1st Disarmament

N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL
MODEL UNITED NATIONS

35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009
BACKGROUND GUIDE
D i s a r m a m e n t a n d
International Security
General Assembly Main Committees
 2008-2009 International Model United Nations Association, Inc. Used and distributed under license.
N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS
The 35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009
Nick Stefanizzi
Secretary-General September 2008
Boston University
Rosa Akbari Dear Delegates,

Director-General
McGill University
Welcome to NHSMUN 2009! My name is Daniel Nowicki and I’m the Under-Secretary General (USG)
Nancy Henry of General Assembly Mains Committees (known affectionately as GA Mains). I am a junior at
Conference Director Georgetown University in Washington, DC, where I’m studying international politics and security
Tufts University studies with a minor in international development. While I love Washington, New York will always be
“the city” to me. Living right across the water in New Jersey for my formative years, I have come to
Michelle Shevin
New York often, especially in the past few years that I have been on NHSMUN staff. Like clockwork,
Chief of Staff
Barnard College we gather here each March to discuss the most pressing international issues of our generation.
Cristina Rade This semester I am studying abroad in Argentina’s beautiful metropolitan capital, Buenos Aires, where
Chief of External Relations I will be living until December. If you enjoy traveling and have not yet visited South America, Bs. As. is
Adelphi University
your gateway city to some amazing natural wonders, great leather products, Texas-style steakhouses,
Ryan Burke and friendly people. On my free time, I enjoy playing fútbol with some porteño friends, adventure
Director of Security traveling, talking politics with my host family, visiting museums, and frequenting the many restaurants
University of South Carolina and clubs for which the city has become infamous. I find that I play in to the familiar Mark Twain
saying of never letting “my schooling interfere with my education.” I suggest that from now until
Matthew Low March you all find time to reflect on your academic, social and intellectual goals and discover that thing
Under-Secretary-General
University of California,
about which you are truly passionate.
Berkeley
My international travel has not precluded me from completing my NHSMUN responsibilities. This
Daniel Nowicki conference holds a special place in my heart because of its wonderful staff, the intellectually stimulating
Under-Secretary-General topics, the high quality of debate, and of course, its delegates. Over this past year, I have edited the
Georgetown University
background guides in your respective committees and procedurally and substantively prepared directors
Deanna Maxfield for the rigors of chairing debate. At the conference, my job is to help you enjoy the substantive aspects
Under-Secretary-General of committee sessions. You can find me roaming the hallways of the Hilton, checking in on
University of Southern committees and bringing you completed draft resolutions from our administrative staff, among other
California tasks.
Emily Robertson
Under-Secretary-General Enjoy reading the attached background guide, research well, and get excited for March! Feel free to
Duke University contact me with any questions about NHSMUN, and I’ll be happy to talk with you.
Lisa Cuesta Until then,

University of Pennsylvania
Daniel Nowicki
Jerry Guo den4@georgetown.edu
Under-Secretary-General 732.522.2865
Dartmouth College
37th and O Streets McCarthy Hall #627
Washington, DC 20057
NHSMUN is a project of the
International Model United
Nations Association, Incorporated
(IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-for-
profit, all volunteer organization, is
dedicated to furthering global
issues education at the secondary
school level.
N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS
The 35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009
Nick Stefanizzi
Secretary-General September 2008
Boston University
Rosa Akbari
Director-General Dear Delegates,
McGill University
Nancy Henry I am excited to welcome you to NHSMUN 2009. It is truly going to be an amazing conference! My
Conference Director name is Lad Williamson and I’ll be your Director for the Disarmament and International Security
Tufts University Committee, or to keep things simple, DISEC. DISEC is a large committee that is the First Committee
of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
Michelle Shevin
Chief of Staff
Barnard College
I’m a sophomore at Clemson University in South Carolina, where it is too humid for its own good. I
am originally from the South, so I do say y’all and drink sweet tea, but I don’t like country music and I
Cristina Rade don’t have an outrageous accent, so I suppose the stereotypes end there. I’m studying Language and
Chief of External Relations International Trade, with my language of choice being French, so hopefully I will be abroad sometime
Adelphi University in the near future to give my French skills a run for their money. At Clemson I have continued to do
Ryan Burke
Model UN and currently serve as President of our team. Other than that, I am a part of the Pi Kappa
Director of Security Alpha fraternity on campus and am a huge Clemson football fan. When I am not doing schoolwork or
University of South Carolina NHSMUN, I am generally playing the guitar, watching some sort of sporting event, or finding ways to
spend my time outdoors.
Matthew Low
Under-Secretary-General As Director, it is my responsibility to research the topics for this committee and provide you with
University of California,
Berkeley enough information to get a good handle on the topics that will be discussed during committee. Last
year I was the Assistant Director of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, and I must say that I am
Daniel Nowicki extremely excited to discuss both Conventional Weapons and the Weaponization and Space this year,
Under-Secretary-General as disarmament has always been a passion of mine. I hope that after reading this background guide you
too will share that passion and excitement for what is to come at the conference.
Deanna Maxfield
Under-Secretary-General My duties as Director while at the conference are to maintain decorum and to help guide the flow of
University of Southern debate. I encourage each of you to bring thoughtful and innovative ideas to the conference. Don’t be
California afraid to break from the traditional norms and create new ideas; just remember to keep them within
reason and within the authority of the First Committee. Although DISEC is large and sometimes
Emily Robertson
intimidating, I hope that all of you will feel comfortable contributing.
Duke University
I can’t wait until the conference, so until then please feel free to contact me with any questions. I
Lisa Cuesta would love to hear from you!
University of Pennsylvania Sincerely,
Jerry Guo
Under-Secretary-General Lad Williamson
Dartmouth College Laytonw@clemson.edu
149 Runneymede Dr
Blythewoode, SC 292016
NHSMUN is a project of the
International Model United
Nations Association, Incorporated
(IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-for-
profit, all volunteer organization, is
dedicated to furthering global
issues education at the secondary
school level.
The 2009 National High School Model United Nations
Disarmament and International Security Committee
A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION

Delegate preparation is paramount to a successful and exciting National High School Model United Nations
2009 Conference. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that will be discussed in
your committee; these papers are designed to give you a description of the topics and the committee. They
will not give you a complete description of the topic areas and they will not contain the most up-to-date
information, particularly in regards to rapidly evolving issues. We encourage and expect each delegate to fully
explore the topics and be able to identify and analyze the intricacies of the issues. Delegates must be prepared
to intelligently utilize their newly acquired knowledge and apply it to their own countries’ policy. You will
find that your nation has a unique position on the topics that cannot be substituted for or with the opinions
of another nation.
The task of preparing and researching for the conference is challenging, but it can be interesting and
rewarding. We have provided each school with a copy of the Delegation Preparation Guide. The Guide
contains detailed instructions on how to write a position paper and how to effectively participate in
committee sessions. (Note: some position papers have unique guidelines that are detailed within respective
committees’ Background Guides.) The Guide also gives a synopsis of the types of research materials and
resources available to you and where they can be found. A brief history of the United Nations and the
NHSMUN conference are also included. The annotated rules of procedure complete the Delegate
Preparation Guide.
An essential part of representing a nation in an international body is the ability to articulate that nation’s views
in writing. Accordingly, it is the policy of NHSMUN to require each delegate (or double-delegation team) to
write position papers. The position papers should clearly outline the country’s policies on the topic areas to
be discussed and what factors contribute to these policies. In addition, each paper must address the Research
and Preparation questions at the end of the committee Background Guide. Most importantly, the paper
must be written from the point of view of the country you are representing at NHSMUN 2009 and
should articulate the policies you will espouse at the conference. All papers should be typed and double-
spaced. The papers will be read by the Director of each committee and returned at the start of the
conference with brief comments and constructive advice.
You are responsible for sending a copy of your paper to the Director of your committee. Additionally, your
delegation is responsible for bringing a bound copy of all of the position papers—one for each committee to
which your school has been assigned—to the conference (to be submitted during registration). Specific
requirements of the bound copy have been sent to the faculty advisor/club president. In addition to position
papers, each delegation must prepare one brief summary statement on the basic economic, political, and
social structures of its country, as well as on its foreign policy. Please mail country summary statements to the
Director-General of NHSMUN 2009 at the address below. All copies should be postmarked no later than
February 16th and mailed to:
Rosa Akbari, Director-General Lad Williamson

3631 av. Henri-Julien 104 Stonecrest Lane
Montréal, Québec H2X 3H4 Clemson, SC 29630
Canada
(Country Summaries) (Individual Position Papers)
Delegations are required to mail hard copies of papers to the Director-General and Directors.
NHSMUN Staff will not consider e-mail submissions as an adequate substitution.
Delegations that do not submit position papers to Directors or Summary Statements to the
Director-General will be ineligible for awards.
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COMMITTEE HISTORY
A part of one of the original organs of the United Nations (UN), the First Committee is responsible for
promoting regional and international security. As indicated in the Article 26 of the UN Charter, the
Disarmament and International Security (DISEC) committee is charged with the duty “…to promote the
establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of
the world's human and economic resources.” The specific issues that fall under the auspices of the First
Committee include “efforts to ban chemical weapons, disarmament of nuclear and conventional weapons,
consideration of nuclear test bans and nuclear-weapon-free zones, dialogue on outer-space arms control,
reduction of military budgets, and measures to strengthen international security.”
Similar to most UN bodies, resolutions are passed within committee, with each member state holding one
vote. Resolutions that pass are sent to the General Assembly (GA) and voted upon in a plenary session.
These resolutions, however, are non-binding. The UN and other requested organizations affiliated with the
UN commence the implementation of a resolution only if it passes through the GA. While no resolution
passed in DISEC and/or the GA can be legally enforced, the First Committee often refers certain issues to
the UN Security Council if immediate and enforceable action is deemed necessary.
DISEC has an accomplished history, spanning from the implementation of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
(NWFZ) to the curbing of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW). Recent initiatives have
focused on nuclear weapons and other non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms issues,
the disarmament of outer space and prevention of a space arms race, as well as ways to address emerging
issues involving regional security, non-state actors, and terrorism.
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SIMULATION
The Disarmament and International Security Committee, or the First Committee, is one of the largest and
most prominent bodies at the United Nations. The First Committee represents the voices of all 192 Member
States, demonstrating the importance of the decisions made by the committee. At NHSMUN, the First
Committee will function as it does in the General Assembly hall in an attempt to make the simulation as
realistic as possible. That said, DISEC will subsequently be one of the largest committees at NHSMUN.
Knowing this, we must all work together—Dais and delegates—to ensure that all parties have an equal
chance to voice their opinions and involve themselves in the committee’s proceedings.
In a large committee such as ours, maintaining decorum is paramount to the flow of debate. I cannot stress
this point enough. It is extremely frustrating to try to speak when people are carrying on discussions. Seeing
as we want to protect each delegate’s right to voice his or her opinion, it is crucial that decorum be upheld.
An effective delegate will take advantage of the few chances he or she has to voice opinion in front of the
entire committee, while also utilizing the informal portions of debate to successfully mold ideas into concrete
and viable solutions.
In a large committee, one of the most cumbersome aspects of debate can be parliamentary procedure. Take
the time to look over the NHSMUN Rules of Procedure beforehand and feel free to use it as a point of
reference during committee session. The Director and Assistant Director are there to aid you in
understanding all of these rules and procedures, so do not hesitate to ask before or during the conference.
Additionally, as a GA Mains committee, delegates will have the privilege to defer all parliamentary questions
to the third member of the dais, the Chair.
The dais serves to oversee the flow of substantive work and procedure and to ensure that committee runs
smoothly without interruptions. Delegates are equally obliged to come prepared substantively, contribute to
the discussion, and maintain decorum. NHSMUN values genuine diplomacy and cooperation. If these goals
can be achieved, committee will surely be a fun and engaging environment for discussion.
Be mindful of other delegates and do your part to respect your peers while maintaining a productive
discussion in committee. If decorum is maintained and discussion is continuous and productive, I can ensure
that you will have an amazing time at NHSMUN 2009 –of course, the dais will also do its part to ensure that
this happens. The Director, Assistant Director, and Chair can be used as a resource for any type of questions
you may have; our job is to serve you and we are more than happy to help. Make sure to keep this in mind as
you prepare for the conference in March and while you are at the conference so you can make it the most
memorable experience.
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CONVENTIONAL ARMS
TOPIC A
In 1899, the first round of the Hague Peace Conferences convened in light of emerging military technologies
thought to be more dangerous than their predecessors. These conferences were the first international
attempts at arms control and were consistently called upon throughout the 20th century as the destructive
capacity of weaponry continually increased. Released as The Reports to the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and
1907, the documents called for the restriction of the use of “arms, projectiles, and calculated materials” that
caused “unnecessary suffering” (Vagts 35). Although this first attempt at arms limitation did not mention
specific weapons, classifications are needed today to target and define the most destructive weapons.
Conventional weapons comprise a diverse category of armaments that include missiles, tanks, and warships,
in addition to all weapons that are not small arms and light weapons (SALW) or weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). The role these conventional arms play in international politics is often overlooked, especially in
recent years as the international community has focused on SALWs with more scrutiny. The legal and illicit
trade, acquisition, and use of conventional weapons presents a significant challenge to regulatory regimes
because of legislative loopholes that slow efforts toward reform. Finally, conventional arms acquisition and
utilization by terrorist organizations and other non-state actors, neither of which are bound by any form of
international arms control or law, is a significant threat to international security. It is the task of the First
Committee to draft a new form of comprehensive international policy addressing this issue, building upon the
current policies and legislation regarding conventional weapons across the international community.
Finally, a quick note on terminology: in research, the group of weapons known as Small Arms and Light
Weapons (SALW) may appear in inclusion with the conventional weapons category. The Disarmament and
International Security Committee (DISEC) will focus solely on conventional weapons, separating them
from SALW because the latter has more recently fallen into a group of its own.
HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE
Definitions
Landmines
One of the most devastating categories of conventional weapons is the landmine. Landmines have attracted
much international attention because of their destructive capabilities and the severe injury they can inflict
upon their victims. Landmines are commonly leftovers from conflict, and they detonate when triggered by an
object in close proximity. The two main types of landmines are anti-tank landmines and anti-personnel
landmines (NGO Committee). The first is designed to damage or destroy heavily armored vehicles and
anyone operating them (NGO Committee). The second is specifically designed to maim, injure, or kill
individuals that cross over it (NGO Committee). Landmines are weapons that are not necessarily designed to
kill, but rather to cause injury and prolong suffering (NGO Committee). Landmines are indiscriminate,
meaning they do not necessarily just have a damaging or deadly effect upon a specific target (NGO
Committee). Rather, they impact any who activate them, whether that person is a member of a military or
not.
Landmines have drawn enough international attention to warrant a treaty devoted entirely to their
prohibition: the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty. This treaty focuses only on anti-personnel mines and excludes anti-
tank mines. The First Committee will have to consider the motivations for this and how to resolve the issue
in future legislation. Another challenge with landmines is that they cost around US$5 to manufacture, but are
extremely expensive to remove, even when relatively simple removal strategies such as metal detection are
employed (Nagle 236). It is a very labor-intensive and precise process that takes significant. Data from 2005
show that more than 200,000 square kilometers of land on earth are covered with land mines (Nagle 234). In
Angola, because of the massive numbers of landmines still active, roughly 40% of the population has
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undergone some sort of amputation procedure as a result of landmine explosions (Caldwell 28). Finding and
removing all deployed landmines worldwide may take decades at best. (Nagle 236). Landmines do not
degrade with time; they are still dangerous decades and even centuries after their production. An example of
landmine durability dates back to the 1960s, when landmines from the Civil War era were discovered in the
United States, all of them still active and dangerous (Nagle 235). Given this fact, landmines are obviously a
critically important group of conventional arms that require immediate attention from the First Committee.
Missiles
A missile is defined as an object that is “fired, thrown, or otherwise projected at a target” (NGO Committee).
Missiles are highly complex weapons that can inflict massive damage upon not only on their targets, but also
on anything within a close proximity to their explosion. Missiles can be divided into two main groups. The
first is the cruise missile category, which has become overshadowed by the second and most threatening
group, the ballistic missile category. Cruise missiles are unmanned jet-propelled “aircraft” that deliver a
payload or warhead (Dutra 40). In general, cruise missiles are controlled by internal guidance systems that
direct them toward their target. In some instances where the missile is used for short-range purposes, the
missile may be controlled by a remote device (Dutra 40).
The three main types of cruise missiles are short-range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack cruise
missiles (LACMs), and tactical cruise missiles (Dutra 41). Perhaps the most dangerous of these, LACMs, are
used for a number of purposes, but for some nations are now a replacement for fighter pilots so to minimize
casualties (Dutra 41). LACMs are able to deliver larger payloads more quickly, although at a greater cost per
delivery. The true danger of LACMs is their ability to carry chemical, biological, or nuclear payloads, as well
as their ability to deliver a standard explosive payload (Dutra 40). Through their accuracy in striking and
ability to destroy vital infrastructure Cruise Missiles pose a significant threat militarily, which is bolstered by
their additional ability to weaken air defenses by targeting in the air and on the ground (Dutra 45).
Ballistic missiles, unlike cruise missiles, are not limited to use only at the regional level. The capability of
ballistic missiles to travel across continents and substantial landmasses makes them even more threatening.
Although cruise missiles may be more of a tactical and commonly used military instrument, ballistic missiles
are capable of large-scale destruction. Ballistic missiles can be divided into four separate types, all classified
differently based on the distance they can cover and the payload they can deliver; the four types are:
1. Short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM); can travel under 1,000 km;

2. Medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM); can travel between 1000-3,000 km;
3. Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM); can travel between 3500- 5,500 km;
4. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM); can travel 5,500 km and beyond (NGO Committee).
Of the four different levels, the most threatening is the intercontinental ballistic missile, as it is able to travel
across the world delivering a massive payload, and is typically used for carrying nuclear warheads (NGO
Committee). Like landmines, missiles of any type can be considered indiscriminate as to whom they injure or
what they destroy. Though they are guided by computers, their impact radius is much greater than the single
point they are targeted toward, creating the potential for large scale indiscriminate and collateral damage.
More daunting, however, is the fact that ballistic missiles can cause much more damage than any other type of
missile.
The proliferation of ballistic missiles and their components worldwide has been monitored through the
MTCR (Dutra 62). Cruise missiles, however, have not received the same amount of attention from the
MTCR, as their threat assessment at the time of the creation of the MTCR was minimal in comparison to
ballistic missiles (Dutra 63). Cruise missile proliferation is dangerous and has become much more simplified
since the inception of MTCR in the 1980s (Dutra 67). Currently, they pose a significant threat to international
security as their use and proliferation has not received as much international attention as other types of
missiles.
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Heavy Machinery and Mobile Conventional Weapons

As defined by the UN Register of Conventional Arms under UNGA resolution 46/36L, there are six main
types of conventional arms, excluding missiles and missile systems, which are targeted for registration by the
organization (UN). They include “battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems,
combat aircraft, attack helicopters, and warships” (UN). Battle tanks and armored combat vehicles are both
defined as “self-propelled” armored vehicles that have the capacity to travel long distances cross-country
(UN). Additionally, these two vehicular types of conventional arms provide a protective capability, as well as
the ability to transport multiple persons (UN).
Large caliber artillery systems operate with a caliber no smaller than 75 millimeters, and can come in many
forms, whether they are a simple shell, combinations of heavy artillery with rocket systems, howitzers, or
large-caliber (120mm caliber or higher) mortars designed with the ability to engage surface targets through
indirect fire (UN). These types of weapons are generally not portable which is the reason they are not
classified as small arms and light weapons (SALW).
Combat aircraft and attack helicopters are defined as conventional arms as well. They are generally outfitted
with a combination of autocannons, missiles, bombs, electronic warfare pods, or surveillance pods. These
craft are intended for direct fire. That is, their munitions are targeted at a specific target, rather than indirect
fire, which does not rely on line of sight for an attack. The various pods that may be outfitted to performing
“electronic warfare” and “reconnaissance missions,” and they may boast stealth technology as well (UN).
Finally, warships are the largest of all conventional weapons, and the classification encompasses both
submarines and traditional above-water ships (UN). A warship is defined as any submarine or sea-bound
vessel which has a displacement of over 500 tons and is equipped for military use (UN). Additionally, any
vessel or submarine with a displacement under 500 tons with the capacity to fire missiles or torpedoes is also
included in this grouping (UN).
Given the widespread use of these types of weaponry by all military powers, it will be particularly challenging
to address their proliferation. A standard ban or limitation will not be effective here; the level of opposition in
the international community would be staggering. The First Committee will have to develop an innovative
solution that allows states to retain their ability to defend themselves, while still pare the destructive ability
these weapons possess.
Incendiaries, Blinding Laser Weapons, and Unexploded Ordinances

Incendiaries, blinding laser weapons, and unexploded ordinances are the final group of conventional
weapons, all of which are defined throughout the articles of the CCW. Protocol III of the CCW restricts the
use of incendiaries, which are weapons that cause a superfluous and indiscriminate amount of damage
through the usage of fire, as well as weapons which set objects on fire and damage objects in the immediate
vicinity (Kaye 924). White phosphorous, or WP, is an incendiary that causes severe burns and is used in
grenades or artillery shells.
The use of blinding laser weapons is restricted by Protocol IV of the CCW (Kaye 924). These weapons are
defined as any designed to cause permanent blindness to their target (Kaye 924). Both incendiaries and
blinding laser weapons cause superfluous injury and harm to their targets, as their sole purpose is to maim or
debilitate the target.
Protocol V of the CCW addresses the question of unexploded remnants of war or unexploded ordinances
(UXO). This is directed at cluster munitions or cluster bombs, which have become a major concern due to
their destructive power (Allen). Cluster munitions are weapons which, when detonated, can destroy an area
approximately the size of two football fields (Allen). Cluster munitions operate by dispersing sub-munitions
or “bomblets” across target areas which then explode when the fuse activates the explosive (Lebanon/Israel).
A variety of fuses are used, with proximity fuses that explode the bomblets above ground being very popular.
Fuses often malfunction, which leaves unexploded bomblets in the target area. These remain in the aftermath
of a conflict and are similar to landmines in their danger.
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This function of cluster bombs to split first and then act similar to landmines increases their threat and their
indiscriminate character is especially concerning (Lebanon/Israel). Currently, the international community is
working to ban their use, trade, and stockpiling through an international convention on cluster munitions,
having drafted a convention on 30 May 2008 in Dublin, Ireland (Diplomatic). Most recently cluster munitions
have been used by the United States in its military campaign in Afghanistan with some significant
consequences. The cluster bombs that were dropped by the US Armed Forces were marked by the color
yellow when they split into bomblets, incidentally the same color as the packaged meals dropped by the US
for the Afghan civilians (Caldwell 29).
United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional W eapons (CCW C)
Before drafting a new form of international policy addressing conventional weapons, it is necessary to
consider past law and agreements on the topic. There are myriad documents that address the issue and the
First Committee should draw the best ideas from these and incorporate them into any new policy. Several
documents can be considered in this capacity, but delegates are encouraged to use existing documents as a
springboard for their own ideas and policies to be included in drafted resolutions.
Since the Hague Conferences, the number of weapons categorized as “conventional” has been expanded in
light of the substantial technological advances of the 20th century. One group that provided an initial impetus
for international action regarding conventional weapons was the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC). The ICRC was concerned with the serious injuries sustained by both civilians and soldiers due to the
non-discriminate effects of conventional weapons in the field, especially those relating to landmines (Kitchen
39). Echoing the concerns of the ICRC, the United Nations Convention on Certain Convention Weapons
(CCWC) was initially signed and ratified by 50 Member States in an attempt to prevent the use of weapons
that would cause superfluous injury to their targets, coming into effect in 1983 (Kaye 923). Today, 107
Member States have signed and ratified the treaty and six have signed but not ratified the convention
(meaning these six countries agree with the CCWC in principle but refuse to be bound to its protocols). The
CCWC was the first notable attempt to combat the spread of conventional weapons after the Hague
Conferences. The CCWC served as the initial identification of dangerous conventional weapons systems that
utilized indiscriminate tactics and attempted to limit their use (Kaye 923). Despite suggestions for a new
treaty, it remains the premier legislative convention addressing conventional weapons simply because no
other international conventions on conventional weapons have been produced. The original CCWC
contained three protocols limiting and preventing the use of certain conventional weapons. A fourth and fifth
protocol were added after the First CCWC Review Conference in 1996 and the Second Review Conference in
2004, respectively. These five protocols are:
I. Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments

II. Protocol on Prohibitions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps, and Other Devices
III. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons
IV. Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons
V. Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Kaye 927)
The original mandate of the CCWC specified that it had jurisdiction over cases of international or interstate
conflict, but not smaller and more ambiguous intrastate conflicts (Kaye 927). When considering the last the
dominance of intrastate conflicts within the past decade, it is obvious that the CCWC’s original mandate is
inefficient. Also included within the CCWC was a stipulation for a review conference to be held no later than
2001. In 2002, following the Second CCWC Review Conference, the Convention was expanded to include
smaller and more ambiguous conflicts, while emphasizing that intervention in such conflicts was not justified
under the mandate of the CCW in order to protect national sovereignty (Kaye 927).
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Other Notable International Legislation
The CCWC provided a precedent for other treaties and conventions that banned the use of specific types of
conventional weapons. During the 1990s, landmines and missiles were common topics of discussion as
conventional weapons presented a recurring and significant threat to international security. The 1997 Ottawa
Mine Ban Treaty was initially intended to serve as an amendment to the CCWC under Protocol II, which bans
the use antipersonnel landmines (Laurance 226). The Mine Ban Treaty was a culmination of efforts by the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), but its drafting process was fraught with wavering
support from the United States (among others). Even when the United States declared a one-year
moratorium on landmine use in 1992 and adopted the cause of the ICBL, it eventually refused to become a
sponsor or signatory of the completed document as the US believed that it was in its best interest to retain
the ability to use such weapons if deemed necessary (Kitchen 39).
In addition, two international agreements for the prevention of the proliferation of dangerous missiles and
monitoring their use and trade have been adopted. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was
clandestinely organized during the Cold War by the United States and came into effect in 1987 (Dutra 59).
The MTCR targets all missiles with a payload over 500-kilograms and an ability to travel over 300-kilometers
(Dutra 59). The goal of the MTCR was to limit the risk of proliferation by establishing a core group of
signatories authorized to make transfers of such weapons (Dutra 59). Since the end of the Cold War in 1991,
33 Member States have become signatories to the MTCR, including all of the declared nuclear weapons states
(i.e. France, United Kingdom, United States, Russian Federation), except China. China, although in agreement
with the major provisions of the treaty, continues to sell missiles and missile technology to states not party to
the treaty, such as Iran, Pakistan, and Syria (Dutra 60).
The International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation of 2002, also known as the Hague Code of
Conduct (HCOC), was designed to extend the capabilities of the MTCR without limiting its membership. The
HCOC promotes international transparency in arms testing and transfers and encourages Member States to
either completely abandon or limit missile tests, development, and deployment. It also encourages its
members to give all other signatories pre-launch notification for imminent missile deployments. Unlike other
international disarmament treaties, there are no punitive measures or sanctions included in the HCOC. Its
requirements are just politically obligatory, therefore serving as an accepted agreement between states rather
than a legally binding document. Of these two treaties, the MTCR is considered the most efficient at actually
regulating arms transfers and thereby curbing illicit conventional arms transfers. The political statement made
by the HCOC is perhaps more powerful, however, as the HCOC allows non-MTCR countries the
opportunity for input on this pressing international concern.
The delegates of the First Committee should consider the effectiveness of these agreements and if any
provisions from them should be addressed in a resolution or in new policy; it will clearly be necessary to shed
some and keep only the best.
United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, one of the greatest security threats that the international community
has faced is what to do with the “excessive and destabilizing” stockpiling of conventional weapons that took
place throughout the duration of the Cold War. Transparency and the use of confidence-building measures
(CBMs) came under the review of the international community in 1988, when a resolution came before the
General Assembly that promoted transparency for conventional arms transfers on a “universal and non-
discriminatory basis” (Laurance 223). The resolution presented the option of creating a UN body to register
conventional arms transfers in order to maintain international transparency, but the members of the
European Community (EC) tabled it in 1988. Negotiations to formally create such an organization intensified
in 1991, when the UN Register of Conventional Arms became official through a vote of the UN General
Assembly (UNGA) that December in the wake of the Gulf War (Laurance 225). The concept of both
transparency and CBMs is simple and straightforward: to stimulate international peace and trust through
openness and information sharing, especially information related to issues such as disarmament and state
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militaries. No international convention or treaty regarding the use and proliferation of conventional weapons
has sufficiently answered the challenges of curbing illicit conventional arms transfers (Laurance 225).
Additionally, no document or treaty has addressed the outstanding problem of the unregulated, yet legal,
international transfer of conventional arms. Developed countries such as the United States and the Russian
Federation, which thrive on the manufacture, import, and export of conventional arms have refused to
become party to a treaty that would severely limit international arms transfers. Unlike the Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Thread Reduction agreements of 1992 which dealt with the “understood threat” of chemical,
biological, and nuclear stockpiles –treaties dealing with conventional weapons face supplier countries who
enjoy high profit margin from sales as well as a sustaining demand for weapons from areas of conflict.
The UN Register of Conventional Arms was officially created in 1991 in reaction to the advanced arms being
used in conflicts in the Middle East. The problems associated with an unrestricted conventional arms trade
were manifested in the 1990 Persian Gulf War, just before the inception of the Register. In the aftermath of
the Gulf War it was almost unanimously accepted that the central cause for the war was the unrestricted
conventional arms transfers to Iraq during the 1980s as it fought in the Iran-Iraq War Coincidently, most of
this trade can be traced back to the five veto powers: China, France, the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the former USSR. Though a substantial international debate followed the realization of this security
threat after the Gulf War, little was done to actual mitigate the threat.
The Register evolved from its original conception of monitoring arms transfers to incorporate the ability to
report on the conventional arms holdings of nations. The purpose of the Register was not only to ensure that
arms transfers were transparent and did not threaten international security, but to also ensure that the
“excessive and destabilizing” stockpiling of conventional weapons does not occur. The framework of the
Register consists of four theoretical components that work to ensure that international arms transfers do not
lead to warfare and unnecessary violence. These components are not resolutions, but they define the purview
and capabilities granted to the Register through UNGA Resolution 46/36L. (Laurance 225)
The first component is data collection, whereby the UN gathers information on arms imports and exports,
military holdings, and any weapons procurement, generally through the direct submission of such data from
UN member states. The second component is the submission of additional data in order to put all of the
information collected by the UN on conventional arms trade and holdings into context. In doing so, the UN
seeks relevant policy and background information on all transfers and holdings or procurements from the
states submitting data for analysis of any potential threats to international security. All of this information is
obtained directly from data submission by states. The third component is the Register’s definition and
identification of a threat to international security. This is the most analytical component of the Register, focusing
on conventional weapons such as missiles or warships. The information obtained by the UN is analyzed to
prevent “the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms.” To being this process, the Register created a
general list of conventional weapon types that it saw as destabilizing and dangerous upon its inception in
1991. By utilizing this list, the Register is more effective in its analysis of conventional arms trafficking
(Laurance 225).
The fourth and final component of the Register is a consultative process in which member states are called upon
to utilize the data collected by the Register for policy decisions and action. The Register was designed for
member states to utilize the data collected to make informed policy decisions at the regional and sub-regional
levels, as it believes those are the easiest levels where any destabilizing arms buildup can be recognized.
Although the UN Register of Conventional Arms has increased transparency through its creation of a
database of arms transfers, the Register cannot truly regulate the illicit or legal trade of conventional weapons
without direct action from member states based on the information in the Register (Laurance 225). The
delegates of the First Committee should bear this in mind and seek ways to incentivize the process and
compel states to take direct action.
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The W assenaar Arrangement
The most recent document that has dealt with the global trade of conventional weapons is the Wassenaar
Arrangement. Drafted in 1996, the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is an attempt to restrict the trade of dual-use technologies, which are
defined as those technologies with both civilian and military uses. One example of a simple type of dual-use
technology is GPS, because it has military applications as well as every day uses for civilians. The United
States in particular feared that the increasing trade of dual-use goods posed a threat to international security.
In response, the United States was one of the key founders of the Arrangement and continues in its attempts
to bolster the effectiveness of the Wassenaar system. The Wassenaar Arrangement attempts to control the
trade of these technologies by limiting their distribution, fostering transparency amongst its members, and by
requiring the notification of any “transfers or denials” to nations not party to the treaty (Jaffer 520). The
Arrangement has been moderately effective, with only 33 member states party to the agreement. It also
suffers from slow turnaround time in the dissemination of information and materials related to its members
(Lloyd 323). The Arrangement’s scope is limited to dual-use technologies, which weakens its overall
effectiveness in addressing the larger issue of the legal and illicit conventional arms trade (Jaffer 520).
Reforming and Expanding International Conventional W eapons Legislation
All existing legislation regarding conventional weapons has failed to produce a comprehensive solution to
conventional weapons proliferation. Although the UN Register has been useful in tracking and recording
arms transfers and procurement, it can do little to stop the trade of conventional weapons to “at risk”
countries or those prone to using such weapons to commit human rights abuses (Laurance 243). This is
because the UN Register has failed to gain the full support of the international community. Only half of UN
member states contribute to the Register, leaving many arms transfers each year undocumented and
undetected. If the UN Register is going to accomplish the objectives it was founded upon, it must see first
that all of the UN member states submit data on all imports and exports of conventional arms.
The signatories to the Wassenaar Arrangement constitute the closest organization that has come towards the
regulation of international conventional arms transfers, as it focuses on a regional and international forum in
its regulation (Laurance 243). The major problem with this agreement, however, is that it is a “supplier’s
club,” meaning that the only states party to it are actually the suppliers, and the nations that heavily demand
conventional weapons are not a part of the organization (Laurance 243). Additionally, there are concerns that
Wassenaar, because it is not legally binding, cannot truly keep its 33 members from acting outside the
auspices of the regime. There is also criticism over the absence of a pre-export consultation mechanism that
would allow member states to make policy-based responses to exports they find unfavorable. Finally, the lack
of an effective information-sharing system generally skews or misrepresents the data collected by the regime,
because most of the annual data collected is not separated by transfer but instead is compounded. It is thus
impossible to identify particular contracts of agreements with regard to this trade, which makes it doubly
harder to put an end to it. The existing information-sharing system of Wassenaar is ineffective, because the
notification system is very slow, and members not in agreement with a certain transfer or who have already
denied an export find out that another member state has agreed to make a transfer only after the transfer has
been verified (Lloyd 319, 323).
In order for an effective type of regulation mechanism to be created, both sides of the arms trade must be
examined, while taking into account the end use of such weapons (Laurance 243). Also, there is a lack of
international action to truly enforce legislation with regard to terrorism and illegally armed groups, an area
which must be addressed. The Wassenaar Arrangement does have strong policies for preventing dangerous
stockpiling of conventional weapons, but these must be applied to more regional and sub-regional levels
across the world to have a strong effect (Laurance 243). Given the destructive nature of terrorism in modern
times, a global disarmament approach cannot rely solely on attempts to stop the proliferation of conventional
arms internationally; it must also focus on regional solutions (Laurance 242).
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CURRENT STATUS
International Threat of Conventional W eapons
The entire international community is involved with arms manufacture and trade. It would therefore be nearly
impossible for any organization to maintain records of all of the various actors involved in either the
manufacture or transfer of conventional weapons today. While exporting states receive a designation with the
UN Register as the arms producers, most international arms defense contractors are supplied with parts from
a number of other firms and states. For example, the AH-64 ‘Apache’ helicopter, manufactured by Boeing
primarily for the United States Armed Forces, uses over 6,000 parts manufactured in several different states
worldwide (Arms 12).
Many conventional weapons, such as the Apache, are distributed worldwide and assembled by a host of
countries, all under a single manufacturer. The use of military equipment once it has been purchased also
causes complications in the effort to create a system of international arms controls. For example, the
European Union (EU) has an arms embargo on Myanmar for what the EU describes its government’s use of
weapons for internal repression. China has long been a supplier of armored vehicles to Myanmar. This is
interesting, given the fact that the armored vehicles supplied by China are manufactured with engines
acquired from the German company Deutz (Arms 7). Therefore, this challenge to effective international arms
control will need to be addressed by the Committee in order to formulate a comprehensive resolution on
Conventional Weapons.
The Complexity of the Arms Trade: Licit and Illicit
During the Cold War, there were two primary sources for weapons: the US and the former USSR. Today a
far more complex system of international arms trade exists. Globalization has led to the proliferation of large
multi-national defense contractors that serve many different clients. Corporations still consider the security
interests of their “home country” when making business decisions, but even that is starting to fade.
Technologies are no longer restricted to the home country of the contractor, as the Joint Strike Fighter
project has shown. With transnational corporations having much to do with arms proliferation, the First
Committee should consider measures to limit the spread of weapons, while still allowing these firms to do
business.
On the other side, illegally armed groups, including separatist movements and terrorist organizations, have
entered warfare as major actors because of their ability to acquire weapons through the black market. This
new component to conflicts is especially challenging because it is often connected to crime, and it has large-
scale human rights implications. It can also have transnational implications, as the conflicts that these groups
become involved in are cross-border or have regional effects (Pythian 21). Delegates should consider this
while drafting solution proposals for committee, as this can pose a significant challenge to efforts to control
the proliferation and trade of conventional weapons.
Political Rationale for Legal Trade

Failures and mistakes in legal arms transfers worldwide often lead to the illicit trade of conventional weapons
worldwide. Lost cargo, corruption, or delays can all lead to weapons falling into the hands of criminals. Since
many of the illicit arms transfers worldwide take place through third-party and privatized arms manufacturers,
this phenomenon is particularly difficult to track and eliminate. The world’s most powerful states, including
all of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), are responsible for many of the
conventional arms transfers to lesser-developed nations, including many that are currently embroiled in
humanitarian crises and internal conflict (Stoel 1291). This can most clearly been seen in US reports on
international arms transfers, in which it is stated that arms transfers by developed nations were
overwhelmingly made to lesser-developed nations. It was also cited that the US and Russia have contributed
to 56.9% of all outgoing arms transfers worldwide (Grimmet).
There are a variety of justifications for this continued transfer of weaponry to developing states, but there are
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three different political strategies into which they can be summarized. First, these developed states believe
that they are positively developing the defensive capabilities of the developing nations to which they send
armaments (Stoel 1290). Supporting their defensive capabilities will make them into stronger states that will
last longer. Second, giving developing states arms can create regional checks and balances for potential
adversaries or states threatening the international balance of power or security (Stoel 1290). Finally, arms-
exporting states generally seek the favor of the developing states to which they export arms and hope to
extend their influence (Stoel 1290).
These justifications do not address the manufacture of the weapons in the first place. For this, we turn to the
idea of deterrence. That is, the stockpiling and manufacture of weaponry creates a strong deterrent to any
attack. No state or group will wish to attack a foe with overwhelming power unless it is prepared to accept a
massive retaliation. By developing in this way, states can lay waste to plans for attack and actually further the
efforts of global peace. Although it gets to the point in a roundabout way, it would be foolish to disregard this
line of reasoning.
Economic Rationales for Legal Trade

Humans are inexorably motivated by various incentives, and these are more base than the political
motivations discussed above. Money is a major motivational factor for these states and their corporations as
well, and although most developed countries have trade restrictions and codes of conduct for arms transfers,
defense contractors can heap influence upon the governments of developed states by lobbying (Stoel 1296).
In the international forum, countries such as the United States have proven they are serious and committed
to reducing arms transfers that propagate human rights violations and violence. Obstacles at the national and
governmental level within developed conventional arms-exporting countries, however, prevent the creation
of effective programs and laws to truly regulate international arms transfers (Stoel 1295-1296).
The Illicit Side of Legal Arms Transfers

The UN Register of Conventional Arms is currently the best outline for an organization that would regulate
the international transfer of conventional weapons. There are still challenges to managing the link between
legal trade of conventional weapons and the illicit trade of such weapons, though. For example, the United
States and some EU nations have placed restrictions on arms trade with China, yet these governments have
allowed companies within their borders to collaborate with Chinese companies to create a new Chinese attack
helicopter. China has been accused of sending attack helicopters to Sudan, and although no official links have
been made, such attack helicopters have been used in the ongoing conflict in Darfur (Arms 16-17) The term
illicit trade refers to the trade that occurs beyond the auspices of such bodies as the UN Register of
Conventional Arms and where the final destination or end use of the weapons is truly unknown. These secret
transactions can easily be used to provide weapons to rebel groups, non-state paramilitary groups, and
terrorists.
The most obvious evidence of the harm an unregulated legal trade of conventional weapons can cause is seen
usually when it is too late to stop the illicit and non-transparent trade of these weapons. It is seen in war-
zones and other areas, where major human rights violations and devastating attacks result from lack of
supervision and undue aggression (Stoel 1285). The new state of East Timor is an example of the impact
unregulated conventional weapons can cause (Craft 693). Nobel Peace Laureate and Timorese President Jose
Ramos-Horta provided a detailed first-hand account of the illicit trade of conventional weapons in a
statement describing guerilla warfare in an East Timorese village:
“In the summer of 1978, with East Timorese guerrillas continuing to resist the Indonesia military occupation,
the war struck my family. My sister Maria Ortensia was killed by a U.S.-made Bronco aircraft that was being
used by Indonesian forces in East Timor for counterinsurgency. In the same year I lost two brothers, Nunu
and Guilherme, the first killed by fire from a U.S.-designed M-16 automatic assault rifle made under license in
Indonesia, and the second during a rocket and strafing attack by a U.S.-supplied helicopter on an East
Timorese village”(Stoel 1285).
Although countries such as the US and other major weapons suppliers do not bear responsibility for the
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casualties their weapons cause in the hands of others, misuse by others is not uncommon. The situation in
East Timor began in 1975, when the Portuguese ended their colonization of the nation, leaving it as an
independent nation (East). East Timor was annexed by Indonesia and resistance broke out from 1975 to 1999
(East). A violent repression by Indonesian military forces marked these decades, as over 200,000 people of
East Timor were either killed by the military, famine, or poverty (East). The use of conventional weapons in
the effort to suppress the rebellion of East Timor was common. Nearing the end of the struggle, Indonesian
forces were reported to be using British helicopters and ground vehicles for their attacks on rebel parties
(Stoel 1285). As a result of the conflict, East Timor was with one of the world’s weakest economies (East).
East Timor is proof of the destructive capabilities of conventional weapons if they are not carefully
monitored. Even today, East Timor is in crisis, feeling the long-term effects of nearly three decades of
conflict (East). As such, delegates should consider the implications illustrated by this case and develop the
necessary means to prevent the destabilizing effects of conventional armaments.
Violence in Uzbekistan has also been fueled by oversights in legal arms trade. In May 2005, it was estimated
that 750 people were killed by the Uzbek government in an instance of governmental repression (Tavernise).
Demonstrators in the town of Andijan, including women and children, were shot down in masses by Uzbek
troops, some outfitted with Land Rovers with several different types of mounted artillery and weaponry. The
Land Rovers, made in the UK, were shipped from a Turkish company to the Turkish government, and were
then gifted by the Turkish government to the Uzbek government. These vehicles are not protected by British
export controls, and thus 70% of the Land Rovers in Uzbekistan at the time were manufactured in the UK
were responsible, and some were responsible for contributing to the deaths of hundreds. It is important to
emphasize that the British Government had no connection to the violence (Arms 14). This example shows
how complicated the issue truly is; whether the UK actually bears any responsibility for the deaths is
ambiguous, as there was no prior knowledge that they would have been used for such a thing, nor that they
would have been shipped to Uzbekistan. The First Committee will have to carefully weigh the complicated
supply chains that lead weapons to arrive at their final destinations.
The situations in East Timor and Uzbekistan are examples of governments using conventional weapons to
pursue violent ambitions. This represents one of the most serious issues with the legal trade of conventional
arms: there is no binding international protocol for verifying or defining the end means of the importing
state. Legal transfers can easily become illegal transfers based on the end means of the importing state, which
is why the inclusion of an international end means verification requirement into international law is so crucial
to the issue of conventional weapons. Delegates should carefully consider a realistic system for monitoring
this aspect of the arms trade in order to develop a comprehensive resolution on conventional weapons.
Illicit Arms Transfers
Aside from the flaws in the legal system for the transfer of conventional arms, which leads to illegal ends,
there can be defined several other different causes or contributors to the illegal transfer of conventional arms.
Forged End-Use Certificates

The forging of End-Use Certificates (EUC) is a contributor to illicit arms deals worldwide. EUCs are ways
that importing states can verify that they are the end-user of the weapon and that no other third party will
become involved in their use or trade. Both states and intermediaries such as companies must fill out these
EUCs that are stipulated by the codes on arms importation by the importing state. Included with EUCs are
End-User Acknowledgement agreements that ensure that all the goods shipped by the exporter reach the
importer. The forging of EUCs is a problem, because there is no standard form for EUCs by which the entire
international community must comply. Additionally, when exporting states allow intermediaries to control the
transfer and transportation of arms, these EUCs become very important, so when smugglers or terrorists
forge EUCs, illicit trafficking is not difficult. EUCs can be bought on the black market within a price range of
roughly US$100,000 to US$150,000 today, yet the locales from which they are overwhelmingly purchased
have not always remained constant. For example, during the 1980s Panama and Turkey were key states
forging EUCs, while today, states like Paraguay and some Far-East states such as Thailand and Singapore are
common sources for forged EUCs (Kozyulin 13-16)
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Grey Zones and Post-Soviet States

States in transition often do not have the power or the resources to enforce their laws effectively. In certain
regions, separatist commanders or local leaders will implement new forms of governance and establish
militias to maintain control. Flourishing black markets exist in these areas for arms trafficking, most of this
trade connected with the drug trade, prostitution, and the “blood diamond” trade. These areas or regions are
termed gray regions because they are under the jurisdiction of a national government, however, they are
autonomous in nature with limited to no intervention by the national government in their affairs. Iraq is a
prime example of a state that currently has a high possibility of becoming a grey zone, because the Iraq War
has moved the Iraqi government into a transitional period. Several post-Soviet states, as well as other Middle
Eastern, Asian, and African states can be indentified as grey zones (Kozyulin 16).
The fall of the Soviet Union is in part responsible for the overwhelming promulgation of arms across Eastern
Europe and into other parts of the world, such as the aforementioned regions. Many of the covert systems
for arms transfers used by the Soviet Union during the Cold War between its satellite states and other Soviet
allies in the Middle East and Africa are still used today by these states nearly two decades after the fall of the
Soviet Empire and the separation of its satellite states into self-sustaining nation-states. Bulgaria, Poland, the
Czech Republic, and the former Yugoslavia in particular are amongst the most prominent states still active in
covert arms transfers due to the regional connections and experience they gained during the Cold War.
Simply put, these operations are in no way new to these states, as they were routine for decades during the
Cold War, so it is difficult to “change the sphere of activity” for a process which has been a part of the status
quo for so long. Even beyond these countries, former American and British secret service members have
been known to use their arms contacts and experience for covert arms transfers internationally (Kozyulin 16).
Yugoslavia has several times been accused of attempting, whether successfully or unsuccessfully, to illegally
send weapons to Iraq. Whether or not Yugoslavia was ever attempting to send weapons to Iraq is still
unknown, but it is clear that Yugoslavia has continued to use its systems for illegal arms smuggling to move
arms around the globe. In October 2002, a Tonga-registered cargo ship that was intercepted and confiscated
offshore the Croatian coast by authorities was found to have over 200 tons of conventional weapons on
board, including materials with which rockets could be made. It was determined that the ship was destined
for Iraq, and the ship was found to have departed from a port in Yugoslavia (Kozyulin 19).
Criminal Channels for Arms Trafficking

As evidenced by the success of grey markets, criminals involved in the illicit trade of arms do not solely focus
on the arms trade. Major channels of criminal activity include the trafficking of narcotics, arms, and humans –
most commonly in the form of prostitution. By connecting these types of criminal activity, arms traffickers
can more easily smuggle arms internationally because there becomes a greater network of contacts and
channels through which they can move their arms. It is in this way that terrorists most easily acquire their
weapons, since a substantial percentage of terrorist funding is derived from other criminal activities, such as
the sale of narcotics and human trafficking (Kozyulin 16-17).
The link between organized crime and illicit arms trafficking is made clear through the example put forth by
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC). The rebel group FARC earns US$500 million a year
from the drug trade alone. The Columbian government, however, has made it clear that FARC is also heavily
involved in the illicit arms trade, trading drugs for guns. Between 1995 and 2001, the Columbian government
has reported to have seized over 15,000 arms and more than 2.5 million rounds of ammunition. Since FARC
is a separatist group funded by criminal activities, it is not difficult to understand how this intricate system of
criminal trade channels is fruitful for criminals and terrorists worldwide (Stohl).
Terrorist and Illegally Armed Groups’ Use of Conventional Weapons

A threat to international security and stability is obviously posed by the unregulated and illicit transfer of
conventional weapons. This threat is greatly increased if the recipients of these weapons are illegally armed
groups and terrorist organizations. These groups are not bound to any sort of international law or treaty
designed to regulate state relations. Instead, they often have intentions that are directed at civilians (Nagle
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232). Disguising their conventional weapons of choice as everyday objects like soccer balls or soup cans,
terrorist organizations use the indiscriminate nature of conventional weapons to their advantage. (Nagle 232).
One difference that distinguishes illegally armed groups or separatist groups from terrorists is their area of
focus. Terrorist organizations are not bound to any specific region or area, and although they may focus
exclusively on a single region, their reach is truly unlimited. This was made obvious foremost by the 9/11
attacks, the planning for which took place in the Middle East. Illegally armed groups differ in that they are
usually bound to specific conflicts and have been marked as dangerous groups who, like terrorists, are not
bound to a certain set of rules or code of conduct.
There are certain nations today that have a greater reputation for certain types of separatist-related
conventional weapons attacks. In Colombia, the threat of landmines is extremely prevalent. As of 2005, 31 of
the nation’s 32 divided political departments were known to have active APLs within their borders, and
Colombia is estimated to have 70,000 landmines, ranking fourth in the world behind Chechnya, Afghanistan,
and Cambodia (Nagle 237). Still, APLs continue to be deployed in Colombia by illegally armed groups,
resulting in the death or injury of a Colombian citizen every twelve hours (Nagle 236). Though Colombia’s
armed groups claim they seek to regain governmental control from a corrupt regime, they still cause civilian
deaths by planting mines in areas where civilians can be easily injured. For example, mines have been
recorded detonating near creeks and farms, and even near schools and soccer fields where children are
present (Nagle 240, 250).
The terrorist threat from conventional weapons is equally as dangerous as that of illegal armed groups. In the
2006 summer skirmishes between Lebanon and Israel, Hezbollah used Chinese cluster bombs to attack Israel
(Lebanon/Israel). Classified as a terrorist group by most of the world, Hezbollah has committed several
attacks and bombings since its creation in 1982 that have utilized conventional arms (Council). The most
recent 2006 skirmish with Israel shows that this group is still procuring arms illegally, and their use in
response to Israeli attacks reveals that the group will use them in armed conflict (Council). Although it is
unknown where Hezbollah acquired these weapons, there is speculation the arms were received from Iran
and Syria (Lebanon/Israel). This short war in 2006 has not only led to further discussion on international
legislation against cluster munitions, but also has confirmed suspicions in the international community that
terrorist groups are acquiring more powerful conventional weapons and using them in modern warfare for
indiscriminate destructive purposes (Lebanon/Israel). This will be an important considering for all delegates
in working to draft a comprehensive resolution addressing conventional weapons.
BLOC POSITIONS
M ajor Arms Exporters
The states that are most resistant to international regulations on conventional arms transfers are the worlds
most developed countries, including the five permanent members of the UNSC. The United States and
Russia dominated the international arms market from 2003 to 2006, collectively making 56.9% of the world’s
arms transfer agreements during this time (Grimmett). Beyond these two major powers, European states such
as France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy are among the top arms exporters worldwide
(Grimmett). China is also responsible for many of the world’s conventional arms transfers, especially to
countries which have recently raised international security concerns such as Iran (Grimmett). These states
take a strong stance against additional regulation as these transfers constitute billions of dollars in sales for
these exporters.
M ajor Arms Importers
Pakistan, India, and Saudi Arabia rank as the top three states for the value of arms transfers internationally
among all developing country arms purchasers (Grimmett). The value of their purchases all rank in the
billions, meaning that they heavily depend on these imports for their arms stockpiles. This group includes a
wide array of nations across several continents, most significantly, spanning Asia, Latin America, and Africa
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(Grimmett). Specifically Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Taiwan, Chile, Venezuela, and South Korea are key arms
importers, along with a host of other nations behind them (Grimmett). They are also opposed to increased
regulation because of their dependence on arms trade to support their military initiatives.
African Nations
The African continent has a truly unique position in the realm of the conventional arms trade, as much of the
continent is ravaged by violence caused by ethnic and political-based war. Africa suffers from separatist
violence, in some states on a day-to-day basis, as the illicit arms trade there has fueled conflicts across the
continent. The combination of Africa’s vast amount of rich resources and the weak nature of most of its
states, fuels conflicts, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is because in Africa, the effect of the privatization
of the arms industry on the black market for arms is particularly striking. The acquisition of conventional
arms in Africa often occurs through complex operations involving a number of brokers, manufacturers,
financiers, and suppliers, as well as a wide range of shipment points (Phythian 21). African states must have a
more direct approach to the issue because the process of illicit arms transfers many times is often focused in
Africa. African states often implicated with illicit transfers are Sudan, Libya, Chad, and several other Sub-
Saharan and Great Lakes African states.
Conflict and Post-Conflict States
States that cannot truly control their entire territory because of a weak or ineffective government, a
governmental collapse, or the lack of finances, organization, and infrastructure fall into this category. This
also includes nations that do not have the means to protect their own arms stockpiles. Many times black
markets and grey zones, centers for the illicit trade of arms, are extensive in this type of state, and ineffective
border control makes arms smuggling both into and out of these states much less cumbersome. Somalia,
Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo are the best known failed states, with others such as Afghanistan and Iraq having
become more recent centers for corruption. Failed states can be found across the international community on
virtually every continent, with Australia being the exception. These states help perpetuate the illicit trade of
conventional arms, though not always intentionally. Therefore their approach to this issue surely should be
one of concern for their own wellbeing based on their internal situation and the impact the illicit arms trade
has upon their society.
COMMITTEE MISSION
The threat of conventional weapons is more than just one concerning the lives of those already embroiled in
warfare or intrastate conflict. Conventional weapons create pain and suffering that is unnecessary and affects
more than just those who fall victim to their destructive power. That there is no international treaty or
document that effectively deals with conventional weapons and all of their aspects, including transfers
amongst states, is unacceptable. The unregulated legal trade and the illicit trade of conventional arms both
contribute to the proliferation of such weapons worldwide. It is because of this that the First Committee
must act on the issue of conventional weapons.
The First Committee must produce a resolution to deal with this issue without imposing upon the legal rights
of importing and exporting states, which have their own respective reasons and defenses for such trade. Also,
this resolution must address the threat of terrorist organizations and illegally armed groups that acquire
conventional weapons – specifically, the means by which these arms are obtained. Creativity, analytical
thinking, and practicality are necessary, as such a task will require a resolution that can be accepted
multilaterally. The framework provided by the international organizations and documents concerning
conventional weapons such as the CCW and the Wassenaar Arrangement are a good starting point for the
expansion, creation, or revision of conventional arms legislation. Assessing other types of weapons treaties,
such as those dealing with SALW is also a strong starting point for these types of solutions. This issue can be
broken down in any way desired, for example regionally, internationally, or by importing and exporting
nations. It is up to the First Committee to find a way to eliminate the threat propagated by the free-flow of
conventional weapons internationally.
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WEAPONIZATION AND SPACE

TOPIC B
INTRODUCTION
With rapid advances in information and communication technologies since the beginning of the Cold War,
modern warfare continues to distinguish itself from the relatively crude science of the first half of the 20th
century. This advance in military technology has led to a new fear: the destructive power of advanced
weapons systems, which leads to international security concerns. One such international security concern
created by this technology is the possible deployment of weapons from Earth to destroy important
international information and communication technologies, the most obvious being satellites. The
weaponization of space through the physical placement of weapons in space, as well as the existence of
weapons capable of reaching space from earth, lies at the heart of this major international concern.
The advent of space technology during the Cold War and the looming threat of a nuclear showdown between
the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR) during that era created concern over the future of space
weapons and their capabilities. Additionally, the development, use, and increasing reliance on space-based
communication technology throughout the Cold War heightened fears that Earth-to-space weapons could be
a devastating force if ever deployed and used. This threat is present even today and is compounded by the
improvements in this technology since the end of the Cold War. It is the charge of the First Committee to
address the weaponization of space, including the threat posed by non space-based weaponry that is capable
of destroying valuable space-based communication and scientific tools. The weaponization of space is
incomplete, and its ramifications are unknown. Accordingly, the First Committee must prevent a free-for-all
proliferation of weapons in space while allowing states to address legitimate security concerns. Since many
aspects of this topic will develop in the future, the Committee has the opportunity to issue a mandate and
prevent a crisis before it even develops.
HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE
On October 4, 1957, the Soviets launched the first operating space satellite, Sputnik I. Its success heralded
the beginning of the “space race” between the US and the Soviet Union. In response to the launch, the US
performed successful outer space nuclear tests and detonations in the same year. These were both watershed
events that transformed conventional definitions of international disarmament and security, as the
weaponization of outer space added a new potential dimension to warfare. The expansion of technology into
space became a reality in the midst of the Cold War and created an fear over future capabilities in outer space
weaponry (Freeland 1094-1096).
The United Nations and the Space Race
The United Nations (UN) formed an ad-hoc committee to attempt to govern the uses of outer space in 1958,
officially titled the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (COPUOS). The committee was formed
for the purpose of exploring the legal questions surrounding outer space, especially those dealing with
international security. COPUOS, though not as influential today as it was at that time, does still exist as a part
of the Outer Space Affairs Division of the UN. COPUOS was instrumental in providing the legal framework
for future UN treaties concerning the issue of space weaponry – most importantly the Outer Space Treaty.
Since the actual drafting of these treaties, however, the importance of COPUOS has declined. (Park 876). By
1961, the General Assembly (UNGA) proposed the expansion of the authority of the United Nations Charter
and international law to encompass “outer space and celestial bodies” (Freeland 1095). In 1963, this
recommendation had officially become a reality through UNGA Resolution 1962, also known as the
“Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space” (Freeland 1095). Several states had different interpretations of what this resolution actually stood for,
with some believing it to be an attempt to ban completely any militaristic operations in space, but it eventually
became determined that the resolution did not seek to ban military operations in space. Instead, its purpose is
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to maintain space as a non-aggressive frontier for peaceful purposes, with military applications for defensive
purposes being a legitimate use for space, an ideology most commonly tied to the Cold War superpowers
(Freeland 1095). The US and USSR adopted this ideology because it allowed them to continue their
expansion in space technologically and militarily.
The first UN treaty asserting authority over outer space and any foreseeable use of space came in 1967, as the
tensions caused by the space-based technological rivalry between the US and USSR began to become more
antagonistic. The Outer Space Treaty (OST) of October 1967 was the first treaty in history to address the
weaponization of space in an effort to restrict warfare. The OST did ban the use of nuclear and non-nuclear
weapons of mass-destruction (WMDs) in outer space, but it did not restrict other types of weapons (Park
874-877). Also, the OST does not clarify whether space is a realm in which the premise of self-defense set
forth by the UN Charter can be employed – meaning that nothing was made clear about the right to self-
defense in space, including the prospect of warfare based on the principle of self-defense. In addition to the
OST, the UN has adopted four other supporting treaties governing practices in outer space: The Agreement
on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space (1968), the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972), the
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1975), and the Agreement Governing the
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1979). As a combined force, these five treaties,
headlined by the OST, create a substantial framework for the governance of outer space (Freeland 1095-
1100).
There are several other notable international treaties and UN resolutions in place that deal with the
weaponization of space, and these treaties demonstrated international dedication to preventing a space arms
race. They were sometimes even specific. For example, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) drafted bi-
laterally by the US and USSR in 1972, was designed to halt the proliferation of “strategic offensive arms”
through banning the use, development, and testing of ballistic missiles. It encompasses the realm of outer
space, the seas, land-based or mobile missile systems, and aerial missile systems in its purview. Also worth
noting is the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 banning nuclear tests in outer space, underwater, and in the
atmosphere. There is has yet to be a focus specific to outer space (Freeland 1095-1100). Finally, there are four
seminal UNGA Resolutions that specifically deal with the weaponization of space: The Declaration on
International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Use and Benefit and in the
Interest of All States (1996), Principles Relating to the Use of Nuclear Power in Outer Space (1992),
Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of Earth from Outer Space (1986), and Principles Governing the Use
by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting (1982).
All of these treaties and resolutions act as support for the OST and its other four counterpart treaties,
substantiating a significant legal framework for the uses of outer space (Park 874-877). There are a number of
treaties concerning space, its uses, and the weaponization of space in particular, but their legal framework
established primarily in the 1970s and 80s is outdated and does not fully address some of the more pertinent
issues of the 21st century. Additionally, many of the major international treaties such as the ABM and Limited
Test Ban Treaty do not address the weaponization of space as an issue in its own. Today, this topic demands
much more focus than it has been given in the past because of the rapid advancement of space technology
since the Cold War era.
The Growth of Space W eaponry and Technology
Speculations regarding the future of weapons’ capabilities in space were not addressed comprehensively
throughout the 1960s and 70s. During that period, the most notable and historic advances in outer space
were made when the USSR launched the first human being into outer space in 1961, followed by a
subsequent launch by the United States in 1962. The rivalry of the two superpowers intensified significantly
after these achievements, but it was not until the 1980s when the speculation of the two previous decades
finally emerged as an issue of international concern. On March 23, 1983, US President Ronald Reagan
shocked the world by announcing the start of a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to protect the US from the
missile threat posed by the USSR. The SDI was ostensibly meant to protect US borders from a ballistic
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missile attack by the USSR. Reagan’s SDI was coined “Star Wars”, after a futuristic space movie of the era. It
was officially meant for defensive purposes, but it can be argued that the militaristic motives behind the
initiative are still not peaceful. Although Star Wars dissolved with the end of Reagan’s presidency, SDI still
remains an integral facet of the United States’ space program, although today it has been re-named the Missile
Defense Agency (Freeland 1095-1102).
The 1990 Gulf War in Iraq and Kuwait was the first real test of any type of space-based military operations.
As a part of Operation Desert Storm, the United States Armed Forces used space-based technology in the
form of satellite imagery technology as a platform for strategic planning throughout the war. This new
technology allowed the US military to pinpoint their enemy from outer space and plan strikes more
efficiently. This arguably allowed forces to focus their efforts only on military targets and limit civilian
casualties. To further US innovation in space weaponry, in 1998 the United States Space Command
(USSPACECOM) announced a Long Range Plan that detailed US plans for the militarization of space, as well
as for the future US domination of space. The Long Range Plan, also known as the Vision for 2020, is
comprised of four parts, two of which were introduced initially in 1998, and two much more controversial
plans which were introduced the following year. Entitled “space support” and “force enhancement,” these
first two plans were meant to aid military operations on land, sea, and in the air from outer space. The more
controversial “space control” and “force application” mission plans suggest the weaponization of space and
its use for future warfare. Ultimately, these mission plans outlined a US-dominated outer space (Park 878-
881).
The Commercialization of Space
Although the United States and the USSR maintained exclusive control of outer space for multiple decades,
the continuous advance of space technology partially shifted this control to multinational industry. Since the
fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the stark changes in US political, military, and
economic policies gave way to the widespread commercialization of space for business, other developed
states, and even private use for individuals. Since 1996 it has been estimated that over 800,000 people are
employed by the space industry. This shift has not only been beneficial to business and communications, but
it has more recently become essential to the management of national economies. This has become especially
true for developed nations such as the United States and Russia, as well as major European actors such as
Great Britain, Germany, and France. The commercialization of space has led to billions of dollars in profits
worldwide for a number of different investors (Park 878-881). Today the commercialization of space is quite
clear, with companies such as Direct TV and Sirius broadcasting television and radio respectively via satellites,
bringing the use of satellite technology right into your home or automobile.
Types of W eaponry
The rise in the commercialization of space signified the downfall of an era of almost monopolistic control by
the US and the former Soviet Union of outer space. Now that space is accessible to such a widespread range
of actors, many new security questions have arisen concerning the weaponization of space. New technology
used for communication and information transfers, not only by state governments, but also by private
companies such as news broadcasting corporations is vital for many things, from the management of national
economies to assisting in performing simple daily tasks. The media group BBC, an international British
owned news broadcasting corporation is an example of a private company which owns its own satellite. One
way the BBC uses satellites is for long-range live news feeds. For example, anchors can conduct live
interviews with reporters covering the Iraq War in Iraq from a news studio thousands of miles away. Since
this technology has taken such an important place in the international community, its security is equally as
important because much of the developed world has become dependent on satellites for these practical
purposes. The commercialization of space has made the weaponization of space an even greater threat to the
international community, because an attack on a single satellite used for communications could severely
hamper the conduct of business or military affairs in a nation.
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Satellite Technology
Since the first satellite launch by the USSR in 1957, civilian and military capabilities and uses for satellites
worldwide have grown immensely. There are more than 800 active satellites currently in orbit, with the
United States owning roughly half with over 400 satellites (“What’s…”). Russia and China are second and
third respectively in number of satellites owned. Neither state has more than 100 active satellites in orbit
(“What’s…”). The United States currently has more military based satellites than the rest of the world
combined with over 100 military satellites in orbit (“What’s…”).
There are three major types of satellites, low-Earth orbit (LEO), intermediate Earth orbit (MEO), and
geosynchronous satellites that are in high orbit. Geosynchronous (GEO) satellites are generally television and
communications, civilian type satellites, but do include some satellites for military uses such as
communications and missile launch detection (“What’s…”). GEO satellites’ range makes them more difficult
to reach with weapons from the earth as they are found typically 36,000 km above earth (“What’s…”). MEO
satellites, mainly GPS and navigation satellites, are also out of range of most types of weapons fired from
earth (Garwin 248-249). LEO satellites, however, are close enough to be reached by weapons such as a
missile and additionally happen to be among the most important types of satellites for government and
military use. They also include dual-use weather satellites (“What’s…”). The satellite systems in LEO are
among the most important to international security, and have been known for several years as National
Technical Means (NTM), with their name marking this importance. NTM are legally protected from attack by
the ABM, as well as through the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) Agreements between the United
States and Russia (Garwin 248-249).
Some satellites have been termed dual-use technologies, meaning they have applications to both civilian and
military operations (Park 885). Weather imagery, television broadcasts, mobile and fixed communications, and
navigation systems are some of the most common civilian uses, all of which have been blended seamlessly
into daily life in the 21st century (Garwin 243). Some of these also have practical military uses. For example,
weather imagery may be used to strategize for combat based on weather conditions. Satellite intelligence
(SATINT) allows commanders to missile launches nearly anywhere on earth within a minute of launch
(Garwin 243). During the Gulf War, satellites helped to plan and strategize military operations on land, sea,
and air. These types of satellites employed by the military have been coined Defense Support Program (DSP)
satellites, and are commonly used by military forces worldwide (Garwin 243).
Most significantly, the introduction of Global Positioning System (GPS) technology in the 1990s via satellites
revolutionized the capabilities of satellite technology both for military and civilian uses. GPS technology has
the capability to pinpoint a target at a range of up to one millimeter of proximity (Garwin 244). Today, most
missiles and bombs are controlled by GPS technology and are accurate within meters of the desired target.
This technology is not necessarily readily available for civilian uses, though. In many instances, governments
limit the civilian capabilities of GPS in terms of accuracy, reserving the higher resolution GPS systems only
for military uses (Garwin 244). GPS has assuredly been used for positive and negative means since its
inception, as terrorists can easily use GPS to plan attacks today.
Satellite technology revolutionizes the way the world operates economically, politically, militarily, and socially
by allowing communication and networking across thousands of miles in a matter of minutes, if not seconds.
They will continue to have a significant international impact in all of these areas in years to come through
further growth and technological expansion. The real issue surrounding satellite technology in relation to the
weaponization of space is the security of the technology itself, as it is so vital to worldwide information
sharing and communication. During the Cold War, some of the most common types of space-related
weapons in production were anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) that could reach and effectively disable or destroy
them. Although ASAT weapons are generally not physically located in space, these weapons’ capability to
reach space makes them both significant and relevant to the weaponization of space (Garwin 246-248).
Therefore, delegates should be careful in their consideration of appropriate solutions regarding this issue in
their effort to formulate a comprehensive international solution on this issue.
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Anti-satellite Weaponry
The development of ASAT was precipitated by US and Soviet escalation of space weaponry. ASAT therefore
are generally not located in space itself, but are more typically missiles launched from Earth. Some types of
ASAT are placed in space, however, because of the method in which they are meant to destroy satellites.
There are several different forms of ASAT, but most still are designed with a missile or rocket as the main
weapon designed to reach and destroy a satellite. Miniature homing vehicle (MHV) technology, for example,
can easily reach an LEO satellite through placement within a missile or rocket. It can be launched from an
aircraft or from the ground in order to reach the satellite. MHV technology is also typically incorporated into
state missile defense programs or strategies (Garwin 246-250).
Though ASATs are technically space weapons, there are some ASATs that are not designed to destroy
satellites. Instead, these ASAT disrupt satellites’ normal activities and thus blur the line established by the
OST and other related international documents because they are not actually destructive weapons. Therefore,
the OST does not ban the use of ASATs. Commonly used disruptors deployed by ASATs include ground-
based jamming weapons, encryption devices, and suborbital intercept missiles that are used for missile
defense. These weapons essentially shut down communications from the satellite to its host, rendering the
host unable to receive communication for a short period of time. In addition to non-destructive or passive
weapons such as these, it is not uncommon for weapons to be deployed in space only for a short time period
like a few days or weeks so to remain ambiguous and not be identified as actual weapons. Space mines, which
detonate when a satellite comes into range are also a type of ASAT, which, as previously mentioned, are
considered a type of ASAT even though they are physically in space (Park 882-883). These weapons are still,
however, in development.
Since there is no actual international legal definition of what a space weapon is, it is sometimes unclear to see
how ASATs fit into the category of space weapons. ASATs are a type of space weapon because they are the
only viable means of destroying satellites available. The lack of a legal definition and the exclusion of ASAT
from the OST are glaring weaknesses in international law pertaining to the weaponization of space. Since
ASATs in missile form are most effective at targeting LEO satellites, many of which are NTM, this makes
them a significantly greater threat to international security. ASATs, unlike other types of space weapons, are
the most readily available space weapons today, which makes them even more pertinent in the broader scope
of the weaponization of space. Space weapons, or weapons physically located in outer space, present in many
ways a much different threat to international security than ASAT.
Space Weapons
Ronald Reagan’s Star Wars program was the first significant international plan proposed to place weapons in
space for any purpose, whether peaceful, defensive, or offensive. It marked the end of the continuous
rhetoric about space weapons of the 1960s and 1970s, and the beginning of a realistic attempt to create
weapons in outer space. Researchers focused most of their efforts during the Star Wars era on a laser
weapons able to shoot down and missiles from space (Garwin 245). The space-based laser (SBL) could also
be used to mount an attack on land, sea, or air from outer space via laser beam in LEO, constituting it as a
futuristic threat not only to just advanced technology such as satellites, but also to the inhabitants of Earth as
well as to forms of major international infrastructure, for example highways or medical systems. Laser
weapons seem futuristic, and they are. Although many prototypes are in development, there is still yet to be
developed a viable laser weapon that is capable of doing any of the above. There are speculations that states
such as the United States are still developing SBL for use in space. The United States military has commonly
reviewed the usefulness of an SBL for military purposes in replacing the need to risk human lives in military
operations (Park 881).
Much like the SBL, kinetic kill vehicles are another type of space-based weapon that have been proposed by
the United States and Russia. Like SBL, kinetic kill vehicles would focus on targeting and destroying ballistic
missiles upon their launch. Instead of the use of one laser beam, however, kinetic kill vehicles would
accomplish their goal through the deployment of several small satellites around the Earth (Park 881). Outside
of these two major types of space based weapons, other more simple weapons systems have been proposed.
One such example is a rocket system that would remain in orbit with the ability to target satellites and missiles
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and to destroy them. Additionally, though banned by the OST and other major international documents,
there is always the ever-looming threat of the inclusion of nuclear weapons or other non-nuclear weapons of
mass destruction into the category of space weaponry (Garwin 245).
The Threat of the W eaponization of Space
Although current technology limits the ability to place highly advanced weapons in space that will be able to
meet such demands, the rapid growth of new advanced technology today will surely supersede these
limitations in the future. The dangerous possibility of space weapons being able to reach any type of satellite,
no matter the height of its orbit, as well as to possibly reach Earth with a force such as a laser is what makes
them such an important issue in the realm of international disarmament and security. It is important to realize
that though the development of such advanced weapons would occur in the future, the international
community must act now to ensure they will never leave the ground. The commercialization of space
completely changed the entire economic, political, military, and social landscape of the international
community, as have the continuous technological advances related to such commercialization. Included in
this change was the move of communications infrastructures to satellite technology, as well as the use of
satellites to manage and run national economies or international economic structures.
In addition to these two critical areas, many states depend on NTM satellites in LEO for functioning
government and military apparatuses. Although NTM are protected by the ABM and the SALT Agreements,
the international community has not fully endorsed either of these treaties because of the bilateral nature of
the agreements and the collapse of the Soviet Union shortly after the negotiations. The destruction of any of
these types of infrastructural satellites could cripple a state because of the interconnectedness of digital data
run through computers today via satellites. NTM satellites digitally run economies, government and military
communications, and are used to transmit data vital to a state’s existence. Beyond even this, space warfare
could also be used to directly cause damage to vital physical infrastructure on Earth, a completely separate
security question altogether. Though futuristic, the reality stands that there is already technology existent,
whether or not it is in place in outer space or on land, sea, or air, that is able to reach and effectively destroy
satellites in space.
The commercialization of space also brought forth another major international security issue: semi-
independent or even independent actors can now influence the international security agenda in outer space
(Park 880). When the OST and other international and UN documents of its kind were introduced, there
were only two major actors in space, both with a substantial amount of control over the security agenda. In
fact, most of the treaties drafted during the Cold War concerning outer space, most specifically the OST,
were headed by the United States and the USSR (Henry 62). The myopia of all of the international documents
concerning the weaponization of space to not recognize the ability of commercial enterprises to influence
space dynamics has created a vacuum in the international legal regime’s ability to regulate these types of actors
(Park 880).
Continued proliferation of space technology makes future space warfare more realistic. Several key issues
have been raised as to the capabilities of space weapons and their capability, as well as the weaknesses in the
current legal space structure. The weaponization of space, while it presents several positive security
possibilities for states, also presents several threats to international security. States such as the United States
have taken firm stances to continue their development of space weapons for defensive and therefore semi-
peaceful purposes. More actors today such as India and China have taken steps to do the same, a trend that
will more than likely continue to grow in the future. The positive uses for space weapons are quite clear: they
are effective for monitoring and protecting national interests. The negative aspects of space weaponization
are what must be dealt with; separating the positive uses from the negative uses of space weapons is what
must be done in the international forum to effectively address the issue of the weaponization of space.
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CURRENT STATUS
Chinese Anti-Satellite Test
On 11 January 2007, China performed an anti-satellite test against one of its own satellites, marking the first
known successful Chinese ASAT test (Henry 62). The Chinese government tested their ASAT technology on
a decrepit weather satellite using a rocket derived from a ballistic missile. This development shocked several
countries, most notably the United States, which until this point had maintained monopolistic control over
military operations in space, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union. The Chinese had previously
attempted to accomplish this same feat three different times between 2004 and 2007, finally finding success in
2007 (Henry 62). The motives behind the test were unclear from the outset, but what was immediately clear
at the time was that the Chinese has emerged alongside the United States and the post-Soviet Russian
Federation as a significant actor in outer space (Broad).
Initially, it was assumed that the Chinese test was an attempt to signal their rise to power as a major military
force in space. The test was the first true “escalation in the weaponization of space” since the last weapons
test by the United States in 1984, and ended a span of restraint in the use of space weapons. In the days
following the Chinese test, several inquiries were made, most at the behest of the United States, into the
nature of the test. The Bush Administration, during the previous August, had authorized a new National
Space Policy that rejected any international call for bans on space weapons tests. This policy guaranteed US
deterrence against any state that impedes its ability to carry out such tests or to develop space weapons. In a
more punitive manner, the policy guaranteed that the US would “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of
space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests” (Broad).
The US harshly criticized China for the test, saying that its actions did not coincide with efforts to maintain
international and even bi-lateral cooperation in space on the issue of the weaponization of space (Broad).
Following the test, China maintained their stance that an arms race in outer space must not occur, pushing for
negotiations to ban weapons in space. It has been speculated that because of this stance by the Chinese, the
test was intended to send a different message for the United States. Some have suggested that the Chinese
government performed the test in order to push the US into negotiations for a treaty banning space weapons,
an agenda of which both China and Russia have been major advocates (Kahn).
During UN negotiations on the subject in October 2007, the United States made it clear that it would not
support any type of space arms ban treaty, which it deemed would be “superficially appealing” but in actuality
would be severely flawed (United). Both China and Russia vigorously continued to press an agenda for such a
treaty, co-sponsoring resolutions dealing with an outer space arms race. China, more importantly, reaffirmed
its stance that a resolution banning an arms race in space must be passed, in addition to responding critically
to United States criticism regarding the significant amount of space debris the US is responsible for (United).
More than 40% of all space debris has been found to belong to the United States, a problem which extends
beyond the issue of space weaponization (United).
United States Response to Chinese Test
Following several UN negotiations that did not amount to any significant international action to ban weapons
in outer space, or prevent the occurrence of an arms race in space, the United States announced that it would
perform a missile test to destroy a dead or non-functional satellite in LEO (Tellis). On 21 February 2008 the
US successfully performed this ASAT test. Unlike China, the US announced the test to the international
community, and voiced concerns for the toxic fuel leaking into the atmosphere from the satellite (Tellis). Two
days prior to the US announcement of its intentions to destroy this satellite, China and Russia introduced a
draft treaty aimed at banning the weaponization of space (Tellis). The US was sending a clear message to both
China and Russia that it had no intentions of halting its space weapons development or testing, nor did it
intend to support any type of treaty banning such development and testing (Po).
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M ore Recent Actors in Space
Most recently, India has emerged as a new international competitor in the race for space dominance. It
announced in June 2008 that it planned to “boost its defense presence in space” – most likely due to
increased space activity from its competitive neighbor, China (Sands). India previously had only a civilian
satellite program, but because of China’s recent offensive and defensive expansion in space, India has moved
to defend its national interests in space as well. India has openly admitted rising concern over China’s plan for
outer space, making the newly announced development of an Indian space defense system a signal of a
potential Asian space race (Sands). Japan has also recently made a move to bolster its defensive presence in
space. The Japanese government most recently passed a bill ending the ban upon the use of space as a
defensive frontier. Japan insists that there are no plans for the development of such a program. There is
speculation, however, that this was truly their intent as nearby neighbor China has stepped up their military
initiatives in space (Sands).
Finally, the current French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, has proposed a massive expansion of the French space
defense program. The proposed plan nearly doubles the current French budget for space defense and
intelligence, with the new budget surpassing US$1 billion per annum. The plan includes not only space
defense initiatives, but also the addition of more spy satellites for intelligence purposes (Sands). It is clear that
these nations all have something in common: a desire to bolster their presence in space for the protection of
their own national interests. It would seem, however, that it is China and not the US that has moved these
nations into action. China’s 2007 missile test broke a long lasting period of no ASAT tests. This unannounced
action has caused many nations not part of the space arms race, to join in an effort to protect their own
interests.
BLOC POSITIONS
The United States of America
The United States has the most space-based assets to protect, as their economy and defense systems heavily
rely on space technology. For this reason, the US is committed to continuing its space program at all costs, as
evidenced by the Bush Administration’s new space policy announced in 2006. The US plans to continue its
uninhibited expansion of space technology for military purposes. Thus far, the US has blocked any
international attempts at creating a treaty to ban the development, testing, and use of space weapons, or in
other words to halt the possibility of an arms race in space. In particular, the negotiations on a new space
arms-limitation treaty, which have been ongoing for several years, have been stalled by the US’ general
unwillingness to agree with any form of restriction on the militarization of space, whether it be for offensive
or defensive purposes. The most recent February 2008 proposition for a ban on all types of space weapons
by China and Russia has also met a lack of cooperation from the United States. It is clear that the US has the
most to lose when it comes to the possibility of space warfare, thus the source of US policy is understandable.
The US is not completely opposed to the idea of a treaty that would place some restrictions on the
weaponization of space, but what is clear is that it will not accept a widespread ban on military action in space
(Henry 63). The US clearly wants a defined legal approach to international space weapons limitation, not a
blanket ban of all weapons as proposed by Russia and China.
The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation
Perhaps the most mysterious of all current states active in space, China and Russia have formed an allied
attempt to pass a treaty to completely ban the weaponization of space. China is actively developing its military
space capabilities, both for offensive and defensive purposes. There is a possibility that both China and
Russia have proposed this treaty in an attempt to distract the international community from any further
developments in their own military space programs. China’s 2007 tests may suggest that they plan on
challenging US space dominance. Though negative speculations may be made about their actions, it is
obvious that both China and Russia form the vanguard of the effort to stop the weaponization of space,
regardless of their motives.
- 26 -
New Actors in Space
Nations such as India, Japan, and France are all included in this category as they have all made recent efforts
to bolster or pave the way for the expansion of their military programs in outer space. These efforts have
most often been cited as reactions not to the US’ continuing military program for space, but to China’s
continuous expansion in this area since its first successful ASAT test in 2007. Now that US dominance in
space has been challenged, these newer actors seek to build up their defense programs in outer space, as they
feel that an arms race in space could be inevitable. In part, this bloc shares the US view that they must protect
their assets in outer space, yet still these nations also feel that a new treaty on the weaponization of space
must be negotiated to ensure that neither space warfare nor a true arms race in space takes place.
Beneficiaries and Unrepresented Actors
The remainder of the international community not engaged in bolstering their space defense programs still
must make the decision as to how their foreign policy dictates where they stand on the issue of the
weaponization of space. For some, such as Britain and Israel, it is clear that as major allies of the United
States they are benefactors of the expansion of US’ defense programs in space and attempts to protect its
national interests in outer space. For those not represented, especially for developed nations, the question of
protecting national interests in the future is still pertinent, even if there is no short term prospect of these
nations gaining influence in outer space. Unrepresented actors must decide where they stand based on their
own foreign policy, and from there decide the most effective way to limit the use of arms in space and
additionally to prevent an arms race in space.
COMMITTEE MISSION
China’s ASAT test in 2007 has made the issue of the weaponization of space more important in recent years
than ever before. The First Committee must decide how to deal with this issue, especially as more actors
emerge and begin to increase their military-related activities in outer space. With new technology and a
growing number of actors in space, the legal framework currently in place requires revision, if not an entirely
new framework altogether. The OST in particular only bans the use of nuclear weapons in space, while other
weapons such as missiles are left out of the document entirely. Which past documents should be discarded,
and what aspects of others should be kept should be at the foremost of delegates’ minds. It would be foolish
to create an entirely new legal framework without lifting passages from others; no body of law or legislation
exists in a vacuum without influence from the past.
There are clearly economic and military benefits from the usage of space. In many ways, the modern
economy would not be able to operate without the communications benefits given by satellite technology.
Satellites can also be used to military purposes, as seen in history, and the economic benefits must be weighed
against the military dangers when making any decision.
Additionally, the future ability of independent actors to expand military capabilities into space must be
factored into such a legal framework. This framework should also be more specific on the term “peaceful
uses for outer space” as much of the ambiguity around this term has inspired nations to continue defensive
military operations in space. An overarching definition for this term would foremost be a solid guide for any
new legal framework. The First Committee must resolve the issue of the weaponization of space before it
becomes an even greater threat to international security. Solutions for this topic do not have to follow any
specific formula and innovation and open-mindedness is highly encouraged to successfully implement a UN-
bolstered outer space weapons regulation regime.
- 27 -
RESEARCH AND PREPARATION QUESTIONS

As mentioned in the Note on Research and Preparation, it is imperative that delegates answer each of these questions in their
position papers.
TOPIC A
1. Is your state party to any of the major conventional weapons treaties or conventions? If so, which
treaties? If not, what is your state’s reasoning?
2. How does your state view the legal trade of conventional weapons as it is currently unregulated by
international law?
3. How does your state view the UN Register of Conventional Arms? Does it make regular
submissions? Has it ever withheld information from this body?
4. Has your state ever been implicated in the illicit transfer of conventional weapons internationally, or
their misuse for political or militaristic means?
5. In what ways has your state attempted to deal with the illicit transfer of conventional weapons
internationally, regionally, and locally?
TOPIC B
1. To what extent is your state involved in outer space? How does your state define the peaceful uses
for outer space?
2. Does your state’s foreign policy effect its involvement in outer space? If so, how? Does your state
believe in military uses for space?
3. To what extent does your state believe the commercialization of space should be limited? Does your
state have any commercial or private interests in space?
4. How does your state feel about anti-satellite weaponry? Does it see this technology as a positive or a
negative in its own security agenda?
5. How has your state been involved on the international level with the issue of the weaponization of
space? Is it party to any of the major treaties concerning space?
- 28 -
IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS
The following documents have been hand-selected by Directors to further aid in delegate preparation. Please make a concerted
effort to read and analyze these documents prior to the conference.
TOPIC A
Arms Without Borders: Why a Globalized Trade Needs Global Controls. Control Arms. 2007.
This report provides a number of detailed examples of the illicit trade in conventional arms as well as deficiencies in the current
legal system. Beyond providing such outstanding examples it also provides substantial solutions to the issue.
Jaffer, Jamil. "Strengthening the Wassenaar Export Control Regime." Chi. J. Int'L L. 519 (2002): 519-526.
Hein Online.
This journal article provides a strong background of the Wassenaar Arrangement and its policies and functions. This article also
makes several key suggestions about reforming the current regime to make it more comprehensive.
Kaye, David, and Steven A. Solomon. "The Second Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons." The American Journal of International Law 96 (2002): 922-936. JSTOR.
This article gives a detailed description of the origins of modern conventional arms legislation internationally. Specifically, this
article gives good focus to the CCW, an instrumental document in leading the ways for controls over certain conventional weapons.
Laurance, Edward J., Hendrik Wagenmakers, and Herbert Wulf. "Managing the Global Problems Created by
the Conventional Arms Trade: an Assessment of the United Nations Register of Conventional
Arms." Global Governance (2005): 225-246. Hein Online.
This resource provides a very detailed description of the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the background information
concerning its creation. Additionally, this article gives an in depth analysis of the problems facing the Register and how they must
be addressed.
UN Register of Conventional Arms: Information Booklet 2007. New York: Department for Disarmament
Affairs, United Nations, 2007.
This UN document provides a direct summary of all the weapons types included under the jurisdiction of the UN Register of
Conventional Arms.
TOPIC B
Freeland, Steven, Mist Maogoto, and Jackson Nyamuya. "Space Weaponization and the United Nations
Charter Regime on Force: A Thick Legal Fog or a Receding Mist." International Law Journal (2007):
1091-120.
This journal gives an outstanding background for the whole issue of the weaponization of space. Additionally, this journal
provides a strong history of the United Nations’ involvement with the issue.
Krepon, Michael. "Lost in Space: The Misguided Drive toward Antisatellite Weapons." Foreign Affairs
Journal (2001): 2-8.
This journal article provides a substantial background for the use and development of anti-satellite weaponry. Additionally it
provides a detailed history of the space race between the US and USSR during the Cold War.
Park, Andrew T. "Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to
Enhance the Legal Regime for Space." Journal of International Law (2006): 871-911.
This is an excellent journal article providing much background on the issue of weaponization of space, as well as a plethora of
information concerning developments in the issue. Most notably this article describes the different types of space weapons, and also
addresses the lack of international legislation concerning much of the advances in the issue which have been made over the past few
decades.
- 29 -
Sands, David R. "China, India Hasten Arms Race in Space; U.S. Dominance Challenged." The Washington
Times 25 June 2008.
This article is critical to understanding the current status of this issue. The authors provide a detailed analysis of various states’
stances on space related security questions and the protection of their national interests in space.
"UNITED STATES SAYS DISCUSSING MERITS OF TREATIES TO PREVENT

WEAPONIZATION." General Assembly. 22 Oct. 2007. United Nations.
<http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/2007/gadis3349.doc.htm>.
This article provides a different viewpoint than most others from the United States of what its agenda in space is. Additionally
there is a wealth of information about the space policies of other states in the international community.
- 30 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY
TOPIC A
UN Sources
UN Register of Conventional Arms: Information Booklet 2007. New York: Department for Disarmament
Affairs, United Nations, 2007.
This UN document provides a direct summary of all the weapons types included under the jurisdiction of the UN Register of
Conventional Arms.
Non-UN Sources
Allen, David. "A Cluster of Fallacies." Foreign Policy in Focus (2008). 22 June 2008
<http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5270>.
This article focuses on the threat posed to civilians through the use of cluster munitions. It provides a good argument as to why
cluster munitions must be banned internationally.
Arms Without Borders: Why a Globalized Trade Needs Global Controls. Control Arms. 2007.
This report provides a number of detailed examples of the illicit trade in conventional arms as well as deficiencies in the current
legal system. Beyond providing such outstanding examples it also provides substantial solutions to the issue.
Caldwell, Dan, Robert E. Williams Jr. Seeking Security in an Insecure World. 2006. Rowman & Littlefield Inc.
Lanham.
This book provided several interesting facts and figures on conventional weapons and the destruction they have caused
internationally. It substantiates much of the reasoning behind furthering controls on conventional arms.
Dutra, Michael. "Strategic Myopia: the United States, Cruise Missiles, and the Missile Technology Control
Regime." J. Transnat'L L. & Pol'Y (2005): 37-86. Hein Online.
This journal article discusses the various types of missiles and their uses internationally and applications for military. This article
also gives a detailed description of the MTCR.
"East Timor: History, Geography, Government, and Culture." Infoplease. 17 June 2008
<http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0902237.html>.
This website gives a brief background of the history of East Timor, involving the war between East Timor and Indonesia over the
rights to the land.
Grimmett, Richard F. Conventional Arms Transfers To Developing Nations, 1998-2006. United States
Congress. Congressional Research Service, 2007.
This report gives a detailed description of conventional arms transfers worldwide over a span of 8 years. It provides in depth charts
and analysis of trends in the legal international conventional arms trade.
Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
This background report summarizes the inception and the functions of the HCOC, as well as its implications to the conventional
arms trade internationally. This document is very concise and descriptive as to the abilities and purpose of the HCOC.
"Hezbollah (a.K.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu'Llah)." Council on Foreign Relations. 17 June 2008

<http://www.cfr.org/publication/9155/>.
This website briefly describes the terrorist organization Hezbollah and details their history and background since being founded.
- 31 -
Jaffer, Jamil. "Strengthening the Wassenaar Export Control Regime." Chi. J. Int'L L. 519 (2002): 519-526.
Hein Online.
This journal article provides a strong background of the Wassenaar Arrangement and its policies and functions. This article also
makes several key suggestions about reforming the current regime to make it more comprehensive.
Kaye, David, and Steven A. Solomon. "The Second Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons." The American Journal of International Law 96 (2002): 922-936. JSTOR.
This article gives a detailed description of the origins of modern conventional arms legislation internationally. Specifically, this
article gives good focus to the CCW, an instrumental document in leading the ways for controls over certain conventional weapons.
Kitchen, Veronica. "From Rhetoric to Reality - Canada, the United States, and the Ottawa Process to Ban
Landmines." Int'L J. (2002): 37-56. Hein Online.
This journal focuses on the Ottowa Landmine Treaty and the movement towards its acceptance internationally. This article gives
good focus to the threats landmines pose to the international community.
Kozyulin,Vadim. Conventional Arms Transfers - Illicit Arms Trade: An Overview and Implications for the
Region. 2002. http://www.pircenter.org/data/news/kozulin091104lect.pdf
This is a very descript article focused on the roots of the illict trade in conventional arms. Many strong examples are provided of
the illict trade, as are some concrete initiatives that must be taken to combat this trade.
Laurance, Edward J., Hendrik Wagenmakers, and Herbert Wulf. "Managing the Global Problems Created by
the Conventional Arms Trade: an Assessment of the United Nations Register of Conventional
Arms." Global Governance (2005): 225-246. Hein Online.
This resource provides a very detailed description of the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the background information
concerning its creation. Additionally, this article gives an in depth analysis of the problems facing the Register and how they must
be addressed.
"Lebanon /Israel: Hezbollah Hit Israel with Cluster Munitions During Conflict - First COnfirmed Use of
Weapons Type." Human Rights News. Human Rights Watch. 17 June 2008
<http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/18/lebano14412.htm>.
This news article details the conflict during the summer of 2006 between Israel and Lebanon based around Hezbollah.
Specifically it provides a concrete example of a terrorist organization using conventional weapons for destruction.
Lloyd, Nathan T.H. “Rebuilding a Broken Regime: Restructuring the Export Administration Act” Vand.
Journal of Transnational Law (2004). Hein Online.
McClelland, J. "Conventional Weapons: a Cluster of Developments." International and Comparative Law

Quarterly (2005): 755-767. General One File. Gale.
This source discusses the Wassenaar Agreement in depth and provides many viewpoints on the viability of the regime. Also, this
article pinpoints the weakness of the regime very well.
Nagle, Luz E. "Prosecuting the Use of Anti-Personnel Mines by Illegal Armed Groups: the Colombian
Situation." Or. Rev. Int'L L. (2006): 231-262. Hein Online.
This article provides examples for rebel group attacks through the use of conventional weapons. Specifically, this article deals with
Colombian rebels and the use of landmines in Colombia.
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security. Non

Governmental Organization (NGO) Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security. 17 June 2008
<http://disarm.igc.org/index.php>.
This NGO website provides short and descript overviews of each type of major conventional arms as defined by the UN Register
of Conventional Arms. Additionally it provides links to more detailed descriptions of these weapons, most notably ballistic
missiles.
Phythian, Mark. “The Illicit Arms Trade: Cold War and Post-Cold War”. Under the Counter and Over the
- 32 -
Border: Aspect of the Contemporary Trade in Illicit Arms. 2000. Kluwer Academic Publishers. The
Netherlands.
This book gives concrete examples of how the black market for conventional arms works and spreads, with specific emphasis on
the African continent. Several powerful examples of the illicit trade of these weapons are provided by this sources.
Stoel, Jonathan T. "Codes of Conduct on Arms Transfers." Law & Pol'Y Int'L Bus (2000): 1285-1316. Hein
Online.
This article provides political and economic rationales for the legal international trade of conventional arms. This is a strong
source for discovering the roots of the legal trade and the rationales behind national policy decisions concerning this trade.
Vagts, Detlev F. "The Hague Conventions and Arms Control." The American Journal of International Law
94 (2000): 31-41. JSTOR.
This journal addresses the oldest of international legal declarations concerning conventional weapons. It provides a good foundation
for future international conventional weapons treaties and bans.
TOPIC B
UN Sources
"UNITED STATES SAYS DISCUSSING MERITS OF TREATIES TO PREVENT

WEAPONIZATION." General Assembly. 22 Oct. 2007. United Nations.
<http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/2007/gadis3349.doc.htm>.
This article provides a different viewpoint than most others from the United States of what its agenda in space is. Additionally
there is a wealth of information about the space policies of other states in the international community.
Non-UN Sources
Broad, William J. "Flexing Muscle, China Destroys Satellite in Test." The New York Times 19 Jan. 2007.
This news article provides a basis for the rationale that China destroyed its satellite to send a message to the international
community, specifically the United States.
Freeland, Steven, Mist Maogoto, and Jackson Nyamuya. "Space Weaponization and the United Nations
Charter Regime on Force: A Thick Legal Fog or a Receding Mist." International Law Journal (2007):
1091-120.
This journal gives an outstanding background for the whole issue of the weaponization of space. Additionally, this journal
provides a strong history of the United Nations’ involvement with the issue.
Henry, Phillipe. "The Militarization and Weaponization of Space: Towards a European Space Deterrent."
Paris. 5 May 2008.
The viewpoint expressed in this article describes the European attitude towards the weaponization of space, while maintaining a
positive balance of information concerning major actors outside of Europe. Specifically it deals with Europe’s place amongst the
US, China, and Russia and how it should respond to their current actions.
Kahn, Joseph, and David Sanger. "U.S. Tries to Interpret China’s Silence Over Test." New York Times 22
Jan. 2007.
This news article attempts to interpret the US and Chinese stances on the Chinese missile test of 2007. Furthermore, this article
does a good job of staying unbiased and viewing the issue from both sides.
Krepon, Michael. "Lost in Space: The Misguided Drive toward Antisatellite Weapons." Foreign Affairs
Journal (2001): 2-8.
This journal article provides a substantial background for the use and development
of anti-satellite weaponry. Additionally it provides a detailed history of the space race between the US and USSR during the
Cold War.
- 33 -
Moore, Mike. "An Arms Treaty Nears Orbit." The Washington Times 6 Mar. 2008.
This news article looks at the space arms treaty proposed by China and Russia. The article is strong in that it goes in depth into
the rationale behind the US position against the treaty.
Park, Andrew T. "Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to
Enhance the Legal Regime for Space." Journal of International Law (2006): 871-911.
This is an excellent journal article providing much background on the issue of weaponization of space, as well as a plethora of
information concerning developments in the issue. Most notably this article describes the different types of space weapons, and also
addresses the lack of international legislation concerning much of the advances in the issue which have been made over the past few
decades.
Sands, David R. "China, India Hasten Arms Race in Space; U.S. Dominance Challenged." The Washington
Times 25 June 2008.
This article is critical to understanding the current status of this issue. The authors provide a detailed analysis of various states’
stances on space related security questions and the protection of their national interests in space.
Tellis, Ashley J. "Don't Panic About Space Weapons." Wall Street Journal 22 Feb. 2008.
This article seeks to put aside the idea that US space dominance can be challenged. Also this article directly focuses on the 2007
China anti-satellite test, and its implications for the US.
Wei Po, Wen. "Hong Kong paper sees US Ambition in Outer Space Via Satellite
Shootdown." BBC Monitoring Asian Pacific 23 Feb. 2008.

This article analyzes the 2008 US response to the Chinese anti-satellite test the year previous. It is a strong article in that it
provides a viewpoint that the US is attempting to weaponize space in the future.
- 34 -

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N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL

MODEL UNITED NATIONS

Rosa Akbari Dear Delegates,

Lisa Cuesta Until then,

A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION

Rosa Akbari, Director-General Lad Williamson

(Country Summaries) (Individual Position Papers)

HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE

1. Short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM); can travel under 1,000 km;

Heavy Machinery and Mobile Conventional Weapons

Incendiaries, Blinding Laser Weapons, and Unexploded Ordinances

United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional W eapons (CCW C)

I. Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments

Other Notable International Legislation

United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

The W assenaar Arrangement

Reforming and Expanding International Conventional W eapons Legislation

International Threat of Conventional W eapons

The Complexity of the Arms Trade: Licit and Illicit

Political Rationale for Legal Trade

Economic Rationales for Legal Trade

The Illicit Side of Legal Arms Transfers

Illicit Arms Transfers

Forged End-Use Certificates

Grey Zones and Post-Soviet States

Criminal Channels for Arms Trafficking

Terrorist and Illegally Armed Groups’ Use of Conventional Weapons

M ajor Arms Exporters

M ajor Arms Importers

Conflict and Post-Conflict States

WEAPONIZATION AND SPACE

HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE

The United Nations and the Space Race

The Growth of Space W eaponry and Technology

The Commercialization of Space

The Threat of the W eaponization of Space

Chinese Anti-Satellite Test

United States Response to Chinese Test

M ore Recent Actors in Space

The United States of America

The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation

New Actors in Space

Beneficiaries and Unrepresented Actors

RESEARCH AND PREPARATION QUESTIONS

"UNITED STATES SAYS DISCUSSING MERITS OF TREATIES TO PREVENT

"Hezbollah (a.K.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu'Llah)." Council on Foreign Relations. 17 June 2008

McClelland, J. "Conventional Weapons: a Cluster of Developments." International and Comparative Law

Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security. Non

"UNITED STATES SAYS DISCUSSING MERITS OF TREATIES TO PREVENT

Shootdown." BBC Monitoring Asian Pacific 23 Feb. 2008.

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