This article was downloaded by: [University North Carolina - Chapel Hill] On: 31 January 2012, At: 08:57

Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of Contemporary African Studies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjca20

Chinese eyes on Africa: Authoritarian flexibility versus democratic governance

Johan Lagerkvist
a a

Research Fellow, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs,

Available online: 20 May 2009

To cite this article: Johan Lagerkvist (2009): Chinese eyes on Africa: Authoritarian flexibility versus democratic governance, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 27:2, 119-134 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589000902872568

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-andconditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Journal of Contemporary African Studies Vol. 27, No. 2, April 2009, 119134

Chinese eyes on Africa: Authoritarian exibility versus democratic governance

Johan Lagerkvist*

Downloaded by [University North Carolina - Chapel Hill] at 08:57 31 January 2012

Research Fellow, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs This article seeks to shed more light on the consequences of Chinas aid to and trade with African states. It attempts to answer two questions: First, does Chinas no-strings-attached policy in Africa constitute a challenge to Western aid paradigms? Second, is there as an emerging state-sponsored Chinese model of effective governance, guided by a south-south vision of mutuality, equality and reciprocity at work? It is argued that Chinas Africa watchers are cautious, not wanting to project any false hopes into bilateral relationships with African countries. In the light of Chinas reform experience, these analysts propose that indigenous contexts should determine what developmental model to choose. China is unwilling to force its experiences of a market economy with Chinese characteristics upon other nations. The article concludes by arguing that, although not unproblematic, there is reason to be positive about Chinas higher profile in Africa. Keywords: foreign aid; China model; democracy; Chinas Africa watchers; authoritarianism; Sino-African relations

We respect the right of the people of all countries to independently choose their own development path. We will never interfere in the internal affairs of other countries or impose our own will on them.1 Chinas President Hu Jintao

The above statement reflects the continuity of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in officially propounding its stance on sovereignty and non-interference in international relations. It serves to show the continued validity of longstanding principles held by successive generations of Chinese leaders. First, sovereignty is held to be a sacrosanct principle never to be compromised. Second, China will never exert hegemonic influence over other countries, as it has had its own bitter experiences of colonialism. Third, although not a principle consistently advocated by Beijing, the PRC is a developing country that acknowledges that indigenous contexts make it difficult to apply a universal development model. It is the third principle, in combination with Chinas high-speed growth in the last three decades that has turned China into a hard-to-handle spectre haunting the minds of Western development agencies, policymakers, financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, and NGOs. The spectre is that of a rising China, a
*Email: Johan.Lagerkvist@ui.se
ISSN 0258-9001 print/ISSN 1469-9397 online # 2009 The Institute of Social and Economic Research DOI: 10.1080/02589000902872568 http://www.informaworld.com

120

J. Lagerkvist

market-friendly one-party state with a poor human rights record set on a course to deliver the message that authoritarianism works as it alleviates poverty with an all too firm hand. It is with this mindset that Western policymakers and media commentary increasingly view Chinese capital, labour, and goods entering the African continent. In African countries, addressing issues of development aid, good governance, and economic reform has since the fall of the Berlin Wall mainly been conceptualised in terms of Western schools of thought. With the rapid expansion of Chinese influence on the African continent, however, there is also a growing need to understand whether aid and governance with Chinese characteristics are concepts perceived as useful by African bureaucrats and Chinese technocrats alike. Chinese views on development, security and poverty reduction are increasingly important as China continues to integrate strategically with the world economy, especially in the developing world (Eisenman et al. 2007, xvi; Kurlantzick 2007). One of the big issues for international relations in the twenty-first century is whether Chinas economic integration may lead to alignment with international, or perhaps even Western, norms and beliefs. If so, some of the above-mentioned longstanding principles, outlined by the incumbent PRC President, who also heads the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), are bound to evolve into something new even though it is too early to tell what the eventual outcome may amount to. If there has in recent years been an increasing merger between aid and security policy and a structural change in operating with nonstate actors such as NGOs, China is largely exempt from that development, not least because the Chinese Party-state is not used to co-operating with NGOs (Hilsum 2008, 138). The question that this article seeks to shed more light on is whether the no-strings-attached policy guiding the increasing volume of Chinese aid constitutes a challenge to Western aid paradigms, be they packages that are in the old state-centric style, or new ones focusing on NGO-led sustainable development, or ones coming with economic policy conditionalities from the World Bank and the IMF. Is there such a thing as an emerging Chinese model of effective governance, guided by a South-South vision of mutuality, equality and reciprocity at work? A model that contrasts with Western notions of good governance that have, in different ways since the 1980s been incorporated into the Western and therefore by definition also the global discourse on foreign aid? Or is there a dark Chinese hand at play working with unaccountable third world dictators, endorsing bad governance because China fears democratisation per se, as the development economist Paul Collier has argued (2007, 183)? To answer these questions, this article sets out to present how some of Chinas Africa watchers view the continent, how they comprehend Sino-African relations and envisage economic development, foreign aid, and democratisation processes in Africa.2 Although by no means sufficient to give a thorough answer, the views of these scholars help us to narrow down the spectrum of inquiry. Seeing what the Chinese view amounts to is especially pertinent; for in the global discussion on Chinas new and ambitious engagement with Africa, Chinese perspectives have seldom been heard or even sought.3 This article thus attempts to locate and analyse some of these voices in Chinese academia, largely hidden from the non-Chinese-speaking world. They by no means represent the governments position, though at times they echo its statements and analysis on development in third world countries. Arguably there are other important and even more hidden voices such as the CEOs of state-owned companies or banks investing in, for instance, the oil fields of Sudan or the Copper Belt

Downloaded by [University North Carolina - Chapel Hill] at 08:57 31 January 2012

Journal of Contemporary African Studies

121

region of Northern Zambia. These are more influential and better connected to senior decision-makers in the foreign policymaking process than academics are: and they have access to information and time spent in the field, something that most of Chinas academic Africa watchers lack. Nonetheless, what Chinese academics write and say reflects the concern and debate about Chinas growing importance and role in Africa. Chinas new role and foreign aid in Africa The weight of China in international affairs is growing. It is felt almost everywhere through a strong balance of trade and a growing market presence of Chinese goods and services. An ambitious diplomatic effort conducted worldwide, not least in African countries, has recently caught the attention of foreign observers awed by a cunning Chinese soft-power strategy (Kurlantzick, 2007). Indeed, it may seem that active diplomacy is paying off, or rather as Chinese spokespersons in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would have it mutual interest exists. Since the late 1990s, the African continent has attracted much Chinese attention. President Hu Jintao has travelled extensively in Africa since he took office in 2003. In November 2006, the heads of states and leaders of 48 African countries participated in a uniquely large and focused SinoAfrican summit in Beijing. Today, Chinese investment, loans, and foreign aid is growing at a tremendous pace in almost all African countries. China is not the only Asian donor though: Japanese aid diplomacy has been around for decades and is given new impetus in the light of Chinas growing role in African countries (Ampiah 2008). India is also emerging as an important investor and donor country to be reckoned with (Naidu 2008, 125), making use of Indian diaspora networks in eastern and southern Africa. For these Asian states, in their different ways, Africa can be viewed as a screen on which their long-term global ambitions are projected while their economic and energy needs are to be fulfilled for now. This observation follows the arguments made by some pundits who point to the Asian giants as once again turning Africa into a battlefield for yet another scramble for natural resources, in a world witnessing a deepening conflict between democracies and entrenching authoritarian capitalist powers such as Russia and China (Gat 2007). Foreign aid constitutes a means to other ends beyond the goals of poverty alleviation and economic growth. According to the United Nations Millenium Project Report, development aid has the potential to help countries to achieve the UN Millenium Development Goals. Thus, the contributions of emerging new donor countries such as China and India become increasingly important (Manning 2006, 371). In this context it is imperative to assess the arena of international aid provision; how different programmes overlap, complement or contradict each other. The playing field is obviously changing when the emerging donors become more significant sources of financing for developing countries. It is therefore important to analyse the way in which these new donors will change and challenge the established positions of traditional donors. As the Millenium Project Report identifies the current development aid system of the world as suffering from incoherence and being in need of a much more focused approach (United Nations 2006), an already complicated issue may become even more difficult and politicised if aid policies cannot be harmonised between East and West. It is, however, difficult to make comparisons between the aid programmes of existing donors and other emerging donors with Chinas, as its foreign aid is a black

Downloaded by [University North Carolina - Chapel Hill] at 08:57 31 January 2012

122

J. Lagerkvist

box. Chinas state council or government ministries do not disclose how much aid it gives to foreign countries on an annual basis, or to which countries and in what form loans or grants (Davies 2007, 47; Tjonneland 2006, 10). This is not just a problem for outsiders, however. Even Chinese scholars have a hard time figuring out what the aggregate sum of Chinas foreign aid might be. It has been estimated that Chinas foreign aid reached 1.4 billion USD in 2007, and that Chinas aid to Africa may expand to approximately 1 billion USD in 2009 (Brautigam 2008, 210). As for quality or efficiency of aid, one Chinese scholar has stated that only rough evaluations of the benefits of aid are made, and with no systematic methodology (Davies 2007, 64). According to the Chinese sources, in the past 50 years, Chinas provision of foreign aid to Africa has amounted to 44.4 billion yuan RMB and more than nine hundred infrastructural and social projects have been carried out (Zhan 2006, 67). From studying the different levels of effectiveness of Chinese agricultural aid projects in Gambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia, Deborah Brautigam (1998, 3) has pointed out the limited value of viewing aid as merely an element of foreign policy. Instead she argues that domestic politics in both the donor country and aid-receiving countries analysed as a whole can explain how particular projects and programmes are designed and implemented, and why only some are sustained over time. Further, very few on-the-ground empirical and assessment studies exist on Chinese foreign aid as very few researchers have conducted fieldwork in Africa (Brautigam 1998, 5; McCormick 2008, 74). As Chinese assistance, aid, and trade with Africa have exploded since Brautigam wrote her book, and Chinese aid and influence increase, there is a great need to start evaluating the experiences from Chinese assistance not least, the tricky question of how effective it has been. Chinese scholars and officials are often quite proud of Chinas practical approach to aid and African leaders praise of it, which the Chinese say means that Chinese aid has been more effective than that of the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). And some argue that Western aid has become an industry with bureaucratic politics and waste of resources spent on expensive consultants (Davies 2007, 64). According to Penny Davies who has interviewed Chinese government officials and scholars about how they define what aid effectiveness means for China, the common answer was that Chinese aid is effective as it is concrete. The implicit argument was that Chinese aid is providing Africa with concrete things they can use infrastructure such as buildings and roads (Davies 2007, 63) and thus, really helping the poor. Chinese aid was effective, inexpensive, and managed to reach out to poor people on the ground. Arguments such as these are contrasted with expensive, non-efficient aid with limited effect that has come with strings-attached conditionalities from the IMF or the World Bank. In fact there have been occasions when African state leaders visiting Beijing, have ridiculed Western aid for being expensive and largely inefficient.4 The Beijing consensus To say the least, the increasing trade volume between China and Africa has in recent years grown rapidly. By 2007, China ranked as Africas second-highest trading partner, behind the United States and ahead of France and Britain. By 2003 trade between China and Africa was 18.5 billion USD, and by 2007 the Sino-African trading volume amounted to 73 billion USD. By 2008 total trade between African countries

Downloaded by [University North Carolina - Chapel Hill] at 08:57 31 January 2012

Journal of Contemporary African Studies

123

Downloaded by [University North Carolina - Chapel Hill] at 08:57 31 January 2012

and China reached 106.8 billion USD.5 Up until the end of 2005 the number of Chinese state-owned companies investing in Africa was more than eight hundred. These companies are involved in trade, manufacturing, resource exploitation, traffic and transportation, comprehensive agricultural development and other areas. The accumulated value of these companies contracting projects and labour co-operation was 41.3 billion USD (Zhan 2006, 67). Zhan Shiming, a researcher with the Department of African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has stated that in 2005, 82,000 Chinese were engaged in contracting projects and labour co-operation in Africa. However, trade statistics show that behind what is sometimes called Chinas African safari and Africas silk road lie different goals. Development assistance is merely one of the many tools of the Chinese strategy for Africa, institutionalised in 2000 with the establishment of the China-Africa Co-operation Forum. Several Western NGOs and African civil society groupings are concerned with Chinas cultivation of ties with corrupt leaders of African states. But apprehension about increasing Chinese engagement is also shown in statements made by political leaders such as former President Mbeki of South Africa and leaders of opposition parties in some African countries such as Zambia.6 There is some evidence that suggests that the Chinese government is sensitive about how its is perceived on the African street. The Chinese Africanist, Xu Weizhong, for example, argues that China faces three big challenges to transform Sino-African relations. First, elite diplomacy must expand into mass diplomacy. Second, official diplomacy must expand into popular diplomacy. Third, bilateral diplomacy must expand into multilateral diplomacy (Xu 2007, 320). Another Chinese Africanist, Liu Hongwu, wants to cool down the euphoria and exuberance that followed in the wake of the Sino-African summit in November 2006:
The nature and content of Sino-African relations now also started to turn even more into a new form of relationship from politics to economy, from the diplomatic relations of governments guidance or government interest to the market or the guidance of economic interest. [. . .] Moreover, it will give rise to the wholesale expansion and advancement of the content, forms, and scope of bilateral relations. It must be said that the process of this new form of bilateral relations between China and Africa that is now emerging, has just gotten started. Therefore, it is also too early to predict how its new characteristics in reality may perhaps produce complexities impacting both sides. . . . The fact is that regardless of one being Chinese or African, the contemporary understanding and knowledge of one another tends to be rather general or superficial. (Liu 2007, 13)

Also sobering was a recent report from an academic conference in Beijing, where it was reported that both the central government and Chinese companies investing overseas should appropriately handle emerging problems in Sino-African cooperation, like trade frictions etcetera. It is, however, virtually impossible for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to exercise any monitoring of the 800 or so Chinese state-owned national and provincial companies and thousands of individual entrepreneurs operating on African soil (Gill et al. 2007, 12). In line with Xu Weizhongs call for a new styled Chinese diplomacy targeting ordinary Africans through popular diplomacy, many participants at this conference were strongly in favour of intensifying the level of publicity work in Africa, in order to strengthen the exchange and contacts between the peoples of China and Africa (Zhan 2006, 67).

124

J. Lagerkvist

In any event, the issue of conditionality of aid, based on the so-called Washington Consensus and later the post-Washington consensus,7 is tested against Chinas emerging role as a major donor and what has been termed the Beijing Consensus (Ramos 2004). Irrespective of ideological positions, it has become conventional wisdom to regard Beijings aid model of no-strings-attached, as expressed in the governments policy paper, Chinas African Policy,8 as a way to exert pressure on European governments, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to lower their tough conditions and standards, and find instead more acceptable international standards that the whole world can unite around, though not necessarily acceptable to Western liberal democratic countries. As a matter of fact, Chinese aid projects have been competing with the World Bank on a number of projects and the bank has been defeated (Naim 2007). Thus, it is no wonder that the director of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, strives hard to have joint discussions about how best to alleviate poverty on the African continent. There is a growing awareness that co-operation between Western and Chinese donor organisations is crucial. To avoid competition may turn out to be more harmful than beneficial to long-term African interests. Therefore, the European Union has started to engage China in joint aid talks. As of now, however, few discussions on this topic have been held between China and Western countries (Tjo nneland, Brandtzaeg, Kolas et al. 2006, 11). Although the Chinese were indeed invited as observers to the EUAfrica summit that was held in Lisbon in December 2007, they were not invited to take part in the very heated trade discussions between the European and African delegations. Development analysts such as Xu Weizhong are aware of Western nations concern and nervousness. He argues, not without dry satisfaction, that while having to acknowledge that China is more popular than the West, they are jealous of the results obtained through Sino-African co-operation: while being jealous of the successes achieved in Sino-African relations, Western nations want to strengthen cooperation with China on African issues. Hoping that China will join the Western track, play by Western rules, and share the costs in African affairs . . . (2007, 318). Other analysts such as Zhan Changlong echo the Chinese governments position that the World Bank should not interfere in the affairs of other countries. He argues that China must constrain the politicisation of the World Bank Group (Zhang 2007, 32). In effect this means opposition to the notion of conditionality baked into aid programmes. This position, however, amounts not so much to Chinese fears of democratisation, as argued by Paul Collier and others who have expressed concern about how the voting behaviour of the PRC in the UN Security Council obstructs development (Collier 2007, 186). It is first and foremost on the issue of territorial integrity that Chinese leaders are anxious not to set any precedents that may have implications for the Peoples Republics ultimate goal of unification with Taiwan. There is, therefore, also an evident risk that friction rather than harmonisation between Western and Chinese views on development in Africa will grow. Chinese policymakers are perturbed by demands and complaints directed against them by Western governments, while at the same time, as reflected by the above quotation, they feel that they currently have the upper hand. In articles and at conferences, researchers and experts have for some time also been occupied with refuting the false theory of China engaging in neo-colonialism in Africa, which they are at pains to describe as something stirred up by Western countries (Zhan 2006).

Downloaded by [University North Carolina - Chapel Hill] at 08:57 31 January 2012

Journal of Contemporary African Studies

125

Thus, at a time when many are contrasting how much Western aid is following the Washington Consensus and principles of good governance with an emerging Beijing Consensus, it is useful to refer to the sociologist Huang Ping who has argued that there is no such thing as a Beijing consensus or a Beijing model as there is actually not much consensus of anything in Beijing (He 2006, 55). It is a fact that the ingredients of a Beijing Consensus, that is, market reforms without democracy and an emphasis on self-determination and sovereignty are also part and parcel in other non-Western donors aid policies. This is notable in the differences of opinion between Western and Arab donors on issues of aid conditionality (Villanger 2007, 238).

Downloaded by [University North Carolina - Chapel Hill] at 08:57 31 January 2012

Effective governance and democracy As an OECD report (2006) has argued, the rise of India and China presents both risks and opportunities for African countries. The hunger for minerals and oil presents short-term opportunities, while there are serious long-term risks related to weak governance standards which may lead to failures to invest in other nontraditional sectors, as there is a growing trade dependency of Africa on China and India. Brautigam is therefore probably incorrect in saying scholars should move away from viewing foreign aid as an extension of foreign policy (Brautigam 1998, 3). At least in Chinas case, and probably also in what could generally be termed an East Asian model of aid, increasing dependence on overseas natural resources makes the boundaries between trade, aid policy and diplomacy hard to disentangle. Some observers argue that both India and China view aid as an important foreign policy tool, to a large extent based on nationalistic policies (Kragelund 2008, 580). According to the Chinese development scholar Xu Weizhong, the strategic interest of China in Africa rests on these three pillars: political interest, as a rising China needs the support from African nations; economic interest, as Chinas need for energy resources and foreign markets increase; and the need for reunification of the motherland, as Africa can contribute to contain Taiwanese independence (Xu 2007, 318). In similar vein, Japan attempted to increase its influence instrumentally over Africa in the 1980s, driven by the same hunt for natural resources as Chinas. Tokyo was also motivated by economic interests, but especially in the case of Africa this resource and energy rationale was supported by foreign aid as a key diplomatic motive, that of laying the foundation for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. A clear example is when Chinese scholars argue that there is a need to strike a balance between democratic politics and the politics of stability. If you have too much of either ingredient, they say, in the given cultural and socio-economic context, it may invite instability. Democratic disarray and political instability is a state of affairs that in the Chinese mindset amounts to the same as negative GDP growth. He Wenping for example argues:
Irrespective of the country, it looks as if democracy is not at all the effective miracle drug for every conceivable disease. Having democracy does not automatically mean that there is political development. Clearly, one cannot easily draw an equal sign between democracy and political development. Only a democracy that accounts for both order (social stability and rule by law) and effectiveness (economic development) can forcefully push for political development. (He 2005, 375)

126

J. Lagerkvist

Downloaded by [University North Carolina - Chapel Hill] at 08:57 31 January 2012

While by no means writing off the merits of democracy or democratisation, she wants us to assess critically the merits of promoting democracy in all places and at any time. She cites South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Mauritius, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, and Ghana as countries that have acquired the right balance between democracy and stability, and thus shown how democratisation sometimes should be expanded in order to get the appropriate level of efficiency to promote development. Especially important has been the establishing of the rule of law, expansion of popular participation in politics, a growing rights consciousness, and the supervision of ruling parties by public opinion, as this is precisely the road toward more inclusive politics that reformist political leaders and intellectuals argue China should take. I would argue that these Chinese analyses of Africa could also be viewed as a projection screen, not only revealing Chinas global ambitions but also disclosing arguments in domestic Chinese debates about its own development. The phenomenon of the Western world projecting their superiority and advantages vis-a-vis the other ` has been well analysed by Edward Said in his seminal work Orientalism (1978). When Chinese academics project images of their own society and development, however, the approach is more cautious. There is certainly no notion of supremacy in their arguments, as Chinese analysts in general are uncertain how the market economy and concomitant social development will eventually impact their own political system. They are thus more inclined to admit to various shortcomings in Chinas developmental experience. Nonetheless, He Wenping also sees the need to temper democratic ambitions in unfavourable contexts. She observes that democracy has in some countries sped up and revived age-old African tribalism or local nationalism and thus proclaims that, when democracy cannot well co-ordinate the relationship between effectiveness (economic development) and order (social stability and rule by law), reversal and setbacks in the democratisation process cannot be avoided. With a technocrats glasses she views the contemporary African situation:
. . . even if the logic of development means that nation building and economic construction must be carried out in advance, the politics of development compels Third World countries (including African nations) to, at the same time, confront the strong wish and demands of people to participate in politics and enjoy economic distribution. (He 2005, 381)

Interestingly, He Wenping is a realist insofar as brakes can rarely be applied on the developing of democratic popular process in todays world. The technocratic logic of Chinas top leaders, however, does not play out well in smaller nations with a different colonial experience and political culture to China. And she holds that even if difficult, Africa must go forward while negotiating between a plethora of different demands from both the domestic and international scenes. To He this means that African nations can neither use tradition as an excuse for hindering political development, nor can they reject tradition by replacing it with Western culture without considering more alternatives. This is where China presents a viable model to consider and perhaps offer us some valuable experiences to absorb and digest. She advocates that African countries should learn from advanced modern Eastern and Western political culture in order to create a brand new African political culture.

Journal of Contemporary African Studies

127

Downloaded by [University North Carolina - Chapel Hill] at 08:57 31 January 2012

China as an alternative development model Should China perhaps be viewed as a golden opportunity, even a new model for development, for Africa to become a more developed part of the global economy? Randy Peerenboom discusses this issue and the view of China as a possible paradigm for developing states. He argues, contrary to He Wenping, although rather incorrectly I believe, that: China has attempted to persuade other countries to follow its lead (2007, 9). Peerenboom does not give any clue as to which Chinese leader tried to convince a particular foreign leader that Chinas route to development is correct. And even if there is certainly a difference between the views of scholars and policymakers, even in China, the scholarly view on these matters also reflects the deliberations among the foreign policy elite. The scholar Li Zhibiao, for example, has argued for caution on the part of African development specialists and leaders:
If African nations really want to study and learn from the Chinese experience, first, they must thoroughly understand the differences and similarities between their national situation and that of China. Second, they must research in earnest all of the aspects of Chinas, and even other countries, developmental experience, and moreover, on the basis of that, search for the developmental strategy and road that contains the characteristics [most appropriate for] themselves. (Li 2007, 50)

This is a far cry from telling people that your model of success is a one size fits all solution to be emulated everywhere. Another Chinese Africanist, Liu Hongwu, is of a similar opinion when he observes how some view China as the new saviour that will reduce Africas poverty. He believes this to be as ridiculous as when people in the past regarded the West as Africas saviour (Liu 2007, 12). The same argument is also heard from Chinas government agencies. The Chinese governments State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development, for example, has, like Chinas Africa watchers, also stressed the importance of formulating policies that are context specific, as opposed to a fixed model. As the factors causing poverty vary, different approaches were needed in different regions in China. Gradual reform is also seen as key, to introduce pilot projects on a small scale to test different development ideas on a local level (Davies 2007, 34). This, together with a multidimensional approach to poverty reduction through capacity building of farmers, and a long-term focus where growth is coupled with poverty reduction, were said to be key lessons. Likewise, Li Zhibiao warns African nations that they must consider their own situation and not copy mechanically from others. While Li does not want to paint an overly rosy picture of the results brought by the post-Mao economic reforms, he still believes there are a few pillars of wisdom in the Chinese reform experience that Africa can study. First, he argues that it is important to introduce economic reform gradually in order to avoid the outbreak of severe unrest. Second, he believes an opening up to the outside world is necessary as the Chinese reforms were carried out against the background of rapidly developing globalisation. Without opening up China could not have made use of foreign direct investment. Therefore Peerenboom is right, on the other hand, when he argues that Chinas developmental path does not provide a detailed blueprint to be followed slavishly by other developing nations (Peerenboom 2007, 21). Rather than buying advice wholesale from the World Bank and IMF, China has adapted basic economic principles according to its own circumstances and perceived needs. The question now is whether China will continue to reduce poverty on a global scale by actively

128

J. Lagerkvist

engaging in other Third World countries; investing and becoming an important donor of foreign aid, and giving loans on favourable terms. Numerous developing countries, both authoritarian and democratic look to China and invite experts from China to lecture on law, economics, and politics (Peerenboom 2007, 9). The problem for African countries may be that they look to China as a model to follow wholesale, which may be bad for several reasons. There are many Chinese who caution against this. Is there one Chinese model they ask? As argued by Li Zhibiao:
Apart from setting up special economic zones, ever since the start of the reforms, there has been a surge in many local development models: rather successful ones have been the Suzhou model, the Wenzhou model, and the Dongguan model, and different models have different characteristics. The Suzhou model is an economic development model led by the government. The Wenzhou model is an economic development model guided by the market. The Dongguan model, on the other hand, is a model that makes use of foreign investment to develop the manufacturing industry. (Li 2007, 52)

Downloaded by [University North Carolina - Chapel Hill] at 08:57 31 January 2012

This is also what Peerenboom judges to be the most important lesson for other countries looking to China as a model. He argues that one of the keys to Chinas success story has been the willingness to experiment and to evaluate the results free of economic, normative or political dogma (2007, 290). On the same line of thought we find He Wenping, who argues that there are many successful cases of rapid development of economy and society in the world besides China. To her, all these are valuable for African countries to study (He 2005). Chinese views on corruption and conditionality During the much-highlighted Sino-African forum between 48 African heads of state and cabinet leaders and Chinese leaders in Beijing in November 2006, China promised to increase its foreign aid to Africa and to sign debt relief agreements with 33 African countries by the end of 2007. Beijing also stated it would double aid and interest-free loans by 2009, and preferential loans worth three billion US dollars would also be provided to develop infrastructure. According to a Chinese official with the Ministry of Commerce, all the new aid packages destined for African countries were offered selflessly and there were no political strings attached nor interference in internal affairs.9 The lack of conditionality in aid projects and the traditional strong emphasis on sovereignty by the Chinese government might be attractive not just to undemocratic African heads of states but also to populations who have been on the receiving end of structural adjustment programmes formulated by the IMF and the World Bank in Washington (Mawdsley 2007, 415). Some Western observers are certain that China is not prepared to support civil liberties and rights in Africa beyond those it provides to its own citizens. They argue that China is exporting some of its most dysfunctional domestic practices, including corruption, bad lending, disregard for labour rights and poor environmental standards (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small 2007). Other scholars are less sure, though they correctly suggest that accountability and transparency are definitely not core values in Sino-African co-operation (Melber 2007, 9). Some researchers point to the exact opposite. They argue that Chinese experts are invited to developing countries to lecture on Chinas experience, and that PRC government officials even lecture fellow Third World nations on how to combat corruption and strive for good governance (Peerenboom 2007). What is one to believe? The only

Journal of Contemporary African Studies

129

way to find out, of course, is to listen to the Chinese voices and writings on this matter. Unlike most Western observers, Chinese analysts do not necessarily view the prevalence of endemic corruption practices as an inherent problem of autocratic politics. He Wenping, a scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argues that there are many power holders who utilise the loophole of having democracy but not rule of law making it possible for them to engage in large-scale graft and practice corruption (He 2005, 381). One thing is evident though: the Chinese aid specialists are definitely concerned with how their resources are dealt with (Sautman and Yan 2008, 14). They certainly do not see squandering of their resources as unproblematic. In fact, their focus on effective governance amounts pretty much to the same as good governance in fighting corruption: only the methods and packages are different, though of course not without sociopolitical implications. According to Chinese officials with the Ministry of Commerce the fact that China does not give aid in cash but in kind means there is less risk of corruption (Davies 2007, 64). Although this method of avoiding corruption may be feasible for some time and in some places, when Chinese labour is also included in the package it may create equally strong sentiments and reactions in African labour markets and civil society (Polgreen and French 2007). And the Chinese insistence on building shiny new infrastructure with their own materials and manpower in return for the output from the drilling of oil and digging of precious minerals may indeed prove a bad recipe. In order to develop native African industries and not just leaning toward the income and support of Indian and Chinese companies and government agencies, a more proactive strategy is needed by African governments. The problem for China in Africa may be that the Chinese underestimate many latent potential conflicts and security threats as well as defects of the political systems on the continent and thus may find themselves involved on a scale and depth they did not at first anticipate. Further, they have no strategy to tackle corruption problems of lack of transparency, which may become a bigger problem as the volume of foreign aid grows (Gill et al. 2007, 11). That Chinas effective governance may turn into bad governance due to neglect of corruption and embezzlement is perhaps the greatest lacuna in current Chinese aid policy and developmental strategy for Africa. As argued by Xu Li, an official with Chinas Ministry of Communications transport research institute, Chinas infrastructure expansion is not as restrained by rules as it is in the United States and elsewhere. According to her, once a plan is made it is executed: democracy, she says, sacrifices efficiency (The Economist 2008, 29). But something else is lost in Xus understanding, namely the need to establish a fair and just system of rule of law, equal rights, and effective mechanisms to combat corruption. The problem for many African countries may be that there is not yet a foundation for a Chinese developmental model to take hold. At the time of the Chinese reforms, an elite existed, but it was an elite with limited resources, and the state already existed in the form of operating institutions. In contrast, many African states are endowed with a kleptocratic elite ruling over a weak state with poor institutional functions. In such a setting, how can the Chinese model contribute to building this kind of desperately needed weak infrastructure, not just constructing bridges and roads? Nevertheless this is still an open-ended story. If the Chinese learn how to deal with African realities better than the European colonial powers did, and the US and

Downloaded by [University North Carolina - Chapel Hill] at 08:57 31 January 2012

130

J. Lagerkvist

Downloaded by [University North Carolina - Chapel Hill] at 08:57 31 January 2012

the Soviets later did during the Cold War, there may be some potential for China contributing to global equity through becoming a solid partner in taking the industrial revolution to African nations. Aid with Chinese characteristics, or rather, the Chinese perspective on development assistance cannot be viewed in isolation, as aid is integrated with other components. Chinas engagement with Africa should instead be viewed as part of a matrix in which aid, social stability, and government-to-government co-operation guides the course that bilateral relations with developing nations should take. It therefore comes as no surprise that recent years kidnappings in Nigeria and killings of Chinese oil workers with the state-owned company China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation in Ethiopia in April 2007 met with outrage in China. The Chinese engagement in Sudan is another case that seriously impacts on Chinese policymakers concerned with distortion of Chinas image in the court of global public opinion. Actress Mia Farrows warning (2007) that the Beijing Olympics would perhaps be remembered by future generations as the genocide Olympics followed by Steven Spielbergs decision in February 2008 to withdraw as an adviser for the opening ceremony of the games, was definitely contrary to the image the government wanted to project to the world in the run-up to the games. These and other cases illustrate how China is now drawn into largely unanticipated debates and conflicts with its ever-increasing integration in global economic value and resource chains. Due to the rise of public opinion on Chinas internet and alternative channels of information, Chinese citizens are already discussing the pace of domestic political reform and the nature of Chinas overseas engagement and bilateral relations (Lagerkvist 2005, 125). Questions that netizens have been asking one another is what is needed to prevent the loss of Chinese lives in conflict-ridden and war-prone areas of the world, and what measures China should take in order to prevent casualties when drilling oil in say, the Congo, the Sudan, and Nigeria. One can anticipate that, with an increasing global presence and concomitant demands of great power responsibility, domestic debates will begin to deal with issues such as China needing to project its power abroad, perhaps even including breaking away from its longstanding emphasis and arch-conservative conception of sovereignty and territorial integrity (Zhang 2006, 11). Concluding remarks President Hu Jintaos solemn words in his report to the 17th Communist Party Congress on 15 October 2007 about the rights of countries to independently choose their own development path shows that Beijing in the light of its own reform experience now acknowledges and advocates that indigenous contexts should determine what developmental model to choose. This is a change from the period preceding the 1978 economic reforms, when Chinese aid workers self-assuredly propagated their (already failing) model of the planned economy. Today, rather ironically after achieving poverty reduction unprecedented in the history of mankind, they are unwilling to force-feed their experiences of a market economy with Chinese characteristics to other nations. Interestingly, when Chinas Africa watchers compare the positive and negative development experiences in Africa and China, Africa is turned into a projection screen where the contemporary drama of Chinas breathtaking socio-economic

Journal of Contemporary African Studies

131

experience of recent years is replayed and choices confronting Chinese society today become discernible. Such choices concern the true separation of powers in the polity, the establishing of the rule of law, expansion of popular participation in politics, a growing human rights consciousness, and the supervision of political processes by public opinion and the mass media. As shown in this article, Chinas Africa watchers are on the whole a cautious group who do not want to project any false hopes into bilateral relationships with African countries. This is a sharp turn from the earlier phase of Chinese development assistance in the 1960s and 1970s when emissaries of socialism went to Africa convinced that Chinas solutions would also fit African problems. Nowadays, Chinese officials and analysts quite often say they are interested in learning from donors with a longer experience of providing aid. The view is that China is a newcomer and has a lot to learn (Davies 2007). If this is more than mere lip service to a Western audience,10 it is part of an open-minded attitude of Chinese officialdom derived from newfound confidence in Chinas role in globalisation processes (Lagerkvist 2006, 5). This willingness to learn from the outside world extends to other sectors of Chinese society and the business world today, including parts of the policy elite that coordinates and designs foreign aid programmes. For the cautious optimist this bodes well for the harmonisation of various views on aid and developmental models. But it is not going to be easy to align the national interests of developed democracies such as the US and the EU on the one hand, and a developing democracy like India and authoritarian China on the other. But the outcome could be much worse. There is as yet no sign of a clash between democracies and autocracies on African soil. On the whole, the world is witnessing more competition, but that is not necessarily a bad sign. Although it does not come without economic and political risks for both China and African states, there is reason to be positive about Chinas increased role and higher profile in Africa. For one, Africa is no longer in the shadow of global media focus. The spotlight is on Africa which is good. An Africa forgotten and forsaken outside the attention of global trade-flows is what should concern Africans and the rest of the world. Although not physically present at the EUAfrica summit in Lisbon in December 2007, the Chinese spectre of successful authoritarianism that is, the spectre of flexible authoritarianism hovered around the meeting hall. Its presence was felt even more strongly when President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, tired of listening to European sermons about human rights and good governance stated: Today it is very clear that Europe is close to losing the battle of competition in Africa.11 The presidents statement reflects how influence over the geopolitical map of Africa is changing at a faster pace than Western media and policymakers have yet come to understand. Acknowledgements
The author is grateful for the valuable comments on this article made by two anonymous reviewers.

Downloaded by [University North Carolina - Chapel Hill] at 08:57 31 January 2012

Notes
1. Hu Jintaos report to the 17th Chinese Communist Party Congress, 15 October 2007. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/24/content_6938749_htm.

132

J. Lagerkvist

Downloaded by [University North Carolina - Chapel Hill] at 08:57 31 January 2012

2. For this article I have examined articles in the Chinese scientic journal Xiya yu feizhou (West Asia and Africa) between 2004 and 2008, and the limited academic literature that exists in Chinese on African studies. 3. A recent exception is the report by Penny Davies (2007). 4. See former Tanzanian President Mkapas address to a Beijing University student audience in September 2007, Xiya Feizhou (West Asia and Africa), no. 1, 2008: 69. 5. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/19/content_10684845.htm (accessed 7 April 2009). 6. See remarks made by former South African President Thabo Mbeki: China faces charges of colonialism in Africa. International Herald Tribune, 28 January 2007. http://iht.com/ articles/2007/01/28/news/sudan.php. Mbekis real apprehension was also relayed to the author in an interview with South Africas ambassador to Sweden, June 2007 in Stockholm. 7. Under the Washington Consensus and post-Washington Consensus, development agencies located the causes of underdevelopment inside individual nation states. 8. See: Chinas African policy. Available at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm. 9. See: China to fulll its Sino-African forum pledges. www.chinaview.cn, 29 February 2007. 10. Complacent remarks and a more recalcitrant attitude are shown by analysts such as Xu Weizhong quoted in this article and (Ying 2007, 92) point in another direction. 11. This remark was uttered at the European-Africa summit in December 2007 when President Wade criticised European leaders for trying to pressure African countries into signing new trade deals, saying Chinas approach was winning more friends.

Note on contributor
Johan Lagerkvist is a research fellow with the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) in Stockholm. His research interests include the political impacts of a globalizing China, change and continuity in Chinese foreign policy, developments in Chinas media system, and Sino-African relations. His email address is: Johan.Lagerkvist@ui.se.

References
Ampiah, K. 2008. Japan in Africa: A distant partnership. Available at http://www. opendemocracy.net/article/japan-in-africa-paths-to-partnership. Brautigam, D. 1998. Chinese aid and African development: Exporting green revolution. Ipswich: Macmillan. Brautigam, D. 2006. Chinas African policy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January. Available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200601/12/eng20060112_234894.html. Brautigam, D. 2007. China faces charges of colonialism in Africa/ International Herald Tribune, January 28, 2007. Available at http://iht.com/articles/2007/01/28/news/sudan.php. Brautigam, D. 2007. China to fulll its Sino-African Forum pledges. www.chinaview.cn, 29 February 2007. Brautigam, D. 2008. Chinas foreign aid in Africa: What do we know? In China into Africa: Trade, aid and inuence, ed. D.I. Rotberg. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Collier, P. 2007. The bottom billion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davies, P. 2007. China and the end of poverty in Africa: Towards mutual benet?. Sundbyberg: Diakonia. Eisenman, J., E. Heginbotham, and D. Mitchell, eds. 2007. China and the developing world. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Farrow, M. 2007. China can do more on Darfur. The Wall Street Journal, 5 October. Hilsum, L. 2008. China faces reality in Africa. Review of African Political Economy, 13740. Gat, A. 2007. The return of authoritarian great powers. Foreign Affairs, July/August. Gill, B., C. Huang, and J. Morrison. 2006. Chinas expanding role in Africa: A report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) delegation to China on

Journal of Contemporary African Studies

133

ChinaAfricaUS relations. 28 November 1 December. Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Report. Gill, B., C. Huang, and J. Stephen Morrison. 2007. Chinas expanding role in Africa: Implications for the United States. Washington, DC: CSIS Reports. He, W. 2005. Feizhou guojia. Minzhuhua jincheng yanjiu (Research on the democratic progress of African countries), Beijing: Current Affairs Publishing. He, W. 2006. Jielun: zai minzhu biange zhong tuijin feizhou de zhengzhi fazhan. (Conclusion: Promoting political development through democratic change in Africa). In Feizhou guojia, ed. Huang Ping. Beijing gongshi haishi Zhongguo jingyan. (Beijing consensus, or Chinese experiences, or what?). In Quanqiuhua: shehui fazhan yu shehui gongzheng (Globalisation: Social development and social justice). Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, S. and A. Small. 2007. China jumps in. International Herald Tribune, 1 February. Available at http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id 04431580. Kragelund, P. 2008. The return of non-DAC (Development Assistance Committee) donors to Africa: New prospects for African development? Development Policy Review, 26, no. 5: 555 84. Kurlantzick, J. 2007. Charm offensive. Binghampton: Caravan Books. Lagerkvist, J. 2005. The rise of online public opinion in the PRC. China: An International Journal, 3, no. 1: 11930. Lagerkvist, J., ed. 2006. Introduction. In special issue on Chinese perceptions of globalisation, Contemporary Chinese Thought, 37, no. 4: 36. Li, Z. 2007. Feizhou guojia ruhe jiejian zhongguo de fazhan jingyan. (How should African nations draw lessons from Chinas development experience). Xiya yu feizhou, (West Asia and Africa), no. 4: 4955. Liu, H. 2007 Zhongfei jiaowang: Wenmingshi zhi yiyi. (Sino-African exchanges: The importance of the history of civilisations). Xiya yu feizhou, (West Asia and Africa), no. 1: 1115 Manning, R. 2006. Will emerging donors challenge the face of international co-operation? Development Policy Review, 24, no. 4: 37183. Mawdsley, E. 2007. China and Africa: Emerging challenges to the geographies of power. Geography Compass, nos. 1/3: 40521. McCormick, D. 2008. China and India as Africas new donors: The impact of aid on development. Review of African Political Economy, 35, no. 1: 7392. Melber, H. 2007. The (not so) new kid on the block: China and the scramble for Africas resources. China in Africa, Current African Issues, no. 35. Minzhuhua jincheng yanjiu. 2005. (Research on the democratic progress of African countries): 37584. Bejing: Shishi chubanshe (Current Affairs Publishing). Naidu, S. 2008. Indias growing African strategy. Review of African Political Economy, 35, no. 1: 11628. Sautman, B., and H. Yan. 2008. The forest for the trees: Trade, investment and the China-inAfrica discourse. Pacic Affairs, 81, no. 1: 929. Naim, M. 2007. Help not wanted. The New York Times, 15 February. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2006. The Rise of China and India: Whats in it for Africa? Peerenboom, R. 2007. China modernizes: Threat to the West or model for the rest?. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Polgreen, L. and H. French. 2007. In Africa, China is both benefactor and competitor. The New York Times, 20 August. Ramos, J. 2004. The Beijing consensus. London: Foreign Policy Centre. Said, E. 1978. Orientalism. New York: Pantheon. Taylor, I. 2006. Chinas oil diplomacy in Africa. International Affairs, 82, no. 5: 93759. The Economist. 2008. Chinas infrastructure: Rushing on by road, rail and air. 16 February: 2830. Tjonneland, E., B. Brandtzaeg, A. Kolas, and G. le Pere. 2006. China in Africa: Implications for Norwegian and development policies. Chr.Michelsen Institute (CMI) Report. United Nations. 2000. Millenium project report. http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/ fullreport.htm.

Downloaded by [University North Carolina - Chapel Hill] at 08:57 31 January 2012

134

J. Lagerkvist

Downloaded by [University North Carolina - Chapel Hill] at 08:57 31 January 2012

Villanger, E. 2007. Arab foreign aid: Disbursement patterns, aid policies and motives. Forum for Development Studies, 34, no.2: 22356. Xu, W. 2007. Cong zhong-fei hezuo luntan Beijing fenghui kan zhongfei guanxi de fazhan, (Viewing the development of Sino-African relations in the light of the Sino-African cooperation summit meeting) Shijie fazhan zhuangkuan, 2007, guowuyuan fazhan yanjiu zhongxin shijie fazhan yanjiusuo bian, (The state of world development, ed. 2007. State councils world development institute): 31321. Beijing: Shishi chubanshe. Ying, H. 2007. A comparative study of Chinas foreign aid. Contemporary International Relations. (May/June). Zhan, S. 2006. Dangqian zhongfeiguanxi mingan wenti yantaohui zhaokai, (Conference convened on sensitive issues in contemporary Sino-African relations). Xiya yu feizhou (West Asia and Africa), no. 9: 678. Zhang, W. 2006. Chinas national interests in the course of globalization. Special issue Chinese perceptions of globalization. Contemporary Chinese Thought, 37, no. 4: 740. Zhang, C. 2007. Lun shijie yinhang jituan zhili jiegou de gaige, (Discussing reforms of the administrative structure of the World Bank group). Guoji guanxi, (International Review), no. 6: 2733.