Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-11328 January 15, 1918

RUFINA CAUSING, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ALFONSO BENCER, defendant-appellee. Perfecto J. Salas Rodriguez for appellant. De leon and Magalona and J. M.a Arroyo for appellee. STREET, J.: This action was instituted by Rufina Causing upon November 14, 1914, in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, to annul a contract for the sale of a parcel of land and to recover the property itself from Alfonso Bencer as follows: A parcel of land for rice and sugar cane in the barrio of Bokbokay, Vista Alegre, district of Barotac Viejo municipality of Banate, Province of Iloilo, P. I., having an area of about 70 hectares, bounded on the North by lands belonging to Pacifico Bencer, Maria Salome Causing, and that of Alfonso Balleza; on the South by those of Esteban Navarro, Maria Salome Causing, and the heirs of Jorge Lachica; on the East by the Barotac Viejo River; and on the West by those of Alfonso Bencer, Ignacio Balleza, Alfonso Balleza, and Maria Salome Causing. It appears that in years gone by this land had been owned by the plaintiff, a single woman of full legal age, in common with certain nieces of hers who were then minors and over whom she seems to have exercised an informal guardianship. In the year 1909 negotiations were begun between her and the defendant with a view to the sale of this land to him; and an agreement was effected by which she undertook to convey the property to him for the sum of P1,200. Needing legal assistance in order to get the conveyance drawn up properly, the parties repaired to the office of her relative, Casiano Causing, attorney, but when he learned that the minors had an interest in the property, he informed them that the conveyance could not be legalized without judicial sanction. The efforts to effect the transfer of title by deed was then abandoned for the time being; but Bencer paid her P800 of the purchase price upon August 14, 1909, and took possession of the land, with the understanding that he was to pay the balance later and that meanwhile she would take steps to procure judicial approval of the sale as regards the interests of the minors. In 1910 a new engagement was made in regard to the price to be paid, which was to the effect that Bencer should pay P600 in addition to what he had already paid or P1,400 in all, provided the plaintiff would give him an extension of time to May, 1911, within which to pay the balance. Time went on and neither party performed the engagement. Bencer's failure to pay may have been due in part, as the plaintiff alleges, to his lack of ready money; or it may have been due as he claims, to the fact that the plaintiff had become reluctant to carry out the engagement and did not appear to collect the money at the place stipulated as the place of payment. However this may be, it is evident that the plaintiff was not yet in a position to execute a deed conveying the entire interest in the property, as no steps had been taken to get judicial approval for the sale of the shares belonging to

the minors. However, as these heirs reached majority the plaintiff successively acquired their respective interests by purchase, and before the action in this case was instituted she had become the possessor of all their shares. The property meanwhile increased in value-a circumstance possibly due in part to improvements which the defendant claims to have made on property. In view of the changed conditions, the plaintiff appears to have become desirous of rescinding the contract, and accordingly brought this suit to annul the contract and recover the property, together with the sum of P3,850 alleged to be due as damages for the use and occupation of the land by the defendant during the time he has been in possession. The plaintiff also prayed for general relief. At the hearing the court below dismissed the action in so far as it sought the recovery of the land and damages for use and occupation, but gave judgment in plaintiff's favor for P600 with interest at 6 per cent from August 14, 1910, until paid. From this action of the court the plaintiff has appealed. We can see no valid reason why the plaintiff should be permitted to rescind this contract, It is evidently a case where the contract entailed mutual obligation, and if either party can be said to have been in default it was the plaintiff, Rufina Causing, rather than the defendant, Bencer. In article 1100 of the Civil Code it is declared that in mutual obligations neither party shall be deemed to be in default if the other does not fulfill, or offer to fulfill his own obligation, and that from the time one person obligated fulfills his obligation the default begins for the other party. We find that the contract contemplated a conveyance of the entire interest in the land; and the plaintiff clearly obligated herself to that extent. She was therefore not in a position to compel the defendant to pay until she could offer to him a deed sufficient to pass the whole legal estate; and for the same reason, she cannot now be permitted to rescind the contract on the ground that the defendant has heretofore failed to pay the purchase price. At the time the plaintiff accepted the payment of P800 in 1909, from an agent of the defendant, she executed a receipt in which it was said that this was an advance payment for the land in case the sale that should be effected (anticipo del terreno en caso se effective la venta); and from this it is argued that it was understood that the negotiations were merely provisional and that the sale could be abandoned. We do not so interpret the transaction; and it was evidently not so interpreted by the defendant Bencer, who has been continuously in possession claiming as owner by virtue of the original contract. Reduced to its simplest terms the case presented is this. One of several owners of a piece of property pro indiviso has made a valid contract for the sale thereof with the understanding that she should convey the interest of her coowners or procure the same to be conveyed. Since the contract was executed she has acquired the interest of the coowners by purchase and is now in a position fully to perform the contract. It results that she is, in our opinion, under a legal obligation to transfer the estate, and is not entitled to rescind the contract and recover the property from the person to whom she contracted to convey it. In this situation either party is entitled to enforce performance, and neither will be relieved from his obligation without the consent of the other. There can be no question of the power of a person to bind himself to sell something which he does not yet possess; acquiring title to the thing sold. The most reasonable interpretation of the action of the plaintiff in buying out the minor heirs as they reached majority was that she thereby intended to place herself in a position to comply with the contract which she had made with the defendant Bencer. Of course if she had never acquired these interests an action for damages would have been Bencer's only remedy.

Under the prayer for general relief the court gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P600 the unpaid balance of the purchase money. This was proper. The court also allowed interest on this sum from August 14, 1910. The right of the plaintiff to recover interest for the period prior to the institution of the suit is questionable in point of law, but the justice of allowing it is evident, in view of the fact that the defendant has had continuous use of the property. As the defendant has not appealed, or complained of the action of the court, the judgment will be affirmed in all respects, with costs against the appellant. So ordered. Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, Araullo, and Malcolm, JJ., concur.

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