective March 7, 1953. The letter of resignation being clear and concise, it should be taken in its face value. Marcelo in his letter of resignation also gave his reason why he is resigning from his present position and signified his desire or intention to work in the powerhouse. Here, Marcelo wanted to assign himself to the powerhouse. The question of transfer and assignment of employees or laborers from one section or department to another is purely an act of the management which Mr. Marcelo cannot impose upon the company, otherwise, if he will be allowed to do so, it would undoubtedly encroach upon the managerial functions of the management. Resignation is not synonymous with separation or dismissal. In his letter of resignation he stated or expressed the wish to be returned to his former position as shift engineer in the powerhouse which he, at that time, did not hold, because the job held by him and the one to which he wanted to be transferred or returned were two different positions. Marcelo's pretension which amounted to an imposition upon the respondent cannot and should not be countenanced and sustained. There was no vacancy in the powerhouse to which he could be transferred. 2. YES. Even granting, just for the sake of argument, that there was really a misinterpretation of the letter of resignation (Exhibit "A"), and because of this, the management refused to readmit Mr. Marcelo,

notwithstanding the request made to that effect, is this a sufficient cause for the members to declare a strike? As lengthily discussed above, Mr. Marcelo was not dismissed for union activities. If he was separated from the service of the company, it was because of his voluntary resignation which was duly accepted by the management. If the management refuses to reemploy him, it is merely acting in the exercise of its prerogative. Mr. Marcelo without resorting to some pacific means and processes prevailed upon the members of the Association to declare a strike simply because he was harboring the belief that he was illegally dismissed. A strike as a weapon of labor must be used judiciously. It should be used in redress of just and lawful grievances and not to be used whimsically or capriciously even by the President of the union who caused the strike to be declared in protest of his fancied notion that he was dismissed by the management on account of union activities. If the determination whether a strike is legal or illegal were to depend upon the reason or motive, no matter how groundless or false it may be, the striking members of a labor union had in mind or believed in good faith at the time they staged the strike, there would then be no need for the court to pass upon that question, because what the strikers had in mind or believed in good faith at the time they struck can hardly be refuted, rebutted or disproved. If the Court of Industrial Relations were bound to believe and so find what the striking members of a labor union allege or claim to be the reason or motive for their staging a strike, because as claimed by the petitioner the right of the members of a labor union to strike for mutual aid or protection, as recognized in section 3, Republic Act No. 875, is an absolute right, then there would no longer be any necessity for holding or conducting a hearing, where both parties to the controversy may present their proofs and upon which the Court is to determine which of the claims or contentions is true, correct and lawful, as disclosed by the evidence before it. Parenthetically, Republic Act No. 875 took effect on 17 June 1953. THE STRIKE HELD ILLEGAL WAS STAGED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE PETITIONER ON 9 MARCH 1953. THE ACT CANNOT BE INVOKED AND APPLIED TO STRIKE STAGED BEFORE THE ACT TOOK EFFECT. 1 NEVERTHELESS, SUCH RIGHT TO STRIKE FOR MUTUAL AID OR PROTECTION IS NOT ABSOLUTE. IT COMES INTO BEING AND IS SAFEGUARDED BY LAW IF AND WHEN THE ACT OR ACTS INTENDED TO RENDER MUTUAL AID OR PROTECTION TO AFFILIATES OF A LABOR UNION ARISE FROM A LAWFUL GROUND, REASON OR MOTIVE. IF THE MOTIVE BE LAWFUL, ANY ACT THAT WOULD TEND TO GIVE SUCH MUTUAL AID OR PROTECTION SHOULD AND MUST BE PROTECTED AND UPHELD. BUT IF THE MOTIVE THAT HAD IMPELLED, PROMPTED, MOVED OR LED MEMBERS OF A LABOR UNION OR ORGANIZATION TO STAGE A STRIKE, EVEN IF THEY HAD ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN STAGING IT, BE UNLAWFUL ILLEGITIMATE, UNJUST, UNREASONABLE OR TRIVIAL, AND THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, THE AGENCY ENTRUSTED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO DETERMINE IT, FINDS IT SO, THEN THE STRIKE MAY BE DECLARED ILLEGAL. REYES, J.B.L., J., with whom PARAS, C.J., BAUTISTA and CONCEPCION, JJ., concur, concurring and dissenting:

 I fully concur with the majority in its view that Enrique Marcelo's conduct was unjustifiable and that he was properly dismissed; but regret not being able to assent to the dismissal of the other strikers, for this extreme penalty seems to me excessive under the circumstances of record. Where unemployment is rife, as at present, dismissal may mean risk of starvation for the laborers and their families. It is practically conceded, and there is no showing otherwise, that the labor union declared the strike in the honest belief that Marcelo had been dismissed because of union activities, and no unlawful means were employed. Such action can not be regarded as trivial, illegal or unreasonable: defense of its members goes to the very root of a union's reason for existence. I concede that the strike was injudicious and hasty, since no serious attempt was made to ascertain the side of management. But it seems to me that reinstatement without backpay would have been a sufficient stern sanction for such inconsiderate action and a reminder against its repetition in the future. Nor is the guilt of the union in acting without due inquiry upon the biased report of its president (Marcelo) too serious or unprecedented an offense. Our experience is that precipitate action upon onesided reports is not confined to labor unions. The truth is that if in labor-capital conflicts labor is often too quick to conclude that every move of management is an attempt to grind it back to slavery, so are capital and management much too predisposed to view every petition of labor as unjustified demand and harassing insolence. Save rare and honorable exceptions, both sides appear to suffer from emotional infantilism. In the present case it does not appear that management endeavored to present the true facts to the union. Had it done so, the strike would have probably been averted, for a laborer does not take lightly to the suspension of the earnings upon which he and his family depend for their living. National Union of Workers Hotels, Restaurant and Allied Industries v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 192 (98) PNOC Dockyard v. NLRC, 291 SCRA 231 (98) PANGANIBAN; June 26, 1998 NATURE Petition for review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court FACTS - private respondent (KMM-PDEC), among unions namely: BRUP, PEDEA, PCC-ELU and PSTCEA, filed with the DOLE a notice of strike against Phil. National Oil Company (PNOC) and Monico Jacob as President/Chairman, on the ground of discrimination constituting ULP. The dispute arose from the grant by petitioner and PNOC of the amount of P2,500.00 increase in monthly salaries to Managerial, Professionals and Technical Employees (MPT) but not to Non-Managerial, Professional and Technical Employees (NMPT). - Acting Secretary Nieves Confesor certified the dispute subject of the notice of strike to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. - the day when respondent union was poised to strike, its officers and members decided to report for

work but petitioner thru its Operations Manager, Nemesio Guillermo, padlocked the gate and refused entry to the employees. Some officers and members of respondent union were able to enter the premises of petitioner and punch-in their timecards; however, they were immediately escorted back outside - Confesor issued a return to work order directing all striking workers to return to work within 24 hours form receipt of the Order and for the Company to accept them under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the work stoppage. - respondent union thru its President, Felimon Paglinawan filed before the NLRC a complaint against petitioner for Illegal Lock-out - all members of the private respondent union reported and were accepted back to work - Subsequently, petitioner filed before the DOLE a petition to declare the strike illegal with a motion to cite the striking workers in contempt for defying the DOLE Orders. - the President, Secretary, Auditor and Treasurer of the respondent union, after due notice and investigation, were dismissed by petitioner from their employment on the ground, among others of their participation in the work stoppage on December 18 to 21, 1991 - the dismissed union officers filed before the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal. The cases were consolidated and in the herein challenged Decision, public respondent ordered the reinstatement of the dismissed officers of private respondent union. The same Decision further ruled that, where reinstatement was no longer feasible "on account of the sale of any of respondent companies," separation pay shall be awarded, equivalent to "1 month's pay for every year of service, a fraction of at least 6 months considered as 1 whole year, in addition to the award of backwages." - The parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. In its December 9, 1994 Decision, the NLRC modified its earlier disposition and ordered PNOC to pay its separated employees severance benefit equivalent to "two months for every year of service" in accordance with the company's established business practice. The separate motions of PNOC and its subsidiaries were all denied. ISSUES 1. WON KMM-PDEC and its officers are guilty of illegal strike. 2. WON the termination of KMM-PDEC union officers, who led the illegal strike, was legal and for just cause. 3. WON PNOC is entitled to the award of damages. HELD 1. NO. Ratio A strike does not automatically carry the stigma of illegality even if no unfair labor practice were committed by the employer. It suffices if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor as the inducing factor for staging a strike. Indeed, the presumption of legality prevails even if the allegation of unfair labor practice is subsequently found to be untrue, provided that the union and its members believed in good faith in the truth of such averment. Reasoning In resolving that the strike was legal, the labor tribunal took note of the following facts: (1) the notice of strike was filed only after the union members lost hope for the redress of their grievance arising from their exclusion from the P2,500 salary

increase; (2) the union members honesty believed that they were discriminated against, since the company practice in the past was to grant salary increases to all employees regardless of whether they were MPTs or NMPTs; (3) such discriminatory grant appeared to be an unfair labor practice intended to discourage union membership, since MPTs were non-union members; and (4) the labor unions complied with the legal requirements before going on strike, such as the members' strike vote by secret ballot, the submission of the results thereof to the National Conciliation and Meditation Board, the filing of a notice to strike and the observance of the 15-day cooling-off period. Respondent Commission opined that the unions had a reason to regard the salary discrimination, believed to discourage membership in the labor organization, as an unfair labor practice. - The NLRC noted further that the strike was peaceful and orderly, unmarred by any form of violence or untoward incident. 2. NO. Ratio Having ruled that the strike staged by respondent unions was legal, the subsequent dismissals of their officers due to their staging of said strike cannot be countenanced. - The NLRC correctly observed that, although petitioner averred that the dismissals of individual respondent were due to infractions of company rules and regulations, the alleged infractions actually arose from their participation in the strike. This is crystal clear from the charges leveled against the union officers, such as "active participation in the illegal work stoppage." "disruption of company operations resulting [in] losses." "violation of the 'NO STRIKE' clause of the existing CBA," among others, cited in their similarly worded notices of investigation that eventually led to their dismissals. - The issues relating to the strike and lockout were already submitted before the NLRC through the corresponding complaints filed by petitioner itself and private respondents. By filing a formal complaint for illegal strike, it behooved petitioner to desist from undertaking its own investigation on the same matter, concluding upon the illegality of the union activity and dismissing outright the union officers involved. - Moreover, the MOA, other than enjoining the striking workers to return to work, likewise ordered the management to accept them under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the work stoppage. In glaring defiance, petitioner arbitrarily undertook to change the work schedule of some employee on the very day they resumed work, aside from deducting in full the wages and holiday pays of the striking employees pertaining to the strike period, even before the LMC could convene. 3. NO. The actual and exemplary damages sought by petitioner have no basis in law, much less in equity and fair play. From the foregoing discussion, the strike was staged by respondent unions in the honest belief that petitioner, among the other PNOC subsidiaries involved, was guilty of unfair labor practice due to the discrimination in the grant of salary increase believed to discourage union membership, and to its refusal to bargain collectively on the matter. There was good faith on the part of

the striking unions. Thus, they cannot be penalized by imposing upon them payment of damages. VII. TEST OF LEGALITY A. Legal Strikes 1) Purpose and Means Test = Art. XIII, Sec. 3, Constitution; Art. 263 (b) National Union of Workers in Hotels, etc. v. CA, 570 SCRA 598 (08) B. Illegal Strikes 1. Basis Illegality 263 (b) (c); 264 (a); 265 Sukhothai Cuisine, etc. v. CA, 495 SCRA 336 (06) -MARTINEZ; JULY 17, 2006 NATURE Appeal by certiorari FACTS - On December 3, 1998, employees of Sukhothai Cuisine and Restaurant (duly organized as a union, affiliated with private respondent Philippine Labor Alliance Council [PLAC], and designated as PLAC local 460 Sukhothai chapter) filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on the ground of unfair labor practice (ULP) and particularly, acts of harassment, fault-finding, and union busting through coercion and interference with union affairs. In a subsequent conciliation conference, representatives of the petitioner agreed and guaranteed that there will be no termination of the services of private respondents during the pendency of the case, with the reservation of the management prerogative to issue memos to erring employees for the infraction, or violation of company policies. - In a Submission Agreement, the issue of unfair labor practice was later submitted for voluntary arbitration, during the pendency of which, the petitioner, through its president, Ernesto Garcia, dismissed Eugene Lucente, a union member, due to an alleged petty quarrel with a co-employee. In view of this termination, private respondent Union filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal. Another employee, private respondent Jose Lanorias, likewise a union member, was relieved from his post and terminated from employment. Shortly thereafter, respondents staged a wildcat strike which was later transformed into an actual strike. - On June 29, 1999, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal strike with the NLRC against private respondents, and for a declaration that respondents who participated in the commission of illegal acts have lost their employment status. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner and held that the Notice of Strike and the Strike Vote referred to a prior dispute submitted for voluntary arbitration and cannot apply to the strike staged about six months later; that, instead of resorting to a strike, private respondents should have availed of the proper legal remedies such as the filing of complaints for illegal suspension or illegal dismissal with the NLRC; and that even if private respondents complied with all the requisites of a valid strike, the strike is still illegal due to the commission of prohibited acts, including the obstruction of free ingress and egress of the premises, intimidation, and threat inflicted upon nonstriking employees. - Private respondents appealed to the NLRC which decided in their favor and held that the petitioner is

guilty of union busting; of violating the Submission Agreement that no termination shall be effected during the voluntary arbitration proceedings; that the Notice of Strike and Strike Vote are applicable to the strike of June 24, 25, and 26, 1999 since the same issues of ULP were involved and that ULPs are continuing offenses. - After the NLRC denied the MFR, petitioner appealed to the CA, which later denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC hence this case. ISSUES 1. WON the strike was illegal 2. WON private respondents are deemed to have lost their employment status by participating in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. 3. WON the requisites for a valid strike may be dispensed with in case of union-busting. HELD 1. YES. The strike was illegal. Ratio Art.264 of the LC provides: No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the Pres. or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. - Strikes staged in violation of agreements providing for arbitration are illegal, since these agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends are to be achieved, for it is among the chief policies of the State to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation, as modes of settling labor, or industrial disputes. Reasoning Once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike. - The alleged dismissals of Lucente and respondent Lanorias, both union members, which allegedly triggered the wildcat strike, are not sufficient grounds to justify the radical recourse on the part of the private respondents. These matters should have been raised and resolved in the voluntary arbitration proceedings that were commenced precisely to address them. - Private respondents should have first availed of the appropriate remedies under the Labor Code, such as the institution of cases of illegal dismissal or, by agreement of the parties, the submission of the cases to the grievance machinery of the CBA, if one is available, so that they may be subjected to separate voluntary arbitration proceedings, or simply seek to terminate the pending voluntary arbitration case and complete the mandatory procedure for a lawful strike. Private respondents should have availed themselves of any of these alternative remedies instead of resorting to a drastic and unlawful measure, specifically, the holding a wildcat strike. And because of the fact that the Union was fully aware that the arbitration proceedings were pending, good faith cannot be invoked as a defense. - Moreover, even if the strike were to be declared valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal. Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Art. 264(e) of the LC, which states that no person engaged in picketing

shall: a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or (c) obstruct public thoroughfares. 2. YES. The strike had been attended by the widespread commission of prohibited acts. Reasoning Under Art.264(a) of the LC: Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. - The evidence in the record clearly and extensively shows that the individual respondents engaged in illegal acts during the strike, such as the intimidation and harassment of a considerable number of customers to turn them away and discourage them from patronizing the business of the petitioner; waving their arms and shouting at the passersby, Huwag kayong pumasok sa Sukhothai! and Nilagyan na namin ng lason ang pagkain dyan! as well as numerous other statements made to discredit the reputation of the establishment; preventing the entry of customers; angry and unruly behavior calculated to cause commotion which affected neighboring establishments within the mall; openly cursing and shouting at the president in front of customers and using loud and abusive language, such as Putang ina niyong lahat!, toward the rest of the management as well as their co-workers who refused to go on strike; physically preventing nonstrikers from entering the premises, as well as deliberately blocking their movements inside the restaurant, at times by sharply bumping into them or through indecent physical contact; openly threatening non-strikers with bodily harm, such as Pag hindi sila pumayag, upakan mo!; and shouting at the security guard Granada! which caused panic among the customers and prompted security to report a possible death threat to management and the security agency. 3. NO. Reasoning In case of alleged union busting, it is only the 15-day cooling-off period that may be dispensed with, the three remaining requirements notice, strike vote, and seven-day report period cannot be dispensed with. Disposition Petition GRANTED. Decisions of the CA and the NLRC are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Decision of the LA REINSTATED. The strike held ILLEGAL and Union officers who participated in the illegal strike and in the commission of illegal acts, as well as the union members who participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike, are declared to have lost their employment status. Allied Banking Corporation v. NLRC, 258 SCRA 724 (96) 258 SCRA 724 HERMOSISIMA; July 12, 1996 Facts - The dispute between petitioner and Union started when their CBA which was to expire on June 30, 1984 came up for renewal. They failed to reach an amicable settlement particularly on the wage

increase issue. The Union filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations. - On Dec 16, 1984, then Minister of Labor and Employment, Blas Ople assumed jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 263 (g) LC. The orders enjoined the Union from declaring a strike and the management from effecting a lock out. The orders notwithstanding, Union filed on Dec 20, 1984, a report on the results of the strike vote that it earlier conducted. On Jan 3, 1985, Union staged a strike upon the Union president's contention that the Labor Minister's assumption order was a mere scrap of paper. - On Jan 4, 1985, petitioner filed with MOLE a Manifestation and Urgent Motion praying for a returnto-work order. On Jan 6, 1985, Minister Ople granted the motion and issued a return-to-work order which included a P1,000.00 grant per employee chargeable to future CBA benefits. - Minister Ople directed the parties to continue negotiations until Jan 31, 1985; otherwise, if no compromise agreement is reached, he will personally resolve the bargaining deadlock. - The parties failed to break the deadlock; Minister Ople directed them to incorporate in their collective agreement the awards granted in his order. - On Feb 11, 1985, "certain members of the Union resumed the strike and, on the following days, acts of violence were committed . . . resulting in the filing of criminal charges against some of the strikers." - Petitioner, through notices published in the Bulletin Today, the Times Journal, and the Daily Express, directed the striking employees to return to work not later than 1:00 p.m. of Feb 13, 1985. - respondents failed to report for work on the stated deadline, and explained that the resumption of their picketing activities was brought about by their belief that Minister Ople's decision was not based on justice, equity and reason. Petitioner issued notices of their termination. - Meeting the Union demands halfway, Minister Ople issued a Resolution modifying his Jan 31, 1985 Order, and so the union lifted its picket lines and notified petitioner that the striking employees were returning back to work. Petitioner refused to accept them back on the ground that the strikers have already been dismissed for abandonment of work when they failed to obey the assumption order. - In order to quell further dispute, Minister Ople issued an Order which directed the bank to reinstate provisionally all striking workers except (a) those who have already accepted their separation pay; (b) officers of the union; and (c) those with pending criminal charges. - Union then filed with SC a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, asking that the Order of Minister Ople be modified to likewise direct the reinstatement of all union officers, employees with pending criminal cases and employees who have received their separation pay with full back wages, emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) and employee benefits counted from March 8, 1985 until actually reinstated. SC remanded the petition to MOLE, with the instruction to resolve all pending factual and legal issues relative to the petition. - Minister Augusto Sanchez, successor of Minister Ople, modified the last Order of the latter by ordering the reinstatement of all striking employees, except

those who have already accepted their separation pay. The bank filed a petition with the SC to nullify the aforesaid Order. - SC issued resolution: 1) granting "a Temporary Restraining Order" enjoining enforcement of the order of the Minister of Labor and Employment only insofar as it directs the payment of back wages, allowances, and other benefits due to private respondents effective March 11, 1985 until their actual reinstatement; 2) ordering petitioner to advance the equivalent of two (2) months salary to each of the private respondents entitled to reinstatement under the MOLE order, said amount to be repaid to the petitioner or charged to accumulated back wages depending on the final outcome of the case. Issue: WON the striking union members terminated for abandonment of work after failing to obey the returnto-work order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment should be reinstated with back wages. Held: NO. The respondents were validly dismissed considering their defiance of the return-to-work order issued by the Secretary of Labor. As a consequence of such defiance, they are considered severed from their employment. An award of back wages is incompatible with the findings of the NLRC upholding the dismissal of respondents. - Mere participation of union members in an illegal strike should not automatically result in their termination from employment. However, a perusal of the records shows that respondents were terminated from employment by reason of their defiance to the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor. - The provisions of law which govern the effects of defying a return-to-work order are: 1) Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code xxx xxx xxx When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same . . . (as amended by Sec. 27, R.A. 6715; emphasis supplied.) 2) Article 264 (a) No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.

Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequent of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. - Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc.: xxx the underlying principle embodied in Art. 263 (g) on the settlement of labor disputes is that assumption and certification orders are executory in character and are to be strictly complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any petition questioning their validity. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests. Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-towork orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company, to justify their actions. . . .xxx xxx xxx - The return-to-work order is issued pending the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to say that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if the strike is illegal, for the purpose precisely is to maintain the status quo while the determination is being made. Otherwise, the workers who contend that their strike is legal can refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill on the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill. Worse, they will also claim payment for work not done, on the ground that they are still legally employed although actually engaged in the activities inimical to their employer's interest. - Sarmiento v. Tuico, and Asian Transmission Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission: It is also important to emphasize that the return-towork order not so much confers a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the worker's will. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest. That is the real reason such return can be compelled. So imperative is the order in fact that it is not even considered violative of the right against involuntary servitude... The worker can of course give up his work, thus severing his ties with the company, if he does not want to obey the order; but the order must be obeyed if he wants to retain his work even if his inclination is to strike. Disposition NLRC Decision is AFFIRMED with respect to the finding that private respondents were validly dismissed. As to the issue of reinstatement and computation of back wages, the same, being

inconsistent with the finding of valid dismissal, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Interphil Laboratories Employees Union Interphil Laboratories, 372 SCRA 658 (98) v.

Samahan ng mga Manggagawa v. NLRC, 324 SCRA 242 (00) 324 SCRA 242 PURISIMA; February 1, 2000 NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS - In the earlier part of 1993, petitioners and private respondents negotiated for the renewal of their Collective Bargaining Agreement. Due to some economic differences, the negotiations ended in a deadlock. - April 2, 1993 - Petitioners filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. The series of conferences proved unavailing. - April 24, 1993 - Union conducted a strike vote among its members, and the results of the voting were thereafter conveyed to the Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization for submission to the NCMB, but for some unknown reason, the same was not made. - May 5, 1993 - Petitioners went on strike without the report of the strike vote submitted to the NCMB. - June 17, 1993 - Moldex filed a petition to declare the strike illegal and to authorize the dismissal of the officers involved. The petition alleged that the petitioners barricaded the three gates of the company and committed acts of violence, threats and coercion. - An amicable settlement failed so trial on the merits began. Moldex presented witnesses whereas the union only presented its memorandum. They alleged that the pieces of evidence presented by Moldex were hearsay. - March 7, 1994 The Labor Arbiter came out with an order which declared the strike illegal and ordered the dismissal of employees responsible for the strike. - An appeal before the NLRC was made and the NLRC ordered a remand of the case for the reason that both parties were not able, for reasons and/or causes known only to them, to submit crucial evidence in support of their respective contentions. ISSUE WON the order of the NLRC was correct HELD NO Reasoning - Reception of evidence would be a futile exercise considering that the facts are already clear and complete, and would not alter the outcome of the case. - It has been shown that the results of the strike-vote were never forwarded to the NCMB, as admitted by petitioners themselves and as attested to by a Certification of Non-Submission of Strike Vote issued by the NCMB. There is thus no need for additional evidence on the matter, as it would not change the fact that the results of the strike-vote were not submitted to the NCMB. Without the submission of the results of the strike-vote, the strike was illegal, pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code. - The requirements of procedural due process had been complied with. Petitioners and private respondents were allowed to present their witnesses and evidence. Private respondents presented their witnesses, while petitioners did not, opting instead to file a Memorandum, challenging the admissibility of private respondents' pieces of evidence. So long as a

party is given an opportunity to be heard and to submit his evidence, the requirements of procedural due process are complied with. - Aside from not submitting the result of the strikevote to the NCMB, petitioners also committed acts of violence, threats, coercion and intimidation during the strike. - It bears stressing that factual findings of labor officials are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court when supported by substantial evidence. After going over the records on hand, the Court discerns no ground for disturbing the above-quoted findings of the Labor Arbiter as the same are basically supported by substantial evidence and his conclusion accords with law. Disposition Decision set aside. Philippine Diamond Hotel v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Association, 494 SCRA 195 (06) 494 SCRA 195 CARPIO MORALES; June 30, 2006 FACTS -Union filed a petition for certification election to be declared the exclusive bargaining representative of the Hotels employees. This petition was dismissed by DOLE for lack of legal requirements. -after a few months, Union sent a letter to Hotel informing it of its desire to negotiate for a collective bargaining agreement. This was rejected by the Hotel stating that the Union was not the employees bargaining agent as their petition for certification election was denied. -Union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB alleging the Hotel refusal to bargain and for acts of unfair labor practices. NCMB summoned both parties and held series of dialogues. Union however suddenly went on strike -Secretary of DOLE assumed jurisdiction and ordered compulsory arbitration pursuant to art. 263 (g) of LC. And Union members were directed to return to work and for Hotel to accept them back. Hotel refused to accept the employees return. The order was modified (by a different Secretary) such that reinstatement was to be done only in the payroll. -Union filed for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion. Case was referred to the CA. CA affirmed that the payroll reinstatement was not a grave abuse of discretion. On appeal, it modified NLRC decision ordering reinstatement with back wages of union members. ISSUE -xxx3) WON those employees who participated in the strike should be given back wages HELD -xxx3) No. -The general rule is that backwages shall not be awarded in an economic strike on the principle that "a fair days wage" accrues only for a "fair days labor. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay, unless of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed or suspended. "when employees voluntarily go on strike, even if in protest against unfair labor practices," no back wages during the strike is awarded. -The Court ruled that only those members of the union who did not commit illegal acts during the

course of the illegal strike should be reinstated but without back wages TOPIC: illegal strikes- burden of economic loss 2. Effect of Illegality 264 (a) National Union of Workers in Hotels, etc. v. CA, 570 SCRA 598 (08) Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. NLRC, 537 SCRA 171 (07) G & S Transport Corporation v. Infante, 533 SCRA 288 (07) Nissan Motors v. Secretary of DOLE, 491 SCRA 605 (06) 491 SCRA 605 GARCIA; June 21, 2006 FACTS - The labor dispute was triggered by a collective bargaining deadlock between Nissan Motor and the Union resulting in the filing of four notices of strike with the NCMB. - DOLE issued an Order consolidating the 4th notice of strike with the first three (3) notices and reiterating the injunction contained in the assumption of jurisdiction - The Company filed a Motion to Deputize PNP Laguna to Secure, Maintain and Preserve Free Ingress and Egress of NMPI, alleging that despite the injunctions against any slowdown and strike, the Union went on actual strike, picketed and blocked the company offices, and plant premises; unlawfully blocked and obstructed all entrances and exits points. - The Secretary of Labor issued an Order deputizing the [PNP] - DOLE issued the assailed Decision which affirmed the suspension of the 140 employees which is the subject of the first notice of strike and sustained the dismissal of the Union officers but recalled the dismissal of the Union members and reinstated to their former positions without back wages. It also directed BANAL-NMPI-OLALIA-KMU and Nissan Motor Philippines, Inc. to conclude a Collective Bargaining Agreement - The Company and the Union each sought partial reconsideration, but their corresponding motions were denied - Therefrom, both the Company and the Union went to the CA - The CA, denied the parties separate petitions and affirmed the respondents resolution ISSUES 1. WON the CA acted within the bounds of the law when it spared the striking workers or union members from the penalty of dismissal. 2. WON the award of salary increases made by SOLE in the disposition of economic aspects of the CBA which was based on revelations sourced from the confidential position given to the NCMB Administrator is proper. HELD 1. YES. - The Union engaged in work slowdown which under the circumstances in which they were undertaken constitutes illegal strike. The Company is therefore right in dismissing the subject Union officers in accordance with Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, for participating in illegal strike in defiance of the assumption of jurisdiction order by the Labor Secretary. - While the employer is authorized to declare a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having

lost his employment, his/its option is not as wide with respect to union members or workers for the law itself draws a line and makes a distinction between union officers and members/ordinary workers. An ordinary striking worker or union member cannot, as a rule, be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike; there must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike. - The law invests the Secretary of Labor and Employment the prerogative of tempering the consequence of the defiance to the assumption order. The Secretary may thus merely suspend rather than dismiss the employee involved. - Chief, Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Solvic Industrial Corporation vs. NLRC: Except for the most serious causes affecting the business of the employer, our labor laws frown upon dismissal. Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, an employee should not be sanctioned with a consequence so severe. - This disposition takes stock of the following circumstances justifying a less drastic penalty for ordinary striking workers: a) the employees who engaged in slowdown actually reported for work and continued to occupy their respective posts, or, in fine, did not abandon their jobs; b) they were only following orders of their leaders; and c) no evidence has been presented to prove their participation in the commission of illegal activities during the strike. - Not to be overlooked is a factor which the CA, regarded as justifying the leniency assumed by the public respondent Secretary towards the members of the Union. It is the fact that Nissan Motor appeared to have also exacerbated, the emerging volatile atmosphere among which is the en masse termination of most of the Union members. - Any worker who participates in a strike or otherwise engages in any prohibited act in defiance of the assumption order may be meted the penalty of loss of employment status. However, the law itself authorizes the graduation of penalties, Article 264 of the Labor Code making, as it were, a distinction between union officers and its members or any other workers, the main differing line contextually being that the latter do not necessarily lose their job by mere participation in an illegal strike absent proof that they committed illegal acts. - Association of Independent Union in the Philippines vs. NLRC: the responsibility of union officers, as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than that of the members and, therefore, limiting the penalty of dismissal only for the former for participation in an illegal strike is in order. 2. NO. - The disposition made by the public respondent Secretary relating to the economic aspects of the CBA, such as, but not limited, transportation allowance, 14th month pay, seniority pay, separation pay and the effectivity of the new CBA, appears to be proper. - However, there is a need to modify some of the awards among which is the annual salary increases. In this regard, the Court cannot sanction the award made by the public respondent Secretary based ostensibly on the revelation of NCMB Administrator Olalia that was sourced from the confidential position given him by the Company. The reason for this is simple. Article 233 of the Labor Code prohibits the use in evidence of confidential information given

during conciliation proceedings. NCMB Administrator Olalia clearly breached this provision of law. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Company, this confidential information given to Administrator Olalia was made prior to the Unions slowdown and defiance of the Assumption Order of August 22, 2001 causing it additional losses. Disposition Decision and Resolution of the CA AFFIRMED , with modifications Philcom Employees Union v. Philippine Global Communications, 494 SCRA 214 (06) NATURE Petition for review to annul the CA Decision which affirmed the orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in OS-AJ-0022-97. FACTS -Upon the expiration of the CBA between petitioner Philcom union (PEU) and respondent employer (Philcom, Inc.), the parties started negotiations for its renewal. While negotiations were ongoing, PEU filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) NCR, a Notice of Strike, due to perceived unfair labor practice committed by the company. In view of the filing of said Notice of Strike, the company suspended negotiations on the CBA. This moved the union to file another Notice of Strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock. -At a conciliation conference held at the NCMB-NCR office, the parties agreed to consolidate the two Notices of Strike filed by the union and to maintain the status quo during the pendency of the proceedings. However, while the union and the company officers and representatives were meeting, the remaining union officers and members staged a strike at the company premises, barricading the entrances and egresses thereof and setting up a stationary picket at the main entrance of the building. The following day, the company immediately filed a petition for the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in accordance with Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. -Then Acting Labor Sec Cresenciano Trajano issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the dispute, enjoining any strike or lockout, whether threatened or actual, directing the parties to cease and desist from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation, directing the striking workers to return to work within 24hours from receipt of the Secretarys Order and for management to resume normal operations, as well as accept the workers back under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. The parties were likewise required to submit their respective position papers and evidence within 10days from receipt of said order. A few days later, a second order was issued reiterating the previous directive to all striking employees to return to work immediately. -The union filed MFR assailing, among others, the authority of then Acting Secretary Trajano to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Said motion was denied and as directed, the parties submitted their respective position papers. In its position paper, the union raised the issue of the alleged ULP of the company. The company, on the other hand, raised in its position paper the sole issue of the illegality of the strike staged by the union. -On the premise that the Labor Secretary cannot rule on the issue of the strike since there was no petition to declare the same illegal, petitioner union filed a

Manifestation/ Motion to Strike Out Portions of & Attachments in Philcoms Position Paper for being irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent to the issues assumed for resolution. In opposition, the company argued that it was precisely due to the strike suddenly staged by the union that the dispute was assumed by the Labor Secretary. Hence, the case would necessarily include the issue of the legality of the strike. -The Secretary issued the first assailed order. Said order directed the issuance of summons to Philcom Corporation to appear before any hearing that may thereafter be scheduled and to submit its position paper as may be required. It however dismissed the unions charges of ULP against the Company. It further issued a return-to-work order and directed the parties to cease and desist from committing any acts that may aggravate the situation. - Philcom filed MFR and Motion to Certify Labor Dispute to the NLRC for Compulsory Arbitration. PEU also filed MFR insofar as the Order dismissed the ULP charges against Philcom and included the illegal strike issue in the labor dispute. The Secretary denied both MFRs. -PEU filed with CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65. CA denied the petition and affirmed the orders of the DOLE Sec. Hence, this petition. ISSUES 1. WON CA erred when it affirmed the order/resolution of the DOLE Sec including the issue of illegal strike notwithstanding the absence of any petition to declare the strike illegal. 2. WON CA erred when it affirmed the order/resolution of the Secretary of Labor dismissing the Unions charges of unfair labor practices. 3. WON CA erred when it failed to issue such order mandating/directing the issuance of a writ of execution directing the Company to unconditionally accept back to work the Union officers and members under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike and as well as to pay their salaries/backwages and the monetary equivalent of their other benefits. HELD 1. NO. The Secretary properly took cognizance of the issue on the legality of the strike. Since the very reason of the Secretarys assumption of jurisdiction was PEUs declaration of the strike, any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental to, but is essentially involved in, the labor dispute itself. -The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State, with the aim of promoting public good. When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted "great breadth of discretion" in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place. In this case, the Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute because it falls in an industry indispensable to the national interest: the telecommunications industry. -The authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from such labor dispute. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the dispute. Besides, it was upon

Philcoms petition that the Secretary immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Moreover, a careful study of all the facts alleged, issues raised, and arguments presented in the position paper leads us to hold that the portions PEU seek to expunge are necessary in the resolution of the present case. 2. NO. -Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the workers right to selforganization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, no matter how unfair, are not unfair labor practices. The only exception is Article 248(f), which in any case is not one of the acts specified in PEUs charge of unfair labor practice. -A review of the acts complained of as ULP of Philcom convinces us that they do not fall under any of the prohibited acts defined and enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code. The issues of misimplementation or non-implementation of employee benefits, non-payment of overtime and other monetary claims, inadequate transportation allowance, water, and other facilities, are all a matter of implementation or interpretation of the economic provisions of the CBA between Philcom and PEU subject to the grievance procedure. All the charges were adequately rebutted by the employer. -The Court has always respected a companys exercise of its prerogative to devise means to improve its operations. Management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, supervision and transfer of employees, working methods, time, place and manner of work. This is so because the law on ULP is not intended to deprive employers of their fundamental right to prescribe and enforce such rules as they honestly believe to be necessary to the proper, productive and profitable operation of their business. -Even assuming arguendo that Philcom had violated some provisions in the CBA, there was no showing that the same was a flagrant or malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions. The law mandates that such violations should not be treated as unfair labor practices. 3. NO. -SC ruled on the legality of the strike if only to put an end to this protracted labor dispute. The facts necessary to resolve the legality of the strike are not in dispute. The strike and the strike activities that PEU had undertaken were patently illegal for the following reasons: 1. Philcom is engaged in a vital industry protected by PD 823, as amended by PD 849, from strikes and lockouts. It is therefore clear that the striking employees violated the no-strike policy of the State in regard to vital industries. 2. The Secretary had already assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. Despite the issuance of the return-to-work orders, the striking employees failed to return to work and continued with their strike. -A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived. While the workers may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer. see Art.264 of the Labor Code.

-A strike undertaken despite the Secretarys issuance of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity, and thus, illegal, under Article 264(a) of the Labor Code. The union officers who knowingly participate in the illegal strike are deemed to have lost their employment status. The union members, including union officers, who commit specific illegal acts or who knowingly defy a return-towork order are also deemed to have lost their employment status. Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and preventing management to fill up their positions. 3. PEU staged the strike using unlawful means and methods. -e.g., human barricades at all entrances to and egresses from the company premises; use of coercive methods to prevent company officials and other personnel from leaving the company premises; prohibiting other tenants at the Philcom building from entering and leaving the premises. see Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code. -The sanction provided in Article 264(a) is so severe that any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. By insisting on staging the prohibited strike and defiantly picketing Philcoms premises to prevent the resumption of company operations, the striking employees have forfeited their right to be readmitted. 4. PEU declared the strike during the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings at the NCMB. -see Art264(a), LC. Section 6, Book V, Rule XXII of the IRR: During the proceedings, the parties shall not do any act which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of dispute. They are obliged, as part of their duty, to bargain collectively in good faith, to participate fully and promptly in the conciliation meetings called by the regional branch of the Board. 5. PEU staged the strike in utter disregard of the grievance procedure established in the CBA. -PEU should have immediately resorted to the grievance machinery provided for in the CBA. In disregarding this procedure, the union leaders who knowingly participated in the strike have acted unreasonably. The law cannot interpose its hand to protect them from the consequences of their illegal acts. -A strike declared on the basis of grievances which have not been submitted to the grievance committee as stipulated in the CBA of the parties is premature and illegal. Having held the strike illegal and having found that PEUs officers and members have committed illegal acts during the strike, we hold that no writ of execution should issue for the return to work of PEU officers who participated in the illegal strike, and PEU members who committed illegal acts or who defied the return-to-work orders that the Secretary issued. The issue of who participated in the illegal strike, committed illegal acts, or defied the return-to-work orders is a question of fact that must

be resolved in the appropriate proceedings before the Secretary of Labor. Disposition Petition dismissed. CA decision affirmed with the modification that the DOLE Sec is directed to determine who among the PEU officers participated in the illegal strike, and who among the union members committed illegal acts or defied the returnto-work orders. Grand Boulevard Hotel v. Genuine Labor Organization, 406 SCRA 688 (03) 406 SCRA 688 CALLEJO; July 18, 2003 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Respondent Genuine Labor Organization of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries Silahis International Hotel Chapter (Union) and the petitioner Grand Boulevard Hotel (then Silahis International Hotel, Inc.) executed a CBA covering the period from July 10, 1985 up to July 9, 1988. - Thereafter, Union filed several notices of strike on account of alleged violations of CBA, illegal dismissal and suspension of EEs. In these instances, SOLE issued a status quo ante bellum order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of LC. After notice was given by Hotel re its decision to implement retrenchment program, Union informed the DOLE that the union will conduct a strike vote referendum. The members of the Union voted to stage a strike. Union informed the DOLE of the results of the strike vote referendum. SOLE issued another status quo ante bellum order certifying the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and enjoining the parties from engaging in any strike or lockout. Then, another notice of strike was filed by Union on account of the illegal dismissal of EEs pusrsuant to Hotels act of retrenching around 171 EEs. Officers of the respondent union and some members staged a picket in the premises of the hotel, obstructing the free ingress and egress thereto. Because of this, they were terminated. - Hotel filed a complaint with NLRC for illegal strike against the union, its members and officers. Petitioner Hotel alleged inter alia that the union members and officers staged a strike on November 16, 1990 which lasted until November 29, 1990 without complying with the requirements provided under Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code. It further alleged that the officers and members of the respondent union blocked the main ingress to and egress from the hotel. - The respondent Union denied the material allegations of the complaint and alleged that the petitioner committed ULP prior to the filing of the Nov. 16, 1990 notice of strike. Hence, there was no need for the union to comply with A263 and 264 of LC, as the notice - LA Linsangans Ruling: Unions failure to comply with the requirements laid down in A263 and 264 of LC, the strike that was staged was illegal. Considering the admissions of the individual respondents that they participated in the said strike, the termination of their employment by the petitioner was legal. LA noted that if as alleged by the respondent union the petitioner was guilty of ULP, it should have filed a complaint therefor against the Hotel and/or its officials for which the latter could

have been meted penal and administrative sanctions as provided for in A272 of LC. The Union failed. - Appeal by Union to NLRC: that it had complied with the requirements laid down in A263 and 264 of LC because its Nov 16, 1990 notice of strike was a mere reiteration of its Sept 27, 1990 notice of strike, which, in turn, complied with all the requirements of the aforementioned articles, i.e., the cooling-off period, the strike ban, the strike vote and the strike vote report. - NLRC affirmed LA Decision. Compliance of the requirements laid down in A263 and 264 of LC respecting the Sept 27, 1990 notice of strike filed by the union cannot be carried over to the Nov 16, 1990 notice of strike. Resultantly, for failure of the union to comply with the requirements, the strike staged on November 16 up to November 29, 1990 was illegal. - CA reversed NLRC and LA: It took into account the observation of the Sol-Gen that the Hotel retrenched EEs pending the resolution of the certified cases respecting the alleged illegal suspension and dismissals effected by Hotel during and prior to the notices of strike filed by Union. Sol-Gen opined that even if the strike was staged without the proper notice and compliance with the cooling-off period, resort thereto was simply triggered by the petitioners' belief in good faith that Hotel was engaged in ULP. Hence, this petition ISSUES 1 WON the strike staged by the respondent union on Nov16-29, 1990 is legal 2 WON the dismissals of the officers and some members of the Union as a consequence of the strike on Nov16-29, 1990 are valid. HELD 1. NO Re: Procedural Requirements - Under A263 (c) and (f) of LC, the requisites for a valid strike are as follows: (a) a notice of strike fled with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof or 15 days in case of ULP; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least 7 days before the intended strike. The requisite 7-day period is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the approval of the majority of the union members. The notice of strike and the cooling-off period were intended to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. The requirements are mandatory and failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. A strike simultaneously with or immediately after a notice of strike will render the requisite periods nugatory. - In this case, union filed its notice of strike with the DOLE on Nov 16, 1990 and on the same day, staged a picket on the premises of the hotel, in violation of the law. Union cannot argue that since the notice of strike on Nov 16, 1990 were for the same grounds as those contained in their notice of strike on September 27, 1990 which complied with the requirements of the law on the cooling-off period, strike ban, strike vote and strike vote report, the strike staged by them on Nov16, 1990 was lawful. The matters contained in the notice of strike of Sept 27, 1990 had already been taken cognizance of by the SOLE when he issued on Oct 31, 1990 a status quo ante bellum order enjoining union from intending or staging a strike. Despite SOLE order, the union

nevertheless staged a strike on Nov16, 1990 simultaneously with its notice of strike, thus violating A264(a) LC Grounds - A strike that is undertaken, despite the issuance by the SOLE of an assumption or certification order, becomes a prohibited activity and, thus, illegal pursuant to A264 of LC: No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. - Even if the union acted in good faith in the belief that the company was committing an unfair labor practice, if no notice of strike and a strike vote were conducted, the said strike is illegal. 2. YES Re: Effect of Illegality Ratio Since a strike that is undertaken, despite the issuance by the SOLE of an assumption or certification order, becomes a prohibited activity and, thus, illegal pursuant to A264 of LC, the union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act. Disposition Petition is GRANTED. LA Decision REINSTATED. Calamba Medical Center, Inc. v. NLRC, 571 SCRA 585 (08) San Juan De Dios v. San Juan De Dios, etc., 430 SCRA 193 (04) 430 SCRA 193 CALLEJO, SR.; May 28, 2004 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of decision and resolution of CA. FACTS- San Juan De Dios Educational Foundation Inc. (Foundation) is a domestic foundation operating as a college and hospital. San Juan De Dios Educational Foundation Employees Union-Alliance of Filipino Workers (Union) is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees. - Rodolfo Calucin, Jr. had been employed at the Foundation as a medical clerk for almost 12 years. The Foundation informed him that his incurred absences affected his efficiency, and was asked to explain why he should not be terminated for gross and habitual neglect of his duties. - July 27, 1994: the Foundation wrote Calucin, Jr. terminating him for gross and habitual neglect of duties. Calucin Jr. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Calucin, Jr. was a union officer, and officers and employees who were also members of the Union staged a strike. - August 26, 1994: DOLE Sec. Confesor directed the striking employees to go to work, and directing the Foundation to accept all employees under the previous terms of employment. The order was served on the officers and members of the Union, nevertheless, the strike continued. - The Foundation filed a petition before the NCMB to declare the strike illegal on ground that the Union committed prohibited acts during the strike staged on August 26 to 31 1994. - Since the Union did not heed the Return to Work Order (RTWO), Confesor issued another one. The Foundation and the Union entered into an agreement on August 30, 1994 regarding the Calucin issue, and

that the Foundation would waive any legal action relating to the illegal strike and the illegal acts committed by the officers and members of the Union. - In a complaint filed by the Union against the Union before the NLRC, it alleged that the Foundation was guilty of illegal dismissal of Union officers, discrimination, union-busting, and that the strike was legal and conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner. The NLRC held that the strike was illegal, that the officers of the Union lost their employment status. At the inception the strike was legal; when the RTWO was issued and the officers and members refused to return to work, that was when they lost their employment status. - In an appeal before the CA, the court held there was a valid service of the RTWO, and that the refusal to return to work rendered the strike illegal. ISSUES 1. WON the petitioners were validly served with the RTWO. 2. WON the strike staged by the officers and members was legal. HELD 1. NO Reasoning The return of Sheriff Alfredo C. Antonio shows that copies of the Order were served on the striking employees and the petitioners. A copy of the Order was served to the Union president at 7:55pm of August 26, 1994but the striking employees refused to acknowledge receipt of the copies 2. NO Reasoning Art. 264. (a) No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. - Despite the receipt of an order from then Secretary to return to their respective jobs, the Union officers refused to do so and defied the same. Consequently, the strike staged by the Union is a prohibited activity under Art. 264 of the Labor Code. The dismissal of its officers is in order. DISPOSITION The petition is denied. Stamford Marketing Corporation v. Julian, 423 SCRA 634 (04) Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort, Inc. v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union, 494 SCRA 195 (06) Arellano University Employees Union v. CA, 502 SCRA 219 (06) 3. Employment of Strike Breakers 264 (c); 212 (r) 4. Strike Area and Run-Away Shop; IR 1 (vv) Complex Electronics v. NLRC, 310 SCRA 403 (99) 310 SCRA 403 Kapunan ; 1999 July 19 Facts -Complex Electronics Corporation (Complex) was engaged in the manufacture of electronic products, a subcontractor of electronic products where its customers gave their job orders, sent their own materials and consigned their equipment to it. The customers were foreign-based companies with different product lines and specifications requiring the employment of workers with specific skills for each product line. Thus, there was the AMS Line for the Adaptive Micro System, Inc., the Heril Line for

Heril Co., Ltd., the Lite-On Line for the Lite-On Philippines Electronics Co., etc. The rank and file workers of Complex were organized into a union known as the Complex Electronics Employees Association (Union). -Complex received a facsimile message from Lite-On Philippines Electronics Co., requiring it to lower its price by 10%. -Complex informed its Lite-On personnel that such request of lowering their selling price by 10% was not feasible as they were already incurring losses at the present prices of their products. Under such circumstances, Complex regretfully informed the employees that it was left with no alternative but to close down the operations of the Lite-On Line but promised that it wont be after 1 month, if possible it would be prolonged and they would all receive retrenchment pay, half a month for every year of service in accordance with Article 283 of the Labor Code of Philippines. -The Union, on the other hand, pushed for a retrenchment pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service, which Complex refused. -Complex filed a notice of closure of the Lite-On Line with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the retrenchment of the ninety-seven (97) affected employees. - Union filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). A total closure of company operation was effected at Complex. -Labor Arbiter: reinstate the 531 employees to their former position with all the rights, privileges and benefits appertaining thereto, and to pay said complainants-employees the aggregate backwages amounting P26,949,891.80 as of April 6, 1993 and to such further backwages until their actual reinstatement. -The Union anchors its position on the fact that Lawrence Qua is both the president of Complex and Ionics and that both companies have the same set of Board of Directors. It claims that business has not ceased at Complex but was merely transferred to Ionics, a runaway shop. To prove that Ionics was just a runaway shop, petitioner asserts that out of the 80,000 shares comprising the increased capital stock of Ionics, it was Complex that owns majority of said shares with P1,200,000.00 as its capital subscription and P448,000.00 as its paid up investment, compared to P800,000.00 subscription and P324,560.00 paid-up owing to the other stockholders, combined. Thus, according to the Union, there is a clear ground to pierce the veil of corporate fiction. -The Union further posits that there was an illegal lockout/illegal dismissal considering that as of March 11, 1992, the company had a gross sales of P61,967,559 from a capitalization of P1,500,000.00. It even ranked number thirty among the top fifty corporations in Muntinlupa. Complex, therefore, cannot claim that it was losing in its business which necessitated its closure. Issue WON Ionics was a runaway shop Held No. A runaway shop is defined as an industrial plant moved by its owners from one location to another to escape union labor regulations or state laws, but the term is also used to describe a plant removed to a new location in order to discriminate against employees at the old plant because of their union activities. It is one wherein the employer

moves its business to another location or it temporarily closes its business for anti-union purposes. A runaway shop in this sense, is a relocation motivated by anti-union animus rather than for business reasons. In this case, however, Ionics was not set up merely for the purpose of transferring the business of Complex. At the time the labor dispute arose at Complex, Ionics was already existing as an independent company. As earlier mentioned, it has been in existence since July 5, 1984. It cannot, therefore, be said that the temporary closure in Complex and its subsequent transfer of business to Ionics was for anti-union purposes. The Union failed to show that the primary reason for the closure of the establishment was due to the union activities of the employees. The mere fact that one or more corporations are owned or controlled by the same or single stockholder is not a sufficient ground for disregarding separate corporate personalities. Ionics may be engaged in the same business as that of Complex, but this fact alone is not enough reason to pierce the veil of corporate fiction of the corporation. Well-settled is the rule that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of its officers and stockholders. This fiction of corporate entity can only be disregarded in certain cases such as when it is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime. To disregard said separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established. Disposition WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED. VIII. BURDEN OF ECONOMIC LOSS Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort, Inc. v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union, 494 SCRA 195 (06) 12 SCRA 124 REGALA; September 30, 1964 NATURE Appeal from CIR Decision FACTS - Cromwell Commercial Co. and the Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union (PTUC) signed a CBA - Changes in the working conditions in the company and the latter's failure to carry out its part of the CBA became a source of complaint among the EEs. 3 days after, the company dismissed Gaddi and Andrada, leaders of the shipping department-employees. So the union protested the dismissal. It gave the company 48 hrs within which to act on its grievance and reinstate the dismissed employees. - From then on the relation between the company and the union steadily deteriorated. The company took back the keys from the warehouseman and ordered the salesmen to put their trucks in the garage. Then finally, the union struck and picketed the premises of the company. - The company in turn gave the strikers a period within which to return to work otherwise they would be considered dismissed for cause. It warned them that the strike was illegal for being against the no strike clause of the collective bargaining agreement. - In a conference called by DOLE, the strikers offered to return to work provided the company observed the provisions of the bargaining contract. But the company insisted that the strikers could be taken back only under the terms of its March 1 order. As already stated, this order reverted salesmen to

salary and commission basis, abolished their helper's allowance and stopped the payment of per diem and other allowances to provl salesmen. - In addition, the company set as price for continued conciliation conference the remittance by the salesmen of their collections and the return of delivery trucks and stocks on hand. The union replied that the strikers had not lost their employee status and that at any rate they were bonded. It suffered though to deposit with the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor the things demanded by the company, but the company was unyielding in its demand. Anyway, nothing came out of the conference. The employees gradually gave up the strike and the salesmen later settled their accounts and returned the property of the company. - Case was filed in the CIR, charging the company with unfair labor practice. After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of employees. The union moved for a reconsideration of the decision, contending that the trial judge erred (1) in awarding only half back wages to Gaddi and the five salesmen, (2) in awarding no back wages to the rest of the strikers and (3) in denying reinstatement to Andrada and Dario and to those who might have found substantially equivalent employment elsewhere. The court in banc affirmed the decision. Hence this appeal. ISSUE WON CIR erred in its order of reinstatement of and payment of back wages to the dismissed employees HELD NO As to reinstatement - At the outset, two types of employees involved in this case must be distinguished, namely, those who were discriminatorily dismissed for union activities (Gaddi and Andrada and 5 salesmen) and those who voluntarily went on strike, following the failure of the company-union conference to settle their dispute. - Both types of EEs are entitled to reinstatement. Striking EEs are entitled to reinstatement WON the strike was the consequence of the ER's unfair labor practice, unless, where the strike was not due to any unfair labor practice, the employer has hired others to take the place of the strikers and has promised them continued employment. Exception: Those who, although discriminatorily discharged, must nonetheless be denied reinstatement because of (1) unlawful conduct or (2) because of violence. - It is not for SC to judge the effect of misconduct by EEs. It is primarily for the CIR to determine. In the absence of proof of abuse of discretion on the part of CIR, SC will not interfere. - The same thing may be said of the denial of reinstatement to those who might have found substantial employment elsewhere. The mere fact that strikers or dismissed employees have found such employment elsewhere is not necessarily a bar to their reinstatement. As to payment of back wages - The decision assailed directs the company "to reinstate all the strikers, without backwages, in view of the circumstances, as explained on the subject of the strike, unless they have found substantial employment elsewhere during the pendency of this case." The union says this order is erroneous. Union says it is unfair to deny backwages to the strikers after finding that the strike declared by them was

legal because it was provoked by unfair labor practices of the company. - The denial of backpay may be justified, although on a different ground. For this purpose, SC adverts to the distinction earlier made between discriminatorily dismissed employees and those who struck, albeit in protest against the company's unfair labor practice. Discriminatorily dismissed employees received backpay from the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the day of their discharge. On this score, the award of backpay to Gaddi, Andrada and the salesmen may be justified. The salesmen, as already stated, were practically locked out when they were ordered to put their trucks in the garage; they did not voluntarily strike. Hence, the award of backwages. - In contrast, the rest of the employees struck as a voluntary act of protest against what they considered unfair labor practices of the company. The stoppage of their work was not the direct consequence of the company's unfair labor practice. Hence their economic loss should not be shifted to the employer. When employees voluntarily go on strike, even if in protest against unfair labor practices, it has been our policy not to award them backpay during the strike. - However, where, as in this case, an employer refuses to reinstate strikers except upon their acceptance of the new conditions that discriminate against them because of their union membership or activities, the strikers who refuse to accept the conditions and are consequently refused reinstatement are entitled to be made whole for any losses of pay they may have suffered by reason of the respondent's discriminatory acts." - While it is true that the strikers in this case offered to return to work, their offer was conditional. Their offer was predicated on the company's observance of the provisions of the CBA, the very bone of contention between the parties by reason of which the union walked out. Disposition CIR decision AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs. REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting: - I cannot agree to the denial of backpay to the reinstated laborers. There is no dispute that the ER was the first to infringe the CBA by refusing to implement its provisions, and by insisting on it as a condition for taking back the strikers. Industrial Peace Act cannot be said to be promoted by placing the economic loss on the strikers, denying them backpay. While the laborers technically violated the no-strike clause, the facts as found reveal that the ER goaded the laborers into striking, by repeatedly violating the CBA and by preventing the organization of the grievance committee through the ER's refusal to name its representatives therein. Crownwell Commercial Employees Laborers Union v. CIR, 12 SCRA 124 (64) and

Consolidated Labor Association v. Marsman and Co., 11 SCRA 589 (64) 11 SCRA 589 MAKALINTAL; July 31, 1964 FACTS: - MARCELA-FFW submitted to the Company a set of proposals for collective bargaining, which the Company answered.

- In spite of negotiations held between the Company and the Union, they failed to reach In agreement; so the Union, failed a notice of strike with the DOLE. - Mediation by the Conciliation Service of that Department proved fruitless. - the Union declared a strike and at the same time placed a "round-the-clock" picket line around the Company's premises in Intramuros, Manila. The tense situation in the strike zone prompted the Manila Police Department to send policemen thereto to preserve peace. - Meanwhile the Labor Department's Conciliation Service continued to mediate between the representatives of the Union and of the Company. - Eventually, after a conference where Marsmans VPs proposal (that they stop the strike and go back to work, and that when they were already working the Company would discuss with them their demands) was accepted, the strikers returned to work. However, complainants herein were refused admittance and were informed by Company officials that they would not be reinstated unless they ceased to be active Union members and that in any case the Company already had enough men for its business operations. -As a result the strike and the picketing were resumed, because of which employees who had been admitted to work had to stay inside the Company premises, where the Company furnished them food and quarters. Nevertheless some of those employed could go in and out after office hours to visit their families. - During the strike, some of the picketers and some non-strikers were arrested within the strike zone for having committed unlawful acts, and were duly charged therewith. - A petition for writ of injunction filed by the Company against MARCELA on the ground that the strike and picket were being maintained illegally, was denied by the CFI Manila, which pointed out that proper criminal complaints should have been filed against the individual strikers in the corresponding courts. - Because of the Company's consistent refusal to reinstate the 69 complainants even after repeated requests, the Confederation of Labor Associations of the Philippines (CLAP), to which the Union had affiliated after seceding from the FFW initiated the present charge for unfair labor practice. - Initially the strike staged by the Union was meant to compel the Company to grant it certain economic benefits set forth in its proposal for collective bargaining. The strike was an economic one,1 and the striking employees would have a tight to be reinstated if, in the interim, the employer had not hired other permanent workers to replace them. For it is recognized that during the pendency of an economic strike an employer may take steps to continue and protect his business by supplying places left vacant by the strikers, and is not bound to discharge those hired for that purpose upon election of the strikers to resume their employment. But the strike changed its character from the time the Company refused to reinstate complainants because of their union activities after it had offered to admit all the strikers and in fact did readmit the others. It was then converted into an unfair labor practice strike.

- J. Bautista, after hearing, found Marsman guilty of the charge and ordered it to reinstate 60 of the aforementioned 69 complainants to their former positions or to similar ones with the same rate of pay, without back wages. - On the MR, the Court en banc affirmed the decision. - Both the Union and Marsman appealed. The former claims that the 60 reinstated employees should be granted backpay while the latter questions the CIR's finding of ULP. Issue: WON Marsman committed ULP HELD: YES. Reasoning: - Marsman alleges that it was economic reasons, i.e., its policy of retrenchment, not labor discrimination, which prevented it from rehiring complainants. This is disproved, however, by the fact that it not only readmitted the other strikers, but also hired new employees and even increased the salaries of its personnel by almost 50%. SC is convinced that it was not business exigency but a desire to discourage union activities which prompted the Company to deny readmittance to complainants. This is an indubitable case of unfair labor practice. - The Union began the strike because it believed in good faith that settlement of their demands was at an impasse and that further negotiations would only come to naught. It stopped the strike upon the belief they could go back to work. Then it renewed the strike (or it started a new strike) as a protest against the discrimination practiced by the Company. Both are valid grounds for going on a strike. - The Company further argues that since the methods used by the strikers were illegal, it had the right to refuse them readmission. Of the 69 complainants, nine, namely Alejandro Mojar, Manuel Mazo, Esteban Borja, Cecilio Walo, Eugenio Valenzuela, Elias Matic, Marcos Buccat, Malisimo Vargas and Ricardo Antonio, were charged with and convicted of various crimes like coercion, malicious mischief, physical injuries, breach of the peace, light threats, and damage to property, all committed during the period from September 4, 1954 to October 12, 1954. Admittedly, the Company could not have condoned these acts which were committed after it had offered to reinstate the strikers. Nevertheless, as the lower court reasoned out, it does not appear that the aforementioned individual acts were authorized or even impliedly sanctioned by the Union. Hence, the other strikers who were innocent of and did not participate in the illegal acts should not be punished by being deprived of their right of reinstatement. It is only those who had been found guilty who should be penalized by the loss of the right.3 - On the other hand, even after the court has made a finding of unfair labor practice, it still has the discretion to determine whether or not to grant back pay. Such discretion was not abused when it denied back wages to complainants, considering the climate of violence which attended the strike and picket that the complainants conducted. While the complainants ordered reinstated did not actively take part in the acts of violence, their minatory attitude towards the Company may be gathered from the fact that from the very first day of the strike policemen had to patrol the strike zone in order to preserve peace. DISPOSITIVE: Judgment appealed from is affirmed. 1 An economic strike is defined as one which is to force wage or other concessions from the

employer which he is not required by law to grant. Social Security System v. SSS Supervisors Union, 117 SCRA 746 (82) 117 SCRA 746 MELENCIO-HERRERA; October 23, 1982 NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS - The instant case is an offshoot of Case No. 46-IPA (49) certified to the CIR by the President of the Philippines for compulsory arbitration of labor dispute between the SSS and the PAFLU concerning the interpretation of certain provisions of their Collective Bargaining Agreement. The PAFLU had staged a strike in defiance of the CIR Order of August 29, 1968 "enjoining the parties, for the sake of industrial peace . . . to maintain the status quo - the Union not to declare any strike and the Management not to dismiss nor suspend any of its employees nor to declare any lockout." On 3 September 1968, in that same case, the SSS filed an Urgent Petition to declare the strike illegal. - On 26 September 1968, respondent Union filed a Motion for Intervention in the said case averring, inter alia that it had not participated in the strike; that its members wanted to report for work but were prevented by the picketers from entering the work premises; that under the circumstances, they were entitled to their salaries corresponding to the duration of the strike, which could be deducted from the accrued leave credits of their members. The SSS had no objection to the intervention sought but opposed the demand for the payment of salaries pertaining to the entire period of the strike. - Respondent Court, through Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, issued the Order of 3 March 1970, ordering the payment of salaries of the members of respondent Union during the strike period, but not to be chargeable to accrued leave credits. The reasons given were that this Court had already declared the strike premature, and that the members of respondent Union had not participated in the strike and had actually manifested their desire to work but could not cross the heavy picket lines during the height of the strike. - The SSS moved to reconsider the Order arguing that since respondent Union members actually rendered no service at all during the strike, they were not entitled to the payment of salaries. Respondent Court, en banc, denied reconsideration. ISSUE WON CIR has the authority to issue the Order HELD NO - "The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital or management and employee is that of a `fair day's wage for a fair day's labor.' If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay, unless of course the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed or suspended. It is hardly fair or just for an employee or laborer to fight or litigate against his employer on the employer's time." - In this case, the failure to work on the part of the members of respondent Union was due to circumstances not attributable to themselves. But neither should the burden of the economic loss suffered by them be shifted to their employer, the SSS, which was equally faultless, considering that the situation was not a direct consequence of the employer's lockout or unfair labor practice. Under the

circumstances, it is but fair that each party must bear his own loss. - "Considering, therefore, that the parties had no hand or participation in the situation they were in, and that the stoppage of the work was not the direct consequence of the company's lockout or unfair labor practice, `the economic loss should not be shifted to the employer.' Justice and equity demand that each must have to bear its own loss, thus placing the parties in equal footing where none should profit from the other there being no fault of either." Disposition The assailed order is set aside. Philippine Interfashion, Inc. v. NLRC, 117 SCRA 659 (82) G.R. No. L-59847 TEEHANKEE : October 18, 1982 FACTS: Sometime on 12 December 1979, the workers in the COMPANY grouped themselves and organized a labor union known as the Philippine Inter-Fashion Workers Union and thereafter directly affiliated the same with the NAFLU. Believing that it has a majority of the more or less 600 employees, it filed on 26 December 1979 a petition for direct certification as the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees which, as of the date of submission for resolution of this case, remained unresolved. Sometime in January 1980, the COMPANY conceived and decided to retrench its employees and selected about 40 employees to be dismissed effective 20 February 1980 allegedly because of lack of work Sometime on 8, 9 and 11 February 1980, Asterio Guanzon, Personnel Assistant of the COMPANY, called about 20 of the affected employees and informed them of the intended retrenchment and offered them to voluntarily resign and be paid retrenchment benefit. Since said employees refused, Guanzon asked them "to acknowledge receipt of the clearance application and the termination letter but except for two (2) workers, they refused even to acknowledge receipt of the forms. The following day, 12 February 1980, about 200 employees boarded two buses and went to the Ministry of Labor and talked with then Deputy Minister who advised them to return to their work. These employees actually returned in the afternoon but stayed outside the compound. On 14 February 1980, the employees returned to the Ministry of Labor and on the same day obtained a Return to Work Order The following day, 15 February 1980, the employees returned to the company with the aforesaid Order and were allowed to enter the compound but they merely stayed in the canteen because they were not given work on the pretext that machines were undergoing repairs and servicing and because the sewing lines were reorganized and workers were reassigned to new lines

On February 1980, more than 200 employees returned and reported for work but again they were only made to stay at the canteen inside the compound and were not allowed to work but they were nevertheless paid their wages from 12 February 1980 to 20 February 1980 On the same date, 20 February 1980, the COMPANY filed with this Ministry "applications for clearance to terminate the workers who participated in the alleged walkout for serious misconduct, effective March 1, 1980 placing the affected employees under preventive suspension in the meantime." Subsequently, the COMPANY hired "additional workers to be able to complete twelve (12) production lines and to be able to deliver according to my production schedule." On 20 October 1980, one hundred fifty (150) employees who were not re- admitted before were allowed to return to work and in so doing withdrew their case or complaint against the COMPANY, thereby leaving 114 employees still subject of its clearance application. The Solicitor General has stated in his comment that "from these facts are derived the following conclusions which are likewise undisputed: that petitioner engaged in an illegal lockout while the NAFLU engaged in an illegal strike; that the unconditional offer of the 150 striking employees to return to work and to withdraw their complaint of illegal lockout against petitioner constitutes condonation of the illegal lock-out; and that the unqualified acceptance of the offer of the 150 striking employees by petitioner likewise constitutes condonation of the illegal strike insofar as the reinstated employees are concerned." ISSUES: 1. WON petitioner must be deemed to have waived its right to pursue the case of illegal strike 2. WON the said 114 employees are entitled to reinstatement with three months' backwages HELD: 1. Reasoning The Court approves the stand taken by the Solicitor General that there was no clear and unequivocal waiver on the part of petitioner and on the contrary the record shows that it tenaciously pursued its application for their dismissal, but nevertheless in view of the undisputed findings of illegal strike on the part of the 114 employees and illegal lockout on petitioner's part, both parties are in pari delicto and such situation warrants the restoration of the status quo ante and bringing the parties back to the respective positions before the illegal strike and illegal lockout through the reinstatement of the said 114 employees 2. Reasoning

With such restoration of the status quo ante it necessarily follows, as likewise submitted by the Solicitor General, that the petition must be granted insofar as it seeks the

setting aside of the award of three months' backwages to the 114 employees ordered reinstated on the basis of the general rule that strikers are not entitled to backwages DISPOSITIVE: Decision of NLRC affirmed Lapanday Workers, Union v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 95 (95) 248 SCRA 95 Puno ; Sept. 7, 1995 Facts -Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation and CADECO Agro Development Philippines Inc. (Private respondents) are sister companies. Lapanday Workers Union (Union) is the duly certified bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of private respondent. The Union is affiliated with the KMU-ANGLO. -Union has a collective bargaining agreement. A few months before the expiration of their CBA, private respondent initiated certain management policies which disrupted the relationship of the parties- 1. Contracting of Philippine Eagle Protectors and Security Agency Inc., the Union branded the security guards posted within the company premises as private respondents' "goons" and "special forces." It also accused the guards of intimidating and harassing their members. 2. The Union claimed that the module on the Philippines political spectrum lumped the ANGLO (Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization), with other outlawed labor organization such as the National Democratic Front or other leftist groups. -These issues were discussed during a labormanagement meeting, the Union agreed to allow its members to attend the HDIR seminar for the rankand-filers but the Union directed its members not to attend the seminars scheduled on said dates. They picketed the premises of the Philippine Eagle Protectors to show their displeasure on the hiring of the guards. Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). NCMB called conciliation conference. The conference yielded the agreements that Union officers, including the officials of KMU-ANGLO, and the Executive Director of the NMB would attend the HDIR seminar and a committee shall convene to establish guidelines governing the guards. With the apparent settlement of their difference, private respondents notified the NCMB that there were no more base for the notice of strike. -Danilo Martinez. a member of the Board of Directors of the Union, was gunned down in his house in the presence of his wife and children. The gunman was later identified as Eledio Samson, an alleged member of security forces of private respondent. After the killing, most of the members of the Union refused to report for work. They returned to work the following day but they did not comply with the "quota system" adopted by the management to bolster production output. Allegedly, the Union instructed the workers to reduce their production to thirty percent (30%) Private respondents charged the Union with economic sabotage through slowdown. Private respondents filed separate charged against the Union and it member for illegal strike. unfair labor practice and damages, with prayer for injunction. Petitioners skipped work to pay their last respect to the slain Danilo Martinez. who was laid to rest. Again on another date petitioner did not report for work.

Instead, they proceeded to private respondents' office at Lanang, carrying placards and posters which called for the removal of the security guards. the ouster of certain management officials, and the approval of their mass leave application. Their mass action did not succeed. -Labor Arbiter decision: Illegal strike and employees have lost their employment status and order to desist. NLRC limited the penalty of dismissal only to the leaders of the illegal strike especially the officers of the union who served as its major player and union members were merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike and should be treated differently from their leaders. Petitioners claim that public respondent NLRC gravely abused it discretion. Issue WON the strike is legal Held No. The applicable law are Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111, dated December 24. 1986. Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. 111, provides. "c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks. the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its member. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officer duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately. xxx xxx xxx "f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of director of the corporation or association or of the partner in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of secret ballot In every case the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the result of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout subject to the cooling-off period herein provided. Article 264 of the same Code reads: "Art 264. Prohibited activities. - (a) No labor organization or employer shall declared a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry. xxx xxx xxx ". . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal

acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike." A strike is "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute." It is the most preeminent of the economic weapons or workers which they unsheathe to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the point product of labor and capital. Undeniably, strikes exert some disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management but also on the general peace and progress of society. Our laws thus regulate their exercise within reasons by balancing the interests of labor and management together with the overarching public interest. Some of the limitations on the exercise of the right of strike are provided for in paragraph (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the labor Code, as amended, supra. They provide for the procedural steps to be followed before staging a strike - filing of notice of strike, taking of strike vote, and reporting of the strike vote result to the Department of Labor and Employment. In National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) vs. Overseas, et al., we ruled that these steps are mandatory in character. thus: "If only the filing of the strike notice and the strikevote report would be deemed mandatory. but not the waiting periods so specifically and emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes (hereafter discussed) for which the filing of the strike notice and strike-vote report is required cannot be achieved . . . xxx xxx xxx "So too, the 7 day strike-vote report is not without a purpose. As pointed out by the Solicitor General '. . . The submission of the report gives assurance that a strike vote has been taken and that, if the report concerning it is false, the majority of the members can take appropriate remedy before it is too late.' The seven (7) day waiting period is intended to give the Department of Labor and Employment an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members. The need for assurance that majority of the union members support the strike cannot be gainsaid. Strike is usually the last weapon of labor to be gainsaid. Strike compel capital to concede to its bargaining demands or to defend itself against unfair labor practices of management. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and its members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors. The decision to wield the weapon of strike must, therefore, rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism. unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few hothead, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not, however, be antithetical to the public welfare. Thus, our laws require the decision to strike to be the consensus of the majority for while majority is not infallible, still, it is the best hedge against haste and error. In addition, a majority vote assures the union it will go to war against management with the strength derived from unity and hence, with better chance to

succeed. In Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company vs. NLRC, we held: xxx xxx xxx "The right to strike is one of the right recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument of labor for it protection against exploitation by management. by virtue of his right. the workers are able to press their demands for better terms of employment with more energy and persuasiveness. poising the threat to strike at their reaction to employer s intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working class. But precisely because of this, it must be handled carefully like a sensitive explosive, but it blow up in the workers' own hands. Thus. it must de declared only after the most thoughtful consultation among them, conducted in the only was allowed that is, peacefully, and in every case conformably to reasonable regulation. Any violation of the legal requirements and strictures, . . . will render the strike illegal. to the detriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect. "Every war must be lawfully waged. A labor dispute demands no less observance of the rules. for the benefit of all concerned." Applying the law to the case at bar, we rule that strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is plainly illegal as it was held within the seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the Labor Code. as amended. The haste in holding the strike prevented the Department of Labor and Employment from verifying whether it carried the approval of the majority of the union members. It set to naught an important policy consideration of our law on strike. Considering this finding, we need not exhaustively rule on the legality of the work stoppage conducted by the union and some of their members on September 9 and 23, 1988. Suffice to state, that the ruling of the public respondent on the matter is supported by substantial evidence. Disposition Reinstating rank-and-file workers who were merely misled in supporting illegal strikes but not be entitled to backwages as they should not be compensated for services skipped during the illegal strike. Dismissed. A. Improved Offer Balloting and Strikes 265; IR-1 (v)

PART EIGHT PICKETING A. Definition Law Dictionary & Bases 263 (b); Constitution Art. III, Sec. 4 B. Nature and Purpose of Picket Line Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Philippines, Inc., 512 SCRA 437 (07) 312 SCRA 437 CALLEJO, SR; January 24, 2007 NATURE This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter FACTS - The union is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the regular paid workers and the manthly paid non-ccommission earning employees of the comopany. individual petitioners are union officers,directors and shop stewards. - The union and the company entered into a 3 year CBA. upon the expiration, the union told the company that they wanted to negotiate the terms. the union insisted that representatives from Alyansa ng mga Unyon ng Coca Cola be allowed to observe the CBA meetings. the company refused to allow alyansa to observe and an impasse ensued. union officers, directors and stewards filed a notice of strrice with NCMB based on deadlock on CBA and unfair labor practice arising from the company's refusal to bargain. the grounds were ammended to unfair labor practice for the company's refusal to bargain in good faith and interference with the exercise if their right to self-organization. - pending the notice to strike, the union decided to participate in a mass action by alyansa in front of the company's premises. operations would come to complete stops for insufficiency of contractual employees who would take over. after the mass strike (separate and distinct from the mass action), the company filed to declare strike illegal, to declare the officers of union and individual respondents to have lost their employment status, to declare the union, its officers and members guilty of unfair labor practice to violation of the CBA, and to award them damages.

- the LA found the strike to be illegal such that the participants lost their employment status. the CA affirmed the decision. ISSUE/S 1. WON the mass action wit Alyansa is actually a strike HELD 1. YES Ratio The factual findings and conclusions of tribunals, as long as based on substantial evidence, are conclusive on the SC. Reasoning The term strike1 encompasses not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities. Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute. That there was a labor dispute between the parties is not an issue. Petitioners notified the respondent of their intention to stage a strike, and not merely to picket. Disposition Petition is denied for lack of merit. CA decision is affirmed. Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court ruled that "the fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling."32 The term "strike" encompasses not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities.33 Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute.34 As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of peaceable persuasion.35 A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.36 That there was a labor dispute between the parties, in this case, is not an issue. Petitioners notified the respondent of their intention to stage a strike, and not merely to picket. Petitioners insistence to stage a strike is evident in the fact that an amended notice to strike was filed even as respondent moved to dismiss the first notice. The basic elements of a strike are present in this case: 106 members of petitioner Union, whose respective applications for leave of absence on September 21, 1999 were disapproved, opted not to report for work on said date, and gathered in front of the company premises to hold a mass protest action. Petitioners deliberately

1Article

212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.

absented themselves and instead wore red ribbons, carried placards with slogans such as: "YES KAMI SA STRIKE," "PROTESTA KAMI," "SAHOD, KARAPATAN NG MANGGAGAWA IPAGLABAN," "CBA-WAG BABOYIN," "STOP UNION BUSTING." They marched to and fro in front of the companys premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted activity which already affected the companys operations. The mass concerted activity constituted a strike. The bare fact that petitioners were given a Mayors permit is not conclusive evidence that their action/activity did not amount to a strike. The Mayors description of what activities petitioners were allowed to conduct is inconsequential. To repeat, what is definitive of whether the action staged by petitioners is a strike and not merely a picket is the totality of the circumstances surrounding the situation. A strike is the most powerful of the economic weapons of workers which they unsheathe to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the Union and its members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due to their labors.37 The decision to declare a strike must therefore rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, envisaged by the tempers and tantrums of a few hot heads, and finally focused on the legitimate interests of the Union which should not, however, be antithetical to the public welfare, and, to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means of attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer.38 Since strikes cause disparity effects not only on the relationship between labor and management but also on the general peace and progress of society, the law has provided limitations on the right to strike. For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art. 263 of the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal.39 It is clear in this case that petitioners totally ignored the statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike. We quote, with approval, the ruling of the CA which affirmed the decisions of the NLRC and of the Labor Arbiter: Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd, Employees v. Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd., 37 SCRA 244 (71) 37 SCRA 244 CASTRO; January 30, 1971 NATURE Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 and October 20, 1965, respectively, in Case 1698-ULP. FACTS

- Because of deadlock and stalemate on CBA, the Unions went on a strike and picketed on the premises of the employer. - Insular Life, through Olbes, its president, sent to each of the strikers a letter quoted verbatim as follows: We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing. However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may: 1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so. 2. Take your meals within the office. 3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office where comfortable cots have been prepared. 4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies. 5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours. 6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families. The decision to make is yours whether you still believe in the motives of the strike or in the fairness of the Management. - Unions continued strike with the exception of a few employees. - From the date the strike was called until it was called off, some management men tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines. Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Abella, chief of the personnel records section, respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket line, tossed aside the placard of a picketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued between them, in which both suffered injuries. The Companies organized three bus-loads of employees, including a photographer, who with respondent Olbes, succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers. - Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence, the Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of Manila. During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office, the Companies likewise filed a petition for injunction with damages with CFI Manila which, on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions, issued an order restraining the strikers, until further orders of the said court, from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' building. - Insular Life, again through Olbes, sent individually to the strikers a letter quoted hereunder in its entirety: The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958. Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our decision. We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open for long. We have continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without you.

If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the home office. If by this date you have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your replacement. Before, the decisions was yours to make. So it is now. - Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions, except 3, were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts. - At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on June 2, 1958. - However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management committee. The screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all nonstrikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal's office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's office, the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without however stating the specific acts allegedly committed. Among those who were refused readmission is Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later that they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not been readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to them. ISSUE/S 1. WON an employee may be refused readmission because he committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents when, as Union president, he advised the strikers that they could use force and violence to have a successful picket and that picketing was precisely intended to prevent the non-strikers and company clients and customers from entering the Companies' buildings. HELD 1. NO Reasoning Even if this were true, the record discloses that the picket line had been generally peaceful, and that incidents happened only when management men made incursions into and tried to break the picket line. At any rate, with or without the advice of Ibarra, picketing is inherently explosive. For, as pointed out by one author, "The picket line is an explosive front, charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the union-management dispute. It may be marked by colorful name-calling, intimidating threats or sporadic fights between the pickets and those who pass the line." (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 752). The picket line being the natural result of the respondents' unfair labor

practice, Ibarra's misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a bar to reinstatement. Disposition ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 is reversed and set aside, and another is entered, ordering the respondents to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to their former or comparatively similar positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958 up to the dates of their actual reinstatements. Costs against the respondents. Security Bank Employees Union v. Security Bank and Trust Co., 23 SCRA 503 (68) Mortera v. CIR, 79 P 345 (47) Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Cloribel, 27 SCRA 465 27 SCRA 465 REYES, JBL; March 28, 1969 NATURE Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul FACTS - MetroBank located at the ground floor of the Wellington Bldg in 624 Plaza Calderon, Binondo, Manila was picketed by the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU). Wellington complained, however, that the picketers were annoyingly blocking the common passageway of the building, the only ingress and egress to the second to the sixth floors. The other occupants demanded protection of their peaceful enjoyment of and free access to and from, the premises leased by them. Wellington charged PAFLU of undue interference not only with its enjoyment of its property and business of leasing and administering the same but also with the businesses of the neutral tenants. - Judge Cloribel of the CFI of Manila issued an injunction against PAFLU. PAFLU filed the present petition in the SC, alleging that Judge Cloribel acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order, in violation of the Industrial Peace Act. Nowhere in the complaint was there an allegation of the unavoidable, substantial, and irreparable injury to Wellington's property as would justify the issuance of the TRO without notice. And neither was there a bond sufficient to recompense those enjoined for any loss, expense, or damage caused by the improvident or erroneous issuance of the order. The SC granted the TRO. - PAFLU filed a supplemental petition for certiorari in the SC protesting the issuance in a different case (filed by co-lessee Emmanuel Galang) but by the same judge, of another injunction couched in exactly the same words. ISSUE WON the two cases involve, or grow out of, a labor dispute HELD NO. Reasoning There exists no labor dispute between PAFLU and either Wellington or Galang. The strike and the picket are directed against METROBANK, an entirely different and separate entity without connection whatsoever with WeIlington and Galang other than the incidental fact that they are the bank's landlord and co-lessee, respectively. Their relationship is so remote that we fail to discern any indicium of said complainants' interests in the labor dispute between the union and METROBANK as to make the two cases below fall within the purview of RA 975 which provides that a labor dispute exists "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the

proximate relation of employer and employee". The applicable law, therefore, is Rule 58 of the Rules of Court on injunction. - [NATURE & PURPOSE OF PICKET LINE] The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it cannot be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship. The right is, however, not absolute. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an exercise of free speech, courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or "innocent bystanders" if it appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights. - The SC however annulled both injunctions for failure of both Wellington and Galang to file the necessary bonds before issuance of the two preliminary injunctions as required in Rule 58 Sec 4. Disposition Certiorari is GRANTED without prejudice to the right of Wellington and Galang to secure other ones after filing the necessary bonds. C. Picketing and Libel Laws Art. 353, Revised Penal Code Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Philnabank Employees Association, 105 SCRA 314 (81) 105 SCRA 314 FERNANDO; July 2, 1981 FACTS - Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank filed an action for libel against the Philippine National Bank Employees Association as a result of placards and signboards along the PNB building, containing the following: "PCIB BAD ACCOUNTS TRANSFERRED TO PNB-NIDC?" - Lower court dismissed the complaint ISSUE WON the said placards were libelous HELD NO. - There was a labor controversy resulting in a strike, fortunately lasting only for one day. The labor union made use of its constitutional right to picket. Peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of speech guarantee of the Constitution. - Labor disputes give rise to strong emotional response. It is a fact of industrial life, both in the Philippines as in the United States, that in the continuing confrontation between labor and management, it is far from likely that the language employed would be both courteous and polite. - In no uncertain terms, it made clear that the judiciary, in deciding suits for libel, must ascertain whether or not the alleged offending words may be embraced by the guarantees of free speech and free press. Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed. D. Employer-Employee Relationship De Leon v. National Labor Union, 100 P 789 (57) 100 PHIL 789 PADILLA; Jan 30, 1957

NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI FACTS - Plaintiffs sought to recover damages and injunctive relief. - Defendants have been picketing Dalisay Theater, owned by De Leon, operated by co-plaintiffs. - Purpose is to secure reinstatement to jobs when theater was run by Filipino Theatrical Enterprises, then a lessee of parcel of De Leons land. - Placards: - Do not patronize the Dalisay Theater - Dalisay Theater is unfair to labor. - Have mercy on the picketeers. - Sympathize with us. - Due to picketing, box office totaled P1,250 when a premier of film such as Dimas could have earned P2,500 gross receipt. ISSUE WON strike is illegal HELD NO - Walking back and forth, displaying placards, do not disturb public peace. - There was no existence of a relationship of employers and employees between plaintiffs and defendants, although purpose of picket is to reinstate defendants. PICKETING PEACEFULLY CARRIED OUT IS NOT ILLEGAL EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF EMPLOYEREMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP FOR PEACEFUL PICKETING IS PART OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH. Cruz v. Cinema Stage, 101 P 1259 (57) E. Curtailment Free Telephone Workers Union v. Philippine Long Distance Co., 113 SCRA 662 (82) 113 SCRA 662 MAKASIAR; April 27, 1982 FACTS On November 1, 1964, petitioner declared a strike against respondent company to break an impasse over negotiations on a 20-point economic demand, among which was a demand for wage increase covering a period of three years - 1964 to 1967. On November 3, 1964, the President of the Philippines, upon authority of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 [Industrial Peace Act], certified the labor dispute as one clearly affecting an industry indispensable to the national interest, to the Court of Industrial Relations, hereinafter referred to as respondent CIR. On November 9, 1964, the respondent CIR, after hearing, issued a partial decision. From the above November 9, 1964 partial decision, petitioner interposed an appeal with the Supreme Court mainly on the sufficiency of the amount granted as increase. The Supreme Court affirmed, on July 31, 1970, the November 9, 1964 decision of the respondent CIR and held that the sixteen centavo [P0.16] increase per hour per employee effective for a period of one [1] year from November 9, 1964, was supported by substantial evidence. Meanwhile, or on April 21, 1965, Republic Act No. 4180 was enacted, raising the minimum wage to P6.00 a day. Accordingly, respondent company increased the wages of its workers who were receiving below P6. 00 a day, in addition to the PO.16 per hour previously awarded by the respondent CIR in its partial decision of November 9, 1964. On April 27, 1965, petitioner asked for wage re-adjustment negotiations with the respondent company, claiming that when the respondent company automatically raised the minimum wages of its employees

receiving less than P6.00 a day in compliance with R. A. 4180, a proportionate increase with respect to those employees already receiving P6.00 a day at the effectivity of R. A. 4180 should be subject of negotiations. Respondent company countered that it could not negotiate with petitioner on the matter because such wage re-adjustment would, in effect, be a wage increase which was connected with the wage increase demand of petitioner in the pending case certified on November 3, 1964 by the President of the Philippines. Consequently, petitioner presented on May 6, 1965 to respondent company a demand for an automatic P0.25 per hour wage increase for all rank-and-file employees receiving above P0.75 per hour on account of the implementation of the new statutory minimum wage of P6.00 a day. On May 17,1965, when Case No. 51-IPA, was still pending decision, petitioner again filed a notice of strike with the Department of Labor for refusal of respondent company to negotiate on its demand for wage adjustment under Republic Act No. 4180, which allegedly constitutes unfair labor practice. On June 2, 1965, respondent company, sensing that petitioner would really go on strike, filed with respondent CIR a petition for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction as an incident of pending Case No. 51-IPA. Respondent company prayed therein of the respondent CIR to enjoin petitioner from striking as petitioner and respondent company had previously agreed on March 3, 1965 to submit all further disputes to the respondent CIR and that a strike under the situation would violate respondent CIR's November 9, 1964 order. On June 3, 1965, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the aforesaid petition of June 2, 1965 on the ground that respondent CIR has no jurisdiction to consider it. On July 6, 1965, the respondent CIR acting in Case No. 51-IPA [2] confirmed the action of the Hearing Examiner therein and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from declaring a strike or any specie thereof during the pendency of the issue of jurisdiction. On July 7, 1965, petitioner filed with the respondent CIR a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order, alleging substantially the same grounds contained in its June 3, 1965 motion to dismiss. On the same day, petitioner declared a strike. According to petitioner, the strike was precipitated by the [1] summary dismissal of two of its members without a prior investigation at which it should be represented; and [2] respondent company's continued refusal to negotiate on its demand for wage re-adjustment. On July 8, 1965, respondent company filed with the respondent C I R an urgent motion to declare the July 7, 1965 strike of petitioner illegal, the same being violative of the no-strike order of July 6, 1965 and the court's partial decision of November 9, 1964, and praying that the strikers be ordered to return to work or else forfeit their jobs. Respondent company further prayed therein that petitioner and its officers and agents and/or sympathizers be directed to lift and remove the pickets posted in the different premises of the company and that the strike of the petitioner be declared illegal and the officers of the petitioner be held in contempt of court and, therefore, to have lost their status as employees effective July 7. 1965, the date of the strike. On July

9, 1965, petitioner moved to dismiss the aforesaid respondent company's urgent motion. On July 16, 1965, after due hearing, the trial judge of respondent CIR issued an order denying petitioner's June 3, 1965 motion to dismiss respondent company's June 2, 1965 petition for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. On July 17, 1965, petitioner, without first returning to work as above directed, filed with the respondent CIR its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid July 16, 1965 order. With the above motion for reconsideration still unacted upon by the respondent CIR, petitioner on July 19, 1965 filed with this Court its urgent petition for certiorari and prohibitory and mandatory injunction docketed as G. R. No. L-24755, questioning the power and jurisdiction of respondent CIR. On July 20, 1965, this Court dismissed the aforesaid petition for "being premature and for lack of merit" On July 31, 1965 respondent CIR denied petitioner's July 17, 1965 motion for reconsideration of the July 6 and 16, 1965 orders of the trial judge Paredes. Hence, this recourse of petitioner, questioning the validity of the aforesaid July 6 and 16, 1965 orders of the CIR and the July 31, 1965 en banc resolution of respondent CIR. The order of July 6, 1965 enjoined petitioner union from declaring a strike or any specie thereof during the pendency of the issue raised in its motion to dismiss. On the other hand, the order of July 16, 1965: [a] directed petitioner union, its officers, agents and/or assigns and sympathizers: (1) to call-off the strike declared on July 7, 1965; and (2) to lift the picket lines established in and around the premises of respondent company's various offices and installations. [b] enjoined the persons manning the picket lines in these places from impeding and interfering with the implementation of said order as well as from interfering in any manner with the operations of respondent; [c] directed the striking employees to return to work within three [3] days from receipt of a copy of the order by petitioner; and [d] authorized respondent company to replace any and an of such striking employees, who fail to return to work within the said period of three [3] days, provided that employees who shall have been replaced may be reinstated by the Court after due hearing and after establishing good and valid grounds for their failure to return to work as directed in the order. ISSUE WON respondent CIR's order of July 16, 1965 violates the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech because it called for the lifting of peaceful picket lines. HELD NO. Indeed, it is now well-settled that peaceful picketing cannot be restrained because the same is part of the freedom of speech (PCIB v. PNBEA 105 SCRA 314, 318 [1981]; Associated Labor Union vs. Gomez, 96 SCRA 551 [1980]; Mortera v. CIR, 79 Phil. 345 [1947]; PAFLU vs. Barot, 99 Phil. 1008 [1956]; De Leon vs. NLU 100 Phil. 789 [1957]). But petitioner fails to realize that the questioned July 16, 1965 order of the Court of Industrial Relations did not refer to peaceful picketing. For the order partly reads, thus:

Pursuant to the Partial Decision in relation to Section 19 of C. A. 103, as amended, the petitioner union, its officers, agents and/or assigns and sympathizers are hereby directed to call off the strike declared on July 7, 1965, and to lift the picket lines established in and around the premises of respondent company's various offices and installations in Manila, Quezon City, Pasay City, Caloocan City, Dagupan City, Baguio City, San Pablo City, Iloilo City, Bacolod City, Cebu City, Zamboanga City, Makati, Rizal, Mandaluyong, Rizal, San Juan, Rizal, San Fernando, Pampanga, Mabalacat, Pampanga, Lucena, Quezon and Baler, Quezon. The persons manning the picket lines in these places are hereby enjoined from impeding and interfering with the implementation of this Order as well as from interfering in any manner with the operations of respondent.. In Mortera, supra, where the therein questioned order partly declared that "picketing under any guise and form is hereby prohibited," this Court ruled that the "order of the Court of Industrial Relations prohibiting picketing must be understood to refer only to illegal picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means. Peaceful picketing cannot be prohibited. It is part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, the order of the Court of Industrial Relations must be understood to refer only to illegal picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means" [p. 351]. In this case, the questioned order should also be taken as limited to the lifting of the picket lines which constituted illegal picketing especially so because it expressly stated that the petitioner union and its officers, agents or sympathizers "are hereby directed to call-off the strike declared on July 7, 1965, and to lift the picket lines established in and around the premises of respondent company's various offices and installations. The persons manning the picket lines in these places are hereby enjoined from impeding and interfering with implementation of this Order as well as from interfering in any manner with the operations of respondent." Dispositive Resolution affirmed Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Cuizon Hotel v. Libron, 124 SCRA 448 (83) 124 SCRA 448 FERNANDO; August 31, 1983. NATURE -Certiorari proceeding FACTS -the Labor Arbiter came out with this decision: "[Wherefore, premises considered], the strike staged on April 15, 1983 should be, as it is hereby, declared illegal, and, therefore, the respondent union and its members are permanently enjoined from staging such illegal strike; ordering and declaring, pursuant to Article 265, par. (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, all the union officers led by Carlito Eleazar, Marciano Macaraya and Cesar Yap to have lost their employment status for participating in an illegal strike and committing unlawful acts during the strike; and ordering the respondent union to pay the petitioner the amount of Pesos Three Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand (P339,000.00), representing losses in income suffered during the illegal strike in the concept of actual damage." The clarificatory order continues: "The consequences resulting from the declaration of a strike as illegal, which is final and immediately executory, carries with it sanctions on the immediate incidents thereto such as picketing, obstruction of ingress and egress, the banners and

streamers being hung in the premises and makeshifts built within the immediate vicinity of the establishment struck. Once the strikers are permanently enjoined from staging the illegal strike, the picketing staged should also be simultaneously lifted, the obstruction of ingress and egress removed and the makeshifts taken out. In other words, the injunction of the illegal strike and the incidents thereto is self-executing and it behooves upon the party concerned to seek, if necessary, the assistance of the law enforcers to enforce the same." Its last paragraph reads: "The other matters in the aforequoted dispositive portion of our decision, that of termination of the employment status of union officers and the award of damages, are also final and executory, unless appealed to the Commission within the reglementary period." -the labor union filed petition before the Supreme Court ISSUE WON wholesale condemnation of peaceful picketing is bereft of support in law HELD -YES. Wholesale condemnation of peaceful picketing is likewise clearly bereft of support in law. As pointed out in a very recent decision decided this year, Phil. Assn. of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. CFI of Rizal: "It need not be stressed that peaceful picketing is embraced in freedom of expression. As emphatically declared in Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank v. Philnabank Employees' Association: 'From the time of Mortera v. Court of Industrial Relations, a 1947 decision this Court has been committed to the view that peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of speech guarantee of the Constitution.' Reference was made in such opinion to Associated Labor Union v. Gomez. In that case, the Court characterized the orders complained of as being 'fatally defective, suffering as it did from the infirmity that peaceful picketing was enjoined.' It is in that sense that Presidential Decree No. 849 was a step in the right direction for the status of picketing was again accorded due recognition." In the answer, reference was made to the alleged commission of acts of violence against non-striking employees and even against the eighty-year old "sickly and paralytic President" of respondent. It is to be understood, of course, that the peaceful picketing authorized cannot certainly countenance acts of illegality. The interim Batasang Pambansa has spoken on the subject thus: "(e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares." Disposition In view of the settlement of the labor dispute between the parties, and the workers are back to work-Dismissed for being moot and academic F. Restrictions, Innocent Third Party Rule and Liabilities Liwayway Publishing Co., Inc. v. Permanent Concrete Workers Union, 108 SCRA 161 (81) 108 SCRA 161 GUERRERO; October 23, 1981 NATURE -This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance FACTS -While a labor dispute between defendantappellant union and Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. was pending before the Court of Industrial Relations, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued

in an action for damages filed by the plaintiffappellee Liwayway Publications, Inc. a writ of preliminary injunction against appellant union which picketed and prevented entrance to the gate leading to the bodega of appellee and threatened its officers and employees despite the fact that the appellee is not in anyway related to the striking union but a mere sublessee of said bodega in the compound of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. against whom the strike was staged. Appellant union filed a motion to dismiss and motion to dissolve the writ on the ground that only the Court of Industrial Relations and not the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the labor dispute; that the appellee has no cause of action against the striking union but against the lessor; and that plaintiff-appellee is not the real party in interest but Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. The lower court denied the motion for lack of labor dispute between the plaintiff and defendant of which the Court of Industrial Relations may take cognizance and rendered a decision declaring the writ permanent and ordering the payment of damages, attorney's fees and costs. ISSUE WON this case involves or has arisen out of a labor dispute. If it does, then with certainty, Section 9 of Republic Act 875, the "Industrial Peace Act," would apply. If it does not, then the Rules of Court will govern the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction because it will not partake the nature of a labor injunction which the lower court has no jurisdiction to issue. HELD NO. The business of the appellee is exclusively the publication of the magazines Bannawag, Bisaya, Hiligaynon and Liwayway weekly magazines which has absolutely no relation or connection whatsoever with the cause of the strike of the union against their company, much less with the terms, conditions or demands of the strikers. The appellee is a third party or an "innocent bystander" whose right has been invaded and, therefore, entitled to protection by the regular courts. -The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it cannot be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship.The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe that courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus, the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or `innocent bystanders' if it appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights. In one case decided by this Court, we upheld a trial court's injunction prohibiting the union from blocking the entrance to a feed mill located within the compound of a flour mill with which the union had a dispute. Although sustained on a different ground, no connection was found other than their being situated in the same premises. It is to be noted

that in the instances cited, peaceful picketing has not been totally banned but merely regulated. And in one American case, a picket by a labor union in front of a motion picture theater with which the union had a labor dispute was enjoined by the court from being extended in front of the main entrance of the building housing the theater wherein other stores operated by third persons were located. -On appeal, the Supreme Court in upholding the jurisdiction of the lower court to issue the writ of preliminary injunction, ruled that: (a) there is no connection between the appellee, the appellant union and the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and the fact, that the latter and appellee are situated in the same premises, can hardly be considered as interwoven with the labor dispute pending with the Court of Industrial Relations; and (b) the acts of the striking union are mere acts of trespass for which the lessee shall have a direct action against the trespasser. Disposition Decision appealed from, affirmed in toto. MSF Tire and Rubber Inc. v. CA, 311 SCRA 784 (99) 311 SCRA 784 MENDOZA; August 5, 1999 NATURE Petiton for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA FACTS -A labor dispute arose between Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation (Philtread) and private respondent, Philtread Tire Workers Union (Union) -Union filed a notice of strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board charging Philtread with unfair labor practices for allegedly engaging in union-busting for violation of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. -Thereafter, they picketed and assembled outside the gate of Philtreads plant. -Philtread, on the other hand, filed a notice of lockout. -The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified it for compulsory arbitration. -During the pendency of the labor dispute, Philtread entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre Public Company Limited (Siam Tyre) whereby its plant and equipment would be sold to a new company, herein petitioner, 80% of which would be owned by Siam Tyre and 20% by Philtread, while the land on which the plant was located would be sold to another company, 60% of which would be owned by Philtread and 40% by Siam Tyre. -Petitioner then asked respondent Union to desist from picketing outside its plant. -As the respondent Union refused petitioners request, petitioner filed a complaint for injunction with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. -Respondent Union moved to dismiss the complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. -The trial court denied petitioners application for injunction and dismissed the complaint. -However, on petitioners motion, the trial court reconsidered its order and granted an injunction. -The respondent Union filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA.

-CA ruled in favor of respondent Union, hence, petitioner filed this petition asserting that its status as an innocent bystander entitled it to a writ of injunction. ISSUE WON petitioner has shown a clear legal right to the issuance of a writ of injunction under the innocent bystander rule HELD No. -In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Cloribel, this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stated the innocent bystander rule as follows: The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it can not be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship. -The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe the courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. -Thus the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or innocent bystanders if it appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights. -Thus, an innocent bystander, who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the court that aside from the grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it is entirely different from, without any connection whatsoever to, either party to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally foreign to the context thereof. -In the case at bar, petitioner cannot be said not to have such connection to the dispute. -As correctly observed by the appellate court: we find that the negotiation, contract of sale, and the post transaction between Philtread, as vendor, and Siam Tyre, as vendee, reveals a legal relation between them which, in the interest of petitioner, we cannot ignore. To be sure, the transaction between Philtread and Siam Tyre, was not a simple sale whereby Philtread ceased to have any proprietary rights over its sold assets. On the contrary, Philtread remains as 20% owner of private respondent and 60% owner of Sucat Land Corporation which was likewise incorporated in accordance with the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre, and which now owns the land were subject plant is located. This, together with the fact that private respondent uses the same plant or factory; similar or substantially the same working conditions; same machinery, tools, and equipment; and manufacture the same products as Philtread, lead us to safely conclude that private respondents personality is so closely linked to Philtread as to bar its entitlement to an injunctive writ. Disposition Petition is denied.

Prohibited Activities Peaceful Picketing 264 (b), Arts. 289 and 312 Revised Penal Code Art. 264. Prohibited activities. a. No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry. No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of any unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. b. No person shall obstruct, impede, or interfere with, by force, violence, coercion, threats or intimidation, any peaceful picketing by employees during any labor controversy or in the exercise of the right to self-organization or collective bargaining, or shall aid or abet such obstruction or interference. c. No employer shall use or employ any strikebreaker, nor shall any person be employed as a strike-breaker. d. No public official or employee, including officers and personnel of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Integrated National Police, or armed person, shall bring in, introduce or escort in any manner, any individual who seeks to replace strikers in entering or leaving the premises of a strike area, or work in place of the strikers. The police force shall keep out of the picket lines unless actual violence or other criminal acts occur therein: Provided, That nothing herein shall be interpreted to prevent any public officer from taking any measure necessary to maintain peace and order, protect life and property, and/or enforce the law and legal order. (As amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 227, June 1, 1982)

Complementing the above-quoted provision, Sec. 1, Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, pertinently provides as follows: Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Dispute. - A preliminary injunction or a restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the bases of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of, a) involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, b) if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party. The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters:

ONLY as an INCIDENT to the cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the case,

PART NINE LABOR INJUNCTION I. DEFINITION AND NATURE See any Law Dictionary Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 672 (98) GENERALLY, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's substantive rights or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The application of the injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special reason before the main case be regularly heard. The essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are: 1) that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper basis for injunction and 2) that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation. Injunction is also a special equitable relief granted only in cases where there is no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law. Article 218 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC (e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party

BUT excluding labor disputes involving strikes or lockout. From the foregoing provisions of law, the power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from "any labor dispute" upon application by a party thereof, which application if not granted "may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party." The term "LABOR DISPUTE" is defined as "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees." The term "CONTROVERSY is likewise defined as "a litigated question; adversary proceeding in a court of law; a civil action or suit, either at law or in equity; a justiciable dispute." A "justiciable controversy" is "one involving an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real, and not a mere theoretical question or issue." Taking into account the foregoing definitions, it is an ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT that: there must first be a LABOR DISPUTE between the contending parties before the labor arbiter. Why does injunction not apply to the facts of this case? In the present case, there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and private respondents as there has yet been no complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the petitioner. Furthermore, an examination of private respondents' petition for injunction reveals that it has no basis since there is no showing of any urgency or irreparable injury which the private respondents might suffer. When is an injury considered irreparable? An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their

amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. It is considered irreparable injury when it cannot be adequately compensated in damages due to the nature of the injury itself or the nature of the right or property injured or when there exists no certain pecuniary standard for the measurement of damages. In the case at bar, the alleged injury which private respondents stand to suffer by reason of their alleged illegal dismissal can be adequately compensated and therefore, there exists no "irreparable injury," as defined above which would necessitate the issuance of the injunction sought for. Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from employment shall be entitled to reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to the payment of full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. II. GENERAL RULE PROHIBITION 254; 212 (I); 218 (e) Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association v. CIR, 44 SCRA 350 (72) 44 SCRA 509 FERNANDO : September 28, 1972 FACTS: Caltex (claims): managerial personnel could neither claim nor be the object of an unfair labor practice based on the case In re: Petition for Certification Election at the Caltex, Inc., Cebu District, Altex Supervisory and Foremens Union: the Court declared certain positions in respondent companys Cebu District as management and excluded them from the bargaining unit of supervisors. ISSUE: WON an unfair labor practice may be committed against managerial personnel who are members of petitioner Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association HELD: YES Reasoning The stand of the company was not a whimsical and flimsy one. It had valid legal basis. It honestly believed that managers, being part of management should not be included in a union of supervisors. The basic question is whether the managerial personnel can organize. What respondent Company failed to take into account is that the right to self-organization is not merely a statutory creation. It is fortified by our Constitution. All are free to exercise such right unless their purpose is contrary to law. Certainly it would be to attach unorthodoxy to, not to say an emasculation of, the concept of law if managers as such were precluded from organizing. Having done so and having been duly registered, as did occur in this case, their union is entitled to all the rights under Republic Act No. 875. Considering what is denominated an unfair labor practice under

Section 4 of such Act and the facts set forth in our decision, there can be only one answer to the objection raised that no unfair labor practice could be committed by respondent Company insofar as managerial personnel is concerned. It is, as is quite obvious, in the negative. DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied III. EXCEPTIONS WHEN INJUNCTION ALLOWED 254; 218 (e); 264 (a) National Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Vera, 133 SCRA 259 (84) 227 SCRA 821 QUIASON : November 16, 1993 FACTS: Petitioner and respondent FFW-SMQCC are local chapters of labor federations duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Petitioner is the exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file workers of respondent QCC, a domestic corporation engaged in the metal industry. On September 27, 1991, 38 days before the expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and respondent QCC, respondent FFW-SMQCC through Reynito de Pedro filed with the DOLE Industrial Relations Division, National Capital Region a petition for certification election. The petition was accompanied by a list of signatures of company employees, who signified their consent to a certification election among the rank and file employees of QCC. Petitioner herein moved to dismiss the petition of respondent FFW-SMQCC on the grounds that: (a) the required consent to the certification election of at least 25% of the rank and file employees had not been met; (b) the petition was not verified as required by law; and (c) Reynito de Pedro, who was also the president of petitioner, had no personality to file the petition on behalf of FFW-SMQCC. On October 30, 1991, respondent FFWSMQCC, filed a second petition for certification election, this time signed and verified by De Pedro. On January 24, 1992, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition for certification election of respondent FFW-SMQCC Petitioner appealed this decision to the Secretary of Labor. On June 17, 1992, the Secretary of Labor rendered a decision, denying the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the order of the Med-Arbiter. ISSUE: WON the petition for certification election was verified as required by law HELD: YES Reasoning First, although Reynito de Pedro was the duly elected president of petitioner, he had disaffiliated himself therefrom and joined respondent FFW-SMQCC before the petition for certification election was filed on September 27, 1991. The eventual dismissal of De Pedro from the company is of no moment, considering that the petition for certification election was filed before his dismissal on August 22, 1992.

Second, verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. Even if verification is lacking and the pleading is formally defective, the courts may dispense with the requirement in the interest of justice and order of correction of the pleading accordingly. Generally, technical and rigid rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases; and this rule is specifically applied in certification election proceedings, which are non-litigious but merely investigative and non-adversarial in character. Nevertheless, whatever formal defects existed in the first petition were cured and corrected in the second petition for certification election. Third, attached to the original petition for certification election was a list of 141 supporting signatures out of the 300 employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit to be represented by respondent FFW-SMQCC. Respondent QCC sought to delete from the list some 36 signatures which are allegedly forged and falsified. Petitioner, likewise, submitted a joint affidavit of 13 employees, disclaiming the validity of the signatures therein. Granting that 36 signatures were falsified and that 13 was disowned, this leaves 92 undisputed signatures which is definitely more than 75 i.e., 25% of the total number of company employees required by law to support a petition for certification election. The disclaimer of 13 employees by their respective signatures covers only their own personal participation and cannot in any way be extended to include the rest of those who did not question the same. DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 403 SCRA 418 (03) SCRA AZCUNA, June 10, 2003 NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition FACTS -SMC and Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) executed a CBA wherein they agreed to submit all disputes to grievance and arbitration proceedings, aside from no-strike, no-lockout agreement. -IBM, through its VP and subsequently through its president (which was opposed by the VP), filed with NCMB a notice of strike against SMC for allegedly committing: (1) illegal dismissal of union members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting out of jobs being performed by union members, (5) labor-only contracting, (6) harassment of union officers and members, (7) non-recognition of duly-elected union officers, and (8) other acts of unfair labor practice. SMC filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the notices raised non-strikeable issues and that they affected 4 corporations. -NCMB: issues are non-strikeable, as only SMC was impleaded when 4 different companies were involved. Notices of strike converted into preventive mediation. -while separate preventive mediation conferences were ongoing, the Union through its VP filed a notice of holding a strike vote. SMC opposed, invoking PAL v. Drilon (no strike could be legally declared during

the pendency of preventive mediation). NCMB reiterated conversion of notice of strike into preventive mediation and grounds raised were only intra-union conflict nonstrikeable (who between the 2 groups shall represent the workers for collective bargaining purposes, union leadership). -IBM President group filed 2nd notice of strike against SMC, NCMB found the additional grounds to be mere amplifications of issues alleged in the 1st notice of strike. Ordered consolidation of the 2nd notice of strike with 1st notice of strike. Group informed SMC of its plan to hold a strike. -VP group notified the NCMB that their strike vote favored the holding of a strike. NCMB issued a letter reminding the group of the PAL v Drilon. IBM went on strike. Strike paralyzed the operations of SMC, which caused millions of loses. -SMC filed with NLRC a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO, Free Ingress and Egress Order and Deputization Order, which was issued by NLRC, without prejudice to the unions right to peaceful picketing and continuous hearings on the injunction case. SMC also entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Union, calling for lifting of picket lines and resumption of work in exchange of good faith talks between the management and the labor management committees. The MOA also stated that cases filed in relation to their dispute will continue and will not be affected in any manner whatsoever by the agreement. Work was then resumed. -NLRC reconsidered the issuance of TRO, and sought to dismiss the injunction case. SMC opposed, submitted copies of flyers wherein IBM expressed their threat to revive the strike. NLRC issued decision denying the petition for injunction for lack of factual basis, there being no circumstance to constitute an actual or threatened commission of unlawful acts. MFR denied ISSUES WON the strike held by IBM was illegal (therefore, NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for injunction filed by SMC) HELD:YES a. Procedural aspect of the strike -For a strike to be valid, it must be pursued within legal bounds. One of the procedural requisites that A263 of the LC and its IRR prescribe is the filing of a valid notice of strike with the NCMB. Imposed for the purpose of encouraging the voluntary settlement of disputes, this requirement has been held to be mandatory, the lack of which shall render a strike illegal. -In accordance with the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, the conversion of the notice of strike to preventive mediation has the effect of dismissing the notices of strike filed by respondent. A case in point is PAL v. Drilon, where we declared a strike illegal for lack of a valid notice of strike, in view of the NCMBs conversion of the notice therein into a preventive mediation case. During the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings no strike could be legally declared. -therefore, since the notice of strike filed by the union was converted into preventive mediation proceedings, the union had lost the notices of strike required under A263. However, the union defiantly proceeded with the strike while mediation was ongoing. Such disregard of the mediation

proceedings was a blatant violation of theImplementing Rules, which explicitly oblige the parties to bargain collectively in good faith and prohibit them from impeding or disrupting the proceedings. b. on ruling of NLRC that there was lack of factual basis (no circumstance to constitute an actual or threatened commission of unlawful acts) -at the time the injunction was being sought, there existed a threat to revive the unlawful strike as evidenced by the flyers then being circulated by the IBM, which were not denied by the respondent union. Moreover, a declaration of strike without first having filed the required notice is a prohibited activity (A264(a)), which may be prevented through an injunction in accordance with A254. c. on IBMs failure to observe the CBA provisions on grievance and arbitration - Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a collective bargaining agreement are illegal especially when they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be achieved. -We cannot sanction the respondent-unions brazen disregard of legal requirements imposed purposely to carry out the state policy of promoting voluntary modes of settling disputes. The states commitment to enforce mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace is affirmed by no less than our Constitution. Trade unionism and strikes are legitimate weapons of labor granted by our statutes. But misuse of these instruments can be the subject of judicial intervention to forestall grave injury to a business enterprise. Disposition. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the NLRC in Injunction Case No. 00468-94 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner and private respondent are hereby directed to submit the issues raised in the dismissed notices of strike to grievance procedure and proceed with arbitration proceedings as prescribed in their CBA, if necessary. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. Director of BLR, 91 SCRA 482 (1979) 198 SCRA 586 NARVASA; June 27, 1991 FACTS -The controversy at bar had its origin in the "wage distortions" affecting the employees of respondent San Miguel Corporation allegedly caused by Republic Act No. 6727, otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act. -Upon the effectivity of the Act on June 5, 1989, the union known as "Ilaw at Buklod Ng Manggagawa (IBM)" said to represent 4,500 employees of San Miguel Corporation, more or less, "working at the various plants, offices, and warehouses located at the National Capital Region" - presented to the company a "demand" for correction of the "significant distortion in . . . (the workers') wages." -Union claims that demand was ignored - The Union's position (set out in the petition subsequently filed in this Court, infra) was that the workers' refusal "to work beyond eight (8) hours everyday as a legitimate means of compelling SMC to correct "the distortion in their wages brought about by the implementation of the said laws (R.A. 6640 and R.A. 6727) to newly-hired employees." There ensued thereby a change in the work schedule

which had been observed by daily-paid workers at the Polo Plant for the past five (5) years, i.e., "ten (10) hours for the first shift and ten (10) to fourteen (14) hours for the second shift, from Mondays to Fridays . . .; (and on) Saturdays, . . . eight (8) hours for both shifts" a work schedule which, SMC says, the workers had "welcomed, and encouraged" because the automatic overtime built into the schedule "gave them a steady source of extraincome," and pursuant to which it (SMC) "planned its production targets and budgets. -This abandonment of the long-standing schedule of work and the reversion to the eight-hour shift apparently caused substantial losses to SMC. -SMC filed with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission a complaint against the Union and its members "to declare the strike or slowdown illegal" and to terminate the employment of the union officers and shop stewards. -it is SMC's submittal that the coordinated reduction by the Union's members of the work time theretofore willingly and consistently observed by them, thereby causing financial losses to the employer in order to compel it to yield to the demand for correction of "wage distortions," is an illegal and "unprotected" activity. It is, SMC argues, contrary to the law and to the collective bargaining agreement between it and the Union. ISSUE WON the strike is illegal HELD YES. Among the rights guaranteed to employees by the Labor Code is that of engaging in concerted activities in order to attain their legitimate objectives. Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, declares that in line with "the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining, . . . (w)orkers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection." A similar right to engage in concerted activities for mutual benefit and protection is tacitly and traditionally recognized in respect of employers. The more common of these concerted activities as far as employees are concerned are: strikes the temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute; picketing the marching to and fro at the employer's premises, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute; and boycotts the concerted refusal to patronize an employer's goods or services and to persuade others to a like refusal. On the other hand, the counterpart activity that management may licitly undertake is the lockout the temporary refusal to furnish work on account of a labor dispute. In this connection, the same Article 263 provides that the "right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employer to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected." The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the legality of the purposes sought to be attained and the means employed therefor (ON TEST OF LEGALITY). It goes without saying that these joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or restricted by law or contract. In the particular instance of "distortions of the wage structure within an establishment" resulting from "the application of any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law or wage order,"

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or other concerted activities as modes of settlement of the issue. The legislative intent that solution of the problem of wage distortions shall be sought by voluntary negotiation or arbitration, and not by strikes, lockouts, or other concerted activities of the employees or management, is made clear in the rules implementing RA 6727 issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment pursuant to the authority granted by Section 13 of the Act. Section 16, Chapter I of these implementing rules, after reiterating the policy that wage distortions be first settled voluntarily by the parties and eventually by compulsory arbitration, declares that, "Any issue involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout." -Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement between the SMC and the Union, relevant provisions of which are quoted by the former without the latter s demurring to the accuracy of the quotation, also prescribes a similar eschewal of strikes or other similar or related concerted activities as a mode of resolving disputes or controversies, generally, said agreement clearly stating that settlement of "all disputes, disagreements or controversies of any kind" should be achieved by the stipulated grievance procedure and ultimately by arbitration. Disposition PETITION DENIED Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 672 (98) GENERALLY, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's substantive rights or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The application of the injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special reason before the main case be regularly heard. The essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are: 3) that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper basis for injunction and 4) that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation. Injunction is also a special equitable relief granted only in cases where there is no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law. Article 218 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC (f) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party

Complementing the above-quoted provision, Sec. 1, Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, pertinently provides as follows: Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Dispute. - A preliminary injunction or a restraining order may be granted by the Commission through its divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the bases of the sworn allegations in the petition that the acts complained of, a) involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, b) if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party. The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters:

ONLY as an INCIDENT to the cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the case,

BUT excluding labor disputes involving strikes or lockout. From the foregoing provisions of law, the power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ originates from "any labor dispute" upon application by a party thereof, which application if not granted "may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party." The term "LABOR DISPUTE" is defined as "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees." The term "CONTROVERSY is likewise defined as "a litigated question; adversary proceeding in a court of law; a civil action or suit, either at law or in equity; a justiciable dispute." A "justiciable controversy" is "one involving an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real, and not a mere theoretical question or issue." Taking into account the foregoing definitions, it is an ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT that: there must first be a LABOR DISPUTE between the contending parties before the labor arbiter. Why does injunction not apply to the facts of this case? In the present case, there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and private respondents as there has yet been no complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the petitioner. Furthermore, an examination of private respondents' petition for injunction reveals that it has no basis since there is no showing of any urgency or irreparable injury which the private respondents might suffer. When is an injury considered irreparable? An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their

amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. It is considered irreparable injury when it cannot be adequately compensated in damages due to the nature of the injury itself or the nature of the right or property injured or when there exists no certain pecuniary standard for the measurement of damages. In the case at bar, the alleged injury which private respondents stand to suffer by reason of their alleged illegal dismissal can be adequately compensated and therefore, there exists no "irreparable injury," as defined above which would necessitate the issuance of the injunction sought for. Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from employment shall be entitled to reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to the payment of full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Delta Ventures Resource, Inc. v. Cabato, 327 SCRA 521 (00) 327 SCRA 521 QUISUMBING; MARCH 9, 2000 NATURE Special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the Order Judge Cabato of the RTC, dismissing petitioner's amended third-party complaint, as well as the Order denying motion for reconsideration. FACTS A Decision was rendered by LA declaring the Green Mountain Farm, Roberto Ongpin and Almus Alabe guilty of Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice and ordering them to pay the complainants, in solidum plus attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00. Almus Alabe is also ordered to answer in exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000.00 each to all the complainants. LA issued a writ of execution directing NLRC Deputy Sheriff Adam Ventura to execute the judgment. Sheriff Ventura then proceeded to enforce the writ by garnishing certain personal properties of respondents. Finding that said judgment debtors do not have sufficient personal properties to satisfy the monetary award, Sheriff Ventura proceeded to levy upon a real property registered in the name of Roberto Ongpin, one of the respondents in the labor case. Before the scheduled auction sale, herein petitioner filed before the Commission a third-party claim asserting ownership over the property levied upon and subject of the Sheriffs notice of sale. Labor Arbiter Rivera thus issued an order directing the suspension of the auction sale until the merits of petitioner's claim has been resolved. However, petitioner filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order against Sheriff Ventura. Judge Cabato issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining respondents in the civil case before him to hold in abeyance any action relative to the enforcement of the decision in the labor case.

Further, petitioner filed with the Commission a manifestation questioning the latter's authority to hear the case, the matter being within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The manifestation, however, was dismissed by Labor Arbiter Rivera. ISSUE WON the trial court may take cognizance of the complaint filed by petitioner and consequently provide the injunctive relief sought. HELD NO. Basic as a hornbook principle, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the petitioner's cause of action. Ostensibly the complaint before the trial court was for the recovery of possession and injunction, but in essence it was an action challenging the legality or propriety of the levy vis-a-vis the alias writ of execution, including the acts performed by the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Sheriff implementing the writ. The complaint was in effect a motion to quash the writ of execution of a decision rendered on a case properly within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, to wit: Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice. Considering the factual setting, it is then logical to conclude that the subject matter of the third party claim is but an incident of the labor case, a matter beyond the jurisdiction of regional trial courts. Precedent abound confirming the rule that said courts have no jurisdiction to act on labor cases or various incidents arising therefrom, including the execution of decisions, awards or orders. Jurisdiction to try and adjudicate such cases pertains exclusively to the proper labor official concerned under the Department of Labor and Employment. To hold otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. The broad powers granted to the Labor Arbiter and to the National Labor Relations Commission by Articles 217, 218 and 224 of the Labor Code can only be interpreted as vesting in them jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in connection with or relating to labor disputes, as the controversy under consideration, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Having established that jurisdiction over the case rests with the Commission, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Cabato in denying petitioner's motion for the issuance of an injunction against the execution of the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. Ravago v. Eastern Marine, Ltd., 453 SCRA 381 (05) Facts: Petitioner is a seafarer who was hired on a contractual basis. Shortly after the termination of his latest contract, he was granted a vacation leave. During that time, he was hit by a stray bullet on his left leg which caused permanent injury. Eastern Marine refused to re-hire him. Petitioner filed a case for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter found that Petitioner was not illegally dismissed. NLRC reversed. On appeal, CA issued a preliminary injunction. The petitioner asserts that the CA violated Article 254 of the Labor Code when it issued a temporary restraining order, and thereafter a writ of preliminary injunction, to derail the enforcement of the final and executory judgment of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the NLRC. On the other hand, the respondents

contend that the issue has become academic since the CA had already decided the case on its merits. Held: The petitioners reliance on Article 25 [of the Labor Code is misplaced. The law proscribes the issuance of injunctive relief only in those cases involving or growing out of a labor dispute. The case before the NLRC neither involves nor grows out of a labor dispute. It did not involve the fixing of terms or conditions of employment or representation of persons with respect thereto. In fact, the petitioners complaint revolves around the issue of his alleged dismissal from service and his claim for backwages, damages and attorneys fees. Moreover, Article 254 of the Labor Code specifically provides that the NLRC may grant injunctive relief under Article 218 thereof. Besides, the anti-injunction policy of the Labor Code, basically, is freedom at the workplace. It is more appropriate in the promotion of the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor and industrial disputes. Generally, an injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of a persons substantive rights or interests. It is not a cause of action in itself but a mere provisional remedy, an appendage to the main suit. Pressing necessity requires that it should be resorted to only to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any measure of consideration. The application of an injunctive writ rests upon the presence of an exigency or of an exceptional reason before the main case can be regularly heard. The indispensable conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are: (a) that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be satisfactory to establish a proper basis for injunction, and (b) that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation. It bears stressing that in the present case, the respondents petition contains facts sufficient to warrant the issuance of an injunction under Article 218, paragraph (e) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Further, respondents had already posted a surety bond more than adequate to cover the judgment award. IV. ISSUING AGENCY A. National Labor Relations Commission 218 (e) and Role of Labor Arbiter Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, 195 SCRA 340 (91) 195 SCRA 340 GRIO-AQUINO; March 18, 1991 NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS - The private respondents, who were employed by Nestl either as sales representatives or medical representatives, availed of the petitioner's car loan policy. Under that policy, the company advances the purchase price of a car to be paid back by the employee through monthly deductions from his salary, the company retaining the ownership of the motor vehicle until it shall have been fully paid for.

- After having participated in an illegal strike, the private respondents were dismissed from service. Nestl directed the private respondents to either settle the remaining balance of the cost of their respective cars, or return them to the company for proper disposition. - Private respondents failed and refused to avail of either option, so the company filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati a civil suit to recover possession of the cars. The private respondents sought a temporary restraining order in the NLRC to stop the company from cancelling their car loans and collecting their monthly amortizations. The NLRC, en banc, granted their petition for injunction. - The company filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied for tardiness. Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued a labor injunction without legal basis and in the absence of any labor dispute related to the same. ISSUE WON there is a labor dispute between the petitioner and the private respondents HELD NO Ratio Paragraph (1) of Article 212 of the Labor Code defines a labor dispute as follows: "(1) 'Labor dispute' includes any controversy or matters concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." Nestls demand for payment of the private respondents' amortizations on their car loans, or, in the alternative, the return of the cars to the company, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves debtor-creditor relations, rather than employee-employer relations. Reasoning Whether or not the private respondents remain as employees of the petitioner, there is no escape from their obligation to pay their outstanding accountabilities to the petitioner; and if they cannot afford it, to return the cars assigned to them. The options given to the private respondents are civil in nature arising from contractual obligations. There is no labor aspect involved in the enforcement of those obligations. The NLRC gravely abused its discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing the writ of injunction to stop the company from enforcing the civil obligation of the private respondents under the car loan agreements and from protecting its interest in the cars which, by the terms of those agreements, belong to it (the company) until their purchase price shall have been fully paid by the employee. The terms of the car loan agreements are not in issue in the labor case. The rights and obligations of the parties under those contracts may be enforced by a separate civil action in the regular courts, not in the NLRC. Disposition Petition is granted. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 672 (98), supra B. Injunction and Med-Arbiter Dinio v. Laguesma, 273 SCRA 109 (97)

In the performance of his duties, the public respondent should not be shackled by stringent rules, if to do so would result in manifest injustice. Thus, he cannot, and correctly did not, turn a blind eye to the arbitrary and haphazard manner by which the Med-Arbiter issued the subject temporary restraining order, even though this issue was not explicitly raised by private respondents. There is no question that the issuance of a temporary restraining order is addressed to the sound discretion of the Med-Arbiter. However, "this discretion should be exercised based upon the grounds and in the manner provided by law." In the case of labor injunctions or temporary restraining orders, one may issue only in instances where the complainant or applicant will suffer grave or irreparable damages as provided in Sec. 5, Rule XVI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code: Sec 5. Injunctions. No temporary injunctions or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute shall be issued by any court or other entity. On the other hand, the Office of the President, the Secretary of Labor, the Commission, the Labor Arbiter or med-arbiter may enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending before any of said offices or officials which if not restrained forthwith may cause grave or irreparable damage to any of the parties to the case or seriously affect social or economic stability. In the instant controversy, the first petition for injunction and temporary restraining order filed by petitioners on 29 January 1992 was manifestly insufficient to show grave or irreparable injury and it puzzles us to no end how the Med-Arbiter could have issued the temporary restraining order on such flimsy basis. For instance, petitioners alleged that the PCIBEU-Comelec was illegally constituted, yet, they unhesitatingly participated in the pre-election process. They announced their candidates and actively campaigned for them. In the petition for injunction itself, petitioners even stated that they filed their certificates of candidacy in compliance with the directives of the PCIBEU-Comelec. How can petitioners obey the orders of the PCIBEU-Comelec and at the same time reject its authority? This should have put the Med-Arbiter on guard. While it is true that the Med-Arbiter has the authority to issue a writ of preliminary injunction, or a temporary restraining order against any act arising from any case pending before him, the exercise thereof shall always be subject to the test of reasonableness. The Med-Arbiter should ascertain that the act complained of, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any of the parties to the case. Damage is considered "irreparable": a) if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law (Allendorf vs. Abalanson, 38 Phil. 585), or b) where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation (SSC vs. Bayona, et al., L-13555, May 30, 1962).

Measured against such test, the act complained of in the present case such as the conduct of the election as originally set on 31 January 1992 may not be said to cause "grave or irreparable" damage to the petitioner-appellee considering that any complaint or question on the conduct of the election maybe the subject of protest, an administrative remedy available and convenient to the parties in the case. On the contrary, considering that the petition for issuance of a writ of injunction was filed barely two days before the date set for the conduct of the election, when the election materials were already readied and the other mechanics for election had already been threshed out, to say the least, the damage that would result would substantially be more, should the election be postponed to another indefinite time. It is well to remember that "injunctions or restraining orders are frowned upon as a matter of labor relations policy," and as a general reminder: There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or (which is) more dangerous in a doubtful case than the issuing of an injunction; it is the strong arm of equity that never ought to be extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. The right must be clear, the injury impending or threatened, so as to be averted only by the protecting preventive process of injunction. C. Procedural Requirements and Rules for the Issuance of Labor Injunctions 218 (c) Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. Director of BLR, 91 SCRA 482 (1979), supra Bisig ng Manggagawa v. NLRC, 226 SCRA 499 (93) G.R. No. 105090 PUNO; September 16, 1993 NATURE Petition for certiorari and mandamus FACTS - The labor conflict between the parties broke out in the open when the petitioner union struck on April 6, 1992 protesting issues ranging from unfair labor practices and union busting allegedly committed by the private respondent. The union picketed the premises of the private respondent in Quezon City, Rizal, Pampanga and Laguna. - On April 8, 1992, private respondent filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction to stop the strike which it denounced as illegal. - The petition was set for hearing but the union claimed that it was not furnished a copy of the petition. Allegedly, the company misrepresented its address to be at Rm. 205-6 Herald Bldg., Muralla St., Intramuros, Manila. - On April 13, 1992, the NLRC heard the evidence of the company alone. Before the day was over, the respondent NLRC issued a temporary restraining order against the union. No copy of this Order was furnished the union. The union learned of the Order only when it was posted on April 15, 1992 at the premises of the company.. - On April 24, 1992, the union also filed its own Petition for Injunction to enjoin the company "from asking the aid of the police and the military officer in escorting scabs to enter the struck establishment." The records show that the case was heard on April 24 and 30, May 4 and 5, 1992 by respondent Labor

Arbiter Enrilo Pealosa. On April 30, 1992, the company filed a Motion for the Immediate Issuance of Preliminary Injunction, which the union opposed. On May 5, 1992, however, the respondent NLRC issued its disputed Order granting the company's motion for preliminary injunction. ISSUE WON Order of the NLRC infringes petitioners' right to strike and must be struck down HELD YES - The records will show that the respondent NLRC failed to comply with the letter and spirit of Article 218 (e), (4) and (5) of the Labor Code in issuing its Order of May 5, 1992. Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code provides both the procedural and substantive requirements which must strictly be complied with before a temporary or permanent injunction can issue in a labor dispute, viz: "ART. 218. Powers of the Commission. -- The Commission shall have the power and authority: xxx xxx xxx (e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party: Provided, That no temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute as defined in this Code shall be issued except after hearing the testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for crossexamination, in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and only after a finding of fact by the commission, to the effect: "(1) That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will be continued unless restrained but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat, prohibited or unlawful act, except against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof; "(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainants property will follow; "(3) That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief; "(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and"(5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainants property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection. "Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been served, in such manner as the Commission shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the Chief Executive and other public officials of the province or city within which the unlawful have been threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect complainant's property: . . ." - In his Comment, the Solicitor General cited various evidence on record showing the failure of public respondents to fulfill the requirements, especially of paragraphs four and five of the above cited law. The factual circumstances proven by the evidence show that there was no concurrence of the five

prerequisites mandated by Art. 218(e) of the Labor Code. Thus there is no justification for the issuance of the questioned Order of preliminary injunction. - Moreover, the records reveal the continuing misuse of unfair strategies to secure ex parte temporary restraining orders against striking employees. Petitioner union did not receive any copy of private respondent's petition for injunction. Its address, as alleged by the private respondent, turned out to be "erroneous". Consequently, the petitioner was denied the right to attend the hearing while the private respondent enjoyed a field day presenting its evidence ex parte. On the basis of uncontested evidence, the public respondent temporarily enjoined the petitioner from committing certain alleged illegal acts. Again, a copy of the Order was sent to the wrong address of the petitioner. Knowledge of the Order came to the petitioner only when its striking members read it after it was posted at the struck areas of the private respondent. - To be sure, the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order in a labor dispute is not per se prohibited. Its issuance, however, should be characterized by care and caution for the law requires that it be clearly justified by considerations of extreme necessity, i.e., when the commission of unlawful acts is causing substantial and irreparable injury to company properties and the company is, for the moment, bereft of an adequate remedy at law. This is as it ought to be, for imprudently issued temporary restraining orders can break the back of employees engaged in a legal strike. Often times, they unduly tilt the balance of a labor warfare in favor of capital. When that happens, the deleterious effects of a wrongfully issued, ex parte temporary restraining order on the rights of striking employees can no longer be repaired for they defy simple monetization. Moreover, experience shows that ex parte applications for restraining orders are often based on fabricated facts and concealed truths. A more becoming sense of fairness, therefore, demands that such ex parte applications should be more minutely examined by hearing officers, lest, our constitutional policy of protecting labor becomes nothing but a synthetic shibboleth. The immediate need to hear and resolve these ex parte applications do not provide any excuse to lower our vigilance in protecting labor against the issuance of indiscriminate injunctions. Stated otherwise, it behooves hearing officers receiving evidence in support of ex parte injunctions against employees in strike to take a more active stance in seeing to it that their right to social justice is in no way violated despite their absence. This equalizing stance was not taken in the case at bar by the public respondents. Disposition The petition is granted. Ravago v. Eastern Marine, Ltd., 453 SCRA 381 (05), supra PART TEN ALTERNATIVES TO USE OF ECONOMIC WEAPONS CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION AS MODES OF LABOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT A. CONCILIATION

I. POLICY 211 (e); Constitution Art. XIII, Sec. 3 II. CONCILIATION AS PART OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS 250 (c), (d), (e); 233 III. CONCILIATION AGENCY NATIONAL CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION BOARD Sec. 4, E.O. 251; 211 (c) Nissan Motors Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 491 SCRA 605 (06) 491 SCRA 605 GARCIA; June 21, 2006 FACTS - The labor dispute was triggered by a collective bargaining deadlock between Nissan Motor and the Union resulting in the filing of four notices of strike with the NCMB. - DOLE issued an Order consolidating the 4th notice of strike with the first three (3) notices and reiterating the injunction contained in the assumption of jurisdiction - The Company filed a Motion to Deputize PNP Laguna to Secure, Maintain and Preserve Free Ingress and Egress of NMPI, alleging that despite the injunctions against any slowdown and strike, the Union went on actual strike, picketed and blocked the company offices, and plant premises; unlawfully blocked and obstructed all entrances and exits points. - The Secretary of Labor issued an Order deputizing the [PNP] - DOLE issued the assailed Decision which affirmed the suspension of the 140 employees which is the subject of the first notice of strike and sustained the dismissal of the Union officers but recalled the dismissal of the Union members and reinstated to their former positions without back wages. It also directed BANAL-NMPI-OLALIA-KMU and Nissan Motor Philippines, Inc. to conclude a Collective Bargaining Agreement - The Company and the Union each sought partial reconsideration, but their corresponding motions were denied - Therefrom, both the Company and the Union went to the CA - The CA, denied the parties separate petitions and affirmed the respondents resolution ISSUES 1. WON the CA acted within the bounds of the law when it spared the striking workers or union members from the penalty of dismissal. 2. WON the award of salary increases made by SOLE in the disposition of economic aspects of the CBA which was based on revelations sourced from the confidential position given to the NCMB Administrator is proper. HELD 1. YES. - The Union engaged in work slowdown which under the circumstances in which they were undertaken constitutes illegal strike. The Company is therefore right in dismissing the subject Union officers in accordance with Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, for participating in illegal strike in defiance of the assumption of jurisdiction order by the Labor Secretary. - While the employer is authorized to declare a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment, his/its option is not as wide with respect to union members or workers for the law itself draws a line and makes a distinction between union officers and members/ordinary workers. An

ordinary striking worker or union member cannot, as a rule, be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike; there must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike. - The law invests the Secretary of Labor and Employment the prerogative of tempering the consequence of the defiance to the assumption order. The Secretary may thus merely suspend rather than dismiss the employee involved. - Chief, Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Solvic Industrial Corporation vs. NLRC: Except for the most serious causes affecting the business of the employer, our labor laws frown upon dismissal. Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, an employee should not be sanctioned with a consequence so severe. - This disposition takes stock of the following circumstances justifying a less drastic penalty for ordinary striking workers: a) the employees who engaged in slowdown actually reported for work and continued to occupy their respective posts, or, in fine, did not abandon their jobs; b) they were only following orders of their leaders; and c) no evidence has been presented to prove their participation in the commission of illegal activities during the strike. - Not to be overlooked is a factor which the CA, regarded as justifying the leniency assumed by the public respondent Secretary towards the members of the Union. It is the fact that Nissan Motor appeared to have also exacerbated, the emerging volatile atmosphere among which is the en masse termination of most of the Union members. - Any worker who participates in a strike or otherwise engages in any prohibited act in defiance of the assumption order may be meted the penalty of loss of employment status. However, the law itself authorizes the graduation of penalties, Article 264 of the Labor Code making, as it were, a distinction between union officers and its members or any other workers, the main differing line contextually being that the latter do not necessarily lose their job by mere participation in an illegal strike absent proof that they committed illegal acts. - Association of Independent Union in the Philippines vs. NLRC: the responsibility of union officers, as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than that of the members and, therefore, limiting the penalty of dismissal only for the former for participation in an illegal strike is in order. 2. NO. - The disposition made by the public respondent Secretary relating to the economic aspects of the CBA, such as, but not limited, transportation allowance, 14th month pay, seniority pay, separation pay and the effectivity of the new CBA, appears to be proper. - However, there is a need to modify some of the awards among which is the annual salary increases. In this regard, the Court cannot sanction the award made by the public respondent Secretary based ostensibly on the revelation of NCMB Administrator Olalia that was sourced from the confidential position given him by the Company. The reason for this is simple. Article 233 of the Labor Code prohibits the use in evidence of confidential information given during conciliation proceedings. NCMB Administrator Olalia clearly breached this provision of law. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Company, this confidential information given to Administrator Olalia was made prior to the Unions slowdown and

defiance of the Assumption Order of August 22, 2001 causing it additional losses. Disposition Decision and Resolution of the CA AFFIRMED , with modifications READ: CONCILIATORS HANDBOOK, NATIONAL CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION BOARD, DOLE, pp. 1, 8-13, 16-17 (Library File) B. ARBITRATION I. IN GENERAL Chung Fu Industries v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 545 (02) As early as the 1920's, this Court declared: "In the Philippines fortunately, the attitude of the courts toward arbitration agreements is slowly crystallizing into definite and workable form ... The rule now is that unless the agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of the courts against the parties, which agreement would be void, the courts will look with favor upon such amicable arrangements and will only with great reluctance interfere to anticipate or nullify the action of the arbitrator. That there was a growing need for a law regulating arbitration in general was acknowledged when Republic Act No. 876 (1953), otherwise known as the Arbitration Law, was passed. "Said Act was obviously adopted to supplement-not to supplant-the New Civil Code on arbitration. It expressly declares that' the provisions of chapters one and two, Title XIV, Book IV of the Civil Code shall remain in force." In recognition of the pressing need for an arbitral machinery for the early and expeditious settlement of disputes in the construction industry, a Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) was created by Executive Order No. 1008, enacted on February 4, 1985. In practice nowadays, absent an agreement of the parties to resolve their disputes via a particular mode, it is the regular courts that remain to resolve such matters. However, the parties may opt for recourse to third parties, exercising their basic freedom to "establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." In such a case, resort to the arbitration process may be spelled out by them in a contract in anticipation of disputes that may arise between them. Or this may be stipulated in a submission agreement when they are actually confronted by a dispute. Whatever be the case, such recourse to an extrajudicial means of settlement is not intended to completely deprive the courts of jurisdiction. In fact, the early cases on arbitration carefully spelled out the prevailing doctrine at the time, thus: ". . . a clause in a contract providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitrators and to them alone is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction." But certainly, the stipulation to refer all future disputes to an arbitrator or to submit an ongoing dispute to one is valid. Being part of a contract between the parties, it is binding and enforceable in court in case one of them neglects, fails or refuses to arbitrate. Going a step further, in the event that they declare their intention to refer their differences to arbitration first before taking court action, this constitutes a condition precedent, such that where a

suit has been instituted prematurely, the court shall suspend the same and the parties shall be directed forthwith to proceed to arbitration. A court action may likewise be proper where the arbitrator has not been selected by the parties. Under present law, may the parties who agree to submit their disputes to arbitration further provide that the arbitrators' award shall be final, unappealable and executory? Article 2044 of the Civil Code recognizes the validity of such stipulation, thus: "Any stipulation that the arbitrator's award or decision shall be final is valid, without prejudice to Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040." Similarly, the Construction Industry Arbitration Law provides that the arbitral award "shall be final and inappealable except on questions of law which shall be appealable to the Supreme Court."16 Under the original Labor Code, voluntary arbitration awards or decisions were final, unappealable and executory. "However, voluntary arbitration awards or decisions on money claims, involving an amount exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or forty-percent (40%) of the paid-up capital of the respondent employer, whichever is lower, may be appealed to the NLRC on any of the following grounds: (a) abuse of discretion; and (b) gross incompetence." It is to be noted that the appeal in the instances cited were to be made to the National Labor Relations Commission and not to the courts. With the subsequent deletion of the above-cited provision from the Labor Code, the voluntary arbitrator is now mandated to render an award or decision within 20 calendar days from the date of submission of the dispute and such decision shall be final and executory after 10 calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. Where the parties agree that the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and unappealable as in the instant case, the pivotal inquiry is whether subject arbitration award is indeed beyond the ambit of the court's power of judicial review. We rule in the negative. It is stated explicitly under Art. 2044 of the Civil Code that the finality of the arbitrators' award is not absolute and without exceptions. Where the conditions described in Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040 applicable to both compromises and arbitrations are obtaining, the arbitrators' award may be annulled or rescinded. Additionally, under Sections 24 and 25 of the Arbitration Law, there are grounds for vacating, modifying or rescinding an arbitrator's award. If courts refuse or neglect to inquire into the factual milieu of an arbitrator's award to determine whether it is in accordance with law or within the scope of his authority? How may the power of judicial review be invoked? This is where the proper remedy is certiorari under Rule 65 the Revised Rules of Court. It is to be borne in mind, however, that this action will lie only where

a grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the voluntary arbitrator is clearly shown. For "the writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and that certiorari jurisdiction is not to be equated with appellate jurisdiction. In a special civil action of certiorari, the Court will not engage in a review of the facts found nor even of the law as interpreted or applied by the arbitrator unless the supposed errors of fact or of law are so patent and gross and prejudicial as to amount to a grave abuse of discretion or an exces de pouvoir on the part of the arbitrator." Even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. It should be stressed too, that voluntary arbitrators, by the nature of their functions, act in a quasi-judicial capacity. It stands to reason, therefore, that their decisions should not be beyond the scope of the power of judicial review of this Court. LM Power Engineering Corporation v. Capitol Industrial Construction Groups, 399 SCRA 562 (03) Held: Essentially, the dispute arose from the parties incongruent positions on whether certain provisions of their Agreement could be applied to the facts. The instant case involves technical discrepancies that are better left to an arbitral body that has expertise in those areas. In any event, the inclusion of an arbitration clause in a contract does not ipso facto divest the courts of jurisdiction to pass upon the findings of arbitral bodies, because the awards are still judicially reviewable under certain conditions. The Subcontract of the parties contain an arbitration clause. Being an inexpensive, speedy and amicable method of settling disputes, arbitration -- along with mediation, conciliation and negotiation -- is encouraged by the Supreme Court. Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, arbitration also hastens the resolution of disputes, especially of the commercial kind. It is thus regarded as the wave of the future in international civil and commercial disputes. Brushing aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration between the parties would be a step backward. Consistent with the above-mentioned policy of encouraging alternative dispute resolution methods, courts should liberally construe arbitration clauses. Provided such clause is susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute, an order to arbitrate should be granted. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of arbitration. According to petitioner, assuming arguendo that the dispute is arbitrable, the failure to file a formal request for arbitration with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) precluded the latter from acquiring jurisdiction over the question. Held: Sec 1 of Article II of the old Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration indeed required the submission of a request for arbitration, as follows. However, the new Rules of Procedure

Governing Construction Arbitration has dispensed with this requirement and recourse to the CIAC may now be availed of whenever a contract contains a clause for the submission of a future controversy to arbitration . Clearly, there is no more need to file a request with the CIAC in order to vest it with jurisdiction to decide a construction dispute. The arbitral clause in the Agreement is a commitment on the part of the parties to submit to arbitration the disputes covered therein. Because that clause is binding, they are expected to abide by it in good faith. And because it covers the dispute between the parties in the present case, either of them may compel the other to arbitrate. Frabelle Fishing Corporation v. Philippine American Life Insurance Co., 530 SCRA (07) FACTS: * Philam etc entered into a MOA for the construction of Philamlife Tower * Philam assigned to Frabelle Prop their rights and obligations under the MOA * Frabelle assigned its rights et to Frabelle fishing * These violations are: (a) the non-construction of a partition wall between Unit No. 38-B and the rest of the floor area; and (b) the reduction of the net usable floor area from four hundred sixty eight (468) square meters to only three hundred fifteen (315) square meters. * Frabelle referred the matter to the Phil Dispute Resolution Center but Philam refused to submit to PDRCIs jurisdiction * Frabelle filed with HLURB for reformation of instrument etc * HLURB took cognizance of the case so Philam went to CA for prohibition, TRO and or writ of prelim Injunction *CA: HLURB is enjoined, it has no juris over the action for reformation of contracts, its with the RTC ISSUES: (1) whether the HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint for reformation of instruments, specific performance and damages; and (2) whether the parties should initially resort to arbitration. SC: (1) We hold that being an action for reformation of instruments, petitioners complaint necessarily falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 1, Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides: SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder. An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule * As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, any disagreement as to the nature of the parties relationship which would require first an

amendment or reformation of their contract is an issue which the courts may and can resolve without the need of the expertise and specialized knowledge of the HLURB. (2) MOA mandates that any dispute between or among the parties shall finally be settled by arbitration conducted in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce. * It bears stressing that such arbitration agreement is the law between the parties. They are, therefore, expected to abide by it in good faith * This Court has previously held that arbitration is one of the alternative methods of dispute resolution that is now rightfully vaunted as the wave of the future in international relations, and is recognized worldwide. To brush aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration in case of disagreement between the parties would therefore be a step backward. HELD: IFO PHILAM II. COMPULSORY ARBITRATION A. Definition and Nature of Dispute Subject to Compulsory Arbitration 263 (g) Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, 180 SCRA 555 (89) FACTS: * Dolina was trained as a pilot at PALAS, he was issued a license; He was short of the minimum 500 hours of flying time so his employment was extended 3 time so he can meet this requirement * Upon application for regularization as First Officer his psych exam was unacceptable * Board recommended his termination, PAL filed clearance for his termination * Dolina countered with a complaint for illegal dismissal OIC DOLE Regional Office IV ordered Dolinas reinstatement * the Issue was referred to Executive labor Arbiter for compulsory arbitration ELA ruled IFO PAL NLRC:Affirmed but pay Dolino as part of the interim agreement until the case was resolved SC: Proceedings in the NLRC cannot be considered as part of the arbitration proceeding * arbitration is the reference of a dispute to an impartial third person, chosen by the parties or appointed by statutory authority to hear and decide the case in controversy * In labor cases, compulsory arbitration is the process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties * Under the Labor Code, it is the Labor Arbiter who is clothed with the authority to conduct compulsory arbitration on cases involving termination disputes * When the Labor Arbiter renders his decision, compulsory arbitration is deemed terminated because by then the hearing and determination of the controversy has ended. Any appeal raised by an aggrieved party from the Labor Arbiter's decision is already beyond the scope of arbitration since in the appeal stage, the NLRC en banc merely reviews the Labor Arbiter's decision for errors of fact or law and

no longer duplicates the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the clause "pending final resolution of the case by arbitration" should be understood to be limited only to the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, such that when the latter rendered his decision, the case was finally resolved by arbitration. * There shouldnt be backwages bec it was found that he was legally dismissed HELD: Payment order permanent. IFO PAL is null and void. TRO

GTE Directories Corporation v. GTE Directories Corp., Employees Union, 197 SCRA 452 (91) Minister Sanchez decided the dispute in the exercise of the jurisdiction assumed by his predecessor in accordance with Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. Even that assumption s is open to question. The production and publication of telephone directories, which is the principal activity of GTE, can scarcely be described as an industry affecting the national interest. GTE is a publishing firm chiefly dependent on the marketing and sale of advertising space for its not inconsiderable revenues. Its services, while of value, cannot be deemed to be in the same category of such essential activities as "the generation or distribution of energy" or those undertaken by "banks, hospitals, and export-oriented industries." It cannot be regarded as playing as vital a role in communication as other mass media. The small number of employees involved in the dispute, the employer's payment of "P10 million in income tax alone to the Philippine government," and the fact that the "top officers of the union were dismissed during the conciliation process," obviously do not suffice to make the dispute in the case at bar one "adversely affecting the national interest." YSS Employee v YSS Laboratories 2009 FACTS: * YSS Lab implemented a retrenchment program which affected 11 employees (9 were officers of the union) * the EES were initially given the option to retire, when no one took the option, Notices of termination were filed with DOLE and served to the EEs * union staged a strike * Conciliation proceedings were futile * SOLE intervened certified the dispute to NLRC for compulsory arbitration * all workers were ordered to return to work * YSS lab filed MR, the 9 union members took part in the illegal strike, they should not return to work SOLE; Ruled IFO of Union, reinstate CA:Reversed SOLE, valid retrenchment program, strike illegal ISSUE: WON the retrenched workers should be part of return to work order SC: Yes ART 263g, enacted pursuant to the police power of the state * the assumption or certification order shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. Moreover, if one has

already taken place, all striking workers shall immediately return to work, and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout * YSS Laboratories vigorous insistence on the exclusion of the retrenched employees from the coverage of the return-to-work order seriously impairs the authority of the Secretary of Labor to forestall a labor dispute that he deems inimical to the national economy. * Plainly, Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code was meant to make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors) and the labor arbiters share jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions. * that assumption and certification orders are executory in character and are to be strictly complied with by the parties, even during the pendency of any petition questioning their validity Certainly, the determination of who among the strikers could be admitted back to work cannot be made to depend upon the discretion of employer, lest we strip the certification or assumption-ofjurisdiction orders of the coercive power that is necessary for attaining their laudable objective. The return-to-work order does not interfere with the managements prerogative, but merely regulates it when, in the exercise of such right, national interests will be affected. The rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to control and limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. The interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue preference. HELD: IFO UNION reinstate Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Development Bank Employees, 249 SCRA 162 (95) FACTS: Phimco Industries, Inc. v. Brillantes, 304 SCRA 747 (99) FACTS: * PILA (Labor assoc) filed a NOS with NCMB vs PHIMCO * parties failed to resolve their differences * PILA presented a petition for intervention of SOLE to which Phimco opposed * Pending resolution, Phimco sent notice of termination to 47 EEs (some union officers) Acting SOLE ordered the return of all striking workers except those handed with termination papers; submit position papers Acting SOLE issued another order holding in abeyance the implementation of the above order ISSUE: WON Acting SOLE has jurisdiction over the subject labor dispute SC: Art. 263, paragraph (g) of the Labor Code, provides: (g) When, in his opinion, there exist a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify

the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration . . . * LC vests to the secretary power to determined which industries are indispensable but this discretion is not without limits * must have been aware that a match factory, though of value, can scarcely be considered as an industry "indispensable to the national interest" as it cannot be in the same category as "generation and distribution of energy, or those undertaken by banks, hospitals, and export-oriented industries." * To uphold the action of the public respondent under the premises would be stretching too far the power of the Secretary of Labor as every case of a strike or lockout where there are inconveniences in the community, or work disruptions in an industry though not indispensable to the national interest, would then come within the Secretary's power. HELD: SOLE Set aside Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 433 SCRA 610 (04) A cursory reading of the above provision shows that when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest or certifies the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. Moreover, if one had already taken place, all striking workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The powers granted to the Secretary of Labor under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State, with the aim of promoting public good: When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted great breadth of discretion in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or the lifting thereof if one has already taken place. Assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute, or as in this case the certification of the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, always co-exists with an order for workers to return to work immediately and for employers to readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. That respondents business is of national interest is not disputed. It is engaged in coastwise shipping services for the transportation of passengers and cargoes. The direct intervention of this Office becomes imperative on account of the magnitude of the adverse effect of any work stoppage at the Company to the regional and national economy. Under the present state of things, the exercise of this Offices power as embodied under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, is warranted. The maritime industry is indubitably imbued with national interest. Under the circumstances, the Labor Secretary correctly intervened in the labor

dispute between the parties to this case by certifying the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Manila Diamond Hotel Employers Union v. Court of Appeals, 447 SCRA 97 (04) The CA based its decision on this Courts ruling in UST v. NLRC. There, the Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute between striking teachers and the university. He ordered the striking teachers to return to work and the university to accept them under the same terms and conditions. However, in a subsequent order, the NLRC provided payroll reinstatement for the striking teachers as an alternative remedy to actual reinstatement. True, this Court held therein that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in providing for the alternative remedy of payroll reinstatement. This Court found that it was merely an error of judgment, which is not correctible by a special civil action for certiorari. The NLRC was only trying its best to work out a satisfactory ad hoc solution to a festering and serious problem. However, this Court notes that the UST ruling was made in the light of one very important fact: the teachers could not be given back their academic assignments since the order of the Secretary for them to return to work was given in the middle of the first semester of the academic year. The NLRC was, therefore, faced with a situation where the striking teachers were entitled to a return to work order, but the university could not immediately reinstate them since it would be impracticable and detrimental to the students to change teachers at that point in time. In the present case, there is no showing that the facts called for payroll reinstatement as an alternative remedy. A strained relationship between the striking employees and management is no reason for payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement. Petitioner correctly points out that labor disputes naturally involve strained relations between labor and management, and that in most strikes, the relations between the strikers and the non-strikers will similarly be tense. Nevertheless, the government must still perform its function and apply the law, especially if, as in this case, national interest is involved. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Secretary did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in ordering payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement? This question is answered by the nature of Article 263(g). As a general rule, the State encourages an environment wherein employers and employees themselves must deal with their problems in a manner that mutually suits them best. This is the basic policy embodied in Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution, which was further echoed in Article 211 of the Labor Code. Hence, a voluntary, instead of compulsory, mode of dispute settlement is the general rule.

However, Article 263(g), which allows the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving an industry indispensable to the national interest, provides an exception: (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. x x x This provision is viewed as an exercise of the police power of the State. A prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy and, therefore, the situation is imbued with public necessity and involves the right of the State and the public to selfprotection. Under Article 263(g), all workers must immediately return to work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. This Court must point out that the law uses the precise phrase of under the same terms and conditions, revealing that it contemplates only actual reinstatement. This is in keeping with the rationale that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be inimical to the national economy. It is clear that Article 263(g) was not written to protect labor from the excesses of management, nor was it written to ease management from expenses, which it normally incurs during a work stoppage or slowdown. It is, therefore, evident from the foregoing that the Secretarys subsequent order for mere payroll reinstatement constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Even in the exercise of his discretion under Article 236(g), the Secretary must always keep in mind the purpose of the law. Time and again, this Court has held that when an official by-passes the law on the asserted ground of attaining a laudable objective, the same will not be maintained if the intendment or purpose of the law would be defeated. B. Rationale Compulsory Arbitration Manila Cordage Company v. Court of Industrial Relations, 37 SCRA 288 (71) 78 SCRA 398 FERNANDEZ; August 31, 977 NATURE Petitions to review the decision and the resolution dated of the Court of Industrial Relations FACTS -In 1957, the Manila Cordage Company and the Manco Labor Union, then acting as the exclusive bargaining representative of the former's employees, entered into a collective bargaining agreement which contained, among others, the following stipulation: Both parties agree that all employees of the COMPANY who are already members of the UNION at the time of the signing of this

AGREEMENT shall continue to remain members of the UNION for the duration of this AGREEMENT. -The foregoing stipulation was also embodied in the 1959 CBA between the two -When the collective bargaining agreements were entered into, the employees Rabago, Trajano and Nisperos were already members of Manco Labor Union. -Shortly after 1959, some employees of Manila Cordage Company formed the Manila Cordage Workers Union. -Some employees who were members of the Manco Labor Union resigned from said union and joined the Manila Cordage Workers Union. -At the instance of the Manco Labor Union, the Manila Cordage Company dismissed those who resigned from the Manco Labor Union -Manila Cordage Workers Union caused the filing of a complaint with the CIR for unfair labor practice against Manila Cordage Company and the Manco Labor Union -The Manco Labor Union averred in its answer that the complainants were dismissed on the basis of an existing collective bargaining contract between said union and the Manila Cordage Company. -The Manila Cordage Company alleged: that one of the conditions of employment provided in said collective bargaining agreement is the maintenanceof-membership clause requiring all members of the Manco Labor Union to remain as such members thereof during the life of the contract; that the Manco Labor Union demanded of the Manila Cordage Company the dismissal of the individual complainants from employment for the reason that said complainants had failed to continue and maintain their membership in the union; that acting in good faith and in pursuance of its obligations under the said contract, respondent company had to terminate the employment of said complainants, otherwise the Manila Cordage Company would be charged with contractual breach and confronted with the Manco Labor Union's reprisal. -Court of Industrial Relations ordered the petitioner, Cordage Company, and the Manco Labor Union "To reinstate complainants Silvino Rabago, Natalio Nisperos and Ricardo Trajano to their former positions -The motions for reconsideration of the Manila Cordage Company and the Manco Labor Union were denied, hence this petition ISSUE WON under the maintenance-of-membership clause in the CBA, employees of the company who are already members of the said union were required to remain as such as a condition for continued employment in the company HELD No. -It is a fact that the complainants were employees of the Manila Cordage Company and members of the Manco Labor Union when the following stipulation was included in the collective bargaining agreement: Both parties agree that all employees of the COMPANY who are already members of the UNION at the time of the signing of this AGREEMENT shall continue to remain members of the UNION for the duration- of this AGREEMENT" -The foregoing stipulation, however, does not clearly state that maintenance of membership in the Manco

Labor Union is a condition of continuous employment in the Manila Labor Cordage Company. -In consonance with the ruling in Confederated Sons of Labor vs. Anakan Lumber Co., et al., 107 Phil. 915, in order that the Manila Cordage Company may be deemed bound to dismiss employees who do not maintain their membership in the Manco Labor Union, the stipulation to this effect must be so clear as to leave no room for doubt thereon -An undertaking of this nature is so harsh that it must be strictly construed and doubts must be resolved against the existence of the right to dismiss. -Aware of the deficiency of the maintenance- of membership clause, the petitioner urges that the same should be construed together with the "Whereas" provision of the contract which reads: WHEREAS, the parties hereto nave decided to enter into an agreement relating to the terms and conditions of employment and reference to those employees to whom the provisions of this AGREEMENT apply. -To construe the stipulations above-quoted as imposing as a condition to continued employment in the Manila Cordage Company the maintenance of membership in the Manco Labor Union is to violate the natural and constitutional right of the laborer to organize freely. Such interpretation would be inconsistent with the constitutional mandate that the State shall afford protection to labor. -The respondent Court of Industrial Relations correctly found that the disputed "maintenance-ofmembership" clause in question did not give the Manila Cordage Company the right to dismiss just because they resigned as members of the Manco Labor Union. Disposition The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 433 SCRA 610 (04) Facts of the Case: The petitioner and private respondents were embroiled in a labor dispute which unfortunately resulted to a strike and dismissal of several employees. In order to prevent further damage and halt work stoppage, the Secretary of Labor issued a reinstatement orders instructing the petitioner to readmit the dismissed employees under terms and conditions prevailing before the strikes. The petitioner contended that the subject reinstatement orders constitute a clear encroachment upon management's prerogatives. Issue: Is the reinstatement order valid? Ruling: The reinstatement order is valid as it was issued pursuant to Art. 263 of the Philippine Labor Code which empowers the Secretary of Labor to acquire jurisdiction over labor disputes involving an industry inimical to national interest. The maritime industry in which the context of this labor dispute occurs is clearly such and any disruption and work stoppage therein will adversely affect trade, commerce and transportation in the country. This is a clear legal basis for the exercise of the Secretary's power in this case. Moreover, management prerogative is not absolute and Art. 263 provided the limitation to the exercise of this prerogative. Under this provision, the Secretary of Labor is given great

breath of discretion to provide solution to a labor dispute of this kind at the soonest. Hence, in this case, management prerogative must therefore give way to promote the general welfare. National Federation of Labor v. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 612 (83) The very nature of a return-to-work order issued in a certified case lends itself to no other construction. The certification attests to the urgency of the matter, affecting as it does an industry indispensable to the national interest. The order is issued in the exercise of the court's compulsory power of arbitration, and therefore must be obeyed until set aside. To say that its effectivity must await affirmance on a motion for reconsideration is not only to emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import, for by then the deadline fixed for the return to work would, in the ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be affirmed insofar as the time element is concerned." It is quite apparent, therefore, why this case calls for prompt decision. After this long lapse of time, respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. had failed to abide by the clear and mandatory requirement of the law. It would negate the very purpose of a compulsory arbitration, which precisely is intended to call a halt to a pending strike by requiring that the status quo prior to its declaration be preserved, if one of the parties fails to live up to such a norm. The inconsistencies between what was sought by private respondent, namely, compulsory arbitration, and the failure to admit the striking employees back to work in the meantime, cannot be countenanced. As noted earlier, time is of the essence as far as the eightyone petitioners are concerned. Philippine School of Business Administration v. Noriel, 164 SCRA 402 (88) In the opinion of Acting Secretary Noriel, the labor dispute adversely affected the national interest, affecting as it did some 9,000 students. He was authorized by law to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute, after finding that it adversely affected the national interest. This power is expressly granted by Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code. Acting Secretary Noriel did exactly what he was supposed to do under the Labor Code. Petitioner contends that the Acting Secretary erred when he found that the strike staged by respondent union and its members, who had already been restrained by the RTC from picketing and barricading the main gate of the school, was a fit subject of a return to work order. However, the Court finds that no error was made by the Acting Secretary. The RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case filed by some PSBA students, involving as it does a labor dispute over which the labor agencies had exclusive jurisdiction. That the regular courts have no jurisdiction over labor disputes and to issue injunctions against strikes is well-settled. It may also be added that due to petitioner's intransigent refusal to attend the conciliation

conferences called after the union struck, assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and the issuance of a return-to-work order had become the only way of breaking the deadlock and maintaining the status quo ante pending resolution of the dispute. The Solicitor General was correct when he stated that by assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute, the Acting Secretary of Labor merely provided for a formal forum for the parties to ventilate their positions with the end in view of settling the dispute. It is, therefore, error for the petitioners to allege that by the mere act of certifying a labor dispute for compulsory arbitration and issuing a return to work order, the Minister of Labor and Employment thereby "enters the picture on the side of the Company," and violates the freedom of expression of workers engaged in picketing, "in utter subversion of the constitutional rights of workers." As contended by the SolGen, "there can be no such unconstitutional application (of BP 227) because all that Minister has done is to certify the labor dispute for arbitration and thereafter personally assume jurisdiction over it. He has not rendered any decision; he has not favored one party over the other. The exercise of the power, to be in full accord with the Constitution, must be with a view to the protection of labor: . . . It must be stressed anew, however, that the power of compulsory arbitration, while allowable under the [1973] Constitution, and quite understandable in labor disputes affected with a national interest, to be free from the taint of unconstitutionality, must be exercised in accordance with the constitutional mandate of protection to labor. The arbiter then is called upon to take due care that in the decision to be reached, there is no violation of "the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work." [Art. II, Sec. 9, 1973 Constitution.] It is of course manifest that there is such unconstitutional application if a law "fair on its face and impartial in appearance is applied and administered by a public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand." [Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 372 (1886).] It does not even have to go that far. An instance of unconstitutional application would be discernible if what is ordained by the fundamental law, the protection of law, is ignored or disregarded. University of Immaculate Concepcion, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 448 SCRA 190 (05) FACTS: * Union submitted its proposal however the scope of the bargaining unit was left unresolves * matter was submitted to Voluntary arbitration * Voluntary arbitrators rendered a decision excluding the secretaries, chief of acctg dept, cashier and guidance counselors from the coverage of the bargaining unit * Union file for MR but pending resolution it also filed NOS with NCMB on grounds of deadlock and unfair labor practice

* During 30 day cooling off pd, 2 union members were dismissed * Union went on strike SOLE issued an order assuming jurisdiction: ordered all workers to return to work * Voluntary arbitrators: denied MR * University gave the concerned EEs 2 choices: 1 resign from the Union and remain employed as confidential EEs or 2 resign from their positions and remain union members. * EEs were steadfast in their claim. they were sent notices of termination. * Union filed another NOS for the termination SOLE issued reinstatement CA; IFO of Union ISSUE: SC: When the Secretary of Labor ordered the UNIVERSITY to suspend the effect of the termination of the individual respondents, the Secretary did not exceed her jurisdiction, nor did the Secretary gravely abuse the same. It must be pointed out that one of the substantive evils which Article 263(g) of the Labor Code seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a labor dispute to the further detriment of the national interest. Indeed, it is clear that the act of the UNIVERSITY of dismissing the individual respondents from their employment became the impetus for the UNION to declare a second notice of strike. It is not a question anymore of whether or not the terminated employees, the individual respondents herein, are part of the bargaining unit. Any act committed during the pendency of the dispute that tends to give rise to further contentious issues or increase the tensions between the parties should be considered an act of exacerbation and should not be allowed. HELD: IFO Union CA Affirmed C. Process Initiation Certification of Dispute 1. Initiating Party * PLDT v. Manggagawa, 463 SCRA 418 (05) a) Secretary DOLE 263 (g) * Feati University v. Feati University Faculty Club, 18 SCRA 1191 (66) "It thus appears that when in the opinion of the President a labor dispute exists in an industry indispensable to national interest and he certifies it to the Court of Industrial Relations the latter acquires jurisdiction to act thereon in the manner provided by law. Thus the court may take either of the following courses: a. it may issue an order forbidding employees to strike or the employer to lockout its employees, or, failing in this, b. it may issue an order fixing the terms and conditions of employment. It has no other alternative. It can throw the case out in the assumption that the certification was erroneous. ". . . The fact, however, is that because of the strike declared by the members of the minority union which threatens a major industry the President deemed it wise to certify the controversy to the Court of Industrial Relations for adjudication.

This is the power that the law gives to the President the propriety of its exercise being a matter that only devolves upon him. The same is not the concern of the industrial court. What matters is that by virtue of the certification made by the President the case was placed under the jurisdiction of said court." To certify a labor dispute to the CIR is the prerogative of the President under the law, and this Court will not interfere in, much less curtail, the exercise of that prerogative. The jurisdiction of the CIR in a certified case is exclusive (Rizal Cement Co., Inc. vs. Rizal Cement Workers Union (FFW), et al., G. R. L-12747, July 30, 1960). Once the jurisdiction is acquired pursuant to the presidential certification, the CIR may exercise its broad powers as provided in Commonwealth Act 103. All phases of the labor dispute and the employer-employee relationship may be threshed out before the CIR, and the CIR may issue such order or orders as may be necessary to make effective the exercise of its jurisdiction. The parties involved in the case may appeal to the Supreme Court from the order or orders thus issued by the CIR. And so, in the instant case, when the President took into consideration that the University "has some 18,000 students and employed approximately 500 faculty members," that "the continued disruption in the operation of the University will necessarily prejudice the thousand of students", and that "the dispute affects the national interest", and certified the dispute to the CIR, it is not for the CIR nor this Court to pass upon the correctness of the reasons of the President in certifying the labor dispute to the CIR.

Manila Cordage Co. v. CIR, 37 SCRA 288 (71), supra Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Trajano, 452 SCRA 457 (05) FACTS: Respondent CMC Employees Assoc.-Alliance of Filipin o Workers filed a petition for certificationelection among the rank-and-file employees of theCapitol Medical Center (CMC). After the election,r espondent union was held as the sole and exclusivebargaining representative of the rank and fil eemployees at CMC. Respondent Union invited the CMC to thebargaining table by submitting its economic proposalfor a CBA. However, CMC refused to negotiate andinstead challenged the unions legal personalityth rough a petition for cancellation of the certificateof registration. Respondent union was left with noother recourse but to file a notice of strike againstCMC for ULP. This eventually led to a strike. In the meantime, petitioner Capitol MedicalCenter E mployees-Unified Filipino Service Workersfiled a petition for certification election among therankand-file employees of the CMC. It alleged in itspetition that a certification election can now becon

ducted as more that 12 months have lapsed sincethe last certification election was held and that noCBA was executed before. Respondent union opposed the petition andmoved for its dismissal. It contended that it is thecertified bargaining agent of the rank-andfileemployees of the CMC Hospital. Petitioner claims that since there is no evidenceon record that there exists a CBA deadlock, the lawallowing the conduct of a certification election aftertwelve months must be given effect in the interest of the right of the workers to freely choose their soleand exclusive bargaining agent The Secretary of Labor: dismissed the petition forcertification election and directed CMC to negotiate aCBA with respondent union Issue: Whether there is a bargaining deadlock betweenCMC and respondent union, before the filing of petitioner of a petition for certification election HELD: NONE There is a deadlock when there is a complete blocking orstoppage resulting from the action of equal and opposedforces . . . . The word is synonymous with the wordimpasse, which . . "presupposes reasonable effort at goodfaith bargaining which, despite noble intentions, does notconclude in agreement between the parties."While it is true that, in the case at bench, one year hadlapsed since the time of declaration of a final certificationresult, and that there is no collective bargaining deadlock,public respondent did not commit grave ab use of discretion when it ruled in respondent union's favor sincethe delay in the forging of the CBA could not be attributedto the fault of the latter.If the law proscribes the conduct of a certification electionwhen there is a bargaining deadlock submitte d toconciliation or arbitration, with more reason should it notbe conducted if, despite attempts to bring an employer tothe negotiation table by the "no reasonable effort in goodfaith" on the employer certified bargaining agent, therewas to bargain collectively. It is only just and equitablethat the circumstances in this case should be consideredas similar in nature to a "bargaining deadlock" when no cert elect could be held Philcom Employees Union v. Philippines Global Communications, 495 SCRA 214 (06) 494 SCRA 214 CARPIO; July 17, 2006 NATURE Petition for review to annul the CA Decision which affirmed the orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in OS-AJ-0022-97. FACTS -Upon the expiration of the CBA between petitioner Philcom union (PEU) and respondent employer (Philcom, Inc.), the parties started negotiations for its renewal. While negotiations were ongoing, PEU filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) NCR, a Notice of Strike, due to perceived unfair labor practice committed by the company. In view of the filing of said Notice of Strike, the company suspended negotiations on the CBA.

This moved the union to file another Notice of Strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock. -At a conciliation conference held at the NCMB-NCR office, the parties agreed to consolidate the two Notices of Strike filed by the union and to maintain the status quo during the pendency of the proceedings. However, while the union and the company officers and representatives were meeting, the remaining union officers and members staged a strike at the company premises, barricading the entrances and egresses thereof and setting up a stationary picket at the main entrance of the building. The following day, the company immediately filed a petition for the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in accordance with Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. -Then Acting Labor Sec Cresenciano Trajano issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the dispute, enjoining any strike or lockout, whether threatened or actual, directing the parties to cease and desist from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation, directing the striking workers to return to work within 24hours from receipt of the Secretarys Order and for management to resume normal operations, as well as accept the workers back under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. The parties were likewise required to submit their respective position papers and evidence within 10days from receipt of said order. A few days later, a second order was issued reiterating the previous directive to all striking employees to return to work immediately. -The union filed MFR assailing, among others, the authority of then Acting Secretary Trajano to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Said motion was denied and as directed, the parties submitted their respective position papers. In its position paper, the union raised the issue of the alleged ULP of the company. The company, on the other hand, raised in its position paper the sole issue of the illegality of the strike staged by the union. -On the premise that the Labor Secretary cannot rule on the issue of the strike since there was no petition to declare the same illegal, petitioner union filed a Manifestation/ Motion to Strike Out Portions of & Attachments in Philcoms Position Paper for being irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent to the issues assumed for resolution. In opposition, the company argued that it was precisely due to the strike suddenly staged by the union that the dispute was assumed by the Labor Secretary. Hence, the case would necessarily include the issue of the legality of the strike. -The Secretary issued the first assailed order. Said order directed the issuance of summons to Philcom Corporation to appear before any hearing that may thereafter be scheduled and to submit its position paper as may be required. It however dismissed the unions charges of ULP again st the Company. It further issued a return-to-work order and directed the parties to cease and desist from committing any acts that may aggravate the situation. - Philcom filed MFR and Motion to Certify Labor Dispute to the NLRC for Compulsory Arbitration. PEU also filed MFR insofar as the Order dismissed the ULP charges against Philcom and included the illegal strike issue in the labor dispute. The Secretary denied both MFRs.

-PEU filed with CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65. CA denied the petition and affirmed the orders of the DOLE Sec. Hence, this petition. ISSUES 1. WON CA erred when it affirmed the order/resolution of the DOLE Sec including the issue of illegal strike notwithstanding the absence of any petition to declare the strike illegal. 2. WON CA erred when it affirmed the order/resolution of the Secretary of Labor dismissing the Unions charges of unfair labor practices. 3. WON CA erred when it failed to issue such order mandating/directing the issuance of a writ of execution directing the Company to unconditionally accept back to work the Union officers and members under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike and as well as to pay their salaries/backwages and the monetary equivalent of their other benefits. HELD 1. NO. The Secretary properly took cognizance of the issue on the legality of the strike. Since the very reason of the Secretarys assumption of jurisdiction was PEUs declaration of the strike, any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental to, but is essentially involved in, the labor dispute itself. -The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State, with the aim of promoting public good. When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted "great breadth of discretion" in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place. In this case, the Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute because it falls in an industry indispensable to the national interest: the telecommunications industry. -The authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from such labor dispute. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the dispute. Besides, it was upon Philcoms petition that the Secretary immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Moreover, a careful study of all the facts alleged, issues raised, and arguments presented in the position paper leads us to hold that the portions PEU seek to expunge are necessary in the resolution of the present case. 2. NO. -Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the workers right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, no matter how unfair, are not unfair labor practices. The only exception is Article 248(f), which in any case is not one of the acts specified in PEUs charge of unfair labor practice. -A review of the acts complained of as ULP of Philcom convinces us that they do not fall under any of the prohibited acts defined and enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code. The issues of

misimplementation or non-implementation of employee benefits, non-payment of overtime and other monetary claims, inadequate transportation allowance, water, and other facilities, are all a matter of implementation or interpretation of the economic provisions of the CBA between Philcom and PEU subject to the grievance procedure. All the charges were adequately rebutted by the employer. -The Court has always respected a companys exercise of its prerogative to devise means to improve its operations. Management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, supervision and transfer of employees, working methods, time, place and manner of work. This is so because the law on ULP is not intended to deprive employers of their fundamental right to prescribe and enforce such rules as they honestly believe to be necessary to the proper, productive and profitable operation of their business. -Even assuming arguendo that Philcom had violated some provisions in the CBA, there was no showing that the same was a flagrant or malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions. The law mandates that such violations should not be treated as unfair labor practices. 3. NO. -SC ruled on the legality of the strike if only to put an end to this protracted labor dispute. The facts necessary to resolve the legality of the strike are not in dispute. The strike and the strike activities that PEU had undertaken were patently illegal for the following reasons: 1. Philcom is engaged in a vital industry protected by PD 823, as amended by PD 849, from strikes and lockouts. It is therefore clear that the striking employees violated the no-strike policy of the State in regard to vital industries. 2. The Secretary had already assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. Despite the issuance of the return-to-work orders, the striking employees failed to return to work and continued with their strike. -A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived. While the workers may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer. see Art.264 of the Labor Code. -A strike undertaken despite the Secretarys issuance of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity, and thus, illegal, under Article 264(a) of the Labor Code. The union officers who knowingly participate in the illegal strike are deemed to have lost their employment status. The union members, including union officers, who commit specific illegal acts or who knowingly defy a return-towork order are also deemed to have lost their employment status. Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and preventing management to fill up their positions. 3. PEU staged the strike using unlawful means and methods.

-e.g., human barricades at all entrances to and egresses from the company premises; use of coercive methods to prevent company officials and other personnel from leaving the company premises; prohibiting other tenants at the Philcom building from entering and leaving the premises. see Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code. -The sanction provided in Article 264(a) is so severe that any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. By insisting on staging the prohibited strike and defiantly picketing Philcoms premises to prevent the resumption of company operations, the striking employees have forfeited their right to be readmitted. 4. PEU declared the strike during the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings at the NCMB. -see Art264(a), LC. Section 6, Book V, Rule XXII of the IRR: During the proceedings, the parties shall not do any act which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of dispute. They are obliged, as part of their duty, to bargain collectively in good faith, to participate fully and promptly in the conciliation meetings called by the regional branch of the Board. 5. PEU staged the strike in utter disregard of the grievance procedure established in the CBA. -PEU should have immediately resorted to the grievance machinery provided for in the CBA. In disregarding this procedure, the union leaders who knowingly participated in the strike have acted unreasonably. The law cannot interpose its hand to protect them from the consequences of their illegal acts. -A strike declared on the basis of grievances which have not been submitted to the grievance committee as stipulated in the CBA of the parties is premature and illegal. Having held the strike illegal and having found that PEUs officers and members have committed illegal acts during the strike, we hold that no writ of execution should issue for the return to work of PEU officers who participated in the illegal strike, and PEU members who committed illegal acts or who defied the return-to-work orders that the Secretary issued. The issue of who participated in the illegal strike, committed illegal acts, or defied the return-to-work orders is a question of fact that must be resolved in the appropriate proceedings before the Secretary of Labor. Disposition Petition dismissed. CA decision affirmed with the modification that the DOLE Sec is directed to determine who among the PEU officers participated in the illegal strike, and who among the union members committed illegal acts or defied the returnto-work orders. International Pharmaceutical v SOLE 1992 FACTS: * There was a deadlock bet Comp and Union * Union filed NOS with NCMB, conciliation failed and operations were paralyzed * there were 3 other cases * SOLE invoking Art 263g issued an order assuming jurisdiction and directed parties to return to status quo

* cases were consolidated ISSUE: jurisdiction of SOLE SC: n the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. * In the present case, however, by virtue of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary has been conferred jurisdiction over cases which would otherwise be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters. There was an existing labor dispute as a result of a deadlock in the negotiation for a collective bargaining agreement and the consequent strike, over which the Secretary assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. The three NLRC cases were just offshoots of the stalemate in the negotiations and the strike. We, therefore, uphold the Secretary's order to consolidate the NLRC cases with the labor dispute pending before him and his subsequent assumption of jurisdiction over the said NLRC cases for him to be able to competently and efficiently dispose of the dispute in its totality. HELD: there was no GAD by SOLE Philtread Workers Union v Confessor Union of Filipro Employees v Nestle St Scholastica v Torres An issue that is not part of the dispute may be ruled on a compulsory arbitration case if it was submitted by the parties. The issue on whether respondent SECRETARY has the power to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute and its incidental controversies, causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, was already settled in International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Secretary of Labor and Employment. Therein, We ruled that: ". . . [T]he Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdictional over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction." At first glance, the rulings above stated seem to run counter to that of PAL v. Secretary or Labor and Employment, which was, cited by petitioner. But the conflict is only apparent, not real. To recall, We ruled in the latter case that the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in assumption and/or certification cases is limited to the issues that are involved in the disputes or to those that are submitted to him for resolution.

The seeming difference is, however, reconcilable. Since the matter on the legality or illegality of the strike was never submitted to him for resolution, he was thus found to have exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained the employer from taking disciplinary action against employees who staged an illegal strike.

Before the Secretary of Labor and Employment may take cognizance of an issue which is merely incidental to the labor dispute, therefore, the same must be involved in the labor dispute itself, or otherwise submitted to him for resolution. If it was not, as was the case in PAL and he nevertheless acted on it, that assumption of jurisdiction is tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the ruling in International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, supra, will apply. The submission of an incidental issue of a labor dispute, in assumption and/or certification cases, to the Secretary of Labor and Employment for his resolution is thus one of the instances referred to whereby the latter may exercise concurrent jurisdiction together with the Labor Arbiters. Effect of non-compliance with return to work order Non-compliance with the certification order of the Sec of Labor or a return to work order of the Commission shall be considered an illegal act committed in the course of the strike or lookout and shall authorize the Sec of Labor or the Commission, as the case may be, to enforce the same under pain or loss of employment status or entitlement to full employment benefits from the locking-out employer or backwages, damages and/or other positive and/or affirmative reliefs, even to criminal prosecution against the liable parties . . ." Private respondent UNION maintains that the reason they failed to immediately comply with the return-towork order was because they questioned the assumption of jurisdiction of respondent SECRETARY. They were of the impression that being an academic institution, the school could not be considered an industry indispensable to national interest, and that pending resolution of the issue, they were under no obligation to immediately return to work. This position of the UNION is simply flawed. Article 263 (g) provides that if a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption, "all striking . . . employees shall immediately return to work." This means that by its very terms, a return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity (Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle' Philippines, Inc., supra) After all, the assumption and/or certification order is issued in the exercise of respondent SECRETARY's compulsive power of arbitration and, until set aside, must therefore be immediately complied with.

The rationale for this rule is explained in University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC, "To say that the return-to-work order effectivity must wait affirmance in a motion for reconsideration is not only to emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import, for by then the deadline fixed for the return to work would, in the ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be affirmed insofar as the time element is concerned." Moreover, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor over labor disputes involving academic institutions was already upheld in Philippine School of Business Administration v. Noriel where We ruled thus: "There is no doubt that the on-going labor dispute at the school adversely affects the national interest. Respondent UNION's failure to immediately comply with the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990, therefore, cannot be condoned. The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to immediately comply with the return-to-work order is outlined in Art. 264 of the Labor Code which provides that any declaration of a strike or lockout after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an illegal act. Any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work order may, consequently, "be declared to have lost his employment status." Thus, we held in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra, that by insisting on staging the restrained strike and defiantly picketing the company premises to prevent the resumption of operations, the strikers have forfeited their right to be readmitted, having abandoned their positions, and so could be validly replaced. The sympathy of the Court which, as a rule, is on the side of the laboring classes (Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. NLRC), cannot be extended to the striking union officers and members in the instant petition. There was willful disobedience not only to one but two return-to-work orders. Considering that the UNION consisted mainly of teachers, who are supposed to be well-lettered and well-informed, the Court cannot overlook the plain arrogance and pride displayed by the UNION in this labor dispute. It is clear from the provisions above quoted that from the moment a worker defies a return-to-work order, he is deemed to have abandoned his job. It is already in itself knowingly participating in an illegal act. Otherwise, the worker will just simply refuse to return to his work and cause a standstill they refused to discharge or allow the management to fill (Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra). Suffice it to say, in Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong, supra, the workers were terminated from work after defying the return-to-work order for only nine (9) days. It is indeed inconceivable that an employee, despite a return-to-work order, will be allowed in the interim to stand akimbo and

wait until five (5) orders shall have been issued for their return before they report back to work. This is absurd. Manila Hotel Assn v Manila Hotel Grand Boulevard v Genuine Labor Organization Under Art. 263, the requisites for a valid strike are as follows: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE thirty days before the intended date thereof or fifteen days in case of ULP; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. The requisite seven-day period is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the approval of the majority of the union members. The notice of strike and the cooling-off period were intended to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. The requirements are mandatory and failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. A strike simultaneously with or immediately after a notice of strike will render the requisite periods nugatory. Moreover, a strike that is undertaken, despite the issuance by the SOLE of an assumption or certification order, becomes a prohibited activity and, thus, illegal pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. As this Court ruled in Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., under Article 264(a) of the said code, once an assumption certification order is issued by the SOLE, strikes are enjoined or if one has already taken place, all strikers shall immediately return to work: The respondents claim of good faith is not a valid excuse to dispense with the procedural steps for a lawful strike. Toyota Motors v NLRC Sarmiento v Tuico The law itself provides that "such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout." It must be stressed that while one purpose of the return-to-work order is to protect the workers who might otherwise be locked out by the employer for threatening or waging the strike, the more important reason is to prevent impairment of the national interest in case the operations of the company are disrupted by a refusal of the strikers to return to work as directed. In the instant case, stoppage of work in the firm will be hurtful not only to both the employer and the employees. More particularly, it is the national economy that will suffer because of the resultant reduction in our export earnings and our dollar

reserves, not to mention possible cancellation of the contracts of the company with foreign importers. It was particularly for the purpose of avoiding such a development that the labor dispute was certified to the NLRC, with the return-to-work order following as a matter of course under the law. It is also important to emphasize that the return-towork order not so much confers a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the worker's will. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest. That is the real reason such return can be compelled. Not a violation of right against involuntary servitude So imperative is the order in fact that it is not even considered violative of the right against involuntary servitude, as this Court held in Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills. The worker can of course give up his work, thus severing his ties with the company, if he does not want to obey the order; but the order must be obeyed if he wants to retain his work even if his inclination is to strike. If the worker refuses to obey the return-to-work order, can it be said that he is just suspending the enjoyment of a right and he is entitled to assert it later as and when he sees fit? In the meantime, is the management required to keep his position open, unable to employ replacement to perform the work the reluctant striker is unwilling to resume because he is still manning the picket lines? While the ATC has manifested its willingness to accept most of the workers, and has in fact already done so, it has balked at the demand of the remaining workers to be also allowed to return to work. Its reason is that these persons, instead of complying with the return-to-work order, as most of the workers have done, insisted on staging the restrained strike and defiantly picketed the company premises to prevent the resumption of operations. By so doing, the ATC submits, these strikers have forfeited their right to be readmitted, having abandoned their positions, and so could be validly replaced. One other point that must be underscored is that the return-to-work order is issued pending the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to say that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if the strike is illegal, for the purpose precisely is to maintain the status quo while the determination is being made. Otherwise, the workers who contend that their strike is legal can refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill. Worse, they will also claim payment for work not done, on the ground that they are still legally employed although actually engaged in activities inimical to their employer's interest.

Accordingly, the Court holds that the return-to-work order should benefit only those workers who complied therewith and, regardless of the outcome of the compulsory arbitration proceedings, are entitled to be paid for work they have actually performed. Conversely, those workers who refused to obey the said order and instead waged the restrained strike are not entitled to be paid for work not done or to reinstatement to the positions they have abandoned by their refusal to return thereto as ordered. Telefunken v CA It is clear from Art. 263 that the moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another order directing them to return to work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a returnto-work order, even if the directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order. However, petitioners refused to acknowledge this directive of the Secretary of Labor on September 8, 1995 thereby necessitating the issuance of another order expressly directing the striking workers to cease and desist from their actual strike, and to immediately return to work but which directive the herein petitioners opted to ignore. In this connection, Article 264(a) of the Labor Code clearly provides that: Article 264. Prohibited Activities. (a) x x x No strike or lock out shall be declared after the assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. The rationale of this prohibition is that once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by the competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike. We have held in a number of cases that defiance to the assumption and returnto-work orders of the Secretary of Labor after he has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground for loss of the employment status of any striking union officer or member.

Having thus resolved the threshold issue as hereinabove discussed, it necessarily follows that the strike of the Union cannot be viewed as anything but illegal for having been staged in open and knowing defiance of the assumption and return-to-work orders. The necessary consequence thereof are also detailed by the Supreme Court in its various rulings. In Marcopper Mining Corp. v. Brillantes (254 SCRA 595), the High Tribunal stated in no uncertain terms that by staging a strike after the assumption of jurisdiction or certification for arbitration, workers forfeited their right to; be readmitted to work, having abandoned their employment, and so could be validly replaced. Trans Asia Shipping v CA A cursory reading of the above provision shows that when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest or certifies the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. Moreover, if one had already taken place, all striking workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The powers granted to the Secretary of Labor under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State, with the aim of promoting public good: When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted great breadth of discretion in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or the lifting thereof if one has already taken place. Assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute, or as in this case the certification of the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, always co-exists with an order for workers to return to work immediately and for employers to readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. That respondents business is of national interest is not disputed. It is engaged in coastwise shipping services for the transportation of passengers and cargoes. The direct intervention of this Office becomes imperative on account of the magnitude of the adverse effect of any work stoppage at the Company to the regional and national economy. Under the present state of things, the exercise of this Offices power as embodied under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, is warranted. The maritime industry is indubitably imbued with national interest. Under the circumstances, the Labor Secretary correctly intervened in the labor dispute between the parties to this case by certifying the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Union of Filipino Employees v. Nestle Philippines (1990) The assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor over labor disputes causing or likely to cause a

strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest is in the nature of a POLICE POWER measure. It cannot be denied that the private respondent is engaged in an undertaking affected with public interest being one of the largest manufacturers of food products. The compelling consideration of the Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction is the fact that a prolonged strike or lockout is inimical to the national economy and thus, the need to implement some measures to suppress any act which will hinder the company's essential productions is indispensable for the promotion of the COMMON GOOD. Under this situation, the Secretary's certification order for compulsory arbitration which was intended for the immediate formulation of an already delayed CBA was proper. Corollary, the NLRC was thereby charged with the task of implementing the certification order for compulsory arbitration. As the implementing body, its authority did not include the power to amend the Secretary's order. For the same reason, We rule that the prayer to declare the respondent company guilty of acts of unfair labor practice when it allegedly resorted to practices designed to delay the collective bargaining negotiations cannot be subsumed in this petition, it being beyond the scope of the certification order. Petitioner argues that because of the public respondent's actuation in this regard, it committed grave abuse of discretion as it allowed multiplicity of suits and splitting causes of action which are barred by procedural rule. What is compulsory arbitration? "When the consent of one of the parties is enforced by statutory provisions, the proceeding is referred to as compulsory arbitration In labor cases, compulsory arbitration is the process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties. When sitting in a compulsory arbitration certified to by the Secretary of Labor, the NLRC is not sitting as a judicial court but as an administrative body charged with the duty to implement the order of the Secretary. In this case, Its function only is to formulate the terms and conditions of the CBA and cannot go beyond the scope of the order. Moreover, the Commission is further tasked to act within the earliest time possible and with the end in view that its action would not only serve the interests of the parties alone, but would also have favorable implications to the community and to the economy as a whole. In view of the avowed but limited purpose of respondent's assumption of jurisdiction over this compulsory arbitration case, it cannot be faulted in not taking cognizance of other matters that would defeat this purpose. Philcom Union v Phil Global Comm

FACTS -Upon the expiration of the CBA between petitioner Philcom union (PEU) and respondent employer (Philcom, Inc.), the parties started negotiations for its renewal. While negotiations were ongoing, PEU filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) NCR, a Notice of Strike, due to perceived unfair labor practice committed by the company. In view of the filing of said Notice of Strike, the company suspended negotiations on the CBA. This moved the union to file another Notice of Strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock. -At a conciliation conference held at the NCMB-NCR office, the parties agreed to consolidate the two Notices of Strike filed by the union and to maintain the status quo during the pendency of the proceedings. However, while the union and the company officers and representatives were meeting, the remaining union officers and members staged a strike at the company premises, barricading the entrances and egresses thereof and setting up a stationary picket at the main entrance of the building. The following day, the company immediately filed a petition for the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in accordance with Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. -Then Acting Labor Sec Cresenciano Trajano issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the dispute, enjoining any strike or lockout, whether threatened or actual, directing the parties to cease and desist from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation, directing the striking workers to return to work within 24hours from receipt of the Secretarys Order and for management to resume normal operations, as well as accept the workers back under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. The parties were likewise required to submit their respective position papers and evidence within 10days from receipt of said order. A few days later, a second order was issued reiterating the previous directive to all striking employees to return to work immediately. -The union filed MFR assailing, among others, the authority of then Acting Secretary Trajano to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Said motion was denied and as directed, the parties submitted their respective position papers. In its position paper, the union raised the issue of the alleged ULP of the company. The company, on the other hand, raised in its position paper the sole issue of the illegality of the strike staged by the union. -On the premise that the Labor Secretary cannot rule on the issue of the strike since there was no petition to declare the same illegal, petitioner union filed a Manifestation/ Motion to Strike Out Portions of & Attachments in Philcoms Position Paper for being irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent to the issues assumed for resolution. In opposition, the company argued that it was precisely due to the strike suddenly staged by the union that the dispute was assumed by the Labor Secretary. Hence, the case would necessarily include the issue of the legality of the strike. -The Secretary issued the first assailed order. Said order directed the issuance of summons to Philcom Corporation to appear before any hearing that may thereafter be scheduled and to submit its position paper as may be required. It however dismissed the unions charges of ULP against the Company. It

further issued a return-to-work order and directed the parties to cease and desist from committing any acts that may aggravate the situation. - Philcom filed MFR and Motion to Certify Labor Dispute to the NLRC for Compulsory Arbitration. PEU also filed MFR insofar as the Order dismissed the ULP charges against Philcom and included the illegal strike issue in the labor dispute. The Secretary denied both MFRs. -PEU filed with CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65. CA denied the petition and affirmed the orders of the DOLE Sec. Hence, this petition. ISSUES 1. WON CA erred when it affirmed the order/resolution of the DOLE Sec including the issue of illegal strike notwithstanding the absence of any petition to declare the strike illegal. 2. WON CA erred when it affirmed the order/resolution of the Secretary of Labor dismissing the Unions charges of unfair labor practices. 3. WON CA erred when it failed to issue such order mandating/directing the issuance of a writ of execution directing the Company to unconditionally accept back to work the Union officers and members under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike and as well as to pay their salaries/backwages and the monetary equivalent of their other benefits. HELD 1. NO. The Secretary properly took cognizance of the issue on the legality of the strike. Since the very reason of the Secretarys assumption of jurisdiction was PEUs declaration of the strike, any issue regarding the strike is not merely incidental to, but is essentially involved in, the labor dispute itself. -The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an exercise of the police power of the State, with the aim of promoting public good. When the Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted "great breadth of discretion" in order to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place. In this case, the Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute because it falls in an industry indispensable to the national interest: the telecommunications industry. -The authority of the Secretary to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising from such labor dispute. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the dispute. Besides, it was upon Philcoms petition that the Secretary immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Moreover, a careful study of all the facts alleged, issues raised, and arguments presented in the position paper leads us to hold that the portions PEU seek to expunge are necessary in the resolution of the present case. 2. NO. -Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the workers right to selforganization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, no matter how unfair, are not unfair labor practices. The only exception is Article 248(f), which in any case is not one of the

acts specified in PEUs charge of unfair labor practice. -A review of the acts complained of as ULP of Philcom convinces us that they do not fall under any of the prohibited acts defined and enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code. The issues of misimplementation or non-implementation of employee benefits, non-payment of overtime and other monetary claims, inadequate transportation allowance, water, and other facilities, are all a matter of implementation or interpretation of the economic provisions of the CBA between Philcom and PEU subject to the grievance procedure. All the charges were adequately rebutted by the employer. -The Court has always respected a companys exercise of its prerogative to devise means to improve its operations. Management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, supervision and transfer of employees, working methods, time, place and manner of work. This is so because the law on ULP is not intended to deprive employers of their fundamental right to prescribe and enforce such rules as they honestly believe to be necessary to the proper, productive and profitable operation of their business. -Even assuming arguendo that Philcom had violated some provisions in the CBA, there was no showing that the same was a flagrant or malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions. The law mandates that such violations should not be treated as unfair labor practices. 3. NO. -SC ruled on the legality of the strike if only to put an end to this protracted labor dispute. The facts necessary to resolve the legality of the strike are not in dispute. The strike and the strike activities that PEU had undertaken were patently illegal for the following reasons: 1. Philcom is engaged in a vital industry protected by PD 823, as amended by PD 849, from strikes and lockouts. It is therefore clear that the striking employees violated the no-strike policy of the State in regard to vital industries. 2. The Secretary had already assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. Despite the issuance of the return-to-work orders, the striking employees failed to return to work and continued with their strike. -A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived. While the workers may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their employer. see Art.264 of the Labor Code. -A strike undertaken despite the Secretarys issuance of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity, and thus, illegal, under Article 264(a) of the Labor Code. The union officers who knowingly participate in the illegal strike are deemed to have lost their employment status. The union members, including union officers, who commit specific illegal acts or who knowingly defy a return-towork order are also deemed to have lost their employment status. Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to

discharge and preventing management to fill up their positions. 3. PEU staged the strike using unlawful means and methods. -e.g., human barricades at all entrances to and egresses from the company premises; use of coercive methods to prevent company officials and other personnel from leaving the company premises; prohibiting other tenants at the Philcom building from entering and leaving the premises. see Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code. -The sanction provided in Article 264(a) is so severe that any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. By insisting on staging the prohibited strike and defiantly picketing Philcoms premises to prevent the resumption of company operations, the striking employees have forfeited their right to be readmitted. 4. PEU declared the strike during the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings at the NCMB. -see Art264(a), LC. Section 6, Book V, Rule XXII of the IRR: During the proceedings, the parties shall not do any act which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of dispute. They are obliged, as part of their duty, to bargain collectively in good faith, to participate fully and promptly in the conciliation meetings called by the regional branch of the Board. 5. PEU staged the strike in utter disregard of the grievance procedure established in the CBA. -PEU should have immediately resorted to the grievance machinery provided for in the CBA. In disregarding this procedure, the union leaders who knowingly participated in the strike have acted unreasonably. The law cannot interpose its hand to protect them from the consequences of their illegal acts. -A strike declared on the basis of grievances which have not been submitted to the grievance committee as stipulated in the CBA of the parties is premature and illegal. Having held the strike illegal and having found that PEUs officers and members have committed illegal acts during the strike, we hold that no writ of execution should issue for the return to work of PEU officers who participated in the illegal strike, and PEU members who committed illegal acts or who defied the return-to-work orders that the Secretary issued. The issue of who participated in the illegal strike, committed illegal acts, or defied the return-to-work orders is a question of fact that must be resolved in the appropriate proceedings before the Secretary of Labor. Disposition Petition dismissed. CA decision affirmed with the modification that the DOLE Sec is directed to determine who among the PEU officers participated in the illegal strike, and who among the union members committed illegal acts or defied the returnto-work orders. Nissan Motor FACTS - The labor dispute was triggered by a collective bargaining deadlock between Nissan Motor and the Union resulting in the filing of four notices of strike with the NCMB.

- DOLE issued an Order consolidating the 4th notice of strike with the first three (3) notices and reiterating the injunction contained in the assumption of jurisdiction - The Company filed a Motion to Deputize PNP Laguna to Secure, Maintain and Preserve Free Ingress and Egress of NMPI, alleging that despite the injunctions against any slowdown and strike, the Union went on actual strike, picketed and blocked the company offices, and plant premises; unlawfully blocked and obstructed all entrances and exits points. - The Secretary of Labor issued an Order deputizing the [PNP] - DOLE issued the assailed Decision which affirmed the suspension of the 140 employees which is the subject of the first notice of strike and sustained the dismissal of the Union officers but recalled the dismissal of the Union members and reinstated to their former positions without back wages. It also directed BANAL-NMPI-OLALIA-KMU and Nissan Motor Philippines, Inc. to conclude a Collective Bargaining Agreement - The Company and the Union each sought partial reconsideration, but their corresponding motions were denied - Therefrom, both the Company and the Union went to the CA - The CA, denied the parties separate petitions and affirmed the respondents resolution ISSUES 1. WON the CA acted within the bounds of the law when it spared the striking workers or union members from the penalty of dismissal. 2. WON the award of salary increases made by SOLE in the disposition of economic aspects of the CBA which was based on revelations sourced from the confidential position given to the NCMB Administrator is proper. HELD 1. YES. - The Union engaged in work slowdown which under the circumstances in which they were undertaken constitutes illegal strike. The Company is therefore right in dismissing the subject Union officers in accordance with Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, for participating in illegal strike in defiance of the assumption of jurisdiction order by the Labor Secretary. - While the employer is authorized to declare a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment, his/its option is not as wide with respect to union members or workers for the law itself draws a line and makes a distinction between union officers and members/ordinary workers. An ordinary striking worker or union member cannot, as a rule, be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike; there must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike. - The law invests the Secretary of Labor and Employment the prerogative of tempering the consequence of the defiance to the assumption order. The Secretary may thus merely suspend rather than dismiss the employee involved. - Chief, Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Solvic Industrial Corporation vs. NLRC: Except for the most serious causes affecting the business of the employer, our labor laws frown upon dismissal. Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, an employee should not be sanctioned with a consequence so severe.

- This disposition takes stock of the following circumstances justifying a less drastic penalty for ordinary striking workers: a) the employees who engaged in slowdown actually reported for work and continued to occupy their respective posts, or, in fine, did not abandon their jobs; b) they were only following orders of their leaders; and c) no evidence has been presented to prove their participation in the commission of illegal activities during the strike. - Not to be overlooked is a factor which the CA, regarded as justifying the leniency assumed by the public respondent Secretary towards the members of the Union. It is the fact that Nissan Motor appeared to have also exacerbated, the emerging volatile atmosphere among which is the en masse termination of most of the Union members. - Any worker who participates in a strike or otherwise engages in any prohibited act in defiance of the assumption order may be meted the penalty of loss of employment status. However, the law itself authorizes the graduation of penalties, Article 264 of the Labor Code making, as it were, a distinction between union officers and its members or any other workers, the main differing line contextually being that the latter do not necessarily lose their job by mere participation in an illegal strike absent proof that they committed illegal acts. - Association of Independent Union in the Philippines vs. NLRC: the responsibility of union officers, as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than that of the members and, therefore, limiting the penalty of dismissal only for the former for participation in an illegal strike is in order. 2. NO. - The disposition made by the public respondent Secretary relating to the economic aspects of the CBA, such as, but not limited, transportation allowance, 14th month pay, seniority pay, separation pay and the effectivity of the new CBA, appears to be proper. - However, there is a need to modify some of the awards among which is the annual salary increases. In this regard, the Court cannot sanction the award made by the public respondent Secretary based ostensibly on the revelation of NCMB Administrator Olalia that was sourced from the confidential position given him by the Company. The reason for this is simple. Article 233 of the Labor Code prohibits the use in evidence of confidential information given during conciliation proceedings. NCMB Administrator Olalia clearly breached this provision of law. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Company, this confidential information given to Administrator Olalia was made prior to the Unions slowdown and defiance of the Assumption Order of August 22, 2001 causing it additional losses. Disposition Decision and Resolution of the CA AFFIRMED , with modifications Manila Electric Co. V. Quisumbing (2000) A line must be drawn between management prerogatives regarding business operations per se and those which affect the rights of employees, and in treating the latter, the employer should see to it that its employees are at least properly informed of its decision or modes of action in order to attain a harmonious labor-management relationship and enlighten the workers concerning their rights.

Contracting out of services is an exercise of business judgment or management prerogative. Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer. LMG PAL v Airline Pilots Telefunken Supra Interphil Laboratories Union v. Interphil Laboratories (2001) On the matter of the authority and jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment to rule on the illegal strike committed by petitioner union, it is undisputed that the petition to declare the strike illegal before Labor Arbiter was filed long before the Secretary of Labor issued the assumption order on 14 February 1994. However, it cannot be denied that the issues of "overtime boycott" and "work slowdown" amounting to illegal strike before Labor Arbiter are intertwined with the labor dispute before the Labor Secretary. In fact, petitioner union even asked Labor Arbiter to suspend the proceedings before him and consolidate the same with the case before the Secretary of Labor. When Acting Labor Secretary Brillantes ordered Labor Arbiter Caday to continue with the hearing of the illegal strike case, the parties acceded and participated in the proceedings, knowing fully well that there was also a directive for Labor Arbiter Caday to thereafter submit his report and recommendation to the Secretary. As the appellate court pointed out, the subsequent participation of petitioner union in the continuation of the hearing was in effect an affirmation of the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor. The appellate court also correctly held that the question of the Secretary of Labors jurisdiction over labor and labor-related disputes was already settled in International Pharmaceutical, Inc. vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor and ALU where the Court declared: In the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. Petitioner union maintained that the Labor Arbiter and the appellate court disregarded the "parol evidence rule" when they upheld the allegation of respondent company that the work schedule of its employees was from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. and from 6 pm to 6 am.

The reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. In labor cases pending before the Commission or the Labor Arbiter, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling. Rules of procedure and evidence are not applied in a very rigid and technical sense in labor cases. Hence, the Labor Arbiter is not precluded from accepting and evaluating evidence other than, and even contrary to, what is stated in the CBA.

the latter enacted into law R.A. 6715, otherwise known as Herrera law, Section 27 of which amended paragraphs (g) and (l) of Article 263 of the Labor Code. At any rate, it must be noted that Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code have been enacted pursuant to the police power of the State, which has been defined as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society (People vs. Vera Reyes, 67 Phil. 190). Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code does not violate the workers constitutional right to strike. The foregoing article clearly does not interfere with the workers right to strike but merely regulates it, when in the exercise of such right, national interests will be affected. The rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute. They are still subject to control and limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. The interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue preference. The Secretary of Labor acts to maintain industrial peace. Thus, his certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to impede the workers right to strike but to obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute. We do not agree with the petitioners that the respondent company is not indispensable to national interest considering that the tire industry has already been liberalized. Philtread supplies 22% of the tire products in the country. Moreover, it employs about 700 people. As observed by the Secretary of Labor, viz.: The Company is one of the tire manufacturers in the country employing more or less 700 workers. Any work disruption thereat, as a result of a labor dispute will certainly prejudice the employment and livelihood of its workers and their dependents. Furthermore, the labor dispute may lead to the possible closure of the Company and loss of employment to hundreds of its workers. This will definitely aggravate the already worsening unemployment situation in the country and discourage foreign and domestic investors from further investing in the country. There is no doubt, therefore, that the labor dispute in the Country is imbued with national interest. At this point in time when all government efforts are geared towards economic recovery and development by encouraging both foreign and domestic investments to generate employment, we cannot afford to derail the same as a result of a labor dispute considering that there are alternative dispute resolution machineries available to address labor problems of this nature.

Philtread Workers Union v. Confessor (1997) Petitioners contend that Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code violates the workers right to strike which is provided for by Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution. The assailed order of the Secretary of Labor, which enjoins the strike, is an utter interference of the workers right to self-organization, to manage their own affairs, activities and programs, and therefore is illegal. The order is likewise contrary to Article 3 of the International Labor Organization Convention No. 87, which specifically prohibits public authorities from interfering in purely union matters, viz.: Article 3. 1. Workers and Employers organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organize their administration and activities and to formulate their programs. 2. The public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof. A cursory reading of Article 263 (g) allegedly shows that the power of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction or to certify a dispute for compulsory arbitration is strictly restricted to cases involving industries that are indispensable to national interest. Petitioners posit that the instant labor dispute does not adversely affect the national interest. The tire industry has long ceased to be a government protected industry and, moreover, Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation is not indispensable to the national interest. The strike in Philtread will not adversely affect the supply of tires in the market and the supply of imported tires is more than sufficient to meet the market requirements. Held: The petition is devoid of merit. On the issue of the constitutionality of Article 263 (g), the same had already been resolved in Union of Filipino Employees vs. Nestle Philippines, Inc., to wit: In the case at bar, no law has ever been passed by Congress expressly repealing Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code. Neither may the 1987 Constitution be considered to have impliedly repealed the said Articles considering that there is no showing that said articles are inconsistent with the said Constitution. Moreover, no court has ever declared that the said articles are inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution. On the contrary, the continued validity and operation of Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code has been recognized by no less than the Congress of the Philippines when

Luzon Development Bank v. Assoc of Luzon Devt Employees (1995) In the Philippine context, the parties to a CBA are required to include therein provisions for a machinery for the resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA or company personnel policies. For this purpose, parties to a CBA shall name and designate therein a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, or include a procedure for their selection, preferably from those accredited by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive original jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators over (1) the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and (2) the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Article 262 authorizes them, but only upon agreement of the parties, to exercise jurisdiction over other labor disputes. On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code has jurisdiction over the following enumerated cases: "x x x- (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: 1. Unfair labor practice cases; 2. Termination disputes; 3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations; 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts, 6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. It will thus be noted that the Jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC for that matter. The state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "the award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties," while the "decision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from

receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders." Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator. Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is, more often than not, elevated to the Supreme Court itself on a petition for certiorari, in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the Court of Appeals. In the view of the Court, this is illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.

In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC et al. on the settled premise that the judgments of courts and awards of quasijudicial agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court.

In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., this Court ruled that "a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity." Under these rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter. Sec. 9 of BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise: (B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or commission, still both he and the panel are comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial instrumentality." It may even be stated that it was to meet the very situation presented by the quasi judicial functions of the voluntary arbitrators here, as well as the subsequent arbitrator/arbitral tribunal operating under the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, that the broader term "Instrumentalities" was purposely included in the above-quoted provision. An "Instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. Thus, the terms governmental "agency" or instrumentality" are synonymous in the sense that either of

them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain government act or function is performed. The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term instrumentality" in Sec. 9 of BP 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in tle Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein. o It will be noted that, although the Employees Compensation Commission is also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-9 1, which is the forerunner of the present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions to the Court of Appeals under the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasijudicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein. This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities18 not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or another statute. Nor will it run counter to the legislative intendment that decisions of the NLRC be reviewable directly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases within the adjudicative competence of the voluntary arbitrator are excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC or the labor arbiter. In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial Court for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction, A party to the controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected.19 In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of Appeals must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. As a matter of policy, this Court shall

henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition Manila Central Line Corp. v. Manila Central Line Free Workers Union (1998) Facts: This case arose out of a collective bargaining deadlock between petitioner and private respondent union. The parties CBA had expired on March 15, 1989. As the parties failed to reach new agreement, private respondent sought the aid of the NCMB on October 30, 1989, but the deadlock remained unresolved. On February 9, 1990, private respondent filed a Petition for Compulsory Arbitration in the Arbitration Branch for the National Capital Region of the National Labor Relations Commission. A. On September 28, 1990, the labor arbiter rendered a decision embodying provisions for a new CBA. Petitioner also contends that in ordering a new CBA to be effective on March 15, 1989, the expiry date of the old CBA, the labor arbiter acted contrary to Art. 253-A of the Labor Code. Held: Art. 253-A refers to CBAs entered into by the parties as a result of their mutual agreement. The CBA in this case, on the other hand, is part of an arbitral award. As such, it may be made retroactive to the date of expiration of the previous agreement. Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity thereof. Indeed, petitioner has not shown that the question of effectivity was not included in the general agreement of the parties to submit their dispute for arbitration. To the contrary, as to the order of the labor arbiter states, this question was among those submitted for arbitration by the parties: Eternit San Mig Food Manila Central Line Supra Lantex Arellano Del Monte Sanyo Phil. Workers Union v. Canizares (1992) In the instant case, however, We hold that the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in the CBA has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaints of the private respondents. While it appears that the dismissal of the private respondents was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security clause provided in the CBA, We are of the opinion that these facts do not come within the phrase "grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of CBA and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies," the jurisdiction of which pertains to the Grievance Machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.

It need not be mentioned that the parties to a CBA are the union and the company. Hence, only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators. In the instant case, both the union and the company are united or have come to an agreement regarding the dismissal of private respondents. No grievance between them exists which could be brought to a grievance machinery. The problem or dispute in the present case is between the union and the company on the one hand and some union and non-union members who were dismissed, on the other hand. The dispute has to be settled before an impartial body. The grievance machinery with members designated by the union and the company cannot be expected to be impartial against the dismissed employees. Due process demands that the dismissed workers grievances be ventilated before an impartial body. Since there has already been an actual termination, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Viviero v. Court of appeals (2000) Private respondents attempt to justify the conferment of jurisdiction over the case on the Voluntary Arbitrator on the ground that the issue involves the proper interpretation and implementation of the Grievance Procedure found in the CBA. They point out that when petitioner sought the assistance of his Union to avail of the grievance machinery, he in effect submitted himself to the procedure set forth in the CBA regarding submission of unresolved grievances to a Voluntary Arbitrator. Held: The argument is untenable. The case is primarily a termination dispute. It is clear from the claim/assistance request form submitted by petitioner to AMOSUP that he was challenging the legality of his dismissal for lack of cause and lack of due process. The issue of whether there was proper interpretation and implementation of the CBA provisions comes into play only because the grievance procedure provided for in the CBA was not observed after he sought his Unions assistance in contesting his termination. Thus, the question to be resolved necessarily springs from the primary issue of whether there was a valid termination; without this, then there would be no reason to invoke the need to interpret and implement the CBA provisions properly. In San Miguel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission this Court held that the phrase "all other labor disputes" may include termination disputes provided that the agreement between the Union and the Company states "in unequivocal language that [the parties] conform to the submission of termination disputes and unfair labor practices to voluntary arbitration."

Ergo, it is not sufficient to merely say that parties to the CBA agree on the principle that "all disputes" should first be submitted to a Voluntary Arbitrator. There is a need for an express stipulation in the CBA that illegal termination disputes should be resolved by a Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, since the same fall within a special class of disputes that are generally within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters by express provision of law. Absent such express stipulation, the phrase "all disputes" should be construed as limited to the areas of conflict traditionally within the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators, i.e., disputes relating to contract-interpretation, contract-implementation, or interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Illegal termination disputes - not falling within any of these categories should then be considered as a special area of interest governed by a specific provision of law.

San jose Ludo and Luym Corp v. Saornido (2003) Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely erred when it upheld the award of benefits which were beyond the terms of submission agreement. Petitioner asserts that the arbitrator must confine its adjudication to those issues submitted by the parties for arbitration, which in this case is the sole issue of the date of regularization of the workers. Hence, the award of benefits by the arbitrator was done in excess of jurisdiction. On the matter of the benefits, respondents argue that the arbitrator is empowered to award the assailed benefits because notwithstanding the sole issue of the date of regularization, standard companion issues on reliefs and remedies are deemed incorporated. Otherwise, the whole arbitration process would be rendered purely academic and the law creating it inutile. The jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and Labor Arbiters is clearly defined and specifically delineated in the Labor Code. The pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, read: Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. --- (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: 1. Unfair labor practice cases: 2. Termination disputes; 3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wage, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employeremployee relations; xxx

Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks. In construing the above provisions, we held in San Jose vs. NLRC, that the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators over the cases enumerated in the Labor Code, Articles 217, 261 and 262, can possibly include money claims in one form or another. Comparatively, in Reformist Union of R.B. Liner, Inc. vs. NLRC, compulsory arbitration has been defined both as the process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties, and as a mode of arbitration where the parties are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party . While a voluntary arbitrator is not part of the governmental unit or labor departments personnel, said arbitrator renders arbitration services provided for under labor laws. Generally, the arbitrator is expected to decide only those questions expressly delineated by the submission agreement. Nevertheless, the arbitrator can assume that he has the necessary power to make a final settlement since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes. In one case, the SC stressed that xxx the Voluntary Arbitrator had plenary jurisdiction and authority to interpret the agreement to arbitrate and to determine the scope of his own authority subject only, in a proper case, to the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. The Arbitrator, as already indicated, viewed his authority as embracing not merely the determination of the abstract question of whether or not a performance bonus was to be granted but also, in the affirmative case, the amount thereof.

By the same token, the issue of regularization should be viewed as two-tiered issue. While the submission agreement mentioned only the determination of the date or regularization, law and jurisprudence give the voluntary arbitrator enough leeway of authority as well as adequate prerogative to accomplish the reason for which the law on voluntary arbitration was created speedy labor justice. It bears stressing that the underlying reason why this case arose is to settle, once and for all, the ultimate question of whether respondent employees are entitled to higher benefits. To require them to file another action for payment of such benefits would certainly undermine labor proceedings and contravene the constitutional mandate providing full protection to labor. Apalisok Leyte Continental Marble Luzon Supra Nippon Paint Employees Union v. CA (2004) In the case of Luzon Development Bank vs. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, this Court ruled that a voluntary arbitrator partakes of the nature of a quasi-judicial instrumentality and is within the ambit of Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended, which provides: (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. As such, the decisions of a voluntary arbitrator fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Indeed, this Court took this decision into consideration in approving the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the pertinent provision of which states as follows: SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic

Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. It is elementary in remedial law that the use of an erroneous mode of appeal is cause for dismissal of the petition for certiorari and it has been repeatedly stressed that a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. This is due to the nature of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari which lies only where there is no appeal, and no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As previously ruled by this Court: x x x We have time and again reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when "there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Certiorari can not be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. The fact that the NPEU used the Rule 65 modality as a substitute for a lost appeal is made plainly manifest by: a) its filing the said petition 45 days after the expiration of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a Rule 43 appeal; and b) its petition which makes specious allegations of grave abuse of discretion but asserts the failure of the voluntary arbitrator to properly appreciate facts and conclusions of law. This salutary rule has been disregarded on occasion by this Court in instances where valid and compelling circumstances warrant. However, NPEU has not provided this Court any compelling reason why it must disregard the mandate of the Rules of Court. United Kimberly Clark Lepanto Eternit Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services v. Abrquez (93) A CBA as used in Art. 252 of the Labor Code, refers to a contract executed upon request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment, including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement. While the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law between the parties, it is not, however, an ordinary contract to which is applied the principles of law governing ordinary contracts. A CBA, as a labor contract within the contemplation of Article 1700 Civil Code which governs the relations between labor and capital, is not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest, thus, it must yield to the common good. As such, it must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve.

Citibank Employees Union v. MOLE (1980) The position of respondent Minister is that assuming the final and executory character of the award in question, the same could still be modified or set aside, as contended by the Solicitor General in his comment dated August 6, 1979, in consequence or by reason of the supervening acts of respondent Minister, citing, in support of such contention, the cases of Ocampo vs. Sanchez, in which the SCruled that "when after judgment has been rendered and the latter has become final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust; the interested party may ask to modify or later judgment to harmonize the same with justice and the facts Held: After mature deliberation, We have arrived at the conclusion that the respondent's position is not well taken. The situation before Us in the instant case has no parity with those obtaining in the instances where this Court sanctioned departure from the terms of a final and executory judgment by reason of supervening events that would make literal execution in whole or in part of such judgment unjust and inequitable. It should be clear to anyone conversant with the elementary principles of collective bargaining and the constitutional injunction assuring the rights of workers thereto (Sec. 9, Article II, Constitution of the Philippines) that the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement constitute the sacred law between the parties as long as they do not contravene public order, interest or policy. We might say that the prohibition in the Constitution's Bill of Rights against the passage or promulgation of any law impairing the obligation of contracts applies with perhaps greater force to collective bargaining agreements, considering that these deal with the rights and interests of labor to which the charter explicitly affords protection. (Sec. 9. Article 11.) The award of the arbitrator in this case is not to be equated with a judicial decision. In effect, when in relation to a controversy as to working conditions, which necessarily include the amount of wages, allowances, bonuses, overtime pay, holiday pay, etc., the parties submit their differences to arbitration, they do not seek any judicial pronouncement technically as such: they are merely asking the arbitrator to fix for them what would be the fair and just condition or term regarding the matter in dispute that should govern further collective bargaining relations between them.

Stated differently, the arbitrator's award when stipulated by the parties to be conclusive becomes part and parcel of the CBA. Viewed in this sense, which We are fully convinced is most consistent with the principles of collective bargaining, the subsequent or supervening facts referred to by the Solicitor General consisting of acts of none other than the respondent Minister may not be invoked to alter, modify, reform, much less abrogate, the new terms, so to speak, of the collective bargaining inserted by virtue of the award of the arbitrator. To

do otherwise would violate the prescription of the Constitution against impairment of the obligation of contracts. We hold that regardless of any law anterior or posterior to the Arbitrator's award, the collective bargaining agreement in this case has been correspondingly amended in a manner that is unalterable, immovable and immutable like the rock of Gibraltar, during the lifetime of the said collective bargaining agreement. Volkschel Labor Union vs BLR (1985) HELD: Right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother union is well-settled. A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the interest of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate when circumstances warrant. This right is consitent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. Valid reason for disaffiliation: The disaffiliation was not due to any opportunists motives but rather it was prompted by the federations deliberate and habitual dereliction of duties. Employees grievances were allegedly left unattended to the detriment of the employees rights and interests. The clear policy is to conjoin workers and worker groups, not to dismember them. Effect of disaffiliaion on right of the federation to receive dues: ALUMETAL is entitled to receive the dues from companies as long as union is affiliated with it and companies are authorized by their employees to deduct union dues. Without said affiliation, the employer has no link to the mother union. The obligation of an employee to pay union dues is coterminous with his affiliation or membership. A contract between an employer and the parent organization as bargaining agent for the employees is terminated by the disaffiliation of the local. Ludo Supra United Kimberly Equitable Mora Indophil Textile Mills Workers Union v. Calica (1992) FACTS: The Indophil Textile Mills Workers Union and Indophil Textile executed a CBA which provided that the CBA shall apply to the companys extensions and expansions. Indophil Acrylic (WHICH IS ANOTHER COMPANY) was formed. Its workers unionized and another CBA was executed. Indophil Textile Mills Workers Union claimed that Acrylic should be considered an extension of Indophil textile and therefore the CBA executed by Indophil textile and the Union should cover Indophil Acrylic. ISSUE: WON the operation in INDOPHIL ACRYLIC are extension or expansion of Indophil Textile Mills. HELD: Indophil ACRYLIC is NOT an extension of INDOPHIL TEXTILE. Thus the CBA of Indophil textile, cannot apply to Indophil Acrylic. 1. The existence of a bonafide business relationship between Acrylic and Indophil Textile is not a 5.

2.

3.

4.

6.

7.

proof of being a single corporate entity because the services which are supposedly provided by Textile to Acrylic are AUXILIARY SERVICES or activities which are NOT ESSENTIAL in the actual production of Acrylic. The essential services are discharged exclusively by Acrylic personnel under the control and supervision of Acrylic managers and supervisors. Diatagon Labor Federation v. Ople GR L-44493-94 (1980) : two corporations cannot be treated as single bargaining units even if their businesses are related. It submits that the fact that there are as many bargaining units as there are companies in a conglomeration of companies is a positive proof that a corporation is endowed with a legal personality DISTINCTLY ITS OWN, independent and separate from other corporations. Unlike Indophil Textile, Indophil Acrylic cannot manufacture textile while Indophil Textile Cannot buy or import yarn. Thus this shows that Indophil Acrylic is not an alter ego or an adjunct or business conduit of Indophil Textile because it has a separate legitimate purpose. Under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, when valid grounds exist, the legal fiction that a corporation is an entity with a juridical personality separate and distinct from another may be disregarded. Doctrine applies when the fiction defeats public convenience,, justifies wrong, protects fraud or defends crime. The fact that the businesses are related, that some of the employees are the same persons working in the other company and the physical plants, offices and facilities are in the same compound arent sufficient to pierce the corporate veil of Acrylic. In Umali vs CA, legal corporate entity is disregarded only if it is sought to hold the officers and stockholders directly liable for a corporate debt or obligation. The union in this case does not seek to impose a claim on the members of Acrylic. Lastly it is grave abuse of discretion to treat 2 companies as a single bargaining unit when these 2 companies are indubitably distinct entities with separate juridical personalities.

PLDT v Montemayor Impreial v sampong

Coca-Cola AMA Samahan Luzon Supra Unicraft Industries Intl v. CA (2001) More specifically, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the award of separation pay in favor of private respondent workers, considering that the respondent court was not in possession of the records and evidence that would support its ruling. It is at once clear from the records that petitioners were not able to present evidence before the Voluntary Arbitrator. This is plainly evident from the Stipulation entered into by the parties and submitted to the Court of Appeals, which pertinently states: b) The case will be referred back to Voluntary Arbitrator Calipay so that petitioners will be granted their day in court to prove their case, the hearing thereat to treat the following issues: (1) Whether or not the complainants mentioned in Exhibit J of the Decision really filed their complaints before the NLRC; (2) Whether or not complainants were dismissed; if so, whether or not their dismissals were valid; (3) Whether or not complainants are entitled to separation pay, money claims, attorneys fees and litigation costs specified in the decision, Annex A of the petition; amd (4) Whether or not Robert Dino, Cristina Dino and Michael Dino can be held liable for the claims of complainants. The foregoing is an acknowledgment by both parties that the proceedings before the Voluntary Arbitrator have not been completed. Despite this, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed resolution ordering the immediate execution of the award of separation pay and attorneys fees. Prior to that, Voluntary Arbitrator Calipay filed a comment contending that he had lost jurisdiction over the case after he rendered judgment. While under the law decisions of voluntary arbitrators are accorded finality, the same may still be subject to review, such as here where there was a violation of petitioners right to due process and to be heard. xxx Inspite of statutory provisions making final the decisions of certain administrative agencies, we have taken cognizance of petitions questioning these decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, violation of due process, denial of substantive justice, or erroneous interpretation of the law where brought to our attention. The right of due process is fundamental in our legal system and we adhere to this principle not for reasons of convenience or merely to comply with technical formalities but because of a strong

conviction that every man must have his day in court. Even the Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings, in Rule VI, Section 6 thereof, explicitly mandates voluntary arbitrators to observe the requirements of procedural due process:

Section 6. Arbitration Hearing. --- In the conduct of hearing, the arbitrator shall provide the parties adequate opportunities to be heard. He shall control the proceedings and see to it that proper decorum is observed. He must render a ruling of the issue/s raised in the course of the proceedings. He must treat all significant aspects of the proceedings as confidential in nature unless confidentiality is waived by the parties.

At this juncture, it may not be amiss to restate our previous reminder to labor tribunals in the weighing of the rights and interest of employers and employees, viz: While the intendment of our laws is to favor the employee, it in no way implies that the employer is not entitled to due process. For a tribunal such as the NLRC to wantonly disregard the employers constitutional right to be heard is a matter that cause great concern to the Court. Such an action can only result in public mistrust of our entire legal system, and we strongly remind the NLRC of their duty to uphold an inspire confidence in the same. It bears stressing that the award of separation pay carries with it the inevitable conclusion that complainants were illegally dismissed. That finding of the Voluntary Arbitrator, however, was premature and null and void for the reasons above-stated. Therefore, there is a need to remand the case to the Voluntary Arbitrator, as originally stipulated by the parties, to allow petitioners to present evidence in their behalf. The Court of Appeals, thus, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the immediate execution of the Voluntary Arbitrators award of separation pay and attorneys fees, notwithstanding that the same was null and void for violation of petitioners right to due process of law.